IN THE SUPREME COURT

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

No. _______________, M.D. Misc. Docket 2016

Docket No. below: 14-CR-550, Lackawanna County, Criminal Division

Stephanie Tarapchak, Incarcerated Person

Joseph Pilchesky, as Stephanie Tarapchak’s “Next Friend”

Petitioners

v.

Kathleen Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania,

Respondent

APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION TO DISQUALITY JUDGE JOHN L. BRAXTON FROM THE MATTER OF COM. V. TARAPCHAK, 14-CR-550,

AND REMOVE COUNSEL, ATTY. JAMES ELLIOTT

______________________________________________________________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate Joseph Pilchesky, “Next Friend”

Lackawanna County Prison 819 Sunset St.

1371 N. Washington Ave. Scranton, PA 18509

Scranton, PA 18509 570-591-4300

joe.pilchesky@gmail.com

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APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION TO DISQUAULITY JUDGE

JOHN L. BRAXTON FROM THE MATTER OF COM. V. TARAPCHAK, 12-CR-550,

AND REMOVE COUNSEL, ATTY. JAMES ELLIOTT

__________________________________________________________________

To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:

Stephanie Tarapchak, an incarcerated person, who has been the subject of criminal

proceedings in Lackawanna County since her arrest on January 2, 2014, by and through her

“Next Friend”, Joseph Pilchesky, asks this court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to end

the severely prejudicial treatment, dispositions and decisions of the Honorable Judge John L.

Braxton, S.J., who has refused to recuse himself, either sua sponte or by Petition to Disqualify,

when he has been named by Stephanie Tarapchak as a defendant in a voluminous Federal

Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-02078, as both a judge and an individual, predicated upon 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985, relating to willful and intentional participation in a conspiracy to deprive a person of

their civil rights, and § 1986, relating to failure to act to prevent the deprivation of a person’s

civil rights when one had the authority to do so. Pursuant to the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§

502, 721 & 726, Section 1 of the Schedule to the Judicial Article of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, and Rules of Appellate Procedure, 3307 & 3309, this Court may assume plenary

jurisdiction; and, for the reasons outlined below, it should assume jurisdiction because the

constitutionally protected rights to due process applies to people charged with crimes who

become subject to extreme prejudice, deprivation of due process and liberty rights and abuse of

discretion that could forever change the course of their lives. In a matter that plainly meets this

Court’s test of manifest injustice, this application seeks to restore the constitutional rights of

Stephanie Tarapchak to be subjected to criminal proceedings by a fair and impartial judge.

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Stephanie Tarapchak further asks this court to remove Atty. James Elliott as court-appointed

counsel, notwithstanding the fact that she formally discharged him on February 16, 2016 via

certified mail. He received the letter on February 17, 2016. He is nonetheless adamant to stay in

the case against her notice of discharge. She is at the sentencing stage of the proceedings after a

two week trial that was held last September, in which she was charged with various medical-

related crimes. She is a doctor of osteopathic medicine. She faces up to eighty years

imprisonment at the discretion of the presiding judge, Judge Braxton. As more fully discussed

below, she is in very serious conflict with Atty. Elliott on several critical issues. Atty. Elliott sees

no conflict whatsoever with Judge Braxton sentencing her and considering her omnibus motions,

notwithstanding that he is a named defendant in a Federal Complaint that alleges that he took

part in a conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights to rig her trial. The Federal

Complaint has twelve defendants, mostly judicial officers, which speaks for itself. Judge Braxton

will likely certainly be a witness at trial, whether or not he’s excused by immunity.

Atty. Elliott was just assigned to her criminal matter by Judge Braxton on January 29, 2016.

On February 10, 2016, Judge Braxton issued an order setting the sentencing date on February 22,

2016, which provides a mere three weeks for Atty. Elliott to review a two week trial transcript,

eleven (11) pre-trial transcripts and a record that is so voluminous that the clerks deem it the

largest they’ve ever had to manage, so large, that it occupies its own room in the Clerk’s Office,

and he has to prepare post-trial motions. Yet, he believes can absorb all that information, process

every detail hinting at relief and submit post-trial motions that will preserve all of her issues.

With there being an over-abundance of facts on the record to support a Motion for Mistrial

predicated upon both prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, he shows no spirit to pursue it to the

obvious very substantial benefits to Tarapchak’s liberty.

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INTRODUCTION

APPLICANTS ARE ASSERTING A CLAIM THAT HAS BEEN SETTLED AS A

MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CENTURIES

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution each contain a due

process clause. Due process deals with the administration of justice and thus the due process

clause acts as a safeguard from arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property by the Government

outside the sanction of law.[1] The Supreme Court of the United States interprets the clauses more

broadly because these clauses provide four protections: procedural due process (in civil and

criminal proceedings), substantive due process, a prohibition against vague laws, and as the

vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Due process ensures the rights and equality of

all citizens.

The Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. The clause, which took effect in 1868, provides that no state shall deny to any

person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws".

Procedural due process

This protection extends to all government proceedings that can result in an individual's

deprivation, whether civil or criminal in nature, from parole violation hearings to administrative

hearings regarding government benefits and entitlements to full-blown criminal trials. The article

"Some Kind of Hearing" written by Judge Henry Friendly created a list of basic due process

rights "that remains highly influential, as to both content and relative priority." [16] These rights,

which apply equally to civil due process and criminal due process, are:[16]

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1. An unbiased tribunal.

2. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it.

3. Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.

4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses.

5. The right to know opposing evidence.

6. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.

7. A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.

8. Opportunity to be represented by counsel.

9. Requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented.

10. Requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for its decision.

In Com. v. Hammer, 494 A. 2d 1054 - Pa: Supreme Court (1985), the Court wrote as follows:

In the courtroom, the judge is the foremost authority, second to none and no governor of the

judge's conduct resides in the courtroom save the judge. As stated in Commonwealth v. Myma,

278 Pa. 505, 123 A. 486 (1924):

The judge occupies an exalted and dignified position; he is the one person to whom the jury,

with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute

impartiality. . . . To depart from the clear line of duty through questions, expressions or conduct,

contravenes the orderly administration of justice.

Id., 278 Pa. at 508, 123 A. at 487. The duty therefore lies with the judge to insure that his

conduct is "above reproach," Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 482, 81 A.2d 316, 319

(1951), or, minimally, is not prejudicial. We therefore question the continued validity of the

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waiver doctrine as applied to improprieties of the trial judge for 97 *97 when the position of

power and authority enjoyed by the judge is considered, the strict enforcement of the waiver

doctrine becomes inadvisable.

The notion that the judge is the foremost regulator of his own conduct is amply recognized by

the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by this Court in 1973, effective January 1, 1984:

A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself

observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be

preserved.

Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (emphasis supplied).

A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Id., Canon 2, Section A (emphasis supplied).

A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .

Id., Canon 3, Section C(1)(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, an officer of the judiciary in this

Commonwealth is charged with a self-regulating function and is deemed the foremost arbiter of

his own personal bias or prejudice and hence his competence to preside over a matter.

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Avoidance of a conflict of interest regarding financial matters requires that a judge should

inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort

to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing

in his household.

Id., Canon 3, Section C (2) (emphasis supplied). It would indeed be a contemptible system

which required counsel in a civil case to ferret out the potential conflicts of interest 98 *98

residing, for example, in a judge's financial interests in order to obtain the judge's

disqualification. That duty resides expressly with the judge. So, too, would it be unacceptable to

permit the inherent injustice of judicial impropriety to go without remedy in a criminal case for

want of censure by objection of counsel. In a criminal prosecution, "[i]t is the judge, not counsel,

who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. `[T]he judge is not

a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct

and of determining questions of law.'" Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-342, 98 S.Ct.

1091, 1096, 55 L.Ed.2d 319, 326-327 (1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).

(end of Hammer citation)

In In Interest of McFall, 617 A. 2d 707 - Pa: Supreme Court (1992), the Court wrote as follows:

"A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct [her]self at all times in

a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Code

of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(A). "A judge should not allow [her] family, social, or other

relationships to influence [her] judicial conduct or judgment." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon

2(B). Recusal is required wherever there is substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside

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impartially. Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. at 21, 459 A.2d at 731 ; Commonwealth v. Boyle,

498 Pa. 486, 490, 447 A.2d 250, 252 (1982); Commonwealth v. Knighton, 490 Pa. 16, 23, 415

A.2d 9, 13 (1980). A jurist's impartiality is called into question whenever there are factors or

circumstances that may reasonably question the jurist's impartiality in the matter. Commonwealth

v. Darush, 501 Pa. at 21, 459 A.2d at 731 ; Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. at 490 n. 4, 447

A.2d at 252 n. 4.

A tribunal is either fair or unfair. There is no need to find actual prejudice, but rather, the

appearance of prejudice is sufficient to warrant the grant of new proceedings. A trial judge

should not only avoid impropriety but must also avoid the appearance of impropriety. In re

Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 430, 538 A.2d at 480 ; Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 524, 364

A.2d 312, 317 (1976)

"[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies must not only be unbiased but

must avoid even the appearance of bias." Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 747, 337

A.2d 858, 859-60 (1975) (quoting Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 129, 252 A.2d 704, 706

(1969) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150,

89 S.Ct. 337, 340, 21 L.Ed.2d 301, 305 (1968))).

(end of McFall citation)

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

In Com. v. Albert, 758 A. 2d 1149 - Pa: Supreme Court (2000), the Court wrote as follows:

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

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§ 1. Likewise, Article 1, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[n]either the

Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of

any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right." Pa. Const.

art. 1, Section 26.

This Court has held that "the equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution

are analyzed ... under the same standards used by the United States Supreme Court when

reviewing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution." McCusker v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 536 Pa. 380, 639 A.2d 776,

777 (1994), quoting Love v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 528 Pa. 320, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1991) .

In Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995), this Court set forth an extensive analysis

regarding the concept of equal protection, its applicability and the level of scrutiny needed

when examining a particular legislative enactment. We stated:

The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection under the law is that like

persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly. Laudenberger v. Port Authority of

Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981) . However, it does not require that all persons

under all circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137,

477 A.2d 1302 (1984). The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit

the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of receiving different treatment,

Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa. Commw. 250, 437 A.2d 1273 (1981), and does not

require equal treatment of people having different needs. Houtz v. Commonwealth, Department

of Public Welfare, 42 Pa.Commw. 406, 401 A.2d 388 (1979) . The prohibition against treating

people differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to

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legislative classifications, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed.

237 (1922), provided that those classifications are reasonable rather than arbitrary and bear a

reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal

Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986) . In other words, a classification must rest upon some

ground of difference which justifies the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship

to the object of the legislation. Id. Judicial review must determine whether any classification is

founded on a real and genuine distinction rather than an artificial one. Equitable Credit and

Discount Company v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941) . A classification, though

discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in violation of the equal protection clause if any state of facts

reasonably 1152 *1152 can be conceived to sustain that classification. Federal Communications

Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211

(1993); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) . In

undertaking its analysis, the reviewing court is free to hypothesize reasons the legislature might

have had for the classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,

Inc.; Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983) . If the

court determines that the classifications are genuine, it cannot declare the classification void even

if it might question the soundness or wisdom of the distinction. Equitable Credit and Discount

Company v. Geier.

(end of Albert citation)

Consistent with the Fifth Amendment, Stephanie Tarapchak (Tarapchak) had and has a

constitutional right to due process at all stages of criminal proceedings. She also has a

constitutional right to equal protection under the law to enjoy the same privileges and immunities

as all citizens.

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Despite these clear constitutional and statutory mandates, Tarapchak has been subjected to

repeated and torturous deprivations of her due process rights and now suffers from being

subjected to a tragically denied right to a fair and impartial judge at a very critical stage of her

proceedings, which is sentencing, with equally critical motions, to include a motion for a mistrial

that involves the prosecutorial and judicial conduct of those named in her Federal Complaint at

3:15-CV-02078, appended hereto as Exhibit “A”, which includes Judge John L. Braxton, S.J..1

Tarapchak’s motions at sentencing should be decided by a fair and impartial judge, and certainly

not by a judge who not only took part in an eighteen-month conspiracy to deprive her of her due

process rights, but took no action to prevent it from escalating.

The Federal Complaint is a twenty-five (25) count enunciation of what three judges, two

defense attorneys, a prosecutor, a prison warden and a house arrest director did to retaliate

against Tarapchak for her participation in exposing rampant corruption in Lackawanna County’s

Family Court. It will be appended to Tarapchak’s brief in support of her Motion for Mistrial,

which motion Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. will hear and dispose of if he is not properly removed

by this Court. He has an obvious interest in the outcome of a Federal Complaint that will support

the basis of Tarapchak’s Motion for Mistrial.

This is how Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. was assigned to preside over Tarapchak’s trial,

which supports that a conspiracy took place between defense counsel, the prosecutor and

the court do deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial

1 A complaint has been filed with the Judicial Conduct Board. In addition, a request for criminal prosecution was filed with the Department of Justice, which reviewed the matter and referred Tarapchak to the Office of the United States Attorney.

