Evaluation of the Bank’s Strategy and Program...

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Côte d’Ivoire:Evaluation of the Bank’s

Strategy and Program 2006–2016

Summary Report

December 2017

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Côte d’Ivoire:Evaluation of the Bank’s

Strategy and Program 2006–2016

Summary Report

December 2017

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© 2017 African Development Bank Group All rights reserved – Published December 2017

Côte d’Ivoire: Evaluation of the Bank’s Strategy and Program 2006–2016 — Summary report An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation, December 2017

Disclaimer

Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the various authors of the publication and are not necessarily those of the Management of the African Development Bank (the “Bank”) and the African Development Fund (the “Fund”), Boards of Directors, Boards of Governors or the countries they represent.

Use of this publication is at the reader’s sole risk. The content of this publication is provided without warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including without limitation warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non- infringement of third-party rights. The Bank specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any information contained in the publication. Under no circumstances including, but not limited to, negligence, shall the Bank be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered which is claimed to result directly or indirectly from use of this publication or reliance on its content.

This publication may contain advice, opinions, and statements of various information and content providers. The Bank does not represent or endorse the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided by any information or content provider or other person or entity. Reliance upon any such opinion, advice, statement, or other information shall also be at the reader’s own risk.

About the AfDB

The overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction. The Bank Group achieves this objective by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs and providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

About Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)

The mission of Independent Development Evaluation at the AfDB is to enhance the development effectiveness of the institution in its regional member countries through independent and instrumental evaluations and partnerships for sharing knowledge.

Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’IvoirePhone: +225 20 26 20 41E-mail: [email protected]

Design & layout: CRÉON – www.creondesign.net

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Task manager Tonssour Clément Bansé, Evaluation Officer

Team members Bilal Bagayoko, Research Assistant, Razafindramanana Herimandimby, Chief Evaluation Officer

Consultants ADE: Jean-Marie Wathelet (Team Leader), Konstantin Gruev, Sylvianne Menard, Auguste Kouassi, Guillaume Ané, N. Bodo, Olivier Crouzier

External peer reviewer Claudine Voyadzis, External Expert Reviewer

Bank's Internal Reference Group Pascal Yembiline, Sidi Hassan Drissi, Robert Masumbuko, Maimouna Diop-Ly, Ali Eyeghe, Borel Anicet Foko Tagne, Jean-Noël Ilboudo, M'Peng Bayoi Daniel

Knowledge Management Officer Telesphore Some, Knowledge Management ConsultantAminata Kouma, Junior consultant, Knowledge Management and Communication

Special thanks to The Ivorian administration at central and decentralized levels, as well as the companies operating the 3rd HKB Bridge and the AZITO and CIPREL Power Plants for their contribution and valuable cooperation during the evaluation phases

Division Manager Samer Hachem

Evaluator General Rakesh Nangia

Acknowledgments iiAbbreviations and Acronyms vExecutive Summary 1Management Response 8

Introduction 19

Context 21Geographical and Political Context 21Economic and Social Performance 22Situation of Fragility, Development Challenges and Issues 22

Bank Strategies and Programs for 2006–2016 24Bank Strategies 24Characteristics of AfDB Portfolio in Côte d’Ivoire for 2006–2016 25

Overview of Methodology 27Country Strategy 27Project Result Assessments 27Tools Mobilized and Sources of Data 28Evaluation Limitations and Solutions Adopted 28

Achievement of Results 31Relevance 31Effectiveness 33Efficiency 37Sustainability 40Cross-cutting Aspects 41Synthesis: Bank Contribution to Outcomes 44

Bank’s Performance 49Consideration of Factors of Fragility 49Choice of Financing Instruments and Modalities 50Analytical Work 52Supervision 53Bank Visibility and Expectations 54

Country Performance 55Aid Coordination Initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire 55Commitment to Results in Partnership with the Bank 55

Conclusions and Recommendations 57

Annexes 61

Contents

Contents

List of figuresFigure 1 Côte d’Ivoire: chronology of political highlights 21Figure 2 AfDB Portfolio in Côte d’Ivoire 2006–2016 25Figure 3 Trend of CPIA scores over the 2004–2015 period 45Figure 4 The Bank’s operations to address various factors

of fragility over the period 2006–2016 50

List of tablesTable 1 Strategic Pillars 2006–2016 24Table 2 Adaptation of Bank Strategies to Country Context 32Table 3 Disbursement Rate 38

vAbbreviations and Acronyms

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADF African Development Fund

AfDB African Development Bank

AZITO Azito Power Plant Expansion Project

CCSN Comprehensive Country Strategy Note

CIE Compagnie ivoirienne d’électricité (Ivorian power utility)

CIPREL CIPREL Power Plant Extension Project

CNO Centre, North and West

COMOREX External Resource Mobilization Committee

CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

CSP Country Strategy Paper

FSF Fragile States Facility

GBV Gender-Based Violence

GOUROU Gourou Integrated Watershed Management Project

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country

HKB Konan Bédié Toll Bridge Project

IDEV Independent Development Evaluation, AfDB

IGA Income-generating activity

PAAEIJ Youth Employability and Integration Improvement Support Programme

PAIA-ID Indénié-Djubalin Agricultural Infrastructure Support Project

PAIMSC Post-Crisis Multisector Institutional Support Project

PARCSI Industrial Sector Competitiveness Enhancement Support Project

PAREF Economic and Financial Reform Support Programme

PARFFM Mano River Union Road Development and Transport Facilitation Programme (Côte d'Ivoire)

PARICS Inclusion and Social Cohesion Enhancement Support Programme

PDP Policy Dialogue Paper

PPP Public-Private Partnership

PRODIJE Young Entrepreneurs Incubator Project

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

PURSSAB Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services

RCI Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

SRF Special Relief Fund

TFP Technical and Financial Partners

UA Unit of Account

Photo: © Ulrich M

ünstermann

1Executive Summary

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Background and Context

This document is a summary of the main observations following the evaluation of the African Development Bank’s strategy in Côte d’Ivoire for the 2006-2016 period. The evaluation was initiated and conducted by the Bank’s Independent Development Evaluation Department (IDEV).

In terms of methodology, the evaluation is based on 10 evaluation questions and two crosscutting analyses. The first relates to the identification of fragility factors and the Bank’s response to them. The second analysis relates to the choice of financing arrangements.

Bank Strategies and Program for the Period 2006–2016

At the beginning of the period, the Bank’s primary objective was to foster a return to normal conditions, conflict resolution and international re-engagement. However, the Bank’s successive strategies quickly moved towards economic recovery and the strengthening of governance and social cohesion. The Bank started implementing a full Country Strategy Paper (CSP) in 2013.

During the period 2006-2016, the Bank financed 35 projects in Côte d’Ivoire, totalling more than UA 1 billion. It supported projects in seven areas of activity, with more than three quarters of its support concentrated in three sectors – transport (39%), energy (20%) and social (17%).

Achievement of Development Outcomes

The relevance of the Bank’s strategy in addressing Côte d’Ivoire’s needs is deemed satisfactory. The Bank was able to adapt its strategy

to the changing environment since the resumption of cooperation following the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, with the 2011 post-electoral crisis management and support for the Ivorian Government’s recovery strategy as from 2012.

The design of projects was deemed satisfactory overall, even though the intervention logic was not sufficiently clear for some projects in the social sectors. With regard to targeting, the Bank’s successive strategies were marked by a constant concern over social inclusion.

The effectiveness of the Bank’s interventions is rated satisfactory overall. Most of the interventions generated the expected outputs, albeit with some variations based on the sector involved. Infrastructure projects generated the expected outputs in a highly satisfactory manner, thus demonstrating the particular effectiveness of some of its interventions, namely transport (HKB) and energy (AZITO, CIPREL) infrastructures. In the agricultural sector, projects (or project components) achieved expected outputs in a generally satisfactory manner, although some projects had difficulty delivering on all expected targets. On the social front (basic social services, social cohesion, sector governance), the achievement of expected outputs is also deemed generally satisfactory, except for the special GBV component of the Multi-sector Post-crisis Project and certain dimensions of the Youth Employability and Integration Improvement Support Programme (PAAEIJ). With regard to the water and sanitation sector, the level of achievement was also satisfactory through the Gourou Integrated Watershed Management Project (Gourou Project).

The achievement of outcomes is deemed satisfactory overall. However, the effectiveness of some projects, notably in the social sector, is rated as unsatisfactory.

Executive Summary

2 Côte d’Ivoire: Evaluation of the Bank’s Strategy and Program 2006–2016 — Summary report

In the transportation area, the achievement of outcomes by the HKB Bridge Project is deemed satisfactory. The amount of traffic in 2016 was estimated at 76% of the target, road users can now join Marcory from Cocody in 15 min; while the expected outcomes in terms of job creation exceeded targets, during both the construction and operation phases. By contrast, the expected outcome in terms of public revenue increase was not achieved in 2016.

With regard to electricity, the achievement of outcomes is deemed highly satisfactory. As expected, AfDB’s contributed to increasing the national electricity generation capacity by more than 20%.

In the water and sanitation sector, the Bank’s contribution, encapsulated in the outcomes of the Gourou Project (at the completion stage) is meeting expectations in a satisfactory manner, particularly in terms of securing the Indenié Junction, which is now accessible during the rainy season, and in terms of imporved living conditions for beneficiaries.

The Bank’s contribution in the agriculture sector is rated satisfactory overall. The resumption of State services in the sector is effective in the Central, Northern and Western (CNO) regions, while agricultural activities have recovered, particularly with the improvement in yields and the marketing networks.

In the social sector (basic services, governance, social cohesion), the overall satisfactory assessment of project outcomes does not reflect mixed results among projects. Out of the five projects considered in analysing these results, three were deemed satisfactory (PAIMSCeducation; the PURSSAB - capacity building, and PARICS), and one was considered unsatisfactory (PAIMSC-Health), while one (PAAEIJ) could not be scored because the causal relationship between project outcomes and outputs was not clearly established in accordance with the reconstituted intervention logic.

Policy dialogue is rated satisfactory in general over the entire period. It was particularly important

at the beginning of the period to ensure that full cooperation could resume. The Bank’s subsequent strategies and particularly the 2013–2017 CSP, systematically included ambitions with regard to policy dialogue. Nonetheless, the strategic ambitions of the full 2013–2017 CSP were not achieved and the dialogue ended up focusing more on the sectoral aspects of projects.

The Bank’s response to emergency situations was overall deemed unsatisfactory. The Bank provided emergency assistance by complementing the necessary resources of other stakeholders in response to humanitarian or health crises. However, significant delays in granting aid compromised the achievement of the objectives sought.

The Bank’s efficiency in managing the portfolio is rated as satisfactory overall. However, there was some variability depending on the type of projects or criteria used: (i) compliance with the timetable for budget support and private sector projects; (ii) highly satisfactory internal rates of return for the two infrastructure projects in the electricity sector, but more problematic in the case of the HKB Bridge, given the gaps when compared to the initial projections; and (iii) significant delays with respect to investment projects’ timetables.

Implementation delays remain an issue of concern for investment projects. The weak national capacity and the slow approval of procurement documents, difficulties in releasing counterpart funding, and late issuance of the Bank’s notice of non-objection appear to be the main causes of project implementation delays.

Measures to improve the portfolio and the Bank’s return to its Headquarters were positive factors. The main Bank portofolio performance indicators in Côte d’Ivoire started improving in 2015.

The sustainability of Bank operations results is deemed satisfactory for private sector operations, which are conducted by private operators with sovereign guarantee. Sustainability

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is unsatisfactory for public sector operations, in particular at the beginning of the period when focus shifted on addressing fragility factors, which did not integrate sustainability as a major issue of concern at the time. Nonetheless, the sustainability of interventions was given more consideration and improved over the evaluation period. That concern became more and more significant in the formulation of development interventions in the 2013–2017 strategy.

The review of crosscutting aspects included gender, environmental management and employment.

The mainstreaming of gender into the Bank’s strategies and programmes in Côte d’Ivoire is generally satisfactory. From a strategic standpoint, the Bank gradually integrated gender equality into its framework documents. However, it is the 2013–2017 CSP that reflect the strongest level of gender sensitivity. Gender is more or less directly mainstreamed into the Bank’s different projects, primarily in social/governance projects. The evaluation showed that progress has been made with regard to gender in connection with the Bank’s interventions. A case in point is PAIMSC, where the various components – health, education and income-generating activities- paid particular attention to women. In all, positive outcomes were achieved with regard to gender in connection with the Bank’s interventions, but they are modest when compared with the magnitude of the issues at stake.

The incorporation of environmental concerns into strategies and operations is overall satisfactory. The analysis showed that strategies do not explicitly include objectives geared towards the environment in general, or to one of its components in particular. However, at the end of the 2006–2016 period, the environment appeared as a crosscutting issue in some of the results sought by the CSP.

Projects are not designed in a manner clearly geared towards green growth, despite the potential. The analysis shows that although some projects are not clearly geared towards “green

growth”, they may contribute to such growth through the impacts that they generate. In this regard, the Bank has supported and continues to support programmes and projects with significant potential in order to generate positive environmental impacts and thus address some environmental fragility issues in Côte d’Ivoire. Infrastructure projects financed by the Bank include favourable responses to unsustainable urban growth and the related pollution. With the Gourou Project, for example, it is possible to find a favourable long-term solution to the pollution of the Ebrié Lagoon by intervening in a very densely populated area (watershed with close to three million people). Lastly, the improvement of the operational efficiency of the AZITO and CIPREL power generating stations will help optimize their CO

2 balance.

Employment is an explicit strategic objective in the Bank’s 2013–2017 strategy. The 2013–2017 CSP put greater emphasis on employment, especially that of young people, since it represents a major challenge in connection with the objectives of stability. To that end, the Bank put emphasis on dialogue with the Government through specific operations designed to boost employment, especially for young people.

The impact assessment shows that the Bank made a satisfactory contribution to Côte d’Ivoire’s remarkable progress in terms of reduction of fragility factors, conflict resolution and economic recovery. The reduction of fragility factors is clearly demonstrated by the changes in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, which was extremely low following the crisis but exceeded the overall African and regional (West African) average in 2015. The Bank positively contributed to addressing the crisis and Côte d’Ivoire’s transition with regards to the fragility, post-crisis, social and economic components. For both the social and economic components, the impact of the Bank’s interventions was significant. Field visits confirmed the impact of the PAIMSC and PURSSAB programmes on the resumption of public services (education, health and access to water), particularly in the Central, Northern and Western regions.


Côte d’Ivoire started recording strong economic growth in 2012, exceeding 8% on average between 2012 and 2015. The Bank’s different budget support efforts contributed to macro-financial stability and supported reforms. The Bank’s participation in major infrastructure projects in the transport, electricity and water and sanitation sectors contributed to boosting growth. Interventions in the agricultural sector helped to enhance production, output and marketing. Support in the education sector should contribute to improving the alignment of training with employment.

Bank’s Performance

The Bank’s performance in Côte d’Ivoire is overall satisfactory, despite some weaknesses in specific areas. This rating is based on the following: (i) the Bank was a reliable partner in supporting the process of crisis resolution and in specific emergency situations; (ii) the Bank made good use of various sources of financing and different means of intervention; (iii) the interventions generated tangible outcomes that contributed to the progress achieved by Côte d’Ivoire since the end of the crisis. This positive overall assessment is confirmed in the stakeholder survey, wherein most respondents have a favourable opinion about the Bank’s interventions in Côte d’Ivoire over the past 10 years.

The Bank’s successive strategies in Côte d’Ivoire have been marked by a constant concern for social inclusion, a fact that is well appreciated by the stakeholders.

Principally, the Bank mobilized three forms of assistance: projects (with a difference between projects executed through delegated contracting and entrusted to the United Nations system, and projects executed by the Ivorian authorities); support for public-private partnerships (PPPs); and support for comprehensive and sector-based reforms. These forms of assistance were overall satisfactory, except for some reservations for some of them.

Budget support operations contributed to macro-budgetary stability and helped fostering policy dialogue on sector-based reforms, particularly in the case of the PAAEIJ. However, the actual contribution of support to the ministries concerned was limited because a portion of the amounts granted went to specific activities, in a context where the still-limited credibility of the budgetary process, as revealed by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Framework (PEFA) evaluations, might limit the use of the instrument.

The three PPPs analysed (HKB Bridge, AZITO and CIPREL) helped facilitated execution of the expected investments on schedule and without cost overruns. The level of services of the three projects is highly satisfactory. These outcomes are attributable to the use of the PPP mechanism. However, while the PPPs facilitate public infrastructure financing, they present some risks in that the financing is generally based on the State’s commitments, which may have potentially significant budgetary consequences, as in the case of the HKB Bridge.

The aim of the project approach is to focus interventions on specific issues. Projects offer AfDB greater visibility as a partner to different stakeholders, but the projects studied as part of this evaluation revealed a number of weaknesses. In several cases, the quality of design was not satisfactory, the sustainability conditions were not met and the projects experienced significant implementation delays.

Several weaknesses were also noted with regard to Bank supervision, in particular the availability of implementation reports and project achievements (more specifically mid-term reports, reports on the monitoring of social and environmental measures and on implementation of emergency assistance). The monitoring of budgetary support performance, with focus on highly detailed outputs, could becloud the overall sector policy objectives. These implementation difficulties are largely shared by the stakeholders, who identify “implementation monitoring” and “implementation modalities” as the

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main areas that should be improved in future Bank projects.

All stakeholders met held high expectations regarding the Bank at various levels, including areas of intervention and level of policy dialogue. While the Bank is a major financial partner, these expectations reveal a lack of visibility of its interventions and the difficulty that the Institution faces in carving out a specific status and image that reflects its involvement in supporting Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy, even though its Headquarters is in Abidjan. The low visibility is also due to the types of financing, for instance budget support and PPPs, where public communication about donors remains low-key. Furthermore, the absence of a team devoted to Côte d’Ivoire and the limited knowledge generation initiated by the Bank play a role in reducing its visibility in relation to the country’s specific challenges.

Country Performance

Côte d’Ivoire has played a leadership role in coordinating donor interventions through clear strategies and establishment of an adequate institutional framework. The Bank’s interventions fell within that framework. By contrast, aid coordination remains unstructured and development partners meet with the Government on an individual basis.

To implement its operations, the Government often took specific measures in relation to its own procurement rules or budgeting process.

Furthermore, in order to improve the absorbtion capacity and the rational use of resources, the Government established the External Resource Mobilization Committee (COMOREX) to monitor commitments and undertake audit/supervision missions.

While these initiatives helped to achieve the objectives pursued and accountability, they also

illustrate the difficulties in following the procedures established for the use of national systems. Further, difficulties in fulfilling conditions precedent also considerably impeded the implementation of some projects.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Bank’s actions in Côte d’Ivoire over the 2006–2016 period were generally positive. The Bank was a reliable partner, offering support during the crisis resolution process and in specific emergency situations. It also made good use of its sources of financing and different forms of intervention by adapting appropriately over the period to the country’s circumstances. Its interventions generated tangible outcomes that contributed to the progress achieved by Côte d’Ivoire since 2006.

However, challenges that the Bank has not been able to fully address remain:

❙ Despite the remarkable progress made by Côte d’Ivoire over the decade, fragility factors persist and might jeopardize the country’s development outlook. One of the major challenges is to satisfy strong social demand owing to the absence of any significant improvement in addressing poverty and inequality.

❙ The presence of the Bank’s Headquarters in Côte d’Ivoire has many advantages for both the Bank and the host country, but also some disadvantages. This evaluation brought to light two issues in this regard. Firstly, all stakeholders expect the Bank to be more involved in Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy in terms of volume of assistance and areas of intervention, and improvement of policy dialogue. Secondly, there is an apparent contradiction between the Bank’s obvious proximity and the difficulty for Ivoirians to find the appropriate interlocutor.

❙ The evaluation brought to light weaknesses in the quality of the design of several interventions.


The principal limitation found with several interventions, in particular those in the social sector, is the intervention logic, which does not establish sufficient linkages between the outputs and the expected outcomes, in order to attain of the overall objective. Other weaknesses included the absence of baselines and the non-quantification of objectives.

❙ Discussions with the stakeholders involved in implementing Bank-funded operations helped address issues related to programme dynamics and supervision: bureaucracy, high mobility of project managers, inadequate monitoring and evaluation.

❙ The analysis of the Bank’s emergency assistance operations pointed to several challenges related to guidelines and intervention modalities, rigorous project execution and monitoring. The Guidelines for Emergency Relief Assistance (2008) do not explicitly list health risks among the types of situations where the Bank plans to intervene rapidly. Yet, the Bank has provided support in biosecurity, particularly in response to the avian flu (and its resurgence) and to the Ebola epidemic. The emergency interventions in Côte d’Ivoire were also not implemented as scheduled and were sometimes conducted to the detriment of an adequate response to pressing needs.

The evaluation proposes the following recommendations in connection with these general conclusions:

Recommendation 1: Provide strategic support to Côte d’Ivoire for more inclusive growth, with a view to reducing poverty and inequality nationwide.

To support the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in this area, the Bank should intervene in the two areas where it has the expertise and recognized experience, namely improving economic governance and providing socio-economic infrastructure, by seeking to target the most vulnerable people in its direct interventions or in the policies that it supports.

This strategy should also more clearly incorporate the main environmental issues affecting Côte d’Ivoire: climate change and the country’s commitments made at COP21, land resources management (agriculture, deforestation, management of protected areas) and issues related to demographic pressures (mobility, water and sanitation). Taking these issues into consideration should create opportunities for sustainable development.

The concern over a better incorporation of gender issues into the Bank’s strategy in Côte d’Ivoire has not yet translated into significant or positive outcomes. The goal will be to move gender to the heart of Bank interventions in terms of targeting, implementation and monitoring.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen policy dialogue on strategic issues and support it through relevant analytical work.

The Bank’s policy dialogue in Côte d’Ivoire during the 2013–2017 period was more sectoral than strategic, owing to the inadequate use of the budget support instrument and the shortage of relevant analytical work to better structure the dialogue around clear objectives with specific timelines. The Bank could, for example, take initiatives to produce knowledge to feed into the dialogue, while trying to play a leadership role in the sectors where it is deeply involved. In this regard, budget support operations should be used to back reform policies on public finance management or at the sector level as mentioned above. In the design and implementation of these budget support interventions, the Bank should be particularly attentive to the quality of policy dialogue and the coordination of interventions.

Recommendation 3: Complete PPP feasibility studies with systematic analyses of the consequences of sovereign guarantees.

The 2016–2020 National Development Policy (PND) calls for the private sector to contribute 62% of total needs, representing about CFAF 18 719 billion. This provides a real opportunity for the Bank to better

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meet the high expectations of Ivorians, using the ADB window to establish balanced and mutually beneficial partnerships with Cote d’Ivoire and partners. However, it is also recommended that PPP feasibility studies be complemented by systematic analyses of the consequences of sovereign guarantees. The financing of the HKB Bridge showed the importance of being very attentive to sovereign guarantees for this type of contract. If they are not sufficiently controlled, they may have a major impact on future budgets. With regard to the State budget, it is recommended that a scorecard be kept of all State’s commitments and their consequences on future budgets.

Recommendation 4: Enhance the Bank’s visibility in relation to its involvement in supporting Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy.

