ECTL Perf Equiv WA2 v1 0 3 - EUROCONTROL

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification – WA2 - Interoperability Targets

Edition: 1.1 Released Issue

SWIM TI Yellow Profile

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on

Performance-Based Certification

WA2 - Interoperability Targets

DOCUMENT IDENTIFIER : EUROCONTROL-ATM/CMC/CNS- PE-WA2-1_0

Edition Number : 1.1

Edition Date : 20 October 2016

Status : Released

Intended for : General Public

Category : EUROCONTROL Non-ERAF



DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS

TITLE

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification – WA1 PBC Processes

Publication Reference:

ISBN Number:

Document Identifier Edition Number: 1.1

ATM/CMC/CNS- PE-WA2-1_0 Edition Date: 20 Oct 2016

Abstract

The present document corresponds to Work Area 2 of the EUROCONTROL Project Management Plan for Performance based Certification to be submitted as a contribution to the joint work to be progressed in coordination with EDA and NATO.

This document contains extracts from civil ATM/CNS regulations and technical standards including a non-exhaustive set of representative data metrics and descriptors that can be used as verification targets for performance equivalence performance based certification.

Interoperability targets can be described in terms of required applications, functionalities, performance levels, Quality of Service (QoS) parameters, interfacing requirements and other quantified/qualified requirements, data metrics or descriptors that have been determined as required to sustain military aircraft operations within EATMN.

Keywords

Interoperability Certification Military Aircraft Performance

Processes Single Sky ATM CNS

Contact Person(s) e-mail Unit

Jorge Pereira [email protected] ATM/CMC/CNS

STATUS, AUDIENCE AND ACCESSIBILITY

Status Intended for Accessible via

Working Draft � General Public ⌧ Intranet ⌧

Draft � EUROCONTROL � Extranet �

Proposed Issue � Restricted � Internet (www.eurocontrol.int) �

Released Issue ⌧



DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the present document.

EDITION NUMBER

EDITION DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE PAGES AFFECTED

0.1 08/05/2015 First draft All

0.2 28/10/2015 Internal Review All

0.3 04/12/2015 Internal Review All

0.4 16/02/2016 Internal Review and Language Check All

1.0 10/06/2016 National POC comments and Internal Review All

1.1 20/10/2016 Review after PBC Workshop PAPA-HU All

Publications EUROCONTROL Headquarters 96 Rue de la Fusée B-1130 BRUSSELS Tel: +32 (0)2 729 4715 Fax: +32 (0)2 729 5149 E-mail: [email protected]



CONTENTS

DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................................ 3

DOCUMENT APPROVAL ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD .............................................................................. 5

CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 9

REFERENCE INDEX ................................................................................................ 10

ABBREVIATION LIST .............................................................................................. 13

1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 17

2. Objective ......................................................................................................... 18

3. Scope............................................................................................................... 19

4. Use of Interoperability Targets ...................................................................... 20

5. INTEROPERABILITY TARGETS (ATM/CNS-RELATED) ............................... 22

5.1 Communications ................................................................................................. 22

5.2 Navigation ............................................................................................................ 33

5.3 Surveillance ......................................................................................................... 46

5.4 Safety Assurance ................................................................................................ 52

6. Summary of Candidate Enablers .................................................................. 55

Appendix I: Communication Requirements

Appendix II: Navigation Requirements

Appendix III: Surveillance Requirements

Appendix IV: Safety Assurance Requirements



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Performance Equivalence / Performance-Based Certification (PBC) for military aircraft is an

alternative certification process to be applied when “traditional” certification cannot be achieved or

when there is an advantage in not using it.

The performance requirements used as the basis to certify and the means to demonstrate

compliance must be extensively documented. That includes all technical, procedural and

operational information.

Consequently, PBC/equivalence of performance must consider measurable (e.g. metrics from

regulations and standards) and non-measurable requirements (e.g. procedures or technical

architecture).

EUROCONTROL proposed to the Military ATM Board (MAB) the provision of guidance on the

ATM/CNS-related aspects and civil-military perspective of PBC. The areas to be subject of

EUROCONTROL guidance will likely include PBC framework processes related with operational

approvals and the identification of interoperability metrics/targets.

The present document corresponds to Work Area 2 of the EUROCONTROL Project Management

Plan for PBC to be submitted as a contribution to the joint work to be progressed in coordination

with EDA and NATO.

This document contains extracts from civil ATM/CNS regulations and technical standards including

a non-exhaustive set of representative data metrics and descriptors that can be used as

verification targets for performance equivalence performance based certification. Interoperability

targets can be described in terms of required applications, functionalities, performance levels,

Quality of Service (QoS) parameters, interfacing requirements and other quantified/qualified

requirements, data metrics or descriptors that have been determined as required to sustain military

aircraft operations within EATMN.

Certification for military aircraft remains a strict responsibility of the States. The production of

guidance material by international organisations shall be seen only as a contribution to achieve

higher degrees of harmonisation and to support a comprehensive nationally-driven certification

environment.



REFERENCE INDEX

Requirement Main Reference Document

Origin

Gen

era

l

CNS International

ICAO Annex 10 PANS-ATM Doc 4444 ICAO GANP

ICAO

CNS European EU Regulation 552/2004 SES Interop. Regulations EASA CS A-CNS

EC EASA

Impact on Military

EUROCONTROL Roadmap on Enhanced Civil-Military CNS Interoperability and Technology Convergence” (Edition 2.0) Multiple EUROCONTROL Guidance Documents for Military Operators

EUROCONTROL

Co

mm

un

icati

on

AGVCS EU Regulation 1265/2007 EU Regulation 1079/2012

EC EC

VHF 8.33 kHz Radios

ICAO Annex 10 Volume III, Part 2 (on VCS) EASA ETSO 2C37e, ETSO 2C38e or ETSO 2C169a (on VCS)

ICAO EASA

EASA CS-ACNS JAR-OPS, JAA TGL 7

EASA JAA

EUROCAE – ED23B, 23C EUROCAE

FAA AC 20-140A FAA

Data Link

ICAO Doc 9705, 9776 ICAO Doc 4444 ICAO GOLD

ICAO ICAO ICAO

EU Regulation 29/2009 EU Regulation 2015/310 EU Regulation 716/2014

EC EC EC

EASA CS-ACNS EASA AMC 20-11

EASA EASA

EUROCAE ED-110, 110B; 120, 122, 154A, 228, 229 EUROCAE ED-100 (FANS 1/A)

EUROCAE EUROCAE

FM Immunity JAA Guidance Leaflet TGL 16

JAA


Origin



Navig

ati

on

PBN

ICAO PBN Manual (Doc 9613)

ICAO

EU Regulation 716/2014 (AF1)

EC

RNAV EASA CS-ACNS (tbd) EASA AMC 20-4 (RNAV-5) EASA AMC 20-5, FAA AC90-96A (RNAV-1) EASA AMC 20-12 (RNAV-10)

EASA EASA EASA EASA

JAA TGL-10 Rev. 1 (RNAV-1)

JAA

RNP FAA AC 90-96 (RNP-1) FAA AC 90-105 (A-RNP)

FAA FAA

EASA AMC 20-26 (RNP AR APCH) EASA AMC 20-27, FAA AC20-138, AC20-130A, AC20-129 (RNP-APCH LNAV/VNAV) EASA AMC 20-28 (RNP APCH SBAS APV)

EASA EASA/FAA EASA

GNSS EASA ETSO C146; FAA TSO C196 (GNSS Stand Alone) EASA ETSO C145; FAA TSO C196 approved iaw FAA AC20-130A or FAA TSO-C115b (GNSS Multisensor)

EASA/FAA EASA/FAA

GBAS ICAO Annex 10 Vol 1 SARPS EASA AMC 20-26, 20-27 FAA TSO C145/146 RTCA DO 229C, DO 253C

ICAO EASA FAA RTCA

PBN Impact on Military

Initial Study for EUROCONTROL (FDC), TRS T07/11135, January 2009

EUROCONTROL

STANAG 4550 NATO

RVSM

ICAO Annex 6 ICAO Annex 11 ICAO EUR Regional Supp Procedures Doc 7030/5 ICAO Doc 9574, 9937

ICAO ICAO ICAO ICAO

EASA CS-ACNS EASA Part-SPA/AMC

EASA EASA

JAA TGL 6 Rev.1 JAA

FAA AC 91-85 FAA


Origin



Nav.

RVSM Impact on Military

EUROCONTROL Guidance Material on RVSM (Edition 2.0) June 2014

EUROCONTROL

Su

rveilla

nce

Aircraft ID and SUR Performance and Interop (Mode S and ADS-B Out).

EU Regulation 1206/2011 EU Regulation 1207/2011 EU Regulation 1028/2014

EC EC EC

Mode S (ELS and EHS)

ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV ICAO Doc 9871 (Edition 2)

ICAO

EASA CS-ACNS EASA ETSO-C112d

EASA EASA

EUROCAE ED73E-73C/RTCA DO181E EUROCAE ED26

EUROCAE/RTCA

JAA TGL13 (Rev 1) JAA

ADS-B

ICAO Doc 9871 (Edition 2) ICAO

EASA CS-ACNS EASA AMC 20-24 EASA ETSO C166b, C112d

EASA EASA EASA

EUROCAE ED102A/ RTCA DO260b

EUROCAE/RTCA

FAA AC 20-165B FAA

Safe

ty A

ssu

ran

ce

ACAS ICAO Doc 9863 Annex 6 ICAO PANS OPS Doc 8168

ICAO ICAO

EU Regulation 1332/2011 EC

EUROCAE ED-143 EUROCAE

German AIC IFR 8 – 23 Dec 2004

German MoT

JAA TGL 8 (Rev 2) JAA

EGPWS / TAWS ICAO Annex 6 ICAO

EASA CS-ACNS EASA ETSO C151b

EASA EASA

ELT ICAO Annex 6 ICAO

FDR / FDM ICAO Annex 6 ICAO

EUROCAE ED-112, 155 EUROCAE



ABBREVIATION LIST

A/G Air / Ground

ACARS Aircraft Communications and Reporting System

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System

ACID Aircraft Identification

ACM ATC Communications Management

ADD Aircraft-Derived Data

ADS-B Automatic Dependant Surveillance - Broadcast

ADS-C Automatic Dependant Surveillance - Contract

AFI Africa-Indian Ocean

AFM Aircraft Flight Manual

AGL Above Ground Level

AGVCS Air-Ground Voice Channel Spacing

AIP Aeronautical Information Publication

AIRB Flight Operations

AMAN Arrival Manager

AMC ATC Microphone Check Service

ANSB Air Navigation Service Board

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider

A-PNT Alternative Positioning Navigation and Timing

APT Airport Surface Surveillance

APV Approach Procedures with Vertical Guidance

ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporated

ASA Airborne Surveillance Applications

ASAS Airborne Separation Assistance System

ASAS Airborne Separation Assurance System

ASEP Airborne Separation applications

ASPA Airborne Spacing applications

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATM/CNS Air Traffic Management / Communication, Navigation, Surveillance

ATN/VDL Aeronautical Telecommunication Network / VHF Data Link

ATS Air Traffic Services

ATSAW Air Traffic Situational Awareness

B-RNAV Basic Area Navigation

CCAMS Centralised Code Assignment & Management System

CDI Course Deviation Indicator

CPDLC Controller-pilot Data Link Communication

CTA Controlled Time of Arrival

CTO Controlled Time Over

DAP Downlink Aircraft Parameter

D-FIS Data Link Flight Information Service

DLIC Data Link Communications Initiation Capability

DLS Data Link Services

DLS-CRO Data Link Services - Central Reporting Office



DME Distance Measuring Equipment

DT Delivery Time

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

EATMN European Air Traffic Management Network

EC European Commission

ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference

EDA European Defence Agency

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service

EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

EHS Enhanced Surveillance

ELS Elementary Surveillance

ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter

ESO European Standardisation Organisations

ESSAP EUROCONTROL Specification for ATM Surveillance Systems

ET Expiration Time

ETSO European Technical Standard Order

EUR Europe

EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment manufacturers

FANS Future Air Navigation System

FAS Final Approach Segment

FCI Future Communications Infrastructure

FDPS Flight Data Processing System

FGS Flight Guidance System

FH Flight Hour

FIR Flight Information Region

FL Flight Level

FM Frequency Modulation

FMS Flight Management System

FRT Fixed Radius Transition

FTE Flight Technical Error

GANP Global Air Navigation Plan

GAT General Air Traffic

GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS Global Positioning System

HF High Frequency

IA Indicators and Alerts

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

IDP Interim Deployment Programme

IFP Instrument Flight Procedure

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

ILS Instrument Landing System

IM Interval Management

INS Inertial Navigation System

IPS Internet Protocol Suite

IRU Inertial Reference Unit



ITP In-Trail Procedure

JAA Joint Aviation Authorities

JAA Joint Aviation Authority

JAR Joint Aviation Regulations

JAR-OPS Joint Airworthiness Requirements - Operations

LNAV Lateral Navigation

LP Landing Point

LPV Localiser Procedure with Vertical Guidance

MAB Military ATM Board

MASPS Minimum Aircraft System Performance Standard

MHz Mega Hertz

MLS Microwave Landing System

MMR Multi-Mode Receivers

MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Specifications

MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards

MTTA Military Transport-Type Aircraft

NAT North Atlantic Region

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NAVAID Navigation Aid

NDB Non Directional Beacon

NM Nautical Mile

NRA Non Radar Airspace

NSE Navigation System Error

OAT Operational Air Traffic

ORCAM Originating Region Code Assignment Method

OT Overdue Delivery Time

PALS Precision Approach Landing System

PBC Performance-based Certification

PBN Performance Based Navigation

PCP Pilot Common Project

PDE Path Definition Error

P-RNAV Precision Area Navigation

QoS Quality of Service

R&D Research and Development

RA Resolution Advisory

RAD Regulatory Approach Document

RAD Radar Airspace

RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring

RCP Required Communication Performance

RF Radius to Fix

RF Radio Frequency

RNAV Area Navigation

RNP Required Navigation Performance

RNP APCH RNP Approach

RSP Required Surveillance Performance

RTA Required Time of Arrival



RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SBAS Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems

SES Single European Sky

SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research

SI Surveillance Identifier / Selective Interrogator

SID Standard Instrument Departure

SIS Signal in Space

SJU SESAR Joint Undertaking

SPI Surveillance Performance and Interoperability

SSEP Self-separation applications

SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar

STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route

SURF Airport Surface

TA Traffic Advisory

TACAN UHF Tactical Air Navigation aid

TAWS Terrain Alerting Warning System

TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System

TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area

TOAC Time of Arrival Control

TSE Total System Error

TT Transaction Time

UAT Universal Access Transceiver

UHF Ultra High Frequency

VDL VHF Data Link

VHF Very High Frequency

VHF DSB AM VHF Double Side Band Amplitude Modulation

VNAV Vertical Navigation

VOR Very High Frequency Omni Directional Range

VSA Visual Separation in Approach



1. Introduction

1.1 As the civil ATM/CNS infrastructure is modernised to enable new concepts, it increases in

complexity and automation turning the definition and validation of technical solutions to enable the

required levels of civil-military ATM/CNS system interoperability a very difficult endeavour.

1.2 Harmonised safety levels are required in aviation and certification is one of the processes

to manage and ensure it. In the SES regulatory framework, systems have to be certified to be

deemed interoperable.

1.3 Military systems and aircraft are essentially designed to support military functions and/or

are weapons platforms with equipage priorities that are normally decided in accordance with its

specific military role. This has led to a clear mismatch between the capabilities of military systems

and civil-derived ATM/CNS requirements. Diverging technical standards and underlying

operational concepts also contribute to those mismatches.

1.4 The wide variety of modern military systems and aircraft evidences a considerable range of

capabilities and functionalities, in some cases more advanced than those available in similar civil

systems and aircraft.

1.5 It is widely recognised that the impact and cost of European ATM Infrastructure

modernisation for military organisations can only be reduced if adherence to ATM requirements is

sought on the basis of performance equivalence / performance-based certification (PBC) (as

opposed to equipage-driven recognition), including maximum re-utilisation of available military

capabilities that can be deemed equivalent. Performance equivalence shall be seen as one option

amongst other possible approaches for compliance.

1.6 Performance equivalence is defined as follows:

“For Military Aircraft, Performance Equivalence is the ability to meet the required

functional attributes of ATM/CNS systems against the performance, safety, security and

interoperability requirements of regulated airspace. This includes the measurable (e.g.

metrics from regulations and standards) and non-measurable functional requirements

(e.g. procedures or technical architecture), demonstrated through the evaluation of

accuracy, integrity, continuity of function and availability.”

1.7 The main challenge with this performance equivalence approach is first to precisely define

“equivalence” and secondly, to be able to demonstrate it. The performance requirements used as

the basis to certify and the means to demonstrate compliance must be extensively documented.

That includes all technical, procedural and operational information.

1.8 Equivalence of performance includes measurable interoperability metrics from regulations

and technical standards and non-measurable requirements (e.g. procedures or technical

architecture). The present document offers a snapshot of some selected interoperability metrics.



2. Objective

2.1 The objective of this deliverable is to compile extracts from (civil) ATM/CNS regulations and

technical standards a set of representative performance or quality of service (QoS) metrics and

descriptors that can be used as verification targets for performance equivalence /PBC of military

aircraft.

2.2 This deliverable shall consolidate a set of tables with representative lists of applications,

functionalities, performance levels, QoS parameters, interface requirements and other

quantified/qualified requirements, data metrics or descriptors that have been determined as

required to sustain military aircraft operations within GAT and or Business/Mission Trajectory

structures. The data is organised in a way that supports the determination of equivalence and/or

verification of conformity against alternative means of compliance.

2.3 ICAO, SES Regulatory materials and a significant number of supporting technical

references are mentioned for each ATM/CNS requirement. The ATM/CNS references comprise

ICAO Annex 10 as the baseline and a wide range of sources including SES regulations, aviation

technical standards (ICAO, EUROCAE/RTCA, ARINC, ESOs, EASA, etc.). Depending on the

requirement under analysis, an equipment-independent view is needed qualifying inter alia:

• levels of availability, integrity, confidentiality

• transmission protocols

• packet loss, data rate, transmission delay

• available air/radio interfaces

• altimetry performance

• horizontal navigation performance

• availability of NAV integrity monitoring

• ability to deal with time constraints

• aircraft identification performance

• available airborne status parameters for downlink

• multimode capabilities

• redundancies/fall back

• performance monitoring



3. Scope

3.1 The present document was developed in the context of a EUROCONTROL project (Work

Area 2) to define a framework for performance-based equivalence / certification (PBC) for military

aircraft. This document directly supports another basic EUROCONTROL deliverable (Work Area 1)

contributing to the definition of the Performance Equivalence / PBC process. It comprises only

guidance elements not suitable to be directly used in certification activities and the original

technical documents (e.g. ICAO, EUROCONTROL, EUROCAE, EASA, etc.) have full precedence.

3.2 Users are strongly advised to consult in parallel the EASA Certification Specifications and

Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airborne Communications, navigation and Surveillance (CS-

ACNS) as it provides more detailed technical information and indicates additional references to be

used. That shall not be detrimental to the equipment-independent perspective to be followed when

progressing with performance equivalence initiatives.

3.2 As this project became the EUROCONTROL contribution to a tri-Agency (EDA, NATO,

EUROCONTROL) initiative the results will be offered for subsequent progress in that context.

Coordination with EASA and national military certification Agencies must be envisaged when

appropriate. Modification / adaptation of the identified performance targets to turn them useable for

the interoperability objectives can be envisaged if a comprehensive process is put in place to

safeguard appropriate equivalence objectives and safety measures.

3.3 After an outlook of each civil requirement, some exploratory read-ahead considerations are

included in relation to Candidate Equivalence Solutions. Such considerations shall be seen only as

initial thoughts that require further discussion, research, validation, verification or demonstration

before being considered for subsequent equivalence investigations.

3.4 In the comments submitted to the initial draft of the present document the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) highlighted that “the document and approach are focused on NATO and European requirements. However, the FAA also controls substantial airspace within which NATO aircraft operate and provides regulations on state and military aircraft operating in this airspace. It suggested that FAA is a key participant is this effort to support better harmonization of any revisions to the use of performance equivalency in certifying military avionics to meet regulatory requirements.”



4. Use of Interoperability Targets

4.1 The ATM/CNS requirements included in the present document must be used in their

appropriate context. For example, Performance Equivalence/PBC shall not be assessed only at

airborne level and in isolation from the external underlying EATMN infrastructure. Equivalent

compliance will have to be defined, discussed and consolidated in relation to the need for the

aircraft to be cooperative with determined components for the wider ATM/CNS environment and

adherence to architecture and operational concept elements. Performance levels shall take due

account of external factors with relevant influence.