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Tarapchak’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, 2016, with Judge Michael

Barrasse presiding. He’d been her judge since March 25, 2015. Tarapchak increasingly beacme

extremely upset with her counsel, Atty. Bernard Brown, for his grossly ineffective preparation,

which included failing to give the court-appointed private investigator any assignments, failing

to call any of the witnesses she had provided to him, failing to review any of the medical records

and files she had stored at her home for the purpose of using them at trial, failing to have any

productive discussions with her regarding her defense and, among other things, failing to provide

her with a copy of the Grand Jury testimony, which he had in his possession as the result of a

deal that was made to by–pass her preliminary hearing, all of which caused Tarapchak to file a

Motion to Supplement Counsel (Motion) on September 15, 2015, supported by a voluminous

brief. Judge Barrasse took no action on Tarapchak’s Motion in terms of holding a hearing, so on

September 18, 2015, a Friday, Tarapchak then filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael

Barrasse and had him personally served that day. On Monday morning, at 9:00 am, September

21, 2015, the first day of trial, she served him with a voluminous brief in support of her Motion

to Disqualify, which specifically, with facts from the record, outlined his role in a conspiracy

with Atty. Brown and the prosecutor to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig the

trial. Judge Barrasse took the bench and read off a few pre-trial orders, to include an order that

denied her Motion to Supplement Counsel. He got up, left the courtroom and never returned. He

gave no explanation on the record for his departure. At that point, Judge John L. Braxton

immediately assumed presiding over the start of the trial and it started. Judge Braxton made no

attempt to address that Atty. Brown was accused of participating in the conspiracy.

This is what Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., knew at the start of the trial regaring her claims

that Atty. Brown should be removed as counsel for his role in a conspiracy to deprive her

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of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial, because these facts are in the Motion

to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and the Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael

Barrasse

1. That Tarapchak’s first appointed counsel, Joseph P. Kalinowski, (Kalinowski) knew she

had been arrested on October 23, 2014, on an alleged bail violation, but she never had a

mandatory hearing before a judicial officer within (72) hours as required under Rule 536

(A) (1) (b) and Pa. Code 234 § 150 (A) (5), (a) and (b). Pursuant to Pa. Code 234 § 150

(A) (7), the bench warrant expired after seventy-hours of the Tarapchak’s incarceration,

which required her release. Instead, a county employee from house Arrest and a prison

guard held an uncounseled bail violation hearing on her alleged bail violation in a prison

hallway absent notice to Tarapchak, absent her presence and decided she violated bail and

they had her incarcerated indefinitely, and she stayed incarcerated for nearly one year

until trial. Tarapchak was never provided the results of the blatantly illegal jailhouse

hearing or that she was going to be detained indefinitely, however, the judge at the time,

Judge Vito Geroulo, and the prosecutor were both given written notice of the same, and

the stayed silent.2,3 In addition, the record is silent. Kalinowski took no action to get relief

for Tarapchak from her illegal and unconstitutional arrest and jailhouse hearing absent

counsel and incarceration, when she should have been released three days after not getting

her bail violation before a judicial officer. Kalinowski was removed as counsel on January

23, 2015 on a motion to remove him filed by Tarapchak.

2. That Tarapchak’s second appointed counsel, Atty. Brown (Brown), who got on board on

March 23, 2015, also knew that she was illegally arrested, subjected to an illegal jailhouse

hearing in a hallway regarding her alleged bail violation that was presided over by a

county employee and a prison guard, who incarcerated indefinitely. Brown also knew

Tarapchak was not served with any written notice that a county employee and a prison

guard were the people who deemed that she violated bail and incarcerated her indefinitely.

Brown also knew Kalinowski filed no habeas action to challenge the illegal jailhouse bail

2 See Exhibit “A” at pages 76 – 86, Count X, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Kalinowski, ¶¶ 235 – 340.3 See Exhibits “B” and “D” of Exhibit “A”, the written notices to a county judge and the prosecutor from a county employee informing him that he and a jail guard held a bail violation hearing in a prison hallway on Tarapchak’s alleged bail violation and have incarcerated her indefintiely.

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violation hearing to get Tarapchak released. Brown filed no habeas action to get

Tarapchak released, so she could participate in the preparation of her defense against

twelve medical-related charges,4 to include gathering a pool of defense witnesses and

organizing medical files in her defense.

3. That Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel with a

voluminous brief in support thereof on September 15, 2015, alleging that Brown had

conspired with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate her

due process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienate her from

participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to rig

her trial.5

4. That Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse on September

18, 2015, 6 and served him that same day, and then filed a voluminous brief in support

thereof on September 21, 2015,7 and served him that morning, the day the trial was

scheduled to begin, alleging that the judge had participated in a six-month long conspiracy

with Brown and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate Tarapchak’s due

process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienated from

participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to rig

her trial.

5. That Judge Barrasse had, without explanation on the record, recused himself on the

morning of the first day of trial after being served with a Motion to Disqualify and a

voluminous brief in support thereof.

6. That Tarapchak did not want Brown representing her based upon his participation in a

conspiracy with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate

her due process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienate her

from participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to

rig her trial.

7. That Brown knew that Tarapchak was never provided with a copy of the Grand Jury

testimony, which she was supposed have been provided by Kalinowski in exchange for

4 See Exhibit “A” at pages 13 – 26, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶¶ 89 (a) – (cc), 96, 97.5 See Exhibits “F” and “G” of Exhibit “A”, the Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel and the brief in support thereof. 6 See Exhibit “H” of Exhibit “A”, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse.7 See Exhibit “J” of Exhibit “A”, the brief in support of Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse.

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by-passing her preliminary hearing, and he had withheld it from her up to the start of trial

so she could not participate in the preparation of her trial.8 Actually, Brown withheld it

during the trial and until after the trial was over.

8. That Brown had argued in opposition to Tarapchak’s civilly filed petition for habeas

corpus relief that was filed at 15-CV-4207 on July 6, 2015,9 which she had to file pro see

because he wouldn’t file it for her.

9. That Brown had knowingly lied to the court on August 5, 2015, when, during argument

on Tarapchak’s civilly filed petition for habeas corpus relief, he falsely stated on the

record that he had raised the same issues in an omnibus motion under her criminal

docket.10

10. That Brown had not given the court-appointed private investigator any assignments.11

11. That Brown remained silent during pre-trial hearings when the prosecutor, Robert LeBar,

and Judge Barrasse were verbalizing that the issues raised in Tarapchak’s civil habeas

action relating to illegal bail violation by a non-judicial officer and subsequent

incarceration were already raised and disposed of in the criminal matter, when Brown,

more than anyone else, as Tarapchak’s counsel, knew that was not true.12

12. That Brown withheld from Tarapchak responsive documents that were wrongly mailed to

him, which were filed in her civil habeas matter by the prosecutor, which prejudiced her at

said hearing from getting the habeas relief she was seeking.13

13. That Brown withheld from Tarapchak the Court’s order advising her of the date and time

of argument on her civil habeas matter as to further severely prejudice her at said

hearing.14

14. That Brown had not obtained or reviewed any of the hundreds of medical files and office

documents that Tarapchak had personally cherry-picked to use in developing her

defense.15

8 See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (b).9 See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (e).10 See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (f).11 See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (g).

