Dow,1978,An Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma

An Analysis of Weber's Work on CharismaAuthor(s): Thomas E. Dow Jnr.Reviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 83-93Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589221 .

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Britishioarnal of Soctology Folunle 29 ;Cuzzlber I MarGh If 78

Thomas E. Dow Jnr.

An analysis of Weber's work on charisma

ABSTRACT

The present paper examines Weber's work on charisma from the original formulation in Economy and Socaety1 to the Enal statement in the essay on 'Politics as a Vocation'.2 Both the intended meaning of charisma in the earlier formulation and the uses and limitations of the new formulation are discussed. The paper concludes with some obser- vations on the place of charisma in Weber's ethical and intellectual life.

THE THEORY OF CHARISMA

In Weber's original formulation, charismatic authority is said to exist when an individual's claim to 'specific gifts of body and mind'3 is ack- knowledged by others as a valid basis for their participation in an extraordinary programme of action. The leader's authority and programme are thus specifically 'outside the realm of everyday routine and . . . [therefore] sharply opposed both to rational ... and to traditional authority.... Both ... are ... forms of everyday routine control ... while charismatic authority ... is ... a specifically revolutionary force'.4 In this sense, 'charisma is self-determined and sets its own limits'.5 It 'rejects all external order . . . ;6 it 'transforms all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms....'7 'In its most potent forms, . . . [it] overturns all notions of sanctity.'8 Instead of respect for rational rule and tradition, it compels 'the surrender of the faitllful to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is alien to all regulation and tradition and therefore is viewed as divine . . .'9

In a basic sense, then, charismatic authority represents a pattern of psychological, social, and economic release: Release from 'traditional or rational everyday economizing . . . ;10 release from 'custom, law and tradition' ;1l release from 'all notions of sanctity' ;12 release from 'ordinary worldly attachments and duties of occupational and family life';l3 and release from oneself or one's conscience.

The courage the follower requires to abandon himself, to overcome the external and internal limits of daily existence (Alltag), is provided by identification with the charismatic leader, in that the leader, on the basis of his apparent gifts of body and mind, his lleroism, is perceived as



84 Thomas E. Dow ffnr.

a model of botll release itself and the apparent power that makes release possible. It follows, that release and the posver of eharisma are interrelated if not identical, and tllat the follower is moved to 'eomplete personal devotion . . .'14 because he sees in the leader forces that exist within himself, forces that are being freed from the restraint of eon- vention by the beillg and action of the leader. Accordingly, the follower obtains 'freedom' from the eommonplace, the ordinary, the recurrent by surrendering to both the initiatives of the leader and the emotional eentres of his own being.

The nature of charisma

Weber argues that eestasy as a 'distinetive subjective condition ... represents . . . charisma . . .'15 As a psychic state associated with charis- matie 'rebirth' or 'self-deification',l6 ecstasy may be produced by 'alcohol, tobaceo, or other drugs . . ., by music and dance; by sexuality; or by a combination of all three . . . ;17 that is, by the 'breaking down [of] inhibitions . . .n18

By linking cllarisma and ecstasy, Weber implies the elemental and daemonie character of the concept; it represents a state of being beyond reason and self-control. Thus it applies equally both to Romeo's adora- tion of Juliet and Othello's rage in the murder of Desdemona. Both Romeo and Othello are lifted out of themselves by the powerful emotions of joy and rage svhich provoke passionate expression and frenzied action. It follows that while the difference between these emotions and the consequences they engender is crucial, it is not a matter that can be resolved within, or is even relevant to, the state of ecstacy itself. The eonsequenees of forces released by charisma must be e;aluated by standards external to the forces themselves. This, it appears, is ^hat Weber had in mind when he insisted that 'how the quality in question would ultimately be judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition'.l9 This indifference (WertfreiAeit) permits us to discover or recognize the ultimate meaning and consequences of charisma, and hence subsequently to establish its moral or ethical signiEcanee in the light of our own values.