There is need for a clear strategy in terms of more active and more visible participation in policy

dialogue, and better communication of the Bank’s involvement in supporting the country’s development strategy.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen monitoring/evaluation of outcomes achievement with regard to the Bank’s operations and strategies.

The response to these issues is vital for the performance of the Bank’s interventions and the achievement of demonstrable and lasting outcomes, and should address quality at entry, effective monitoring mechanisms and suitable means of integrating crosscutting issues.

Recommendation 6: Clarify the guidelines and forms of intervention with regard to emergency assistance to ensure that they are better tailored to the risks and sources of fragility, and ensure rapid interventions that hit their targets in as short a time as possible.


Management Response

Management welcomes the results of the evaluation carried out by the Independent Evaluation Department (IDEV) concerning Bank Group assistance to Côte d’Ivoire over the 2006-2016 period and its contribution to that country’s development. The aim of the evaluation is to draw relevant lessons in order to improve the Bank’s future strategy and operations in Côte d’Ivoire. Management agrees overall with the evaluation results. The evaluation’s general conclusion is that the performance of the Bank’s operational strategies and programmes in Côte d’Ivoire during the reference period is satisfactory. The operations have had a positive impact on the post-crisis situation and produced tangible results. However, Management notes the challenges highlighted by the evaluation, in particular, the weak and slow response in emergency situations which reduced the effectiveness of the Bank’s actions. It has also noted the weaknesses raised in terms of sustainability of the operations due to a lack of central government commitment to guarantee the continuity and smooth operation of the structures established.

1. Central and decentralized government services, private sector and civil society.2. These are the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 Dialogue Notes, the 2009-2010 Global Strategy Note (GSN), the 2011-2012 Country Brief and 2013-2017 CSP.

Introduction

The key evaluation criteria used are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The evaluation also took into account cross-cutting aspects relating to gender, employment and environmental management. The evaluation is based on a document review, sector evaluations and discussions held with all stakeholders1 during two field missions and visits. The evaluation of outcomes focuses on the priority pillars and sectors of the Country Strategy Paper2, mainly transport, energy, water and sanitation, agriculture, governance (budget and institutional support), the social sector as well as the emergency programmes that were the subject of sector evaluations.

Management welcomes the results of the evaluation carried out by IDEV which will contribute to the preparation of new Bank operations in Côte d’Ivoire and, more generally, of those to be implemented in Transition States. More specifically, this evaluation will enhance the preparation of the Bank’s future Country Strategy Paper (2018– 2022 CSP) for Côte d’Ivoire to be finalized and submitted for consideration and approval by the Boards of Directors in June 2018. This evaluation will also lead to more

effective operationalization of the Bank’s Ten-Year Strategy (2013-2022) and to the achievement of the objectives of the Bank’s Hi-5 priorities.

The recommendations of the IDEV evaluation were already taken into account in the Combined 2013–2017 CSP Completion Report and 2017 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR) which will be presented to CODE in 2018 at the same time as an outline of the pillars of the new country strategy.

As a reminder, the evaluation’s specific recommendations concern:

❙ Strengthening of strategic support to the country to ensure more inclusive growth, that will reduce poverty and inequalities countrywide;

❙ Enhancement of dialogue on policy and strategy-related issues through relevant analytical work;

❙ Systematic conduct of analyses of the impacts of sovereign guarantees given in the context of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) ;

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❙ Enhancement of the Bank’s visibility in the implementation of Côte d’Ivoire’s National Development Plan (NDP3);

❙ Strengthening of monitoring and evaluation of the outcomes defined in the logical frameworks of the Bank’s operations and strategies;

❙ Clarification of operational guidelines and modalities in emergency situations, on the basis of inherent risks and sources of fragility in order to speed up actions and more closely target the population’s needs.

Relevance

Management welcomes the fact that the evaluation of relevance of the Bank’s operations in Côte d’Ivoire is deemed satisfactory overall. The evaluation confirms that the Bank has been able to adapt its cooperation at both strategic and operational levels to the changing national context following the signing of the Ouagadougou agreements in 2007. This was also true during the management of the post-electoral crisis in 2011 and implementation of the Government’s economic recovery strategy from 2012.

The evaluation’s main findings concern:

❙ The effectiveness of the alignment of the Bank’s strategies with the country’s development priorities during the aforementioned different reference periods experienced by the country4;

❙ The relevance of the strategic positioning on the Governance and Infrastructure pillars, which contributed to the strengthening of social cohesion, the restoration of basic administrative and social services, economic recovery and job creation;

3. The previous NDP covered the 2012-2015 period. A new ongoing NDP covers the 2016-2020 period. It was presented to the TFPs including the Bank at the Consultative Group meeting held in Paris in in December 2016.4. The 2006-2010 post-conflict period, the year 2011 of the post-electoral crisis and the 2012-2016 cooperation resumption period.

❙ The mainstreaming of social inclusion and poverty reduction issues in the Bank’s development projects; and

❙ Weak quality at entry of social sector public projects and lack of specific studies conducted on social issues.

Management takes good note of these findings. In the case of the last finding, it states that it must be considered in the country’s post-conflict context and its situation of fragility, marked, among others, by an overall weakness of public services, including those responsible for the production of statistics and sector work. This seriously affected emergency operations in the social sector which represent 31% of resources leveraged over the period. However, in spite of the difficulties relating to quality at entry, the impact of these projects has not been significantly weakened. These are the Post-Crisis Multisector Institutional Support Project (PAIMSC) and the Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services (PURSSAB), which have resulted in the resumption of social services (education, health and access to water) especially in the Central, North and West zones which were the epicentre of the crises.

Management notes that youth employment and women’s empowerment have always been two of the cross-cutting strategic objectives of the 2013-2017 CSP. This culminated in the implementation of the following three operations: the Youth Employability and Integration Support Programme (PAAEIJ), the Social Cohesion and Enhancement Support Programme (PARICS) and the Young Entrepreneurs’ Incubator Project (PRODIJE). Furthermore, social issues have been systematically factored into infrastructure as well as energy and transport projects in the form of related activities.

Management indicates that this approach will be maintained and consolidated in the next 2018-2022


CSP which will focus on the youth employment strategy (2016-2025). Furthermore, in keeping with the Bank’s Gender Strategy, the Bank’s 2018-2022 CSP will support cross-cutting aspects including gender, youth employment and fragility.

Management points out that, in association with the private sector and in view of the energy gap, power generation operations considered to be efficient in the form of PPP will be continued using a programme-based approach. They will thus help to reduce factor costs and develop the agro-silvo-pastoral and fisheries sub-sector value chains. In addition, as part of the regional integration strategy and 2013–2022 Ten-Year Strategy, the Bank’s regional public sector operations will focus on the transport sectors (roads, air and trains) to facilitate and increase community trade and continue to interconnect power grids within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and to impel the establishment of a real regional power market.

Effectiveness

The results of the Bank’s operations in Côte d’Ivoire over the period under review have been deemed satisfactory overall. Management notes that the Bank has contributed to Côte d’Ivoire’s remarkable progress towards weakening the drivers of fragility and ensuring the recovery of economic growth. Indeed, in the case of most of the operations, the expected outcomes and outputs were achieved.

As regards infrastructure projects, the expected outputs were achieved. The outcomes are considered satisfactory even though, for the Henri Konan Bédié (HKB) Bridge, the evaluation reveals that, to date, traffic remains below forecast. In the area of agriculture, effectiveness was also deemed satisfactory even though, in the case of some projects, an evaluation is more delicate since there were no initially quantified objectives5.

5. This concerns the agricultural component of the Post-Conflict Multisector Institutional Support Project (PAIMSC), the Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services (PURSSAB), the Youth Employability and Integration Support Programme (PAAEIJ) and the Social Cohesion and Enhancement Support Programme (PARICS)

The evaluation considers effectiveness in the social sector to be unsatisfactory because of the absence of direct links between PAAEIJ outputs and outcomes. On this point, Management specifies that the programme’s main objective was to support key reforms that would, in time, create many jobs. On the other hand, the evaluation notes that PAAEIJ supported actions relating to: (i) the development of tools for managing the training/employment relationship; (ii) strategic reflection through a feasibility study for SME/SMI development. In the same vein, it should be stressed that, in agreement with the Government, a fairly high proportion, about 16% of the sector budget support (SBS) was allocated to activities with strong leveraging effects on job creation. As a result 1,500 jobs for youth were created out of an estimated 2,000.

It was also noted that PAAEJ’s programme-based design in two tranches helped to maintain sustained policy dialogue with the sector Ministries and structures concerned by the reforms. Indeed, the Bank has played a real catalytic role in sector dialogue. On 15 January 2015, this led to the establishment, by Order of the Prime Minister, of two permanent coordination platforms, one dedicated to the education/training sector and the other to the organization of relations between structures responsible for vocational training and the private sector. These platforms played a key role in the preparation of the 2016-2025 development strategy for the education/training sector adopted by the Council of Ministers in May 2017.

The evaluation reveals that, under the 2013–2017 CSP, the proposed dialogue objectives were not achieved since dialogue was more focused on sector issues. More specifically, with regard to budget support, the evaluations notes that policy dialogue was satisfactory at entry and in the design phase of reform programmes which were synergized by the intervention of other technical and financial partners. The policy dialogue evaluation was somewhat mixed during


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implementation of budget support operations. On these two dialogue components, Management recalls that strategy-related dialogue should be organized around the following five (5) points: (i) the country’s regional role in the common market and weakening the drivers of fragility; (ii) improvement of the business climate; (iii) environmental protection; (iv) gender mainstreaming and (v) increased mobilization of domestic resources.

In the area of regional integration, two key land transport projects and one national air transport project (approved in November 2017)6have ensured during the preparation phase of these projects, to start the dialogue on regional integration. These exchanges focused in particular on customs facilitation through the construction of juxtaposed customs posts on the borders with Mali, Guinea and Liberia; enforcement of WAEMU regulations on axle loads and application of instruments on the civil aviation sector; Discussions will continue during the next CSP 2018–2022.

As regards the business climate, the Economic Management and Growth Support Programme (PAGEC) ensured continuing dialogue with the Government through a matrix aimed at improving the business climate and mobilizing domestic resources for two of the programme’s components. Its implementation as well as that of the Financial Management Support Programme will provide an opportunity for in-depth dialogue in accordance with the strategic directions of the 2013-2017 CSP.

As regards environmental protection, it should be noted that this issue is the subject of continuing dialogue with the Government on biodiversity conservation, climate change control and adaptation in the context of agricultural projects. In particular, this dialogue has led to the start of preparation of the Forestry Capital Restoration and Resilience Building Project in the central region of Côte d’Ivoire (PRCFAR). In order to consolidate this approach,

6. Air Cote d’ivoire modernisation support program

the Bank will collaborate more, and more closely with the specialized agencies of the United Nations System, some bilateral and multilateral partners and the other partners of the REDD+ process.

Management fully shares the need underscored by the evaluation to strengthen the ongoing policy dialogue in order to enhance the visibility of actions relating to effectiveness and the Bank’s operations. With regard to budget support, Management notes that dialogue has been focused on implementation of the Public Finance Reform Master Plan in order to modernize the country’s public finance management. Special emphasis was placed on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public spending and increased mobilization of tax revenue by broadening the tax base. The Bank is, therefore, actively participating in dialogue on structural reforms and public finances as part of the ‘Public Finance Management’ thematic group which meets at least every quarter. Management will focus more on strengthening dialogue on reform policies in consultation with the other technical and financial partners.

Efficiency

The Bank’s efficiency regarding portfolio management was deemed satisfactory overall. The evaluation indicated that private sector and budget support operations adhere to a satisfactory implementation schedule whereas significant delays are especially noted in public investment projects. Furthermore, the use of resources was considered to be satisfactory on the whole even though this conceals wide disparities between projects, due mainly to their low quality at entry. Management shares this analysis and highlights the following points:

❙ Project commencement delays are linked to the post conflict situation and context of fragility. Indeed, the country had a renewed administration


which was gradually establishing itself and whose capacities were to be built prior to the commencement of projects;

❙ The context of instability also seriously disrupted the project implementation cycle during the period under consideration;

❙ Delays in obtaining the Bank’s no-objection notices have been considerably reduced since the Bank’s return to Abidjan; and

❙ The Bank’s proximity will enable Côte d’Ivoire to more rapidly benefit from this available technical expertise.

The evaluation stresses that the financial rate of return on the HKB bridge is unsatisfactory. In response, Management points out that the poor performance of the first three years of operation of the bridge was not due to an error in the estimation of traffic (estimated at 56,000 vehicles/day in year 4-2017/18), for it is now close to 70,000 vehicles/day, i.e. above the levels forecast by the traffic study. This poor performance of the 3 first years is rather the result of a series of sovereign decisions of the public authorities to modify two key parameters and resize the project. This concerned: (i) the failure to close the Houphouët-Boigny (HB) bridge for renovation during the first three years of the operation of the HKB bridge contrary to the baseline option and, (ii) fixing the category 1 toll rate at CFAF 500 compared to a contractual toll rate of close to CFAF 1,000. This is, therefore, the choice of the public authorities undoubtedly to maintain social cohesion and make the structure more inclusive.

Sustainability

The evaluation notes that the sustainability of the outcomes of Bank-financed private sector operations that benefited from sovereign

7. These include the Singrobo Hydropower Plant Project approved by the Council in November 2017, which has a sovereign guarantee from the State.

guarantees, is considered to be satisfactory. On the contrary, sustainability was deemed unsatisfactory for public sector operations, in particular at the beginning of the period, due to the focus on addressing the drivers of fragility which did not consider sustainability as a major challenge in the country’s context.

Management takes good note of some anxiety concerning the performance of public sector operations. Management also shares the concern expressed in the evaluation regarding the need to systematically carry out the required relevant analyses when sovereign guarantees are granted to avoid unduly affecting the country’s debt sustainability. These two issues are already taken into account in the 2017 Country Portfolio Improvement Plan. Management will take this into account in the preparation of the Bank’s new strategy (2018–2022 CSP) and the implementation of its operations. More specifically, with regard to sovereign guarantees, it should be noted that the Bank has already drawn the attention of the Minister responsible for the Economy and Finances to new projects proposed by private developers for Bank financing, which would require State guarantees7.

Management also takes good note of the problem of monitoring environmental measures which is not systematically documented and/or carried out. These issues will be addressed during project and programme supervision and review missions. Management points out that the opinion that the sustainability of public sector operations is considered to be unsatisfactory overall should be qualified in light of the post-crisis context. Notwithstanding, the administrative structures established and the training given have significantly contributed to the country’s development. Similarly, the ongoing CSP’s second pillar on the rehabilitation of transport, energy and agricultural infrastructure has contributed to the development of naturally sustainable structures since 2013.


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In conclusion, Management has taken good note of the need to strengthen consideration of the economic, financial and institutional aspects of projects as well as internal and external risks likely to impact on the operations. The new CSP will contribute to the establishment of real risk management strategies that will be discussed with all the national stakeholders including the other TFPs and private actors intervening under Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), both at the design and operational stages of future operations.

Cross-Cutting Aspects

The evaluation points out that gender mainstreaming in the Bank’s strategies and programs in Côte d’Ivoire is satisfactory overall. The Bank has gradually mainstreamed the gender dimension in its framework documents.

Management fully agrees with the evaluations’ finding that, while the outcomes are positive, they remain modest compared to the scale of the challenges. Management will ensure that the different ongoing initiatives are leveraged, in particular the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA), as well as future projects in order to have a stronger gender impact.

The evaluation mentions that the assessment of environmental mainstreaming at both the strategic and operational levels is mixed and, therefore, unsatisfactory. Management takes note of this observation which will deepen the analysis of environmental aspects in Bank strategies and projects in Côte d’Ivoire. The Bank is already preparing operations solely devoted to deforestation control which represents a major challenge for Côte d’Ivoire, through the Forestry Capital Restoration and Resilience Building Project in the central region of Côte d’Ivoire (PRCFAR) which is being prepared. Finally, Management wishes to stress that some agricultural projects and programs of the 2013–2017 CSP (infrastructure, regional agri-business hubs, value chains and agribusiness) have considerable structuring potential in the sectors concerned. Management will engage in dialogue with the Government to encourage the latter to improve the sensitization of the stakeholders involved in order to achieve more sustainable and environmentally friendly production. Management notes with interest that the projects for the two bridges (HKB and Yopougon-Plateau) contain positive responses to the issues of unsustainable urban growth and the related pollution.


Recommendation Management response

Recommendation 1: Provide strategic support to Côte d’Ivoire in order to achieve inclusive growth aimed at reducing poverty and inequalities countrywide.

For details of each recommendation, please refer to the evaluation report (pages 57 to 59)

Agreed. The future 2018–2022 CSP, under preparation, will retain projects that will accelerate the Bank’s approach aimed at significantly reducing poverty by capitalizing on the results of the 2013–2017 CSP.

In order to reinforce the inclusive nature of growth and with regard to Côte d'Ivoire's potential and room for growth in agriculture, the Bank is planning to continue its approach in terms of agribusiness hubs under construction. This will speed up the structural transformation of the agricultural sector which contains the highest number of poor people and remains the country’s largest employer. More specifically, the Bank will pursue its approach in terms of inclusion of activities related to infrastructure projects which will contribute to the strengthening of economic and social inclusion. In this context, the Bank will support:

❙ Skills building for young people in the scientific, technology and vocational sub-sectors in order to strengthen the competitiveness of labour and support economic transformation while paying special attention to gender issues considering the under-representation of girls in science streams in general;

❙ Strengthening of the inclusive nature of the economy through the promotion and development of the economic activities of vulnerable groups including rural communities, women and young people by ‘developing skills to transform the demographic dividend into an economic dividend’;

❙ The development of agri-hubs on the basis of this new integrated approach (agriculture, livestock, transport, electrification, water and sanitation, socio-economic infrastructure, ICT, reforestation, etc.). This support will include nutrition, mechanization, youth employment, the processing of agricultural products and the mainstreaming of climate change in synergy with the global climate funds.

Management fully agrees with the evaluation’s main lessons and recommendations. They were entirely taken into account in the preparation of the Combined 2013–2017 CSP Completion Report and 2017 Country Portfolio Performance Review. Furthermore, the evaluation’s lessons and recommendations will also be used to inform the design of the Bank’s future strategies and operations in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular the new 2018–2022 Country Strategy Paper which will be submitted to the Boards for approval in June 2018.

Summary of Management’s Actions


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Recommendation 2: Strengthen dialogue on policies and on strategy-related issues supported by relevant analytical work.


Agreement. As part of the implementation of the 2018–2022 CSP, the Bank will strengthen its dialogue on policies and strategy-related issues supported by relevant analytical works. Through the Economic Management Support Programme (PAGEC), dialogue will focus on the following points

❙ The effectiveness and transparency of public finance management in particular, the challenges relating to: (i) the widening of central government’s fiscal space in order to facilitate implementation of its ambitious national development plan; (ii) enhancing the effectiveness of public expenditure in particular by ring-fencing pro-poor spending, in order to reduce the persisting wide disparities in the country; and (iii) Improving the transparency of public financial management (financial management, procurement) and accountability;

❙ The diversification of growth sources, in particular (i) access to energy; (ii) access to financing through restructuring of the public banking sector; (iii) rural land tenure and (iv) coffee-cocoa sector governance;

❙ Policy dialogue in the context of donor thematic coordination groups, and;

❙ Maintenance of the principle of high level dialogue initiated since early 2017 and which has been fruitful.

Recommendation 3: Complement PPP feasibility studies with systematic analyses of the consequences of guarantees given by the State.


Agreed. In formulating its next CSP, the Bank has pre-identified economic and sector work needs in order to facilitate the search for financing and ensure closer strategic alignment with national priorities. To this end, ongoing projects provide for many studies in key sectors to improve project quality upstream and constitute a solid pipeline for the new strategy.

With regard to PPPs, in addition to the feasibility studies taking into account the consequences of the State guarantees, the Bank through the G20 compact, has undertaken to provide:

❙ Advisory services for the structuring, transactions and/or the negotiation of PPP projects (energy, port, airport, railways, roads, etc.) but also practical training on the institutional, legal and financial aspects of PPPs ;

❙ Legal assistance provided to the Public Authorities involved in PPP projects through the African Legal Support Facility when additional capacity is required;

❙ Development of transaction facilitation tools (TFT): preparation of standard contracts and standard documents including PPP tool kits, procedures handbooks and standard PPP contracts to facilitate the preparation, provisioning and implementation of PPP projects.



Recommendation 4: Enhance the Bank’s visibility in relation to its support to Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy.


Agreed. During the implementation of the 2013–2017 Country Strategy, the Bank took an active part in the sectoral and thematic working groups set up as part of the cooperation between the Government and the Heads of Development Cooperation. This commitment will be maintained.In addition, during the cycle of the new CSP 2018–2022, the Bank will strive to better communicate the results of its operations in Côte d'Ivoire, using the Bank's dissemination tools. In particular, RDGW will work with SNDR to promote operations in MapAfrica and through Country Result Briefs.In this approach to improve the visibility of the Bank, it should be noted that with the contribution of RDGW and the technical support of PCER, the Bank will highlight the impact of the Bank's operations in Côte d'Ivoire on various communication platforms , in Q1, 2018. In addition, the Bank will organize workshops and fiduciary clinics for the benefit of executing agencies and will ensure their monitoring in order to: (i) accelerate project implementation, in particular in the case of technical assistance and; (ii) increase the use of national systems in compliance with the agreements concluded with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire relating to procurement. At future workshops, the establishment of monitoring-evaluation systems will be developed. The following activities to be started will also contribute to this visibility in particular: ❙ Increased support to the National Development Plan (NDP) through implementation of the Economic Management Support Project aimed at contributing to the mobilization of resources, capacity building for structures responsible for development planning in pro-poor ministries and the extension of gender-responsive budgeting.

❙ The studies under preparation will ensure more active and visible participation in policy dialogue as described in the response to recommendation 2; (ii) a communication plan focused on the Bank’s involvement in supporting the country’s development strategy will also be prepared to support the 2018–2022 CSP.

❙ The Bank will capitalize on project and portfolio supervision and mid-term review missions to organize communication activities with the different stakeholders, in particular, the public administration, development partners, civil society organizations and the private sector.


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Recommendation 5: Strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of outcomes as regards the Bank’s operations and strategies.


Agreed. In a systematic way, all the strategy instruments (Country Brief, Country Note, DSP) produced during the period under review (2006–2016) included logical frameworks for monitoring / evaluation of the achievement of the objectives, the effects and impacts, both at mid-term and at the end of the period. The same applies to public and private, regional or emergency operations that have benefited from the various financial instruments of the Bank.However, with regard to the Bank's five new priorities (High 5), the Bank will strengthen the monitoring / evaluation logical frameworks to better monitor the strategic and operational impacts related to the achievement of the High 5. In this process, the evaluation of the 2013–2017 CSP’s implementation and portfolio performance yielded useful lessons that would enhance the effectiveness of cooperation between Côte d’Ivoire and the Bank. These lessons will be taken into account in the preparation of the 2018–2022 CSP. To this end, the documentary analysis and the ongoing dialogue with the country have already made it possible to identify key areas for strengthening the monitoring / evaluation function. It is thus expected that: ❙ Project design will more specifically take into account the implementation capacities of the executing agencies and clearly defined development objectives with the planned activities;

❙ Portfolio reviews will be frequently organized (quarterly instead of half-yearly) in order to facilitate the monitoring of the different projects;

❙ Maintaining a logbook to indicate the status of the different requests will ensure closer monitoring and speed up their processing;

❙ The fiduciary teams of the Bank will conduct awareness-raising actions of the various contracting authorities within the Government (ministries) on the applicable procurement methods and rules, in order to reduce delays and complexity; and

❙ RDGW and the sector departments involved in the country portfolio will develop, on the basis of the portfolio flashlight reports, internal tools to improve project management conditions.