12 See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (i).13 See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (j).14 See Exhibit “A” at page 18, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (k).15 See Exhibit “A” at page 19, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (m).

15

15. That Brown had concealed from Tarapchak that he had close personal and political ties

with a political enemy of her paramour, Joseph Pilchesky.16

16. That Brown did NOT file an answer to Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Brown as

Counsel, nor dispute the allegations contained therein in open court when he had ample

opportunity to do so.17

17. That Brown never had meaningful pre-trial discussions at the prison with Tarapchak to get

any assistance or information from her in the preparation of her defense.18

18. That Brown did not share the medical reports with her from her own court-appointed

medical expert, and that he had hired a medical expert absent the proper qualifications.19

19. That Brown had not solicited from Tarapchak the names of her longtime friends and

patients to be witnesses in support of her defense or to impeach prosecution witnesses,

and when she gave him a list as trial neared, he ignored it and never made contact with

any of them.20

20. That when Brown was served with the prosecutor’s response to Tarapchak’s Motion to

Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel, he withheld it from Tarapchak to prejudice her at the

time of hearing.21

21. That Brown knowingly lied to the court on April 10, 2015, when he stated that he did not

know that Tarapchak did not get a bail violation hearing before a judicial officer within

(72) hours when he knew she was arrested on a bail violation, convicted by a county

employee and jail guard and incarcerated by their actions.22

22. That on April 10, 2015, Brown advised Tarapchak to plead guilty to an alleged bail

violation that had occurred on October 23, 2014, whereupon Judge Barrasse then ruled

that since she pleaded guilty to the bail violation, then she waived her right to a hearing

before a judicial officer, when Brown knew she had a constitutional right to be released

on October 27, 2014, for failure of the Court to give her a mandatory bail violation

hearing with (72) hours of being arrested on October 23, 2014.23

16See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (p).17 See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (q).18 See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (s).19 See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (t).20 See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (u).

21 See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (v).22 See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (w).23 See Exhibit “A” at page 22, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (x).

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23. That Brown appeared at the prison after she filed her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown

as Counsel on the Saturday before trial was set to begin and threatened that if she didn’t

withdraw the motion she’d have to represent herself at trial.24

24. That Brown appeared at the prison after she filed her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown

as Counsel on the Saturday before trial was set to begin and threatened that if she didn’t

withdraw the motion she’d have to represent herself at trial.25

All that known to Judge John L. Braxton about Brown’s disturbingly contemptuous,

biased and prejudicial representation of Tarapchak pre-trial and he allowed him to stay on

as counsel in a trial where, if convicted, she faced life in prison, and Judge Braxton refuses

to recuse himself from sentencing her and ruling on post-trial motions

Everything highlighted above in paragraphs (1) through (24), and more, was included in

Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and Motion to Disqualify Judge

Michael Barrasse that were filed prior to the start of trial. Tarapchak did not get a hearing on the

Motion to Supplement Counsel and Judge Braxton knew it, yet he did nothing to cure it for her.

Instead, he simply threw her to the wolves and watched them gobble her up. Judge John L.

Braxton knew there was a very threatening problem with Tarapchak’s defense regarding a

conspiracy to deprive Tarapchak of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. He knew

that Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Barrasse and voluminous brief in support

thereof on the eve of the start of trial alleging said conspiracy with Brown and the prosecutor to

rig her trial, which resulted in Judge Barrasse recusing himself, which was how Judge Braxton

was assigned to preside over the trial. Judge Braxton knew that Judge Barrasse did not hold an

evidentiary hearing on Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel. Yet, he did

24 See Exhibit “A” at page 23, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (bb).25 See Exhibit “A” at page 23, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (cc).

17

nothing that a constitutionally conscious man would do to right a plethora of wrongs to restore

her rights. In addition, what judge would have allowed the trial to start absent being familiar

with any aspect of the case? He took no time whatsoever to get familiar with the case.

The fact that Judge Barrasse had denied Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as

Counsel without a due process hearing to protect her rights, and denied her any opportunity to

argue on behalf of it should have triggered immediate and appropriate action by Judge Braxton

to, at minimum, direct that a hearing shall be held on her Motion before the trial begins, yet he

did nothing. A hearing would have elicited testimony from Brown that he knew upon

appointment on March 23, 2015, that Tarapchak, who was incarcerated at the time of his

appointment, was arrested on October 23, 2014, on an alleged bail violation and never had a

mandatory bench warrant or bail violation hearing within (72) hours before a judicial officer, and

knew that she had a right at law to be immediately released, and he not only failed to file a

habeas action to get her released, but he argued in opposition to her own civil habeas action that

she had to file when her refused to do so, which certainly would have supported that Brown was

on board with the prosecutor to rig the trial. Why else would Brown have kept Tarapchak, a

doctor, and his best private investigator, in prison pre-trial other than to prevent her from

participating in the preparation of her own defense in terms of gathering her own pertinent

medical files and office documents to introduce at trial, and getting her own witnesses lined up to

support her defense and/or to impeach prosecution witnesses? That’s conspiracy at play.

Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., knowingly, willfully and intentionally, and with deliberate

indifference to Tarapchak’s rights, ignored his duty to protect those rights to the benefit of

the goals of the conspiracy

18

Judge John L. Braxton’s duty to protect Tarapchak’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, as

well as the dignity and esteem of the Court, was sewn from the seeds of his pledge to obey the

State and Federal constitutional each time he took his oath of office. The purpose of Judge John

Braxton taking the oath of office was to guarantee that the people, all of the people, can at all

times rely upon his dignity and integrity to be a man beyond reproach and outside the reach of

dishonest and unethical conduct by evil-minded practitioners of conspiracies, but he faltered

when he closed his mind to duty and ignored his oath of office, and instead, opened the court up

to the business of corruption and conspiracy to protect conspirators and their lowly interests in

stacking the scale of justice with insidious prejudice to secure Tarapchak’s demise.