One must begin with the nature or essence of eharisma; that essenee is Dionysian. Like the god Dionysus, eharisma 'represents . . . the incar- nate life-force itself, . . . the thrust of the sap in the tree and the blood in the veins . .X20 Consequently, extraordinary gifts of body or mind whicll express or release this power or force are daemonic, in that, as in the myth of Dionysus, they represent grace or divinity 'divested of morality . . .'21 Such daemonic force is 'not devilish but the reality of . . . eareless pcser.22

Accordingly, it is not, as Weber recognizes, to 'ultimate ethical prin- ciples',23 or to the 'beings . . . concealed "behind" . . . the eharismatic- ally endowed . . . persons',24 tllat follovers give their allegiance, but to



An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 85

the power itself. Whoever possesses that power or charisma 'is stronger even than the god, whom he can compel to do his will'.25 It is the perceived power over demons, death, and Alltag in general that is crucial, and that power is elemental not ethical. If it is a concealed power at all then, it is so only in the sense that it is concealed within each of us. Charisma discovers, expresses, and releases that power; it literally 'revo- lutionizes men from witllin',26 freeing emotional and instinctual elements previously repressed by convention.

This pattern is found in fAe Bacchae, where the Maenads on the mountain are possessed by the charisma of their leader and murder Pen- theus in a state of ecstatic surrender. While their ecstasy itself is not subject to judgment, any more than the caprice or carelessness of lightning, rain, or wind, tlle ethical meaning of its consequences must still be sought tllrough the application of personal values. That Weber himself sought such meaning is evident in his final statement on charisma. A model for this final formulation, incidentally, may be found in the actions of the Chorus in The Bacchae, in that 'the Bacchantes of the Chorus are not possessed'n27 as were those who killed Pentheus. 'A divinity . . . moves in their words, but less as a chaotic wildness than as a controlled and passionate conviction.'28 It is this quality of 'controlled and passionate conviction' which stands at the centre of Weber's formulation in 'Politics as a Vocation'. The intellectual path that led him to this Snal formulation may be reconstructed as follows.

In the ideal typical model, charisma is presented as an emotional life- force antithetically related to the routine requirements of daily existence. Conceptually, it represents 'that part of social life [of human existence] that remains forever beyond the reach of bureaucratic domina- tion'.29 In reality, however, its realm is being eroded by the progressive rationalization of life. Discipline, as the instrument of rationalization, 'inexorably takes over ever-larger areas as the satisfaction of political and economic needs is increasingly rationalized. This universal phen- omenon more and more restricts the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated conduct.'30

Given this trend, or at least Weber's perception of such a trend, it is perhaps not misleading to suggest that he did celebrate 'charisma as an "emotional life-force" antagonistic to the dreary construction of the iron cage'.3l Yet it was not a solution he could accept fully, in that it replaced the emotional emptiness of bureaucratic conformity with the irresponsibility of charismatic commitment; that is, it substituted for passive conformity to convention behaviour 'determined [either] by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor',32 or by his uncondit- ional orientation to the realization of 'absolute values'.33 Both patterns of course are irrational and irresponsible, in the sense that in neither one is the actor 'influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action' .34



Ellomas E. Dow jfnr. 86

HEART OF DARKNESS35

The Dionysian quality of charisma and its consequences may be illus- trated most clearly in a literary model. This example is intended as a literary equivalent of Weber's ideal type, in that it suggests what the essenee of charisma would be in the absence of non-charismatic elements and what the consequences of eharismatic involvement would be in the absence of routinization.

In the character of Kurtz, Chief of the Inner Station, Conrad pro- vides us with a case study of the nature and consequences of charisma. To those who followed him, Kurtz was a god. He represented 'the unprecedented and absolute unique . . .n,36 that which is 'alien to all regulation and tradition and therefore is viewed as divine ...'37 His divinity was based on release and the power that makes release possible. In the Heart of Darkness, the thunder and lightning of his weapons represents the literal power which releases on the world a force that can only be considered elemental or daemonic. By accepting IZurts as one who possesses this power and expresses this force, his followers share in this power and experience this force within themselves. They achieve freedom from the requirements of their own daily existence by surrendering to the will of Kurtz. His being and his purpose provide an occasiorl for the breaking down of inhibitions and the realization of ecstasy the subjective state of charisma.

By rejeeting 'as undignified all methodical rational acquisitiorl, in fact, all rational economic conduct',38 and by freeing himself from the 'worldly attachments and duties of occupational and family life',39 Kurtz creates an independent existence one characterized by !\4arlow as involving 'no method at all'.40 Yet it is precisely this lack of method, restraint, and rationality that deEnes charisma and explains both the loyalty of Kurtz's followers and their 'grief' and 'utter despair' at his departure.

By allowing himself to be returned to the ship, their god deserts them, and, in the absence of his being and llis power, his charisma, they must return to the conventions and restraints of daily existence. Their leader, on the other hand, must die a victim of the very life-force he released but eould not control.

