Effects of fiscal credibility on inflation expectations: evidence ...2021/01/04 · trol (Blinder...
Transcript of Effects of fiscal credibility on inflation expectations: evidence ...2021/01/04 · trol (Blinder...
Effectsoffiscal credibilityoninflationexpectationsevidencefromanemerging economy
JUANCAMILOANZOAacuteTEGUI-ZAPATAMScJUANCAMILOGALVIS-CIROPhD
ArticleJELE37E62E61httpsdoiorg103326pse4514
TheauthorswouldliketothanktwoanonymousrefereesforhelpfulcommentsonearlierversionsofthispaperAnyremainingerrorsarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthors
ReceivedJuly162020 AcceptedNovember102020
JuanCamiloANZOAacuteTEGUI-ZAPATAUniversidadAutoacutenomaLatinoamericanaDepartmentofEconomicsCarrera55ANo49-51MedelliacutenColombiae-mailjuananzoateguiunaulaeducoORCiD0000-0003-0588-1364
JuanCamiloGALVIS-CIROUniversidadPontificiaBolivarianaDepartmentofEconomicsCircular1No70-01MedellinColombiae-mailjcgalviscirogmailcomORCiD0000-0001-6680-275X
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
126 AbstractThis paper analyses the impact of fiscal imbalances on expectations for an emerg-ing economy with inflation targeting In particular based on the Colombian expe-rience we build a fiscal credibility index and evaluate its impact on inflation expectations for the 2004-2019 period To analyse fiscal and monetary interac-tions we propose an econometric model and use the OLS and GMM methods The results show that the loss of fiscal credibility associated with divergences between the fiscal deficit and agentsrsquo expectations can increase inflation expectations by between 9 and 12 Furthermore inflation expectations in Colombia incorpo-rate important macroeconomic information related to unemployment GDP and exchange rates
Keywords inflation expectations fiscal policy credibility
1 INTRODUCTIONTheanchoringfactors for inflationexpectationsareessential forfine-tuninganeconomicpolicyframework(MankiwReisandWolfers2003)Ininflationtar-geting expectations aremonitored by central banks because agents set pricesaccordingto their inflationforecastingTheseexpectationsaffect the long-termstructureoftheinterestratetheplannedexpenditureandthereforeinflationcon-trol(Blinderetal2008)AccordingtotheseminalcontributionsofSargentandWallace(1981)afiscalpolicystanceisrelevantforcontrollinginflationexpecta-tionsInthisregardifthepublicexpectsthatthefiscalpositionisunsustainableinflationexpectationswillnotbe lowBasedon this relativeconsensus ineco-nomic theory there is a growing and dynamic literature on the interactionsbetweenfiscalandmonetarypoliciesinemergingeconomies
PromptedbySargentandWallace(1981)somestudieshavesoughttoanalysetheempiricalandtheoreticalrelationshipbetweenfiscalvariablesandinflationexpec-tationsineconomieswithinflationtargetsFirstCataoandTerrones(2003)findthatdeficitGDPratiodownturnsproduceasignificantreductionininflationwithmore effects in countrieswith high and persistent inflationA similar result isreportedbydeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)CelasunGelosandPrati(2004)aswell as deMendonccedila andTostes (2015) note that fiscal balance recoveriesreduceinflationexpectationsandobservedinflationOtherstudiessuchasCeri-solaandGelos(2009)suggestthattheinflationtargetpastinflationandthepri-mary fiscal balance can anchor inflation expectations in emerging economiesNonetheless Celasun Gelos and Prati (2004) provide empirical evidence thatinflationexpectationshavebackward-lookingcomponentsdespiteinflationtargetannouncementsSimilarresultsarereportedbyAraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone (2017)whohighlight that inflation expectations showpersistenceOtherperspectivesforexampleBerlemannandElzemann(2006)findthatinfla-tionexpectationsaredrivenbypresidential election results and theprobabilitythatleftistpartieswillcometopower
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)127Withcentralbankindependencetheuseoftheinflationtaxtoachievefiscalbal-
ancedecreases(MineaandTapsoba2014)Inflationtargetingadoptionleadstoagovernmentcommitmenttofiscalsustainabilitywhichallowsinflationexpecta-tionstobeanchoredinthecentralbankrsquostargets(seeforexampleCerisolaandGelos 2009)With this perspective being borne inmind the objective of thispaper isempiricalandconsistsofexamining theeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomy
ColombiaisasmallemergingeconomyinLatinAmericathathasmadeimportanteffortstoachievebettereconomicstabilitythroughacoherentandprudentpolicyIntheColombiancasethegovernmentadoptedtheinflationtargetingattheendof1999Since2000theCentralBankofColombiahasimproveditscommunicationwithmarketsbyinformingthemaboutinflationtargetsandmonetarypolicyman-agement(HamannHofstetterandUrrutia2014)Since2003thecentralbankhasimplementedsophisticatedmethodologiestomonitorinflationexpectationsfiscaldeficit expectations and expected economic growth In the fiscal managementstrandthegovernmentestablishedadecreasinggoalforthefiscaldeficit tocon-vincemarketsaboutfiscalbalance sustainabilityAsa result aftermore than10yearstheColombianeconomyrecovereditsinvestmentgrade(Moodyrsquos2014)InsumColombiaisaninterestingeconomiclaboratoryinwhichtoanalysetheinter-actionsbetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicy(CiroanddeMendonccedila2017)
ThispaperoffersanewperspectiveontheproblemoffiscaleffectsoninflationexpectationsFirstweusecentralbankexpectationssurveysandbuildafiscalcredibilityindexbasedonoverallfiscaldeficitexpectationsSecondweanalysethelong-termrelationshipsthatmayexistbetweenfiscalcredibilityandinflationexpectationsbasedonacointegrationmodelThirdweverifywhether for theformationofinflationexpectationsagentsconsidertheavailablepublicinforma-tionaboutmacroeconomicvariablesFinallythisstudypresentsacontributiontotheunderstandingoftheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombiancaseTheresultsshowthatthelossoffiscalcredibilitywhichisasso-ciatedwithdivergencesbetween thefiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationscanincreaseinflationexpectationsbybetween9and12FurthermorethisstudyshowsthatinflationexpectationspresentinertiaandreacttoGDPandtheexchangerateTheevidencealsoindicatesthatthe2008subprimecrisisincreasedinflationexpectationsinColombia
Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollowssection2presentsaliteraturereviewsection3presentsthemethodologyformeasuringfiscalcredibilitysec-tion4providesempiricalevidencebymeansofeconometricanalysisonthefis-calcredibilityeffectoninflationexpectationsandsection5concludesthepaper
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128 2 FISCAL CREDIBILITY AND INFLATION TARGETINGTheinflationtargetingframeworkrequiresahighdegreeofcoordinationbetweenthecentralbankandfiscalpolicyInfactforthepolicyframeworktobecredibletherecannotbepermanentfiscaldeficitsthatleadtofiscaldominanceandpublicdebtmonetization(MishkinandSavastano2001AllsoppandVines2005DeMendonccedila2007)Theabsenceoffiscaldominanceisarequirementforinflationtargeting(MishkinandSavastano2001)For this institutionsarenecessary toensurethebankrsquosindependenceandthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalbal-ance(Wyplosz2005)
AccordingtoGuumlrkaynakLevinandSwanson(2010)andStrohsalMelnickandNautz(2016)long-terminflationexpectationsshouldnotrespondtomacroeco-nomicinformationwhenthereiseconomicpolicycredibilityInLatinAmericafiscal imbalancesareaproblemandcastdoubtonmonetarypolicycredibilityFiscalbalanceisthusanindicatorthatmustbecarefullymonitoredtoensurethecredibility of the inflation targets (Minea andTapsoba 2014)One strategy toresolvethisproblemresortstotheimpositionoffiscalresponsibilitylaws(DebrunHaunerandKumar2009LinandYe2009deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016)Followinguponthisideaseveralstudieshaveanalysedtheeffectoffiscaltargetsorrulesoninflation
Onestrandoftheliteraturehasfocusedonmeasuringtheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityinemergingeconomiesunder inflation targetingThis literaturefocusesonfiscalcredibilityindicestoidentifytheireffectsonmacroeconomicvariablesInthecaseofBraziltherearefiscalcredibilityindicesonthedeficitandpublicdebtTheresultsofthesestudiesshowthatfiscalcredibilityhelpstoanchorinflationexpectationsreducesinflationarypressuresandexchangeratepass-throughoninflationlowersdisagreement infiscal expectations and stabilizesmarket interest rates (deMen-donccedilaandTostes2015deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016MontesandAcar2018)AccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)anincreaseinfiscalcredibilityhelpsfixedratebondstobeissuedFurthermorecredibilityreducesthepublicdebtindexed tomarket interest ratesAlong this same line the studybyMontes andSouza(2020)suggeststhatgreaterfiscalcredibilityreducessovereignrisk
OtherstudieshavefoundsimilarresultswithoutusingcredibilityindicesThorn-tonandVasilakis(2019)usingasampleof61low-andmiddle-incomecountriesfindthatcountriesthatadoptedtransparentfiscalrulesincreasedtheirfiscalcred-ibilityMoreoverinthecaseofIndonesiaKunkoro(2015)showsthatrulesforthefiscaldeficitareadevicetoobtainfiscalcredibilityFurthermorecredibilityreduces deficit volatility and contributes to price stabilityA similar result isreportedforthecaseofJapanAccordingtoShirakawa(2012)whenthegovern-mentlosescredibilityregardingdebtsustainabilityinflationincreasesboostinginterest ratesand increasingdefaultprobabilitiesSimilarly for thecaseof theCzechRepublicKlyuevandSnudden (2011)demonstrate that public expecta-tionsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalconsolidationcanimproveits
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)129credibilityAccordingtotheirresultsfiscalcredibilityhelpshighertaxincomes
andlowermarketinterestratestobeachieved
OtherempiricalstudiesmeasurecredibilitythroughfinancialmarketsrsquoreactionsInparticularKandilandMorsy(2014)proposethatfiscalcredibilitycanbemeasuredbytheconfidencethatmarketsshowinfiscalstimuliAccordingtotheirresultsfis-calstimulibackedbyinternationalreservesgenerategreatercredibilityandincreasethe impact of stimuli related to public spending In addition credible marketannouncementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice
21 THE COLOMBIAN CASETheBankoftheRepublicthecentralbankofColombiaemergedin1923asanissuetransferdepositanddiscountbankandisthehighestmonetaryexchangeandcreditauthorityinColombiaThebankfunctionedasadevelopmentbankfortheeconomicgrowthofColombiabetween1930and1980Inthoseyearscoffeegrowers industrialists merchants and other agents had representation on theboard of directors In this period the Colombian economy exhibited averageannualinflationratesof20
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthepolitical constitution ofColombiaAt that time the reform created a board ofdirectorsforthebankmadeupofsevenmembersthegeneralmanagerarepre-sentativeofthegovernmentwhoistheMinisterofFinanceandPublicCreditandfivefull-timemembersAsapositivesignofindependencebetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicytodatetheBoardofDirectorshasneverapprovedloanstothegov-ernmenttofinancethefiscaldeficit
In2000theCentralBankofColombiaadoptedaninflationtargetingregimeandinflationrateshaveaveraged5peryearInflationtargetingwasadoptedasamon-etarypolicyresponsetoanchorinflationexpectationsandincreasefiscalrestrictions(Goacutemez2006Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRodriacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Tosup-portthecentralbanksince2004theColombiangovernmenthashaddebtcontrolsandamedium-termfiscalframeworkthatprovidesinformationaboutfiscalplansInadditionin2012theColombiangovernmentadoptedafiscalruletoprogressivelyreducethefiscaldeficitTheobjectiveofthisruleistoachieveaprimaryfiscaldefi-citof less than1ofGDPfrom2022 (Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRod-riacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Toachieve these targets thegovernmenthascarriedout taxreformstoreducethefiscaldeficitDespiteallthesefiscalcommitmentsreformshavebeenpartialwithanaverageofonetaxreformeverytwoyearsAsaresultfiscalimbalanceshavenotbeenresolvedandfiscalcredibilityislow