When should it have been clear to Judge John Braxton that if Judge Barrasse was intending to

disqualify himself, then Judge Barrasse should not have entertained Tarapchak’s Motion to

Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel, within which it was alleged that Judge Barrasse was a part

of a conspiracy to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. When did his

black robe fall off? What judicial rocket had to go off in Judge Braxton’s mind to bring his spirit

to a boil over a conspiracy getting as far as it did, as it sat in his courtroom waiting to proceed,

sufficient for him to confront it and slay it? Apparently, no rocket went off, because the trial

went off, rigged as planned, with no intervention from the only man in the courtroom with the

power to prevent it from proceeding beyond picking the jury. When a conspiracy between

defense counsel, the prosecutor and the previous presiding judge to deprive a defendant of her

constitutional rights to due process and liberty shows its ugly head before the succeeding

presiding judge the challenge is on the table for one of two things to happen for one side or the

other. Both sides can’t win in the high stakes games of judicial conspiracies planned and

executed to execute an innocent person, because if the person were not innocent, no conspiracy

19

need planning and execution to assent to conviction. When Judge John L. Braxton took over as

presiding judge in Tarapchak’s case, the conspiracy needed no appearance by Sherlock Holmes

to be revealed to him. Tarapchak had put it on display with the filing of her Motion to

Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and Motion to Disqualify Judge Barrasse, both of which

sounded in claims for relief from a conspiracy to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights

to rig her trial, and neither one was disputed on the record, or off it, for that matter. That’s all

Tarapchak was asking for was a fair trial before a fair tribunal, as guaranteed by the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. That relief was denied by Judge John L. Braxton through his silence,

through his failure to give her a hearing on her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel,

and through is loyalty to the conspiracy. This Court should not allow Judge Braxton’s loyalty to

the conspiracy take another step towards advancing harm upon Stephanie Tarapchak’s

constitutional rights by removing him from her case, as well as her current counsel, Atty. Elliott.

Federal judges will ultimately decide Judge John L. Braxton’s level of responsibility for

Tarapchak’s constitutional sufferings as the Federal Complaint moves forward. The Office of the

United States Attorney will decide if he has criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242.

Tarapchak also filed a complaint with the Judicial Board of the Supreme Court against Judge

John L. Braxton, S.J. on November 4, 2015, regarding his unethical conduct in Com. v.

Tarapchak. Meanwhile, he absolutely should not be presiding over any matters involving

Stephanie Tarapchak and should be removed.

In addition to the Federal Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-02078, which includes 42 U.S.C. §

1985 and § 1986 conspiracy claims against Atty. Brown, Tarapchak also filed a state civil action

against him for malpractice at 1255-CV-2016 in relation to his starring role in the conspiracy to

20

deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. See Exhibit “B”. In the state

civil action, Atty. Brown has been joined by co-defendants Warden Robert McMillan and House

Arrest Director, Patrick Lynn (Lynn), relating to her arrest by Lynn, a non-law enforcement

officer with absolutely no judicial authority, on an alleged bail violation, Lynn’s appearance at

the Lackawanna County Prison to hold a blatantly unconstitutional hearing with a prison guard in

a prison hallway on whether or not Tarapchak violated bail conditions, Lynn’s decision that she

did violate bail conditions, Lynn’s incarceration of her for one year, and Lynn’s actions to

conceal his jailhouse misconduct from Tarapchak and the public record, all of which was done as

Warden McMillan looked the other way. And, Warden McMillan looked the other way many

hundreds of times, because in Lackawanna County, it’s Patrick Lynn who decides who violated

bail and who goes to jail, not the judges, in the name of judicial and government economy.

Tarapchak filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., which he denied, but

not on its merits

(The backdrop)

1. On October 27, 2015, Atty. Brown filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel at the behest of

Tarapchak, which he did not serve upon Tarapchak. See Exhibit “C”

2. A hearing was scheduled for November 5, 2015, on Brown’s Motion to Withdraw. When

Tarapchak was notified that morning by prison staff that she was going to be attending

said hearing, she contacted Joseph Pilchesky, who had to rush to the courthouse to get a

copy of the motion in order to file an answer thereto on her behalf as her “Next Friend”.

See Exhibit “D”, Tarapchak’s answer to Brown’s Motion to Withdraw, which is ripe with

assertions that the reasons she demanded his withdrawal were his participation in a

21

conspiracy with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor to deprive her of her due process and

liberty rights to rig her trial.

3. The hearing was presided over by Judge John L. Braxton, who, from the bench, granted

the Motion to Withdraw26 and reaffirmed Tarapchak’s indigent status to qualify for new

appointed counsel, and he told her that Brown was no longer in the case.27 See Exhibit

“E”, the transcript dated November 5, 2015.

4. Judge Braxton also told Tarapchak he was going to get her competent counsel outside of

Lackawanna County.28

5. On November 4, 2015, Tarapchak filed her federal complaint at 3:15-CV-02078. See

Exhibit “A”.

6. The summonses were issued by the Federal Clerk of Court on November 23, 2015, and

Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., was served accordingly on December 2, 2015. See Exhibit

“F”, the Return of Service.

7. On December 2, 2015, upon belief that Judge Braxton had granted Atty. Brown’s Motion

to Withdraw, and not having been served with any order from the Court that new counsel

had been appointed, Tarapchak, by and through Joseph Pilchesky, as her “Next Friend”,

filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., which only cited that he was

named in the federal complaint. See Exhibit “G”.

8. On December 8, 2015, again through Joseph Pilchesky as “Next Friend”, Tarapchak filed

an Amended Motion to Disqualify Judge Braxton, S.J., but she enhanced it with

allegations of the prejudice he’d demonstrated toward her relating to allowing Brown to

26 See Exhibit “E”, the transcript at page (3), lines 20 – 23, and page (18), lines 21 – 24.27 See the transcript at page (21), lines 1 -2.28 See the transcript at page (21), lines 20 – 25.

22

remain as counsel for trial. See Exhibit “H”. On the same day, a brief in support of

Disqualifying Judge Braxton was filed. See Exhibit “I”

9. Entered into the docket was an order dated December 2, 2015, that granted the withdrawal

of Atty. Brown, notwithstanding that Judge Braxton had granted his Motion to Withdraw

on the record on November 5, 2015, as discussed above in paragraph (3). See Exhibit “J”

10. With Tarapchak’s sentencing set for December 10, 2015, and not having any word from

Judge Braxton that he had assigned counsel, Tarapchak, again by and through Joseph

Pilchesky as “Next Friend”, filed a Motion to Stay Sentencing, citing that she was still

unrepresented. See Exhibit “K”

11. December 10, 2015, came and went for an anxiety-ridden Tarapchak. Judge Braxton had

not issued an order directing that sentencing was continued indefinitely.

12. On December 16, 2015, Judge Braxton issued two orders. The first was an order that

denied Tarapchak’s Amended Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, Exhibit “L”,

and the second denied the Motion to Stay Sentencing, Exhibit “M”. Both orders cited that

since Tarapchak was represented by counsel, Joseph Pilchesky had no right to file the

Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., or the Motion to Stay Sentencing on

behalf of Tarapchak as her “Next Friend”, as that was hybrid representation. Nothing

prevented Judge Braxton from ruling on the merits of the Motion to Disqualify Judge

John L. Braxton, S.J.

Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., permitted Atty. Brown to Withdraw as Counsel because

he’s named in the Federal Complaint, but he won’t recuse himself

See Exhibit “E”, which is the transcript for the hearing on Atty. Brown’s Motion to

Withdraw on the grounds that Tarapchak named him in the Federal Complaint at 3:15-CV-

23

02078. At page (19), lines 13 – 22, Judge Braxton stated that Atty. Brown has been sued by

Tarapchak in Federal Court and there is no reason to ask him to work when he himself has

become the source or in a recognized adversarial position.

At lines 23 – 24, Prosecutor Robert LeBar stated: “I agree wholeheartedly, your honor,…”

Judge Braxton advocated for the withdrawal of Atty. Brown because he’s named in the

Federal Complaint, and the prosecutor supports said advocacy, yet Judge John Braxton

adamantly refuses to recognize that he is in the exact same adversarial position as Atty.

Brown was in. Atty. Brown recognized his duty to withdraw. Judge John Braxton refuses to

recognize it to the severe bias and prejudice of Stephanie Tarapchak.

Judge John L. Braxton’s integrity and credibility is a serious issue. He was removed from

the ballot in a 2009 election for election fraud for lying on his Statement of Financial

Interests, as was well publicized. Once confronted with a challenge to his nomination petition,

he didn’t withdraw in that matter, either; instead a judge had to remove him. His poor

decision-making and judgment has a very stubborn side to it.

Judge John L. Braxton’s slight of hand relating to appointing counsel

13. When Tarapchak received the orders mentions above, she contacted Joseph Pilchesky and

advised that Judge Braxton indicated in both orders that she was represented by counsel,

so she requested that he check the docket, which he did. He found an order dated

November 30, 2015, which had appointed Atty. Francis X. O’Connor as counsel, who was

from outside of Lackawanna County. Tarapchak was not served with the order upon issue.

See Exhibit “N”

24

14. A review of the orders appended at exhibit “J”, “K”, “L” and “M” show they are different

than the order appended at Exhibit “N”, the order that appointed Atty. O’Connor as

counsel, as the former indicates that the parties have all been “CC’d” in on the order,

while the later indicates that no one was “CC’d”. Translated, for whatever reason,

Tarapchak was not notified that Atty. O’Connor was appointed new counsel, which rings

with suspicion, since he’s a custody and estates lawyer with some DUI experience, but no

criminal trial experience, hardly qualified to pick up Tarapchak’s appellate challenges.

15. Standing alone, no conspiracy at play, the failure to notify Tarapchak that Atty. O’Connor

was appointed counsel on November 30, 2015, may appear innocuous, but how did Atty.

O’Connor know he had been appointed? He didn’t enter an appearance on the record. See

Exhibit “O”, the docket entry for 14-CR-550, Com. v. Tarapchak.

16. Furthermore, Atty. O’Connor never made contact with Tarapchak between November 30,

2015 and January 29, 2016, when he was removed as counsel. Prison records can support

that he never appeared there and he never spoke on the phone with Tarapchak.

17. On February 6, 2016, Tarapchak sent Atty. O’Connor a terse letter demanding an

explanation for his conduct in failing to enter an appearance and making contact with her.

See Exhibit “Q”. Atty. O’Connor never responded.

18. Furthermore, on January 29, 2016, Judge Braxton issued an order directing that Atty.

O’Connor’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel was granted, but there is no

Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed on the record. In addition, at the hearing held that day

on the issue, Atty. O’Connor did not appear. In the January 29, 2016, order, Atty.

O’Connor was replaced by Atty. James Elliott. See Exhibit “P”

25

19. On February 10, 2016, knowing that Atty. O’Connor did no work for Tarapchak in

preparation for post-trial motions over a span of two months, Judge John Braxton issued a

new sentencing order, setting the sentencing of Tarapchak for February 22, 2016. See

Exhibit “R”. That provided Atty. Elliott with less than thirty (30) days to review the trial

transcript of a two-week trial on complicated medical-related charges, which required

medical expertise to assist in evaluating, eleven (11) pre-trial transcripts, and the entire

record, which staff at the Clerk’s Office often referred to as the largest file it has ever

held, so large that it has its own room, and effectively prepare all of Tarapchak’s post-trial

motions with no chance of failing to preserve any of a number of issues that could

determine success or failure under appeal. And, Atty. Elliott wants nothing to do with

filing a Motion for Mistrial with glaring support for one at his fingertips.

20. To Atty. Elliot’s some credit, he immediately appeared at the prison to visit with

Tarapchak and he gave her some encouragement that he was going to give her adequate

and effective counsel on appeal. She apprised him of at least some of the suffering she had

endured under previous counsel and all of judges. She also requested that he provide her

with a copy of the trial transcript so she could assist in the preparation of post-trial

motions, since she didn’t have a copy, because Atty. Brown had refused to provide her

with a copy and Atty. O’Connor never engaged in representation.

The quick exposure of Atty. Elliott as anti-Tarapchak

21. Tarapchak relied upon Pilchesky to memorialize communications with Atty. Elliott via

email, who was open to communicating with him. On February 3, 2016, at the request of

Tarapchak, Pilchesky sent an email to Atty. Elliott and addressed the issues of filing a

26

Motion to Disqualify Judge Braxton and a Motion for Mistrial. See Exhibit “S”, the email

dated February 3, 2016.

22. A Motion for Mistrial predicated upon prosecutorial and judicial misconduct would be

Tarapchak’s “Get out of Jail” card, and stay out. Of course, she’d be excited about it being

filed. Atty. Elliott, however, responded with signs of reluctance.

23. The email included three attachments, which were the previously filed two Motions to

Disqualify Judge Braxton, S.J., and a full copy of the Federal Complaint wherein Judge

Braxton is a named defendant, which Complaint elaborately sets forth all of the judicial

and prosecutorial misconduct that Tarapchak suffered. See Exhibit “S”, the email dated

February 3, 2016.

24. Atty. Elliott could have simply filed a Motion for Mistrial, copied and pasted the contents

of the Federal Complaint within it, appended a copy thereto as support, asked for a

hearing, called all of the named defendants in the Complaint to testify and hammered

them on their participation in the conspiracy against Tarapchak, but he has not shown any

constitutional spirit to get Tarapchak justice.

25. On February 11, 2016, Pilchesky sent another email to Atty. Elliott. In this email,

Pilchesky advised him that Tarapchak was impatiently waiting for the trial transcript, and

she wants to know what his intentions are relating to filing the Motion to Disqualify Judge

Braxton and the Motion for Mistrial. See Exhibit “T”, the February 11, 2016, email.