Recommendation 6: Clarify emergency assistance operating guidelines and arrangements in order to more closely adapt them to the risks and sources of fragility and guarantee a rapid response as soon as possible.


Agreed. The Bank concurs with the need to adapt its operating instruments in emergency situations. It had already initiated a review of emergency operations financed over the 2008–2010 period in order to identify the procedural and operational bottlenecks that impede the smooth and rapid implementation of such operations. The study’s recommendations include the need to: ❙ Shorten the processing times of emergency operations by closer cooperation between country offices and executing agencies;

❙ Strengthen dialogue with governments and executing agencies in order to ensure rapid preparation of the appraisal report on the proposal; and

❙ Reach an agreement between the Government and executing agency in keeping with the preparation of the proposal on procurement and disbursement-related aspects in order to minimize delays in signing the Letter of Agreement (LA) and payment of funds. This would allow the speedy implementation and achievement of the outcomes of the emergency programme

The Bank will take into consideration the recommendations of this review following their validation by the Board. They will be used in the 2018–2022 CSP, in particular in the formulation and implementation of ensuing future emergency operations.

Photo: © ADE

19Introduction

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This evaluation report covers the strategies, interventions and dialogue on the Bank’s policies implemented through the relevant financing instruments in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire over the 2006–2016 period.

The evaluation, initiated and conducted by IDEV, aims at accountability by evaluating the achievement of outcomes of the Bank’s assistance in Côte d’Ivoire, on the one hand, and at capitalization by drawing lessons to improve the Bank’s subsequent strategies in the country and more generally in transition states.

The evaluation started in October 2016 with a preparatory field visit. Following a documentary study and preparation phase, a field mission was conducted from 31 January to 17 February 2017. Consisting of two IDEV representatives and seven members of ADE, the multidisciplinary evaluation team worked in close cooperation with the General Directorate of Strategy and Aid Coordination (DGSCA) of the Ministry of Planning and Development, which fully supported the mission.

Meetings were held with close to 200 actors, representing the Ivorian Government (both central and local), the private sector, the Bank, NGOs and other development partners. All the people met were given an additional opportunity to express themselves individually through an electronic survey (see details in Tools Mobilized and Sources of Data, page 29). A significant number of actors met are direct

beneficiaries of the Bank’s operations. Field visits were organized to assess the achievements in situ: Henri Konan Bédié Bridge (Abidjan), Azito power generation plant (Abidjan), PAAEIJ facilities (Yamoussoukro), PAIMSC facilities (Vallée du Bandama and Montagnes districts), and PURSSAB facilities (Montagnes district). The site visits provided an opportunity to meet with the final beneficiaries of the projects. An end-of-mission workshop was held with the stakeholders to discuss the initial observations. The workshop helped validate or clarify certain analyses.

This report summarizes a technical report featuring detailed responses to the evaluation questions.

The document is divided into five main chapters:

❙ Chapter 1: Country context during the period 2006–2016, general development policies and strategies, etc.

❙ Chapter 2: Bank’s activities in Côte d’Ivoire, theory of change and inventory of cooperation actions

❙ Chapter 3: Study objective, key methodological elements and evaluation framework

❙ Chapter 4: Main observations and overall assessment of the performance of the Bank and Côte d’Ivoire

❙ Chapter 5: Recommendations

Introduction

Photo: © Ulrich M

ünstermann

21Context

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Context

Geographical and Political Context

Côte d’Ivoire is a State in West Africa with a surface area of 322 462 km². Its population is estimated at more than 22 million. It is a young population, 42% of whom are below 14 years of age. The country is undergoing rapid urbanization (54% of the population in 2015), with a strong concentration of the country’s population in the two largest cities, Abidjan and Bouaké.

The highlights of the recent political history of Côte d’Ivoire can be summarized as follows: (i) death of President Houphouët-Boigny (1993) and political instability leading to civil war (2002–2007); (ii) Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007) and political and security normalization effort; (iii) presidential elections and post-electoral crisis (2010-2011); and (iv) re-election of President Alassane Ouattara (2015). These aspects as well as developments in the Bank’s engagement are summarized in the figure below.

Figure 1: Côte d’Ivoire: chronology of political highlights

Evaluation Period 2006 – 2016

AfDB

Str

ateg

ies

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

2006–07Country Dialogue

Paper

Dialogue on the Clearance

of Arrears, Reconstruction and Capacity

Building

2003- Suspension of Disbursements

- Relocation of the AfDB

Headquarters to Tunis

2007–08Country Dialogue

Paper

Dialogue on the Clearance

of Arrears, Reconstruction and Capacity

Building

2009–10Global Strategy Note

Clearance of Arrears and Re-engagement

(Governance and Economic Infrastructure)

2011–12Country Profile

Rehabilitation of Infrastructure and Improvement of

Governance

2013–17Country Strategy Paper

Enhancement of Governance and Development of Infrastructure in Support

of Economic Recovery

2014 Return of the headquarters to

Abidjan

2008Enhanced

Engagement Strategy in

Fragile States

2012Evaluation

of Assistance to Fragile

States

2014–19Strategy for Addressing Fragility and

Building Resilience

2004Post-Conflict

Country Facility (PCCF)

FSFFragile States

Facility

TSFTransition Support Facility

2010–11Post-Election

Crisis

Attempted Coup d'Etat

2002

Eligibility for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative

1998

Ouagadougou Political Accord

2007

Presidential Elections

2010

Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Political Normalisation

2011

Referendum on the Draft New Constitution

2016

Re-election of President Ouattara

2015

2014–15Ebola

Resumption of Activities by Major Donors

2009

Achievement of the HIPC Initiative completion point

2012

2002–07Civil War

Source: IDEV

2003


Economic and Social Performance

The second-largest economy of West Africa behind Nigeria and one of the world’s main cocoa, coffee and cashew nuts exporters, Côte d’Ivoire has since independence had a strong economic, and especially agricultural, potential. After suffering from a political crisis between 2006 and 2011, the Ivorian economy recovered as the political situation improved. Annual GDP growth averaged approximately 9% since 2012. However, it remains vulnerable to exogenous shocks, including climate uncertainties and fluctuations in commodity prices, particularly agricultural products. The incidence of poverty has declined slightly, going from 48.9% in 2008 to 46.3% of the population in 2015. The same decline is true for inequalities, with a Gini index score that went from 0.420 in 2008 to 0.405 in 2015.

Although the economic outlook is promising over the short and medium term with an average growth rate of more than 7% between 2017 and 2019 (IMF), it remains dependent on a correction of vulnerabilities in the energy and financial sectors as well as continued structural reforms to improve the business climate and public finance management (distortions of the budgetary cycle, lack of transparency and oversight, problems with the execution of expenditures, etc.).

Situation of Fragility, Development Challenges and Issues

The issues of fragility and the transition are essential for evaluating the Bank’s engagement in Côte d’Ivoire. The resumption of strong economic growth is not the only factor to ensure stability in Côte d’Ivoire, which remains marked by social and political divisions.

Since 2006, but especially since 2012 following the post-electoral conflict, most conflict and fragility indicators have shown a positive evolution in Côte d’Ivoire’s situation, especially in terms of strengthening of the State and delivery of public

services. These significant advancements led the Bank to remove Côte d’Ivoire from the list of countries in transition in 2016.

However, the strong growth recorded over the past few years has not been sufficiently inclusive and the social fabric remains fragile. Certain fragility factors go in tandem: in urban areas, the combination of population growth and youth unemployment; in rural areas, the combination of land issues, environmental degradation, return of displaced persons and refugees, and identity-related tensions. National statistics indicate that gender inequalities persist in the country, despite the political will displayed and resources deployed. Examples include the prevalence of female genital mutilations, which although prohibited by law since 1998, affect about 36% of women aged between 15 and 49. This is one of the highest rates in West Africa. From an economic perspective, women are more affected by unemployment (unemployment rate of 11.9% versus 7.4% for men in 2012). They also have less access to land and resources: even though Ivorian law allows women to acquire land, local customs prevent the application of these land law in rural areas. The 2011 crisis has had consequences in terms of gender-based violence. The number of victims has risen significantly (12,493 cases in 2011 compared to 478 between 2007 and 2010).

The country’s economic vulnerability has deepened over the past six months with the 35% decline in world cocoa prices, which accounts for close to 50% of export revenue and two thirds of jobs, and is the primary source of income for more than 800 000 agricultural households in the country. The decline in world cocoa prices, which occurred in a national context marked by strikes and demonstrations since the end of 2016 and during the first half of 2017 (electricity prices, students’ study conditions, civil servant salaries and pensions, mutinies), is a major concern for both the Government and the country’s development partners, including the Bank.

Côte d’Ivoire also faces different regional factors of fragility. For example, during the evaluation

23Context

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period, the country faced cross-border problems with Liberia (PEA) following the incursion of rebel groups, the rise in violent extremism from the neighbouring country to the north (Mali), as well as the Ebola epidemic that hit Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone the hardest.

To address these challenges, Côte d’Ivoire, while reaffirming the role of the private sector as a driver, has made the improvement of the rate of raw materials processing and the development of full value chains in the agricultural sector major development issues for its “emergence”. In

that connection, it has established five strategic objectives that are included in its National Development Programme (PND) 2016–2020 and are aligned on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely: (i) enhance the quality of institutions and good governance; (ii) accelerate the development of human capital and the promotion of social welfare; (iii) accelerate structural transformations and industrialization; (iv) develop infrastructure distributed harmoniously across the country and preserve the environment; and (v) strengthen regional integration and international cooperation.


Bank Strategies and Programs for 2006–2016

Bank Strategies

During the 2006–2016 period, five documents underpinned the Bank’s cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire. The principal orientations (pillars) of these documents can be summarized as follows:

The evaluation covers a decade marked by three distinct periods: end of conflict (2006–2010), post-electoral crisis (2011–2012) and resumption of Bank cooperation (2013–2017). These elements marking a change in the Bank’s strategy are reflected in the comprehensive theory of change presented in Annex A1.

Table 1: Strategic Pillars 2006–2016

Strategic Document Pillar 1 Pillar 2Dialogue Note 2006–2007 Dialogue for access to the Post-Conflict

Countries Facility (PCCF)Reconstruction and building of institutional capacity

Dialogue Note 2007–2008 Clearing of arrears and Bank’s re-engagement

Global Strategy Note 2009–2010

Strengthening of governance Development of regional economic infrastructure

Country Data Sheet 2011–2012

Strengthening and restoration of infrastructure, restoration of basic social services

Improvement of governance and capacity-building

Country Strategy Paper 2013–2017

Strengthening of governance and accountability Development of infrastructure to support economic recovery

25Bank Strategies and Programs for 2006–2016

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Characteristics of AfDB Portfolio in Côte d’Ivoire for 2006–2016

During the period 2006–2016, the Bank financed 35 projects in Côte d’Ivoire totalling more than UA 1 billion. The Bank supported

projects in seven sectors, with three quarters thereof concentrated in three sectors – transport (39%), energy (20%) and social (17%). The projects in these three sectors are also more sizeable (the highest average budget being in the transport sector).

Figure 2: AfDB Portfolio in Côte d’Ivoire 2006–2016

Source: RCI - List of approved projects 2006–2016 Source: RCI - List of approved projects 2006–2016

Source: AfDB project portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, budgets in UA million.

Finance12,0 • 1%

Energy205,8 • 20%

Governance103,3 • 10%

Agriculture108,9 • 11%

Social170,0 • 17%

Transport406,0 • 39%

Water & Sanitation24,0 • 2%

Budget by Sector of Intervention (UA M and %) Average Budget (UA M) by Sector

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27Overview of Methodology

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Overview of Methodology

Overall, the evaluation approach can be broken down into the two major levels of analysis: the strategic level and the operational level. This analysis is based on the evidence gathered by mobilizing a series of tools as described below.

Country Strategy

This evaluation is based on the (re)construction of the theory of change of the Bank’s assistance in Côte d’Ivoire which is represented in Annex A1. The analysis primarily aims at verifying the extent to which the Bank’s assistance contributed to the outcomes established by broader action frameworks (Bank’s own priorities and national development priorities). The evaluation framework was built around 10 evaluation questions. The evaluation framework is presented in Annex A2. That outcome-based evaluation focused primarily on an analysis of the outcomes in terms of “outputs” and outcomes.

Two crosscutting analyses provided substantial material for the response to the evaluation questions. The first is related to the identification of fragility factors, the Bank’s response to these factors and changes in those factors over the evaluation period. The second analysis deals with the arrangements in context of “budget support” as part of the Bank’s cooperation with the country.

Project Result Assessments

The operations in the Bank’s portfolio in Côte d’Ivoire during the 2006–2016 period were broken down into three groups, constituted using a multi-criteria approach (status, nature of intervention, budget). Each group corresponds to a different degree of depth of analysis of the operations:

❙ Group No. 3 – Projects subject to outcome-based evaluation (OBE), representing six projects and 21% of the total commitment of the total AfDB portfolio for 2006–2016 in Côte d’Ivoire. These completed projects were subject to a documentary review, discussions with the stakeholders involved and the end beneficiaries. An outcomes evaluation report was prepared for each project. A summary table of scores for each project is presented in Annex C.

❙ Group No. 2 – Projects subject to an evaluation review focusing on relevance and implementation (10 projects and 27% of the portfolio). The analysis was based on a documentary review and a discussion guide for representatives of executing agencies; it was presented on a specific analysis grid.

❙ Group No. 1 – Projects subject to a documentary review (19 projects and 51% of the portfolio concerning projects that are very recent and/or in the early stages of implementation).


A four-level scoring scale was used. The scale is described in detail in Annex A.

Tools Mobilized and Sources of Data

Information was collected using different tools in order to assemble qualitative and quantitative data. In this regard, data collection tools were prepared, notably grids for the collection of information according to groups of projects selected and discussion guides.

One hundred and ninety-three (193) discussions were held with stakeholders. A field mission was conducted in several areas of the country, during which facilities were visited, and structured and targeted discussions held with central and regional government representatives, private sector and civil society actors, as well as entities and individuals who benefitted directly from the interventions. An electronic questionnaire was sent to 141 individuals met who had an electronic address, through which 41 responses were collected (29% response rate).

The information collected and the analyses developed based on all the tools described were used to prepare a technical report. This document is a summary of that report.

Evaluation Limitations and Solutions Adopted

The first challenge of the evaluation was that of complexity, due to the diversity of interventions studied and the different levels of analysis required. The following solutions were adopted to address this challenge:

❙ The group approach made it possible to consider virtually all interventions of the portfolio based on their status. However, this approach does not help resolving the problem of assessing the outcomes of programmes that have not been

completed. This criterion remains limited to group 3 projects. The other interventions that are still on-going or that started recently are not yet sufficiently mature for their impacts to be evaluated.

❙ The crosschecking of information from different sources made it possible to validate observations.

Another challenge was the context of fragility and transition, which involves an analysis tailored to that context and its dynamics. Given that the context evolved profoundly between the start of the evaluation period (2006) and the end (2016), it was necessary to ensure that the legitimate focus of the stakeholders on the recent period did not translate into an imbalance to the detriment of the first few years of the period. It was also important to take into account the sensibilities of the different stakeholders in a profound post-crisis climate that created divisions in the country. These challenges were addressed as follows:

❙ The methodology followed took into account the inherent limitations of an evaluation in a country in transition: articulation on a timeline analysis, reconstruction of theories of change based on the changing context, crosscutting analysis of the fragility factors and the Bank’s responses.

❙ To the extent possible, the stakeholders directly concerned by the operations were mobilized, with a focus on those representing direct institutional memory, even if they have changed occupation. Likewise, operations were systematically put in their proper context.

❙ An online survey following the meeting with stakeholders was systematically offered to participants for them to complement the information received and to express themselves anonymously without being influenced by reporting lines and other social pressures.

29Overview of Methodology

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The final challenge of this evaluation was the low quality-at-entry of certain projects, notably the weak rationale and the absence of baselines or quantified objectives, and the lack of data on the implementation of several projects (non-availability of supervision

reports, departure of the Bank’s project managers, etc.). Focus groups, individual interviews, online surveys and site visits were used to overcome that obstacle, but certain aspects could not be evaluated owing to lack of sufficient facts.

Photo: © ADE

31Achievement of Results

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Achievement of Results

Relevance

The Bank responded well to Côte d’Ivoire’s strategies and needs, and was able to adapt its actions to changes in the context of fragility. The Bank’s strategies were deemed satisfactory in relation to Côte d’Ivoire’s strategies and needs. As shown in the presentation of the theory of change (Annex A), the Bank’s successive strategies during the period under review were meant to explicitly support the country’s development strategies. Table 2 below summarizes the successive adaptations.

The design of Bank projects to achieve development objectives was generally

satisfactory. Infrastructure projects had generally clear objectives and good intervention logique. For example, the project to extend the AZITO plant was designed to produce more electricity with the same amount of gas by replacing the single cycle with a combined cycle. The project to build a new bridge in Abidjan (HKB), which was designed to improve traffic conditions and reduce travel time, satisfied a critical need, even though the package ultimately selected was based on much too optimistic traffic assumptions.

Quality-at-entry was, however, lower for social sector projects. Weaknesses in the design of interventions were encountered with the PAIMSC, PURSSAB capacity building, PARICS and PAAEIJ projects. For example, the PAIMSC-agricultural component did not have a clearly oriented rationale with regard to the expected outputs. The specific indicators selected were not quantified, since that component had no baselines or intermediary target values. Another example is the budget support component of the PAAEIJ, whose rationale was explained only summarily, particularly with regard to the linkage between the activities supported, the expected reforms and the objectives pursued. For the PURSSAB-capacity-building operation, the weakness had more to do with poor programme design. As mentioned by Ivorian officials responsible for the programme, the procedures and rules were not adapted to the constraints of a post-conflict environment; which is at the origin of the difficulties encountered during implemention.

The Bank’s successive strategies in Côte d’Ivoire were marked by a constant concern for social inclusion. The concern for poverty reduction and

The relevance of the Bank’s strategy was deemed satisfactory overall. The Bank was able to adapt its strategy to the changing environment since the resumption of cooperation following the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement, the management of the 2011 post-electoral crisis and the support for the Ivorian Government’s recovery strategy beginning in 2012. Project design was generally satisfactory even though for some interventions in the social sectors, the rationale was not always sufficiently clear. In terms of targeting, the constant concern for social inclusion was satisfactorily taken into consideration in the Bank’s successive strategies.

Evaluation criteria RatingAlignment / adaptation Highly satisfactory

Project design Satisfactory

Inclusion Satisfactory

Overall assessment Satisfactory


Table 2: Adaptation of Bank Strategies to Country Context

National Strategic Framework Bank’s Strategic Response

2006–2010 – Post-conflict period

Post-Crisis Operational Program (PCP): Following the Ouagadougou Agreement, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire presented the PCP to development partners in July 2007. The objective was to “create an institutional framework that restored the State’s authority across the country, to ensure the organization of credible elections”. The programme had seven operational thrusts and an institutional anchor, including a department in the Office of the Prime Minister responsible for monitoring and coordination.

Dialogue Note 2006–2007: aimed at (i) continuation of the dialogue on the achievement of the criteria for accessing the Bank’s Post-Conflict Countries Facility (PCCF); and (ii) participation in reconstruction and institutional capacity building.Dialogue Note 2007–2008: pursued the same objective of finding a solution to clear Côte d’Ivoire’s arrears, to allow the Bank to fully resume its cooperation with the country. The Post-Crisis Multi-Sector Institutional Support Programme (PAIMSC) was initiated within that framework, and contributed mainly to the following two components:* (i) restoration of State authority; and (ii) consolidation of national reconciliation.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II) for the period 2009–2012. The overall objective of the PRSP was to consolidate peace and improve the living conditions of the people.

Global Strategy Note 2009–2010: prepared to support the Government’s strategy and lay the ground for the Bank’s re-engagement in Côte d’Ivoire. It had two objectives: to develop an arrears clearance plan and to facilitate the Bank’s re-engagement around two pillars: (i) strengthening of governance; and (ii) development of regional economic infrastructure.

Following the 2011 post-electoral crisis

Presidential emergency program. Côte d’Ivoire’s strategy proposed in the PRSP was interrupted following the 2011 post-electoral crisis. A presidential emergency programme (PEP) was rapidly designed to respond to social emergencies. Totalling CFAF 45 billion, the programme primarily targeted basic services for the people – water and sanitation, health and education, as well as decentralized State entities.

Country Fact Sheet 2011–2012. The Bank supported the implementation of the PEP through the Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services (PURSSAB).

Cooperation resumption period 2012–2015

National Development Program 2012–2015. In 2012, the Government launched an ambitious economic and social recovery programme called the National Development Programme (PND) 2012–2015, whose objective was to make Côte d’Ivoire an emerging country by 2020 through: (i) strong and sustained growth over a long period; (ii) building of a significant middle class; and (iii) participation in the world production system. The PND was ultimately designed to generate strong and inclusive growth for the country. The priority sectors identified were infrastructure, agriculture, justice and good governance, security, human capital, industry and SMEs, urban development and housing.

Although it had not yet formally received the full strategy paper, the Bank supported the PND through the resumption of major private investments with the approval of two infrastructure projects that had been put on the back burner during the crisis. It also rekindled projects that had been interrupted by the crisis.CSP 2013–2017. In 2013, the Bank proposed a full CSP covering the period 2013–2017, with clear focus on support for the PND. The CSP was built on two pillars: governance (Pillar 1) and infrastructure (Pillar 2). Pillar 1 had two dimensions, the first focusing on continuing the national reconciliation and social cohesion efforts, and the second on economic inclusion and access to employment. With regard to infrastructure, three areas were selected: development of the agricultural sector, development of transport, including at the regional level, and improvement of access to electricity.

improvement in the living conditions of the people is common to all the Bank’s strategy papers in Côte d’Ivoire, to the extent that this is the principal purpose of its interventions. The five strategy papers that formed the framework for the Bank’s cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire were analysed, with specific

focus on the social inclusion components. All Bank strategy papers address the issue of poverty and analyse the key issues in the social sector – health, education, water and sanitation, often including aspects relating to gender (men and women) or vulnerable groups (children). Three of the five papers


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forming the framework for the Bank’s strategy in Côte d’Ivoire comprise social inclusion objectives. These objectives are discussed in the 2013–2017 CSP. The Bank’s focus on social inclusion is well perceived by stakeholders, 70% of whom indicated in a real-time survey that social inclusion is a strong specificity (and the strongest) of the Bank’s interventions in Côte d’Ivoire. Sensitivity to the needs of women and young people is also deemed somewhat strong, with scores of 64% and 56%, respectively.

However, it has not been possible to identify any specific studies planned or conducted on social issues and their implications for cooperation between the Bank and Côte d’Ivoire. This is presented in more detail in the section devoted to analytical work.