The significance of Kurtz's collapse, dissolution, and death is examined by the narrator, Marlow, who associates Kurtz's downfall with his lack of restraint. Yet when forced to choose between the charismatic fire burning unchecked in Kurtz and literally consuming him, and the meaningless existence of the faithless pilgrims, he chooses Kurtz. The faithless pilgrims, the manager, the company, must lDe rejected in favour of life, bllt that life must be lived with restraint lest it become a Chorror' -the judgment rendered by Kurtz upon 'tlle adventures of his soul on this earth'.4l Thus 'Kurtz, living outside all nortus, yet knows that they exist and eondemn him. Implicit in his cry [then] is an admission of



An analysis of Weber's work on clzarisma 87

what he has evaded, a realization of the insuff1ciency of his total eom- mitment to himself and of the validity of the standards which eondemn him.'42 Marlow recognizes that neither Kurtz 'with his abandon, nor the manager with his getting on in the world',43 has the restraint, the controlled passion, necessary for genuinely human behaviour. Thus he anticipates Weber's Enal statement on eharisma, in that the application of his own values leads Weber inevitably towards a Marlowian rather than a Kurtzian solution. The specific nature of this solution, which seeks both to preserve and eontrol the force of charisma, is outlined in the voeational essays.

THE VOCATIONAL ESSAYS44

At the beginning of his essay on 'Politics as a Vocation' (Politik als Beruf ), Weber asks: 'What kind of a man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his lland on the wheel of history ?'45 ( Was fur ein Mensch man sein muss, um seine Hand in die Speichen des Rades der Geschichte legen zu durfen.46) He answers his rhetorieal question by indicating tllat the pri- vilege of power should not be granted to the 'political dilettante', the 'sterilely excited' romantie whose inner bearing is 'devoid of all feeling of objective responsibility'47 or to the man of great vanity, whose 'need personally to stand in the foreground'48 is associated with a lack of objectivity and a eorresponding irresponsibility; or to the 'mere power politician', who hides his 'inner weakness and impotence' behind a self- intoxicating worship of power for its own sake.49 Nor should the wheel of history be placed in the hands of those who 'simply and dully accept [their political] occupation[s]',50 lacking the faith and passion necessary for 'genuinely human eonduct',51

Behind these negative earicatures, of 'parvenu-like braggart'52 and passionless politieal bureaucrat, which all sould tend to reject, lies Weber's deeper eonviction that political leadership should no longer be sought in the unmediated charismatic qualities of the past. This position follows from his admission that unrestrained charismatic release, which he previously described and extolled in Economy and Societ, is associated necessarily with an absolute ethic of ultimate ends (gesinnungsethisch) which 'does not ask for consequences'53 and hence has no interest in controlling or 'taming'54 the passions which it releases. On the other hand, Weber argues that the total repression of these passions would tend also to preclude the kind of responsible leadership henow fanrours.55 I; or Weber, then, neither complete repression nor complete release repre- serlt 'mature' or 'genuine' human behaviour.56

Accordingly, the sober hero of the essay on 'Politics as a Vocation' is neither a Kurtz nor a Thomas Ruddenbrooks,57 but rather a dynamic combination of both. He is to har7e passion (Leidenschaft), a feeling of responsibility (VerantwortangsgefizAl), and a sense of proportion (Aag- enmass). But how, XVeber asks, 'can warm passion and a cool sense of



Thomas 15. Dow 5}nr. 88

proportion be forged together in one and the same soul? Politics [he observes] is made with the head, not with other parts of the body or soul. And yet devotion to politics [he concludes], if it ls not to be frivo- lous intellectual play but rather genuinely human conduct, can be born and nourished from passion alone.'58

The problem is resolved by suggesting that genuine passion may be expressed in the service of responsibility and proportion. The passionate or mature man then, is described by Weber as one who 'is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. [Such a man] . . . acts by follow- ing an ethie of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: Here I stand; I can do no other.' (Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich.59) At this point 'an ethie of ultimate ends [Gesinnungsethik] and an ethic of responsibility [Verantwortungsethik] are not absolute con- trasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man [echten Menschen] a man who can have the calling for politics'.60

Thus Weber's whole or 'genuine man' represents a synthesis of charisma and asceticism. He does not have the total freedom of llis Dionysian predecessor in the earlier formulation of charisma; yet he is not without warmth. His soul is 'free' to express itself passionately in defence of an ethie of responsibility.