4.2 A concrete example is the description of navigation error in the ICAO PBN manual

(Document 9613). It states that the inability to achieve the required lateral navigation accuracy may

be due to navigation errors related to aircraft tracking and positioning. The three main errors in the

context of on-board performance monitoring and alerting are PDE (Path Definition Error), FTE

(Flight System Error), and NSE (Navigation System Error), as shown in Figure 1. The distribution

of these errors is assumed to be independent, zero-mean and Gaussian. Therefore, the distribution

of TSE (Total System Error) is also Gaussian with a standard deviation equal to the root sum

square (RSS) of the standard deviations of these three errors:

4.2.1 PDE occurs when the path defined in the RNAV system does not correspond to the desired

path1, i.e. the path expected to be flown over the ground. Use of an RNAV system for navigation

presupposes that a defined path representing the intended track is loaded into the navigation

database.

A consistent, repeatable path cannot be defined for a turn that allows for a fly-by turn at a

waypoint, requires a fly-over of a waypoint, or occurs when the aircraft reaches a target altitude

(see Attachment A to Volume I for further explanation). In these cases, the navigation database

contains a point-to-point desired flight path, but cannot account for the RNAV system defining a fly-

by or fly-over path and performing a manoeuvre. A meaningful PDE and FTE cannot be

established without a defined path, resulting in variability in the turn. In contrast, when a RF leg

transition or FRT is used, as with some RNP specifications (see below), a path can be defined and

therefore PDE and FTE can be determined. Also, a deterministic, repeatable path cannot be

defined for paths based on heading and the resulting path variability is accommodated in the route

design.

4.2.2 FTE2 relates to the air crew or autopilot’s ability to follow the defined path or track, including

any display error (e.g. CDI centring error). FTE can be monitored by the autopilot or air crew

procedures and the extent to which these procedures need to be supported by other means

depends, for example, on the phase of flight and the type of operations. Such monitoring support

could be provided by a map display.

4.2.3 NSE refers to the difference between the aircraft’s estimated position and actual position.

1 Note — The World Geodetic System — 1984 (WGS-84) or an equivalent Earth reference model should be

the reference Earth model for error determination. If WGS-84 is not employed, any differences between the selected Earth model and the WGS-84 Earth model must be included as part of the PDE. Errors induced by data resolution must also be considered. 2 FTE is sometimes referred to as PSE. FTE is not simply determined by halving the TSE, even though this may coincidentally be the

case. FTE assumptions per flight phase are provided in DO-208, Appendix E, Table 1, and these rely on the expectation that the aircraft will remain on the route centre line.



NSE is sometimes referred to as positioning estimation error (PSE).

Figure 1

4.3 Similar considerations could be raised in relation to other factors such as software,

technology readiness level, ground infrastructure quality of service, interfacing, etc. In summary,

civil-military ATM/CNS interoperability imperatives and the need for SES/SESAR compliance

dictate the need to reach performance equivalence/PBC at the level of Operational Approvals.

Adequate system engineering processes must be applied to ensure that the equivalence measures

are synchronised with standardisation/industrialisation efforts to guarantee a determined technical

readiness level (TRL).



5. INTEROPERABILITY TARGETS (ATM/CNS-RELATED)

5.1 Communications

5.1.1 Air-ground voice

5.1.1.1 Air-ground ATC communications in the context of GAT rely traditionally on instantaneous

voice communications between pilots and controllers using an ANSP radio communications

infrastructure based on VHF DSB AM line-of-sight.

5.1.1.2 Since 1999, the introduction of VHF 8.33 kHz channel spacing radio communication

equipment has been taking place in the European area for GAT/IFR operations in the sequence of

ICAO EANPG decisions.

5.1.1.3 In the context of the Single European Sky (SES), Regulation (EU) 1265/2007 on air-ground

voice channel spacing (AGVCS) turned the 8.33 kHz requirement into binding European

legislation, mandating the carriage of 8.33 kHz radios for GAT/IFR operations above Flight Level

(FL) 195 and the provision of ground services by ANSPs. Subsequently, SES Regulation (EU)

1079/2012, also on AGVCS, repealed the first AGVCS regulation and expanded the 8.33 kHz

requirement into the lower airspace below FL195.

5.1.1.4 The way air-ground voice is used will change in the medium/long term as soon as air-

ground data link becomes the primary enabler of routine air-ground ATC communications. By then,

analogue VHF voice is expected to remain in service, as backup, to sustain safety-critical

communications until alternative digital voice solutions become available (foreseen in the very long

term). For air-ground voice communications in oceanic and remote areas, civil evolution will be to

migrate from High Frequency (HF) to SATCOM voice (INMARSAT and/or IRIDIUM) with HF voice

retained as backup. This will provide increased throughput and transmission quality.

5.1.1.5 The abovementioned SES AGVCS Regulations include specific provisions for State aircraft

8.33 kHz mandatory equipage when conducting IFR/GAT flights in the ICAO EUR Region. In

parallel, the flights of remaining non-8.33 kHz equipped State aircraft, which cannot be retrofitted

for a justified compelling reason, shall be accommodated by the civil ANSPs on UHF or 25 kHz

VHF assignments, provided that they can be safely handled within the capacity limits of the ATM

system.

5.1.1.6 Civil aircraft shall be equipped with the radio communication equipment required by the

applicable airspace requirements (according to Regulation (EU) 965/2012 of the European



Commission in October 2012 (IR-OPS)). ICAO provisions are in Annex 10 and EUROCAE

Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) for Airborne VHF Receiver-Transmitter

operating in the frequency range 117,975-137,000 MHz in document EUROCAE ED-23B and ED-

23C. There is no specific equipage definition for military aircraft. The regulation encourages

implementation of EUROCAE ED-23C standard, if possible, which has improved performance over

ED-23B.

5.1.1.7 In general, non-8.33 kHz equipped State aircraft flying GAT/IFR are handled on UHF

frequencies operated by civil ANSPs. However, some States have chosen to retain some VHF 25

kHz channels for air-ground communications, in many cases due to lack or limited UHF coverage.

The handling of non-8.33 kHz equipped State aircraft is summarised in the individual State AIP and

EUROCONTROL guidance documents are available. It is important to highlight that when civil and

military ATC organisations are integrated, the UHF service may be provided by civil ANSPs to also

handle OAT traffic. In some locations, the UHF coverage tends to be less comprehensive than the

VHF coverage. Consequently the use of UHF for ATC may not be viable without some safety

precautions and retention of VHF 25 kHz channels might be necessary, especially in lower

airspace where coverage is poor.

Recurrent technical constraints to install VHF radios in military aircraft comprise, for example, the

need to upgrade the central digital displays to support one more digit in the indicator of the COM

channel, adaptation of the HMIs and software changes for which no service bulletins are known.

Further guidance regarding the interoperability targets can be found in Appendix I Communication

Requirements.

5.1.1.8 Candidate Equivalence Solutions:

• Already today, UHF radios, widely available in military aircraft, support ATC

communications on the basis of ANSP provision to handle non-VHF 8.33 capable State

aircraft. Where UHF coverage is limited, VHF 25 kHz channels are used. A dual band

VHF/UHF multimode radio could help mitigating the difficult equipage target mandating

VHF 8.33 kHz capability.

• Analogue voice will likely remain in service for a long term period. Digital voice will not be

introduced for air-ground communications in a short or medium term period. When moving

to digital voice, its waveform should be part of software define radio common multimode

configuration supporting civil and military requirements.

5.1.1.9 Suitability for a Performance Based Approach

• Civil air-ground voice communications requirements (including 8.33 kHz channel spacing),



as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct application of a performance based

approach.

5.1.1.10 Performance Statements

• In terms of system performance requirements, EASA CS-ACNS makes reference to ICAO

Annex 10, Volume III, Part 2 and envisages for Voice Channel Spacing:

o Integrity: The voice communication systems is designed commensurate with a

‘major’ failure condition.

o Continuity: The continuity of the voice communication system is designed to an

allowable qualitative probability of ‘remote’.


Requirements.

5.1.2 Air-ground data link for CPDLC (ATN B1)

5.1.1.2 The Data Link Services Regulation (EU) 29/2009 of 16 January 2009) mandates DLS

equipage for civil aircraft and ground implementation while declaring that State aircraft are exempt.

Nevertheless, it also stipulated that Member States which decide to equip new transport type State

aircraft entering into service from 01 January 2014 (amended by Regulation 2015/310 moving the

equipage date to 01 January 2019) with a data link capability relying upon standards which are not

specific to military operational requirements shall ensure that those aircraft have the capability to

operate the data link services defined in the Regulation (ATN/VDL Mode 2 data link technology or

“other communications protocol”).

The main changes in terms of implementation dates introduced by Regulation 2015/310 are:

• Airborne implementation date (civil aircraft) 5 February 2020 (no distinction between

forward- and retro-fit)

• Airborne implementation date (new transport type State aircraft if decided to equip with civil

capability) 1 January 2019 (forward-fit only)

• Ground implementation date 5 February 2018

• “Old aircraft” (civil) dates changed by 5 years to 2003 / 2022

At the moment, studies determined by Regulation 2015/310 and conducted by the SESAR Joint

Undertaking are ongoing to indicate if multi-frequency capability needs to be introduced in the

VDL2 infrastructure (airborne and ground) and to indicate options to mitigate the occurrence of

technical provider aborts. Initial conclusions are that multi-frequency will be required. When the



present document was developed there was not yet substantial information available.

5.1.2.2 The EUROCAE/RTCA-standardised controller-pilot data link communication (CPDLC)

services/applications mandated in Regulation 29/2009 include:

• Data Link Communications Initiation Capability (DLIC) - used to uniquely identify an aircraft

and to provide version and address information for all data communications services.

• ATC Communications Management (ACM) - to handle repetitive frequency changes

• ATC Clearances and Information Service (ACL) - to provide standard clearances - ACL

(e.g. "Climb to level 350")

• ATC Microphone Check Service (AMC) – AMC: to handle repetitive frequency changes

5.1.2.3 These services do not replace voice as a primary means of communication - both media

will always be available, thus providing mutual back-up, a definite safety improvement; in case of

non-standard communications or emergency, "revert to voice" is the procedure.

5.1.2.4 In parallel to the provisions related with aircraft equipage, the Regulation will also apply to

air traffic service providers (ATS providers) which are required to ensure that ATS Units providing

air traffic services have the capability to provide and operate the defined data link services. This is

valid for General Air Traffic in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (GAT/IFR) within the

airspace above FL285 in the European Union states flight information regions (FIR) identified in the

Regulation. As a consequence, the ANSPs are expected to implement the ground infrastructure

from 05 February 2018 and aircraft operators must ensure airborne equipage from 05 February

2020 (civil aircraft) and 01 January 2019 (forward fit recommendation for new transport type State

aircraft).

5.1.2.5 Today, some ANSPs are already offering operational CPDLC services. In the sequence of

aircraft operators’ efforts, some hundreds of civil commercial aircraft are already equipped

generating many CPDLC flights every year.

5.1.2.6 CPDLC implementation brings substantial benefits in terms of capacity increase, safety,

limits the need to introduce new sectors, reduces controller workload per aircraft, avoids

misspelling and induces efficiency gains translate into lower unit rates. It is estimated that with 75%

of flights equipped an increase in capacity of 11% will be achieved overall.

5.1.2.7 Performance targets must be monitored and smooth operation guaranteed at the technical

level such that the benefits materialise.

5.1.2.8 A Data Link Services - Central Reporting Office (DLS-CRO) works in the context of the



Network Manager (NM) to operate as a central function monitoring data link operations and will

solve issues affecting safety, capacity, performance and interoperability at European level. The

DLS-CRO will monitor implementation and will ensure the smooth operation of CPDLC in Europe

being the focal point for operational data collection, problem investigation, document repositories,

sharing of experiences, etc. The DLS-CRO will be also available to provide support also to

transport-type State aircraft operators and to coordinate implementation and provides an extensive

level of support and guidance to all civil and military ATS providers and aircraft operators.

5.1.2.9 Some transport-type military aircraft start to evidence civil data link capability (ATN/VDL-2

or FANS/ACARS). Should State aircraft operators voluntarily decide to equip transport type aircraft

with a data link solution, compliant with the DLS Regulation 29/2009, they would be in position to

accrue the CPDLC benefits identified above and to be better prepared to comply with the

performance targets and improvements foreseen in the European ATM Master Plan.

5.1.2.10 In this case, the State aircraft operations will be able to benefit of the assistance available

in the EUROCONTROL/Network Manager, including the DLS-CRO, for the provision of technical

guidance, support to implementation and definition of subsequent interoperability developments.

5.1.2.11 Concerning CPDLC services, it is important to highlight that non-equipped State aircraft

will continue to be handled with voice and that FANS/ACARS equipped aircraft will be

accommodated during a transitional period in line with the DLS Regulation. In relation to future

Initial 4D and Full 4D Trajectory Management, the absence of data link capability to support the

sharing of trajectory data between aircraft systems and ground ATS infrastructure will be more

complex due to the level of automation involved.


Requirements.


• Present trend is for civil data link capability based on ATN/VDL-2 or FANS/ACARS to be

considered the eligible capability for transport-type military aircraft where civil CPDLC

capability is considered required. Other aircraft types are (at least initially) due to be

accommodated on the basis of air-ground voice.

• Other alternatives for civil-military data link interoperability shall not be excluded but are still

being subject of R&D investigation or face severe institutional objections. Security and

spectrum coordination aspects are crucial for any equivalence opportunities in this area.

Concrete examples are the potential reutilisation of existing military capabilities through

ground interfaces or synergies with Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) (including



terrestrial or SATCOM) developments. FCI is expected to offer a technology convergence

path and/or a multilink environment for military to take advantage of longer term civil

solutions.

• It is expected that longer-term emergence of software defined radio technologies will offer

opportunities to cope with data link requirements on the basis of waveform accommodation

in a multi-mode configuration. By then, possible performance equivalence approaches may

reveal feasible.


• Civil air-ground data link communications requirements for CPDLC based on the use of

VDL Mode 2, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct application of a

performance based approach. Nevertheless, this situation will likely change very soon as

ICAO is in advanced stage of development of Required Communications Performance

(RCP) concept which will give precedence to performance/QoS considerations in terms of

continuity, availability, integrity, transaction time, etc. RCP approach seems more viable for

Future COM technologies and is already reflected in the COM requirement tables in

appendix I. Availability of software defined radio options may also offer opportunities to

pursue a performance equivalence approach.


• In terms of system performance requirements, EASA CS-ACNS envisages for CPDLC Data

Link Services (ATN B1):

o Integrity: The data link system integrity is commensurate with a ‘major’ failure

condition.

o Continuity: The data link system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative

probability of ‘probable’.

Note: see additional DLS interoperability requirements in EASA CS-ACNS Book 2. Consult

also ICAO Annex 10.

5.1.3 Air-ground data link for initial 4D (ATN B2)

5.1.3.1 The widespread implementation of air-ground data link communications which, in the

future, will replace air-ground voice (VHF) as the primary means of ATC communications, will be a

fundamental enabler for the introduction of advanced concepts like 4D trajectory operations and

new separation modes. Regulatory provisions exist already in the PCP Regulation (716/2014 of 27

June) – ATM Framework 6 Initial Trajectory Information Exchange.



5.1.3.2 The availability of DLS compliant solutions (e.g. ATN/VDL Mode 2 or FANS/ACARS, during

a transitional period) shall be seen as an important baseline capability not only to support the first

set of CPDLC services but also the Initial 4D services that will comprise some trajectory

management applications, relying on the ADS-C technique, in the sequence of EUROCAE3/RTCA

standards. For the majority of equipped aircraft, a software upgrade of VDL2 data link avionics,

and possibly wiring, will suffice to execute Initial 4D trajectory services.

5.1.3.3 More advanced (civil) Full 4D requirements will require the introduction of higher capacity

data link technologies plus the bandwidth in the context of the Future Communications

Infrastructure (FCI) initiatives comprising airport, terrestrial and satellite communications

(SATCOM) data link solutions as well as a multilink environment.

5.1.3.4 Initial 4D operations can be broken down in two steps; the first is the synchronisation

between air and ground of the flight plan or Reference Business/Mission Trajectory. The second

step is imposing a time constraint and allowing the aircraft to fly its profile in the most optimal way

to meet that constraint. The ATM system relies on all actors having the same view; it is therefore

essential that the trajectory in the Flight Management System (FMS) is synchronised with the one

held on the ground in the Flight Data Processing Systems (FDPS) and the wider network systems.

ADS-C is a fundamental enabler to achieve that objective.

5.1.3.5 The avionics function, Required Time of Arrival (RTA), can be exploited by both en-route

and TMA controllers for demand/capacity balancing, metering of flows and for sequencing for

arrival management. By preparing the metering of aircraft at an earlier stage of the flight, the

impact of constraints is minimised. This allows (civil) ATC to make optimum use of capacity at the

right time, minimising risks through complexity reduction. This process enhances aircraft profile

optimisation, flight predictability and allows improvements in the stability and reliability of the

sequence built by ATC.

5.1.3.6 Initial 4D will require a more sophisticated message set and ADS-C reports for the

exchange of the aircraft’s intended 4D trajectory together with the required functional integration of

CPDLC and ADS-C with the aircraft’s avionics. The new EUROCAE/RTCA standard, containing

the new CPDLC, ADS-C and D-FIS applications/services, is referred to as ATN B2. It is envisaged

that ATN will use the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) as described in ICAO document 9896.


Requirements.


3 EUROCAE WG 78



• Present trend is for civil data link capability based on ATN/VDL-2 or FANS/ACARS to be

considered the eligible capability for transport type military aircraft, where CPDLC capability

is considered required, serving also as the baseline enabler for subsequent i4D

applications. Other aircraft types are (at least initially) not due to be i4D cooperative on the

basis of air-ground data exchanges.

• Other alternatives for civil-military data link interoperability shall not be excluded but are still

being subject of R&D investigation or face severe institutional objections. Security and

spectrum coordination aspects are crucial for any equivalence opportunities in this area.

Concrete examples are the potential reutilisation of existing military capabilities through

ground interfaces or synergies with Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) (including

terrestrial or SATCOM) developments. FCI is expected to offer a technology convergence

path and/or a multilink environment for military to take advantage of longer term civil

solutions.

• Civil-military data link interoperability will be critical to enable SESAR trajectory

management functionalities relying on the air-ground exchange of time constraints but any

alternative enablers can only be considered if security and all institutional issues can be

mitigated and if identified QoS levels can be met.


• Civil air-ground data link communications requirements for initial 4D based on the use of

VDL Mode 2, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct application of a

performance based approach. Nevertheless, this situation will likely change very soon as

ICAO is in advanced stage of development of Required Communications Performance

(RCP) concept which will give precedence to performance/QoS considerations in terms of

continuity, availability, integrity, transaction time, etc. RCP approach seems more viable for

Future COM technologies and is already reflected in the COM requirement tables in

appendix I.


• Initial 4D (ATN B2) is not yet covered by EASA CS-ACNS but the PCP Regulation

(716/2014) AF6 states that i4D requires the data link capability described in the DLS

regulation (29/2009). Nevertheless, the best approach to determine the performance levels

for i4D and Full 4D is to consider Future COM RCP values described in annex I.

o Integrity: See Annex I.

o Continuity: See Annex I.



o Availability: See Annex I.

o Transaction Time: See Annex I.

5.1.4 FM Immunity

5.1.4.1 Since 1 January 2001 VHF broadcasting stations in Europe are allowed to operate with

reduced restrictions and increased transmitter power levels. This has a significant implication for

aircraft with VHF navigational receivers, especially VOR and ILS. It applies also to VHF COM

transceivers.

5.1.4.2 Consequently, for safety reasons VOR and ILS receivers (as well as VHF COM

transceivers) in aircraft are now required to be protected against potential interference from VHF

broadcast transmissions. This entails the use of FM immune VHF equipment by modification of

existing equipment or re-equipage.

5.1.4.3 Some States have mandated the carriage of FM Immune VHF avionics for en-route and at

airports. However, exemptions for State aircraft may still be negotiated on a bilateral basis.

5.1.4.4 Aircraft operators and aircrew are to refer to national aeronautical publications (AIP, AIC)

for current official policy and procedures. Additional details can be found in JAA guidance leaflet

TGL 16.


Requirements.


• Multi-Mode Receivers (MMRs), and other VHF transceivers, that are relatively modern and

introduced in the sequence of recent military aircraft modernisation programmes shall be

FM Immune. So far no technical alternative was determined for compliance with this

requirement and accommodation shall be organised on the basis of case by case waivers.


• FM Immunity requirements for communications, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for

the direct application of a performance based approach.


• Consult JAA TGL16 and ICAO Annex 10. ICAO Annex 10 Volume 3 states, for example

about VHF data link, in terms of interference immunity performance, that (quote) the

receiving function shall satisfy the specified error rate with a desired field strength of not



more than 40 microvolts per metre, and with one or more out-of-band signals, except for

VHF FM broadcast signals, having a total level at the receiver input of minus 33 dBm. In

areas where adjacent higher band signal interference exceeds this specification, a higher

immunity requirement will apply. The receiving function shall satisfy the specified error rate

with a desired field strength of not more than 40 microvolts per metre, and with one or more

VHF FM broadcast signals having a total level at the receiver input of minus 5 dBm.