Five interventions in the social sector represented close to 17% of the overall budget for the 2006–2016 period. However, if projects financed through the private sector window are excluded, social sector interventions represented more than 31% of mobilized resources. This sector posted a much higher proportion during the successive crises that the country experienced. The Bank approved its most significant social projects, in budgetary terms, in 2007 following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement (PAIMSC) and in 2011 following the post-electoral crisis (PURSSAB and HUMAN). These operations were the only ones approved by the Bank in their respective years, thus confirming their decisive and structuring nature for the Bank’s portfolio on the subject. The highlights of the first few years of implementation of the full Country Strategy Paper (CSP 2013–2017) was the approval of two interventions in the sector, representing 20% and 29% of annual approvals, respectively.

Effectiveness

Overall, the generation of expected outcomes was satisfactory for all completed projects, but with a few differences based on the sector of intervention. Infrastructure projects achieved the expected outputs in a highly satisfactory manner, especially transport infrastructure (HKB Bridge) and energy (AZITO, CIPREL), thus demonstrating their effectiveness. In the agriculture sector, projects (or project components) acheived the expected outputs in a generally satisfactory manner, although for some projects difficulties were encountered in realizing the outputs. For social projects (basic social services, social cohesion, sector governance), generation of the expected outcomes was deemed overall satisfactory , except for the special GBV component of the post-crisis multi-sector project and certain dimensions of the PAAEIJ. As for the water and sanitation sector, the level of achievement was also

Evaluation Criteria RatingAchievement of outputs Satisfactory

Achievement of outcomes Satisfactory

Policy dialogue Satisfactory

Response to emergency situations Unsatisfactory


Effectiveness was deemed satisfactory overall. The Bank contributed to the remarkable progress recorded by Côte d’Ivoire in terms of reduction of factors of fragility and economic growth. Most interventions generated the expected outputs and achieved the expected outcomes. Infrastructure projects were executed as planned. The outputs were deemed satisfactory, even though for the HKB Bridge traffic to date remains less than anticipated. The effectiveness of interventions in the agriculture and social sectors was rated satisfactory even though for certain projects the assessment is more delicate, in the absence of initial quantified objectives.


deemed satisfactory, thanks to the Gourou Project. Details concerning the generation of outputs are available in Annex D.

Although outcomes obtained were deemed satisfactory overall, a number of operations, especially in the social sector, performed poorly and their effectiveness was rated as unsatisfactory. Details concerning the achievement of outcomes of all projects analysed are available in Annex D.

In the transport sector, the achievement of outcomes of the HKB Bridge Project were deemed satisfactory. The level of traffic in 2016 on this major infrastructure was estimated at 76% of the objective, while the outcomes in terms of job creation exceeded expectations during both the construction and the operation phases. Furthermore, the HKB Bridge helped cut travel time between Cocody and Marcory by at least one hour (the connection now takes approximately 15 minutes). In contrast, the expected outcome in terms of increased public revenue was not achieved in 2016. Moreover, with regard to the impact of the project in reducing the operating costs of vehicles, to date, no study has been able to confirm the actual expected costs reduction of at least 30%.

The effectiveness in the power sector was deemed satisfactory. As expected, the Bank’s contribution led to more than 20% increase in the national power generation capacity.

In the water and sanitation sector, the Bank’s contribution, consisting essentially of the outcomes of the Gourou Project (in its completion phase), is in the process of meeting expectations. The project’s first positive impact is increased safety at the Indenié Junction, which is now accessible during the rainy season. The project also helped improving the quality of life of the beneficiaries, thanks to wastewater/waste management and awareness-raising campaigns, as the evaluation team was able to note during the field visit and through discussions with project managers. However, the absence of

quantified data on the specific project area made it impossible to assess the overall project performance in terms of achieving outcomes.

The Bank’s contribution in the agriculture sector was deemed satisfactory. Meetings with local government representatives and beneficiary groups confirmed the resumption of State services in the Central, Northern and Western regions as well as the recovery of farming activities, in particular with an improvement in output and the marketing circuit (18 000 tonnes in 2016). Furthermore, the Bank contributed to the financing of the cocoa campaign for 2016, which concerned some 30 cooperatives and 7 500 farmers. It should be noted, however, that the non-quantified objectives of some projects made it impossible for the evaluation team to assess the achievement of certain outcomes.

In the social sector (basic services, governance and social cohesion), although effectiveness was deemed overall satisfactory, there were differences in performance between projects. Of the five interventions used in conducting the outcomes analysis, three were rated as satisfactory ((PAIMSC-Education; PURSSAB Capacity building and PARICS), one was deemed unsatisfactory (PAIMSC-Health), and the evaluator could not assess the performance of PAAEIJ, due to the absence of direct linkages between the project outputs and outcomes.

For the education component of PAIMSC, the interventions were not expected to produce direct outcomes but a general impact by increasing the enrolment rate from 44% in 2006 to 61% in 2010. The evaluation team was not able to assess the actual contribution of PAIMSC, but a documentary analysis and field missions confirmed the significant increase in enrolment in beneficiary institutions.

For PURSSAB, the non-quantified outcomes sought were a resumption of the operations of economic and financial administrations, access to basic social services, as well as the establishment of dialogue and peace mechanisms. The documentary analysis and the meeting between the evaluation team and


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the main actors concerned made it possible to assess the qualitative outcomes of the intervention, deemed positive overall.

For PARICS (in its completion phase at the time of evaluation), about 80% of the objective of training and re-socialization of former fighters was achieved. This should allow them to be supported in their re-insertion into civilian life. There is no data on the outcomes achieved through this support. However, the recent upheavals (January 2017) show that the re-insertion of former fighters remains a sensitive issue that has not been completely resolved.

Most outcome indicators announced by PAAEIJ were achieved. The unemployment rate among youth of working age fell from 9.4% to 8.6% in 2014. The per capita GDP increased to CFAF 908 000 (2015). The proportion of university-level students registered in science and technology rose from 26% to 33.4% in 2015 (from 18% to 24.8% among girls). With regard to the objective of reducing the unemployment rate of students from technical and vocational schools, the data is contradictory. Despite these rather positive developments on PAAEIJ’s effectiveness, the evaluation team does not propose any rating for the project’s performance. The causal link between project outputs and outcomes is not clearly demonstrated in relation to the reconstituted intervention rationale.

Policy dialogue was deemed generally satisfactory for the period considered. It was particularly important at the start of the period to enable the resumption of full cooperation. Two documents geared specifically to policy dialogue (Dialogue Notes 2006–2007 and 2007–2008) were issued at the beginning of the period, at a time when the country was coming out of the crisis and cooperation was resuming. The Bank showed its special commitment by initiating the dialogue with the country to clear all its arrears (Economic and Financial Reform Support Programme – PAREF, 68% of the arrears to the Bank cleared by a CFAF 183.9 billion ADF grant), and to restore the conditions for long-term cooperation, leading to a clearance plan.

This was an essential element for the international community’s re-engagement and a trigger for interventions by technical and financial partners (TFPs), particularly the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the reduction of the interim debt as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (World Bank and IMF).

For the 2013–2017 CSP, the objectives announced were not achieved and the dialogue focused more on sector issues. The Bank’s subsequent strategies, particularly the 2013–2017 CSP, systematically included policy dialogue goals. The goals of the full 2013–2017 CSP were not achieved and the dialogue focused more on the sectoral aspects of actual projects. The country strategy had defined five key topics for dialogue (country’s role at regional level in the common market and reduction of factors of fragility; improvement of the business climate; preservation of the environment; gender mainstreaming; and strengthening of domestic resource mobilization), but ultimately the dialogue was held with line ministries on matters related to actual projects, including: (i) technical assistance emergencies (four capacity-building operations, initially not envisaged); (ii) an energy and renewable energy access; (iii) transport operations (Lagos-Abidjan corridor, lagoon transport, San Pedro Port extension).

More specifically with regard to budget support, the policy dialogue at entry was deemed satisfactory, while the policy dialogue during implementation was somewhat mixed. For budget support programmes, dialogue on supported policies was held, at two levels:

❙ Dialogue at entry, which focused essentially on pre-approval triggers: the triggers were clearly defined, and were few and in line with a multi-year outlook, even though some that were too ambitious, gave rise to disbursement difficulties (PAAEIJ; PARICS). For the Ebola Multi-country Emergency Budget Support, the little preparation time available severely limited the dialogue on reforms.


❙ Dialogue during implementation focused more on outcomes. Based on the available information, the quality of that dialogue was deemed unsatisfactory. For PAREF, dialogue was confined to TFPs involved in joint monitoring (World Bank, European Union and IMF). With regard to PURSSAB, dialogue was limited due to the short duration of the operation in an emergency context focusing on the human and technical resources deployed. Dialogue also focused on very specific measures under PARICS, for instance the number of former fighters to be reintegrated, without actually contributing to the development of an inclusion and social cohesion policy. With regard to the more specific Multi-country Budget Support Programme in a health emergency (Ebola), the definition of the common matrix remained highly generic due to the very different levels of development of the health systems of the countries concerned. The most positive experience was observed under PAAEIJ, which featured a programme-based design that maintained a sustained policy dialogue with concrete monitoring of indicators and measures, using a participatory approach, etc.

The response to emergency situations was generally unsatisfactory. The Bank delivered emergency assistance to complement the efforts of other stakeholders in response to humanitarian or health crises. However, major delays in the granting of aid compromised the achievement of the objectives sought.

The relevance of emergency assistance was overall satisfactory, in terms of needs identification, alignment and targeting. Identification of and alignment on the country’s needs were clearly demonstrated by the inclusion of support instruments in the mechanisms set up and/or planned for Côte d’Ivoire (response to the avian flu using a sophisticated response mechanism; real leadership role played by the Government in the Ebola response). Targeting was often clear and quantified with regard to the level of beneficiary groups, geographical scope and the importance of contributing to the financial gap.

However, delays in the implementation schedules generally compromised the adequacy of the response to emergencies. Despite the insistence on the urgent nature of the issue and all the arrangements made in the planning documents, the respective schedules of the emergency projects to provide ad hoc aid in response to the avian flu threat and the Ebola response programme were not respected satisfactorily. In the case of the project to combat the avian flu, 17 months elapsed between the project approval and the start of implementation of the livestock health component. The reaction time did not improve considerably upon the resurgence of the avian flu – 10 months were needed between the transmission of the Government’s official request to the Bank and the signing of the Letter of Agreement. Works started one month later after the signing of the Agreement. With regard to the Ebola Emergency Response Programme, where the preparation of the appraisal report was shortened to the maximum, it took an additional 1-1.5 months between effectiveness and fulfilment of conditions for first disbursement. The audit schedule was also not respected. In some cases, non-compliance with the implementation schedule had a negative impact on the response provided, which was at odds with the most pressing needs.

Although the Bank’s precise contributions cannot be clearly delineated, overall effectiveness remains unsatisfactory. Since the execution of projects reviewed was delegated, the specific monitoring and evaluation requirement was either not systematically followed (avian flu, Red Cross), or featured contributions to a national policy from different donors. This made it difficult to evaluate the Bank’s specific contribution.

The Bank intervened twice in response to the avian flu epidemic in 2006 and 2015. Based on available information, by the time that the executing entity prepared its report, the 2006 intervention recorded little progress and the country’s use of resources had been limited (14%), especially with regard to the livestock health component. The second intervention, in response to the resurgence of the epidemic in


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Evaluation Criteria RatingCompliance with the schedule Satisfactory

Efficient use of resources Satisfactory


2015, was ongoing at the time of the evaluation. The information available shows rather disappointing outcomes: out of 28 activities anticipated, only 11 were fully implemented, representing 23.5% of the budget. As at end-January 2017, the situation remained of concern despite a reduction in the number of outbreaks. The goal of total eradication (zero case) of the virus has not been achieved to date.

In 2011, AfDB provided ad hoc humanitarian aid to victims of the post-electoral crisis through the Red Cross. The resources provided by the Bank focused on the food aspects and allowed for the distribution of food anticipated to meet the needs of target populations for 14 days. However, the project did not clearly establish a key for the distribution of aid, in particular between the territories of Abidjan and the West.

In 2014, technical and financial partners, especially those in the sub-region, including certain neighbouring countries of Côte d’Ivoire, joined forces to face another health emergency (the Ebola epidemic). The Bank mobilized its emergency assistance instrument, the Special Relief Fund (SRF), as part of a multi-country intervention (SWAPS project), and provided budget support via the African Development Fund. The major activities planned under the Ebola Response Programme were generally implemented: governance arrangements were made, planning documents were adopted, awareness campaigns were carried out and oversight was conducted. However, the outcomes listed in the logical framework cannot be attributed to the Bank’s intervention alone. A major mobilization of TFPs was undertaken to respond to the threat (specifically in Côte d’Ivoire – World Bank and International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR)). According to official sources, no case of Ebola was reported in the country and precautionary measures were lifted in September 2016.

Efficiency

Private sector operations, implemented in the form of public-private partnerships, were generally executed as scheduled. The HKB Bridge was scheduled to be built in 25 months, but the project was delayed by 9 to 10 months in relation to its approval date. It is worth noting that part of the delay was due to contractual and administrative issues (more than three months between approval and initial engagement) and not to construction work. Given the scope of the works, compliance with the schedule was deemed satisfactory. The AZITO and CIPREL Power Projects were satisfactorily executed and on schedule. Lastly, the loan for the SUCDEN Project was disbursed as scheduled.

The Bank’s budget support for governance/social measures in a post-crisis context were disbursed rapidly and generally as anticipated. The PAREF implementation schedule was generally respected, in a post-crisis context marked by the resumption of cooperation. The budget support component under the PURSSAB Programme was implemented in a relatively short time in response to an emergency (the capacity building component was delayed significantly by nearly 32 months).

The Bank’s efficiency in portfolio management was deemed satisfactory overall. Private sector operations and budget support were executed on schedule in a satisfactory manner, while significant delays were noted, particularly for investment projects. The use of resources was also deemed satisfactory overall, despite major disparities between projects due essentially to their quality-at-entry.


The disbursement conditions were fulfilled as scheduled. The resources were successfully disbursed within two months.

However, delays were noted for these budget support instruments. Although resources for PAAEIJ were disbursed as scheduled, significant delays of seven to eight months were recorded in the release of funds to line ministries, for several reasons: (i) the disbursement method selected by the Government, which applied two-tranche proportions for resources transfer to the ministries; (ii) cash flow problems; (iii) adjustment difficulties, which delayed the implementation of activities scheduled. PARICS also experienced considerable delays, especially in connection with fulfilling the disbursement conditions related to rural land. The conditions for disbursement of the second tranche were not fulfilled by the other entities executing the programme, thus necessitating a one-year extension (expected completion date: December 2016; during the February 2017 field mission, the programme was still ongoing).

A number of investment projects experienced significant delays, ranging from about one year (PAIMSC) to three or more years (PURSSAB – capacity-building component; Gourou), owing to specific difficulties that affected the disbursement rate. The delays were attributable to the nature of the projects, the implementation context (country in crisis), and delays in securing notices of non-objection.

PAIMSC and PURSSAB (capacity building component), undertaken in response to the crises, faced considerable obstacles at both the start-up and the implementation phases, which

led to delays. The multi-sector PAIMSC Project experienced significant delays. Scheduled to last two years (between 2007 and 2009), it was actually completed in 2013, owing to: (i) problems at start-up (10-months delay for the rural development component); (ii) change of project managers; (iii) failure to audit the different components whose execution was delegated to United Nations agencies; and (iv) constraints arising from the resurgence of instability during the post-electoral crisis of 2010–2011. PURSSAB (capacity building component) faced start-up difficulties related in particular to contracts for the supply of computer and desktop publishing equipment, leading to delays of more than 12 months. During the implementation phase, new difficulties related to procurement methods, change of project managers and the absence of local suppliers and service providers for certain activities also caused delays. With all these difficulties, the programme experienced delays totalling 31.5 months, with three extensions of the completion date.

The context of resurgent instability also considerably disrupted the implementation cycle of the Gourou Project. This caused serious delays since work did not start until 2013, three years after approval.

With regard to the Bank’s road infrastructure active portfolio under public investment projects, road link operations on the Mano River (budget of UA 96.6 million, close to 9% of the overall portfolio) and the Bamako-San Pedro corridors (UA 70 million, close to 7% of the portfolio) encountered start-up delays, owing to: (i) mobilization of counterpart funding, (ii) the Ebola epidemic in the region, and (iii) difficulties in

Table 3: Disbursement Rate

Disbursement Rate (%) January 2014 January 2015 January 2016 February 2017

Public sector 12.87% 38.94% 22.33% 13.13%

Private sector 22.85% 71.53% 91.94% 98.8%

TOTAL Côte d’Ivoire

18.27% 54.21% 50.13% 15.36%

Source: AfDB data


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compiling regional records, for instance agreements between several countries.

In 2014, the disbursement rate of Bank projects in Côte d’Ivoire was 18%, compared with an overall Bank Group average of 24% (APPR). The disbursement rates have increased significantly since 2014, particularly owing to private sector operations. The relatively satisfactory disbursement rate in January 2015 is attributable to successive disbursements for HKB (UA 26.1 million); AZITO (UA 17.89 million) and CIPREL (UA 16.3 million), and budget support for PAAEIJ (UA 13.15 million). The disbursement level for January 2016 is primarily attributable to the disbursement for SUCDEN (UA 79 million) and to a lesser degree for CIPREL (UA 15.2 million). However, there was a slight decrease in the disbursement rate for public sector operations in 2016 that was not completely offset by the private sector increase.

Due to lack of data, the evaluation team was unable to recalculate the current rate of return and compare it to that initially anticipated. The efficient use of resources was evaluated by reviewing the assumptions underlying the rate of return, whenever possible.

The financial return on the HKB Bridge was deemed unsatisfactory. The HKB Project had an overall rate of return estimated at 23% (taking into account all the economic and financial benefits). The current levels of traffic and toll are considerably lower than anticipated (60 000 vehicles/day for the first year of commissioning compared with a forecast of 75 000 vehicles/day and a CFAF 500 toll versus an assumption of CFAF 1 000). Overall, the project posts a deficit and the State guarantee has been mobilized. The State paid €26 million in 2016, representing about 40% of the operator’s income. Under these conditions, rather than be a source of revenue for the State, the HKB Bridge is now a significant source of expenditure.

Based on current information, the CIPREL and AZITO projects should be as efficient as

anticipated. For example, based on contacts on the ground and supervision reports, the AZITO Project is being carried out in a satisfactory manner, in line with forecasts. The risks are limited to the volumes produced and their sales price. Over the first 12 years of operation (beginning in 2015), which correspond to the period of reimbursement of the Bank’s loan, the AZITO Project should generate total revenue of USD 1,694 million EU and net total profit after tax of USD 524 million.

The efficient use of budget support resources cannot be measured owing to the fungibility of resources related to this instrument. There is no clear information as to PAAEIJ and PARICS. In the case of PURSSAB, the budget support instrument was used to allocate resources to the strategic expenditures needed for restarting public education services, while avoiding to over-fund certain activities due to the convergence of TFP programmes, all with a view to improving the efficiency of Government’s programme.

The efficiency of post-crisis investment interventions was mixed. As part of PAIMSC, the mobilization of United Nations agencies made it possible to very quickly gain access to and take action in the Centre, North and West regions, as these non-State agencies have the legitimacy, neutrality and technical competence needed to intervene in armed conflict situations. In certain cases, however, the work delivered was not of satisfactory quality and therefore had to be redone or completed (schools, health centres, etc.) Administrative difficulties related to operations audit also affected smooth programme implementation. As regards the agricultural component, the unsatisfactory quality of the project design created special difficulties in the alignment of: (i) supplies with needs, and (ii) the date of supply of inputs with the agricultural calendar. The efficiency of the Gourou Project was deemed satisfactory, despite delays caused by the resurgence of political instability. Lower-than-forecast costs made it possible to save about CFAF 6 billion. These savings were used to improve outputs and prepare future actions by preparing the Gourou Basin Masterplan Study.


Sustainability

The sustainability of interventions was evaluated by distinguishing between private sector operations and public sector projects. For the former, two criteria were mobilized: economic and financial performance, on the one hand, and environmental and social performance, on the other. The latter were analysed on the basis of: (i) technical soundness; (ii) economic and financial viability; and (iii) external risk management.

The sustainability of private sector operations is generally satisfactory, although it is a major economic and financial challenge for the HKB Toll Bridge in Abidjan. Transport and power infrastructure was built through public-private partnership (HKB Bridge, AZITO and CIPREL), making the private partner the guarantor of maintenance and operation. Therefore, sustainability focuses mainly on the financial viability of operations, but should pose no problem since it is guaranteed by the State under

concession and partnership contracts. The challenge for these interventions is the impact of guarantees on State budgets. As the sustainability analysis of the HKB Bridge has shown, State guarantees amounted to more than EUR 26 million per year in 2015 and 2016. Regarding the pre-financing of the agricultural season, SUCDEN, the operator, posted a solid financial performance with an increase in net profit. The profit for 2014 and 2015 stood at CFAF 66 million and 195 million, respectively (despite the decline in export revenue due to the drop in inventoried production and the decreased turnover in 2015, compared to 2014). However, SUCDEN had a problem with the renewal of its export license, but that was resolved by end-2015.

Environmental performance is generally satisfactory, insofar as infrastructure projects have caused no profound and irreversible changes in their immediate natural environment. Actually, these projects are helping to optimize or reduce pressure on some key resources. Hence, the Toll Bridge has improved the performance of the urban transport system by helping to ease traffic congestion and thus reducing pollution, while the carbon footprints of the power plants have been minimized with the installation of a combined cycle that is more efficient per unit of fuel used. However, the monitoring of environmental measures is not systematically documented and/or carried out. The evaluator did not have direct access to ESMP implementation monitoring documents.

The sustainability of public sector operations is deemed unsatisfactory overall. Public sector sustainability is more guaranteed for some interventions than for others, but remains generally unsatisfactory.

Evaluation Criteria RatingOverall evaluation of sustainability of private sector operations SatisfactoryEconomic and financial performance Satisfactory

Environmental and social performance Satisfactory

Overall evaluation of the sustainability of public sector operations UnsatisfactoryTechnical aspects Satisfactory

Economic, financial and institutional aspects Unsatisfactory

Consideration of internal and external risks Unsatisfactory

The sustainability of the outcomes of Bank's operations was deemed satisfactory for private sector operations, where services are provided by private operators with State guarantee. Sustainability was deemed unsatisfactory for public sector operations, particularly at the beginning of the period, due to the fact that efforts were focused on addressing factors of fragility; in such context, sustainability was not considered a major issue. Nonetheless, the sustainability of interventions improved over the period evaluated.


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The review considers that the analysis and the technical choices are satisfactory overall. Technical aspects constitute a major challenge, especially in the post-crisis context. They influence the quality of preliminary studies and the identification of needs, which are thus faced with multiple constraints: physical access, the need to act urgently, lack of technical skills (for example, the case of PAIMSC). The quality of the design is essential to ensure that the achievements are sustainable and that the target population can benefit from the project for as long as possible. A positive example of this is the GOUROU Project, under which the coherence and harmonization of facilities were promoted using the same technology as that used for the existing infrastructure (a guarantee of sustainability). Overall, while several projects display technical weaknesses because they were designed within the emergency context of the post-conflict period, the weaknesses have been gradually corrected to a point where performance is generally satisfactory, or even highly satisfactory, for projects approved in recent years.