3 METHODOLOGYFiscalpolicyhaseffectsonmacroeconomicstabilityandmustbemanagedinaliableandcoherentmanner(FataacutesandMihov2003)Fiscalcredibilityisanassetfor governments and indicates that agents believe that fiscal targets will beachievedandthatasustainablefiscalpositionwillbemaintained(HaunerJonaacuteš
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
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Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
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Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
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Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
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Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
126 AbstractThis paper analyses the impact of fiscal imbalances on expectations for an emerg-ing economy with inflation targeting In particular based on the Colombian expe-rience we build a fiscal credibility index and evaluate its impact on inflation expectations for the 2004-2019 period To analyse fiscal and monetary interac-tions we propose an econometric model and use the OLS and GMM methods The results show that the loss of fiscal credibility associated with divergences between the fiscal deficit and agentsrsquo expectations can increase inflation expectations by between 9 and 12 Furthermore inflation expectations in Colombia incorpo-rate important macroeconomic information related to unemployment GDP and exchange rates
Keywords inflation expectations fiscal policy credibility
1 INTRODUCTIONTheanchoringfactors for inflationexpectationsareessential forfine-tuninganeconomicpolicyframework(MankiwReisandWolfers2003)Ininflationtar-geting expectations aremonitored by central banks because agents set pricesaccordingto their inflationforecastingTheseexpectationsaffect the long-termstructureoftheinterestratetheplannedexpenditureandthereforeinflationcon-trol(Blinderetal2008)AccordingtotheseminalcontributionsofSargentandWallace(1981)afiscalpolicystanceisrelevantforcontrollinginflationexpecta-tionsInthisregardifthepublicexpectsthatthefiscalpositionisunsustainableinflationexpectationswillnotbe lowBasedon this relativeconsensus ineco-nomic theory there is a growing and dynamic literature on the interactionsbetweenfiscalandmonetarypoliciesinemergingeconomies
PromptedbySargentandWallace(1981)somestudieshavesoughttoanalysetheempiricalandtheoreticalrelationshipbetweenfiscalvariablesandinflationexpec-tationsineconomieswithinflationtargetsFirstCataoandTerrones(2003)findthatdeficitGDPratiodownturnsproduceasignificantreductionininflationwithmore effects in countrieswith high and persistent inflationA similar result isreportedbydeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)CelasunGelosandPrati(2004)aswell as deMendonccedila andTostes (2015) note that fiscal balance recoveriesreduceinflationexpectationsandobservedinflationOtherstudiessuchasCeri-solaandGelos(2009)suggestthattheinflationtargetpastinflationandthepri-mary fiscal balance can anchor inflation expectations in emerging economiesNonetheless Celasun Gelos and Prati (2004) provide empirical evidence thatinflationexpectationshavebackward-lookingcomponentsdespiteinflationtargetannouncementsSimilarresultsarereportedbyAraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone (2017)whohighlight that inflation expectations showpersistenceOtherperspectivesforexampleBerlemannandElzemann(2006)findthatinfla-tionexpectationsaredrivenbypresidential election results and theprobabilitythatleftistpartieswillcometopower
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)127Withcentralbankindependencetheuseoftheinflationtaxtoachievefiscalbal-
ancedecreases(MineaandTapsoba2014)Inflationtargetingadoptionleadstoagovernmentcommitmenttofiscalsustainabilitywhichallowsinflationexpecta-tionstobeanchoredinthecentralbankrsquostargets(seeforexampleCerisolaandGelos 2009)With this perspective being borne inmind the objective of thispaper isempiricalandconsistsofexamining theeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomy
ColombiaisasmallemergingeconomyinLatinAmericathathasmadeimportanteffortstoachievebettereconomicstabilitythroughacoherentandprudentpolicyIntheColombiancasethegovernmentadoptedtheinflationtargetingattheendof1999Since2000theCentralBankofColombiahasimproveditscommunicationwithmarketsbyinformingthemaboutinflationtargetsandmonetarypolicyman-agement(HamannHofstetterandUrrutia2014)Since2003thecentralbankhasimplementedsophisticatedmethodologiestomonitorinflationexpectationsfiscaldeficit expectations and expected economic growth In the fiscal managementstrandthegovernmentestablishedadecreasinggoalforthefiscaldeficit tocon-vincemarketsaboutfiscalbalance sustainabilityAsa result aftermore than10yearstheColombianeconomyrecovereditsinvestmentgrade(Moodyrsquos2014)InsumColombiaisaninterestingeconomiclaboratoryinwhichtoanalysetheinter-actionsbetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicy(CiroanddeMendonccedila2017)
ThispaperoffersanewperspectiveontheproblemoffiscaleffectsoninflationexpectationsFirstweusecentralbankexpectationssurveysandbuildafiscalcredibilityindexbasedonoverallfiscaldeficitexpectationsSecondweanalysethelong-termrelationshipsthatmayexistbetweenfiscalcredibilityandinflationexpectationsbasedonacointegrationmodelThirdweverifywhether for theformationofinflationexpectationsagentsconsidertheavailablepublicinforma-tionaboutmacroeconomicvariablesFinallythisstudypresentsacontributiontotheunderstandingoftheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombiancaseTheresultsshowthatthelossoffiscalcredibilitywhichisasso-ciatedwithdivergencesbetween thefiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationscanincreaseinflationexpectationsbybetween9and12FurthermorethisstudyshowsthatinflationexpectationspresentinertiaandreacttoGDPandtheexchangerateTheevidencealsoindicatesthatthe2008subprimecrisisincreasedinflationexpectationsinColombia
Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollowssection2presentsaliteraturereviewsection3presentsthemethodologyformeasuringfiscalcredibilitysec-tion4providesempiricalevidencebymeansofeconometricanalysisonthefis-calcredibilityeffectoninflationexpectationsandsection5concludesthepaper
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
128 2 FISCAL CREDIBILITY AND INFLATION TARGETINGTheinflationtargetingframeworkrequiresahighdegreeofcoordinationbetweenthecentralbankandfiscalpolicyInfactforthepolicyframeworktobecredibletherecannotbepermanentfiscaldeficitsthatleadtofiscaldominanceandpublicdebtmonetization(MishkinandSavastano2001AllsoppandVines2005DeMendonccedila2007)Theabsenceoffiscaldominanceisarequirementforinflationtargeting(MishkinandSavastano2001)For this institutionsarenecessary toensurethebankrsquosindependenceandthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalbal-ance(Wyplosz2005)
AccordingtoGuumlrkaynakLevinandSwanson(2010)andStrohsalMelnickandNautz(2016)long-terminflationexpectationsshouldnotrespondtomacroeco-nomicinformationwhenthereiseconomicpolicycredibilityInLatinAmericafiscal imbalancesareaproblemandcastdoubtonmonetarypolicycredibilityFiscalbalanceisthusanindicatorthatmustbecarefullymonitoredtoensurethecredibility of the inflation targets (Minea andTapsoba 2014)One strategy toresolvethisproblemresortstotheimpositionoffiscalresponsibilitylaws(DebrunHaunerandKumar2009LinandYe2009deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016)Followinguponthisideaseveralstudieshaveanalysedtheeffectoffiscaltargetsorrulesoninflation
Onestrandoftheliteraturehasfocusedonmeasuringtheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityinemergingeconomiesunder inflation targetingThis literaturefocusesonfiscalcredibilityindicestoidentifytheireffectsonmacroeconomicvariablesInthecaseofBraziltherearefiscalcredibilityindicesonthedeficitandpublicdebtTheresultsofthesestudiesshowthatfiscalcredibilityhelpstoanchorinflationexpectationsreducesinflationarypressuresandexchangeratepass-throughoninflationlowersdisagreement infiscal expectations and stabilizesmarket interest rates (deMen-donccedilaandTostes2015deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016MontesandAcar2018)AccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)anincreaseinfiscalcredibilityhelpsfixedratebondstobeissuedFurthermorecredibilityreducesthepublicdebtindexed tomarket interest ratesAlong this same line the studybyMontes andSouza(2020)suggeststhatgreaterfiscalcredibilityreducessovereignrisk
OtherstudieshavefoundsimilarresultswithoutusingcredibilityindicesThorn-tonandVasilakis(2019)usingasampleof61low-andmiddle-incomecountriesfindthatcountriesthatadoptedtransparentfiscalrulesincreasedtheirfiscalcred-ibilityMoreoverinthecaseofIndonesiaKunkoro(2015)showsthatrulesforthefiscaldeficitareadevicetoobtainfiscalcredibilityFurthermorecredibilityreduces deficit volatility and contributes to price stabilityA similar result isreportedforthecaseofJapanAccordingtoShirakawa(2012)whenthegovern-mentlosescredibilityregardingdebtsustainabilityinflationincreasesboostinginterest ratesand increasingdefaultprobabilitiesSimilarly for thecaseof theCzechRepublicKlyuevandSnudden (2011)demonstrate that public expecta-tionsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalconsolidationcanimproveits
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)129credibilityAccordingtotheirresultsfiscalcredibilityhelpshighertaxincomes
andlowermarketinterestratestobeachieved
OtherempiricalstudiesmeasurecredibilitythroughfinancialmarketsrsquoreactionsInparticularKandilandMorsy(2014)proposethatfiscalcredibilitycanbemeasuredbytheconfidencethatmarketsshowinfiscalstimuliAccordingtotheirresultsfis-calstimulibackedbyinternationalreservesgenerategreatercredibilityandincreasethe impact of stimuli related to public spending In addition credible marketannouncementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice
21 THE COLOMBIAN CASETheBankoftheRepublicthecentralbankofColombiaemergedin1923asanissuetransferdepositanddiscountbankandisthehighestmonetaryexchangeandcreditauthorityinColombiaThebankfunctionedasadevelopmentbankfortheeconomicgrowthofColombiabetween1930and1980Inthoseyearscoffeegrowers industrialists merchants and other agents had representation on theboard of directors In this period the Colombian economy exhibited averageannualinflationratesof20
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthepolitical constitution ofColombiaAt that time the reform created a board ofdirectorsforthebankmadeupofsevenmembersthegeneralmanagerarepre-sentativeofthegovernmentwhoistheMinisterofFinanceandPublicCreditandfivefull-timemembersAsapositivesignofindependencebetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicytodatetheBoardofDirectorshasneverapprovedloanstothegov-ernmenttofinancethefiscaldeficit