26. On February 14, 2016, Atty. Elliott visited Tarapchak at the prison. He did not have a

copy of the trial transcript with him, advising her that he only just got a copy. On the

evening of February 14, 2016, Pilchesky sent an email to the appropriate Court Reporter,

Cathene Nardozzi, within which he inquired if the trial transcript for Tarapchak has been

27

available electronically. On February 16, 2016, she responded in the affirmative. See

Exhibit “U”, the email.

27. Tarapchak’s hopes that Atty. Elliott was of the ethical backbone to fight the right fight for

her rights turned to dire and fear-immersed suspicion that he was either lacking in the

backbone department or his appointment was to merely bring the conspiracy to the desired

closure, or both, but either would be fatal to her future.

28. It was Judge John Braxton, who, when he released Atty. Brown, said on the record that he

was adamant to find an “out-of-county” attorney.29

29. It was Judge John Braxton who found an “out of county” attorney in Atty. O’Connor, but

then released him on a ghost Motion for Leave to Withdraw, and appointed Atty. James

Elliott, a member of a well-entrenched local political family, whose brother, David Elliott,

was formerly the longtime Chief of Police for the City of Scranton, and whom, Joseph

Pilchesky used as daily political target practice for years on his political website,

dohertydeceit.com, constantly slamming him for his grossly inadequate administrative and

leadership skills.

30. At the November 5, 2015, hearing on Atty. Brown’s Motion to Withdraw at the request of

Tarapchak, Judge john Braxton also told her, “So once you tell the attorney you want him

to withdraw as counsel, he has no choice.”30

Atty. James Elliott was formally discharged as counsel on February 16, 2016.

31. With Tarapchak having serious conflicts with Atty. Elliott regarding her constitutional

rights and best interests, and with sentencing looming in the immediate future, and having

29 See Exhibit “E”, the transcript at page (18), lines 3 – 25, and page (19), lines 1 – 9.30 See Exhibit ”E”, the transcript at page (3), lines 11 – 13.

28

deep suspicions of his true intentions to protect her rights and liberty, she opted to protect

herself and she instructed Pilchesky to send him formal notice that he has been

discharged, effective immediately. All things considered as things developed with Atty.

Elliott, the risk of trusting him fell to fear of his intentions. See Exhibit “V”, the letter

dated February 16, 2016, sent certified.

32. On February 17, 2016, after Pilchesky verified through USPS tracking that the certified

letter dated February 16, 2016, had not yet been received by Atty. Elliott, Pilchesky sent

him an email advising him that the letter was sent certified on February 16, 2016, a copy

of which was attached to the email. See Exhibit “W”, the email dated February 17, 2016.

33. On February 17, 2016, at 10:00 pm, Atty. Elliott sent a responsive email to Pilchesky

advising him that he refuses to withdraw as counsel. Pilchesky’s response, on Tarapchak’s

behalf, is included in the same email. See Exhibit “X”, the email dated February 17, 2016.

34. The trust is permanently broken in Atty. Elliott.

35. The communications with Atty. Elliott have been broken.

Implication of the Federal Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-2015

In review of the Federal Complaint, appended as Exhibit “A”, the Court will discover that it

is predicated solely upon facts from the record. All of the exhibits have been provided. The

parties to the Complaint are as follows:

PARTIES

1. The Plaintiffs are Dr. Stephanie Tarapchak, a pre-trial incarcerated person, currently

incarcerated in the Lackawanna County Prison, with an address of 1371 N. Washington

Ave., Scranton, PA 18509, and shall hereafter be referred to as Dr. Tarapchak; and

29

Joseph Pilchesky, also as Dr. Tarapchak’s legal “Next Friend”, with an address of 819

Sunset St., Scranton, PA 18509 and shall hereafter be referred to Pilchesky.

2. The Defendant is Lackawanna County, a body politic and corporation created under the

laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with an office located at 200 Adams Ave.,

Scranton, PA, and shall hereafter be referred to as the County.

3. The Defendant is Joseph P. Kalinowski, Esq., First Public Defender of the Office of the

Public Defender, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave., Scranton, PA and

shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. Kalinowski.

4. The Defendant is Kathleen Kane, Esq., a Lackawanna County lifelong resident, duly

elected Attorney General of Pennsylvania, with an office located at Strawberry Square,

16th Floor, Harrisburg, PA, 17120, and shall hereafter be referred to as Attorney General

Kane.

5. The Defendant is Atty. Robert LeBar; a duly appointed Senior Attorney General of

Pennsylvania, with an office located at 1000 Madison Ave., Suite 310, Norristown, PA,

19403, and shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. LeBar.

6. The Defendant is Lackawanna County Judge Michael Barrasse; a duly elected and

retained judge of Lackawanna County, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,

Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Barrasse.

7. The Defendant is Lackawanna County Judge Vito Geroulo; a duly elected and retained

judge of Lackawanna County, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,

Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Geroulo.

8. The Defendant is Senior Judge John Braxton; a duly retained and appointed senior judge

of the Court of Common Pleas with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,

Scranton, PA, 18503 and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Braxton.

9. The Defendant is United States Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, with an office

located at 197 S. Main St., Wilkes Barre, PA and shall be referred to as Judge Saporito.

10. The Defendant is Robert McMillan; a duly appointed Warden of the Lackawanna County

Prison, with an office located at 1371 N. Washington Ave., Scranton, PA, 18509, and

shall hereafter be referred to as Warden McMillan.

30

11. The Defendant is Patrick Lynn; a duly appointed Director of the Lackawanna County

Prison Home Detention Program (House Arrest), with an office located at 621 Spruce St.,

Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Director Lynn.

12. The Defendant is Bernard Brown, Esq., the duly appointed defense counsel for Dr.

Tarapchak with an address located at 58 8th Ave., #60, Carbondale, PA, 18407, and shall

hereafter be referred to as Atty. Brown.

13. The Defendant is Nicholas Kravitz, Esq., with an office located at 425 Spruce St.,

Scranton, PA 18503 and shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. Kravitz.

The Complaint has twenty-five (25) counts, many of which are 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986

claims, relating to conspiring to deprive a person of their civil rights and failing to prevent said

deprivation when required to do so. Other claims are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims relating to

Tarapchak illegal arrest and intentional pre-trial incarceration.

The claims against Judge John L. Braxton relate only to § 1985 and § 1986 claims. See Count

VIII at pages 68 – 73, the claims for conspiring to deprive Tarapchak of her due process and

liberty rights. Those claims can be amended based upon his conduct during and after trial, and

will likely be amended once Tarapchak gets the trial transcript. See Count IX at pages 73 0 76,

the claims for failing to prevent the conspiracy from continuing into the trial.