(unquote)

5.1.5 Air-ground data link for full 4D (not in present edition)

5.1.6 Air-ground data link for other requirements (e.g. AIM) (not in present edition)

5.1.7 Oceanic communications requirements

5.1.7.1 The procedures to be observed in the oceanic context are well described in the ICAO

document 7030 NAT regional supplementary procedures, for the North Atlantic airspace. ICAO

Annex 10 describes the infrastructure resources.

5.1.7.2 For Oceanic and remote areas, High Frequency (HF) voice remains the primary means of

direct pilot-controller voice communications. However, HF band used for long-range

communications (beyond visual / radio-horizon range) evidence poor link quality and there is

limited reuse of the frequency channel. Consequently, voice communications via SATCOM, such

as INMARSAT or MTSAT, started to be used in Oceanic and remote airspace, providing increased

throughput and transmission quality. High Frequency (HF) voice remains as backup.

5.1.7.3 ATS data link communications in Oceanic and remote airspace are provided using FANS-

1/A (ACARS) systems to support AOC applications and to achieve a number of ATS operational

benefits such as separation assurance at 30/30 NM (RNP4) lateral/longitudinal, route and flight

level conformance monitoring, facilitation of in-flight rerouting and weather avoidance and tailored

arrival procedures. Such data communications can be carried over HF data link (HFDL) or

SATCOM.

5.1.7.4 Satellite data communications can use SATCOM Data 2, an ACARS packet-based sub-

network. It uses the INMARSAT Aero-H Data 2 services compliant with available aircraft equipage

(ACARS/FANS) and also with the ACARS AOA derivative. The ATN-compliant evolution is

SATCOM Data 3, a bit-oriented sub-network. It uses the INMARSAT Aero-H Data 3 services.

5.1.7.5 En-Route reporting services are provided either through ADS-C or procedurally. ADS-C is

used to supply surveillance information over the Oceanic region via satellite data link. In most

cases, ADS-C and CPDLC are implemented simultaneously with FANS 1/A. In the North Atlantic

Region (NAT) there are plans to implement CPDLC services.



5.1.7.6 The use of ADS-C technique is based on a negotiated one-to-one peer relationship

between aircraft providing automatic dependant surveillance information and a ground facility

requiring receipt of ADS messages. During flights over areas without radar coverage, reports can

be periodically sent by an aircraft to the controlling air traffic region.

5.1.7.7 There are HF transceivers on board which have to be shared between voice and data.

Voice communications have precedence over data link, which limits the HFDL availability. If HFDL

was a useful medium an additional transceiver could be installed. However HFDL has a low data

rate hence SATCOM is better solution.

5.1.7.8 Satellite broadband services are a key building block of today’s telecommunications hybrid

networks which may offer services, including communications to improve air–ground exchanges.

5.1.7.9 A satellite-based system providing the required capacity and quality of service is needed

not only to serve Oceanic airspace but also to complement the ground-based continental data link,

improving total availability. In fact, the fundamental role of data link in continental airspace has

been recognised by ICAO and is identified by the European ATM Master Plan as a crucial enabler

for advanced concepts like 4D trajectory management (Initial and Full 4D) and new separation

modes.

5.1.7.10 The type of satellite constellation (dedicated or commercial) to be used in the context of

air transport still needs further research. INMARSAT has launched a new service called

SwiftBroadband (SBB) using a new (4th) generation of satellites. Investment is being made in SBB

to enable it to have the appropriate performance to support ATM communications.

5.1.7.11 In the US, IRIDIUM Communications Inc. started to plan a second-generation satellite

constellation called IRIDIUM NEXT in 2007. With launches expected to begin in 2015, IRIDIUM

NEXT will offer higher data speeds, flexible bandwidth allocation, and IP-based routing. In the

meantime, the US military have found innovative ways to use IRIDIUM services, making IRIDIUM

NEXT a privately-held but significant space resource for future military operations in the US. Work

has been completed at ICAO to develop provisions to allow IRIDIUM to offer ATM satellite

communications.


• ATS data link communications in oceanic and remote airspace are provided using ACARS

technology over HF data link or SATCOM Data. The evolution towards ATN-compliance will

be achieved using the INMARSAT Aero data services. Satellite broadband services,

provided by INMARSAT Swift Broadband (SBB) and Iridium Next, are a key building block

of the hybrid networks.




• Oceanic requirements for communications, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the

direct application of a performance based approach.


• Consult ICAO Annex 10 and ICAO document 7030. In the annexes to the present

document some specific oceanic performance values are identified.

5.2 Navigation

5.2.1 PBN en-route

5.2.1.1 The initial 2008 publication of ICAO’s PBN Manual (Document 9613) which introduced

ICAO’s PBN Concept marked a significant global change by integrating the reliance of airspace

design on navigation ‘standards’. An ICAO Resolution at the 37th Assembly in 2010 confirmed the

launch of PBN in all phases of flight as a significant step towards high-level goals and ambitions for

global uptake of PBN.

5.2.1.2 PBN represents a fundamental shift from sensor-based to performance-based navigation.

The PBN concept has expanded area navigation techniques, originally centred upon lateral

navigation accuracy only, to a more extensive statement of required performance related to

accuracy, integrity and continuity along with how this performance is to be achieved in terms of

aircraft and crew requirements.

5.2.1.3 At a conceptual level, ICAO introduced the three-component PBN in support of any

airspace concept along with Communications, Surveillance and ATM. These three components are

the navigation specification, the navigation application and the NAVAID Infrastructure.

5.2.1.4 A navigation application is defined by the implementation of a navigation specification and

its supporting navigation infrastructure, applied to routes, procedures, and/or defined airspace

volume, in accordance with the intended Airspace Concept.

5.2.1.5 The Navigation Infrastructure refers to ground- and space-based navigation aids. The

Navigation Specification is a technical and operational specification that identifies the required

functionality of the on-board area navigation equipment. It also identifies how the navigation

equipment is expected to operate in the NAVAID Infrastructure to meet the operational needs of

the Airspace Concept. ICAO Navigation specifications provide the basis for States to develop their

certification and operational approval documentation. The Navigation Application reflects the ATS

routes (including SIDs/STARs) and Instrument Flight Procedures (IFP) based on the NAVAID

Infrastructure and Navigation Specification.



5.2.1.6 PBN introduces two kinds of navigation specifications: RNAV and RNP. A fundamental

element of RNP specifications is the requirement for on-board performance monitoring and failure

alerting capability. This system alerts the pilot if navigation performance requirements are not

being met. Ultimately, RNP applications will become the norm.

5.2.1.7 The PBN manual contains core material relating to 11 navigation specifications and

includes descriptions as the performance (accuracy, integrity and continuity) required from the

RNAV system, the functionalities required to meet the requirements of the Navigation Application,

the approval process, aircraft eligibility and operational approval.

5.2.1.8 The PBN Manual also defines additional functionalities (required or optional) which can be

used in association with several of the navigation specifications. Examples of those functionalities

are: RF (Radius to Fix), which is a path terminator used for SIDs, STARs and Approach, FRT

(Fixed Radius Transition), which is a is a leg transition used when the FMS is in en-route mode,

RNAV Holding, which means reduction in the size of the holding area to permit holds to be placed

closer together or in more optimum locations and Parallel Offset related with the aircraft ability to

comply with tactical parallel offset instructions as an alternative to radar vectoring.

5.2.1.9 The PBN concept suggests that RNAV specifications are effectively legacy specifications

and PBN’s sights are firmly set on RNP. The final goal of ICAO seems to be for Advanced RNP to

become the main navigation specification used in en-route and terminal airspace. Advanced RNP

specification has now been published with ‘conservative’ default lateral accuracy values in all flight

phases and scalable RNP remains an optional function in Advanced RNP which can be in the

future a flexible option to choose one of a series of accuracy values in each flight phase.

Further guidance regarding the interoperability targets can be found in Appendix II Navigation

Requirements.


• Studies have been conducted for Airbus A400M and Eurofighter Typhoon, Ref Initial Study

to Determine Feasibility of Navigation Equivalent Verification of Compliance for State

Aircraft Against ATM Navigation Standards by France Development Counseil (FDC) for

EUROCONTROL, TRS T07/11135, January 2009. This study concluded that:

o Military navigation architectures cannot easily comply with the majority of PBN navigation

specifications due to the eligibility of sensors and to all the issues related to the flight path

definition based on ARINC 424 data. It should be noticed that the display systems used

on modern military aircraft can easily meet the civil requirements.

o The GNSS signals used by military are predominantly GPS PPS (and possibly in the



future Galileo PRS). Usually inertial systems are updated by this signal and not by

DME/DME thus preventing IRU from eligibility. Other navigation fixing means could be

used, particularly on combat aircraft, such as data link, radar, TACAN or terrain correlation

in some cases.

o Except those designed to support GAT/IFR navigation, the military navigation computers

are not using the ARINC 424 data structure. They only implement some of the basic path

terminators and military specific path definition and guidance used for CAP and AAR

patterns, low level flight etc. In addition the flight plan structure cannot support the

handling of SID, STAR and APP sequences. Such capabilities cannot qualify the aircraft

beyond RNAV-5.

o Regarding sensors, tactical aircraft with airborne architecture constraints could be handled

by accepting the equivalence of military TACAN, GPS PPS, GALILEO PRS performances.

Such military systems might include, Multimode receivers (MMR),

o The use of GNSS governmental signals, including GPS PPS, would require investigation

of equivalence of performance with civil requirements for GPS SPS receivers and the

need for specific signal processing modes (e.g. PPS-LO mode) which increase the

complexity and costs of the receivers. The compliance of the core system software to the

civil standards for software design assurance level is crucial for equipment approval. It

faces confidentiality issues that the civil airworthiness regulatory framework cannot handle

without amending the regulations defining the equipment approval process.

o In order to select sensors that could be used in GAT/IFR it would be important to prepare

the floor to future navigation specifications likely requiring a redundant multi-sensors

RNAV system (e.g. A-RNP).

o The case of flight path definition appears more critical since it is at the heart of the RNAV

concept. The primary goal of the requirement for a navigation data base being to fit each

aircraft with common reference data able to generate predictable and repeatable paths,

the mitigation of the absence of navigation data base can be only partial and subject to

severe operational limitations inhibiting the intended benefit. Significant efforts are

required to investigate different approaches and aspects to overcome this major problem.

o The military computers implement a similar way to ARINC 424 to describe the trajectory

with Way Point (WPT) attributes and guidance laws along the path. A first question would

be to assess how these attributes could be enhanced to include a sufficient set of

equivalent ARINC 424 path terminators to enable GAT/IFR operations. A second question

would be to investigate whether an approach starting from the existing ARINC 424



structure and extending it with the specific military path terminators necessary to define

military trajectories could be cost beneficial. A last question would be the feasibility of a

common piece of software package in high level programming language that could be

transplanted in different navigation computers in order to reduce recurrent development

costs.

o Another major point is the potential physical limitations (computing resources, memory

etc.) that can be encountered when including a NAV data base in the military computer

and attempting to structure military mission flight plans so that the computer can handle

both GAT/IFR and military mission, perhaps into a unique flight plan as it is the case on

the A 400M. In case these limitations are stringent it would be necessary to define an

acceptable minimum set of ARINC 424 path terminators necessary for En-route and

Terminal.

o Military aircraft programmes usually include the development of a Mission Planning

System that has less limitation than the aircraft navigation computer. The possibility to

transfer some functions to these systems and under which conditions regarding data

integrity, safety, operational viability etc. should be investigated. In such case it would be

also necessary to determine whether an increased Path Definition Error (PDE) would be

acceptable provided the Flight Technical Error (FTE) might be reduced by a systematic

use of the Auto Pilot (AP).

• In summary, the various PBN specifications used in the en-route context (RNAV or RNP for

different levels of accuracy) entail the availability of a NAV avionics suite with a very high

level of integration. As PBN is already “performance-based” multiple enabler options are

possible (e.g. GNSS, DME/DME, DME/IRU, etc.) but these are clearly listed in the system

requirements sections of ICAO document 9613.

• A significant number of military transport aircraft may simply be forward fitted as civil

mainline. For certain aircraft types, research on potential military systems to sustain PBN

specifications can be considered for a significant number of airborne systems but it needs

to be ensured that the specification remains valid for the totality of its performance

requirements. Re-drafting of PBN specifications could also be envisaged for more extreme

cases if still in line with operational needs.

• Compliance options identified in the study referenced above still need some research to be

useable to sustain PBN specifications in the en-route context. Final equivalence options

may include, inter alia: use of GNSS restricted signal receivers (GPS/PPS, GALILEO/PRS)

instead of other eligible sensors, Mission Computers/MMRs used to process a defined level



of ARINC 424 NAV data instead civil air data computers, use of TACAN instead DME,

higher precision INS, alternative ways to ensure required position report rate, alternative

integration with aircraft displays, use of specific flight guidance/flight control functionalities,

relative navigation (RELNAV), etc.


• Civil PBN requirements, as currently defined, are already suitable for the direct application

of a performance based approach to a certain extent. Document 9613 prescribes defined

sets of multiple system enablers allowing the selection of those that can fulfil particular

airspace requirements and the identified levels of performance (e.g. GNSS, DME/DME,

INS/IRS, etc.).


• PBN not yet included in EASA CS-ACNS. Consult ICAO Annex 10 and ICAO document

9613. In the annexes to the present document some specific PBN performance values are

identified.

5.2.2 PBN on approach

5.2.2.1 The ICAO PBN Manual includes also the RNP APCH specification which offers approach

options including Lateral Navigation (LNAV) or Approach Procedures with Vertical Guidance

(APV). The latter include Lateral Navigation with Vertical Guidance (LNAV/VNAV, relying on

Barometric VNAV) or Localiser Procedure with Vertical Guidance (LPV, relying on Space Based

Augmentation System). A considerable number of runway ends in Europe is expected to soon

implement APV approach types.


Requirements.


• Considerations above for PBN en-route apply also here. The vast majority of military aircraft

is not APV-equipped. Vertical NAV capability of multiple aircraft types was determined to be

a weak aspect in military systems performance.

• For multiple aircraft types, equipage with compliant barometric configurations or with SBAS

receivers might be the preferred solution.

• To meet the future requirements such as VNAV, RTA etc. the question of the

implementation of an aircraft performance package necessary to provide the required



performance and reliability of the computed information and flight path in the navigation

computer was raised in the FDC study. Altimetry systems on combat aircraft are a major

obstacle to VNAV due to the multiple store configurations affecting differently its

aerodynamics.






INS/IRS, etc.).


• PBN is not yet included in EASA CS-ACNS. Consult ICAO Annex 10 and ICAO document


identified.

5.2.3 PBN functionalities

5.2.3.1 The PBN Manual also defines additional functionalities (required or optional) which can be

used in association with several of the navigation specifications. The purpose of the additional

functionalities (RF, FRT, TOAC and Baro-VNAV) is:

5.2.3.2 RF stands for Radius to Fix and FRT stands for Fixed Radius Transition and in PBN, both

functionalities are associated only with RNP specifications. RF is a path terminator used for SIDs,

STARs and Approach. FRT is a leg transition used when the FMS is in en-route mode.

5.2.3.3 The use of both RF and FRT ensures aircraft turn on a repeatable path. This means that if

closely-spaced routes have turns on them, there is no need to increase the spacing between the

routes on the turn when RF or FRT is coupled to RNP. In the terminal environment, RF also makes

it possible to design curved approaches in terrain rich areas, or to avoid noise sensitive areas.

5.2.3.4 RNAV Holding means reduction in the size of the holding area to permit holds to be placed

closer together or in more optimum locations.

5.2.3.5 Parallel Offset is about the aircraft ability to comply with tactical parallel offset instructions

as an alternative to radar vectoring.

5.2.3.6 TOAC stands for Time Of Arrival Control and enables an aircraft to reach a waypoint within

X number of seconds of a specific time.



5.2.3.7 Baro-VNAV - VNAV stands for Vertical Navigation; it is a function in the FMS which allows

the vertical path of the aircraft to be better controlled and managed which makes it possible to the

FMS to process and enable optimal profiles such as continuous descent operations and to cope

with vertical constraints defined in the airspace design.


Requirements.


• Considerations above for PBN en-route and approach apply also here.

• However, the specific case of each functionality must be assessed in accordance with the

particular nature of the performance attribute. It is certain that flight control/flight guidance

can play an important role together with the existing RNAV system and FMS navigation. For

that the navigation database is identified as a major difficulty as stated before. Correlated to

this point, the military navigation computers offer limited capabilities in term of path

computing since they usually comply with only few ARINC 424 path terminators. Aircraft

already RNAV-5 compliant may provide some initial capacities which are however

insufficient to comply with more demanding requirements. Besides, some tactical

capabilities like holding patterns might be re-used with an adequate compliance check of

the function.






INS/IRS, etc.).




identified.

5.2.4 More considerations on PBN impact on military

5.2.4.1 Implementation options for PBN in Europe have been regulated in EU Regulation 716/2014

of 07 June 2014 (Pilot Common Project) and will depend of future regulation under development by

EASA. Due to the complexity of wider PBN implementation and its huge impact shaping new



airspace structures, specific measures will have to be defined to ensure that military aircraft can be

seamlessly and safely integrated in the PBN environment. Those measures shall address the need

for military aircraft to:

• access to aerodromes/airports equipped with runway ends without precision approaches

where PBN RNP APPCH specifications, lateral or APV approaches, are introduced

• access to military aerodromes located within extended AMAN 200 NM horizon,

• transit (low or high), land and depart through TMAs (within the range of extended AMAN

and where PBN SIDs/STARs are introduced)

• fly in the en-route environment (GAT) where PBN ATS routes have been introduced.

5.2.4.2 The required measures are twofold: 1) transitional arrangements by the Air Traffic Service

Providers to cope with non-equipped or lower capability State aircraft on the basis of

conventional/alternative navigation procedures/support and/or b) performance-based certification

using equivalent military capabilities.

5.2.4.3 Those civil-military implications and challenges associated with PBN deployment are

extensively described in the “Preliminary Impact Assessment on Civil-Military Organisation”

included in the first Regulatory Approach Document (RAD), delivered in March 2013 as part of the

first phase of the PBN regulatory mandate given to EUROCONTROL by the European

Commission.

This document highlighted the following civil-military aspects:

• The need to accommodate State aircraft flying GAT is justified by the legitimate sovereignty

roles and national security and defence missions that require unrestricted access to the

airspace. That calls for seamless interoperability due to the need to reduce segregation and

limit ATC workload by minimising special handling and exemptions.

• Some legacy State aircraft will never be PBN compliant hence airspace design should pay

due regard to mixed mode environment.

• Transition arrangements for State aircraft shall consider the size of the fleets and the

diversity of aircraft types and its life cycles, reversionary (conventional) ATS support to

handle non-equipped or lower capability aircraft and voluntary opportunities to use available

military capabilities and specific military airborne configurations which might be considered

as equivalent means of compliance.

• PBN brings new requirements for the airworthiness and operational approval which will be



reflected in new certification material for the specifications introduced in the ICAO PBN

Manual. These will have to be considered by the certification activities performed by

national military organisations. The ICAO PBN Manual does not change the regulatory

basis of the airworthiness and operational approval processes. National authorities keep

their respective roles and responsibilities.

5.2.4.4 In addition, the “Roadmap on Enhanced Civil-Military CNS Interoperability and Technology

Convergence” (Edition 2.0 17/10/2013), endorsed by the EUROCONTROL Military ATM Board

(MAB), summarises the current civil navigation arrangements for the handling of State aircraft

operating as GAT as follows:

• State aircraft are exempted from B-RNAV requirement. For en-route GAT, State aircraft

should be routed via VOR/DME-defined ATS routes or via conventional navigation aids

(national AIPs). Within TMAs, non B-RNAV State aircraft should be routed via non-RNAV-

based SIDs and STARs.

• For terminal operations, State aircraft that are not approved for P-RNAV operations may

continue to make use of conventional procedures, as stated in national AIPs.

• State aircraft without the required vertical navigation capability (APV based on Baro

LNAV/VNAV or SBAS LPV) to perform RNAV approaches based on the use of GPS/GNSS,

will continue to use existing conventional non-precision approaches.

5.2.4.5 The same document identifies the recurrent technical shortcomings and certification issues

that PBN requirements trigger for State aircraft. In fact, studies have shown that the technical

constraints that prevent military aircraft to be PBN compliant include: non-eligible sensors, difficult

airborne integration with available military avionics including displays, ARINC 424 data base not

supported absence of RNAV computer or RAIM, insufficient position output rate, limited vertical

NAV performance, etc.).

5.2.4.6 As a consequence, one of the main routes for PBN compliance in relation with military

aircraft equipage shall be performance based certification/equivalence for military aircraft allowing

the re-utilization of available navigation capabilities.


• Considerations above for PBN en-route and approach apply also here. That is relevant for

the particular case of TMA structures (SIDs/STARs) that require a certain level of area

navigation capability.