In2000theCentralBankofColombiaadoptedaninflationtargetingregimeandinflationrateshaveaveraged5peryearInflationtargetingwasadoptedasamon-etarypolicyresponsetoanchorinflationexpectationsandincreasefiscalrestrictions(Goacutemez2006Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRodriacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Tosup-portthecentralbanksince2004theColombiangovernmenthashaddebtcontrolsandamedium-termfiscalframeworkthatprovidesinformationaboutfiscalplansInadditionin2012theColombiangovernmentadoptedafiscalruletoprogressivelyreducethefiscaldeficitTheobjectiveofthisruleistoachieveaprimaryfiscaldefi-citof less than1ofGDPfrom2022 (Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRod-riacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Toachieve these targets thegovernmenthascarriedout taxreformstoreducethefiscaldeficitDespiteallthesefiscalcommitmentsreformshavebeenpartialwithanaverageofonetaxreformeverytwoyearsAsaresultfiscalimbalanceshavenotbeenresolvedandfiscalcredibilityislow
3 METHODOLOGYFiscalpolicyhaseffectsonmacroeconomicstabilityandmustbemanagedinaliableandcoherentmanner(FataacutesandMihov2003)Fiscalcredibilityisanassetfor governments and indicates that agents believe that fiscal targets will beachievedandthatasustainablefiscalpositionwillbemaintained(HaunerJonaacuteš
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 20172006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
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39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
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AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
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39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
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51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
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53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)127Withcentralbankindependencetheuseoftheinflationtaxtoachievefiscalbal-
ancedecreases(MineaandTapsoba2014)Inflationtargetingadoptionleadstoagovernmentcommitmenttofiscalsustainabilitywhichallowsinflationexpecta-tionstobeanchoredinthecentralbankrsquostargets(seeforexampleCerisolaandGelos 2009)With this perspective being borne inmind the objective of thispaper isempiricalandconsistsofexamining theeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomy
ColombiaisasmallemergingeconomyinLatinAmericathathasmadeimportanteffortstoachievebettereconomicstabilitythroughacoherentandprudentpolicyIntheColombiancasethegovernmentadoptedtheinflationtargetingattheendof1999Since2000theCentralBankofColombiahasimproveditscommunicationwithmarketsbyinformingthemaboutinflationtargetsandmonetarypolicyman-agement(HamannHofstetterandUrrutia2014)Since2003thecentralbankhasimplementedsophisticatedmethodologiestomonitorinflationexpectationsfiscaldeficit expectations and expected economic growth In the fiscal managementstrandthegovernmentestablishedadecreasinggoalforthefiscaldeficit tocon-vincemarketsaboutfiscalbalance sustainabilityAsa result aftermore than10yearstheColombianeconomyrecovereditsinvestmentgrade(Moodyrsquos2014)InsumColombiaisaninterestingeconomiclaboratoryinwhichtoanalysetheinter-actionsbetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicy(CiroanddeMendonccedila2017)
ThispaperoffersanewperspectiveontheproblemoffiscaleffectsoninflationexpectationsFirstweusecentralbankexpectationssurveysandbuildafiscalcredibilityindexbasedonoverallfiscaldeficitexpectationsSecondweanalysethelong-termrelationshipsthatmayexistbetweenfiscalcredibilityandinflationexpectationsbasedonacointegrationmodelThirdweverifywhether for theformationofinflationexpectationsagentsconsidertheavailablepublicinforma-tionaboutmacroeconomicvariablesFinallythisstudypresentsacontributiontotheunderstandingoftheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombiancaseTheresultsshowthatthelossoffiscalcredibilitywhichisasso-ciatedwithdivergencesbetween thefiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationscanincreaseinflationexpectationsbybetween9and12FurthermorethisstudyshowsthatinflationexpectationspresentinertiaandreacttoGDPandtheexchangerateTheevidencealsoindicatesthatthe2008subprimecrisisincreasedinflationexpectationsinColombia
Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollowssection2presentsaliteraturereviewsection3presentsthemethodologyformeasuringfiscalcredibilitysec-tion4providesempiricalevidencebymeansofeconometricanalysisonthefis-calcredibilityeffectoninflationexpectationsandsection5concludesthepaper
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
128 2 FISCAL CREDIBILITY AND INFLATION TARGETINGTheinflationtargetingframeworkrequiresahighdegreeofcoordinationbetweenthecentralbankandfiscalpolicyInfactforthepolicyframeworktobecredibletherecannotbepermanentfiscaldeficitsthatleadtofiscaldominanceandpublicdebtmonetization(MishkinandSavastano2001AllsoppandVines2005DeMendonccedila2007)Theabsenceoffiscaldominanceisarequirementforinflationtargeting(MishkinandSavastano2001)For this institutionsarenecessary toensurethebankrsquosindependenceandthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalbal-ance(Wyplosz2005)
AccordingtoGuumlrkaynakLevinandSwanson(2010)andStrohsalMelnickandNautz(2016)long-terminflationexpectationsshouldnotrespondtomacroeco-nomicinformationwhenthereiseconomicpolicycredibilityInLatinAmericafiscal imbalancesareaproblemandcastdoubtonmonetarypolicycredibilityFiscalbalanceisthusanindicatorthatmustbecarefullymonitoredtoensurethecredibility of the inflation targets (Minea andTapsoba 2014)One strategy toresolvethisproblemresortstotheimpositionoffiscalresponsibilitylaws(DebrunHaunerandKumar2009LinandYe2009deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016)Followinguponthisideaseveralstudieshaveanalysedtheeffectoffiscaltargetsorrulesoninflation
Onestrandoftheliteraturehasfocusedonmeasuringtheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityinemergingeconomiesunder inflation targetingThis literaturefocusesonfiscalcredibilityindicestoidentifytheireffectsonmacroeconomicvariablesInthecaseofBraziltherearefiscalcredibilityindicesonthedeficitandpublicdebtTheresultsofthesestudiesshowthatfiscalcredibilityhelpstoanchorinflationexpectationsreducesinflationarypressuresandexchangeratepass-throughoninflationlowersdisagreement infiscal expectations and stabilizesmarket interest rates (deMen-donccedilaandTostes2015deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016MontesandAcar2018)AccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)anincreaseinfiscalcredibilityhelpsfixedratebondstobeissuedFurthermorecredibilityreducesthepublicdebtindexed tomarket interest ratesAlong this same line the studybyMontes andSouza(2020)suggeststhatgreaterfiscalcredibilityreducessovereignrisk
OtherstudieshavefoundsimilarresultswithoutusingcredibilityindicesThorn-tonandVasilakis(2019)usingasampleof61low-andmiddle-incomecountriesfindthatcountriesthatadoptedtransparentfiscalrulesincreasedtheirfiscalcred-ibilityMoreoverinthecaseofIndonesiaKunkoro(2015)showsthatrulesforthefiscaldeficitareadevicetoobtainfiscalcredibilityFurthermorecredibilityreduces deficit volatility and contributes to price stabilityA similar result isreportedforthecaseofJapanAccordingtoShirakawa(2012)whenthegovern-mentlosescredibilityregardingdebtsustainabilityinflationincreasesboostinginterest ratesand increasingdefaultprobabilitiesSimilarly for thecaseof theCzechRepublicKlyuevandSnudden (2011)demonstrate that public expecta-tionsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalconsolidationcanimproveits
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)129credibilityAccordingtotheirresultsfiscalcredibilityhelpshighertaxincomes
andlowermarketinterestratestobeachieved
OtherempiricalstudiesmeasurecredibilitythroughfinancialmarketsrsquoreactionsInparticularKandilandMorsy(2014)proposethatfiscalcredibilitycanbemeasuredbytheconfidencethatmarketsshowinfiscalstimuliAccordingtotheirresultsfis-calstimulibackedbyinternationalreservesgenerategreatercredibilityandincreasethe impact of stimuli related to public spending In addition credible marketannouncementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice
21 THE COLOMBIAN CASETheBankoftheRepublicthecentralbankofColombiaemergedin1923asanissuetransferdepositanddiscountbankandisthehighestmonetaryexchangeandcreditauthorityinColombiaThebankfunctionedasadevelopmentbankfortheeconomicgrowthofColombiabetween1930and1980Inthoseyearscoffeegrowers industrialists merchants and other agents had representation on theboard of directors In this period the Colombian economy exhibited averageannualinflationratesof20
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthepolitical constitution ofColombiaAt that time the reform created a board ofdirectorsforthebankmadeupofsevenmembersthegeneralmanagerarepre-sentativeofthegovernmentwhoistheMinisterofFinanceandPublicCreditandfivefull-timemembersAsapositivesignofindependencebetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicytodatetheBoardofDirectorshasneverapprovedloanstothegov-ernmenttofinancethefiscaldeficit
In2000theCentralBankofColombiaadoptedaninflationtargetingregimeandinflationrateshaveaveraged5peryearInflationtargetingwasadoptedasamon-etarypolicyresponsetoanchorinflationexpectationsandincreasefiscalrestrictions(Goacutemez2006Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRodriacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Tosup-portthecentralbanksince2004theColombiangovernmenthashaddebtcontrolsandamedium-termfiscalframeworkthatprovidesinformationaboutfiscalplansInadditionin2012theColombiangovernmentadoptedafiscalruletoprogressivelyreducethefiscaldeficitTheobjectiveofthisruleistoachieveaprimaryfiscaldefi-citof less than1ofGDPfrom2022 (Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRod-riacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Toachieve these targets thegovernmenthascarriedout taxreformstoreducethefiscaldeficitDespiteallthesefiscalcommitmentsreformshavebeenpartialwithanaverageofonetaxreformeverytwoyearsAsaresultfiscalimbalanceshavenotbeenresolvedandfiscalcredibilityislow
3 METHODOLOGYFiscalpolicyhaseffectsonmacroeconomicstabilityandmustbemanagedinaliableandcoherentmanner(FataacutesandMihov2003)Fiscalcredibilityisanassetfor governments and indicates that agents believe that fiscal targets will beachievedandthatasustainablefiscalpositionwillbemaintained(HaunerJonaacuteš
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 20172006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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EXPEC
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
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30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
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31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
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34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
128 2 FISCAL CREDIBILITY AND INFLATION TARGETINGTheinflationtargetingframeworkrequiresahighdegreeofcoordinationbetweenthecentralbankandfiscalpolicyInfactforthepolicyframeworktobecredibletherecannotbepermanentfiscaldeficitsthatleadtofiscaldominanceandpublicdebtmonetization(MishkinandSavastano2001AllsoppandVines2005DeMendonccedila2007)Theabsenceoffiscaldominanceisarequirementforinflationtargeting(MishkinandSavastano2001)For this institutionsarenecessary toensurethebankrsquosindependenceandthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalbal-ance(Wyplosz2005)
AccordingtoGuumlrkaynakLevinandSwanson(2010)andStrohsalMelnickandNautz(2016)long-terminflationexpectationsshouldnotrespondtomacroeco-nomicinformationwhenthereiseconomicpolicycredibilityInLatinAmericafiscal imbalancesareaproblemandcastdoubtonmonetarypolicycredibilityFiscalbalanceisthusanindicatorthatmustbecarefullymonitoredtoensurethecredibility of the inflation targets (Minea andTapsoba 2014)One strategy toresolvethisproblemresortstotheimpositionoffiscalresponsibilitylaws(DebrunHaunerandKumar2009LinandYe2009deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016)Followinguponthisideaseveralstudieshaveanalysedtheeffectoffiscaltargetsorrulesoninflation