The review notes the existence of a positive momentum, but considers that the factoring of the economic, financial and institutional aspects was unsatisfactory overall. The gains of post-conflict interventions are expected to be reflected in the policies and operations of the respective sectors of intervention. Although the equipment delivered is being put to use and functional in some cases (PAIMSC and PURSSAB for the agricultural, health, education, water and sanitation sectors), a key challenge, as far as sustainability is concerned, remains the commitment of the State to ensuring continuity and the maintenance of the operating budgets of the facilities. For example, under PAIMSC: (i) the field mission helped to establish that certain achievements had been maintained through the intervention of subsequent projects (production sales office, schools, health facilities, etc.) and that others were no longer functional (such as the Bouaké Centre of Excellence); (ii) given that a second phase of the project had been envisaged, there was no planned exit strategy. For its part, PAAEIJ attached importance to the sustainability aspects of operations, but attention to national

ownership (participatory design) was limited to the central level, since regional directorates were not involved in the process. Capacity building within the ministries concerned has remained incomplete insofar as a series of commitments are still to be implemented, such as the generalization of performance contracts, the monitoring of the integration of graduates and the functioning of the Interministerial Task Force. It should also be noted that PAAEIJ has adopted modalities for the disbursement of support in respect of operations for which all the planned services were not procured. Lastly, the capacity building component of PURSSAB, which financed office automation and IT equipment, propose no specific mechanisms for ensuring the maintenance of the equipment supplied.

Consideration of internal and external risks is deemed unsatisfactory. The gains of the interventions may be impacted by government decisions directly related to the scope and functioning of the public administration (for instance, the initiative to reduce the number of civil servants). Moreover, a sudden change in the political context may compromise gains in terms of social cohesion. These factors of instability may be compounded by exogenous factors linked mainly to the absence of a natural or ethnic border with neighbouring countries in the sub-region. The projects analysed do not include real strategies for managing risks nor any concrete measures for mitigating them.

Cross-cutting Aspects

The review of crosscutting aspects includes the gender perspective, the environment and employment.

The mainstreaming of the gender perspective into the Bank’s strategies and programmes in Côte d’Ivoire is satisfactory overall.

At the strategic level, the Bank has gradually mainstreamed the gender perspective into its framework documents. The first four documents - 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 NDP, as well as the transitional strategies for 2009–2010 and 2011–2012 - are largely limited to identifying


gender-related issues (context and recall of the objectives of the government strategy). The 2013–2017 CSP is the most gender sensitive in terms of its objectives. Indeed, the gender perspective is addressed in the development of the intervention strategy, where it is explicitly referred to in Pillar 1, Deliverables 1 & 2 and non-financial activities (policy dialogue, studies and advisory services). In addition, a specialist in the field was mobilized during the design of the strategy.

The mainstreaming of the gender perspective is reflected in the various Bank interventions, in a more or less direct manner, mainly in social/governance projects. Therefore, the gender perspective was mainstreamed into several components of the multi-sector PAIMSC intervention, in particular: (i) the agricultural component through the integration of women's groups as beneficiaries of interventions (bundled sales, income-generating activities, etc.); and (ii) the health-GBV component with a focus on reproductive health and gender-based violence management. PURSSAB and PARICS are an extension of the activities to provide medical and social support to victims of conflict. PARICS has placed emphasis on the re-socialization and employability of ex-combatants. For its part, PURSSAB, through the safe drinking water component, has further eased the water-fetching chore, which is mainly a woman’s task. PAAEIJ, primarily targeted unemployed youths, including women who are the most severely affected by unemployment (15% of women aged 15-34 are unemployment vs. 9.7% for men, 2012). The programme also sought to improve girls’ enrolment in science and technology streams, whether in vocational training or higher education. The (multinational) Ebola Response Programme included a crosscutting gender perspective, since patient care is mainly provided by women.

Positive gender outcomes have been achieved as a result of Bank interventions, but these are modest when compared to the scale of the problems.

❙ In terms of economic integration and unemployment, the Henri-Konan-Bédié Bridge hired almost 1,500 workers during its construction phase, of which 11% women. Under PAIMSC, women‘s income-generating activities that sought to introduce a revolving system lacked continuity, and as such had very limited effects over time, notably in terms of the functioning of the system.

❙ As concerns access to education/literacy, there was a substantial contribution to re-establishing the primary and secondary education system after the two periods of crisis (PAIMSC, PURSSAB). In contrast, the effect of PAAEIJ on vocational/university training and the employability of girls is unclear, given the challenges facing the sector.

❙ Regarding health, the PAIMSC helped to rehabilitate gynaecological surgery units. However, the needs remain very significant and other PTFs have intervened recently to renew equipment installed by PAIMSC (e.g. the Bouaké University Teaching Hospital - CHU). Regarding gender-based violence, PAIMSC’s contribution remains mixed, depending on the operational effectiveness of the platforms and centres of excellence in different regions of the country. Progress has been timid; centralized monitoring is still not effective, a major challenge concerns forced marriages (few practical solutions are available) and the widespread practice of genital mutilation.

In connection with non-financial activities, it is worth mentioning that a Gender Profile Study was published in 2015. The mission was not able to assess its effective contribution to enhancing the mainstreaming of the gender perspective into on-going Bank interventions.

The assessment of the environmental aspects at both the strategic and operational level is generally mixed and therefore unsatisfactory. Although 83% of direct online respondents express


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a favourable opinion on the Bank's interventions in Côte d'Ivoire over the past 10 years, these aspects have not been integrated into a process of strategic thinking and coherent action, despite the challenge.

The Bank’s strategies offer only a partial and rudimentary analysis of the environmental aspects and challenges in Côte d'Ivoire. These aspects are not addressed in terms of their relationship to other factors or their influence on the fragility trajectory. The Bank's strategic documents (dialogue notes, transitional frameworks and CSPs) show a degree of sensitivity to environmental issues, especially with CSP 2013–2017, in line with the international paradigm of "sustainable development". The main issues raised are related to demographic pressure, rapid deforestation, and constraints on natural resources, biodiversity loss and the perceptible effects of climate change.

The analysis of the strategies revealed the absence of objectives that are explicitly oriented towards the environment in general, or towards any of its components in particular. At the end of the 2006–2016 period, environmental concerns appear to be crosscutting in some of the outcomes sought by the CSP, whether at the level of intervention pillars, of policy dialogue for reform or of the advisory support to be provided. The main aspects relate to the link between investment in the country's key economic sectors (transport infrastructure, agriculture, energy) and climate resilience, as well as reforms aimed at fostering a green economy, climate change adaptation, natural resources preservation and waste management.

Limited resources were mobilized for environmental management. During the 2006–2016 period, the Bank did not finance any project explicitly focused on the "Environment" sector in Côte d'Ivoire. Furthermore, operations in the other sectors did not allocate any specific resources for the mainstreaming of environmental concerns other than compliance with environmental and social assessment procedures. Although preliminary impact assessments and environmental and social

management plans were prepared, the mission noted that the implementation and monitoring of ESMP measures remain flawed, particularly as shown by the lack of follow-up and the difficulty in accessing documentation – a trend that does not differ significantly from the problems observed in other fragile States.

Project design is not clearly geared towards green growth, despite the potential. Based on the analysis of some projects, it is observed that even if they do not have an intervention logic that is clearly geared towards "green growth", they can contribute towards achieving that goal through the effects they generate. In this regard, the Bank has supported and is supporting programmes and projects with significant potential to achieve positive environmental effects, and thus to address some of the environmental fragility challenges facing Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, projects in the agricultural sector (infrastructure, clusters, value chains and agribusinesses) have a great potential for structuring the sector and raising awareness among the stakeholders with a view to promoting more sustainable production. That will help to limit deforestation and biodiversity loss. It should also be noted that the very effectiveness of these projects could be adversely affected by environmental fragility, especially in light of the effects of climate change (e.g., the PAIA-ID project).

Nevertheless, some projects have positive effects. The Bank-financed infrastructure projects include positive responses to problems of unsustainable urban growth and the attendant pollution issues. The Bank has participated and is currently involved in structuring projects in the area of urban mobility, which will help to balance the transport system, reduce movement-related pollution and nuisance (HKB Bridge, urban railway project). The infrastructure construction that these projects entail will possibly have adverse effects on the urban environment, but there is no denying that the projects will also have a significantly favourable on this environment. For its part, the GOUROU Project will provide a favourable and long-term solution to the pollution problems of the Ebrié Lagoon, since it


covers a very densely populated area (a watershed with 3 million inhabitants). Lastly, enhancing the operational efficiency of the AZITO and CIPREL power plants will help optimize their CO2 balance and to respond to the challenges of climate change. Indeed, the combined cycles installed in the two plants increase the efficiency of electricity production but also reduce CO2 emissions per unit of gas flared.

Employment becomes an explicit strategic objective of the Bank in the 2013–2017 strategy. Employment is a major issue in Côte d'Ivoire. According to the Agence d’étude et de promotion de l’emploi (Agency for Employment Research and Promotion, AGEPE), cited in the National Development Plan for 2015–2020, combined unemployment (unemployed or under-employed portion of the available workforce) is estimated at over 26.5%. Furthermore, over 93% of the workforce is employed in the informal sector. In the Bank’s policy dialogue notes and the two transitional strategies covering the period 2009–2013, employment is discussed from the perspective of the contextual analysis in Côte d'Ivoire, but is not explicitly identified in the intervention pillars or priority areas. The CSP 2013–2017 focuses more heavily on employment, notably on youth employment, as this constitutes a major challenge for achieving stability objectives. Employment becomes a crosscutting objective included in the outcomes sought by the two pillars of the strategy. Pillar I specifically targets youth employment through the two programmes that the CSP plans to finance, simultaneously with a view to avoiding the risks of (resurgence of) conflict (PARICS) and with a view to improving the training of young people in order to promote their employability/integration into the labour market (PAAEIJ). The second pillar of the CSP focuses on the contribution to employment of interventions in the main sectors - agriculture, agricultural value chains and infrastructure, notably direct employment in the building and construction sector.

The Bank also focused on dialogue with the Government, with a view to improving employment (notably the reform measures agreed upon in the context of the PAAEIJ budget support).

However, the projects selected do not measure up to the stated ambitions. The programme does not address practical needs. PAAEIJ targeted 2 000 young people, or 1.3% of the cumulative target population of the main youth employment programmes. It has contributed little to the creation of direct employment (1,000 trainees concerned) with disappointing results. Furthermore, although support for the various ministries concerned with youth employability and integration is linked to the challenges of professional integration, it does not contribute directly to job creation.

Synthesis: Bank Contribution to Outcomes

Contribution to ending the crisis

The period of successive socio-political crises that Côte d'Ivoire experienced (2006–2011) severely disrupted the country’s development trajectory, impacting the social cohesion and undermining the functioning of key sectors of activity.

During this period, the Bank remained a trusted partner involved in investment activities (projects and programmes) and non-financial operations (dialogue), while maintaining continuity.

Before the official signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement marking the end of the 2002–2007 civil war, the Bank embarked on policy dialogue setting out the conditions for the resumption and normalisation of cooperation with the country, notably with a view to ensuring eligibility to its specific instrument - the Post-Conflict Country Facility (subsequently known as FSF and currently as TSF). Once these conditions were met, the Bank helped to mitigate the effects of the crisis and improve the living conditions of the population. In particular, it included its intervention in the Programme national de sortie de crise du gouvernement ivoirien (the Ivorian Government's National Crisis Exit Programme, PNSC), with its multi-sector project (PAIMSC) aimed at restoring essential public services, basic infrastructure, capacity building


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Figure 3: Trend of CPIA scores over the 2004–2015 period

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

201520142013201220112010200920082007200620052004

2.62

2.74

2.98

3.15

3.73.63.6

3.3

3.2

3.5 3.5

3.7

Côte d’Ivoire Africa West Africa

Post-Election crisisCivil War

Source: ADE, based on data from the African Development Bank (2016)

and provision of assistance to victims, which target zones severely impacted by conflicts (Central, Northern and Western regions).

In keeping with its commitment, the Bank also invested in improving and enhancing the economic governance of the country. In this regard, it financed two budget support operations - PAREF in 2009, aimed at creating a macroeconomic framework for growth, and PURSSAB in 2012, aimed at bridging a budget deficit with a view to the urgent rehabilitation of basic services, as well as the restoration of peace and social cohesion. The role of PURSSAB, which falls within the framework of the Presidential Emergency Programme (PPU), was significant in stabilizing the country at the time of the resurgence of instability following the post-electoral crisis of 2011.

To meet the challenges of the persistent fragility, as part of its Country Strategy for 2013-2017, the

Bank intervened with another programme in the social sector - PARICS. This programme is aimed at reintegrating ex-combatants into social and economic life, and strengthening social cohesion by targeting issues relating to rural land tenure, dialogue and care for victims.

The Bank has contributed to the positive developments in the crisis exit and transition process in Côte d'Ivoire, both on the social and the economic governance fronts. In both areas, the impact of the Bank's interventions has been very important. The field visits confirmed the effect of the PAIMSC and PURSSAB programmes for the resumption of public service missions (education, health and access to water), particularly in the Central, Northern and Western regions. This trend is demonstrated, among others, by the remarkable catching up made by the CPIA index (the index used to analyse fragility situations) in Côte d'Ivoire from 2012–2013, such


that it exceeded the African global and regional average (West Africa) in 2014–2015, despite the two crises that the country experienced.

Contribution to economic recovery and to key sectors

Over the past decade, Côte d'Ivoire has made significant progress in economic growth, with an annual growth rate of more than 8% between 2012 and 2015. Fiscal policy and structural reforms have contributed to this dynamism by increasing investment and improving the business climate. At the social level, the progress is more limited, and the country has experienced little change in terms of poverty (the poverty rate went from 49.8% to 46.3%); inequalities have also narrowed slightly, with a Gini coefficient for income that went from 0.420 in 2008 to 0.405 in 2015.

Transport infrastructure. After years of conflict and under-investment, the transport sector is facing two major problems related to the essential conditions for continued growth, namely the quality of the road network and the congestion in Abidjan. Paved roads account for about 8% of the network, which is well below the proportion for comparable countries. Moreover, the network has seriously deteriorated (75% is aged between 15 and 35 years). As for Abidjan, the growth of the city's population by more than 2 million inhabitants has increased the traffic to levels beyond the capacity of the current network.

The Bank actively supports the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, both in the road sector and in the city of Abidjan, although to date most of the projects are not yet operational. In the road infrastructure front, the Bank is involved in two regional road projects, with the first aimed at facilitating transport with Mali on the San-Pedro-Bamako (PARFM) corridor, and the second at linking Liberia and Sierra Leone (PAFT) in the Mano River region. When completed, these road links will increase the network of asphalted roads in good condition by 280 km, and also positively impact regional trade.

As far as Abidjan is concerned, the effects of the HKB Bridge have already been discussed. The Bank's contribution is expected to become even more significant with the multi-donor urban train project in Abidjan, which the Bank is financing to the tune of UA 190 million.

Energy infrastructure. Significant investments were also made in the electricity sector in Côte d'Ivoire after the country's commitment to stabilization (2011–2012). These efforts have resulted in increased power generation capacity, regional interconnection (Ghana-Togo-Benin, Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea) and the enhancement of transmission and distribution, making it possible to raise the coverage rate for Ivorian localities (with the number of localities served rising from 34% in 2012 to 43% in 2014). However, the household electrification rate remains low, especially in rural and peri-urban areas, where there has been no significant increase over the period (55.8% in 2008 to 61.9% in 2014). To improve this situation and double the current number of domestic subscribers (about 1.1 million) by 2020, the Government has launched two programmes to electrify all localities with less than 500 inhabitants, while reducing household subscriber costs (CFAF 1 000 is payable upon connection; the balance of CFAF 150,000 is spread over a 10-year period).

The Bank has actively supported the increased supply dynamics with these two projects that were completed in the electricity sector. The projects improved the operational efficiency of two of the country’s three thermal power stations - AZITO and CIPREL - whose generation capacity increased from 278 to 417 MWH and from 212 to 321 MWH, respectively. The increased potential has enhanced Cote d'Ivoire's capacity to export electricity to Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali. In addition, the interconnection with Ghana makes it possible to export to power Togo and Benin. It should be noted that the improvement in the access rate will be supported by a project recently approved by the Bank (end-2016), aimed at enhancing the electricity transmission network in the Western region of the country. However, the sector is still characterized by fraud, dilapidated equipment and power grid saturation, which resulted in losses of around 22% in


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2015. This situation, coupled with recovery problems, creates a structural financial imbalance in the sector averaging CFAF 58 billion per year. Until 2016, the sector depended on State subsidies to ensure its financial balance. Interviews with Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Électricité (CIE, the Ivorian power utility) during the field mission revealed that no subsidies are expected from the State in the years ahead.

The agricultural sector. The agricultural sector is a major source of employment; it employs nearly two-thirds of the workforce and thus contributes significantly to the formation of national GDP (24%). Despite the staggered progress made in certain sectors during the period, the competitiveness of the sector remains generally very limited, mainly due to the stagnation in output, low technical skills of producers, lack of access to inputs and markets, aging means of production, land issues, etc. The sector continues to be marked by export-oriented cash crops with low local processing rates - cocoa (30%); coffee (less than 5%), cashew (less than 5%), and rubber (less than 5%).

The Bank's involvement in the agricultural sector in Côte d'Ivoire is determined by the country's priorities and needs. After contributing to the technical and administrative rehabilitation of the sector in the Centre, North and West regions, as part of the crisis exit effort (PAIMSC – agricultural component), the Bank has resolutely supported the government programme (PNIA - National Agricultural Investment Programme) through a series of operations: (i) agropole projects that adopt an integrated approach aimed at increasing productivity in food industries by helping to improve infrastructure, organize the actors and enhance climate resilience; (ii) the PAIA-ID Project aimed at increasing the production, productivity and marketing of major crops; and (iii) support for the pre-financing of the cocoa/coffee crop season (SUCDEN). Moreover, there is a recent and on-going initiative in the agricultural and youth employment sector (Enable Youth), aimed at enhancing agricultural entrepreneurship. The analysis showed that two operations that have been completed or are in the completion phase (PAIA-ID and SUCDEN)

contributed, at relatively modest levels, to the revival of the agricultural sector, which has been one of the engines of growth in Côte d'Ivoire in recent years. The PAIA-ID Project targeted about 12 000 farmers, while a number of cocoa farmers' cooperatives were funded under the SUCDEN initiative.

Access to employment. The employment situation in the country over the post-crisis period has been characterized by rather positive developments, as demonstrated by the economic recovery. In 2012, the Government adopted a National Employment Policy (PNE) that places the fight against unemployment, especially among young people, at the heart of its concerns. Several initiatives have been launched to promote youth employment, in cooperation with the country's development partners. Considerable progress has been made, but the employment situation remains worrying, as most of the jobs created are precarious and remain concentrated in the informal sector. The number of jobs created in the formal sector from 2012 to 2014 is estimated at of 251,818 (source: PND), with the private sector accounting for 85% and the public sector for 15%.

In terms of employment, the Bank’s 2013–2017 intervention strategy in Cote d’Ivoire targets young people, in particular, as explained above. With the PAAEIJ Project, the Bank participated in an employability improvement programme for both vocational training and higher education graduates, which should eventually improve employment, even if the results, for the time being, are disappointing. The Bank also supported a youth entrepreneurship project based on a business incubation model (PRODIJE on-going), but the effects of the project, in terms of employment, are not yet tangible. In addition to these direct job-creation initiatives, the Bank - through various projects, such as HKB - has created thousands of direct and indirect jobs, on which we cannot capitalize in this report for lack of reliable and systematic statistics. Mainstreaming employment into the Bank's strategies and operations, in line with its 2016-2025 youth employment strategy, should help to better reflect the Bank's contribution to job creation in Regional Member Countries.

Photo : © Ulrich M

ünstermann

49Bank’s Performance

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Bank’s Performance

The Bank's performance in Côte d'Ivoire is generally satisfactory, although there are a number of specific shortcomings. Performance was analysed based on the following criteria: (i) consideration of fragility factors; (ii) relevance of the choice of intervention instruments and modalities; (iii) capacity to produce relevant analytical work; (iv) quality of supervision; and (iv) visibility.

Consideration of Factors of Fragility

Figure 4 below shows this situation. The factors of fragility faced by Côte d'Ivoire during the period have been grouped as political, social, economic and environmental. The Bank's operations intended to address the various factors of fragility are identified by green color.

The Bank intervened to boost the institutions weakened by the crises, from 2007 through the PAIMSC Project and in 2011 through the PURSSAB Project. Without directly intervening in the political or security sphere, the Bank nevertheless actively participated in reconciliation efforts and in the process of demobilizing combatants through the PARICS Project. Two Bank programmes – PAAEIJ and PARICS - are aimed at reducing inequalities in access to services, resources and jobs. Gender equality is included in several operations; for

example, PAIMSC has a component that deals with gender-based violence (GBV) and PAAEIJ seeks to improve girls' access to education. Land problems constitute a key challenge and have been addressed in the PARICS Project. The Bank's contribution to macroeconomic stabilization became effective in 2009 when it launched PAREF, which was followed by a budget support projects such as PURSSAB in 2011 and PAAEIJ in 2013. The Bank's interventions at the service level are numerous and include several road projects, the construction of the HKB Bridge and the Gourou sanitation projects. Electricity infrastructure projects aim to improve the supply of electricity without creating additional environmental impact. The Bank was also able to address the fragility generated by the Ebola epidemic.

The evaluation also noted the consistency of Bank Group's assistance in Côte d'Ivoire with its strategy for fragile countries. The Bank's "Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States" incorporates 10 Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2005), representing the international consensus on what constitutes best practice in this area. Of the 10 principles, the AfDB has, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, properly complied with the first principle, namely "Take context as a starting point", by preparing five strategy papers, based on the analysis of the context and its evolution, which will serve as a road map for Bank assistance. Concerning the principle "Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance", the AfDB was, in cooperation with the European Union, the World Bank and the United Nations, one of the first partners to focus on social cohesion, by initiating risky but vital projects aimed at ensuring a successful crisis exit. The Bank was also able to react quickly during the post-election crisis in 2011. The Bank’s long-term commitment in Côte d'Ivoire was further strengthened by the return of its Headquarters to Abidjan in 2014.

The Bank has adopted a strategic approach tailored to the context of fragility and its evolution. By comparing the analysis of the various factors of fragility with the Bank's strategies and operations, it can be seen that the Bank’s activities have had an impact on several decisive factors of fragility.