• For runway ends equipped with APV for Non Precision Approaches (some hundreds of



secondary airfields in Europe, when no alternative VOR/DME procedures are available, the

option when equipage with SBAS is not viable, must be to investigate available

LNAV/VNAV barometric performance including measures to attain the altimetry system

error limits on the basis of alternative military altimetry configurations.




identified.

5.2.5 4D NAV (RTA) (not in present edition)

5.2.5.1 More demanding PBN functionalities will not be applicable to State aircraft even when

introducing other requirements that are key to enable more advanced 4D concepts, as it is the

case with the ability to meet time constraints (RTA). Those capabilities should not be initially

mandated for State aircraft and can remain only as a voluntary option.


• Trajectory management requirements, resulting from SESAR target concept, indicates that

navigation capabilities and performance are critical to support 4D trajectory concepts. RTA

functionality is amongst those. It is important to add to the vertical, horizontal and

longitudinal performances and containment functions the time management requirements.

The ability to process time constraints relies strongly on flight guidance/control capabilities

and on data bases and flight management system automation. Business/mission

trajectories will be described as well as executed with the required precision in all 4

dimensions.

• Trajectory management functions entail the understanding that navigation functions have to

be seen from a holistic perspective and considered as a merging of multiple performance

components, in space and in time, and involve an assembly of applications, sensors,

airborne computers and data bases, together with data link interactions.

• Trajectory-related applications should be sensor-independent and some tailored

requirements or alternative mitigation of missing capabilities might be necessary due to

certain on-board capability constraints. The usual limitation on military aircraft is the

mismatch of navigation data bases, which may require translation using a ground-based

mission support system as well as difficulties associated with supporting ARINC 424

formats, vertical navigation and RTA capability.



• The use of Military Mission Systems (MMS) / Mission Computers to emulate FMS functions

is still dependent on the results of ongoing SESAR R&D efforts. Hence, the options for

acquiring on-board automated trajectory management functions in military aircraft remain

uncertain.

• In terms of communications, the need for military aircraft to support the real time exchange

and processing of trajectory management data and to meet time constraints will become

important when Mission Trajectory concept starts to be implemented. If initially a single time

constrain (CTO/TTO) is implemented in the context of initial 4D trajectory, the absence of

data link can be mitigated with the use of voice. When multiple time constraints (CTO/TTO,

CTA/TTA) are to be processed, including at FMS level, the availability of data link becomes

important, in particular for transport type State aircraft.

• Innovative approaches might be studied like supplementary ground support of manual

inputs to FMS/MMS not excluding the use of voice commands.






INS/IRS, etc.).




identified.

5.2.6 Take off & landing

5.2.6.1 A reduction of the ILS Cat I infrastructure may occur, especially for ILS at the end of

operational life in airports with low levels of traffic (replacement by APV). For major airports, ILS

Cat II/III is expected to remain the main precision approach and landing system over the next 20

years.

5.2.6.2 For Cat II/III operations, MLS may be introduced at certain runway ends, when an

alternative option to ILS is required.

5.2.6.3 GBAS Cat I and SBAS/EGNOS operations will be implemented at an increasing number of

airports during Step 1, as an alternative to ILS Cat I.



5.2.6.4 GBAS Cat II/III will become available in the medium term, but widespread deployment is

beyond the Step 1 timeframe.

5.2.6.5 State aircraft without the required vertical navigation capability (SBAS, LNAV and

LNAV/VNAV) to perform RNAV approaches based on the use of GPS/GNSS, will continue to use

existing conventional non-precision approaches.

5.2.6.6 Concerning precision approach and landing operations, in parallel with the introduction of

GBAS, State aircraft with lower NAV capability will continue to be accommodated on the basis of

conventional means and/or special handling procedures. Until at least 2020 and beyond, military

operations will rely on the use of ILS, MLS and Differential GPS systems available in Multi-Mode

Receivers (MMR).

5.2.6.7 It is assumed that the minimum Precision Approach and Landing System (PALS)

requirement for military operations is Cat I. Therefore, Cat II/III should be seen as

recommended/optional for transport type State aircraft, not being critical in terms of airport access

(depending on the airfields into which they operate).


Requirements.


• In terms of Precision Approach and Landing Systems (PALS) Cat I must suffice to support

all military requirements.

• As ILS starts to be replaced by GBAS at certain major civil airports, it is expected that

military PALS will take due account of the fact that GBAS, as defined by ICAO, will become

the main technical solution for precision landing even if military operations require the

retention of ILS capability even for the very long term. A potential area to be targeted for

performance equivalence investigations is the suitability of military Multi-Mode Receiver

(MMR) to support operations based on any xLS enabler.

• Military requirements will be supported by the introduction of a Future PALS concept (under

discussion within NATO), considering the availability of MMR, which includes ILS, MLS and

DGPS capabilities. The main driver of future (military) PALS will be the need for

commonality with a civil satellite-based GNSS infrastructure. There is an expectation that

the foreseeable evolution in the civil aviation community towards GNSS and augmentations

will influence the technology selected for PALS.

• Standardisation developments might be required to ensure compatibility between military



GPS (DGPS) receivers defined in NATO STANAG 4550 and civil GBAS. It is important to

note that DGPS may not be useable in aerodromes where APV/LPV is required.

• Ideally the airborne self-contained NAV avionics will evolve to sustain landing requirements

of military aircraft. These avionics might typically include Inertial Navigation System (INS)

with GPS (later GNSS) updates to support pilots with positioning and bearing information as

well as for approach and landing. SBAS is expected to be useable for Cat I in the medium

term.

• Again here it is important to address the need to assess the equivalence of military GNSS

restricted signals (GPS/PPS, GALILEO/PRS) when these are hybridized with the overall

NAV system.


• Civil take-off and landing requirements, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct

application of a performance based approach as they are outside the scope of PBN and

refer to navigation concepts that are not based on area navigation (RNAV).


• Consult ICAO Annex 10. In the annexes to the present document some specific PBN

performance values are identified.

5.2.7 Conventional redundancies/fall back

5.2.7.1 It is expected that PBN deployment will bring a greater focus on processes for verification

of compliance for State aircraft and military authorisations. The bottom line will be that the majority

of State aircraft will remain in operation without the required PBN capabilities and will still need to

be handled on the basis of conventional support for a certain transition period. This does not apply

to a smaller number of forward fit actions for transport-type aircraft entering into service or

undergoing major mid-life upgrades for compliance with certain basic PBN functionalities.

5.2.7.2 NDBs and VORs will be gradually removed, from circa 2015, in line with civil plans. A

residual number of VORs will be retained to support local operations in the vicinity of military

aerodromes and to cope with limited airborne equipage.

5.2.7.3 TACAN will be required until at least 2025 even if a gradual introduction of GNSS/INS

alternatives starts earlier. Retention of TACAN for en-route navigation by military aircraft should

continue to be supported on the basis of economic, spectrum and equipage risks presented by

alternative technologies. Until alternative consolidated navigational equipment is in place, a

minimum TACAN route structure is expected to be retained.



5.2.7.4 A terrestrial back-up, to cater for GNSS signal vulnerabilities, based mainly on DME

(TACAN for the military) and ILS (MLS where feasible) until beyond 2020; Alternative Positioning

Navigation and Timing (A-PNT) may be introduced later. An initial proposal is under discussion to

introduce a new SSR/Mode N system to provide navigation service by replacing DME and TACAN.


• For conventional navigation requirements if might be relevant to investigate the feasibility of

re-utilizing TACAN equipment to mitigate lack of DME ranging capability where justified by

operational requirements.


• Civil conventional requirements, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct

application of a performance based approach.


• Consult ICAO Annex 10 and monitor A-PNT developments. In the annexes to the present

document some specific PBN performance values are identified.

5.2.8 Oceanic navigation requirements: see paragraph 5.1.7 and consult ICAO document 7030

NAT regional supplementary procedures. The annexes to the present document make reference to

some specific PBN performance specifications valid for oceanic and remote.

5.3 Surveillance

5.3.1 Aircraft ID

5.3.1.1 To address the problems of the shortage of SSR Mode 3/A codes through better code

management and to coordinate the implementation of Aircraft Identification as a long term solution,

the Air Navigation Services Board (ANSB), at EUROCONTROL, approved a plan to implement an

Aircraft Identification Initial Operating Capability for 09 February 2012 (Baseline Scenario) which

would integrate Mode S ELS operations with more efficient SSR Code management through

CCAMS and enhanced ORCAM. This was part of an Aircraft ID Strategy.

5.3.1.2 The Aircraft Identification (ACID) requirements are stipulated in Regulation 1206/2011,

laying down the requirements on aircraft identification for surveillance in order to ensure the

unambiguous and continuous individual identification of aircraft within EATMN.

Further guidance regarding the interoperability targets can be found in Appendix III Surveillance

Requirements.

5.3.2 SSR / Mode 3/A

5.3.2.1 SSR is an independent/cooperative surveillance technology that detects and measures not

only the position of aircraft but also requests additional parametric information from the aircraft



itself, such as its identity and altitude. It relies on active answer signals generated by the

transponders carried by the aircraft. The transponder is a radio transceiver that receives the signal

generated by the SSR on one frequency (1030 MHz) named “interrogation” and transmits on

another (1090 MHz) named “reply”.

5.3.2.2 SSR Mode A/C is mature; however there are only 4096 identification codes available and

the altitude resolution is limited to 100 feet. There is also uncertainty as to whether this technology

has sufficient capacity and accuracy to support new concepts. SSR Mode A/C (sliding window and

mono-pulse variants) is to be reduced as soon as operationally viable. Reasons for phasing it out

include its RF inefficiency and poor performance in high traffic density airspace. Traditional SSR is

not compatible with Aircraft Identification (ACID) regulatory requirements.

5.3.2.3 Some legacy SSR transponders may evidence anomalies which are detrimental to the RF

environment. Mode 3/A code shortages are addressed by the ACID strategy which hopes to be

fully reliant on Mode S downlinked aircraft identification.


Requirements.

5.3.3 Mode S ELS and EHS

5.3.3.1 Mode S as another independent/cooperative surveillance technology is a recognised

requirement for State aircraft, influencing the interoperability of State aircraft aiming to fly in a

Mode S-based aircraft identification environment.

5.3.3.2 The conditions prescribing the mandatory carriage and operation of Mode S by State

aircraft are set out in Commission Regulation (EU) Nr 1207/2011 amended by (EU) Nr 1028/2014

laying down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the Single

European Sky. [at the moment of drafting, an EASA Rulemaking Task was studying the evolution

of the SPI regulation].

5.3.3.3 Article 8 (“State Aircraft”) lays down regulatory measures for State aircraft operators, ATS

providers and Member States. Besides detailed equipage requirements for Mode S ELS, EHS,

ADS-B OUT and related deadlines, it acknowledges the fact that not all State aircraft can or will be

equipped within given deadlines. Therefore, it describes transitional arrangements for non-Mode-S

equipped State aircraft.

5.3.3.4 ATS providers must ensure that non-Mode-S equipped State aircraft are accommodated,

provided that they can be safely handled within the capacity of the ATM system.

5.3.3.5 Member States have to publish the procedures related to the handling of non-equipped

State aircraft in national AIPs.

5.3.3.6 On an annual basis ATS providers have to communicate to the Member State that has

designated them, their plans for the handling of non-equipped State aircraft. These plans shall take

into account associated capacity limits of the ATM system.

5.3.3.7 Some States (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United

Kingdom) have planned (and some already enforced) earlier implementation of surveillance

capabilities for State aircraft. That is coordinated on a national basis and should be taken into

account when military organisations plan their deployment efforts and operations. It is important to



note that every single flight of a Non-Mode S capable state aircraft within any national Mode S

declared airspace requires dispensation of the respective nation/nations.

5.3.3.8 Mode S transponders also give a fundamental basis for subsequent ADS-B Out capability

as this technique relies on the Mode S 1090 MHz Extended Squitter data link.

5.3.3.9 Mode S transponders must comply with the provisions of ICAO Annex 10, SARPs. It must

be an approved Mode S Level 2 transponder, as a minimum (ED-73E represents the current

desired compliance standard for Mode S transponders. The upcoming release of ETSO-C112d will

cause ETSO-C112c and its reference to ED-73C to be obsolete. TSO-C112d already calls out the

technical equivalent document DO-181E. Therefore, ED-73E represents the appropriate Minimum

Operational Performance Standard for Mode S transponder compliance). It also includes aircraft

identification. The transponders need to support Surveillance Identifier Codes. Only II/SI compliant

Level 2 transponders are accepted by the SES SPI Regulation; the use of Mode II/IS as a fall-back

mitigation must be seen as non-recommended and transitional due to its negative RF impact.


Requirements.


• Mode S implementation for military aircraft must be adequately coordinated with the

equipage efforts in relation to IFF Mode 5 in accordance with NATO recommendations on

the subject. If platform integration of positioning (PNT) data to support ADS-B

implementation also fulfils the hardware requirements for implementing IFF Mode 5 Level 2

report capability on upgradeable Mode 5 Level 1 equipped platforms, states are

encouraged to consider both integrations at the same time.


• Civil Mode S requirements, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct application

of a performance based approach.


• In terms of system performance requirements, EASA CS-ACNS envisages for Mode S ELS:

o Integrity: The Mode S ELS airborne surveillance system integrity is designed

commensurate with a ‘minor‘ failure condition.

o Continuity: The Mode S ELS airborne surveillance system continuity is designed to

an allowable qualitative probability of ‘remote’.

• In terms of system performance requirements, EASA CS-ACNS envisages for Mode S

EHS:

o Integrity: The Mode S EHS airborne surveillance system integrity is designed

commensurate with a ‘minor’ failure condition for the downlink aircraft parameters.

o Continuity: The Mode S EHS airborne surveillance system continuity is designed to

an allowable qualitative probability of ‘probable’ for the downlink aircraft parameters.

5.3.4 ADS-B Ground and Airborne SUR



5.3.4.1 ADS-B Out refers to a unit (e.g. aircraft ground vehicle) broadcasting onboard data such as

identity, position, velocity, etc. ADS-B In refers to an additional capability to receive ADS-B Out

messages of surrounding ADS-B Out capable aircraft. The positions of these aircraft are displayed

to aircrews for traffic situation awareness.

5.3.4.2 ADS-B In enables Airborne Surveillance Applications (ASA) (or Airborne Separation

Assistance System – ASAS), for ATSAW, Spacing or Separation purposes.

5.3.4.3 There are currently three ADS-B data link technologies: 1090MHz Extended Squitter

(1090ES), Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) (allowed in U.S lower airspace) and VHF Digital

Link Mode 4 (VDL-4). Future high-capacity data links might also be capable of supporting ADS-B.

The predominant technology being used in Europe and the U.S. for ADS-B is 1090MHz Extended

Squitter (1090ES). Many existing Mode-S aircraft transponders provide the ADS-B Out 1090ES

functionality that will need to be certified in order to be used operationally.

5.3.4.4 1090 MHz extended squitter was adopted as the basis for ADS-B data link interoperability

and became the "de facto" civil standard worldwide. The other data link technologies such as VDL

Mode 4 or UAT may be implemented locally, but global solutions are clearly preferred to ensure

interoperability and limit costs.

5.3.4.5 [Paragraph only relevant for civil operators. The FAA has not found the “application

categories” to be of use. Deletion will be considered in a subsequent version] ADS-B functionalities

depend essentially on the applications considered. These are standardised by EUROCAE WG 51

(and RTCA SC186). Depending on the operational goal, the following application categories can

be distinguished:

• Air Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSAW): aimed at enhancing the flight crew’s knowledge

of the surrounding traffic situation both in the air and on the airport surface.

• Airborne Spacing (ASPA) applications: for flight crew to achieve and maintain a given

spacing from a designated aircraft, as specified in a new ATC instruction.

• Airborne Separation (ASEP) applications: the controller delegates separation responsibility

and transfers the corresponding separation tasks to the flight crew, who ensures that the

applicable airborne separation minima is met. The separation responsibility delegated to the

flight crew is limited to designated aircraft, specified by a new clearance, and is limited in

time, space, and scope.

• Self-separation (SSEP) applications: These applications require flight crew to separate their

flight from all surrounding traffic, in accordance with the applicable airborne separation

minima and rules of flight.

5.3.4.6 In summary, ADS-B is a dependent/cooperative Surveillance technique that relies on

aircraft broadcasting their identity, position and other aircraft information (parameters). These are

used to support applications which provide the means to implement multiple operational concepts.

5.3.4.7 ADS-B Out enables Ground Surveillance applications which comprise:

• ADS-B in Non Radar Airspace (ADS-B NRA)

• ADS-B in Radar Airspace (ADS-B RAD)



• ADS-B for Airport Surface Surveillance (ADS-B APT)

• ADS-B for Aircraft-Derived Data (ADS-B ADD)

5.3.4.8 It is important to describe how ADS-B In is intended to be used. In that sense, ADS-B In

(with uncertain deployment perspectives) enables Airborne Surveillance comprising the

applications related with airborne traffic situational awareness (ATSAW), spacing, separation and

self-separation. In particular this includes the following Air Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSAW)

applications currently planned (See DO-317B/ED-194A and DO-361 for correct nomenclature for

these applications):

• ATSAW In-Trail Procedure in oceanic airspace (ITP)

• ATSAW Visual Separation in Approach (VSA)

• ATSAW during Flight Operations (AIRB)

• ATSAW on the Airport Surface (SURF)

• Interval Management (IM)

5.3.4.9 Subsequently, additional ADS-B In spacing, separation and self-separation applications

(also known as “ASAS”) will be introduced. These will provide the flight crew with the means to

have a picture of the surrounding traffic and will gradually provide then means for the flight crew to

maintain a given spacing from a designated aircraft and ultimately to receive delegated

responsibility for separation and to separate their traffic from all surrounding traffic.

5.3.4.10 ADS-B supports a fundamental concept element of SESAR (new separation modes)

including for Mission Trajectory.

5.3.4.11 ADS-B applications are standardised in EUROCAE WG 51 and RTCA SG 186 and

equipage requirements rely on the use of Mode S transponders and 1090 ES in accordance with

EUROCAE/RTCA ED102/DO260 and ED/102A/DO 260b.

5.3.4.12 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011 amended by (EU) 1028/2014 lays down

requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the Single European

Sky (SPI).

5.3.4.13 The Regulation includes requirements on the systems contributing to the provision of

surveillance data, their constituents and associated procedures, in order to ensure the

harmonisation of performance, the interoperability and the efficiency of these systems to support

EATMN and for the purpose of civil-military coordination.

5.3.4.14 It applies to the surveillance chain made up of airborne and ground-based surveillance

systems, surveillance data processing systems, ground-to-ground communications systems used

for the distribution of surveillance data, as well as to their constituents and associated procedures.

In practice, it mandates the implementation of Mode S (ELS and EHS), ADS-B Out and related

ground surveillance components.

5.3.4.15 The detailed technical requirements supporting the SPI regulation can be found in the

EUROCONTROL Specification for ATM Surveillance Systems (ESSAP), volumes 1 and 2.

5.3.4.16 ADS-B Out for transport-type State aircraft is also covered in EC Regulation 1207/2011



amended by (EU) 1028/2014as described above. It is a baseline requirement, seen initially as a

follow on of Mode S EHS capability through the addition of supplementary applications, with due

regard to relevant safety cases and adequate certification practices. Additional ADS-B applications

for State aircraft that require ADS-B In were not regulated. ADS-B In implementation for transport-

type State aircraft will depend on receiver capability (normally relying on the Mode S extended

squitter component also used for TCAS) and will entail a wiring retrofit (mainly to enable GNSS

sources) as well as respective certification.

In the United States there is a mandate for the wide implementation of ADS-B from 1st January

2020.


Requirements.


• ADS-B implementation for military aircraft must be adequately coordinated with the

equipage efforts in relation to IFF Mode 5 in accordance with NATO recommendations on

the subject. If platform integration of positioning (PNT) data to support ADS-B

implementation also fulfils the hardware requirements for implementing IFF Mode 5 Level 2

report capability on upgradeable Mode 5 Level 1 equipped platforms, states are

encouraged to consider both integrations at the same time.

• Research was conducted in SESAR 9.24 to determine feasibility of using military

transponders (Mode S component) to support ADS-B for military aircraft. Project 9.24 was

created in order to define and validate technical solutions to enable military aircraft to

become more cooperative with the civil surveillance environment by enabling the air-ground

and air-air exchange of surveillance parameters that contribute to improving the ATM

network. That capability relies on the ADS-B technique, whose functionalities are now

under evaluation with a view to reusing existing military aircraft capabilities. Potential

equivalence initiatives could build upon those results.

• In particular for ADS-B IN, subject to additional R&D, potential interoperability options to re-

utilise military transponders might mitigate the absence of TCAS component (to enabler

squitter reception) through the use of combined interrogator components.

• FAA indicated that “US DoD solutions” are currently in development or existing and are

being fielded.


