Fairness Across the World: Preferences and Beliefs

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Fairness Across the World: Preferences and Beliefs Ingvild Alm˚ as 1,2 Alexander W. Cappelen 1 Erik Ø. Sørensen 1 Bertil Tungodden 1 FAIR Workshop - Deaton Review, October 14, 2020 1 FAIR - The Choice Lab, NHH Norwegian School of Economics 2 IIES - University of Stockholm

Transcript of Fairness Across the World: Preferences and Beliefs

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Fairness Across the World:

Preferences and Beliefs

Ingvild Almas1,2 Alexander W. Cappelen1

Erik Ø. Sørensen1 Bertil Tungodden1

FAIR Workshop - Deaton Review, October 14, 2020

1 FAIR - The Choice Lab, NHH Norwegian School of Economics2 IIES - University of Stockholm

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Large differences in inequality across the world

WB Gini (mean 2010−2018)0.30.40.50.6Not included

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Less inequality in rich countries

$1,000

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$100,000

0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6Gini (World Bank)

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The will of the people?

I Focus of the presentation: How are these globalinequality differences related to the fairness views ofpeople in each country?

I Future work: Understand how the fairness viewsco-evolve with social institutions (Bowles, JEL, 1998; Fehrand Hoff, EJ, 2011; Besley and Persson, AERI 2019).

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Why are fairness views important?

Fairness and Voting

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Fairness views - broader perspective

I The role of the fairness views of people may differ acrosssocieties due to different political structures (Alesinaand Glaeser, 2004), limited state capacity (Besley andPersson, AER, 2009), and other factors.

I The fairness views of people may also shape inequalitythrough non-voting mechanisms, for example byimposing wage rigidities in labor markets (Kaur, AER,2019).

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Inequality acceptance - two stories

I The classical view: Equality-efficiency trade-off

I The fairness view: Unfair and fair inequality

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Inequality acceptance - preferences and beliefs

I Preferences: People may differ in inequality acceptancebecause they differ in how they trade off equality andefficiency (Okun, 1975) or in what they consider a fairinequality (Almas, Cappelen, and Tungodden, JPE,2020).

I Beliefs: People may differ in inequality acceptancebecause they differ in their beliefs about howinequality affects efficiency (Acemogly, Robinson, andVerdier, JPE, 2017) or in their beliefs about the causesof inequality (Piketty, QJE, 1995; Alesina andAngeletos, AER, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, QJE, 2006;Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso, AER, 2018).

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Fairness across the world: the approach

I Preferences: Study real distributive behavior ofrepresentative populations in 60 countries in identicaleconomic environments, where we control andrandomly vary the source of inequality and the costof redistribution?

I Beliefs: Study beliefs about the equality-efficiency tradeoff and a broad range of beliefs about whether individualchoices and background factors cause inequality?

I Policy attitudes: Relate these preferences and beliefs towhether people find existing inequality unfair andsupport redistribution - and to actual inequality andincome levels in the countries.

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Contributions of the paper

I Provides a unique study of fairness preferences acrossthe world, including the largest experimental studyimplemented in the social sciences.

I Provides rich and novel data on the beliefs shapinginequality acceptance.

I Provides new understanding of how fairness preferencesand beliefs may contribute to explain global variationin inequality.

I Provides global large-scale causal evidence on theimportance of the source of inequality and the cost ofredistribution for inequality acceptance in generalpopulations.

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Pre-analysis plan

I Describes the main research questions and formulates themain hypotheses to be tested, but more open than aclassical pre-analysis plan.

I Describes the design in detail.

I Describes the identification strategy.

I The plan is publicly available and was posted on AEARCT registry before we opened any data for analysis.

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The design of the study

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Fairness across the world – study design

I We implemented a module on the Gallup World Poll in2018 in 60 countries (65800 respondents; 1000+ in eachcountry, China (3600+) India (3000), Russia (2000)).

I The module consists of three parts:I Fairness preferences: All the respondents made a real

spectator distributive decision for two workers.I Beliefs: All the respondents answered a subset of

questions on their beliefs about the causes of inequalityand their belief about the efficiency cost ofredistribution.

I Policy attitudes: All the respondents answered twoquestions about attitudes to current inequality and onwhether government should aim to reduce inequality.

I Novel approach: First experimental study in GallupWorld Poll (Falk et al., QJE,2018).

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Countries included in the studyFigure 1: Countries in the experiment

Note: The 60 countries included in the experiment are shown in dark grey, they are: Afghanistan,Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile,China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany,Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi,Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia,Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey,Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

3 ParticipantsIn this study, we have two types of participants: spectators and workers. We here provide anoverview of the recruitment procedures.