If the concerns behind this synthesis are considered, one sees, on the one hand, that Weber shares Dostoevsky's fear that genuinely human eonduct will be eliminatedin the 'crystal palace' of modern society,6l but on the other hand, he is not willing totally to endorse the irrational as a solution. In the context of political power, he could not accept Dostoev- sky's view that 'two times two makes five is sometimes . . . a very charm- ing . . . thing'.62 Actually, when two times two makes five or three or whatever, as in I984, one is in the presence of arbitrary and irresponsible power, and it is this arbitrary and irresponsible power that Weber rejects most clearly in his Enal view of charisma.

Instead of Dostoevsky's equation, Weber would have preferred Win- ston Smith's conclusion that if 'the freedom to say that two plus two make four . . . is granted, all else follows'.63 In the sense intended by Smith, the equation represents what Weber meant by objectivity, proportion, and passion. In short, it suggests that passionate responsibility for the past, the present, and the future is the primary source of genuinely human behaviour.

Marlow

A useful literary model of Weber's new charismatic man may be found in the eharacter of Marlow in Conrad's Heart of Darkness. SpeciScally, Marlow was able to rise above the mere conventions and prejudices of his time to consider the ultimate meaning of his conduct. In Weber's terms, he was aware of a 'responsibility for the consequences of his con- duet and ... [felt] such responsibility with heart and soul'.64 His



An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 89

meeting with the Intended, in which he reports Kurtz's last words to have been her name rather than an exclamation of horror, clearly suggests an ethic of responsibility rather than an ethic of absolute ends.

Moreover, although Marlow admired and defended the daemonic Kurtz against the faithless pilgrims and weak-eyed devils of the company, he still recognized that Kurtz was hollow and condemned him for his lack of restraint. Only Marlow was able to avoid both the dissolution of uncontrolled release and the thoughtless and banal cruelty of irresponsible convention.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE

It follows that Marlow rather than Kurtz would represent the sober and mature hero of the political essay. Yet the meaning of Weber's solution is less clear. Does it represent simple advocacy, an arbitrary preference, a personal value judgment; or is it intended as a 'sociological ethic'? Close reading of Weber's essay on 'Science as a Vocation' (Wissenschaf als Beruf) suggests the latter position, in that V9eber clearly uses this essay to establish an affinity between science and the 'preferred' ethic of responsibility.

In this essay, Weber admits, indeed insists, that science is not the 'way to true being, . . . to true art, . . . to true nature, . . . to true God, . . . to true happiness . . .'; and he agrees with Tolstoi that science cannot tell us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'65 It cannot do this, Weber argues, because 'the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion'.66 Consequently, 'scientific pleading is meaningless in principle because the various splleres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other'.67 In light ofthis position, one could argue that Weber found himself 'the possessor of an albatross-concept of science, which, like the mariner's bird, left one with no opportunity for rest and, in an ultimate sense, had no rational meaning at all'.68

In fact, however, Weber found in the limits of science an occasion not for despair but for 'moral achievement'.69 In the context of divergent values, he sas science as providing not choice but clarity. That is, 'if you take such and such a stand [hold such and such a value], then, according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a means to carry out your conviction practically'.70 Similarly, 'if you want such and such an end, then you must take into the bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all experience will occur'.7l In this way, science can help the individual 'give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct'.72 And because it does this, Weber argues, science 'stands in the service of "moral" forces; [it] . . . fulfils the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility'.73

In short, science makes meaningful choice possible, in the sense that it



Thomas E. Dow Xnr. 9o

allows one to make choices that involve 'accountability to the social and political forces of one's age'.74 Yet science cannot make these choices for us; it cannot speak directly of values or good intentions but only of means and consequences. And for this reason, science is associated with an ethic of responsibility rather than an ethic of ultimate ends. From this it seems reasonable to conclude that it was Weber's intention to provide a form of intellectual legitimation for this ethic and for the new charismatic leadership that was to follow it.