• ADS-B requirements, as currently defined in Europe, seem NOT suitable for the direct

application of a performance based approach. However, FAA indicated that “ADS-B

requirements, as currently defined in the US, are a performance based approach”. They

justify with the statement that “from a US perspective, the US ADS-B mandate is

performance-based as applied to the aircraft”.


• In terms of system performance requirements, EASA CS-ACNS envisages for ADS-B Out:



o Integrity: The ADS-B Out airborne surveillance system integrity is designed

commensurate with a ‘major‘ failure condition for the transmission of the parameters

listed in the EASA CS-ACNS Book 1 Subpart D. The ADS-B Out system integrity is

designed commensurate with a ‘minor‘ failure condition for the transmission of other

data parameters.

o Continuity: The ADS-B Out system continuity is designed to an allowable

qualitative probability of ‘remote’.

5.4 Safety Assurance

5.4.1 Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)

5.4.1.1 ACAS II tracks aircraft in the surrounding airspace through replies from their ATC

transponders. If the system diagnoses a risk of impending collision it issues a Resolution Advisory

(RA) to the flight crew which directs the pilot how best to regulate or adjust his vertical speed so as

to avoid a collision. Experience, operational monitoring and simulation studies have shown that

when followed promptly and accurately, the RAs issued by ACAS II significantly reduce the risk of

mid-air collision.

5.4.1.2 ACAS II can issue two types of alerts:

- Traffic Advisories (TAs), which aim to help the pilots in the visual acquisition of the intruder

aircraft, and to alert them to be ready for a potential resolution advisory.

- Resolution Advisories (RAs), which are avoidance manoeuvres recommended to the pilot. When

the intruder aircraft is also fitted with an ACAS II system, both systems coordinate their RAs

through the Mode S data link, in order to select complementary resolution senses.

5.4.1.3 For ACAS II to achieve its intended safety benefits, pilots must operate the system and

respond to ACAS II advisories in a manner compatible with the system design. Many advisories

involve more than one ACAS II equipped aircraft. In these coordinated encounters, it is essential

that the flight crew on each aircraft respond in the expected manner.

5.4.1.4 The implementation of ACAS II has increased the safety and reduced the possibility of mid-

air collision. However, in order for ACAS II to continue to deliver its safety benefit, it is essential

that pilots are adequately trained on ACAS II operations and followed the procedures and the

airborne equipment is updated to the latest software version.

5.4.1.5 Following the identification by EUROCONTROL of two safety issues in the existing TCAS II

Version 7.0 logic (one relating to the performance of the RA-reversal logic, and the other involving

unintentional incorrect pilot responses to Adjust Vertical Speed RAs) the TCAS II Minimum

Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) developed RTCA and EUROCAE have been

reviewed and updated.

5.4.1.6 During a joint session in March 2008, the RTCA SC (Special Committee) 147 and

EUROCAE WG (Working Group) 75 agreed on the final version of the TCAS II MOPS, to be known

as TCAS II version 7.1.

5.4.1.7 On 25 March 2010 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) launched a regulatory

initiative for the introduction of ACAS II software version 7.1. This effort culminated with the

publication of regulation 1332/2011 of 16/12/2011 making reference to EASA Basic Regulation



(216/2008) in respect to its applicability.

5.4.1.8 EASA Basic Regulation explicitly states that it does not apply to products, parts,

appliances, personnel and organisations carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue,

firefighting, coastguard or similar activities or services. Nevertheless, it stresses that Member

States must undertake to ensure that such activities or services have due regard as far as

practicable to the objectives of that Regulation (article 1).

5.4.1.9 Back in 2005, the ECAC Member States have commonly agreed on an Aircraft Collision

Avoidance System (ACAS) policy and a mandatory ACAS II (TCAS version 7.0 or above)

implementation schedule. This mandatory implementation does not apply to State Aircraft.

5.4.1.10 By that time, the Military Authorities of the ECAC Member States agreed on a voluntary

installation programme on military transport-type aircraft (MTTA) equivalent to their Phase 1 civilian

counterparts by 1 January 2005 (for fixed-wing turbine engine aircraft having a maximum

certificated take-off mass exceeding 15,000kgs, or a maximum approved passenger seating

configuration of more than 30). A revised Policy on ACAS for State aircraft is under discussion at

the moment of drafting this document to reflect the need to recommend equipage with the latest

TCAS logic (version 7.1).

5.4.1.11 Notwithstanding that the military commitment is voluntary, Germany has made ACAS II

mandatory within its airspace, from 1 January 2000, for all aircraft whether civil or MTTA, which

meet the Phase 1 criteria, and from 1 January 2005 for all aircraft whether civil or MTTA which

meet the Phase 2 criteria (for fixed-wing turbine engine aircraft having a maximum certificated

take-off mass exceeding 5,700kgs, or a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of

more than 19). As from 01 January 2005 German authorities put in place transitional arrangements

and an exemption process (German AIC IFR 8 - 23 Dec 2004).

Further guidance regarding the interoperability targets can be found in Appendix IV Safety

Assurance Requirements.


• No research has been conducted on safety assurance system alternatives for military

aircraft. Modern military platforms evidence cueing/awareness capabilities that could be

relevant to mitigate the absence of collision avoidance. IFF capability and airborne radars

could be important in this respect.


• Civil safety assurance requirements, as currently defined, are NOT suitable for the direct

application of a performance based approach.


• In terms of system performance requirements, while ACAS is not extensively covered by

EASA CS-ACNS reference must be made to ICAO Annex 10 Volume 4 and JAA TGLs 8

and 26. Annex 10 states:

(Quote) ACAS shall interrogate SSR Mode A/C and Mode S transponders in other aircraft

and detect the transponder replies. ACAS shall measure the range and relative bearing of

responding aircraft. Using these measurements and information conveyed by transponder



replies, ACAS shall estimate the relative positions of each responding aircraft. ACAS shall

include provisions for achieving such position determination in the presence of ground

reflections, interference and variations in signal strength (Unquote). Annex 10 Vol 4

describes a significant number of performance parameters that are required to meet the

described objectives. The following examples are given:

o Track establishment probability. ACAS shall generate an established track, with at

least a 0.90 probability that the track is established 30 s before closest approach, on

aircraft equipped with transponders when all of the conditions (described in Annex

10 Volume 4 paragraph 4.3.2.1.1) are satisfied.

o False track probability. The probability that an established Mode A/C track does not

correspond in range and altitude, if reported, to an actual aircraft shall be less than

10-2. For an established Mode S track this probability shall be less than 10-6. These

limits shall not be exceeded in any traffic environment.

5.4.2 EGPWS/TAWS (not in present edition)

5.4.3 ELT (not in present edition)

5.4.4 Flight Data Recorder (not in present edition)

5.4.5 Enhanced Visual Systems (not in present edition)

5.4.6 Meteo Systems (not in present edition).



6. Summary of Candidate Enablers

6.1 Background

6.1.1 The approach followed for performance equivalence/PBC shall allow the selection of the

equipage or functionality option which reveals to be more beneficial in terms of technical

integration impact, safety and cost. Being the technology trend in ATM/CNS a more integrated

environment, it may happen that the lack of one particular capability can be mitigated with another

one including dependencies between ground and airborne enablers. Re-utilization of available

military capabilities and/or integration adaptations should be a preferential approach for

compliance.

6.1.2 It is understood that performance equivalence/PBC involves installation certification

aspects which are not discussed in the present document. It is also important to acknowledge that

interoperability entails in many cases much more than to simply replace an enabler by another

one. It requires very often an architecture / system approach where interfaces, antennas, software

and other constituents may play a fundamental role. It is assumed that these aspects are

considered in subsequent technical work for any of the identified ATM/CNS target requirements.

6.1.3 The lists of enablers below are only a repository of equipage options potential eligible for

any particular avionics suite configuration deemed applicable to sustain any identified performance

targets. The options proposed are not exhaustive and there might be others equally suitable.

6.1.4 It is important to highlight that several enablers can be traced against SESAR architecture

enablers at https://www.atmmasterplan.eu/architecture (for authorised users).

6.2 Common civil ATM/CNS Technical Equipment

6.2.1 The ATM/CNS performance targets extracted from civil technical regulatory and

standardisation materials extensively presented in the annexes to the present document rely on

common technical equipment summarised below:

COM:

• VHF Transceivers with 25 kHz channel spacing

• VHF Transceivers with 8.33 kHz channel spacing

• UHF Transceivers

• FANS/ACARS Data Link

• VHF Data Link Mode 2 for CPDLC and i4D (with CMU)

• Future COM Data Link: Terrestrial LDACS for continental

• Future COM Data Link: AeroMACS / 802.16 WIMAX for airport

• Future COM Data Link: SATCOM for continental and oceanic

• HF voice and HF Data Link (HFDL) for oceanic



• SATCOM Inmarsat for oceanic

• VHF FM Immunity (VHF COM, ILS, VOR)

NAV:

• ILS NAV receiver (part of MMR)

• MLS NAV receiver (part of MMR)

• GBAS Cat I, II/III (or DGPS equivalent in MMR)

• Sensors: DME/DME, VOR/DME, GNSS (open signals) , INS/IRU

• RNAV Computer with RAIM

• Air Data Computer (with GNSS updates)

• Data Base ARINC 424 Path Terminators

• APV with barometric VNAV coupled with FMS

• LPV using SBAS/EGNOS receiver

• Connection to flight guidance, flight control, autothrottle/pilot/flight director

• Multi-Functional Control Displays

• TACAN

• ELT

SUR:

• SSR Mode A+C Transponder

• SSR Mode S Elementary Surveillance (ELS) Transponder (Level 2)

• SSR Mode S Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) Transponder (Level 2)

• ADS-B Out

• ADS-B In

SAFTEY ASSURANCE:

• ACAS/TCAS II (version 7.0)

• TCAS II version 7.1 (recommended)

• EGPWS

• TAWS with automatic updates from AOC

• ELT

• Enhanced Visual Systems / Head Up Displays



6.3 Summary of Candidate Military ATM/CNS Technical Equipment

6.3.1 Candidate equivalent solutions for military aircraft compliance on the basis of performance,

as described, before indicates multiple military equipment with potential to be considered in the

context of PBC. This equipment might comprise:

COM:

• UHF transceivers

• Military data communications enablers in a multilink environment

• Military SATCOM

NAV:

• Military MMRs comprising VOR, ILS/MLS and DGPS deemed equivalent to GBAS

• Sensors: TACAN, VOR/TACAN, GNSS restricted signals (GPS/PPS, GALILEO PRS),

Military INS/IRU

• Mission Computer / Military Mission Systems (MMS)

• NAV Data Base / DAFIF

• Alternative Vertical NAV Configurations (e.g. for RVSM)

• Connection to flight guidance, flight control, auto throttle/pilot/flight director

• Multi-Function Control Displays

SUR:

• SSR Mode A+C Transponder

• Military SSR Mode S Transponder (Level 2)

• Military IFF Mode 5 Transponder (Level 2)

• Military Combined Interrogator Transponder (CIT)

• Airborne Radar

6.4 Technical References

6.4.1 An important repository of certification specifications, regulatory basis and technical

references for civil aircraft is the EASA CS-ACNS document on top of ICAO SARPS. The EASA

CS-ACNS describes Certification Specifications that are applicable to all civil aircraft for the

purpose of compliance with equipage requirements with respect to on-board Communication,

Navigation and Surveillance systems. Additional references are inserted in the interoperability

tables in the appendixes of this document.

6.4.2 EASA CS-ACNS, together with EASA AMCs and guidance material is a fundamental

document supporting certification of civil aircraft. For performance equivalent/PBC applied to

military aircraft it is recommended that military equivalent documentation is developed to mirror

CS-ACNS and include military specifics.



Appendix I Communication Requirements



Medium term Communication Requirements (COM) – Air-Ground Voice, CPDLC and ADS-C

Nr Requirement Description Area of

Applicability

Detailed Description Criticality for

Airspace Access

Implementation Stage References Support to

Certification COM 1

25 kHz VHF Voice

2 sets of VHF Transceivers with 25kHz channel spacing as envisaged in JAR-OPS, JAA TGL7 Rev 1 for civil aircraft Mandated for non- 8.33kHz area, e.g. below FL 245

Continental airspace

Already implemented The system should conform with the requirements of EUROCAE document ED-23C

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. 2 sets of VHF Transceivers DSB AM with 25kHz channel spacing It can be multimode with UHF

COM 2

8.33 kHz VHF Voice

The Regulation 1079/2012 requires in its Article 5 that the aircraft radio equipment must have 8.33 kHz channel capability (In Regulation 1079/2012 there is no reference to the amount of radios needed). Regulation 923/2012 which concerns the Standardised European Rules of Air (SERA) considers equipage requirements to be airspace-rule based. JAR-OPS, JAA TGL7 Rev 1 for civil aircraft envisaged 2 Sets of VHF Transceivers with 8,33 KHZ channel spacing but this requirement is not in line with the abovementioned regulation.

Continental airspace (ICAO EUR region)

The voice communication system is capable of 8.33 kHz and 25 kHz channel spacing The voice communication system is capable of operating with off-set carrier frequencies on 25 kHz channel spacing. The voice communication system conforms to the performance requirements of the following sections of ICAO Annex 10, volume III, Part 2 (Second Edition —July 2007 incorporating Amendment No 85) Chapter 2 ‘Aeronautical Mobile Service’:

a) Section 2.1 ‘Air-ground VHF communication system

characteristics’.

b) Section 2.2 ‘System characteristics of the ground

installations’ of ICAO.

c) Section 2.3.1 ‘Transmitting function’.

d) Section 2.3.2 ‘Receiving function’ excluding sub-

section 2.3.2.8 ‘VDL —Interference Immunity

Performance’. Integrity: The voice communication system is designed commensurate with a ‘major’ failure condition. Continuity: The continuity of the voice communication system is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘remote’.

It applies to all State aircraft with transition arrangements for technical and procurement constraints including handling on VHF 25 kHz or UHF by ANSPs. Above FL 195 non-transport type State aircraft when justified by procurement constraints are to equip by 31 December 2015 at the latest. All State aircraft entering into service (or suffering major mid-life upgrades) after 01 January 2014 to be equipped (Forward Fit). Retrofit all State aircraft by 31 December 2018. Transition Arrangements are possible due to technical, budgetary or procurement constraints with communication to the Commission by 30 June 2018 and equipage by 31 December 2020 at the latest. Exempted: All State aircraft that go out of service by 31 December 2025.

Mandatory carriage above FL195 from 15 March 2007. Carriage applicable also below FL195 from 17 November 2012. EC regulation 1079/2012 Phase 3 (by 31stDec. 2018), aims for full deployment in all European airspace, however European States can propose to delay deployment in areas that have a limited network impact.

Attention: Possible amendments to regulation 29/2009 may follow

EC regulation 1079/2012 ICAO Annex 10, Volume 3, Part 2. ICAO PANS-ATM Doc 4444 The system should be approved in accordance with ETSO-2C37e, ETSO-2C38e or ETSO-2C169a JAA TGL 7 Rev 1 EASA CS-ACNS

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. The Regulation 1079/2012 requires in its Article 5 that the aircraft radio equipment must have 8.33 kHz channel capability (In this Regulation there is no reference to the amount of radios needed). JAR-OPS, JAA TGL7 Rev 1 for civil aircraft envisaged 2 Sets of VHF Transceivers with 8,33 KHZ channel spacing but this requirement is not in line with the abovementioned regulation. It remains to be defined a backup policy for State aircraft when equipped with one 8.33 kHz VHF radio and UHF. EC regulation 1079/2012 (Article 9) contains arrangements for State aircraft ATS providers are to accommodate non- equipped State Aircraft on UHF or VHF 25 kHz, provided safety ensured. Publication in national aeronautical information publication (AIP) of applicable procedures is also required.

COM 3

VHF FM Immunity

FM immune VHF equipment is to be used

Mandated for en-route and airports as specified in national AIPs

ILS and VOR receivers to be protected against interference from VHF broadcast.

Aircraft operators and aircrew are to refer to national aeronautical publications (AIP, AIC) for current official policy and procedures.

JAA guidance leaflet TGL 16

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. Exemptions for State a/c may still be negotiated on a bilateral basis. See AIPs.




Applicability


Airspace Access


Certification COM 4

Medium term

4

CPDLC Continental

The RCP130 specification has been established for the exchange of simple CPDLC clearances and ATC communication management within the Continental airspace. These exchanges are intended to be used for ATM operations in en-route airspace. For CPDLC transactions, where the safety assessment (e.g. ‘clearance’ messages) requires an expiration timer upon initiation of a transaction, the maximum transaction time is stated as an expiration time (ET). For CPDLC transactions, the nominal transaction time is stated as 95% transaction time (TT95%).

Continental airspace (en-route airspace)

Requirements end to end:

RCP 130

Parameter ET TT95%

Transaction time (sec) 130 67

Continuity (C) 0.999 0.95

Availability (A) 0.989

Integrity (I) 1E-5 per FH

Requirements for the aircraft:

RCP 130

Parameter ET TT95%



Integrity: The data link system is designed commensurate with a ‘major’ failure condition. Continuity: The data link system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘probable’.

Low (It may be replaced by A/G voice.)

CPDLC implementation in Continental airspace underway, in accordance with Reg. 29/2009. I4D planned for deployment in SESAR PCP/IDP CPDLC considered for NAT airspace in accordance with ICAO doc. 7030 Supp.

ICAO Annex 10 ICAO Doc 9705 (ATN-B1) ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document SESAR P15.2.4 Deliverables EASA CS-ACNS ED-110 (Protection Mechanism) ED-120 (SPR IR) ED-122 (SPR Oceanic) ED-154A (Dual Stack) ED228 (SPR ATN-B2) ED229 (INTEROP ATN-B2)

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach when RCP references are used as the basis for air-ground data link services. Civil: VHF Data Link Radio (ATN /VDL2) for CPDLC and I4D / F4D or Future COM including LDACS, AeroMACS or SATCOM. Military: As above + Military (data link accommodation through ground gateway).

COM 5

Medium term ADS-C Continental

The RSP160 specification is established in support of the exchange of trajectories, using ADS-C. For ADS-C transactions, the maximum transaction time is stated as surveillance Overdue delivery Time (OT). For ADS-C transactions, the nominal transaction time is stated as surveillance nominal Delivery Time (DT95%).

Continental airspace


RSP 160

Parameter OT DT95%






RSP 160

Parameter OT DT95%



Medium (Not replaceable with A/G voice.)

I4D planned for deployment in SESAR PCP/IDP CPDLC considered for NAT airspace in accordance with ICAO doc. 7030 Supp.

ICAO Annex 10 ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document SESAR P15.2.4 Deliverables ED228 (SPR ATN-B2) ED229 (INTEROP ATN-B2)


4 Source: SESAR 15.2.4 D04: In consultation with the SJU, it has been decided to define the progressive increase of performance into 3 phases (short-term, medium-term and long-term), rather than the two phased increase of performance (step ‘1’ and step ‘2/ 3’), defined in the Master Plan Ed2.0.

This is to emphasize that the SJU believes the progressive increase of performance needs towards the end target will be stretched over 3 phases. The three phases coincide with the 3 blocks, described in the ICAO/GANP. However, it is expected that the same new ATN/IP Baseline, developed and published within the medium-term will also be used for the long-term.

As a result of the 3 to 5 years delay of the mandate of ATN--B1 implementation in Europe, using VDLM2 Multi-Frequency, ATN-B1 has become defacto the short term implementation with continuation of AOC, AIS/MET as today. Consequently, ATN-B2 (i4D concept and airport services), as defined in ED228 (SPR for ATN-B2) ED229 (INTEROP for ATN-B2), using VDLM2 and complemented with Satcom Class B (Iris pre-cursor), will start IOC around 2018 and expanded towards full deployment in the medium term. It is expected that the ATN-B3/IP baseline (move from i4D concept towards full 4D concept) will start IOC around 2023, using the 3 new links and expanded towards full deployment in the long term. I




Applicability


Airspace Access


Certification COM 6

Medium term CPDLC Oceanic / Remote

As today and short-term, in the mid-term, the FANS based CPDLC operations require RCP240 and RCP 400 with RCP400/A1 allocations.

Oceanic and Remote airspace


RCP 240

Parameter ET TT95%



Availability (A) 0.989 (safety)

0.9899 (efficiency)



RCP 240

Parameter ET TT95%







COM 7

Medium term ADS-C Oceanic / Remote

In the mid-term, the main use of ADS-C in oceanic/remote airspace is the provision of position reports and the provision of reports associated with a projected route (re-routing) or a change to the lateral deviation/vertical rate/level range.

Oceanic and Remote airspace


RSP 180

Parameter OT DT95%



Availability (A) 0.989 (safety)

0.9899 (efficiency)



RSP 180

Parameter OT DT95%









Long term Communication Requirements (COM) – CPDLC and ADS-C

It should be emphazised that, except for the short-term and medium term, the CPDLC- and ADS-C performance requirements for the long term are proposals. Because the proposed requirements have neither been

validated by simulations or trials, nor have they been properly coordinated with SESAR operational groups (WP4, 5, 6), the requirements defined in the present document are speculative and should be merely used as

input for further research activities (e.g. WP 15.2.6 for future Satcom requirements, EUROCAE WGs).