3.1 Recruitment of spectatorsSpectators were recruited by Gallup, and our questions were asked as a subset of the Gallup WorldPoll 2018. Figure 1 (p. 4) shows the countries covered by our study.

3.2 Recruitment of workersTo elicit the fairness preferences, each spectator makes a real-life redistributive choice for twoworkers. The workers will be recruited from the international online market place Amazon Me-

4

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List of countries

I The 60 countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina,Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia,Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia,Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia,France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi,Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway,Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda,South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UnitedKingdom, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, andZimbabwe.

I Covers all the large economies and 80% of the worldpopulation.

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Fairness preferences

I Spectators decide whether to redistribute earningsbetween a pair of workers who have conducted a job.I Workers recruited through an international online market

place (mturk).I Same pool used in all countries.

I Spectators recruited and participating through GallupWorld Poll.

I Representative samples of the populations in the 60countries.

I Three treatments, between-individual design.

I Luck (L).

I Merit (M).

I Efficiency (E), introducing a cost of redistribution.

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Do you accept the inequality?

6 USD 0 USD?

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Luck - Distributive decision (in the US)

I 1. Leave it as it is: (6, 0)

I 2. Redistribute: (4.5, 1.5) or (3, 3)

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Treatments

I Merit: Manipulates the source of the inequality:I Earnings determined by the one who was most

productive on the assignment.

I Efficiency: Manipulates the cost of redistribution:I Iceberg cost of 50% - (3.6,1.2) or (2,2).I Highlights that there is a cost to transfer the money.

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Important design choices

I Real choice: The decision made by a spectator wasmatched with a unique pair of workers.

I Same pre-redistribution earnings in all situations:All spectators faced the pre-redistribution earnings of (6USD, 0 USD); PPP adjusted for each country.

I Complete information: Spectators had completeinformation about the source of the inequality and thecost of redistribution.

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Theoretical framework

I We provide a simple social preference model to guide theinterpretation of the results.

I The spectators choose the distribution (x , y), where y isthe income to the worker with no pre-redistributionearnings. We assume that the spectators care aboutfairness and efficiency:

V (y) = −β(y −mj)2 − (cjy)2, (1)

I where β > 0 is the weight attached to fairness relative toefficiency, mj is what the spectator perceives as the fairincome to the worker with no pre-redistribution earningsin treatment j , and cj is the cost of redistribution intreatment j , j = L,M ,E .

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Optimal behavior in the different treatments

I Luck and Merit treatments:

y(j) = mj (2)

I Efficiency treatment:

y(E ) = mEβ/(β + 1) (3)

I We observe that:I β → 0 implies that y(E )→ 0.I β →∞ implies that y(E )→ mE .

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Fairness views

The spectators make distributive decisions in situations wherethere is no violation of procedural fairness. Three salientfairness views:

I Egalitarianism: Inequalities due to luck and performanceare unfair.

I Meritocratism : Inequalities due to luck are unfair,inequalities due to performance are fair.

I Libertarianism: Inequalities both due to luck andperformance are fair.

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Summary: Treatments and identification

All treatments: Earnings of (6 USD, 0 USD).

I Only difference: Source of inequality or cost ofredistribution.

The three treatments enable us to identify:

I General inequality acceptance.

I Causal effect of the source of inequality.

I Causal effect of a cost of redistribution.

I Prevalence of fairness views.

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Beliefs

Each participant was asked a subset of 9 belief questions, on a1–5 disagree to agree scale (1- strongly disagree, 5 - stronglyagree).

I Source of inequality (luck)I In your country, one of the main reasons for the rich

being richer than the poor is that the rich have hadmore luck in life than the poor.

I Cost of redistribution (tax incentives)I In your country, if the government increases the taxes

that the rich have to pay, the rich will work less andinvest less.

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Potential sources of inequality

Choice orQ # Background

Hard work CRisk preferences CTime preferences CSelfishness CIllegal activities CLuck BAbilities (innate) BF. Opportunities B

Tax incentives

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Policy attitudes

Everyone answered these two (1–5 disagree to agree scale):

I Unfair inequality: In your country, the economicdifferences between the rich and the poor are unfair.

I Redistribution: In your country, the nationalgovernment should aim to reduce the economicdifferences between the rich and the poor.

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Results: Preferences

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Inequality acceptance

I Inequality implemented by spectator:

e =|x − y |x + y

. (4)

I Equivalent to the Gini coefficient in this economicenvironment.

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Implemented inequality – pooled across treatments

Implemented Gini coeff.0.000.250.751.00Not included

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Is there less inequality acceptance in rich countries?