Choice of Financing Instruments and Modalities

The Bank mobilized eight different sources of financing, of which the main three – the ADF (35.4%), the FSF (15.9%) and the ADB window (47.5%) – together account for almost 99% of the funding. The mobilization of these sources of financing has evolved with the intervention context and the challenges to be addressed, with the ADF and the FSF intervening at the beginning of the post-crisis period (2006-2011) and the ADB as soon as the country was able to access the private sector

Figure 4: The Bank’s operations to address various factors of fragility over the period 2006–2016

Political Factors

Problems in the functioning

of political parties(Role of officials, selection of candidates with limited local

legitimacy)

Regional disparities in access to services and employment, inter- and

intra-community tension, incomplete reconciliation

process

Macroeconomic dependence

(dependence on exports, financing needs)

Strong and sustained growth, but perceived to

be hardly inclusive

Degradation of the natural environment

Demographic dynamics

Pressure on resources(deforestation, water quality)

Post-crisis economy dominated by agriculture/

cash crop farming, low value addition

(no local processing)

Urban population growth - increased demand for transport facilities and

basic services

Inequalities in access to services, resources,

employment

Recent and less recent immigration, displaced

persons, high population growth and non-

registration of births

Limited empowerment of women; violence against women and

children

Risk-fraught elections:Tendency to boycott elections and manipulate young people

Dissensions within the security establishment

Impaired capacity and functioning

of the institutions

Human and social capital undermined by the crises

Transitional justice not completed

Inequalities in access, property management, herdsmen-farmer conflicts, climate issues, mineral resources, etc.)

Unemployment and integration difficulties, affecting mostly young people

Proximity to other states in transitionRegional fragility Radicalism Ebola

Violent mobilizations

Social Factors

Economic Factors

Environmental Factors

Risk of undermining prospects for growth and poverty reduction

AfDB's Interventions

The Bank has mobilized various sources of financing, and tailored its instruments to needs. However, the effectiveness of these choices was limited by implementation-related factors.


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window (from 2012). The Bank has mobilized mainly three forms of aid: the project (with a difference between projects whose execution was delegated to the United Nations system and those implemented by the Ivorian authorities), support for public-private partnerships (PPPs) and support for reforms at the global and sector level.

The project implementation approach was constrained by a number of weaknesses. The implementation approach made it possible to target interventions at specific issues and gave the AfDB high visibility as a partner of the various stakeholders. However, the projects reviewed in this evaluation suffered from weaknesses at multiple levels. In several cases, the design quality was unsatisfactory, sustainability conditions were not met, and project implementation experienced lengthy delays. In considering this rather disappointing performance of these projects, account should be taken of the difficult post-crisis context in which they were initiated.

Budget support has had mixed results. Four budget support operations (PAREF, PURSSAB, PAAEIJ, PARICS) were mobilized in Côte d’Ivoire to meet situational needs without seeking to ensure continuity of initiated activities. Review of the use of the instrument in Côte d'Ivoire revealed that the scope and efficiency of the budget support instrument were limited by a number of practices, including:

❙ Targeting of certain amounts at specific activities. The two sector-based budget support programmes - PAAEIJ and PARICS - introduced the practice of targeting amounts at specific operations. The budget support arrangement was chosen for the PAAEIJ programme because the balance of ADF-12 needed to be mobilized rapidly. In this context, the intervention sought to articulate two distinct support dimensions: a cyclical pillar with tangible activities (direct opportunities for the integration of unemployed youths) and a structural pillar with intangible activities (sector reforms aimed at the workforce). About 17% of the amounts disbursed

by PAAEIJ was allocated to so-called priority projects. As for PARICS, almost all the funds were clearly allocated to three programmes: ADDR, PNSC and CDVR. While this targeting maintains alignment with national procedures, it has nonetheless "distorted" the instrument by introducing high transaction costs, especially in terms of management and control. The delays in implementing the targeted measures slowed down the programme as a whole, casting doubts on the efficiency of the instrument. Furthermore, the fact that the principle of fungibility of funds was ignored severely limited the capacity to conduct a policy dialogue on strategic issues relating to public finance management (PFM) and budget resource allocation, or even on other aspects of the sector policy governing the targeted operations. Under PARICS, one of the benefits of the targeted activities underscored by stakeholders was the ability to report on and closely monitor activities.

❙ Support for a programme with objectives that may be relevant and consistent with the CSP and the national strategy, but which do not really constitute macroeconomic, institutional or sector-based reform, as was the case with PARICS.

❙ Failure to adapt certain proposed monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to the instrument (external audit, production of mid-term performance reports, etc.), as was the case with the PURSSAB.

Regarding compliance with principles, coordination with other donors has been effective under PURSSAB (cooperation with the WB, IMF and NGOs) and PAAEIJ (catalytic role with other TFPs in this sector). Although PAREF had no coordination framework, the programme shared a common matrix of priority reform measures, while a joint review was conducted in September 2009 (without the Bank) and joint reports produced. Concerning PARICS, action was meant to be “concerted” and not joint. Harmonization of procedures, even when these procedures are aligned on those of the Government,


is questionable in light of the measures taken by the Bank to channel funding into the structures targeted at the outset. The practice of targeting resources-and controlling the implementation of measures obstructed harmonization and resulted in specific transaction costs.

Ownership by the beneficiaries was deemed positive overall, as captured in the completion reports (establishment of a monitoring/evaluation framework, production of implementation reports, the Government's determination and political will to implement reforms). Regarding PAAEIJ, in particular, the ownership and sustainability of the partnerships were rated as satisfactory, with a strong involvement of the Ministry of Planning. Nonetheless, this observation may be tempered somewhat in view of the delays by the Government in providing the resources needed to carry out the agreed reforms and in transmitting disbursement dossiers. In this context, it should be emphasized that a number of sector-based entities clearly did not have a sound understanding of the instrument at the outset. No specific mention is made of possible complementarities with other modalities implemented.

While budget support operations have contributed to macro-budgetary stability, the effective contribution of support to the ministries concerned, in a context where the credibility of budgets is still not adequately ensured. As pointed out by PEFA assessments (within the context of public finance management evaluation), this situation is likely to limit the relevance of the use of the instrument. The use of targeting in resource allocation, the direct agency funding method and the customized approach have proven ineffective in this context.

PPPs have led to the building of complex infrastructure, but the guarantees provided by the State pose a risk to public finances. The three PPP projects analysed (HKB Bridge, AZITO and CIPREL) made it possible to carry out the planned

investments in a timely manner and without any surprises in terms of costs. The level of services of the three projects is highly satisfactory. These results are attributable to the use of the PPP mechanism. In all three cases, the use of the PPP made it possible to: (i) work with a partner familiar with the technical aspects; (ii) reduce the time required to mobilize participating companies; (iii) reduce operating risks; and (iv) share risks by taking a stake in the private partner’s capital.

However, while PPPs help to facilitate public infrastructure financing, they are risky, since such financing is generally based on State commitments that may have considerable budgetary consequences, as in the case of the HKB Bridge. The legal and institutional framework for PPPs under preparation should help address this imbalance in the sharing of risks stemming from the partnership.

Analytical Work

The evaluation has shown that it was not possible to establish a clear and precise list of analytical work planned by the Bank for the 2006-2016 period in Côte d'Ivoire. The strategy papers do not all explicitly provide for the conduct of economic and sector-based studies. The special intervention context was characterized by successive socio-political crises, so that the Bank's strategies focused mainly on the short term.

The 2013-2017 CSP is the only document that includes an explicit section on analytical work by providing for two studies, which have so far not been carried out: (i) structural transformation of

The Bank's contribution in terms of analytical work has been limited


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the agricultural sector and improvement of primary products; and (ii) mobilization of resources and optimization of the tax potential.

Existing or planned analytical works are more centred on specific areas of intervention (including in connection with Bank-financed projects) than on sector-wide policies. Thus, within Bank-supported operations, there are activities that transcend the scope of specific feasibility studies, projection or implementation facilitation. Examples include the Abidjan Traffic Study (HKB Bridge Project), the Gourou Basin Master Plan, the diagnostics for the development of private training and the establishment of Higher Education Research Development and Innovation Bureaux (PAAEIJ). Two studies (currently underway) were also included as specific operations in the Bank’s portfolio, namely: (i) the Extension of the San Pedro Autonomous Port; and (ii) the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway Development Project, both of which are not explicitly provided for in the country strategies.

Supervision

Supervision could not be fully analysed because it was limited by (i) the non-availability of documents; and (ii) the failure to identify the persons responsible for supervision. As a result, and for illustrative purposes, the evaluator made a photographic compilation of available supervision documents and their planning for Group 3 projects (completed

projects). The partial analysis, nonetheless, revealed three main trends:

❙ An expanded supervision report should be produced on the two private sector projects after works completion and commissioning of the infrastructure. Concerning the HKB, two implementation supervision reports are available, but no expanded supervision report or its equivalent was produced. In the case of AZITO, it was observed that the project was subject to an annual supervision, as evidenced by end-of-mission reports, but the evaluator did not have access to any supervision report (whether expanded or not).

❙ The Public Sector Post-Crisis Project (PAIMSC) was supervised on three occasions, hence the assumption that the context of the 2010-2011 period did not allow for such missions. Furthermore, delegating the contracting authority has its own challenges in terms of feedback. Thus, each of PAIMSC’s three components was the subject of specific reports prepared by the executing agencies, with the agricultural component split by FAO into two sub-components, etc. This resulted in a lack of overall vision and made it difficult to supervise the achievement of overall objectives.

❙ Budget support is the most regularly supervised operation and is generally in line with the rate of one supervision mission per half-year (a rate equal to or less than one supervision in 6 months, in the case of PURSSAB, PAAEIJ and the EBOLA operations). It is worth noting that the budget support performance was generally monitored very closely at the level of outputs, along with sector performance indicators. The link between the two is not easy to demonstrate as in the case of PURSSAB and PAAEIJ, which may ultimately limit the ability to focus on improving the situation of the final beneficiaries and addressing the

Several weaknesses were identified in the Bank's supervision system in Côte d'Ivoire, including the non-availability of project implementation and project asset reports and output-focused monitoring.


constraints or factors hindering the achievement of sector policy objectives.

In addition, implementation monitoring is a key aspect that needs improvement, according to the stakeholders consulted (61% of respondents mentioned it as the area where improvement was most needed), and implementation modalities should also to be optimized, especially in terms of (i) procedures and particularly no-objection notifications; (ii) the stability of project managers; and (iii) the clarification of the respective roles of stakeholders.

The Bank’s one-time emergency assistance is not systematically monitored. The institutional memory is quickly lost and the executing agency does not systematically comply with the requirement that a specific report be prepared on activities financed by the Bank under a delegated implementation arrangement. In the case of infrastructure projects that have the most impact on the natural and social environment, the monitoring of mitigation measures and compensation effects is not stringent, given that environmental and social management plans (ESMPs) are not systematically available, and even when they are available, they are not effectively monitored.

Bank Visibility and Expectations

All stakeholders met had high expectations from the Bank at various levels, including areas of intervention and level of policy dialogue. While the Bank is a major financial partner, these expectations reveal a lack of visibility of its interventions and the difficulty for the institution to have a specific status and image that reflects its involvement in supporting the development strategy of Côte d’Ivoire, even though its headquarters is in Abidjan. The low visibility should also be considered in relation to the types of financing (for instance budget support and PPPs), where public communication about donors remains low-key. The absence of a team devoted to Côte d’Ivoire and the limited production of knowledge initiated by the Bank also play a role in reducing its visibility in relation to the specific issues affecting the country.

The Bank’s visibility in Côte d’Ivoire has remained low in the face of the many expectations.

55Country Performance

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Country Performance

Côte d'Ivoire's performance in terms of implementing the Bank's programme was analysed according to the following criteria: (i) leadership in the coordination of development assistance; and (ii) commitment to results in partnership with the Bank.

Aid Coordination Initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire

As already described above, Côte d'Ivoire has consistently provided a clear strategic anchor to the Bank's strategies over the period under review.

During the recent Ebola outbreak, the authorities played a real leadership role by ensuring coordination at all levels of government - from the central to the devolved structures of the State - involving traditional rulers who are closest to the communities and the population. The integrated response framework embodied in the plans, decrees and measures adopted, as well as the participatory approach implemented, were perceived as a "model for TFP coordination". There is an "Expanded Coordination Committee" established in 2014 primarily to ensure humanitarian coordination and dialogue.

Under the new National Development Plan for the period 2016-2020, an Advisory Group Organizing Committee was set up to coordinate financing and implementation. There was also provision for the establishment of 14 sector-based working groups that were to become operational in 2016 but which, based on information received, do not yet exist. The Government’s main interlocutor is the Group of Heads of Cooperation of Technical and Financial Partners chaired during the evaluation by AFD, with the support of the Bank's economist.

In summary, Côte d'Ivoire has assumed a leadership role through explicit strategies and the establishment

of an appropriate institutional framework with which the Bank's interventions were aligned. In contrast, aid coordination remains poorly structured and each development partner meets the services on an individual basis.

Commitment to Results in Partnership with the Bank

For proper implementation of certain operations, the Government has often taken specific measures in relation to its own rules on public procurement or the functioning of the budgetary process.

Under PAIMSC, the Ivorian Government agreed that Bank assistance be implemented by United Nations agencies that had access to the Central and Northern, Western regions of the country. Under the capacity-building component of PURSSAB, the Government agreed to use UNOPS procedures for the procurement of ambulances, after the rejection and cancellation of the initial competitive bidding process.

Within the framework of the PAAEIJ and PARICS budget support programmes, the Ivorian Government set up a working group in the Ministry of Planning to promote the implementation of the targeted operations planned under the two programmes. This group helped to support the commitment of funds by the entities concerned and to report on the results obtained.

Furthermore, to improve absorptive capacity and the rational use of resources, the External Resources Mobilization Committee (COMOREX) was set up to monitor commitments and carry out audit and supervision missions. COMOREX has a technical unit (CT-Comorex) which managed a database (Excel files) of development partners’ interventions. Since


2014, the Ivorian Government has worked to improve the system. A first agreement was signed with a company called "Development Gateway" to design a more powerful tool that has been accessible since 2017. This platform provides access to information on projects.

While these initiatives have helped to achieve and report on the desired objectives, they also show how difficult it is to monitor the procedures for the use of national systems.

Moreover, difficulties in meeting the conditions precedent considerably slowed down the implementation of other projects. In the case of the Bamako-San Pedro Road Project, the first disbursements were obtained behind schedule end-

2016, due to the non-fulfilment of disbursement conditions by the national counterpart. In the case of PAAEIJ, the disbursement of the second tranche of the loan was delayed by more than 18 months. The reasons given for such delays are: (i) the disbursement conditions were fulfilled later than expected (in May 2015), due to difficulties related to the two conditions precedent, namely the signing of programme contracts between the Ministry in charge of Higher Education and at least two public universities, and the adoption of a coordination process for the education and training sector; (ii) late submission to the Bank of the tranche disbursement request; and (iii) institutional changes in the ministry’s organization, which may have impacted the project implementation.

57Conclusions and Recommendations

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Conclusions and Recommendations

The Bank’s actions in Côte d’Ivoire over the 2006-2016 period were generally positive. The Bank was a reliable partner, offering support during the crisis resolution process and in specific emergency situations. It also made good use of its sources of financing and different forms of intervention by adapting appropriately over the period to the country’s circumstances. Its interventions generated tangible outcomes that contributed to the progress achieved by Côte d’Ivoire since 2006.

However, challenges that the Bank has not been able to fully address remain:

❙ Despite the remarkable progress made by Côte d’Ivoire over the decade, fragility factors persist and might jeopardize the country’s development outlook. One of the major challenges is to satisfy strong social demand caused by to the absence of any significant improvement in addressing poverty and inequality.

❙ The presence of the Bank’s Headquarters in Côte d’Ivoire has many advantages for both the Bank and the host country, but also some disadvantages. This evaluation brought to light two issues in this regard. Firstly, all stakeholders expect the Bank to be more involved in Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy in terms of volume of aid and areas of intervention, and improvement of policy dialogue. Secondly, there is an apparent contradiction between the Bank’s obvious proximity and the difficulty for Ivoirians to find the appropriate interlocutor.

❙ The evaluation brought to light weaknesses in the quality of the design of several interventions. The principal limitation found with several interventions, in particular those in the social sector, is the action rationale, which does not establish sufficient linkages between the outputs and the expected outcomes, aimed at contributing to the attainment

of the overall objective. Other weaknesses included the absence of baselines and the non-quantification of objectives.

❙ Discussions with the stakeholders involved in implementing Bank-funded operations helped to address issues related to programme dynamics and supervision: bureaucracy, high mobility of project managers, inadequate monitoring and evaluation.

❙ The analysis of the Bank’s emergency assistance operations pointed to several challenges related to guidelines and intervention modalities, rigorous project execution and monitoring. The Guidelines for Emergency Relief Assistance (2008) do not explicitly list health risks among the types of situations where the Bank plans to intervene rapidly. Yet, the Bank has provided support in biosecurity, notably in the response to the avian flu (and its resurgence) and to the Ebola epidemic. The emergency interventions in Côte d’Ivoire were also not implemented as scheduled and were sometimes conducted to the detriment of an adequate response to pressing needs.

The evaluation proposes the following recommendations in connection with these general conclusions:

Recommendation 1: Provide strategic support to Côte d’Ivoire for more inclusive growth with a view to reducing poverty and inequality across the country.

To support the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in this area, the Bank should intervene in the two areas where it has the expertise and recognized experience, namely improving economic governance and providing socio-economic infrastructure, by


seeking to target the most vulnerable people in its direct interventions or in the policies that it supports.

In the area of economic governance, the objective should be not only to improve public finance management but also to further enhance the business climate. To improve public finance management and efficiency, the weaknesses identified in the last PEFA should be addressed and the economic efficiency of pro-poor spending consolidated. To ensure a sound business climate, the reforms that led to the performance of the public procurement system being deemed satisfactory overall (2007 review) should be continued and supported by the Bank, in an effort to further modernize the functioning of the public procurement system.

Regarding socio-economic infrastructure, the Bank should prioritize support for infrastructure that has a direct impact on the poorest segments of the population in order to help them to meet their needs in terms of health, education, access to water and electricity, and income-generating activities. From a poverty-reduction strategy perspective, support to the electricity sector could focus on increasing coverage and network access for vulnerable segments of the population. In the agricultural sector, the Bank's experience in various areas (infrastructure, capacity building and private sector financing) could be enhanced through an integrated approach to strengthen value chains. The objective would be to capitalize on Côte d'Ivoire’s agricultural potential as a source of growth and employment. Interventions in the transport sector could align on these approaches by fostering access to markets in rural areas.

This strategy should also more clearly incorporate the main environmental issues affecting Côte d’Ivoire: climate change and the country’s commitments made at COP21, land resources management (agriculture, deforestation, management of protected areas) and issues related to demographic pressures (mobility, water and sanitation). Taking these issues into consideration should create opportunities for sustainable development.

Lastly, concern to better incorporate gender issues into the Bank’s strategy in Côte d’Ivoire has not yet translated into significant or positive outcomes. The goal will be to put gender at the heart of Bank interventions in terms of targeting, implementation and monitoring.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen policy dialogue on strategic issues and support it through relevant analytical work.

The Bank’s policy dialogue in Côte d’Ivoire during the period 2013-2017 was more sectoral than strategic, owing to the inadequate use of the budget support instrument and the shortage of relevant analytical work to help to better structure dialogue around clear objectives with specific timelines. For instance, the Bank could take initiatives to produce knowledge to feed into the dialogue, while trying to play a leadership role in the sectors where it is deeply involved. In this regard, budget support operations should be used to back reform policies on public finance management or at the sector level as mentioned above. In the design and implementation of these budget support interventions, the Bank should be particularly attentive to the quality of policy dialogue and the coordination of interventions.

Recommendation 3: Round out the PPP feasibility studies with systematic analyses of the consequences of State guarantees.

The 2016-2020 National Development Policy (PND) calls for the private sector to contribute 62% of total needs, representing about CFAF 18 719 billion. This provides a real opportunity for the Bank to better meet the high expectations of Ivorians, using the AfDB window to establish balanced and mutually beneficial partnerships with Cote d’Ivoire and partners. However, it is also recommended that PPP feasibility studies be complemented by systematic analyses of the consequences of State guarantees. The financing of the HKB Bridge showed the importance of being very attentive to State guarantees for this type of contract. If they are not sufficiently controlled, they may have a major impact

59Conclusions and Recommendations

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on future budgets. With regard to the State budget, it is recommended that a scorecard be kept of all the State’s commitments and their consequences on future budgets.

Recommendation 4: Enhance the Bank’s visibility in relation to its involvement in supporting Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy.

There is need to put a clear strategy in place with regard to the following: (i) more active and more visible participation in policy dialogue as described in recommendation 2; (ii) a communication plan geared towards the Bank’s involvement in supporting the country’s development strategy.

Given that the location of the Bank's Headquarters in the country complicates the implementation of programmes, the (re-)establishment of a structure that deals specifically with Côte d'Ivoire could be a step towards clarifying the Bank’s status and image.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of outcomes with regard to the Bank’s operations and strategies.

Regarding quality-at-entry, special attention should be paid to the formulation of an effective intervention logic that makes it possible to clearly define the results chain as a basis for subsequent monitoring.

As part of the implementation, sustained efforts should be devoted to systematic, rigorous and "real-time" monitoring designed to ensure the most integrated path to achieving results. To that end, the Bank can seize the opportunity to adopt a more participatory approach and involve actors on the ground in the monitoring exercise. Another possibility could be to revitalize and ensure better use of Open Data for Africa platforms. This approach has the advantage of allowing the Bank to address not only the concerns regarding the impact on the end beneficiaries but also issues relating to accountability, communication and the visibility of its interventions.

Lastly, the use of a "marker" approach could favour the integration of crosscutting concerns such as the environment, gender, employment or food security. Such an approach is being developed in the Bank for gender issues and could be expanded to other areas.

Recommendation 6: Clarify the guidelines and forms of intervention with regard to emergency assistance to ensure that they are better tailored to the risks and sources of fragility, and ensure rapid interventions that hit their targets in as short a time as possible.

A Bank-wide emergency response strategy could be envisaged as part of the necessary effort for managing the risks and threats faced by African countries. In particular, health threats should be explicitly included in the Guidelines for Emergency Relief.

To avoid long response times, it is recommended that the Bank conclude a framework agreement with partner organizations that are most often involved in aid mobilization (notably the United Nations system), as that would enable resources to be mobilized almost automatically (see the EU experience in this area). Moreover, the Bank's financial instrument – the Special Relief Fund (SRF) - has very limited resources and is still poorly adapted to a situation where emergency and fragility are concurrent, especially since fragility may have a regional dimension. The experience of the budget support provided in response to the Ebola outbreak, mainly for preventive purposes in Côte d'Ivoire, points to the need for instruments with greater capacity to mobilize the resources required to respond, in future, to a situation where a country faces risks originating from outside its borders, but affecting its territory and resources (for example, migration crises leading to political or climate refugees). It is recommended to set up a specific instrument to respond to emergencies and risks, with the possibility of this instrument combining grants and assistance from trust funds.