Applicability


Airspace Access


Certification COM 8

Long term CPDLC Continental

Except for complex CPDLC clearances, the RCP60 specification has been established for the exchange of simple CPDLC clearances and ATC communication management within all airspaces, including TMA. For CPDLC transactions, where the safety assessment (e.g. ‘clearance’ messages) requires an expiration timer upon initiation of a transaction, the maximum transaction time is stated as an expiration time (ET). For CPDLC transactions, the nominal transaction time is stated as 95% transaction time (TT95%).

Continental airspace (terminal and en-route airspace)


RCP 60

Parameter ET TT95%






RCP 60

Parameter ET TT95%





ICAO Annex 10 ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document SESAR P15.2.4 Deliverables Note

5


COM 9

Long term ADS-C Continental

RSP60 specification is being proposed in support of the exchange of trajectories, using ADS-C. The trajectory based operations are expected to include some parts of the oceanic/remote airspace. It is envisaged that aircraft flying in the NAT region will perform, negotiate and synchronise the trajectory negotiations and synchronisation such that it supports in meeting the multiple CTOs and CTA. For ADS-C transactions, the maximum transaction time is stated as surveillance Overdue delivery Time (OT). For ADS-C transactions, the nominal transaction time is stated as surveillance nominal Delivery Time (DT95%).

Continental airspace some parts of Oceanic and Remote airspace


RSP 60

Parameter OT DT95%






RSP 160

Parameter OT DT95%





ICAO Annex 10 ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document SESAR P15.2.4 Deliverables Note on certification material

6


5 Not presuming on EASA AMC packaging, future civil certification material should be based on the performance requirements under standardisation in EUROCAE/RTCA WG-78/SC-214 developing SPR and Interop standards for advanced ATS datalink communications (ED-xx/DO-yy) including

ACM, DCL and ITP services. As an illustration the certification material may have to validate the safety aspects of these advanced datalink capabilities:

- The integrity requirements to be allocated to the datalink systems to support the extended set of datalink messages. For information EUROCAE WG-78 Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) of CPDLC implementations assumes that ”Datalink implementations within aircraft systems are expected to be at least ED12B/DO178B based Design Assurance Level C (DAL C) and within ground systems at least ED109/DO278 based Assurance Level 4 (AL4) or the equivalent EUROCONTROL/ SWAL4, respectively”

- The cockpit HMI and the flight crew workload induced by the use of advanced datalink capabilities

6 Not presuming on EASA AMC packaging, future civil certification material should be based on the performance and safety requirements under standardisation in the following working groups

- EUROCAE/RTCA WG-78/SC-214: developing SPR and Interop standards for advanced ATS datalink communications (ED-xx/DO-yy) including the 4DTRAD service

- EUROCAE/RTCA WG-85/SC-227: developing the MASPS for Required Navigation Performance for area navigation (ED-75C/DO-236C) including section 2.5 - Time Of Arrival Control.

As an illustration the certification material may have to validate the safety aspects of the I4D operations:

- The integrity requirements to be allocated to the datalink systems to support the extended set of datalink messages in the 4D TRAD service. For information EUROCAE WG-78 Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) of CPDLC and ADS-C implementations assumes that ”Datalink implementations within aircraft systems are expected to be at least ED12B/DO178B based Design Assurance Level C (DAL C) and within ground systems at least ED109/DO278 based Assurance Level 4 (AL4) or the equivalent EUROCONTROL/ SWAL4, respectively”

- The cockpit HMI and the flight crew workload induced by the I4D operations

- The need for performance requirements (e.g. aircraft ability to meet the time constraint within the specified accuracy (+/-30 seconds) with a 95% probability assuming a defined “meteorological uncertainty”




Applicability


Airspace Access


Certification COM 10

Long term CPDLC Oceanic / Remote

The RCP240 specification supports any complex clearance (4D Route) in en-route Continental- and Oceanic/Remote airspace and at the airport (D-Taxi, Departure) for which the largest contributor is the Responder.

Oceanic and Remote airspace (en-route airspace)


RCP 240

Parameter ET TT95%






RCP 240

Parameter ET TT95%





ICAO Annex 10 ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document SESAR P15.2.4 Deliverables Note

7


7 For D-TAXI: not presuming on EASA AMC packaging, future civil certification material should be based on:

- the performance requirements under standardisation in EUROCAE/RTCA WG-78/SC-214: developing SPR and Interop standards for CPDLC (ED-xx/DO-yy)

- requirements for aerodrome database included in ED-99C “User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Information” and ARINC 816 “Embedded Interchange Format for Airport Mapping Data-base”, in addition to requirements for updating database data as specified by ED-76 “Standards for processing aeronautical data”

- requirements for the Airport Moving Map Display included in DO-257A “MOPS for the Depiction of Navigational Information on Electronic Maps”

For AeroMACS: ICAO SARPs and Guidance Material for AeroMACS are currently under development by the CP/1 Communications Panel.

RTCA SC-223 and EUROCAE WG-82 are working for the MOPS standardization.

Currently, the ED-223 ““Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) For the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication System (AeroMACS)” is in progress.

For i4D SATCOM: not presuming on EASA AMC packaging, future civil certification material should be based on the performance and safety requirements under standardisation in EUROCAE WG-82.

EUROCAE WG-82 is currently progressing with the development of:

- MASPS for Class B SATCOM. The requirements are derived from the ATN Baseline 2 SPR (ED228/DO350).

- Draft DO-262 MOPS for Class B SATCOM consisting in adding ATN/OSI to the current MOPS that includes ACARS.

The ICAO COM-panel meeting in December 2014 concluded with the recognition for the need of an updated SARPS to include Class B.

RTCA SC-222 should also jointly develop MASPS and MOPS for Class B SATCOM.



Appendix II Navigation Requirements

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification – WA2 Interoperability Targets

Performance Based Navigation (PBN) – En-Route

Nr Requirement Description Area of Applicability

Detailed Description Criticality for Airspace Access

Implementation Stage

References Support to Certification

NAV-01

RNAV-10

The lateral TSE must be within ±10 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±10 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Continuity: loss of function is classified as a major failure condition

En-route, oceanic and remote areas

Accuracy: during operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNP 10, the lateral TSE must be within ±10 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±10 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Continuity: loss of function is classified as a major failure condition for oceanic and remote navigation. The continuity requirement is satisfied by the carriage of dual independent LRNSs (excluding SIS). SIS: if using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 20 NM exceeds 10

–7 per hour.

Related to equipage; Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Recommended

tbd

ICAO doc 9613 EASA AMS 20-12

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. At least two independent and serviceable LRNSs comprising an INS, an IRS FMS or a GNSS, with an integrity such that the navigation system does not provide an unacceptable probability of misleading information.

For aircraft incorporating dual GNSS, dual INS or IRU’s (with Standard or Extended time limit), some criteria for these specific configurations have been specified. Aircraft equipped with a single INS or IRU and a single GPS meet the RNAV-10 requirements without a time limitation.

Related to usage of dual GNSS; there is additional guidance related to time limitations, use of sensors and other acceptable means of compliance (FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-138A). Related to usage of dual INS or IRU’s; some systems might already be RNAV-10 approved, if they have been certified according to applicable certification standards. Additional guidance can be found on the time limitations and requirements for an operator to meet. For aircraft with a single INS/IRU and single GPS, these must be approved to 14 CFR, Part 121, Appendix G. More details can be found in ICAO doc 9613.

NAV-02

RNAV-5

The lateral TSE must be within 5 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±5 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition More details are available regarding INS/IRS, VHF VOR, DME, GNSS.

Mandatory in all ECAC en – route continental airspace. (Terminal)

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNAV 5, the lateral TSE must be within 5 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±5 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. SIS: If using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 10 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour.

Note: The minimum level of integrity and continuity required for RNAV 5 systems for use in airspace designated for RNAV 5 would normally be met by a single installed system comprising one or more sensors, an RNAV computer, a control display unit and navigation display(s) (e.g. ND, HSI or CDI), provided that the system is monitored by the pilot and that in the event of a system failure the aircraft retains the capability to navigate relative to ground-based NAVAIDs (e.g. VOR/DME or NDB). Although not prescribing performance targets to be met, their use and approvals are described with more detailed information.

Essential for some en-route structures

For ECAC airspace the primary sources of navigation information are VOR/DME, DME/DME and GPS. The availability and continuity of VOR and DME coverage have been calculated for most of Europe and they are considered to be capable of meeting the requirements of the en-route phase of operations. State aircraft are exempted from the B-RNAV mandatory requirement. Within TMAs, non B-RNAV State aircraft should be routed via non-RNAV-based SIDs and STARs. For en route, State aircraft should be routed via VOR/DME-defined ATS routes or via conventional navigation aids. See national AIPs.

ICAO doc 9613 EASA AMC 20–4 FAA 90-96

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. RNAV 5 operations are based on the use of RNAV equipment which automatically determines the aircraft position using input from one or a combination of the following types of position sensors, together with the means to establish and follow a desired path: a) VOR/DME; b) DME/DME; c) INS or IRS; and d) GNSS





Implementation Stage References Support to Certification

NAV-03

RNAV-2

The lateral TSE must be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition. Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition.

En-route continental Terminal

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNAV 2, the lateral TSE must be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. SIS: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNAV 2 if using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 4 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part B, Chapter 3, 3.3.3)

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613.

RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 operations are based upon the use of RNAV equipment that automatically determines the aircraft position in the horizontal plane using input from the following types of position sensors (no specific priority): a) GNSS in accordance with FAA TSO-C145(), TSO-C146(), or TSO-C129(). Positioning data from other types of navigation sensors may be integrated with the GNSS data provided other position data do not cause position errors exceeding the total system accuracy requirements. The use of GNSS equipment approved to TSO-C129 () is limited to those systems which include the minimum functions specified in the ICAO PBN Manual; b) DME/DME RNAV equipment complying with the criteria listed in the ICAO PBN Manual; c) DME/DME/IRU RNAV equipment complying with the criteria listed in the ICAO PBN Manual.

Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for GNSS, DME/DME RNAV and DME/IRU equipped aircraft.

In paragraph 3.3.3.2 of ICAO doc 9613 (Part B Implementing RNAV 1 and RNAV 2), figures are provided related to update rates, accuracy, position estimation error, etc. Please take into account the guidance provided in the described document for more detailed information.






NAV-04

RNAV-1

The lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition. Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition.

En-route and terminal Some States may require P-RNAV certification for IFR operations in notified terminal airspace. For certain TMAs for aircraft that are not approved for P-RNAV operations conventional procedures may continue to be available as stated in national AIPs

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNAV 1, the lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. SIS: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNAV 1 if using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 2 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour.

Essential for some en-route structures

Partially implemented in Europe (en-route) Currently being introduced in European P-RNAV. Further implementation to be regulated through EASA opinion on PBN.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part B, Chapter 3, 3.3.3) EASA AMC 20–5, FAA 90-96 and JAA TGL10 -Revision 1 OPS approval required to fly P-RNAV


RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 operations are based upon the use of RNAV equipment that automatically determines the aircraft position in the horizontal plane using input from the following types of position sensors (no specific priority): a) GNSS in accordance with FAA TSO-C145(), TSO-C146(), or TSO-C129(). Positioning data from other types of navigation sensors may be integrated with the GNSS data provided other position data do not cause position errors exceeding the total system accuracy requirements. The use of GNSS equipment approved to TSO-C129 () is limited to those systems which include the minimum functions specified in the ICAO PBN Manual; b) DME/DME RNAV equipment complying with the criteria listed in the ICAO PBN Manual; c) DME/DME/IRU RNAV equipment complying with the criteria listed in the ICAO PBN Manual.

Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for GNSS, DME/DME RNAV and DME/IRU equipped aircraft.

In paragraph 3.3.3.2 of ICAO doc 9613 (Part B Implementing RNAV 1 and RNAV 2), figures are provided related to update rates, accuracy, position estimation error, etc. Please take into account the guidance provided in the described document for more detailed information.






NAV-05

RNP-4

The lateral TSE must be within ±4 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±4 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition. Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a major failure condition. The RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met.

En-route, oceanic and remote airspace.

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNP 4, the lateral TSE must be within ±4 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±4 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a major failure condition for oceanic and remote navigation. The continuity requirement is satisfied by the carriage of dual independent long-range navigation systems (excluding SIS). On-board performance monitoring and alerting: The RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met, or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds 8 NM is greater than 10

–5.

SIS: If using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 8 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour.

Note: Compliance with the on-board performance monitoring and alerting requirement does not imply an automatic monitor of FTE. The on-board monitoring and alerting function should consist at least of a NSE monitoring and alerting algorithm and a lateral deviation display enabling the crew to monitor the FTE. To the extent operational procedures are used to monitor FTE, the crew procedure, equipment characteristics, and installation are evaluated for their effectiveness and equivalence as described in the functional requirements and operating procedures. PDE is considered negligible due to the quality assurance process and crew procedures.

ICAO doc 9613`(Part C, Chapter 1, 1.3.3)

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. For RNP 4 operations in oceanic or remote airspace, at least two fully serviceable independent LRNSs, with integrity such that the navigation system does not provide misleading information, must be fitted to the aircraft and form part of the basis upon which RNP 4 operational approval is granted. GNSS must be used and can be used as either a stand-alone navigation system or as one of the sensors in a multi-sensor system. United States FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-138A, or equivalent documents, provides an acceptable means of complying with installation requirements for aircraft that use, but do not integrate, the GNSS output with that of other sensors. FAA AC 20-130A describes an acceptable means of compliance for multi-sensor navigation systems that incorporate GNSS. The equipment configuration used to demonstrate the required accuracy must be identical to the configuration specified in the MEL or flight manual. The design of the installation must comply with the design standards that are applicable to the aircraft being modified and changes must be reflected in the flight manual prior to commencing operations requiring an RNP 4 navigation approval.



Nr Requirement Description Applicability Technical Description Criticality for Airspace Access


NAV-06

RNP-2

The lateral TSE must be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition. Continuity: For RNP 2 oceanic/remote continental airspace applications, loss of function is a major failure condition. For RNP 2 continental applications, loss of function is a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport.

En-route, oceanic and remote airspace. En-route continental airspace.

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNP 2, the lateral TSE must be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±2 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To satisfy the accuracy requirement, the 95 per cent FTE should not exceed 1 NM.

Note: The use of a deviation indicator with 2 NM full-scale deflection is an acceptable means of compliance.

Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness guidance material (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: For RNP 2 oceanic/remote continental airspace applications, loss of function is a major failure condition. For RNP 2 continental applications, loss of function is a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. If a single aircraft configuration is to support all potential applications of RNP 2, the more stringent continuity requirement applies. The AFM limitations section must reflect restrictions in capability to aid in operational approvals.

SIS: The aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 4 NM exceeds 1 × 10

–7per hour.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 2, 2.3.3)

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. On-board performance monitoring and alerting is required. The aircraft navigation system, or aircraft navigation system and pilot in combination, is required to monitor the TSE, and to provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds two times the accuracy value is larger than 1 × 10

–5. To the extent

operational procedures are used to satisfy this requirement, the crew procedure, equipment characteristics and installation should be evaluated for their effectiveness and equivalence. The following systems meet the accuracy and integrity requirements of these criteria: a) aircraft with E/TSO-C129a sensor (Class B or C), E/TSO-C145() and the requirements of E/TSOC115b FMS, installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-130A; b) aircraft with E/TSO-C129a Class A1 or E/TSO-C146() equipment installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-138A or AC 20-138B; During the aircraft certification process, the manufacturer must demonstrate the ability of the pilot to operate the aircraft within the allowable FTE. The demonstration of FTE should account for the aircraft type, the operating envelope, aircraft displays, autopilot performance, and flight guidance characteristics. When this is done, the pilot may use the demonstrated value of FTE to monitor compliance to the RNP requirements. This value must be the cross-track distance to the defined path. For cross-track containment compliance, the demonstration should account for any inaccuracies in the cross-track error computation (e.g. resolution) in the TSE.





NAV-07

RNP-1

The lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To satisfy the accuracy requirement, the 95 per cent FTE should not exceed 0.5 NM.

Terminal and Approach

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes designated as RNP 1, the lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To satisfy the accuracy requirement, the 95 per cent FTE should not exceed 0.5 NM.

Note: The use of a deviation indicator with 1 NM full-scale deflection has been found to be an acceptable means of compliance. The use of an autopilot or flight director has been found to be an acceptable means of compliance (roll stabilization systems do not qualify). Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 1 × 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. On-board performance monitoring and alerting: The RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met, or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds 1 NM is greater than 1 × 10

–5.

SIS: If using GNSS, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 2 NM exceeds 1 × 10

–7per hour.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 3, 3.3.3) See Note on certification references for Advanced RNP

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. The following systems meet the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements of these criteria: a) aircraft with E/TSO-C129a sensor (Class B or C), E/TSO-C145() and the requirements of E/TSOC115b FMS, installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-130A; b) aircraft with E/TSO-C129a Class A1 or E/TSO-C146() equipment installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-138 or AC 20-138A; and c) aircraft with RNP capability certified or approved to equivalent standards. Compliance with the on-board performance monitoring and alerting requirements does not imply automatic monitoring of FTEs. The on-board monitoring and alerting function should at least consist of an NSE monitoring and alerting algorithm and a lateral deviation display enabling the crew to monitor the FTE. To the extent operational procedures are used to monitor FTE, the crew procedure, equipment characteristics, and installation are evaluated for their effectiveness and equivalence, as described in the functional requirements and operating procedures. PDE is considered negligible due to the quality assurance process and crew procedure.

Related to GNSS positioning, some special criteria have been identified and are described further in paragraph 3.3.3.3 of ICAO doc 9613 (Part C Implementing RNP 1).

RNP 1 is based on GNSS positioning. Positioning data from other types of navigation sensors may be integrated with the GNSS data provided the other positioning data do not cause position errors exceeding the TSE budget. Otherwise, means should be provided to deselect the other navigation sensor types. Note: For RNP procedures, the RNP system may only use DME updating when authorized by the State.





NAV-8

Advanced RNP

The lateral TSE must be within the applicable accuracy (±0.3 NM to ±2.0 NM) for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ± the applicable accuracy for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time.

En-route, oceanic and remote airspace. En-route continental airspace. Terminal Approach

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on routes or procedures designated as RNP, the lateral TSE must be within the applicable accuracy (±0.3 NM to ±2.0 NM) for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The alongtrack error must also be within ± the applicable accuracy for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To satisfy the accuracy requirement, the 95 per cent FTE should not exceed one half of the applicable accuracy except for a navigation accuracy of 0.3 NM where the FTE is allocated to be 0.25. Note.— The use of a deviation indicator is an acceptable means of compliance for satisfying the FTE part of the lateral TSE with the scaling commensurate with the navigation application. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness guidance material (i.e. 1 × 10

–5per hour).

Continuity: Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition for applications predicated on this navigation specification. Where a State or application establishes a classification of major, the continuity requirement may be typically satisfied by carriage of dual independent navigation systems. SIS: For GNSS RNP system architectures, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than two times the applicable accuracy (2 × RNP) exceeds 1 × 10

–7per hour.

Notes: 1. The lateral TSE includes positioning error, FTE, PDE and display error. For procedures extracted from the on-board navigation database, PDE is considered negligible due to the navigation database requirements, and pilot knowledge and training. 2. For RNP systems where the architecture is an integrated, multi-sensor capability and where GNSS integrity is incorporated into a 2 × RNP integrity alert consistent with RTCA/EUROCAE DO-236/ED-75 when performance cannot be met, a separate GNSS integrity alert is not required.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 4, 4.3.3) Note on certification material

8

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. On-board performance monitoring and alerting is required. The aircraft navigation system, or aircraft navigation system and flight crew in combination, is required to monitor the TSE, and to provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met or if the probability that the TSE exceeds two times the accuracy value is larger than 10

–5. To the extent

operational procedures are used to satisfy this requirement, the crew procedure, equipment characteristics, and installation should be evaluated for their effectiveness and equivalence.

Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for GNSS, IRS, DME, VOR and multi-sensor systems.

Related to usage of GNSS and IRS, there are additional requirements focused on accuracy and drift rate compliance. Related to usage of DME and VOR; some operating constraints have been identified, restricting use in certain cases. For aircraft with a multi-sensor system, there must be an automatic reversion to an alternate RNAV sensor if the primary RNAV sensor fails. More details are described in ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 4, 4.3.3.6).

8 On Advanced RNP: The need for a specific AMC on the Advanced RNP is foreseen. Consistency with AMC 20-26 for RNP AR, AMC 20-27 for the RNP 1, and any future regulation documents for further RNP specifications, should be ensured.

Future civil certification material should take into account the results of EUROCAE/RTCA WG-85/SC-227.



Performance Based Navigation (PBN) – Approach

Nr Requirement Description Applicability Technical Description Criticality for

Airspace Access Implementation Stage References Support to

Certification

NAV-9

RNP-APCH OPERATIONS DOWN TO LNAV AND LNAV/VNAV MINIMA

The lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition. Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition. The RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met.