One can also argue that Weber wished to associate his models of political and scientific man with a theory of human development. Specifically, he refers throughout both vocational essays to 'genuinely human conduct',75 to 'a genuine man',76 to acting 'like a man',77 to something being worthy of 'man as man',78 to 'a mature man',79 and then associates these optimal but nonspecific states of personal development with the specific characteristics of the Beruf politician or scientist. This view of personal development is part of a major classical tradition in Western thought. It also corresponds to contemporary definitions of personal or political maturity. Davies' argument,80 for example, tllat a mature man is one who can recognize and accept the consequences of his own choices and the choices of others as they affect himself and the polity at large, is the equivalent of the argument advanced by Weber in the vocational essays. The uses and limitations of tllis or any theory of human development will be examined more fully later in tllis paper.

Summary

In the new charismatic model of the vocational essays, Weber specifically condemns the quality of irresponsible release which is inllerent in all forms of the original charismatic formulation. This condemnation must then be applied both forwards and backwards in time; that is, to such manifestations in the past as well as to such possible manifestations in the future. Of the latter, of course, Weber could know nothing, and in this respect lle was fortunate. For it was not the new charisma but the old that was to control Germany in the years after his death; his hopes for the elimination of charismatic irresponsibility were not realized either in his time or our own.

What remained after Weber's death was a new definition of charisma. Yet it was an ambiguous definition, in that by locating charisma Ermly within the structures of everyday life it removed from it all its extraordinary and distinctive external characteristics. In a sense then, Weber 'advanced what he had earlier discussed as the historical "routinization of charisma" to the level of a "pure type" of charismatic leadership . . .'81 This type, however, is revealed only in the heightened passion, feeling of responsibility, and sense of proportion which distinguishes one man from another. Yet such distinctions are by their very nature quite difficult to make. This is not to suggest that the new charismatic model



An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 9I

is undesirable, or even intellectually indefensible, but only that it pre- sents great if not insuperable analytical and conceptual difficulties.

THE EVALUATION OF CHARISMA

Weber's analysis of charisma in the vocational essays was both value free and value relevant, in that he discussed the consequences normally associated with a charismatic ethic of ultimate eIlds and then judged these consequences in terms of a value relevant model of personal and social development. Yet even in the latter case, it can be argued that the linkage of personal growth and development with choice, responsibility and, by extension, participation is not a mere value judgment. Rather, it is possible to suggest that it represents a major supposition of classical democratic theory which has been supported at least inferent- ially by recent findings.82

Having said this, we are still not prepared to argue that this model of personal and social development is necessarily conclusive. Indeed, recognizing the difficulties associated with the evaluation of competing developmental perspectives, it seems preferable simply to state the 'preferred' position, and to suggest its place in the original charismatic context. Specifically, if human growth and development are associated with the opportunity to participate, with the willingness and ability to choose, and with a readiness to assume responsibility for the consequences of one's choices, it seems clear that on balance these qualities are not encouraged in noninstitutional charismatic communities.

In short, the requirements of the revolutionary charismatic com- munity are necessarily at odds with the developmental perspective advanced by Weber in the vocational essays. It is this conflict that is behind Weber's rejection of the noninstitutional charismatic commun- ity. In its place, he sought a new integration of charisma and asceticism. That this synthesis was not achievedin his lifetime may suggest its essentially romantic or utopian nature. Indeed, to speak seriously of a genuine path between the lifelessness of everyday convention and the dissolution of total charismatic release is to speak not primarily of history but rather of hope the hope that passion in the service of an ethic of responsibility might yet rescue man from the immaturity and in- humanity of both unexamined routine and irresponsible release. Weber held this hope as both a man and a scholar, and, in a period not extern- ally favourable to its realization, advised his students to 'set to work and meet the demands ofthe day' in terms of such an ethical commitment.83

Conclusion

In Econo?7ty and Society Weber developed three ideal typical models of authority: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatlc. Eacll model, in turn, rested on a different principle of legitimacy; that is, on the sanctity of the past, or the rationality of law, or the personal grace of a



Thomas E. Dow 31zr. 92

noninstitutional figure. Thus charisma is introduced as part of a formal typological system. In this sense, its utility for purposes of definition is independent of the value one attaches to it. Yet in Weber's value relevant philosophy of history this same charismatic quality clearly serves as a vehicle of personal freedom in opposition to the progressive bureau- cratization and rationalization of everyday life. However, Weber ultimately came to reject this unchecked vellicle of freedom. Since it did not provide an occasion for responsible choice or an opportunity for personal development, he could not accept it.