Onestrandoftheliteraturehasfocusedonmeasuringtheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityinemergingeconomiesunder inflation targetingThis literaturefocusesonfiscalcredibilityindicestoidentifytheireffectsonmacroeconomicvariablesInthecaseofBraziltherearefiscalcredibilityindicesonthedeficitandpublicdebtTheresultsofthesestudiesshowthatfiscalcredibilityhelpstoanchorinflationexpectationsreducesinflationarypressuresandexchangeratepass-throughoninflationlowersdisagreement infiscal expectations and stabilizesmarket interest rates (deMen-donccedilaandTostes2015deMendonccedilaanddaSilva2016MontesandAcar2018)AccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)anincreaseinfiscalcredibilityhelpsfixedratebondstobeissuedFurthermorecredibilityreducesthepublicdebtindexed tomarket interest ratesAlong this same line the studybyMontes andSouza(2020)suggeststhatgreaterfiscalcredibilityreducessovereignrisk
OtherstudieshavefoundsimilarresultswithoutusingcredibilityindicesThorn-tonandVasilakis(2019)usingasampleof61low-andmiddle-incomecountriesfindthatcountriesthatadoptedtransparentfiscalrulesincreasedtheirfiscalcred-ibilityMoreoverinthecaseofIndonesiaKunkoro(2015)showsthatrulesforthefiscaldeficitareadevicetoobtainfiscalcredibilityFurthermorecredibilityreduces deficit volatility and contributes to price stabilityA similar result isreportedforthecaseofJapanAccordingtoShirakawa(2012)whenthegovern-mentlosescredibilityregardingdebtsustainabilityinflationincreasesboostinginterest ratesand increasingdefaultprobabilitiesSimilarly for thecaseof theCzechRepublicKlyuevandSnudden (2011)demonstrate that public expecta-tionsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmentstofiscalconsolidationcanimproveits
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)129credibilityAccordingtotheirresultsfiscalcredibilityhelpshighertaxincomes
andlowermarketinterestratestobeachieved
OtherempiricalstudiesmeasurecredibilitythroughfinancialmarketsrsquoreactionsInparticularKandilandMorsy(2014)proposethatfiscalcredibilitycanbemeasuredbytheconfidencethatmarketsshowinfiscalstimuliAccordingtotheirresultsfis-calstimulibackedbyinternationalreservesgenerategreatercredibilityandincreasethe impact of stimuli related to public spending In addition credible marketannouncementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice
21 THE COLOMBIAN CASETheBankoftheRepublicthecentralbankofColombiaemergedin1923asanissuetransferdepositanddiscountbankandisthehighestmonetaryexchangeandcreditauthorityinColombiaThebankfunctionedasadevelopmentbankfortheeconomicgrowthofColombiabetween1930and1980Inthoseyearscoffeegrowers industrialists merchants and other agents had representation on theboard of directors In this period the Colombian economy exhibited averageannualinflationratesof20
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthepolitical constitution ofColombiaAt that time the reform created a board ofdirectorsforthebankmadeupofsevenmembersthegeneralmanagerarepre-sentativeofthegovernmentwhoistheMinisterofFinanceandPublicCreditandfivefull-timemembersAsapositivesignofindependencebetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicytodatetheBoardofDirectorshasneverapprovedloanstothegov-ernmenttofinancethefiscaldeficit
In2000theCentralBankofColombiaadoptedaninflationtargetingregimeandinflationrateshaveaveraged5peryearInflationtargetingwasadoptedasamon-etarypolicyresponsetoanchorinflationexpectationsandincreasefiscalrestrictions(Goacutemez2006Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRodriacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Tosup-portthecentralbanksince2004theColombiangovernmenthashaddebtcontrolsandamedium-termfiscalframeworkthatprovidesinformationaboutfiscalplansInadditionin2012theColombiangovernmentadoptedafiscalruletoprogressivelyreducethefiscaldeficitTheobjectiveofthisruleistoachieveaprimaryfiscaldefi-citof less than1ofGDPfrom2022 (Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRod-riacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Toachieve these targets thegovernmenthascarriedout taxreformstoreducethefiscaldeficitDespiteallthesefiscalcommitmentsreformshavebeenpartialwithanaverageofonetaxreformeverytwoyearsAsaresultfiscalimbalanceshavenotbeenresolvedandfiscalcredibilityislow
3 METHODOLOGYFiscalpolicyhaseffectsonmacroeconomicstabilityandmustbemanagedinaliableandcoherentmanner(FataacutesandMihov2003)Fiscalcredibilityisanassetfor governments and indicates that agents believe that fiscal targets will beachievedandthatasustainablefiscalpositionwillbemaintained(HaunerJonaacuteš
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 20172006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
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39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
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51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
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54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)129credibilityAccordingtotheirresultsfiscalcredibilityhelpshighertaxincomes
andlowermarketinterestratestobeachieved
OtherempiricalstudiesmeasurecredibilitythroughfinancialmarketsrsquoreactionsInparticularKandilandMorsy(2014)proposethatfiscalcredibilitycanbemeasuredbytheconfidencethatmarketsshowinfiscalstimuliAccordingtotheirresultsfis-calstimulibackedbyinternationalreservesgenerategreatercredibilityandincreasethe impact of stimuli related to public spending In addition credible marketannouncementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice
21 THE COLOMBIAN CASETheBankoftheRepublicthecentralbankofColombiaemergedin1923asanissuetransferdepositanddiscountbankandisthehighestmonetaryexchangeandcreditauthorityinColombiaThebankfunctionedasadevelopmentbankfortheeconomicgrowthofColombiabetween1930and1980Inthoseyearscoffeegrowers industrialists merchants and other agents had representation on theboard of directors In this period the Colombian economy exhibited averageannualinflationratesof20
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthepolitical constitution ofColombiaAt that time the reform created a board ofdirectorsforthebankmadeupofsevenmembersthegeneralmanagerarepre-sentativeofthegovernmentwhoistheMinisterofFinanceandPublicCreditandfivefull-timemembersAsapositivesignofindependencebetweenmonetaryandfiscalpolicytodatetheBoardofDirectorshasneverapprovedloanstothegov-ernmenttofinancethefiscaldeficit
In2000theCentralBankofColombiaadoptedaninflationtargetingregimeandinflationrateshaveaveraged5peryearInflationtargetingwasadoptedasamon-etarypolicyresponsetoanchorinflationexpectationsandincreasefiscalrestrictions(Goacutemez2006Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRodriacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Tosup-portthecentralbanksince2004theColombiangovernmenthashaddebtcontrolsandamedium-termfiscalframeworkthatprovidesinformationaboutfiscalplansInadditionin2012theColombiangovernmentadoptedafiscalruletoprogressivelyreducethefiscaldeficitTheobjectiveofthisruleistoachieveaprimaryfiscaldefi-citof less than1ofGDPfrom2022 (Loacutepez-EncisoVargas-HerreraandRod-riacuteguez-Nintildeo2016)Toachieve these targets thegovernmenthascarriedout taxreformstoreducethefiscaldeficitDespiteallthesefiscalcommitmentsreformshavebeenpartialwithanaverageofonetaxreformeverytwoyearsAsaresultfiscalimbalanceshavenotbeenresolvedandfiscalcredibilityislow
3 METHODOLOGYFiscalpolicyhaseffectsonmacroeconomicstabilityandmustbemanagedinaliableandcoherentmanner(FataacutesandMihov2003)Fiscalcredibilityisanassetfor governments and indicates that agents believe that fiscal targets will beachievedandthatasustainablefiscalpositionwillbemaintained(HaunerJonaacuteš
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 20172006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
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EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
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ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
130 and Kumar 2007) In particular fiscal credibility is relevant to policymakersbecauseitcanhelpguidethemarketinawaythatavoidsrisinginflationexpecta-tions(deMendonccedilaandMachado2013)
Itisimportanttonotethatinthecaseofemergingeconomiesfiscaldeficitscon-stantlyputthefulfilmentofthecentralbankrsquosobjectivesatriskAsaresultinfla-tion expectation control is affected by fiscal credibility (Cerisola and Geros2009)Thispaperevaluatestheeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpecta-tionsforthecaseoftheColombianeconomybasedoncentralbankexpectationssurveysThesesurveysaverage40participantsamongprivatebanksstockbro-kers pension funds academics and international organizations In the presentstudyinflationexpectationsarecalculatedas1-year-aheadinflationforecastsoftheparticipantssurveyedThisinformationisavailabletothepublicthroughitscentralbanktimeseriesstatisticssystemDrawingontheinformationavailablewepresenttheinflationexpectationsforthe2004-2019periodinfigure1
Figure 1Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in )
Inflation expectations Trend (HP filter)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2004 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 20172006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia Trend calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
Inflationexpectationsdeclinedbetween2004and2013towardsthecentralbankrsquoslong-terminflationtargetwhichwassetat3Thisprocesswaspartiallyinter-ruptedbythesubprimecrisisof2007-2008Since2014therehasbeenanincreaseininflationexpectationsduetothegreatdifficultyofcontrollingsomeunexpectedeventssuchasastrongdevaluationintheexchangerateandsomeinternalcrisescausedbyinternalpoliticalproblemsrelatedtomonetarypolicy
Thereareseveralchallengesinmeasuringfiscalcredibilitybecausethegovern-mentrsquosbudgetconstraintinvolvesseveralvariablesAccordingtodeMendonccedilaandMachado(2013)fiscalcredibilitycanbeevaluatedbypublicconfidenceinrelationto thegovernmentrsquosability toavoidtheriskofdefaultMoreover it ispossible to affirm that there is fiscal credibility when there is a government
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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EXPEC
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
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39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
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44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
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39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
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51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)131commitmenttothesustainabilityofpublicfinancesAsaresultthereiscredibility
whenthegovernmentdoesnotusetheinflationtaxtofulfilitsobligations(HaunerJonasandKumar2007DebrunandKinda2017)
TomakecredibilitymeasurablethereareseveralproposalsAccordingtoDrazenandMasson(1994)credibilitycanbemeasuredbyagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingthefiscalresultsAnotherapproachisofferedbyNaert(2011)whopostulatesthatfiscalpolicyiscredibleifthereislittledifferencebetweenthecurrentlevelandtheprojectedlevelofsomefiscalmeasureThechallengeistodefinesomemeasureoffiscalperformanceonwhichagentsformexpectationsandmakeprojectionsBasedonDebrunandKinda(2017)fiscalperformancecanbemeasuredbytheoverallfiscaldeficitthatisbythedifferencebetweenexpendituresdebtserviceandtaxesHence