Approach

Accuracy. During operations on the initial and intermediate segments and for the RNAV missed approach, of an RNP APCH, the lateral TSE must be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±1 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. During operations on the FAS of an RNP APCH down to LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima, the lateral TSE must be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To satisfy the accuracy requirement, the 95 per cent FTE should not exceed 0.5 NM on the initial and intermediate segments, and for the RNAV missed approach, of an RNP APCH. The 95 per cent FTE should not exceed 0.25 NM on the FAS of an RNP APCH. Note: The use of a deviation indicator with 1 NM full-scale deflection on the initial and intermediate segments, and for the RNAV missed approach and 0.3 NM full-scale deflection on the FAS, has been found to be an acceptable means of compliance. The use of an autopilot or flight director has been found to be an acceptable means of compliance (roll stabilization systems do not qualify). Integrity. Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 10

–5per hour).

Continuity. Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. On-board performance monitoring and alerting. During operations on the initial and intermediate segments and for the RNAV missed approach of an RNP APCH, the RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met, or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds 2 NM is greater than 10–5. During operations on the FAS of an RNP APCH down to LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima, the RNP system, or the RNP system and pilot in combination, shall provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met, or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds 0.6 NM is greater than 10

–5.

SIS. During operations on the initial and intermediate segments and for the RNAV missed approach of an RNP APCH, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 2 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour. During operations on the FAS

of an RNP APCH down to LNAV or LNAV/VNAV minima, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 0.6 NM exceeds 10

–7per hour.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 5 Section A, 5.3.3) EASA AMC 20-27 FAA documents AC20-138, AC20-130A and AC20-129.

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. There are no RNP APCH requirements for the missed approach if it is based on conventional means (VOR, DME, NDB) or on dead reckoning. The following systems meet the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements of these criteria: a) GNSS stand-alone systems, equipment should be approved in accordance with TSO-C129a/ ETSO-C129a Class A, E/TSO-C146() Class Gamma and operational class 1, 2 or 3, or TSO C-196(); b) GNSS sensors used in multi-sensor system (e.g. FMS) equipment should be approved in accordance with TSO C129 ( )/ ETSO-C129 ( ) Class B1, C1, B3, C3 or E/TSO C145() class 1, 2 or 3, or TSO C-196(). For GNSS receiver approved in accordance with E/TSO-C129(), capability for satellite FDE is recommended to improve continuity of function; and c) multi-sensor systems using GNSS should be approved in accordance with AC20-130A or TSO-C115b, as well as having been demonstrated for RNP APCH capability.

Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for GNSS.

RNP APCH is based on GNSS positioning. Positioning data from other types of navigation sensors may be integrated with the GNSS data provided the other positioning data do not cause position errors exceeding the TSE (TSE) budget, or if means are provided to deselect the other navigation sensor types.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 5, 5.3.3.2-Section A)





NAV-10

RNP-APCH OPERATIONS DOWN TO LP AND LPV MINIMA

Approach

Accuracy: Along the FAS and the straight continuation of the final approach in the missed approach, the lateral and vertical TSE is dependent on the NSE, PDE and FTE: a) NSE: the accuracy itself (the error bound with 95 per cent probability) changes due to different satellite geometries. Assessment based on measurements within a sliding time window is not suitable for GNSS. Therefore, GNSS accuracy is specified as a probability for each and every sample. NSE requirements are fulfilled without any demonstration if the equipment computes three dimensional positions using linearized, weighted least square solution in accordance with RTCA DO 229C (or subsequent version) Appendix J. b) FTE: FTE performance is considered acceptable if the lateral and vertical display full-scale deflection is compliant with the non-numeric lateral cross-track and vertical deviation requirements of RTCA DO 229 C (or subsequent version) and if the crew maintains the aircraft within one-third the full scale deflection for the lateral deviation and within one-half the full scale deflection for the vertical deviation. c) PDE: PDE is considered negligible based upon the process of path specification to data specification and associated quality assurance that is included in the FAS data-block generation process which is a standardized process. The responsibilities for FAS DB generation lies with the ANSP. Note: FTE performance is considered acceptable if the approach mode of the FGS is used during such approach. Integrity: Simultaneously presenting misleading lateral and vertical guidance with misleading distance data during an RNP APCH operation down to LPV minima is considered a hazardous failure condition (extremely remote). Simultaneously presenting misleading lateral guidance with misleading distance data during an RNP APCH operation down to LP minima is considered a hazardous failure condition (extremely remote). Continuity: Loss of approach capability is considered a minor failure condition if the operator can revert to a different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. For RNP APCH operations down to LP or LPV minima at least one system is required. SIS: At a position between 2 NM from the FAP and the FAP, the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert within 10 seconds if the SIS errors causing a lateral position error are greater than 0.6 NM, with a probability of 1-10

–7per hour.

Note on additional performance issues

9

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 5 Section B, 5.3.3) Requirements for SBAS receivers is contained in ICAO annex 10 Volume 1 Also see specification RTCA DO 229C and FAA TSO C145/146A. EASA AMC 20-28

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. On-board performance monitoring and alerting: Operations on the FAS of an RNP APCH operation down to LP and LPV minima, the on-board performance monitoring and alerting function is fulfilled by: a) NSE monitoring and alerting (see the SIS section below); b) FTE monitoring and alerting: LPV approach guidance must be displayed on a lateral and vertical deviation display (HSI, EHSI, CDI/VDI) including a failure indicator. The deviation display must have a suitable full-scale deflection based on the required track-keeping accuracy. The lateral and vertical full scale deflection are angular and associated to the lateral and vertical definitions of the FAS contained in the FAS DB; and c) Navigation database: once the FAS DB has been decoded, the equipment shall apply the CRC to the DB to determine whether the data is valid. If the FAS DB does not pass the CRC test, the equipment shall not allow activation of the LP or LPV approach operation.

9 After sequencing the FAP and during operations on the FAS of an RNP APCH operation down to LP or LPV minima:

a) the aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert within 6 seconds if the SIS errors causing a lateral position error are greater than 40 m, with a probability of 1-2.10–7 in any approach (Annex 10, Volume I, Table 3.7.2.4-1); and

b) The aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert within 6 seconds if the SIS errors causing a vertical position error is greater than 50 m (or 35 m for LPV minima down to 200 ft), with a probability of 1-2.10–7 in any approach (Annex 10, Volume I, Table 3.7.2.4-1).





NAV-10

RNP-APCH OPERATIONS DOWN TO LP AND LPV MINIMA

Approach

The following systems meet the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements of these criteria: a) GNSS SBAS stand-alone equipment approved in accordance with E/TSO C146a (or subsequent version). Application of this standard guarantees that the equipment is at least compliant with RTCA DO 229C. The equipment should be a class gamma, operational class 3; b) for an integrated navigation system (e.g. FMS) incorporating a GNSS SBAS sensor, E/TSO C115b and AC 20- 130A provide an acceptable means of compliance for the approval of this navigation system when augmented by the following guidelines: i) the performance requirements of E/TSO-C146a (or subsequent version) that apply to the functional class gamma, operational class 3 or delta 4 is demonstrated; and ii) The GNSS SBAS sensor is approved in accordance with E/TSO C145a class beta, operational class 3; c) approach system incorporating a class delta GNSS SBAS equipment approved in accordance with E/TSO C146a (or subsequent version). This standard guarantees that the equipment is at least compliant with RTCA DO 229C. The equipment should be a class delta 4; and d) future augmented GNSS systems are also expected to meet these requirements.


Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for GNSS.

RNP APCH operations down to LP or LPV minima are based on augmented GNSS positioning. Positioning data from other types of navigation sensors may be integrated with the GNSS data provided it does not cause position errors exceeding the TSE budget, or if means are provided to deselect the other navigation sensor types.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 5, 5.3.3.2-Section B)





NAV-11

RNP- AR APCH

All aircraft operating on RNP AR APCH procedures must have a cross-track navigation error no greater than the applicable accuracy value (0.1 NM to 0.3 NM) for 95 per cent of the flight time. A critical component of RNP is the ability of the aircraft navigation system to monitor its achieved navigation performance, and to identify, for the pilot, whether the operational requirement is or is not being met during an operation.

Approach

Lateral accuracy. All aircraft operating on RNP AR APCH procedures must have a cross-track navigation error no greater than the applicable accuracy value (0.1 NM to 0.3 NM) for 95 per cent of the flight time. This includes positioning error, FTE, PDE and display error. Also, the aircraft along-track positioning error must be no greater than the applicable accuracy value for 95 per cent of the flight time. Vertical accuracy. The vertical system error includes altimetry error (assuming the temperature and lapse rates of the International Standard Atmosphere), the effect of along-track error, system computation error, data resolution error, and FTE. The 99.7 per cent of system error in the vertical direction must be less than the following (in feet):

where θ is the VNAV path angle, h is the height of the local altimetry reporting station and ∆h is the height of the aircraft above the reporting station. Note: VNAV systems compliant with the performance specification for RNP APCH operations down to LPV minima (see Chapter 5, Section B) meet or exceed this vertical accuracy performance criteria. System monitoring. A critical component of RNP is the ability of the aircraft navigation system to monitor its achieved navigation performance, and to identify, for the pilot, whether the operational requirement is or is not being met during an operation (e.g. “Unable RNP”, “Nav Accur Downgrad”). It should be noted that the monitoring system may not provide warnings of FTE. The management of FTE must be addressed as a pilot procedure. GNSS updating. A crew alert is required when GNSS updating is lost unless the navigation system provides an alert when the selected RNP no longer meets the requirements for continued navigation.

Not yet applicable in Europe.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 6, 6.3.3). The aircraft must comply with FAA AC 20-129 and either FAA AC 20-130 or AC 20-138, or equivalent. EASA AMC 20-26


Additional requirements have been described as criteria for specific navigation services, in particular for augmentation based on GPS, IRS, DME, VHF and multi-sensor systems.

Related to usage of GPS equipment, there is additional guidance related to compliance, system accuracy, position estimation error, etc. Related to IRS, DME and VOR; there is additional guidance related to drift rates, update rates, etc. For multi-sensor systems, there must be automatic reversion to an alternate area navigation sensor if the primary area navigation sensor fails. Automatic reversion from one multi-sensor system to another multi-sensor system is not required. Furthermore details are provided for Altimetry System Error and Temperature Compensations systems.

ICAO doc 9613, Part C, Chapter 6, 6.3.3.3)





NAV-12

RNP- 0.3

The lateral TSE must be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a Major failure condition. Loss of function is a major failure condition for remote continental and offshore operations. Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition for other RNP 0.3 operations if the operator can revert to a different available navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. The aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 0.6 NM exceeds 1 × 10

–7 per hour.

En-route continental Terminal Approach

The aircraft navigation system, or aircraft navigation system and the pilot in combination, is required to monitor the TSE, and to provide an alert if the accuracy requirement is not met or if the probability that the lateral TSE exceeds two times the accuracy value is larger than 10

–5.

Accuracy: During operations in airspace or on ATS routes designated as RNP 0.3, the lateral TSE must be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. The along-track error must also be within ±0.3 NM for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time. To meet this performance requirement, an FTE of 0.25 NM (95 per cent) may be assumed. Note: For all RNP 0.3 operations, the use of a coupled FGS is an acceptable means of complying with this FTE assumption (see RTCA DO-208, Appendix E, Table 1). Any alternative means of FTE bounding, other than coupled FGS, may require FTE substantiation through an airworthiness demonstration. Integrity: Malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment is classified as a Major failure condition under airworthiness regulations (i.e. 1 × 10

–5 per hour).

Continuity: For the purpose of this specification, loss of function is a major failure condition for remote continental and offshore operations. The carriage of dual independent long-range navigation systems may satisfy the continuity requirement. Loss of function is classified as a minor failure condition for other RNP 0.3 operations if the operator can revert to a different available navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. SIS: The aircraft navigation equipment shall provide an alert if the probability of SIS errors causing a lateral position error greater than 0.6 NM exceeds 1 × 10

–7 per hour.

RNP 0.3 operations require coupled FGS to meet the allowable FTE bound unless the manufacturer demonstrates and obtains airworthiness approval for an alternate means of meeting the FTE bound. The following may be considered as one operational means to monitor the FGS FTE. a) FTE should remain within half-scale deflection (unless there is other substantiated FTE data); b) Pilots must manually set systems without automatic CDI scaling to not greater than 0.3 NM full-scale prior to commencing RNP 0.3 operations; and c) Aircraft with electronic map display, or another alternate means of flight path deviation display, must select appropriate scaling for monitoring FTE. Automatic monitoring of FTE is not required if the necessary monitoring can be achieved by the pilot using available displays without excessive workload in all phases of flight. To the extent that compliance with this specification is achieved through operational procedures to monitor FTE, an evaluation of the pilot procedures, equipment characteristics, and installation must ensure their effectiveness and equivalence, as described in the functional requirements and operating procedures.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Chapter 7, 7.3.3).

Requirement suitable for direct application of performance based approach within the limits of system requirements defined in ICAO document 9613. The following systems meet the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements of these criteria; a) Aircraft with E/TSO-C145a and the requirements of E/TSO-C115B FMS, installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-130A; b) Aircraft with E/TSO-C146a equipment installed for IFR use in accordance with FAA AC 20-138 or AC 20-138A; and c) Aircraft with RNP 0.3 capability certified or approved to equivalent standards (e.g. TSO-C193). On-board performance monitoring and alerting is required.



Performance Based Navigation (PBN) – Functionalities



NAV-F01

Radius to Fix (RF) Path Terminator

The lateral TSE must be within +/- 1 × RNP of the path defined by the published procedure for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time for each phase of flight and each autopilot and/or flight director mode requested.

RNP 1 RNP 0.3 RNP APCH Advanced RNP

The navigation system must have the capability to execute leg transitions and maintain a track consistent with an RF leg between two fixes. The lateral TSE must be within +/- 1 × RNP of the path defined by the published procedure for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time for each phase of flight and each autopilot and/or flight director mode requested. Notes: 1. Industry standards for RF defined paths can be found in RTCA DO-236B/EUROCAE ED-75B (section 3.2.5.4.1 and 3.2.5.4.2). 2. Default values for FTE can be found in RTCA DO-283A. FAA AC 120-29A, 5.19.2.2 and 5.19.3.1, also provides guidance on establishing FTE values.

Might be required for certain RNP specified operations.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Appendix 1, 4).


The autopilot, flight director and flight management computer to have at least “roll-steering” capability and be able to achieve a bank angle up to 25 degrees above 400ft AGL.

An autopilot or flight director with at least “roll-steering” capability that is driven by the RNP system is required. The autopilot/flight director must operate with suitable accuracy to track the lateral and, as appropriate, vertical paths required by a specific RNP procedure. The flight management computer, the flight director system, and the autopilot must be capable of commanding and achieving a bank angle up to 25 degrees above 400 ft AGL.

The ability of the aircraft to maintain the required FTE after a full or partial failure.

The ability of the aircraft to maintain the required FTE after a full or partial failure of the autopilot and/or flight director should be documented.

NAV-F02

Fixed Radius Transition (FRT)

The system must be able to define transitions between flight path segments using a three-digit numeric value.

RNP 4 RNP 2 Advanced RNP

The system must be able to define transitions between flight path segments using a three-digit numeric value for the radius of turn (to 1 decimal place) in nautical miles, e.g. 15.0, 22.5.

Might be required for certain RNP specified operations.

ICAO doc 9613 (Part C, Appendix 2, 3).


The lateral TSE must be within +/-1 × RNP of the path defined by the published procedure for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time for each phase of flight and any manual, autopilot and/or flight director mode.

The navigation system must have the capability to execute a flight path transition and maintain a track consistent with a fixed radius between two route segments. The lateral TSE must be within +/-1 × RNP of the path defined by the published procedure for at least 95 per cent of the total flight time for each phase of flight and any manual, autopilot and/or flight director mode. Note: Default values for FTE can be found in RTCA DO-283A. FAA AC 120-29A, 5.19.2.2 and 5.19.3.1, also provides guidance on establishing FTE values.

Additional requirements have been specified with regards to how information is displayed and how the navigation database needs to work.





NAV-F03

RNAV-Holding

The RNAV system facilitates the holding pattern specification by allowing the definition of the inbound course to the holding waypoint, turn direction and leg time or distance on the straight segments, as well as the ability to plan the exit from the hold.

RNP 4 RNP 2 RNP1 Advanced RNP

A holding procedure will only normally be required at defined holding points on entry to terminal airspace. However, holding may be required by ATC at any point. A hold shall be defined by a point, the turn direction, an inbound track and an outbound distance. This data may be extracted from the database for published holds or may be manually entered for ad hoc ATC holds. Note.— It is highly desirable that the RNAV system provide a holding capability that includes the computation of the hold flight path, guidance and/or cues to track the holding entry and path. The system with the minimum of crew intervention must be capable of initiating, maintaining and discontinuing holding procedures at any point and at all altitudes.

NAV-F04

Parallel Offset /

Parallel offsets provide a capability to fly offset from the parent track, as defined by the series of waypoints. The turn defined for the parent track (fly-by or FRT) shall be applied in the offset track.

RNP 4 RNP 2 RNP1 Advanced RNP

The system must have the capability to fly parallel tracks at a selected offset distance; When executing a parallel offset, the navigation accuracy and all performance requirements of the original route in the active flight plan apply to the offset route; The system must provide for entry of offset distances in increments of 1 NM, left or right of course;

• The system must be capable of offsets of at least 20

NM;

• When in use, the system must clearly annunciate the

operation of offset mode;

• When in offset mode, the system must provide

reference parameters (e.g. cross-track deviation,

distance-to-go, time-to-go) relative to the offset path

and offset reference points;

• The system must annunciate the upcoming end of the

offset path and allow sufficient time for the aircraft to

return to the original flight plan path;

• Once the pilot activates a parallel offset, the offset

must remain active for all flight plan route segments

until the system deletes the offset automatically; the

pilot enters a new direct-to routing, or the pilot.



Conventional Navigation – Approach and Landing



NAV-13

ILS

The aircraft to be fitted with the necessary equipment to allow ILS approach and landings.

Approach and Landing

The ILS shall comprise the following basic components:

a) VHF localizer equipment, associated monitor system,

remote control and indicator equipment;

b) UHF glide path equipment, associated monitor

system, remote control and indicator equipment;

c) VHF marker beacons, or distance measuring

equipment (DME), together with associated monitor

system and remote control and indicator equipment.

Part of the conventional navigation

ICAO Annex 10, Chapter 3.

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. ILS is available as part of the Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR)

NAV-14

MLS

The aircraft to be fitted with the necessary equipment to allow MLS approach and landings.


The basic configuration of the MLS shall be composed of the following:

a) approach azimuth equipment, associated monitor,


b) approach elevation equipment, associated monitor,


c) a means for the encoding and transmission of

essential data words, associated monitor, remote

control and indicator equipment;

d) DME/N, associated monitor, remote control and

indicator equipment.

Part of the conventional navigation

ICAO Annex 10, Chapter 3.

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. MLS is available as part of the Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR)



Conventional Navigation – Vertical Navigation Nr Requirement Description Applicability Technical Description Criticality for


Certification

NAV-15

GBAS

The aircraft to be fitted with the necessary equipment to allow GBAS approach and landings.


GBAS equipment is contained in aircraft multi-mode receiver (MMR).

In operation at selected airports (CAT I operations). Deployment status and plans available at www.flygls.net

GBAS SARPS for CAT I became applicable in Nov 2001 (refer to ICAO SARPS annex 10 volume 1) GBAS SARPS for CAT II/III published as baseline development standards. CAT II certification in progress CAT III standards being developed GBAS performance specification is contained in RTCA DO 253c LAAS receiver MOPS. Note on certification material

10

NAV-V01

RVSM

The aircraft to be capable to meet the requirements for operation with a 1000ft vertical separation minimum within RVSM airspace.

ECAC airspace FL 290 to FL 410.

ICAO Min. Aircraft System Performance Standard (MASPS) The RVSM MASPS include:

1. Two independent, cross-coupled altitude

measurement systems;

2. One automatic altitude control system (±65');

3. One altitude alert system (±300'/±50');

4. One SSR altitude reporting transponder (5) RVSM

compliant avionics configuration.

Integrity: The RVSM system is designed commensurate with a major failure condition. Continuity: The probability of the loss of the RVSM system is better than or equal to remote.

Mandated in ECAC airspace above FL 290 to FL 410.

ICAO Annex 6, Section 7 ICAO Annex 6, Appendix 4 ICAO Doc 9574 EASA ACNS – Book 1 – Subpart E – Others JAA TGL 6 Revision1 EU OPS 1 Subpart L (1.872) European Regional Supplementary Procedures Doc. 7030/5 Guidance Material for the Certification and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace Edition 1.0, 2012, EUROCONTROL

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach.