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0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6Gini (World Bank)

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Is there less inequality acceptance in rich countries?

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$100,000

0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6Gini (World Bank)

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P/c

apita

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8Gini in experiment

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P/c

apita

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Implemented inequality in Luck and Merit

treatments

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Luck Merittreatment

Mea

n in

equa

lity

(Gin

i) ±

s.e.

m.

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Implemented inequality in Luck and Merit

treatments

0.0

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0.4

0.6

0.8

Luck Merittreatment

Mea

n in

equa

lity

(Gin

i) ±

s.e.

m.

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Luck: Implemented Gini

Implemented Gini coeff.0.000.250.751.00Not included

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Merit: Implemented Gini

Implemented Gini coeff.0.000.250.751.00Not included

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Luck: Implemented Gini by country

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●●

● ●

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Norw

ayC

anadaN

etherlandsJordanE

gyptA

ustraliaP

ortugalS

witzerland

France

Argentina

Brazil

Ethiopia

TurkeyU

nited Kingdom

Morocco

Malaw

iItalyC

hileS

outh Korea

Bolivia

Colom

biaH

ungaryP

hilippinesG

reeceJapanV

enezuelaIsraelU

nited States

Sri Lanka

TanzaniaT

hailandR

ussiaZ

imbabw

eK

azakhstanE

cuadorP

eruG

ermany

IranC

ameroon

Bangladesh

Ukraine

Rw

andaK

enyaM

exicoA

fghanistanS

painZ

ambia

Estonia

IndonesiaS

outh Africa

Nigeria

Croatia

Cam

bodiaC

zechiaP

akistanA

lgeriaU

gandaIndiaV

ietnamC

hina

Country

Mea

n im

plem

ente

d G

ini ±

s.e

.m.

Luck treatment

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Merit: Implemented Gini by country

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0.00

0.25

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0.75

1.00

Bangladesh

TanzaniaM

alawi

Philippines

IsraelA

rgentinaE

thiopiaT

hailandN

orway

Afghanistan

Sri Lanka

Brazil

Venezuela

Cam

eroonC

hileN

etherlandsF

ranceH

ungaryJordanIndonesiaZ

imbabw

eS

witzerland

Egypt

Colom

biaK

azakhstanS

outh Korea

Morocco

Kenya

Germ

anyB

oliviaU

kraineE

cuadorC

ambodia

Portugal

United K

ingdomIndiaP

eruC

roatiaJapanS

outh Africa

TurkeyC

anadaS

painP

akistanZ

ambia

Nigeria

Mexico

Uganda

IranR

wanda

Australia

ItalyA

lgeriaC

zechiaG

reeceR

ussiaU

nited States

China

Estonia

Vietnam

Country

Mea

n im

plem

ente

d G

ini ±

s.e

.m.

Merit treatment

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Implemented inequality in Luck and Efficiency

treatments

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Luck Efficiencytreatment

Mea

n in

equa

lity

(Gin

i) ±

s.e.

m.

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Implemented inequality in Luck and Efficiency

treatments

0.0

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0.8

Luck Efficiencytreatment

Mea

n in

equa

lity

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s.e.

m.

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Luck: Implemented Gini

Implemented Gini coeff.0.000.250.751.00Not included

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Efficiency: Implemented Gini

Implemented Gini coeff.0.000.250.751.00Not included

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Efficiency: Implemented Gini by country

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0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Norw

ayF

ranceN

etherlandsA

ustraliaE

gyptC

anadaS

witzerland

Morocco

Argentina

Hungary

Chile

Philippines

Brazil

JordanM

alawi

United K

ingdomIsraelP

ortugalC

olombia

Venezuela

Bolivia

TurkeyE

thiopiaZ

imbabw

eJapanU

nited States

ItalyG

reeceB

angladeshS

outh Korea

IranR

ussiaS

painG

ermany

Thailand

Peru

Sri Lanka

Cam

eroonK

azakhstanTanzaniaK

enyaE

cuadorM

exicoC

roatiaR

wanda

Czechia

Ukraine

Estonia

Zam

biaC

ambodia

IndonesiaN

igeriaA

fghanistanU

gandaS

outh Africa

Pakistan

Algeria

IndiaC

hinaV

ietnam

Country

Mea

n im

plem

ente

d G

ini ±

s.e

.m.

Efficiency treatment

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Treatment effects

The empirical specification is

ei = α + αMMi + αEEi + γXi + εi ,

where ei is the income inequality implemented by spectator i ,Mi and Ei are indicator variables for spectator i being in theMerit or the Efficiency treatment, and Xi is a vector of controlvariables.