DEFt=Gt + rDtndash1ndashTt (1)
whereDEFtistheoverallfiscaldeficitGtisthepublicexpenditurerDtndash1isthepublicdebtinterestandTtisthetaxrevenuesAllthevariablesaredefinedasapercentageofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)
Anessentialpointregardingthecredibilityofeconomicpolicyispublicexpecta-tionAccordingtoCukiermanandMeltzer(1986)credibilitycanbemeasuredastheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthepolicymakerrsquosplansandthepub-licrsquosbeliefsaboutthoseplansMoreoverashighlightedbyFaustandSvensson(2001)credibilityisnegativelyrelatedtothedistancebetweenagentsrsquoexpecta-tions and the achievements of the policymaker FollowingHauner Jonas andKumar(2007)fiscalcredibilitycanbeapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenagentsrsquoexpectationsofthefiscaldeficit(E(DEFt))andthefiscaldeficitachievedbythegovernment(DEFt)Inotherwordsthegreaterthedifferencebetweentheobservedfiscaldeficitandagentsrsquoexpectationsthelessfiscalcredibilitythereisbecausethereisnoconvergenceinagentsrsquobeliefs
Fromthatperspectivethispaperusesacredibilitylossindicator(CRED_LOSS) that considers thedifferencesbetween theagentsrsquo expectationsabout thefiscaldeficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue)
CRED_LOSSt =|E(DEFt)ndashDEFt| (2)
whereE(DEF)isagentsrsquoexpectationsabouttheoverallfiscaldeficitandDEF is theoverallfiscaldeficitobservedThebehaviourofbothvariablesovertimeispresentedinfigure2TheagentsrsquoexpectationsregardingtheoverallfiscaldeficitareextractedfromthesurveyoftheCentralBankofColombiacalledldquoMacroeco-nomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮInthissurveythecentralbankasksbrokerscommercialbankspension fundsacademic institutesand ratingagencies about the quarterly forecast of several macroeconomic variables
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
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18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficitThequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(seeappendixtableA1)
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented infigure2belowItisobservedthatfrom2004to2008expectationsunderestimatedthe observedfiscal deficitThen since the endof 2008 expectations began togrowandwerelocatedclosetothefiscaldeficitsurpassingitin2010Between2010and2011thegovernmentadoptedafiscalruleontheprimaryfiscaldeficitandfromthenonexpectationsbegantofallFrom2012to2016therehasbeenanincreaseintheobservedfiscaldeficitandconsequentlyinexpectationsThisincreaseinvariablespeakedin2016Sincethentherehasbeenadropinboththeobserveddeficitandtheexpectations
Figure 2Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in of GDP)
Overal fiscal deficit observed Fiscal deficit expectations
0
100
200
300
400
500
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Figure3showstheperformanceoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)from2004to2019inColombiaTheCRED LOSSindicatorshowsthattherewasuncertaintyaboutfiscalpolicyinthe2006-2008periodAsaresultfiscalcredibilitylosswashighinthatperiodOnceexpectationsbegantoapproachtheobserveddeficitthelossofcredibilityeasedandreachedalowof014in2011Q1AfterthiswebegantoobserveanunstablebehaviourofcredibilitylossDespitethisthetrendoftheseriesshowsthatthelossofcredibilitywasstablebetween2012and2019Forthefullperiod(2004-2019)thecredibilitylosswas09onaverage
SincetheseminalcontributionofKydlandandPrescott(1977)economictheoryhas assumed that an agents expectationsdependon thegovernmentrsquos crediblecommitmenttoanannouncedtargetInotherwordstheexpectedpathofthefiscaldeficitmattersfortheformationofinflationexpectationsInparticularwhenthereisnocommitmenttofiscalequilibriumgovernmentliabilitiesareensuredwithseigniorageandtheoutcomeisanincreaseinexpectedinflation(SargentandWal-lace1981)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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142 REFERENCES1 Allsopp C andVines D 2005 The macroeconomic role of fiscal policy
Oxford Review of Economic Policy21(4)pp485-508httpsdoiorg101093oxrepgri027
2 AraujoCandGaglianoneW2010Survey-basedInflationExpectationsinBrazilBIS Papers 49pp107-114
3 BerlemannM and Elzemann J 2006Are expectations on inflation andelectionoutcomesconnectedAnempiricalanalysisEconomic Letters91(3)pp354-359httpsdoiorg101016jeconlet200512007
4 BevilaquaAMesquitaMandMinellaA2008BrazilTamingInflationExpectationsWorking Papers Central Bank of Brazil(129)pp1-40
5 BlinderA[etal]2008CentralBankCommunicationandMonetaryPolicyJournal of Economic Literature 46(4) pp 910-945 httpsdoi101257jel464910
6 BomfimAandRudebuschG2000OpportunisticandDeliberateDisinfla-tion Under Imperfect Credibility Journal of Money Credit and Banking 32(4)pp707-721httpsdoiorg1023072601179
7 CataoLAandTerronesM2003FiscalDeficitsandInflationIMF Work-ing PaperNo0365WashingtonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451848700001
8 CelasunOandGelosG2009WhatdrivesinflationexpectationsinBrazilAnempiricalanalysisApplied Economics41(10)pp1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
9 CelasunOGelosGandPratiA2004ObstaclestodisinflationwhatistheroleoffiscalexpectationsEconomic Policy19pp441-81httpsdoiorg101111j1468-0327200400129x
10CerisolaMandGelosG2009WhatDrivesInflationExpectationsinBra-zilAnEmpiricalAnalysisApplied Economics41(10)1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
11CiroJCGandDeMendonccedilaHF2017Effectofcredibilityandreputationon discretionary fiscal policy empirical evidence from ColombiaEmpirical Economics53(4)pp1529-1552httpsdoiorg101007s00181-016-1177-2
12CukiermanAandMeltzerAH1986Atheoryofambiguitycredibilityand inflation under discretion and asymmetric informationEconometrica54(5)pp1099-1128httpsdoi1023071912324
13DeMendonccedilaHF2007TowardscredibilityfromInflationtargetingtheBrazilian experience Applied Economics 39(20) 2599-2615 httpsdoiorg10108000036840600707324
14DeMendonccedilaHFandDaSilvaR2016ObservingtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationEvidencefromanemergingeconomyEconomics Bul-letin36(4)pp2333-2349
15DeMendonccedilaHFandMachadoMR2013PublicDebtManagementandCredibility Evidence from an emerging economy Economic Modelling30(1)pp10-21httpsdoiorg101016jeconmod201209009
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14316DeMendonccedilaHFandTostesFS2015Theeffectofmonetaryandfiscal
credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
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18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
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20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
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AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
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45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
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47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
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51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
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54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in )
CRED_LOSS Trend (HP Filter)
00
04
08
12
16
20
24
28
32
2004 20062005 20082007 2009 2010 20122011 20142013 20162015 20182017 2019
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidenceand itcanhelpformexpectationsAccordingtoMishkin(2007)inflationtargetinginanenviron-mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicyHencethebaselinemodelconsideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows
E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectationsCRED_LOSSt is thefiscalpolicycredibilitylossXtisavectorofexplanatoryvariablesandεtistheresidualterm
To observe an initial empirical relationship between inflation expectations andfiscalcredibilitylossascatterplotforbothvariablesispresentedinfigure4ThetheoreticalintuitionofapositiverelationshipbetweenbothvariablesisconfirmedThusabetterprojectionofthefiscaldeficitcanleadtoareductionininflationexpectations
Itisimportanttoverifywhetherthepublicinformationavailableonmacroeco-nomicandfinancialvariablesistakenintoconsiderationbytheagentsForthisitis useful touse themost recent data for inflation forecasts (MankiwReis andWolfers2003)Financialmarketvolatilityaffectstheperformanceofemergingeconomiesandindirectly theformationofexpectations(KennedyandPalerm2014)FortheColombiancasetheinternationaleconomyoutlookcausesvolatil-ityincapitalflowsandthebalanceofpaymentsthatcanimpactinflationexpecta-tionsThereforeweusebehaviouroftheSampP500stockmarketindex(VIXt-1)asourfirstexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
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22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
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25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
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29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
134 Figure 4Inflation expectations and fiscal credibility loss in Colombia
CRED_LOSS (in )
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
(in
)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source Authors elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
Expectationsdependonpastinformationandeachagentinterpretstheavailableinformationinadifferentway(Roberts1997)Infacttheincreaseininflationexpectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch andFischer1993)Thereforepast inflation(πt-1) isusedas thesecondexplanatoryvariable
Inemergingeconomiesmovementsintheexchangerateimpactmarginalcostsandinflationforecasts(CelasunGelosandPrati2004)InparticulartheColom-bianeconomyhas an importantpass-throughof the exchange rate todomesticinflationthroughitscosteffectsThusasthethirdexplanatoryvariablethepastexchangerate(et-1)isused
AccordingtotheNeo-KeynesianPhillipsCurvemodelinflationexpectationsarerelatedtotheprofitmark-upovercostsThesemark-upchangesareafunctionofthe economic cycle (Woodford 2003) Thus we useGDP (yt-1) as the fourthexplanatoryvariableforinflationexpectations
OnthebasisofOkunrsquoslawitispossibletoestablisharelationshipbetweenoutputandthelabourmarketAccordinglyasanalternativemeasureoftheeconomythepast unemployment rate is used as the fifth explanatory variable for inflationexpectations(Ut-1)
Inshorttoanalysetheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsweusedanexplanatoryvariableassociatedwithexternalrisk(VIXt-1)twomeasuresasso-ciatedwithpastprices(πt-1 et-1)andtwomeasuresassociatedwitheconomicper-formance (yt-1 Ut-1)Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasanexplanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectationsAdummyvariable (Dt) is also added to capture the possible effect of the 2007-2008
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
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38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
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51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)135subprimecrisisThisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear20081Thusthepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels
E(πt) =α0 + α1 E(πtndash1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXtndash1 + α4πtndash1 + α5ytndash1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7 + α8 E(πtndash1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXtndash1 + α11etndash1 + α12ytndash1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14 + α15 E(πtndash1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXtndash1 + α18πtndash1 + α19Utndash1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21 + α22 E(πtndash1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXtndash1 + α25etndash1 + α26Utndash1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionallyweestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables
E(πt) =α28 + α29 E(πtndash1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXtndash1 + α32πtndash1 + α33ytndash1 + α34etndash1 + α35Utndash1 + α36Dt+ εt
4 (8)
Theperiodunderconsideration is from2004-1 to2019-4 (quarterlydata)ThechoiceoftheperiodisduetodataavailabilityforthefiscaldeficitexpectedwhicharenecessarytobuildthecredibilityindexSeetableA1(appendix)forthesourcesofdataanddescriptionsofallvariablesusedinthestudy
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEAsinpreviousliteraturetheuseoftimeseriesdatainestimationsentailsverify-ingwhetherunitrootsexistThereforebeforecarryingouttheestimationsofallmodelstheincreasedDickey-Fullerunitroottest(ADF)thePhillips-Perrontest(PP) and theKwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity testwereperformedTheresultsarepresentedintableA3(appendix)Basedontheresultsoftheteststhevariablestobeusedinequations(4)-(8)areI(1) andhavethesameorderofintegration
AccordingtoEngleandGranger(1981)itispossibletoestimatethemodelspro-posedifthereisastationarycombinationintheseriesCointegrationtestswereperformedfortheproposedmodelThechoiceofVARlagandtheinclusionofthedeterministiccomponentsofthecointegrationvectorwasmadeonthebasisoftheSchwarz criterion (Harris 1995)The cointegration test proposed by Johansen(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3appendix)Thusthemodelswere estimatedwith the series in levelswithout problems of spuriousregressions
1BesidethepresentedmodelswealsoestimatedmodelswithoutputgapreplacingGDPaswellasbyinclud-ingmorelagsofinflationTheobtainedresultswerenotstatisticallysignificantandareavailableuponrequest
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
136
Ta
bl
e 1
Infla
tion
expe
ctat
ions
det
erm
inan
ts in
Col
ombi
a
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Constant
08989
(02031)
[44248]
00362
(02488)
[01455]
06253
(02608)
[23970]
09408
(02767)
[33991]
06288
(03236)
[19629]
09959
(02499)
[39840]
03482
(01554)
[22405]
06309
(01903)
[33140]
09878
(01745)
[56591]
10719
(03441)
[31124]
E(π t-1
)06092
(00851)
[71545]
08396
(00593)
[141422]
03724
(01189)
[31319]
08238
(00504)
[163314]
04751
(01174)
[40448]
05825
(01077)
[54078]
07714
(00450)
[171204]
03668
(00840)
[43202]
07946
(00366)
[217099]
04685
(00597)
[78414]
CRE
D L
OSS
t
01054
(00412)
[25584]
01133
(00478)
[24474]
00947
(00402)
[23528]
01269
(00436)
[29071]
00915
(00411)
[22243]
01052
(00371)
[28319]
00959
(00317)
[30221]
00972
(00458)
[21210]
01213
(00312)
[38856]
00994
(00249)
[39793]
VIX t-1
00001
(00038)
[00315]
00033
(00044)
[07421]
00040
(00036)
[11140]
00047
(00038)
[12400]
00017
(00037)
[04600]
00003
(00021)
[01541]
00044
(00042)
[10539]
00022
(00029)
[07648]
00057
(00026)
[21536]
00004
(00024)
[01691]
π t-1
00979
(00277)
[35290]
01677
(00397)
[42245]
01334
(00408)
[32657]
01053
(00312)
[33666]
01600
(00252)
[63330]
01405
(00178)
[78799]
e t-1
00001
(660E-05)
[20913]
00003
(00001)
[19674]
00002
(00001)
[19534]
984E-05
(566E-05)
[17388]
00005
(00002)
[22540]
00001
(663E-05)
[19117]
y t-1
42515
(23130)
[18380]
52183
(26785)
[19681]
52481
(23384)
[22442]
33457
(09125)
[36661]
56147
(14500)
[38720]
36543
(09729)
[37558]
Ut-1
00969
(00427)
[22690]
00503
(00289)
[17391]
01257
(00608)
[21095]
00962
(00440)
[23806]
00472
(00185)
[25415]
00989
(00347)
[28453]
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)137
OL
SG
MM
minusHA
CD
epen
dent
var
iabl
e
E(π
)M
odel
(1)
Mod
el (2
)M
odel
(3)
Mod
el (4
)M
odel
(5)
Mod
el (1
)M
odel
(2)
Mod
el (3
)M
odel
(4)
Mod
el (5
)
Dt
08585
(01993)
[43064]
-02435
(02559)
[-09517]
08723
(01858)
[46937]
09731
(02023)
[48087]
09283
(01967)
[47174]
09354
(03533)
[26475]
02069
(03345)
[06163]
07943
(02019)
[35744]
10797
(03648)
[33984]
11167
(03112)
[35882]
R2 ad
j091
087
092
091
092
091
085
089
089
091
F-statistic
8705
6583
10759
9742
3557
Prob(F-Stat)
000
000
000
000
000
LMtest(1)
093
139
204
137
2151
p-value(LMTest)
040
025
014
026
000
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
test
060
096
067
139
179
p-value(B-P-Gtest)
072
046
066
023
014
J-statistic
487
521
239
850
379
Prob(J-stat)
056
039
066
020
070
Instruments
13
12
11
13
15
NinstrNobs
020
019
017
020
023
Not
e M
argi
nal s
igni
fican
ce le
vels
(
) d
enot
es 0
01
()
den
otes
00
5 a
nd (
) den
otes
01
0 S
tand
ard
erro
rs a
re in
par
enth
eses
and
t-st
atis
tics i
n br
acke
ts P
(F-s
tatis
tic)
repo
rt th
e re
spec
tive
p-va
lue
of th
e F-
test
P(J
-sta
tistic
) rep
ort t
he re
spec
tive
p-va
lued
of t
he J
-test
The
list
of G
MM
inst
rum
ents
are
pre
sent
ed in
tabl
e A6
(app
endi
x)
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
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24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) andGeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM) In thecaseof themodelsestimatedwith OLS tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimatesAccordingtoHansen(1982)themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityandautocorrelation problems may exist which will invalidate the OLS estimatesGiventhisinGMMestimatestheinstrumentschosenwerelaggedforatleastoneperiodAccordingtoWooldridge(2001)toobtainefficientestimationswiththeGMMmethodoveridentificationrestrictionsarenecessaryInthissensetheJtestwasappliedTheestimationsofequations(4)-(8)arepresentedintable1
The results of the estimates show the expected signTheparameter associatedwithpastexpectations(E(πt-1))ispositiveandsignificantInflationexpectationspresentsomeinertiawiththeexpectationsofthepastperiodThatisthereissomeevidencethatexpectationsareadaptiveandagentslearnslowlyAsimilarresultisreportedbyMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)
Thecoefficientassociatedwithfiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantinallmodelsThetheoreticalintuitionthatthefiscalpolicystancehasbeenimportant inshapinginflationexpectations isconfirmedThuswhenconfidencegrowsaboutthegovernmentrsquoscommitmenttofiscalsustainabil-ity theexpected inflationdecreasesTheevidencesupports the theoreticalper-spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthattheloweruncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitandthereforegreaterfiscalcredibil-ity matter for inflation expectations Similar results are reported by Kuncoro(2015)CerisolaandGeros(2009)andCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)
Withtheresultsintable1wecalculatedthatanincreaseofoneunit inCRED LOSScanboostinflationexpectationsinarangethatvariesbetween915and12Forexampleifinflationexpectationsareat3anincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSS can increaseexpectations toa rangebetween327and3362 ThereforeaccordingtoCelasunGelosandPrati(2004)thefindingsshowthatbuildingfiscalcredibilityisrelevanttoanchoringinflationexpectations
Ontheotherhandinrelationtothecoefficientassociatedwithpastexternalrisk(VIXt-1) theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificantThisfindingsuggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflationexpectationsinColombiaTheimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformationofexpectationsisalsosignificantUsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch(2000) it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topastinflationmonetary policy in Colombia is not fully credibleAccording to theresults thecoefficientassociatedwithpast inflationvariesbetween979and
2 CRED LOSSiscalculatedintheunitsinwhichthefiscaldeficitismeasuredaspercentageofGDPThere-foreanincreaseofoneunitinCRED LOSSmeansthatdeficitexpectationsare1(ofGDP)abovetheobserveddeficit
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
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plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
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0
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Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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11CiroJCGandDeMendonccedilaHF2017Effectofcredibilityandreputationon discretionary fiscal policy empirical evidence from ColombiaEmpirical Economics53(4)pp1529-1552httpsdoiorg101007s00181-016-1177-2
12CukiermanAandMeltzerAH1986Atheoryofambiguitycredibilityand inflation under discretion and asymmetric informationEconometrica54(5)pp1099-1128httpsdoi1023071912324
13DeMendonccedilaHF2007TowardscredibilityfromInflationtargetingtheBrazilian experience Applied Economics 39(20) 2599-2615 httpsdoiorg10108000036840600707324
14DeMendonccedilaHFandDaSilvaR2016ObservingtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationEvidencefromanemergingeconomyEconomics Bul-letin36(4)pp2333-2349
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18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
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37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
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39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
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44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
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53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)1391677Thereforeifpastinflationincreasesoneunitandexpectationsareat3
theresultisthatexpectationscanmovetobetween329and350HoweverthisresultsuggeststhatinflationaryinertiahasfalleninColombiaandexpecta-tions are better anchored Some empirical studies highlight similar results foremerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (seeCelasunGelosand Prati 2004 BevilaquaMesquita andMinella 2008 Cerisola andGeros2009Gaglianone2017)
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1)thecoefficientispositiveandsignificantAccordinglydepreciation tends to increase inflationexpectations in the Colombian economy This result indirectly confirms thehypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoitseffects on imported inputs However in the estimated models the estimatedparametertendstowardzerowhichindicatesthatveryhighdevaluations(above1000Colombianpesos)arenecessaryforexpectationstoincreasebymorethanonepercentagepointSimilarevidencehasbeenreportedbyBevilaquaMesquitaandMinella(2008)AraujoandGaglianone(2010)andGaglianone(2017)
Thecoefficientassociatedwiththepastbehaviouroftheeconomy(yt-1)ispositiveandstatisticallysignificantThatis inflationexpectationsfallinrecessionsandrise ineconomicbooms In thecaseof thecoefficientassociatedwith thepastunemploymentrate(Ut-1)theeconometricresultshowsthatitisalsopositiveandsignificantAccordingtoMankiwReisandWolfers(2003)inflationexpectationsarehighduringperiodsofhighunemploymentsuggestingabelatedoverreactionof expectations to the labourmarket situationWith the results of table 1 anincreaseinthepastunemploymentrateleadstoincreasesininflationexpectationsinarangebetween004and012percentagepointsTheresultsconfirmthetheo-reticalperspectiveoftheKydlandandPrescott(1977)dynamicincoherencemod-elsThesemodels indicate that increases inunemploymentcanbe theresultofattemptstosurpriseagentswithunexpectedinflationExpansivepolicycanleadtoshort-termgainsintermsofproductincreasesasthePhillipscurvepointsoutHoweveraccordingtothefindingsofIreland(1999)inthelongtermtheresultisabalanceinwhichtheinertiaofinflationexpectationsispositivelycointegratedwiththeunemploymentrateThustheevidencesuggeststhatduringtheperiodofanalysis there was no trade-off between inflation expectations inflation andunemploymentFinallythecoefficientassociatedwiththedummyvariable(Dt) is positiveandsignificantinalmostallmodelsInotherwordsthesubprimecrisisraisedinflationexpectationsinColombia