A Motion for Mistrial will include claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct based

upon the claims of conspiracy in the Federal Complaint

Among other things, a Motion for Mistrial will most certainly include claims of prosecutorial

and judicial misconduct, both of which have spanned three judges from the first pre-trial hearing

and into the trial, and Judge John L. Braxton is included in those claims. He cannot possibly

preside over a hearing on a Motion for Mistrial when his own conduct will be called into

31

question to support the motion. His removal from this matter is required to assure that the

Motion for Mistrial is heard by a fair and unbiased court.

Both Judge John L. Braxton and Atty. James Elliott should be removed from the matter of

Com. v. Tarapchak, 14-CR-550, to preserve and protect her constitutional rights to a fair

and unbiased tribunal under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to preclude any

further biased and prejudicial treatment by Judge John L. Braxton, and to preserve and

protect her state constitutional right to effective counsel

The State has no compelling interest in advocating or supporting the presence of bias and

prejudice at any stage of a criminal proceeding. Indeed, sentencing is an extremely critical stage,

as is disposing of post-trial motions. For the valid reasons stated above, Tarapchak has

overwhelmingly demonstrated that both bias and prejudice are present in her criminal matter

with Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., presiding.

Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. has been sued in his judicial and private capacity in a civil rights

violation matter, but not in an ordinary civil rights case claiming damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, where immunity almost always relieves liability, but rather, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and §

1986 claims for conspiracy to deprive a person of their civil rights. It remains to be seen if he

escapes accountability under the cloak of immunity as a judge or individual. Even if he does, he

will still, nonetheless, be a part of the federal trial, because the attorneys involved will not be

allowed to enjoy immunity defenses. One way or another, Judge John L. Braxton is going to

testify at the federal trial and be subjected to deposition.

It would be a travesty of justice to Tarapchak if Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., is not removed

from this matter to preclude his involvement in her sentencing and disposition of post-trial

32

motions, which should include a Motion for Mistrial where his conduct will be subject matter in

support of the motion.

The State has no compelling interest in advocating or supporting the presence of ineffective

counsel, either, where it can be shown to exist and an opportunity presents itself to prevent it.

Atty. Elliott has posited that he his little interest in filing a Motion for Mistrial in spite of a

plethora of factual evidence on the record to support claims of prosecutorial and judicial

misconduct. He has no interest in filing a Motion to Recuse Judge John L. Braxton. In fact, he

told Tarapchak the conflict with him is her own fault for filing the Federal Complaint in the first

place. Atty. Elliot placed no objection on the record to Judge Braxton giving him three weeks to

review a two-week trial transcript, eleven (11) pretrial transcripts and an enormous record, much

of it complicated specialty medical information, in preparation of post-trial motions, which

speaks for itself in terms of him being able to effectively read all that must be read, comprehend

it, process it for appeal and prepare post-trial motions. Atty. Elliott has refused to provide

Tarapchak with a copy of the trial transcript. It was immediately available electronically from the

court reporter, and after being counsel for two weeks, he went to the prison and said he just got

it, but still didn’t give her a copy so she could read it and participate in the preparation of post-

trial motions. Judge Braxton appointed an “out-of-county” attorney, then allowed him to

withdraw and appointed Atty. Elliott, a local and politically, well-entrenched attorney.

Tarapchak justifiably fears that if Atty. Elliott is allowed to represent her, notwithstanding

that she has already discharged him, that her state constitutional right to effective counsel will be

jeopardized and perhaps result in unpreserved issues on appeal that could translate into an unjust

and lengthy prison sentence. He should be formally removed as counsel by this Court as the right

thing to do with all facts known under the circumstances.

33

Tarapchak has no adequate remedy at law

Absent intervention by this Court, Tarapchak’s rights to a fair and impartial tribunal with

effective counsel during sentencing proceedings, and relating to the fair disposition of post-trial

claims, will be lost, because Judge John L. Braxton refused to recuse himself where a clear bias

and prejudice can rise from her filing of a Federal Complaint, wherein he is named as a

conspirator to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial; and, Atty. Elliott

has already abundantly demonstrated a clear lack of interest in providing Tarapchak with

effective counsel.

Plenary jurisdiction is necessary because Respondent has disregarded Supreme Court

precedent

As Tarapchak has aptly cited in her Discussion above, this Court has no tolerance for the

imposition of bias and prejudice at any stage of any civil or criminal proceeding. Case law is

abundantly instructive that a judge should recuse himself, not even requiring a motion to recuse,

where any showing of impartiality surfaces. Here, Judge John L. Braxton is a defendant in a

Federal Complaint alleging that he not only participated in a conspiracy to deprive her of her due

process and liberty rights, but took no action to prevent it when he had the absolute authority to

do so. His blatant disregard for Supreme Court precedent on this issue speaks for itself and he

should be removed from the matter of Com v. Tarapchak, 14-CR-550 immediately.

Relief Sought

34

Stephanie Tarapchak most respectfully requests that this court exercise its extraordinary

jurisdiction over this matter and remove Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., as judge, and remove Atty.

James Elliott as counsel, because she has a federal constitutional right to a fair and unbiased

tribunal at all stages of proceedings and a state constitutional right to effective counsel.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________ _______________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:

1371 N. Washington Ave. 819 Sunset St.

Lackawanna County Prison Scranton, PA 19509

Scranton, PA 18509 570-591-4300

VERIFICATION

35

This is to verify that the statements made herein are true and correct to the best of my

information, knowledge and belief. I understand that my statements are subject to 18 Pa 4904,

relating to Unsworn Falsification to Authorities.

February 19, 2016

___________________________ _______________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:

1371 N. Washington Ave. 819 Sunset St.

Lackawanna County Prison Scranton, PA 19509

Scranton, PA 18509 570-591-4300

CERTIFICAT OF SERVICE

36

This is to certify that I, Stephanie Tarapchak, did cause to be served upon the parties below a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Application for Extraordinary Jurisdiction on this 19 th day

of February, 2016, by placing the same into the U.S. Mail, first class prepaid postage, or by

hand-delivery, as indicated:

Honorable Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. – hand delivery

200 Adams Ave.

Annex Building

Scranton, PA 18503

Clerk of Court of Lackawanna County – hand delivery

200 N. Washington Ave.

Scranton, PA 18503

James Elliott, Esq. - mail

142 S. Main St.

Scranton, PA 18504

Robert LeBar, Esq., Senior Deputy for the Commonwealth – mail

37

Office of the Attorney General

1000 Madison Ave., Suite 310

Norristown, PA 19403

___________________________ ______________________________

Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:

1371 N. Washington Ave. 819 Sunset St.

Lackawanna County Prison Scranton, PA 19509

Scranton, PA 18509 570-591-4300

38