Instead, he offered a new synthesis of restraint and release, in which the grace of charisma was to be guided by an ethic of responsibility. This ethic, in turn, was found to have an affinity with science, in the sense that while science cannot choose for us, it can demonstrate to us that our own choices are in fact responsible. (In the sense intended here, choices which involve 'accountability to the social and political forces of one's age'84 are responsible.) It does this by clarifying both the means necessary to achieve our stated ends and the consequences normally to be anticipated in connection with these ends.

Finally, in tracing Weber's journey from the charisma of release to the charisma of passionate responsibility, we see the application of the path outlined in the vocational essays: After considering the nature of charisma and the consequences associated with it, and engaging his own values, Weber 'took a stand' regarding charisma. He then invited his students at the vocational lectures to undertake a similar journey; that is, in effect, to investigate in the light of tlleir own ultimate values the meaning of charisma. And, by extension, we too are invited to Ex the place of charisma in our own ethical and intellectual universe.

Thomas E. Dow jtnr., A.B., A.M., PH.D. Professor of Sociotogy

State University of J\ew York Purchase, Afew York

Notes I. Max Weber, Economy and Society

(Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed.), New York, Bedminster Press, I968; and Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation' in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, I gs8a.

2. Weber, Igs8a; op. cit.; and Max Weber, 'Science as a Vocation' in Hans Gertll and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, Igs8b.

3. Weber, I968, Op. cit., p. I I I2. 4. Max Weber, The Theory of Social

and Economic Organization (A. M. Hender-

son and TaIcott Parsons, trans.), edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, New York, Oxford University Press, I 947, pp. 36 I-2.

5. Weber, I968, Op. cit., p. I I I2. 6. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5. 7. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5. 8. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I 7. 9. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5. IO. Weber, I947, Op. Cit., p. 362. I I . Weber, I 968, Op. Cit., p. I I I 7. I2. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I7. I3. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I3. I 4. Weber, I 947, Op. Cit., p. 359. I 5. Weber, I 968, Op. Cit., p. 40 I .



An analysis of Weber's work on charisma

6. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535.

I7. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535.

I8. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535.

I9. Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. 359.

20. William Arrowsmith, 'Intro- duction to the Bacchae' in Grene and Lattimore, The Complete Greek Tragedies, Volume IV, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, I958,p.537.

2I. Ibid., p. 537.

22. Ibid, p. 537s

23. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 467.

24. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 40I.

25. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 422.

26. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III6.

27. Arrowsmith, op. cit., pp. 539-40.

28. Arrowsmith, op. cit., p. 540.

29. James V. Downton, Jr., Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process, New York, The Free Press, I973,p.273.

30. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. II56.

3I. Arthur Mitzman, The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber, New York, Knopf, I970,p.304.

32. Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II5.

33s Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II7.

34s Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II7.

35. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., I97I.





40. Conrad, op. cit., p. 63.

4I. Conrad, op. cit., p. 7I.

42. Jerome Thale, 'Marlow's quest' in R. Kimbrough, Heart of Darkness, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., I97I, p.

I80.

43. Ibid., p. I80.

44. Weber, Igs8a and b, op. cit. 45s Weber, I958a, ops cits, ps II5s

46. Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Tubingen, J. C. B. Mohr, I958C,ps533

47s Weber, I958a, op. cit., p. II5.

93 48. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I I6.

49. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. II6. 50. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I28. 5I. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I I5. 52. Weber, I gs8a, op. cit., p. I I 6. 53. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I20. 54 Weber, Igs8a, ops cits, ps I I5 55 Weber, I958a, ops cits, ps I I5 56. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 57. Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks, New

York, Knopf, I967. 58. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. II5. 59. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 60. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 6I. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from

Underground, New York, E. P. Dutton, I 960, p. 3 I .

62. Ibid., p. 30. 63. George Orwell, I984, New York,

The New American Library, I949, p. 69. 64. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 65. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 43. 66. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 52. 67. Weber, Igs8b, op. cit., p. I47. 68. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 255. 69. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 47. 70. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 5 I .

7 I . Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 5 I .

72. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 52. 73 Weber, I 958b, op. cit., p. I 5 74. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 229. 75 Weber, I958a, op. cit., p. I I5. 76. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 77 Weber, I 958b, op. cit., p. I 55. 78. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 37. 79. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27. 80. James Davies, Human ;Nature in

Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior, New York, John Wiley & Sons, I963, pp. 324-5

8I. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 249. 82. Peter Bachrach, The Theory of

Democratic Elitism: A Critique, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, I 967, Pp. 98-9.

83. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 56. 84. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 229.

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Dow,1978,An Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma

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