41 OLS RECURSIVE ESTIMATESItisimportanttoverifythewayinwhichtheeffectoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationshasvariedover timeFor thisOLSrecursiveestimateswereper-formedonthecoefficientoffiscalcredibilityloss(CRED LOSS)estimatedinthefivemodelspresentedintable1Thestabilityovertimeoftheparametersassoci-atedwithfiscalcredibilityispresentedinfigure5
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
142 REFERENCES1 Allsopp C andVines D 2005 The macroeconomic role of fiscal policy
Oxford Review of Economic Policy21(4)pp485-508httpsdoiorg101093oxrepgri027
2 AraujoCandGaglianoneW2010Survey-basedInflationExpectationsinBrazilBIS Papers 49pp107-114
3 BerlemannM and Elzemann J 2006Are expectations on inflation andelectionoutcomesconnectedAnempiricalanalysisEconomic Letters91(3)pp354-359httpsdoiorg101016jeconlet200512007
4 BevilaquaAMesquitaMandMinellaA2008BrazilTamingInflationExpectationsWorking Papers Central Bank of Brazil(129)pp1-40
5 BlinderA[etal]2008CentralBankCommunicationandMonetaryPolicyJournal of Economic Literature 46(4) pp 910-945 httpsdoi101257jel464910
6 BomfimAandRudebuschG2000OpportunisticandDeliberateDisinfla-tion Under Imperfect Credibility Journal of Money Credit and Banking 32(4)pp707-721httpsdoiorg1023072601179
7 CataoLAandTerronesM2003FiscalDeficitsandInflationIMF Work-ing PaperNo0365WashingtonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451848700001
8 CelasunOandGelosG2009WhatdrivesinflationexpectationsinBrazilAnempiricalanalysisApplied Economics41(10)pp1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
9 CelasunOGelosGandPratiA2004ObstaclestodisinflationwhatistheroleoffiscalexpectationsEconomic Policy19pp441-81httpsdoiorg101111j1468-0327200400129x
10CerisolaMandGelosG2009WhatDrivesInflationExpectationsinBra-zilAnEmpiricalAnalysisApplied Economics41(10)1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
11CiroJCGandDeMendonccedilaHF2017Effectofcredibilityandreputationon discretionary fiscal policy empirical evidence from ColombiaEmpirical Economics53(4)pp1529-1552httpsdoiorg101007s00181-016-1177-2
12CukiermanAandMeltzerAH1986Atheoryofambiguitycredibilityand inflation under discretion and asymmetric informationEconometrica54(5)pp1099-1128httpsdoi1023071912324
13DeMendonccedilaHF2007TowardscredibilityfromInflationtargetingtheBrazilian experience Applied Economics 39(20) 2599-2615 httpsdoiorg10108000036840600707324
14DeMendonccedilaHFandDaSilvaR2016ObservingtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationEvidencefromanemergingeconomyEconomics Bul-letin36(4)pp2333-2349
15DeMendonccedilaHFandMachadoMR2013PublicDebtManagementandCredibility Evidence from an emerging economy Economic Modelling30(1)pp10-21httpsdoiorg101016jeconmod201209009
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14316DeMendonccedilaHFandTostesFS2015Theeffectofmonetaryandfiscal
credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
17DebrunXHaunerDandKumarM2009IndependentFiscalAgenciesJournal of Economic Surveys23(1)pp44-81httpsdoiorg101111j1467-6419200800556x
18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
140 Ingeneraltheestimatesshowthatfortheperiodanalysedthesignsandeffectsoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationswerestablebutin4ofthe5modelstheparametersdecreasedAccordingtothegraphstheparametersassociatedwiththeCRED LOSSvariabledroppedfrom20to10ThustheimpactofcredibilitywasreducedbyahalfInthe2016-2019periodtheeffectofcredibilitystabilizedandtheresultsconfirmtheimportanceoffiscalpolicyintheshapingofinflationexpectationsinColombia
Figure 5Fiscal credibility coefficient recursive estimates model 1 2 3 4 5 (in )
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-05
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
plusmn 2 S ERecursive C(2) estimates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Recursive C(2) estimates plusmn 2 S E
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source Authoracutes elaboration Data from the Central Bank of Colombia
5 CONCLUSIONSThisstudyanalysedtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationexpectationsintheColombianeconomyTheresultsallowustomakethreeobservationsFirstecono-metricestimateresultsindicatethatananchoringofexpectationsintheobservedfiscaldeficit(lowerCRED LOSS)canreduceinflationexpectationsInparticularthefindingsshowthatfiscalcredibilityshouldbemonitoredbythecentralbankin
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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17DebrunXHaunerDandKumarM2009IndependentFiscalAgenciesJournal of Economic Surveys23(1)pp44-81httpsdoiorg101111j1467-6419200800556x
18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)141itseffortstostabilizeexpectationsSecondpastinflationbehaviourcontinuestobe
importantindetermininginflationexpectationsThustheresultssuggestthatthereisstillagapinstrengtheningthemanagementofexpectationsinlong-termcentralbanktargetsandincorporatingforward-lookingbehaviourThirdinflationexpecta-tions in Colombia incorporate important macroeconomic information related tounemploymentGDPandexchangeratesInbrieftheempiricalevidencedevelopedinthisstudyindicatesthattostabilizeinflationexpectationsinColombiaitisneces-sarytohaveastableeconomicenvironmentandcrediblefiscalpolicy
Disclosure statementNopotentialconflictofinterestwasreportedbytheauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
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2 AraujoCandGaglianoneW2010Survey-basedInflationExpectationsinBrazilBIS Papers 49pp107-114
3 BerlemannM and Elzemann J 2006Are expectations on inflation andelectionoutcomesconnectedAnempiricalanalysisEconomic Letters91(3)pp354-359httpsdoiorg101016jeconlet200512007
4 BevilaquaAMesquitaMandMinellaA2008BrazilTamingInflationExpectationsWorking Papers Central Bank of Brazil(129)pp1-40
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6 BomfimAandRudebuschG2000OpportunisticandDeliberateDisinfla-tion Under Imperfect Credibility Journal of Money Credit and Banking 32(4)pp707-721httpsdoiorg1023072601179
7 CataoLAandTerronesM2003FiscalDeficitsandInflationIMF Work-ing PaperNo0365WashingtonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451848700001
8 CelasunOandGelosG2009WhatdrivesinflationexpectationsinBrazilAnempiricalanalysisApplied Economics41(10)pp1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
9 CelasunOGelosGandPratiA2004ObstaclestodisinflationwhatistheroleoffiscalexpectationsEconomic Policy19pp441-81httpsdoiorg101111j1468-0327200400129x
10CerisolaMandGelosG2009WhatDrivesInflationExpectationsinBra-zilAnEmpiricalAnalysisApplied Economics41(10)1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
11CiroJCGandDeMendonccedilaHF2017Effectofcredibilityandreputationon discretionary fiscal policy empirical evidence from ColombiaEmpirical Economics53(4)pp1529-1552httpsdoiorg101007s00181-016-1177-2
12CukiermanAandMeltzerAH1986Atheoryofambiguitycredibilityand inflation under discretion and asymmetric informationEconometrica54(5)pp1099-1128httpsdoi1023071912324
13DeMendonccedilaHF2007TowardscredibilityfromInflationtargetingtheBrazilian experience Applied Economics 39(20) 2599-2615 httpsdoiorg10108000036840600707324
14DeMendonccedilaHFandDaSilvaR2016ObservingtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationEvidencefromanemergingeconomyEconomics Bul-letin36(4)pp2333-2349
15DeMendonccedilaHFandMachadoMR2013PublicDebtManagementandCredibility Evidence from an emerging economy Economic Modelling30(1)pp10-21httpsdoiorg101016jeconmod201209009
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14316DeMendonccedilaHFandTostesFS2015Theeffectofmonetaryandfiscal
credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
17DebrunXHaunerDandKumarM2009IndependentFiscalAgenciesJournal of Economic Surveys23(1)pp44-81httpsdoiorg101111j1467-6419200800556x
18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
JUA
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S EV
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
JUA
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FLATION
EXPEC
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
142 REFERENCES1 Allsopp C andVines D 2005 The macroeconomic role of fiscal policy
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2 AraujoCandGaglianoneW2010Survey-basedInflationExpectationsinBrazilBIS Papers 49pp107-114
3 BerlemannM and Elzemann J 2006Are expectations on inflation andelectionoutcomesconnectedAnempiricalanalysisEconomic Letters91(3)pp354-359httpsdoiorg101016jeconlet200512007
4 BevilaquaAMesquitaMandMinellaA2008BrazilTamingInflationExpectationsWorking Papers Central Bank of Brazil(129)pp1-40
5 BlinderA[etal]2008CentralBankCommunicationandMonetaryPolicyJournal of Economic Literature 46(4) pp 910-945 httpsdoi101257jel464910
6 BomfimAandRudebuschG2000OpportunisticandDeliberateDisinfla-tion Under Imperfect Credibility Journal of Money Credit and Banking 32(4)pp707-721httpsdoiorg1023072601179
7 CataoLAandTerronesM2003FiscalDeficitsandInflationIMF Work-ing PaperNo0365WashingtonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451848700001
8 CelasunOandGelosG2009WhatdrivesinflationexpectationsinBrazilAnempiricalanalysisApplied Economics41(10)pp1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
9 CelasunOGelosGandPratiA2004ObstaclestodisinflationwhatistheroleoffiscalexpectationsEconomic Policy19pp441-81httpsdoiorg101111j1468-0327200400129x
10CerisolaMandGelosG2009WhatDrivesInflationExpectationsinBra-zilAnEmpiricalAnalysisApplied Economics41(10)1215-1227httpsdoiorg10108000036840601166892
11CiroJCGandDeMendonccedilaHF2017Effectofcredibilityandreputationon discretionary fiscal policy empirical evidence from ColombiaEmpirical Economics53(4)pp1529-1552httpsdoiorg101007s00181-016-1177-2
12CukiermanAandMeltzerAH1986Atheoryofambiguitycredibilityand inflation under discretion and asymmetric informationEconometrica54(5)pp1099-1128httpsdoi1023071912324
13DeMendonccedilaHF2007TowardscredibilityfromInflationtargetingtheBrazilian experience Applied Economics 39(20) 2599-2615 httpsdoiorg10108000036840600707324
14DeMendonccedilaHFandDaSilvaR2016ObservingtheinfluenceoffiscalcredibilityoninflationEvidencefromanemergingeconomyEconomics Bul-letin36(4)pp2333-2349
15DeMendonccedilaHFandMachadoMR2013PublicDebtManagementandCredibility Evidence from an emerging economy Economic Modelling30(1)pp10-21httpsdoiorg101016jeconmod201209009
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14316DeMendonccedilaHFandTostesFS2015Theeffectofmonetaryandfiscal
credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
17DebrunXHaunerDandKumarM2009IndependentFiscalAgenciesJournal of Economic Surveys23(1)pp44-81httpsdoiorg101111j1467-6419200800556x
18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
JUA
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S EV
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CE FR
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G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
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S EV
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CE FR
OM
AN
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G EC
ON
OM
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PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14316DeMendonccedilaHFandTostesFS2015Theeffectofmonetaryandfiscal
credibilityonexchangeratepass-throughinanemergingeconomyOpen Econ-omies Review26(4)787-816httpsdoiorg101007s11079-014-9339-3
17DebrunXHaunerDandKumarM2009IndependentFiscalAgenciesJournal of Economic Surveys23(1)pp44-81httpsdoiorg101111j1467-6419200800556x