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Treatment effects Table 9: Main treatment effects

Implemented Gini

Merit (d) 0.259∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗

(0.004) (0.004)

Efficiency (d) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗

(0.004) (0.004)

Rich (d) 0.007(0.006)

Poor (d) 0.007∗

(0.004)Female (d) −0.013∗∗∗

(0.004)Age (Z-score) 0.015∗∗∗

(0.002)Married (d) −0.008∗

(0.004)

# children (Z-score) −0.014∗∗∗

(0.003)

Middle edu (d) −0.003(0.004)

High edu (d) −0.008(0.006)

Working (d) −0.011∗∗∗

(0.004)

Urban (d) −0.011∗∗

(0.004)

Country FE No YesObservations 64,784 63,714

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Treatment effect by country, Merit

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0.0

0.2

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0.6

IndiaC

hinaB

angladeshA

fghanistanU

gandaIndonesiaP

akistanC

ambodia

Algeria

TanzaniaC

roatiaC

ameroon

South A

fricaT

hailandV

ietnamN

igeriaIsraelP

hilippinesK

enyaZ

ambia

Sri Lanka

Spain

Czechia

Malaw

iU

kraineZ

imbabw

eK

azakhstanG

ermany

Venezuela

Ecuador

Mexico

Estonia

Ethiopia

Peru

Rw

andaA

rgentinaC

hileH

ungaryIranB

razilC

olombia

South K

oreaB

oliviaJapanM

oroccoR

ussiaU

nited Kingdom

France

Sw

itzerlandU

nited States

JordanTurkeyG

reeceE

gyptItalyN

etherlandsN

orway

Portugal

Australia

Canada

Country

Coe

ffici

ent o

n 'm

erit'

± s

.e.

Coefficients from country−by−country regressions of gini on treatment indicators.

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Treatment effect by country, Efficiency

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0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

Spain

Bangladesh

Uganda

France

China

Zim

babwe

Hungary

Croatia

Philippines

Czechia

IranM

oroccoC

hileIsraelK

enyaG

ermany

Cam

bodiaM

exicoC

ameroon

Peru

Russia

Venezuela

Estonia

IndiaM

alawi

Colom

biaA

ustraliaV

ietnamU

nited Kingdom

Netherlands

IndonesiaZ

ambia

Pakistan

Sw

itzerlandE

gyptB

oliviaK

azakhstanA

lgeriaU

nited States

Nigeria

JapanR

wanda

Ecuador

Brazil

Argentina

Norw

ayS

outh Africa

Thailand

Greece

Ukraine

TurkeyTanzaniaE

thiopiaS

ri LankaItalyA

fghanistanS

outh Korea

Canada

JordanP

ortugal

Country

Coe

ffici

ent o

n 'e

ffici

ency

' ± s

.e.

Coefficients from country−by−country regressions of gini on treatment indicators.

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Inequality acceptance: Luck

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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8Gini in experiment

GD

P/c

apita

Luck treatment.

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Inequality acceptance: Merit

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$100,000

0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9Gini in experiment

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P/c

apita

Merit treatment.

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Inequality acceptance: Luck and Merit

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$10,000

$100,000

0.25 0.50 0.75Gini in experiment

GD

P/c

apita

treatment

luck

merit

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Rich countries are more meritocratic

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0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6Share meritocrats

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Rich countries are not more efficiency-seeking

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−0.1 0.0 0.1Treatment effect on Gini in experiment (Efficiency vs luck)

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Preferences: Main findings

I Observation 1: Significant variation in fairnesspreferences across the world, particularly with respect toinequality due to luck. Rich countries are much moremeritocratic than poor countries. Much less variance inefficiency preferences.

I Observation 2: Variation in fairness preferences maycontribute to explain why we observe less inequality inrich countries. Rich countries are less accepting ofinequality due to luck.

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Results: Beliefs

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Choice beliefs (means)

1

2

3

4

Hard work Risk preferences Time preferences Selfishness Illegal activitiesBelief question

Mea

n be

lief ±

s.e

.m.

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Background beliefs (means)

1

2

3

4

Luck Abilities OpportunitiesBelief question

Mea

n be

lief ±

s.e

.m.

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Beliefs: Choice versus Background

Difference in beliefs: Choice (3 var) − Background−0.50.00.5Not included

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Beliefs: Efficiency

Efficiency12345Not included

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Rich countries believe more in background factors

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0Belief in choice (3 var)

GD

P/c

apita

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Rich countries believe less in a large efficiency cost

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

2.5 3.0 3.5Belief in efficiency

GD

P/c

apita

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Beliefs: Main findings

I Observation 3: Significant variation in beliefs across theworld, both with respect to the source of the inequalityand the cost of redistribution

I Observation 4: Variation in beliefs may contribute toexplain why we observe less inequality in rich countries.Rich countries agree more that inequality is due tobackground factors and less that there are efficiency costswith redistribution.