10

On GBAS Cat II/III: In the initial GBAS standardisation (GAST-C), the GBAS contributions to the Navigation System Error (NSE) level performance were fixed in the ICAO standards, allowing for a consistent set of ICAO Annex 10 and Airborne Equipment characteristics.

In the GAST-D concept, the performance allocation between the ground station and the airborne part has been revised in particular to benefit from higher airborne navigation sensor integration. Allocation of accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements takes into account the capabilities of GBAS GPS L1 and above all, of the aircraft performance.

Because of the flexibility left to aircraft manufacturers by this total system approach, EASA formal position on aircraft certification criteria is essential. For that purpose, EASA should formally support GBAS CAT III rule making activities in working groups such as All Weather Operations Harmonization Aviation Rulemaking Committee (AWO HARC).

Note that GAST-D airborne certification requirements have been derived from:

- the adaptation of EASA Certification Specification – All Weather Operations (CS-AWO) and associated Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) for ILS Catt III certification, and

- new requirements provided by FAA in the course of a new certification baseline referred to as Advisory Circular AC120-xLS Advisory Circular AC 120-xls (“Criteria for Approval of Weather Minima for 3D Instrument Approaches Having Angular Performance Characteristics).



Appendix III Surveillance Requirements



Surveillance Requirements (SUR) – Aircraft ID, Mode 3/A, Mode S and ADS-B




SUR 1

Aircraft ID

European air traffic management network

Regulation (EC) 1206/2011 of 22/11/2011 describes the overall objectives for aircraft identification to rely on the functioning of surveillance information required for unambiguous identification of aircraft. In practice it implies the need to have aircraft equipped with Mode S after a determined date. The implementation of the ACID IR will progressively phase-out all classical and monopulse SSR that are not able to downlink the aircraft identification data item and that are also less efficient in terms of transponder occupancy and in terms of RF spectrum (1030-1090 MHz bands) usage.

tbc

EC regulation 1206/2011 ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 2


SUR 2

Mode 3A / C

Mode 3A / C transponder compliant with ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 2

ECAC Airspace

The system functional requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Transponder characteristics (Mode A/C capability)

• Data transmission (including Mode A code, pressure altitude, etc)

• Altitude Source

• Flight deck interface (to be able to select Mode A code and transponder condition, and to display selected Mode A code to flight crew, etc)

The system performance requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Integrity: The Mode A/C only airborne surveillance system integrity is designed commensurate with a ‘minor‘ failure condition.

• Continuity: The Mode A/C airborne surveillance system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘probable’.

The installation requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Dual/multiple transponder installation

• Antenna installation

Mandated Mandated for IFR/GAT and for VFR/OAT in 'designated airspace'

tbc

EC regulation 1206/2011 EC regulation 1207/2011 EC regulation 1028/2014 ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 2

EASA CS-ACNS (2013)

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. Mode 3A / C Airborne Transponder






SUR 3

Mode S ELS

Transponder compliant with ICAO Annex 10 SARPS with Mode S level 2 and SI capable “Basic Functionality” required:

• Automatic reporting of

Aircraft Identity

• Transponder capability

report

• Altitude reporting in 25 ft

intervals

• Flight status

• SI Code capability

ICAO EUR and AFI regions where Member States are responsible for the provision of air traffic services in accordance with the service provision Regulation. Note: Airspace defined in Article 1(3) of Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Commission Implementing Rule (IR) EU1207/2011 (laying down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky), as amended by EU1028/2014 specifies the airborne equipage requirements for Mode S ELS. The system functional requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Transponder characteristics (minimum Level 2 transponder with SI capability)

• Data transmission (including Mode A code, Aircraft ID, ICAO 24-bit address, pressure altitude, etc)

• Flight deck interface (to be able to select Mode A code and transponder condition, and to display selected Mode A code and aircraft ID to flight crew, etc)


• Integrity: The Mode S ELS airborne surveillance system integrity is designed commensurate with a ‘minor‘ failure condition.

• Continuity: The Mode S ELS airborne surveillance system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘remote’.

The installation requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Dual/multiple transponder installation

• ICAO 24-bit address

• Antenna installation

• Antenna diversity

High ELS operations will extend to all of the airspace defined in Article 1(3) of Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, by not later than 02 January 2020.

The respective overall deadline to equip all State Aircraft is 7 December 2017. However, existing State mandates that stipulate equipage compliance earlier than the dates specified in this rule remain applicable. For State aircraft that can’t be equipped in due time the IR mandates Member States to communicate to the Commission by 1 July 2016 a list of State aircraft that can’t be equipped.

EC regulation 1206/2011 EC regulation 1207/2011 EC regulation 1028/2014 ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 2 ICAO Doc 9871 Edition 2 EASA CS-ACNS (2013) ETSO-C112d EUROCAE ED-73E (JAA TGL 13 Revision 1) FAA: TSO-C112d RTCA DO181-E


Mode S 1090 Extended Squitter Transponder






SUR 4

Mode S EHS

EHS adds to ELS the ability to downlink the following aircraft derived data (DAP set):

• Selected altitude

• Roll angle

• Track angle rate

• True track angle

• Ground speed

• Magnetic heading

• Indicated airspeed

• Vertical rate


Commission Implementing Rule (IR) EU1207/2011 (laying down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky), as amended by EU1028/2014, specifies the airborne equipage requirements for Mode S EHS. The system functional requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Transponder characteristics (approved Mode S with

EHS capabilities)

• Data transmission (able to downlink the following aircraft parameters: MCP selected altitude, roll angle, true track angle, Ground speed, Magnetic heading, etc)

• Flight deck interface (to be able to select Mode A Code and transponder condition, and to display selected Mode A code and aircraft ID to flight crew, etc)


• Integrity: The Mode S EHS airborne surveillance

system integrity is designed commensurate with a ‘minor‘ failure condition for the downlink aircraft parameters listed in CS ACNS.D.EHS.015.

• Continuity: The Mode S EHS airborne surveillance system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘probable’ condition for the downlink aircraft parameters listed in CS ACNS.D.EHS.015.

High

The respective deadline is 7 June 2020. However, existing State mandates that stipulate equipage compliance earlier than the dates specified in this rule remain applicable. EHS is currently mandated currently in designated airspace of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. EHS is also mandated above FL 245 in the airspace of Belgium and the Netherlands (within airspace delegate to MUAC). If an exemption against the carriage and operation of Mode S EHS airborne equipment is required, the operator of the aircraft shall apply to the appropriate National Aviation Authorities.

EC regulation 1206/2011 EC regulation 1207/2011 EC regulation 1028/2014 ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 2 ICAO Doc 9871 Edition 2 EASA CS-ACNS (2013) ETSO-C112d EUROCAE ED-73E (JAA TGL 13 Revision 1)

FAA: TSO-C112d RTCA DO181-E


Mode S 1090 Extended Squitter Transponder

SUR 5

ADS-B Out

ADS-B Out Transmit System broadcasting ground surveillance applications air to ground. ADS-B out parameters:

• Identity

• Position

• Velocity

• Other parameters


Commission Implementing Rule (IR) (EU) No 1207/2011 (laying down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky) amended by EU1028/2014 specifies the airborne equipage requirements for “ADS-B Out”. The system functional requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• ADS-B Out Data (a minimum set of parameters)

• ADS-B Transmit Unit (antenna and power requirements)

• Horizontal Position and Velocity Data Sources

• Other Data Sources

• Flight Deck Control and Indication Capabilities The system performance requirements as defined by EASA ACNS detail the following:

• Integrity: The ADS-B Out system integrity is designed commensurate with a ‘major’ failure condition for the transmission of the parameters named in EASA ACNS.

• Continuity: The ADS-B Out system continuity is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘remote’.

Further details are provided for the Horizontal Position and Velocity Data Refresh Rate and Latency

Medium

The respective deadline is 7 June 2020. A US Mandate was issued for 1

st

January 2020 (14 CFR 91.225 and 14 CFR 91.227)

EC regulation 1207/2011 EC regulation 1028/2014 ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 5 ICAO Doc 9871 Edition 2 EASA CS-ACNS (2013) EASA AMC 20-24 ETSO-C112d EASA ETSO / C166b EUROCAE ED-102A / RTCA DO-260B ICAO Annex 10 Doc. 9871 Ed.2 ADS-B Out Horizontal Position Source: EASA ETSO-129a (plus specific CS-ACNS qualifications). Note on additional certification references for ASPA

11

It relies on Mode S 1090 Extended squitter transponder FAA AC 20-165B provides guidance for the installation and airworthiness approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) OUT systems in aircraft

11

On ASPA S&M application: Not presuming on EASA AMC packaging, future civil certification material should be based on the performance and safety requirements under standardization in the following working groups :

- EUROCAE/RTCA WG-51/SC-186: are developing a MOPS (ED-XXX/DO-XXX) and an updated SPR and Interop standard (ED-195A/DO-328A) for Airborne Spacing – Flight Deck Interval Management (ASPA FIM, Version 1) (ED-195A/DO-328A). Expect Final Review Approval by the end of 2015.

- The SESAR ASPA-S&M function as defined and validated so far can be considered as a subset of the ASPA FIM (Airborne Spacing Flight deck Interval Management) operational capability with auto-mated guidance that goes beyond the minimum capability required. SESAR 9.5 project will




Applicability Detailed Description Criticality for


Certification SUR 6

ADS-B In

ADS-B In Transmit System broadcasting airborne surveillance applications air /ground /air: ADS-B in airborne separation assurance system (ASAS) for air traffic separation awareness, spacing and separation purposes.

Optional. While there isn’t a known mandate for ADS-B In equipage there are standards for equipping with such systems.

ADS-B In enables Airborne Surveillance comprising the applications related with airborne traffic situational awareness (ATSAW), spacing, separation and self-separation. In particular this includes the following Air Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSAW) applications currently planned:

• ATSAW In-Trail Procedure in oceanic airspace (ATSAW ITP)

• ATSAW Visual Separation in Approach (ATSAW VSA)

• ATSAW during Flight Operations (ATSAW AIRB)

• ATSAW on the Airport Surface (ATSAW SURF)

• Interval Management (IM)

• Indicators and Alerts (IA) Subsequently, additional ADS-B In spacing, separation and self-separation applications (also known as “ASAS”) will be introduced. These will provide the flight crew with the means to have a picture of the surrounding traffic and will gradually provide then means for the flight crew to maintain a given spacing from a designated aircraft and ultimately to receive delegated responsibility for separation and to separate their traffic from all surrounding traffic. ADS-B applications are standardised in Eurocae WG 51 and RTCA SG 186 and equipage requirements rely on the use of Mode S transponders and 1090 ES in accordance with Eurocae/RTCA ED102/DO260 and ED/102A/DO 260b.

Not Mandated

Not regulated

ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV, Chapter 5 ICAO Doc 9871 Edition 2 EASA CS-ACNS (2013) EASA AMC 20-24 ETSO-C112d EASA ETSO / C166b EUROCAE ED-102A / RTCA DO- 260B DO-317B/ED194A, MOPS for Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA) System ATSA-AIRB (ED-164/DO-319), ATSA-SURF (ED-165/DO-322), ATSA-VSA (ED-160/DO-314) and ATSA-ITP (ED-159/DO-312) ICAO Annex 10 Doc. 9871 Ed.2 ADS-B Out Horizontal Position Source: EASA ETSO-129a (plus specific CS-ACNS qualifications).

It is anticipated that EUROCAE/RTCA WG-51 / SC-186 will publish standards for Pairwise Trajectory Management in 2017 which will support operations anticipated for ASAS / ASEP InTrail Follow and In Trail Merge.

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. It relies on Mode S 1090 Extended squitter transponder complemented by ACAS

conduct complementary validation work.

- MOPS includes the CDTI requirements and requirements for navigation information from the FMS or other sources

- The MOPS document provides both for integrated (forward fit) and retrofit requirements.

- Automated guidance and CPDLC are not minimum equipment requirements in the MOPS but are not precluded from implementation.

- The updated SPR and Interop standard and MOPS assume ADS-B Out complies with ED102/DO260B requirements (i.e. European mandate) or require an alternate means of compliance for Version 0 and Version 1 implementations such as crosscheck with TCAS range, bearing and altitude.

- Need to determine if the MOPS can be used to cover a TCAS eTSO specifically given that the AS-SAP requirements could be implemented in both a TCAS and FMS.

Note: The FIM MOPS will be published separately from the MOPS for other ADS-B In applications (ED-XXX/DO-317B).

EUROCAE/RTCA WG-78/SC-214: developing requirements for CPDLC messages in support of ASPA and FIM Version 1 as part of SPR and Interop standards for advanced ATS datalink communications (ED-xx/DO-yy).

- The integrity requirements to be allocated to the datalink systems to support the CPDLC messages in support of ASPA FIM are expected to be at least ED12B/DO178B based Design Assurance Level C (DAL C) and within ground systems at least ED109/DO278 based Assurance Level 4 (AL4) or the equivalent EUROCONTROL/ SWAL4, respectively”

Note: The CPDLC messages in support of ASPA FIM are not a minimum requirement for FIM Version 1 MOPS. They are expected to be a minimum requirement for FIM, Version 2, for which an SPR and Interop Standard and MOPS are expected in 2018 or 2019.



Appendix IV Safety Assurance Requirements

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification – WA2 Interoperability Targets

Safety Assurance – ACAS, EGPWS/TAWS, ELT, FDR, Weather Radar and Wake Vortex Detection




GEN 1

ACAS II (TACS Version 7.0)

TCAS ll Software Version 7.0

Mandated for EUR Region (including FIR Canarias) by ICAO European Commission Implementing Rule 1332/2011 in EU airspace

Amendment 85 to ICAO Annex 10 volume IV, published in October 2010, introduced a provision stating that all new ACAS installations after 1 January 2014 shall be compliant with version 7.1 and all ACAS units shall be compliant with version 7.1 after 1 January 2017.

ECAC (outside EU airspace): All civil fixed-wing turbine-engine aircraft with a maximum take-off mass over 5,700 kg, or capable of carrying more than 19 passengers, must be equipped with TCAS II version 7.0.

ACAS mandate applies only to civil aircraft. Military authorities voluntarily committed to equip transport-type aircraft. In Germany, carriage and operation of ACAS II (i.e. version 7.0 or 7.1) by military transport aircraft is mandatory, see AIC IFR 13 20 MAR 03.

European Commission Implementing Rule 1332/2011 ICAO Annex 10 vol.4 ICAO Doc 9863 (ACAS Manual) ICAO Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, Part 1 –International Commercial Air Transport –Aeroplane PANS OPS Doc 8168 PANS ATM Doc 4444 EU-OPS 1 Subpart K Guidance Document for MEL Policy JAA TGL 26

Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. For certification: JAA TGL 8 Revision 2 For pilot training and operational procedures see ICAO PANS-OPS, Doc 8168, ICAO Doc 9863 and JAA TGL11.

GEN 2

ACAS II (TACS Version 7.1)

TCAS ll Software Version 7.1

Mandated for EUR Region (including FIR Canarias) by ICAO European Commission Implementing Rule 1332/2011 in EU airspace

European Union Airspace: TCAS II version 7.1: -all (civil) aircraft with a maximum certified take-off mass exceeding 5,700kg or authorised to carry more 19 passengers from 1 March 2012; -with the exception of aircraft with an individual certificate of airworthiness issued before 1 March 2012 that must be equipped as of 1 December 2015; -Aircraft not referred above but which will be equipped on a voluntary basis with ACAS II, must be equipped with version 7.1.

Regulation 1332/2011 of 16/12/2011 mandated TCAS Version 7.1 making reference to EASA Basic Regulation (216/2008) in respect to its applicability where military aircraft are excluded. The adoption of TCAS version 7.1 for transport type State aircraft may not have been seen as mandatory, in regulatory terms, but it is strongly encouraged for safety reasons.

European Commission Implementing Rule 1332/2011 ICAO Annex 10 vol.4 ICAO Doc 9863 (ACAS Manual) ICAO Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, Part 1 –International Commercial Air Transport –Aeroplane PANS OPS Doc 8168 PANS ATM Doc 4444 RTCA DO-185B EUROCAE ED-143 EU-OPS 1 Subpart K Guidance Document for MEL Policy JAA TGL 26 Note on the evolution of TCAS (ACAS SX)

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Requirement NOT yet suitable for direct application of performance based approach. For certification: JAA TGL 8 Revision 2 For pilot training and operational procedures see ICAO PANS-OPS, Doc 8168, ICAO Doc 9863 and JAA TGL11.

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The Hybrid Surveillance MOPS (RTCA DO300) prepared by SC147, was published in 2006.

An update of the MOPS document was published by RTCA SC147 and EUROCAE WG75 to address both requirements for hybrid surveillance and extended hybrid surveillance. This update was published by RTCA as DO-300A/ED221 in 2013.

FAA has issued TSO-C119d, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance based on DO300A. The Hybrid capability is a minimum requirement.

FAA has published an Advisory Circular 20-151A which includes performance standards for the functionality of TCAS II hybrid surveillance.

RTCA SC147 and EUROCAE WG75 have started development of MOPS for ACAS Xa (same type of requirements as TCAS II) and ACAS Xo (specific operations). The expected publication date of the MOPS is December 2018. EUROCAE WG75 a lso targets to provide interoperability (i.e. compatibility) requirements between ACAS of different design by Q4 2015.

Once MOPS and implementations are available, FAA intends to keep validity of the existing TSO for TCAS II but to create a new and different TSO for ACAS X.

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification - WA2 - Interoperability Targets

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Version Draft 1.0 of 89

10 Jun 2016




GEN 3

EGPWS/TAWS

From 1 January 2007, all turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 5 700 kg or authorized to carry more than nine passengers shall be equipped with a ground proximity warning system which has a forward looking terrain avoidance function. Applicable to aircraft with: (1) MCTM>5700kg or a more than 30seats and a C of A issued after 1/1/2001; (2) same MTCM and if 9 seats or more and C of A issued after 1/1/2004; (3) same MCTM and 9 seats or more and already equipped with GPWS -no TAWS required

A ground proximity warning system shall provide automatically a timely and distinctive warning to the flight crew when the airplane is in potentially hazardous proximity to the earth’s surface. A ground proximity warning system shall provide, unless otherwise specified herein, warnings of the following circumstances:

a) excessive descent rate;

b) excessive terrain closure rate;

c) excessive altitude loss after take-off or go-around;

d) unsafe terrain clearance while not in landing configuration:

1. gear not locked down;

2. flaps not in a landing position; and

e) excessive descent below the instrument glide path. Integrity:

a) Integrity of the TAWS (including un-enunciated loss of the terrain alerting function) is designed commensurate with a major failure condition.

b) False terrain alerting is designed commensurate with a minor failure condition.

c) Failure of the installed TAWS does not degrade the integrity of any critical system interfacing with the TAWS.

Continuity: Continuity of the TAWS is designed to an allowable qualitative probability of ‘probable’. GPWS : The predictive terrain hazard warning functions, does not adversely affect the functionality, reliability or integrity of the basic GPWS functions. Additional performance requirements, including terrain and airport information and positioning information can be found in EASA CS-ACNS

Applicability to State a/c not defined

Mandated from JAN 2003 Note: If MCTM>15000kg or passengers >30 the date is 01 JAN 2005 and if MCTM>5700kg or passengers > 9 the date is 01JAN 2007

ICAO ANNEX 6 part 1: Operation of Aircraft, 6.15; Part II: Operation of Aircraft, 6.9.

EASA CS-ACNS


ICAO ANNEX 6 part 1: Operation of Aircraft, 6.15; Part II: Operation of Aircraft, 6.9.

GEN 4

ELT

ICAO Worldwide aircraft requirement

Consult National A.I.P

MANDATED 1/1/2002 All aircraft with a C of A after 1/1/2002 shall be equipped with an automatic ELT capable of transmitting on 121.5MHz and 406MHz. Aeroplanes with a C of A before 1/1/2002 must have any type of ELT capable of transmitting on 121.5MHz and 406MHz. An Operator shall ensure that all ELTs that are capable of transmitting on 406Mhz shall be coded in accordance of ICAO Annex 10 and registered with the national agency responsible for initiating a search & rescue

ICAO SARPS Annex 6 Part 1, para 6.17 See also EU OPS 1 subpart K (1.820) ICAO Annex 10 EASA NPA2013-26 EASA Opinion 01/2014

EUROCONTROL contribution to the 3-Agency framework on Performance-Based Certification - WA2 - Interoperability Targets

__________________________________________________________________________

Version Draft 1.0 of 89

10 Jun 2016

service. GEN 5

FDR and FDM

The aircraft to be equipped with both a Flight Data Recorder and a Quick Access Recorder, to be able to perform routine monitoring.

ICAO Worldwide requirement (civil)

Not applicable

Not applicable

ICAO Annex 6, Vol 1. 6.3 ICAO Annex 6, Vol 1. 3.3 EUROCAE ED-112 EUROCAE ED-155


GEN 6

Weather hazard detection

GEN 7

Wake vortex detection

ECTL Perf Equiv WA2 v1 0 3 - EUROCONTROL

Documents

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