Annexes


Annex A — Methodology

Return to normalisation, international re-engagement and exit from crisis

Economic Recovery

1

2Impacts

RCI strate-

gies

Different frameworks of the Emergency Post

Conflict Assistance (EPCA) PlanDSRP 2009–2013

AfDB strategies

NSGP 2009–2010 (*Transitional Framework ) Country Profile 2011–2012 (*Transitional Framework )

PDN 2006–2007 Policy Dialogue

Note

PDN 2007–2008 Policy Dialogue

Note

Outcomes

Preparation of Bank

re-engage-ment and

resumption of disburse-

ment

Normali-sation of

international relations

Mitigate the socio-eco-

nomic effects of the crisis and improve

people's living

conditions

Enhanced and improved economic governanceImprovement of food secu-rity and living conditions of

populations

Competitive-ness; reliable and affordable

electricity; increased sup-

ply capacity, reduction of

GHG emissions

Improvement of traffic and

road conditions in Abidjan

Outputs

Recovery conditionsRehabilitation

of public services

and basic infrastructure;

assistance to victims (in the Central,

Northern and Western

Zones)

Effective public finance mana-gement (PFM)

Basic social

services restored

Enhanced procure-

ment system

Infrastructure enhanced and

restored

Installation of the combined

cycle - improved

operational capability

Bridge connecting Cocody and

Marcory exists (75-100K v/d

expected)

Trained PFM

officers

Capacities built,

material and human resource

needs covered

Eligibility for the Bank's Post-Conflict Countries

Facility

AfDB projects/

programs /Policy Dialogue

PAIMSC

Post-Crisis Multi-Sector Institutional

Support

Policy Dialogue GOUROU AZITOPAIAID HKBPAREF PURSSAB

2002–2006Civil War

2009 20132010–2011Political Crisis

Source: IDEV

A1 - Theory of Change

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Enhancement of governance, social cohesion, and support for economic recovery that creates jobs for inclusive development3

CSP 2013–2017

Pillar 1 Enhancement of Governance and Accountability

Pillar 2 Development of Infrastructure in Support of Economic Recovery

Regional com-mon market

and reduction of fragility;

improved busi-ness climate; environmental

protection; Gender and

National Development Plan (PND); mobilization of domestic resources

Enhanced dialogue, reconciliation, social

cohesion and inclusion

Access to decent employment improved and economic inclusion

encouraged

Enhance agricultural sector performance in

order to reduce extreme poverty and hunger

High quality and affordable power for the population and

enterprises

Improved movement of persons and goods and enhanced

dynamism of the country in the region

Improved financial governance of basic

social services

Reintegration: economic and social

reintegration of former combatants,

vulnerable groups, displaced persons

and women victims of GBV

Best national strategies for skills development. Effective implemen-tation of employment

policy. Steering educational system for

economic demand

Setting up of infrastruc-ture for production,

processing and mar-keting; development of institutions and the community; resilience of the regional market

to climate change; competitiveness of the industrial sector; youth

agribusiness

Rural and peri-urban electrification in

Central, Northern and Western (CNO) zones; enhancement of the network and quality of service; clean and renewable energy; regional integration

Opening up of agricultural areas; easing

of urban traffic (Abidjan)

Interconnec-tion (road corridors);

trade; transit of goods and

access to ports facilitated

Results-based budget management;

modernization of the public procurement

framework; "Good Governance & Anti-Corruption"

National Plan

PARICS

Social Inclusion and Cohesion

Enhancement Support

PAAEIJ PRODIJE

Improvement of employability

and integration of youths

Two agropole projects PARCSI Enable Youth

CIPREL Interconnection CSLG; Transport net-work enhancement

Dialogue

PARFFM/ PAFT/ Abidjan Urban Transport/ Studies on the

Abidjan-Lagos Highway and San Pedro Port

Institutional support for capacity building

PAIM

SC II

2016


A2 – Evaluation FrameworkQuestions(Reference number in the current report)

ToR

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Resp

onse Assessment Criteria

QE1 – Relevance of the assistance in terms of meeting the needs of the country and beneficiary groups

❙ Relevance and quality of Bank strategies to Côte d'Ivoire's needs and priorities

❙ Selectivity in portfolio construction and concentration in areas the Bank has comparative advantages in Côte d'Ivoire

❙ Relevance and quality of Bank project design for achieving the objectives

❙ Targeting, visibility and experiences of target groups of the interventions

QE2 – Consistency of the assistance with the Bank's strategy in fragile countries

❙ Consideration of fragility factors in the Bank's strategies in Côte d'Ivoire

❙ Adaptation of country strategies to changing Bank strategies in fragile states

❙ Compliance with international standards of engagement in situations of fragility

QE3 – Inclusiveness of Bank interventions (social, gender and age equality)

❙ Socially inclusive nature of Bank interventions

❙ Integration of the principle of gender equality into Bank interventions

❙ Integration of youth employment concerns into Bank interventions

QE4 – Response to environmental factors of fragility

❙ Consideration of environmental factors of fragility in the strategies of the Bank and its dialogue with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire over the past decade

❙ Inclusion of environmental factors in Bank projects and influence on these factors

QE5 – Effectiveness of assistance in terms of achieving the country's development objectives

❙ Achievement of outputs expected from Bank interventions

❙ Generation of observable direct effects, whether expected or not, by the outputs of Bank interventions

❙ Contribution of intervention effects to country development objectives

QE6 – Effectiveness of emergency and humanitarian assistance

❙ Relevance and quality of emergency project design

❙ Achievement of the planned outputs of the emergency response

❙ Compliance of the emergency response with an appropriate timetable

❙ Generation of observable direct effects, whether predicted or not, by the outputs of emergency interventions

QE7 – Sustainability of outcomes

❙ Sustainability concerns (factors and objective) in strategies and policy dialogue

❙ Continuation of outcomes once the intervention is completed

QE8 – Efficiency of interventions

❙ Compliance of Bank interventions with an appropriate timetable

❙ Efficient use of Bank intervention resources

QE9 – Source of financing and intervention arrangements

❙ Effective mobilization of available sources of financing and the various intervention arrangements

❙ Activation and implementation of budget support arrangements in line with the budgetary context and the objectives sought by the Bank

❙ Mobilisation of PPP in line with short- and long-term financing needs

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Questions(Reference number in the current report)

ToR

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Resp

onse Assessment Criteria

QE10 – Non-Financial Activities of the Bank

❙ Bank Mobilization in Policy Dialogue

❙ Conduct of analytical work and its adequacy to support decisions

❙ Supervision quality and dedicated human resources

QE11 - Côte d'Ivoire’s performance as a Bank partner

❙ Measures taken by Côte d'Ivoire to facilitate the implementation of Bank interventions

❙ Coordination of development partners by Côte d'Ivoire to achieve its own objectives in sectors targeted by Bank interventions

QE12 - Bank's performance as a development partner

Dealt with in a concluding and summary section


A3 – Evaluation Process

Reporting Phase

Met

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Appr

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Deliv

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Impl

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Evaluation Questions

1. Inventory of available information and literature review.

2. Contextual analysis and reconstruction of the change theory.

3. Structuring evaluation questions and developing the evaluation framework.

4. Detailed inventory of interventions and sampling

5. Côte d'Ivoire preparatory mission 6. Preparation of collection tools

❙ Baseline "theory of change" framework

❙ Evaluation framework

❙ Inception report

Information and discussion sessions with AfDB stakeholders (including the preparatory mission)

❙ Evaluation matrix completed in a systematic and targeted manner - preliminary responses and assumptions to be verified

❙ Comparing the information and the reality on the ground - reports

Presentation of the approach to the AfDB at the beginning of the mission, meetings with the stakeholders, in situ visits, end-of-mission workshop

❙ Technical report

❙ Project results assessment (PRA)

❙ Summary report

Discussion session on the interim technical report

1. Analysis of relevant documents and literature

2. Field missiona. Meetings with key

stakeholdersb. Case studies, workshop for

the presentation the results achieved in Côte d'Ivoire

3. Online consultation of the stakeholders met.

1. Integration of results – summary of information by indicator, analysis by sub-question, preliminary response

2. Triangulation of information and verification of validity

3. Conclusions and recommendations

Response to Evaluation Questions – Findings and Conclusions

Summary and Recommendations

Data Collection and Assumptions

Possible Answers

Supplementary Information

Cross-checking and Verification

Structuring into Sub-questions

Indicators

Inception Phase Data Collection and Analysis Phase

Task

s

Source: IDEV

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A4 – Project Rating Scale

Score 1 2 3 4Scale Highly unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Highly satisfactory

Relevance Very poor design, quite inappropriate and very limited/non-existent alignment

Poor or inappropriate design; and limited or flawed alignment

Fairly solid and fairly appropriate design; and significant alignment

Very solid and highly appropriate design; and total alignment

Efficiency Expected outputs not achieved in most casesNone or very few of the expected outcomes are achieved

Expected outputs achieved with considerable gapsFew of the expected outcomes are achieved

Expected outputs achieved in most casesMost of the expected outcomes are achieved

Expected outputs fully achieved All expected outcomes are achieved

Effectiveness Wide gap between the ERR and the capital opportunity costWide gap between the expected and actual implementation timeframe

Wide gap between the ERR and the capital opportunity cost Wide gap between the expected and actual implementation timeframe

Reasonable gap between the ERR and the capital opportunity costReasonable gap between the expected and actual implementation timeframe

Little or no gap between the ERR and the capital opportunity costLittle or no gap between the expected and actual implementation timeframe

Sustainability Mechanisms to ensure viability (on the technical, economic, financial, institutional, partnership, environmental and social fronts) are not guaranteed

Mechanisms to guarantee viability (on the technical, economic, financial, institutional, partnership, environmental and social fronts) are hampered by significant risks.

Mechanisms to guarantee viability (on the technical, economic, financial, institutional, partnership, environmental and social fronts) are generally provided, with certain risks.

Mechanisms to guarantee viability (on the technical, economic, financial, institutional, partnership, environmental and social fronts) are provided in full.


Annex B — Key Comparative Socioeconomic Indicators of the Country

Indicators Unit 2000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (e)National AccountsGNI at Current Prices Million US $ 10 571 23 695 26 589 29 407 32 128 32 009 ...

GNI per Capita US$ 640 1 150 1 260 1 360 1 450 1 410 ...

GDP at Current Prices Million US $ 10 420 25 382 27 099 30 103 34 084 31 532 35 583

GDP at 2000 Constant prices Million US $ 10 420 11 065 12 246 13 311 14 482 15 775 17 096

Real GDP Growth Rate % -4,6 -4,7 10,7 8,7 8,8 8,9 8,4

Real per Capita GDP Growth Rate

% -6,8 -6,9 8,1 6,1 6,2 6,3 5,8

Gross Domestic Investment % GDP 10,8 10,5 16,5 17,7 18,8 20,3 23,9

Public Investment % GDP 2,8 3,6 4,5 6,5 6,2 6,9 7,5

Private Investment % GDP 8,0 6,9 12,0 11,1 12,6 13,4 16,4

Gross National Savings % GDP 7,8 20,1 16,0 16,0 19,3 16,8 18,4

Prices and MoneyInflation (CPI) % 2,5 4,9 1,3 2,6 0,4 1,2 1,1

Exchange Rate (Annual Average) local currency/US$ 712,0 471,9 510,5 494,0 494,4 591,4 588,3

Monetary Growth (M2) % -29,4 11,1 0,7 9,4 16,1 8,7 6,5

Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP

% 16,0 31,1 27,1 27,6 28,2 27,7 26,3

Government FinanceTotal Revenue and Grants % GDP 17,1 18,1 14,4 18,9 20,4 19,5 21,0

Total Expenditure and Net Lending

% GDP 18,3 18,4 22,1 22,8 21,8 23,8 24,7

Overall Deficit (-) / Surplus (+) % GDP -1,2 -4,0 -3,1 -2,3 -2,2 -2,8 -3,8

External SectorExports Volume Growth (Goods) % -2,8 -3,4 8,1 1,4 -0,1 14,9 8,8

Imports Volume Growth (Goods) % -15,8 -21,9 49,2 3,6 -12,4 13,5 7,3

Terms of Trade Growth % -17,0 4,6 -2,5 1,6 -6,0 -0,3 2,7

Current Account Balance Million US $ -293 3 111 -475 -462 -766 -791 -1 043

Current Account Balance % GDP -2,8 12,3 -1,8 -1,5 -2,2 -2,5 -2,9

External Reserves months of imports 2,3 5,5 3,9 4,1 4,4 0,3 0,3

Debt and Financial FlowsDebt Service % exports 1,5 22,8 9,4 12,6 8,2 10,1 10,9

External Debt % GDP 178,8 66,8 44,2 41,3 37,0 41,8 39,6

Net Total Financial Flows Million US $ 715 1 971 1 358 3 1 108 1 814 ...

Net Official Development Assistance

Million US $ 351 1 436 2 885 1 273 925 653 ...

Net Foreign Direct Investment Million US $ 235 302 330 407 439 430 ...

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Real GDP Growth Rate, 2004–2016 (%)

2015 201620142013201220112010200920082007200620052004-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Source : AfDB Statistics Department; IMF: World Economic Outlook, April 2017 and International Financial Statistics, April 2017; AfDB Statistics Department: Development Data Portal Database, March 2017. United Nations: OECD, Reporting System Division. Last Update: June 2017

Notes: … Data Not Available ( e ) Estimations ( p ) Projections

Inflation (CPI), 2004–2016 (%)

15 20161413121110090807060520040

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Current Account Balance as % of GDP, 2004–2016

15 2016141312111009080706052004

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14


Project Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability

HKB 4 4 2 2

AZITO 4 3 4 3

PAIMSC 3 3 3 3

PURSSAB 3 3 3 3

PAAEIJ 3 2 - 2

Annex C — Evaluation Rating

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Annex D — Expected Outputs and Outcomes

D1 – Expected Outputs

Sect

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e Main Outputs Expected Main Outputs Achieved

Tran

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HKB

Brid

ge 4 ❙ Technical and physical achievement

❙ Governance and operation of the structure

❙ Feasibility and social acceptability

❙ > 100%: 2x3-lane, 1.5 km-long bridge constructed: sections (i) North (2x2 lanes with high traffic and highway bridges); (ii) Lagoon (dyke, toll station enlarged in 2016); (iii) South (2x3-lane, 2.1 km-long road with pedestrian access; additional works on the VGE interchange to ease traffic on the HKB Bridge)

❙ 100%: concession agreement, insurance contract and matrix of established tariffs

❙ The resettlement of the second wave of project-affected residents is underway (agreement obtained)

Elec

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AZIT

O; C

IPRE

L 4 ❙ Technical and physical achievement

❙ Governance and operation of the structure

❙ 100% installation of a steam turbine and a transformer with the latest technological features; construction of a water demineralization plant and a water supply borehole (low discharge of effluents into the lagoon)

❙ 100%: concession agreement, insurance contract and matrix of tariffs drawn up

Agric

ultu

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PAIM

SC-A

gric

ultu

ral C

ompo

nent 3 ❙ Rehabilitation of administrative and

experimental structures

❙ CNRA, MINAGRI, MIPARH, FIRCA and OPA Equipment.

❙ Reconstruction of CNRA genetic resources

❙ Technical capacity building for OPA/ supervisory services

❙ Building of the technical, production and marketing capacity of producer groups and associations

❙ 33 multi-purpose infrastructures rehabilitated, fewer than anticipated due to cost under-estimation

❙ Equipment distributed but not to all beneficiaries (some takeovers//OPAs) or in double quantity (MIRAH), quality not always up to expectations. Absence of initial quantified target

❙ Access to seed and production capacity for reconstituted and functional fry (CNRA), with some persistent difficulties

❙ Numerous quality training sessions provided

❙ 347 structured and functional groupings with their management bodies; many achievements in terms of training on production methods (absence of target); establishment of 4 collection and marketing centres and a sales office for producers (Bouaké)

SUCD

EN 3 ❙ 400 000 tonnes of cocoa purchased in 2017

❙ (On-going) 12.5% or 50,000 t purchased in 2015/2016, of which 7,500 t certified by the sustainable cocoa programme. 152,000 and 241,000 tonnes sold in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The objective seems high given the 2014/2015 results. The achievement rate is rather modest, due partly to the difficulties faced by SUCDEN in obtaining licences

PAIA

-ID 3 ❙ Development of agricultural structures

❙ Capacity building

❙ (On-going) 70% of the structures put in place: rehabilitated and developed lowlands, rural roads re-profiled/rehabilitated and critical bridges repaired, boreholes drilled and 40 pump installed

❙ (On-going) 67%: training offered to 447 rice farmers, 813 members of coffee/cocoa cooperatives and 2 152 food producers. Supply of banana suckers and cassava cuttings, 17 ha of off-season vegetable crops. Establishment of an ESMP Committee


Sect

or

Inte

rven

tion

Scor

e Main Outputs Expected Main Outputs Achieved PA

IMSC

- E

duca

tion 3 ❙ Rehabilitation/equipment of 110

schools/660 primary school classrooms, sanitary facilities and water points, educational kits and school supplies

❙ Basic pedagogical training for 4 345 volunteer teachers

❙ Capacity building for 10 inspectorates and establishment of 300 school clubs (hygiene, health and peace)

❙ (Objective revised in 2010) Activities achieved overall: 99% of classrooms built (607 primary schools, 44 pre-schools); 102% of the sanitary facilities provided; amusement equipment for 10 nursery schools, furniture for 66 nursery classes, 30 350 primary school desks, teaching materials and school kits. Significant residual requirements taken into account under the Presidential Emergency Programme (PPU)

❙ 92% or 4 005 volunteer teachers were trained and integrated into the public service between 2009-2012 in the target regions

❙ Ten (10) primary school inspectors trained and equipped with IT equipment; distribution of sanitary equipment to each school, importance of these clubs (e.g., Bouaké) for the maintenance of schools (rooms, school yards and environment)

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PAIM

SC -

Hea

lth-G

BV

2 ❙ Refresher courses for health personnel (7,545 doctors and others)

❙ Rehabilitation and equipment of 32 health units, 3 gynaecological blocks and peripheral maternity units

❙ Psychosocial and economic care for victims of GBV and monitoring system (4 reception centres, 300 officers trained, care for 100% of victims, training and income-generating activities (IGAs) for at least 50% of GBV victims, care for at least 30% of victims by police/legal assistance, at least 50% GBV victims treated); awareness-raising

❙ 44% (3 319 people) trained (maternal and reproductive health, nutrition, school medicine and epidemiology). Cancellation of training and redefinition of targets following the increase in per diem rates.

❙ (Target reviewed), 27 level one health facilities (CWSF) rehabilitated and equipped, as well as the Séguéla regional health centre (operating rooms, imaging, and resuscitation equipment), supply IT equipment (12 sets) and rolling stock (4 ambulances, 1 pick-up truck and 30 motorcycles for the level one health facility). 100% of the gynaecological blocks (including those of the Bouaké University Health Centre and the Guiglo Regional Health Centre visited are functional)

❙ Two (2) of the 4 centres of excellence constructed; the Bouaké centre (visited) was set up, but a holistic approach was not implemented (difficulty in assigning medical staff, relay provided by OIS Africa for medical certificates up to 2016). 85% of the personnel concerned were trained); treatment of GBV victims: the visit to Bouaké revealed that the staff assigned to provide this care are not specific and specialized. Limited potential for reaching the target of providing care to 100% of victims, due to the under-performance by centres of excellence and various practices (e.g., Man/Guiglo - existing holistic care algorithm and operational reference platform, e.g., in Bouaké, only psycho-social care is provided, the centre's building was not functional and the equipment was not used; 1 to 2 cases received care per month in 2016). 61% of survivors were reintegrated through income-generating activities (IGAs), but there is no link between these activities and women victims of GBV in Bouaké, for example. Legal assistance reached its target (33%), but the trend is not encouraging for cases of physical violence (4%). Awareness raising was conducted through a feature film entitled: "Fifi’s Challenge" and radio broadcasts.

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PURS

SAB

- Ca

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ty b

uild

ing 3 ❙ Strengthening economic, financial

and planning services

❙ Improvement of access to basic social services (education, health, and water)

❙ Implementation of dialogue mechanisms

(absence of precise quantified targets or under-estimation)

❙ Eight (8) lots of IT equipment procured and distributed according to priorities (theft-deficit-better performance), but with significant delays (notice of non-objection). 8 lots of office equipment procured and delivered, of which 2 lots were re-oriented to the Directorate of Economic Analysis and Projection (DCPE) (replacement of equipment after the fire). Nine studies were carried out (11 reports available) on different themes (private sector, public enterprises, performance of financial institutions, financial institute, economic governance support, statistical production, control and inspection procedures manual and accounting management and mail handling). Thirteen types of training involving 807 people were identified at the request of the beneficiaries and conducted in various fields (public partnerships, audit and risk management, WAEMU guidelines, medium-term expenditure framework, conflict management, monitoring & evaluation, results-based management, financial programme, expenditure execution procedures, customs, HR, etc.)

❙ 100% (5 medicalized + 15 transfer) of the ambulances procured; delays in the choice of the contractor (Bank's notice of non-objection). Procurement of waste pre-collection material and kits for Abidjan and 16 municipalities in the Centre, North and West regions and conduct of awareness campaigns.

❙ Achievements comprise the setting up of an information and management system and IT equipment for the collection of testimonies in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR); and the conduct of various media and awareness-raising activities for the purpose of peacebuilding and reconciliation

PARI

CS 3 ❙ Resocialization, coaching training of ex-combatants (15,500, of whom 2 000 women, or 22% of the total number of ex-combatants of the two antagonistic groups)

❙ Social cohesion - land tenure security, dialogue and mediation mechanisms, care for victims

❙ Coordination of cohesion policies and enhancement of participation

The project is underway:

❙ Overall, 80% (57% of the female target) of ex-combatants were trained: 28% in transport-related trades, 27% in agro-pastoral activities and 40% in trades related to agro-pastoral activities, 2.2% in solar energy, 1.3% in small-scale processing, and the remaining 3% in small-scale processing, transport and plastic waste recovery

❙ 261 demarcated villages; 1 100 monitoring and co-ordination committees set up. No information on other activities

❙ Mass awareness campaign, called "Operation Happiness" (Opération bonheur), enabling the closure of military sites/camps and the adherence of ex-combatants to the process.


Sect

or

Inte

rven

tion

Scor

e Main Outputs Expected Main Outputs Achieved PA

AEIJ 3 ❙ Vocational training and employment

reforms (9 vocational courses, 300 students undergoing work/study course, review of private vocational training, integration survey for two institutions, THIMO 2000)

❙ Improved relevance and governance of higher education (30% of science scholarships/ higher education establishments awarded to girls; 1 University self-evaluation, higher education external evaluation mechanism, 2-3 performance contracts, Search results valuation Office, feasibility study)

❙ Improved sector coordination (annual coordination meeting, AGEPE-MESRS agreement, integration review, 12% of girls enrolled in industrial/technical streams)

❙ 13 professional branches currently structured and managed by the employers, portraits were drawn up for 9 branches aiming at a matching between necessary skills and training needs, but the committees do not function fully (absence of official framework - decree not adopted, status not clarified and non-appointed facilitators). 427 students have followed sandwich courses in three training centers (wood, car, electricity), but progress is still to be made in terms of interface between needs and profiles sought. A diagnostic study has been developed, but there is not much visibility on its operationalization, in a context of high stakes in the quality of private vocational training (control problem, inspection, student assessment and follow-up of insertion). A robust survey on the insertion of young people from the FP could not be carried out (absence of basic data in the establishments, reduced and fragile sample giving rise to a provisional document not yet validated), a pro-software was piloted in 2 institutions, but faced fund raising issues. 75% of training courses / THIMO were conducted in 10 different sectors, the guarantee funds provided were not replenished by the town halls as planned in the initial commitment.