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Results: Policy Attitudes

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The most divided country?

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The most divided country

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Is inequality in your country unfair?

12345Not in sample

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Should government in your country aim to reduce

inequalities?

12345Not in sample

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Government should aim to reduce inequality?

Zambia Zimbabwe

Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Ukraine Vietnam

Malawi Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Philippines

Egypt Ethiopia India Indonesia Kenya

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bolivia Cambodia Cameroon

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

0.000.250.500.75

0.000.250.500.75

0.000.250.500.75

0.000.250.500.75

0.000.250.500.75

Agreement that government should aim to reduce inequality (1−5)

Fra

ctio

n

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Government should aim to reduce inequality?

United Kingdom United States Venezuela

South Africa South Korea Spain Sri Lanka Switzerland Thailand Turkey

Kazakhstan Mexico Netherlands Norway Peru Portugal Russia

Greece Hungary Iran Israel Italy Japan Jordan

Colombia Croatia Czech Republic Ecuador Estonia France Germany

Algeria Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Chile China

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

0.00.20.40.60.8

0.00.20.40.60.8

0.00.20.40.60.8

0.00.20.40.60.8

0.00.20.40.60.8

0.00.20.40.60.8

Agreement that government should aim to reduce inequality (1−5)

Fra

ctio

n

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Policy attitudes: Preferences and beliefs

I We find that both preferences and beliefs aresignificantly associated with policy attitudes.

I Individuals who implement less inequality in theexperiment demand more redistribution.

I Individuals who believe that inequality is due to familybackground, luck, criminal activity, and selfish behaviordemand more redistribution; individuals who believe thatinequality is due to hard work demand less redistribution.

I Preferences and beliefs are uncorrelated.

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Actual inequality: Preferences and beliefs

I We find that inequality acceptance in the experiment isclosely associated with actual inequality in society.

I People from societies with more inequality implementmore inequality in the experiment.

I Find the same pattern if we exploit regional variation.

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Results: Concluding remarks

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Concluding remarksI We report from the first global experimental study of

fairness preferences and beliefs.I Find large variation across the world in fairness

preferences and beliefs.

I Contribute to explain why rich countries implementless inequality.I Less accepting of inequality due to luck.I Believe to a greater extent that inequality reflects

background factors and less that it is costly toredistribute.

I Show that fairness preferences and beliefs are associatedwith policy attitudes and actual inequality insociety.

I Find that present inequality is considered unfair inmost countries and that there is largely support for furtherredistribution, the US being the most striking exception.

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Thank you!

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Fairness and moral motivation - work in progressI Understanding meritocracy

I What is a morally relevant choice? (Cappelen, Fest,Sørensen, and Tungodden)

I Why do people reward talent, but not other types ofluck? (Bartling, Cappelen, Skarpeid, Sørensen, andTungodden)

I Fairness in winner-takes-all markets (Bartling, Cappelen,Eckstrom, Sørensen, and Tungodden)

I Merit with limited information? (Cappelen, de Haan, andTungodden)

I Second-best fairness (Cappelen, Cappelen, and Tungodden)

I The moral mind - a global studyI Selfishness (Cappelen and Tungodden)I Moral universalism (Cappelen, Enke, and Tungodden)I Freedom and paternalism (Bartling, Cappelen, Hermes, and

Tungodden)

I Socialization of moral views - a global study, (Cappelen, Falch,Sørensen, and Tungodden)

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Luck treatmentI am now going to ask you to make a decision that will decide how tworeal people are paid for some work they have conducted. You do notknow these two individuals, but they will receive the payment that youdecide. Recently, these two individuals were hired to do an assignmentthat could be completed in a short time. They worked independently anddid not communicate with each other in any way. They were both paid acompensation for taking part in the work. After they had completed theassignment, they were told that it was randomly decided that one ofthem would earn an additional 6 USD for the work on the assignmentwhile the other would not earn anything additional for the work on theassignment. However, they were also told that a third person couldchange how the additional earnings would be divided between the two ofthem. You are this third person and it is now up to you to decidewhether you want to change how the additional earnings are dividedbetween the two workers for the work on the assignment. You can choosebetween some alternatives and whatever you decide will happen; the twoindividuals will receive what you decide. How do you want to dividethe additional earnings? Remember, what you choose will be paidto these two people in real life.