ESARDA Working Group Training and Knowledge Management 1 Nuclear Material Subject to Safeguards G....

ESARDA Working Group Training and Knowledge Management

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Nuclear Material Subject to SafeguardsG. Janssens-Maenhout

ESARDA Course 23 - 27 March 2015:“Nuclear Safeguards and Non Proliferation”

Legal aspects


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branches of nuclear law

•Safety•Emergency response and management•Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning•Transportation •Environmental Assessment and Protection•Non-Proliferation and Safeguards•Nuclear Security and Physical Protection•Liability and Compensation•Trade Control


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Safeguards Security Safety


History of nuclear fission


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History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

From Einstein to Eisenhower


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From Einstein to Eisenhower


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Creation of the IAEA, 1953-1957


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Creation of the IAEA, 1953-1957


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The Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1970


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The Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1970


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Earlier Proliferation cases


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Earlier Proliferation cases


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Current Proliferation cases


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Focus on legal aspects of safeguards:

Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards agreementsAdditional ProtocolNuclear trade

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Non-proliferation & nuclear safeguards: legal aspects

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1945-1970: important legal steps



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IAEA mandate

The IAEA

•An independent inter-governmental organization•Not part of the United Nations•Unique relationship with the UN Security Council•Has its own 140 Member States•Created by the Statute of the IAEA•Statute of IAEA authorizes Agency to establish and administer safeguards



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IAEA safeguards



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Sensitive points in fuel cycle



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First safeguards agreements



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1970-1990: towards comprehensive safeguards system



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1970-1990: towards comprehensive safeguards system

NPT

Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs):•Not to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to NNWSs(Art. I)

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs):•Not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Art. II)•Accept safeguards on all nuclear material (Art. III.1, 4)

All States Parties:•Export controls (Art. III.2)•Pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament

Fundamental requirements:

Comprehensive (or “full scope”) safeguards: •Conclude agreement “in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system”•Within 6 months of becoming partyControlson exportsto NNWSsof:•Nuclear material•Equipment and material “especially designed or prepared”(“EDP”) for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material –“single use”



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The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsINFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (April 1971)Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsINFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (April 1971)

…to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere ...

INFCIRC/153, para 1

OBLIGATIONS:

•Establish a State system of accounting for & control of nuclear material (SSAC)•Provide information to the Agency•Facilitate access by Agency•Cooperate with the Agency

Information•Initial report on nuclear material (par 34, 62)•Initial list of all nuclear facilities (par 42, 106)•Record keeping of nuclear activities (par 51-58)•Report inventory changes (import, export) (par59-69)

Access•DIV -facility design information verification (par 48)•Inspections (par 71-73)



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The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsINFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (April 1971)Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsINFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (April 1971)

…to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere ...

INFCIRC/153, para 1

OBLIGATIONS:

•Establish a State system of accounting for & control of nuclear material (SSAC)•Provide information to the Agency•Facilitate access by Agency•Cooperate with the Agency

Information•Initial report on nuclear material (par 34, 62)•Initial list of all nuclear facilities (par 42, 106)•Record keeping of nuclear activities (par 51-58)•Report inventory changes (import, export) (par59-69)

Access•DIV -facility design information verification (par 48)•Inspections (par 71-73)



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1990-2000: strengthening safeguards with the additional protocol



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Assurances of Correctness and Completeness of a State’s Nuclear Material Declarations

Measures under Safeguards Agreement•Agency access to undeclared locations•Early provision of facility design information•Environmental sampling•Use of satellite imagery

Measures requiring additional authority•Additional information •Broader access•Simplified inspector designation and visa requirements

Model Additional Protocol INFCIRC/540 (May 1997)



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Why an Additional Protocol ?

•Need for increased security and safety of nuclear material, domestically and internationally, as demonstrated by recent events•Improve State’s ability to control nuclear material and nuclear-related activities anywhere in the State•Improve export controls and help prevent and counteract illicit trafficking•Credible assurances of the peaceful nature of the State’s nuclear programme

What is new with the Additional Protocol?

Additional Information•Initial declaration •Annual updates•Quarterly reporting of relevant exportsComplementary Access•Short notice (2/24 hours) •Mechanism for prior consultations in the event of question or inconsistency •Managed access to protect sensitive informationAdministrative Measures•Simplified inspector designation • Reduced visa requirements

Complementary access



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2000 - : challenges in the last decade


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Current challenges:

•Nuclear black markets–non-State actors

•Breakout–withdrawal from the NPT

•Disarmament slowdown–failure to fulfil obligations under Article VI of the NPT



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Nuclear material and technology trade: legal aspectsMultilateral non-proliferation regimes


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Nuclear material and technology trade: legal aspects

Multilateral non-proliferation regimes


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Nuclear material and technology trade: legal aspectsMultilateral non-proliferation regimes Principle : International free trade

of goods and technologiesWithin the guidelines/under theconditions defined by WTO (GATT,GATTS, TRIPS)

Exceptions: strictly defined,exceptional and ruled by international agreements

Article XXI of GATT establishesfive exceptions related to:- Information- UN embargoes-War and emergency- Arms and related items- Nuclear materials


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Nuclear material and technology trade: legal aspectsGuidelines for nuclear transfers and nuclear dual use transfers


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Nuclear material and technology trade: legal aspectsIn EU 28

Council Regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports,transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items as amended by the Regulation 1232/2011 and 388/2012.

Council Joint Action of 22 June 2000 (2000/0401/CFSP)concerning the control of technical assistance relatedto certain military end-uses

Trade principles by EU/EC

But authorisations by Member States

The catch-all clause: Possibility for Member States to controlnot listed itmes: if there is risk that this item might be used in weapons of massdestruction programor if the exporter is aware that an item he intends to export


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Rehearsal

A.The IAEA is an independent UN organisation with special relationship to the UN SC. B.The NPT divides Member States in NWS and NNWS with different safeguards agreements. C.The AP was strengthening the NPT safeguards with regard to access and information but not with the unannounced inspections.D.The NPT became effective in 1970 when sufficient Parties signed the Treaty and was meanwhile signed up by more Parties, but faced also already the withdrawal of a Party. A.Nuclear trade control extends the nuclear material also with nuclear technology. B.In EU the EC sets the principles of trade control of items and is responsible for the authorisation of the exportC.In EU the nuclear material procurement is subject to approval of the Euratom Fuel Supply Agency. D.In Belgium Synatom is the agency dealing with the fuel management, whereas Euratom is dealing with the safeguards of the fuel.

Which expressions are incorrect ?


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Rehearsal

A.Not irradiated fuel is not radioactive. B.Reprocessing of spent fuel needs a highly automised chemical process with remote control.C.Fuel Enrichment is possible by chemical or physical processes (centrifuge, gas diffusion etc.)D.Enrichment of 1 ton fuel requires more energy than the reprocessing of 1 ton spent fuel.

A.Each nuclear power plant is subject to safety, safeguards and security regulationsB.The fuel in Belgium is state-property and under control of the EURATOM inspectorate. C.Enhancement of safety standards corresponds to an enhancement of safeguards standards. D.Safety of a nuclear power plant is under inspection of a national safety authority.

Which expressions are incorrect ?

ESARDA Working Group Training and Knowledge Management 1 Nuclear Material Subject to Safeguards G....

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