18DebrunXandKindaT2017StrengtheningPost-CrisisFiscalCredibilityFiscalCouncilsontheRisendashANewDatasetFiscal Studies38(4)pp667-700httpsdoiorg1011111475-589012130
19DornbuschR andFischerS1993Moderate InflationWorld Bank Eco-nomic Review7(1)pp1-44httpsdoiorg101093wber711
20DrazenAandMassonPR1994Credibilityofpoliciesversuscredibilityof policymakers Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(3) pp 735-754httpsdoi1023072118420
21EngleRFandGrangerCWJ1987CointegrationanderrorcorrectionRepresentation estimation and testingEconometrica 55(2) pp 251-276httpsdoi1023071913236
22FataacutesAandMihovI2003TheCaseforRestrictingFiscalPolicyDiscre-tionQuarterly Journal of Economics 118(4) pp 1419-1447 httpsdoi101162003355303322552838
23FaustJandSvenssonL2001Transparencyandcredibilitymonetarypol-icywithunobservablegoalsInternational Economic Review 42(2)pp369-397httpsdoiorg1011111468-235400114
24GaglianoneW2017EmpiricalFindingsonInflationExpectationsinBrazilasurveyWorking Papers Central Bank of BrazilNo464pp1-25
25GoacutemezJ2006LaPoliacuteticaMonetariaenColombiaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo394
26GuumlrkaynakRLevinA andSwansonE2010Does InflationTargetingAnchorLong-RunInflationExpectationsEvidencefromtheUSUKandSwedenJournal of the European Economic Association8(6)pp1208-1242httpsdoiorg101111j1542-47742010tb00553x
27Hamann F Hofstetter M and Urrutia M 2014 Inflation Targeting inColombia2002-2012Borradores de Economiacutea 818pp1-44httpsdoiorg1032468be818
28Hansen P L 1982 Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method ofMomentsEstimatorsEconometrica50(4)pp1029-1054httpsdoi1023 071912775
29HarrisR1995Using cointegration analysis in econometric modelingLon-donPrenticeHall
30HaunerDJonaacutešJandKumarM2007PolicyCredibilityandSovereignCreditTheCaseofthenewEUMemberStatesIMF Working PaperNo071Washing-tonInternationalMonetaryFundhttpsdoiorg1050899781451865653001
31IrelandPN1999Doesthetime-consistencyproblemexplainthebehaviorofinflationintheUnitedStatesJournal of Monetary Economics44(2)pp279-91httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(99)00026-4
JUA
N C
AM
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PATA JU
AN
CA
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GA
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TS OF FISC
AL R
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FLATION
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S EV
IDEN
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OM
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GIN
G EC
ON
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PUB
LIC SECTO
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ON
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ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
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R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
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OM
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
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GIN
G EC
ON
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ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
144 32JohansenS1991Estimationandhypothesistestingofcointegrationvectorsin gaussian vector autoregressive modelsEconometrica 59(6) pp 1551-1580httpsdoi1023072938278
33KandilMandMorsyH2014FiscalStimulusandCredibilityinEmergingCountriesEastern Economic Journal40pp420-439httpsdoiorg101057eej201325
34KennedyMandPalermA2014EmergingmarketbondspreadsTheroleofglobalanddomesticfactorsfrom2002to2011Journal of International Money and Finance43(1)pp70-87httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201312008
35KlyuevVandSnuddenS2011EffectsoffiscalconsolidationintheCzechRepublicCzech Journal of Economics and Finance 61(4) pp 306-326httpsdoiorg1050899781455228058001
36KuncoroH2015DoestheCredibleFiscalPolicySupportthePricesStabi-lizationReview of Economic Perspectives 15(2)pp137-156httpsdoi101515revecp-2015-0014
37KydlandFandPrescottE1977RulesRatherthanDiscretiontheIncon-sistencyofOptimalPlansJournal of Political Economy85(3)pp473-492httpsdoi101086260580
38LinSandYeH2009Doesinflationtargetingmakeadifferenceindevel-oping countries Journal of Development Economics 89(1) pp 118-123httpsdoiorg101016jjdeveco200804006
39Loacutepez-Enciso E Vargas-Herrera H and Rodriacuteguez-Nintildeo N 2016 LaestrategiadeinflacioacutenobjetivoenColombiaUnavisioacutenhistoacutericaBorradores de EconomiacuteaNo952httpsdoiorg1032468be952
40Mankiw N Reis R andWolfers J 2003 Disagreement about InflationExpectations NBER Working Paper No 9796 pp 1-60 httpsdoiorg101086ma183585256
41MineaAandTapsobaR2014Doesinflationtargetingimprovefiscaldis-cipline Journal of International Money and Finance 40(1) pp 185-203httpsdoiorg101016jjimonfin201310002
42MishkinFS2007Monetary Policy StrategyTheMITPress43MishkinFSandSavastanoM2001MonetarypolicystrategiesforLatin
AmericaJournal of Development Economics66(2)pp415-444httpsdoiorg101016s0304-3878(01)00169-9
44MontesGandAccedilarT2018FiscalcredibilityanddisagreementinexpectationsaboutinflationevidenceforBrazilEconomics Bulletin38(2)pp826-843
45MontesGandSouzaI2020SovereigndefaultriskdebtuncertaintyandfiscalcredibilityThecaseofBrazilThe North American Journal of Econom-ics and Finance51(C)pp1-26httpsdoiorg101016jnajef201809009
46Moodyrsquos Investors Service 2014Moodyrsquos upgrades Colombiarsquos rating toBaa2fromBaa3outlookstableJuly(RatingActionColombia)
47NaertF2011CredibilityofFiscalPoliciesandIndependentFiscalBodiesReview of Business and Economic Literature56(3)pp288-309
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ON
OM
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45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
JUA
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AacuteTEG
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EFFEC
TS OF FISC
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ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
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R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)14548Roberts JM 1997 Is Inflation Sticky Journal of Monetary Economics
39(2)173-196httpsdoiorg101016S0304-3932(97)00017-249SargentT andWallaceN 1981 Someunpleasantmonetarist arithmetic
FederalReserveBankofMinneapolisQuarterly Review pp1-17httpsdoiorg1021034qr531
50ShirakawaM2012The Importance of Fiscal Sustainability Preconditions for Stability in the Financial System and in PricesRemarksattheBanquedeFranceFinancialStabilityReviewLaunchEventinWashingtonDCApril1-3
51StrohsalTMelnickR andNautzD 2016The time-varyingdegreeofinflation expectations anchoring Journal of Macroeconomics 48(C) pp62-71httpsdoiorg101016jjmacro201602002
52ThorntonJandVasilakisC2019Dofiscalrulesreducegovernmentbor-rowingcostsindevelopingcountriesInternational Journal of Finance and Economicspp1-12httpsdoiorg101002ijfe1771
53WoodfordM2003Interest and Prices Foundations of a Theory of Mone-tary PolicyPrincetonUniversityPress
54WooldridgeJ2001ApplicationsofGeneralizedMethodofMomentsEsti-mation Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4) pp 87-100 httpsdoi101257jep15487
55WyploszC2005FiscaldisciplineinEMUrulesorinstitutionsNational Institute Economic Review191pp70-84
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
146 APPENDIX
Table a1Sources of data and description of the variablesVariable Variable description Data source
E(π)
InflationexpectationscomputedbytheCentralBankofColombiaInflationexpectationsare1yearforwardThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
CRED LOSSCredibilityTheindicatorwasconstructedwiththedifferencebetweentheobserveddeficitandtheexpecteddeficit
Devisedbyauthors
DEF
FiscaldeficitobservedbytheCentralNationalGovernment(GDP)-Accumulatedinthelast4quarters Datain
CentralBankofColombia
E(DEF)
Fiscaldeficitexpectations(GDP)ExpectationscomefromcentralbanksurveysTheforecastingdeficitistheoverallfiscaldeficitThesurveyiscalledldquoMacroeconomicProjectionsofLocalandForeignAnalystsˮDatain
CentralBankofColombia
πInflationaccumulatedin12monthsmeasuredbythevariationofthe consumerpriceindexDatain
CentralBankofColombia
e Exchangerate(monthaverage)oftheColombianpesoUnitedStatesdollar CentralBankofColombia
y
GrossdomesticproductSerieswasbuiltonrealColombiancurrencywithconstantpricesfrom2005Thevariableisseasonallyadjustedbythecentralbank Inthemodelstheserieswasusedinnaturallogarithm
CentralBankofColombia
U UnemploymentratewithseasonaladjustmentX12Datain CentralBankofColombia
VIX VolatilityofthestockmarketindexSampP500 FederalReserveofStLouis
D AdummyvariableThedummytakesavalueof1foryear2008and0fortherest Devisedbyauthors
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)147Table a2
Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Min Max SDE(π) 39455 28766 56900 07804DEF 30272 12166 46816 08691E(DEF) 24996 06500 40800 09183CRED LOSS 09798 00200 31400 07920π 43057 18464 82436 16576e 236002 176214 346201 49515U 106105 84389 142076 13231y 120552 117126 123205 01811VIX 181577 95100 441400 77106
Note E(π) DEF E(DEF) CRED LOSS π and U were used in
Table a3Unit root tests (ADF PP and KPSS)
SeriesADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp Test CV (1) Banda Esp Test CV
(1) Banda Esp Test CV (5)
E(π) 1 C -244 -354 3 N -128 -260 4 CT 016 014CRED LOSS 2 N -116 -260 1 N -161 -260 5 CT 015 014
π 1 C -315 -356 3 N -106 -260 3 CT 016 014e 0 N -065 -260 1 N -053 -260 6 CT 023 014U 0 C -286 -355 3 C -286 -355 5 C 084 046y 0 CT -175 -411 4 CT -159 -413 6 C 100 046VIX 0 C -361 -354 1 C -349 -354 5 CT 015 014
Note CV critical value Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion ADF ndashthe final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion PP and KPSS ndash spectral estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used
Table a4VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag SchwarzEquation(4) Equation(5)0 881 0 14311 150 1 6742 208 2 756Equation(6) Equation(7)0 295 0 19571 -375 1 13452 -307 2 1470
Note denotes the lag order selection
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1
JUA
N C
AM
ILO A
NZO
AacuteTEG
UI-ZA
PATA JU
AN
CA
MILO
GA
LVIS-C
IRO
EFFEC
TS OF FISC
AL R
EDIB
ILITY O
N IN
FLATION
EXPEC
TATION
S EV
IDEN
CE FR
OM
AN
EMER
GIN
G EC
ON
OM
Y
PUB
LIC SECTO
R EC
ON
OM
ICS
45 (1) 125-148 (2021)
148 Table a5Number of cointegrating relations by modelData trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Testtype NointerceptNotrend
InterceptNoTrend
InterceptNotrend
Intercepttrend
Intercepttrend
Equation(4)trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansenrsquos cointegration testHypNofCE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(005) p-value
Equation(4)R=0 050 9673 6981 000Rle1 046 6018 4785 000R=2 031 2734 2979 009Equation(5)R=0 062 11619 7697 000Rle1 050 6587 5407 000R=2 027 2977 3519 017Equation(6)R=0 056 9552 7697 000Rle1 035 5248 5407 006Equation(7)R=0 062 10960 8880 000Rle1 042 5965 6387 010
Note Model selected by the Schwarz criterion Values based on Mackinnon Denotes the null hypothesis rejection at 5
Table a6List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2πt-3yt-4yt-5VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3CREDLOSSt-2et-3et-4yt-3yt-4VIXt-2VIXt-3VIXt-4 Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3πt-2 πt-3Ut-2 VIXt-2Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3E(π)t-4 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3Ut-2Ut-3 Ut-4VIXt-2Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2E(π)t-3 CREDLOSSt-2CREDLOSSt-3et-2et-3yt-4yt-5Ut-2Ut-3VIXt-2πt-2 πt-3 Dt-1