❙ 28.5% of STEM scholarships are awarded to girls (economic development, general increase in the number of fellows, slightly higher for girls, the draft decree currently not implemented). 2 self-assessments were conducted (UFHB on the Bio-science and Earth Sciences units and UAO on the LMD reform). The mechanism is still in talks and remains to be finalized: following the reshuffle of the government in March 2014, the MESRS has renounced the reactivation of the National Evaluation Committee of the Superior and new directions are taken (program-contracts). 2 university performance contracts have been signed with MESRS, but the principle of such a mechanism remains to be validated by all the centers and « grandes écoles » (agreement to be obtained on the practical modalities). The feasibility study of the research valorization offices has been carried out and validated, the facilitators are in place but do not yet have a specific structure.

❙ The Task Force has been boosted by the establishment of a cross-sectoral committee serving as a reference for the education-employment sector, but the challenge of its sustainability is important (members of the permanent team to be appointed, budget allocation to be made effective). A framework agreement has been established between the ministries responsible for employment and the higher education sector, with a start of strengthening operational collaboration, which remains to be updated with recent institutional changes. The Youth Integration Unit responsible for observing the labor market has no real institutional anchoring. The state of play on the follow-up of FP graduates showed the systematic absence of mechanisms and data collected. It is noted that the number of girls in the industrial sectors is growing faster than that of girls in the tertiary sector, 13% of girls being in the industrial sector (2015).

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GOUR

OU 3 ❙ Sanitation infrastructure (4 water reservoirs built and 3 rehabilitated, including 3 connected to the main drainage channel, 4 654 ml of drainage channels constructed and 3 346 ml rehabilitated)

❙ Monitoring, control and awareness

❙ Studies - environment and social diagnosis; integrated management of the basin, planning document

❙ Institution building and training framework

❙ >100%: the 7 dams and the drainage canals were completed / rehabilitated, major cleaning works were carried out on the existing buffer dams (Indénié crossroads). Complementary work has been carried out (sanitary, waste management, lighting, etc.) The achievements are of quality.

❙ Annual monitoring carried out. No information on awareness activities.

❙ 100%: the studies were conducted and used as a basis to organize a round table with the donors and raise about 80% of the funds needed for the financing of the Gourou II (2018-2038).

❙ No information on the institutional support


D2 – Expected Outcomes of Bank InterventionSe

ctor

Inte

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Scor

e Main Outcomes Expected Main Outcomes Achieved

Tran

spor

t

HKB

Brid

ge 4 ❙ 75,000 vehicles/day (2013) and 100,000 (2020)

❙ 4% annual increase in traffic (2013-2016)

❙ + 1.5 billion / + 7 billion CFAF (2015/2022) in State revenue

❙ 840 jobs

❙ Reduction of the travel time between Marcory and Cocody by at least one hour

❙ Rapid bus service and rehabilitation of the Houphouët Bridge

❙ Reduction of vehicle operating costs by 30%

❙ 60 000 vehicles/day (moving average for 2016; 76% of the 2013 target and 57% of the 2020 target)

❙ +10% in Grand district (estimate)

❙ Compensation – no increase in the State budget

❙ >100%: 1,500 jobs created during the construction phase and 65 during the operation phase

❙ Travel time between Marcory and Cocody reduced from at least one hour to 15 minutes at present

❙ 0%, No non-project-financed activities

❙ Reduction of vehicle operating costs (information not available)

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AZIT

O 3 ❙ Additional 139 MW

❙ Thermal rate of return

❙ Annual availability rate of 86.7%

❙ Employment

❙ Supply capacity of 1 600 GWH ; 60% of households have access to electricity and EUR 76 million is generated in State revenue (2020)

❙ 100%; contribution to the increase in electricity generation: + 10% compared to the 2012 capacity

❙ Less than the maximum required in the agreement

❙ Annual availability of 91.8%

❙ 52 full-time jobs currently, of which 12 for women, unavailable data on the construction phase

❙ To be measured in 2020

CIPR

EL 3 ❙ Additional 222 MW

❙ Same objectives as for AZITO 2020

❙ Contribution to the increase in electricity generation: + 12% compared to the 2012 capacity

❙ To be measured in 2020

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ultu

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PAIM

SC 3 ❙ Administrative and experimental structures rehabilitated, equipped and resources reconstituted

❙ The capacity of research and supervisory services, as well as groups and associations enhanced

❙ Increased production-marketing capacity

❙ Qualitative assessment: contribution to the resumption of agricultural production and development (bundling) in the areas concerned

SUCD

EN 3 ❙ CFAF 27 billion in working capital and CFAF 4.5 billion maximum exposure to credit risk

❙ (March 2016): 100% loan use, given the more than twofold increase in the pre-financing granted by SUCDEN. Thirty (30) local cooperatives and suppliers received pre-financing; 7 500 small farmers covered

PAIA

-ID 3 ❙ Increased production and productivity

❙ Improved marketing of agricultural products

❙ Production of 325 000 tonnes achieved and increased yield of major crops

❙ 18 000 tonnes of agricultural products marketed (2016)

Soci

al

PAIM

SC E

duca

tion 3 ❙ Increase in net enrolment rate from 44%

(2006) to 61% (2010) ❙ Steady improvement in the primary enrolment rate between 2009-2012 (UNESCO), the period of the PAIMSC intervention

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BV 2 ❙ Primary health centre attendance rate increases by 30% in 2010 in target areas

❙ GBV: Care provided and socio-economic integration achieved in 95% of cases

❙ Increasing health service utilization rate; 30% achieved in 2014; disparities between the areas visited: Tonpki - 38.7%; Cavally Guemon - 37.4%; and Gbêkê - 47.9%

❙ GBV: 546 survivors of conflict-related violence and 183 groupings provided care; little link between income-generating activities (IGAs) and victims of violence; no follow-up at national level

PURS

SAB

- ca

p.bu

il. 3 ❙ Optimum functioning of the economic, financial, and planning services. Improved access to drinking water, sanitation, health and education services. Dialogue and peacebuilding mechanisms in place

❙ Qualitative assessment: Positive contribution overall to health services, access to water, the functioning of public services, dialogue and peacebuilding mechanisms.

PARI

CS 3 ❙ 15,500 ex-combatants re-socialized and trained in a trade

❙ 100% ex-combatants integrated in active life

❙ At least 70% of village lands demarcated and secured (West, North-East regions)

❙ Psychological, medical and legal support for victims of GBV

❙ 77%; contribution to the training and re-socialization of 12,000 ex-combatants, i.e. 17% of the 70,000 on the lists, according to the French Institute of International Relations - IFRI).

❙ No data on the outcomes on occupational reintegration, land management and care of victims, including those of GBV

PAAE

IJ 2 ❙ Unemployment rate among active young people: 9% (2020)

❙ Increase in GDP per capita (CFAF 750 000)

❙ 26% of higher education students in science and technology, (18% of them girls)

❙ 6% in secondary technical vocational training

❙ Reduction of unemployment rate among technical vocational training graduates to 21%

❙ Reduction of the unemployment rate among higher education graduates to 37% (and to 46% among girls)

❙ Unemployment went from 9.4% in 2012 to 8.6% in 2014; youth unemployment decreased by 23%, but less significant for girls (13%).

❙ > 100% expected (projection: CFAF 908 000)

❙ >100%; 33.4% in 2015 and 24.8 among girls

❙ >100%; 6.8% in 2015

❙ Not achieved, 25.3% of unemployed vocational and technical training graduates; 31% among girls

❙ Contradictory data (cf. ERP)

❙ Contribution to the financing of the education sector through budget support (80% of the total programme budget, UA 15 million). Besides improving the selected indicators, the progress achieved in the three main areas of intervention of the programme remains mixed (see ERP)

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GOUR

OU 3 Evolution between 2009 and 2015:

❙ Decrease in: incidence of malaria (from 14.6% to 11%); the infant mortality rate (from 8.4% to 3.2%); the maternal mortality rate (from 0.54% to 0.15%); cholera-related deaths (from 15.39% to 11.54%)

❙ Decrease in health care spending

❙ Flooded area decreased from 4 ha to 0.5 ha

❙ Awareness-raising; investment programme in the Basin

❙ Creation of 2,300 jobs, including 1,000 for women

❙ Lack of numerical data on the project area; data at the national level does not indicate changes as targeted by the project

❙ Significant contribution to the availability of the Indenié Junction even in the rainy season

❙ Contribution to improving the living standards of the populations concerned through waste management and behavioural changes induced by the awareness campaigns.


Annex E — List of Bank Operations in Côte d'Ivoire 2006–2016

Acronym Name of Project Sector Instrument Approval Commitment Scheduled End Last Disb. Budget (UA) % project / sector

% sector/ TOTAL

HKB Henri Konan Bédié Bridge Project Transport AfDB 01/03/2012 28/06/2012 31/12/2020 17/11/2014 46 374 031 11% 5%


Transport ADF/FSF 18/12/2014 04/06/2015 30/06/2020 65 460 000 16% 6%

PARFFM-add Mano River Union Road Development and Transport Facilitation Programme (Côte d'Ivoire, supplementary loan))

Transport ADF 03/06/2015 02/03/2016 31/12/2018 31 177 000 8% 3%

PAFT Transport Development and Facilitation Programme (Bamako-Zantiebougou-Boundiali-San Pedro)

Transport ADF 26/11/2015 03/05/2016 30/06/2021 70 000 000 17% 7%

SAN PEDRO Study on the San Pedro Autonomous Port Extension

Transport NEPAD/FAPA 27/12/2012 30/06/2013 31/07/2016 31/10/2016 1 952 807 0% 0,2%

ABJ-LAG Study on the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway Development Project

Transport ADF 21/09/2016 1 000 000 0% 0,1%

URB-ABJ Abidjan Urban Transport Project Transport AfDB 16/12/2016 29/12/2016 30/09/2018 190 000 000 47% 18%

Transport 7 projects 405 963 838 100% 39%


Social ADF 05/12/2007 28/02/2008 31/12/2013 23/12/2013 20 000 000 12% 2%

HUMAN Emergency Aid for Humanitarian Assistance to the Post-crisis Victims

Social FSS 27/07/2011 09/08/2011 31/12/2012 705 572 0,4% 0,1%

PURSAB Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services

Social ADF/FSF 01/06/2011 10/06/2011 15/06/2012 11/07/2011 95 000 000 56% 9%

Social FSF 03/06/2011 10/06/2011 30/09/2015 25/11/2015 5 500 000 3% 0,5%

PAAEIJ Youth Employability and Integration Support Programme

Social ADF 04/12/2013 06/12/2013 31/12/2015 09/10/2015 18 832 999 11% 2%

PARICS Social Inclusion and Cohesion-Enhancement-Support Programme

Social ADF/FSF 13/06/2014 25/06/2014 31/12/2016 06/10/2014 29 970 000 18% 3%

Social 5 projects 170 008 571 100% 17%

AVIAIRE 1 Emergency Aid to Check the Spread of Avian Influenza

Agriculture SRF 06/10/2006 16/05/2007 30/06/2007 352 786 0,3% 0,03%

ALIM Emergency Food Aid for Victims of Civil War Agriculture SRF 18/06/2008 18/06/2009 308 511 0,3% 0,03%

PAIA-ID Indenie-Djubalin Agricultural Infrastructure Support Project

Agriculture ADF 01/03/2012 20/03/2012 28/02/2018 22/06/2016 21 600 000 20% 2%

2PAI-Bélier Belier Region Agro-Industrial Pole Project Agriculture ADF 17/10/2014 09/02/2015 31/12/2021 17/06/2016 998 000 1% 0,1%

SUCDEN Agricultural Comodities Agriculture AfDB 10/07/2015 07/12/2015 30/06/2016 29/01/2016 79 955 225 73% 8%

AVIAIRE 2 Emergency Humanitarian Aid to Support the Government in the Fight against Avian Flu

Agriculture SRF 23/12/2015 06/04/2016 31/03/2017 705 572 1% 0,1%

PPF Youth Employment in Agribusiness (PPF) (Enable youth)

Agriculture ADF 27/07/2016 14/02/2017 31/07/2018 1 000 000 1% 0,1%

CHAIN VAL Value Chain Development Project in Indénié Region

Agriculture NTF 21/10/2016 14/02/2017 31/12/2020 4 000 000 4% 0,4%

Agriculture 8 projects 108 920 093 100% 11%

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% sector/ TOTAL

HKB Henri Konan Bédié Bridge Project Transport AfDB 01/03/2012 28/06/2012 31/12/2020 17/11/2014 46 374 031 11% 5%


Transport ADF/FSF 18/12/2014 04/06/2015 30/06/2020 65 460 000 16% 6%

PARFFM-add Mano River Union Road Development and Transport Facilitation Programme (Côte d'Ivoire, supplementary loan))

Transport ADF 03/06/2015 02/03/2016 31/12/2018 31 177 000 8% 3%

PAFT Transport Development and Facilitation Programme (Bamako-Zantiebougou-Boundiali-San Pedro)

Transport ADF 26/11/2015 03/05/2016 30/06/2021 70 000 000 17% 7%

SAN PEDRO Study on the San Pedro Autonomous Port Extension

Transport NEPAD/FAPA 27/12/2012 30/06/2013 31/07/2016 31/10/2016 1 952 807 0% 0,2%

ABJ-LAG Study on the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway Development Project

Transport ADF 21/09/2016 1 000 000 0% 0,1%

URB-ABJ Abidjan Urban Transport Project Transport AfDB 16/12/2016 29/12/2016 30/09/2018 190 000 000 47% 18%

Transport 7 projects 405 963 838 100% 39%


Social ADF 05/12/2007 28/02/2008 31/12/2013 23/12/2013 20 000 000 12% 2%

HUMAN Emergency Aid for Humanitarian Assistance to the Post-crisis Victims

Social FSS 27/07/2011 09/08/2011 31/12/2012 705 572 0,4% 0,1%

PURSAB Emergency Programme to Restore Basic Social and Administrative Services

Social ADF/FSF 01/06/2011 10/06/2011 15/06/2012 11/07/2011 95 000 000 56% 9%

Social FSF 03/06/2011 10/06/2011 30/09/2015 25/11/2015 5 500 000 3% 0,5%

PAAEIJ Youth Employability and Integration Support Programme

Social ADF 04/12/2013 06/12/2013 31/12/2015 09/10/2015 18 832 999 11% 2%

PARICS Social Inclusion and Cohesion-Enhancement-Support Programme

Social ADF/FSF 13/06/2014 25/06/2014 31/12/2016 06/10/2014 29 970 000 18% 3%

Social 5 projects 170 008 571 100% 17%

AVIAIRE 1 Emergency Aid to Check the Spread of Avian Influenza

Agriculture SRF 06/10/2006 16/05/2007 30/06/2007 352 786 0,3% 0,03%

ALIM Emergency Food Aid for Victims of Civil War Agriculture SRF 18/06/2008 18/06/2009 308 511 0,3% 0,03%

PAIA-ID Indenie-Djubalin Agricultural Infrastructure Support Project

Agriculture ADF 01/03/2012 20/03/2012 28/02/2018 22/06/2016 21 600 000 20% 2%

2PAI-Bélier Belier Region Agro-Industrial Pole Project Agriculture ADF 17/10/2014 09/02/2015 31/12/2021 17/06/2016 998 000 1% 0,1%

SUCDEN Agricultural Comodities Agriculture AfDB 10/07/2015 07/12/2015 30/06/2016 29/01/2016 79 955 225 73% 8%

AVIAIRE 2 Emergency Humanitarian Aid to Support the Government in the Fight against Avian Flu

Agriculture SRF 23/12/2015 06/04/2016 31/03/2017 705 572 1% 0,1%

PPF Youth Employment in Agribusiness (PPF) (Enable youth)

Agriculture ADF 27/07/2016 14/02/2017 31/07/2018 1 000 000 1% 0,1%

CHAIN VAL Value Chain Development Project in Indénié Region

Agriculture NTF 21/10/2016 14/02/2017 31/12/2020 4 000 000 4% 0,4%

Agriculture 8 projects 108 920 093 100% 11%



% sector/ TOTAL


Governance ADF/FSF 06/03/2009 06/03/2009 31/12/2009 06/03/2009 83 870 000 81% 8%

EBOLA Response Programme Gouvernance ADF 01/10/2014 01/10/2014 31/12/2016 6 000 000 6% 1%

PARCSI Support to Industrial Sector Competitiveness Enhancement Project

Governance ADF 30/09/2015 11/12/2015 30/11/2019 21/06/2016 10 000 000 10% 1%

CERAP Establishment and Facilitation of the African Governance Ethics Network (Cote d’Ivoire)

Governance FMD * 17/10/2012 31/12/2016 ? 127 316 0,1% 0,01%

TARGETED SUPPORT Targeted Support and Capacity Building Project Governance FSF 01/03/2010 01/03/2010 30/09/2013 ? 2 000 000 2% 0,2%

PRODIJE Young Entrepreneur Incubator Project Governance FAPA 04/09/2015 04/09/2015 30/06/2018 1 348 186 1% 0,1%

Governance 6 projects 103 345 502 100% 10%

AZITO Azito Power Plant Extension Energy AfDB 19/12/2012 18/10/2013 27/02/2020 15/05/2015 25 581 751 12% 2%

CIPREL CIPREL Power Plant Extension Energy AfDB 24/07/2013 14/08/2013 23/06/2026 27/11/2015 39 977 613 19% 4%

INTERCO CI, Liberia, SL and Gui Electricity Networks Interconnection Project (CSLG)

Energy ADF 06/11/2013 22/11/2013 31/12/2018 33 000 000 16% 3%

ELEC-OUEST Project to Enhance the Electricity Transmission Network in the Western Region of Côte d'Ivoire

Energy AfDB 16/11/2016 20/12/2016 31/12/2019 107 200 000 52% 10%

Energy 4 projects 205 759 364 100% 20%


Wat. & Sanit. ADF 24/11/2010 10/06/2011 30/12/2016 06/06/2016 23 000 000 96% 2%

AWF Promotion of Access to Toilets and Jobs in Bouaké and Katiola through Reuse of Sludge and Urine

Wat. & Sanit. FAE 04/09/2013 13/06/2014 31/12/2017 13/10/2014 999 440 4% 0,1%

Water & Sanitation 2 projects 23 999 440 100% 2%

MCI Participation in the Equity Capital of Microcred Côte d'Ivoire and TA

Finance FAPA 16/04/2010 11/06/2013 31/12/2016 15/11/2013 1 353 572 11% 0,1%

ENTR Entrepreneurship Development Support Project Finance FAPA 16/12/2014 04/09/2015 15/12/2016 668 618 6% 0,1%

RACMP Trade Insurance Membership Programme Finance ADF 23/09/2015 03/05/2016 31/12/2019 9 930 000 83% 1%

Finance 3 projects 11 952 189 100% 1%

81Annexes

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% sector/ TOTAL


Governance ADF/FSF 06/03/2009 06/03/2009 31/12/2009 06/03/2009 83 870 000 81% 8%

EBOLA Response Programme Gouvernance ADF 01/10/2014 01/10/2014 31/12/2016 6 000 000 6% 1%

PARCSI Support to Industrial Sector Competitiveness Enhancement Project

Governance ADF 30/09/2015 11/12/2015 30/11/2019 21/06/2016 10 000 000 10% 1%

CERAP Establishment and Facilitation of the African Governance Ethics Network (Cote d’Ivoire)

Governance FMD * 17/10/2012 31/12/2016 ? 127 316 0,1% 0,01%

TARGETED SUPPORT Targeted Support and Capacity Building Project Governance FSF 01/03/2010 01/03/2010 30/09/2013 ? 2 000 000 2% 0,2%

PRODIJE Young Entrepreneur Incubator Project Governance FAPA 04/09/2015 04/09/2015 30/06/2018 1 348 186 1% 0,1%

Governance 6 projects 103 345 502 100% 10%

AZITO Azito Power Plant Extension Energy AfDB 19/12/2012 18/10/2013 27/02/2020 15/05/2015 25 581 751 12% 2%

CIPREL CIPREL Power Plant Extension Energy AfDB 24/07/2013 14/08/2013 23/06/2026 27/11/2015 39 977 613 19% 4%

INTERCO CI, Liberia, SL and Gui Electricity Networks Interconnection Project (CSLG)

Energy ADF 06/11/2013 22/11/2013 31/12/2018 33 000 000 16% 3%

ELEC-OUEST Project to Enhance the Electricity Transmission Network in the Western Region of Côte d'Ivoire

Energy AfDB 16/11/2016 20/12/2016 31/12/2019 107 200 000 52% 10%

Energy 4 projects 205 759 364 100% 20%


Wat. & Sanit. ADF 24/11/2010 10/06/2011 30/12/2016 06/06/2016 23 000 000 96% 2%

AWF Promotion of Access to Toilets and Jobs in Bouaké and Katiola through Reuse of Sludge and Urine

Wat. & Sanit. FAE 04/09/2013 13/06/2014 31/12/2017 13/10/2014 999 440 4% 0,1%

Water & Sanitation 2 projects 23 999 440 100% 2%

MCI Participation in the Equity Capital of Microcred Côte d'Ivoire and TA

Finance FAPA 16/04/2010 11/06/2013 31/12/2016 15/11/2013 1 353 572 11% 0,1%

ENTR Entrepreneurship Development Support Project Finance FAPA 16/12/2014 04/09/2015 15/12/2016 668 618 6% 0,1%

RACMP Trade Insurance Membership Programme Finance ADF 23/09/2015 03/05/2016 31/12/2019 9 930 000 83% 1%

Finance 3 projects 11 952 189 100% 1%

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About this Evaluation

This report presents the main findings of the evaluation of the Bank's strategies, interventions and policy dialogue activities in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire during the period 2006-2016. This evaluation has a twofold objective of accountability and capitalization of lessons to improve the Bank's future strategies in the country and in transition states more generally. During the evaluation period, five documents framed AfDB cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire, and the Bank financed 35 operations totaling more than UA 1 billion.The methodological approach was that of a contribution analysis based on the (re) construction of the theory of change in Bank assistance to Côte d'Ivoire. The evaluation revealed that the Bank generally had a positive role in Côte d'Ivoire over the period 2006–2016. It has been a reliable partner in supporting the country's process to exit from the crisis and in specific emergency situations. In addition, the Bank has made good use of its various sources of financing and different types of intervention, adapting itself appropriately to the country's circumstances over the period.

However, challenges that the Bank has not been able to fully address remain; these include: (i) lack of significant reduction in poverty and inequality; (ii) weaknesses in the quality of the design of several interventions; (iii) absence of reference situations or quantified objectives; and (iv) bureaucracy, high turnover of project managers, and inappropriate monitoring and evaluation. Finally, the evaluation proposes the following recommendations in relation to its general conclusions:

❙ Provide strategic support to Côte d’Ivoire for more inclusive growth, with a view to reducing poverty and inequality nationwide;

❙ Strengthen policy dialogue on strategic issues and support it with relevant analytical work;

❙ Complete PPP feasibility studies with systematic analyses of the consequences of sovereign guarantees;

❙ Enhance the Bank’s visibility in relation to its involvement in supporting Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy;

❙ Strengthen monitoring/ evaluation of outcomes achievement with regard to the Bank’s operations and strategies;

❙ Clarify the guidelines and forms of intervention with regard to emergency assistance to ensure that they are better tailored to the risks and sources of fragility, and ensure rapid interventions that hit their targets in as short a time as possible.

An IDEV Country Strategy Evaluation

African Development Bank GroupAvenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d’IvoirePhone: +225 20 26 20 41E-mail: [email protected]

idev.afdb.org

Evaluation of the Bank’s Strategy and Program...

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