Do institutions influence satisfaction with democracy?

Pippa NorrisHarvard University

Enduring questions

• Classic theoretical issues about political institutions: – Do institutions influence growth, welfare and peace

• Previous classes; mixed evidence, research debate

– Do institutions shape public opinion?• Attitudes: political legitimacy, representation, accountability, identity,

satisfaction with democracy, and system support?• Behavior: Willingness to pay taxes, obey the law, protest and vote?

• Empirical challenges:– What can rigorous cross-national evidence and comparative

survey analysis tell us about these issues?– Do power-sharing institutions maximize public satisfaction with

the way democracy works?

Class Structure

I. Theoretical framework: Context and theories of citizen satisfaction with democratic governance

i. Public evaluations of democratic institutions and processes ii. Public perceptions of policy performanceiii. Institutional theories about ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in power-

sharing democracy

II. Research design, concepts, & data sourcesIII. Trend data and interpretationIV. Analysis of causesV. Conclusions

Democratic Deficits Critical Citizens Revisited

Pippa Norris Contents List of tables and figures Preface and acknowledgments I: Introduction

1. Democratic hopes and fears 2. The conceptual framework 3. Evidence and methods

II: Symptoms 4. Trends in the U.S. and Western Europe 5. Comparing political support around the world 6. Trends in democratic deficits

III: Diagnosis 7. Rising aspirations 8. Democratic knowledge 9. Negative news 10. Failing performance

IV: Prognosis 11. Consequences for citizenship, governance, and democratization 12. Conclusions and implications

CUP Spring 2011

I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I. Theoretical context

• Are American and European citizens increasingly disaffected with government and dissatisfied with democracy?– Anger exacerbated by recession?– E.g. In US, the resurgence of U.S. Tea Party and

‘patriot’ groups and anti-incumbency mood• If so, does this reflect a deeper failure of

representative democracy?

Democratic decline?

• Theorists speculate about democratic decline in

Western post-industrial societies:

– Colin Crouch ‘Post-democracy’, John Keane ‘death of

democracy’, Colin Hay ‘people hate politics’

• Decline in active citizenship, growing suspicion of

party politics, and erosion of trust in government

• Normative assumptions about ideal citizen?

Democratic decline?

• Western European evidence

– Party identification has weakened (Dalton &

Wattenburg),

– Party membership has plummeted (Mair and Biezen),

– Electoral turnout has fallen (Franklin),

– Growing discontent with parties, parliament and

governments (Dalton)

Theoretical model

DEMAND-SIDE:Rising public

aspirations for democracy?

INTERMEDIARY:Negative news

coverage of government?

SUPPLY-SIDE:Failure of

process or policy performance of

the state?

DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT:

Disparities between the

perceived democratic

performance and public aspirations

CONSEQUENCES:For political

activism, citizen compliance, and

regime democratization

Alternative explanations of satisfaction with democracy

1. Institutional performance?• Citizens rationally assess the quality of democratic institutions, such

as respect for human rights, free and fair elections, corruption, and civil liberties within each state

• Bratton and Mattes/Evans and Whitfield

2. Or policy performance? • Public evaluates the government’s record on delivering more specific

economic, social, and foreign policy issues • Hay/ Dalton/ Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg

3. Power-sharing institutions• Institutional rules shape the distribution of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’• Winner-take-all rules maximize public dissatisfaction• Chris Andersen et al. ‘Loser’s Consent’ (OUP 2005)

Power-sharing model

Winners Losers

Low

<< S

yste

ms

supp

ort >

>Hig

h Majoritarian institutionsConsensus institutions

II: RESEARCH DESIGN

Multiple surveys

• Focus on system support attitudes not behaviors

• Time-series survey trends• Annual Euro-barometer surveys 1970s+

• American National Election Study 1958-2008

• NORC U.S. General Social Survey 1972+

• Global comparisons• World Values Survey 1981-2007 in 90+ societies

• Global-barometers 55 societies

NATIONAL IDENTITIES

APPROVAL OF CORE REGIME

PRINCIPLES AND VALUES

EVALUATIONS OF REGIME

PERFORMANCE

CONFIDENCE IN REGIME

INSTITUTIONS

APPROVAL OF INCUMBENT

OFFICE-HOLDERS

<<

M

ost s

peci

fic

Mos

t di

ffuse

>

>

Multiple Levels of Systems Support

Core concepts of book

– Demand for democracy:

• Those who aspire to democracy as the ideal form of government

(normative values);

– Supply of democracy:

• Those who are skeptical when evaluating how democratically their

own country is being governed (judgments of regime performance)

– Democratic deficit:

• Gap between demand (aspirations) and supply (satisfaction)

Core Measures(i) Democratic aspirations: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” Standardized to 100-pts.

(ii) Democratic satisfaction: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” Standardized to 100-pts.

Democratic deficit: Mean difference between (i) and (ii).

Source: The World Values Survey 2005-7

Democratic deficits

High development Medium Low development50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

9087

84 85

65 65

59

AspirationsSatisfaction

(i) Democratic aspirations: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” Standardized to 100-pts.(ii) Democratic satisfaction: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” Standardized to 100-pts. Democratic deficit: Mean difference between (i) and (ii). Source: The World Values Survey 2005-7

Interpretation of trends

• Where?– Similar trends across comparable societies?– Or erosion in specific nations? U.S.

exceptionalism?• When?

– Exact timing and significance of any fluctuations• What?

– Politicians or democratic politics?– Specific or diffuse levels of systems support?

III: EVIDENCE: CH.4 TRENDS IN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE

American trust in the federal government, 1958-2008

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

7376

6561

53 53

3633

2925

33

44

3840

28 29

21

33

4044

56

47

35.6

R² = 0.287994123440628

% Trusting most of the time/just about always

Note: The standard ANES question is: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?” The unstandardized beta regression coefficient proved significant (>001).Source: The American National Election Surveys, 1958-2008

Trust in the U.S. Supreme Court & Executive, 1972-2006

19721973

19741975

19761977

19781979

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20060

10

20

30

40

50

R² = 0.000404725514179472

R² = 0.0213463540783486

Executive Branch Linear (Executive Branch) Linear (Executive Branch)Supreme Court Linear (Supreme Court)

Note: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” The proportion reporting ‘a great deal’ of confidence in each institution. The linear trends summarize each series. Source: U.S. General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2006 http://publicdata.norc.org/webview/

Trust in the U.S. Congress, 1972-2006

19721973

19741975

19761977

19781979

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20060

10

20

30

40

50

R² = 0.14138677518041

US Congress Linear (US Congress)

Note: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” The proportion reporting ‘a great deal’ of confidence in each institution. The linear trends summarize each series. Source: U.S. General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2006 http://publicdata.norc.org/webview/

U.S trust in private sector

19721973

19741975

19761977

19781979

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20060

10

20

30

40

50

R² = 0.166465874073675

R² = 0.174226229889581

Banks and financial institutions Linear (Banks and financial institutions)Major companies Linear (Major companies)

Note: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” The proportion reporting ‘a great deal’ of confidence in each institution. The linear trends summarize each series. Source: U.S. General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2006 http://publicdata.norc.org/webview/

European trust in national government, 1997-2008

Note: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The national government.” Proportion responding ‘Tend to trust’. OLS regression analysis was used to monitor the effects of time (the survey year) on trust in the national government, generating the unstandardized beta coefficient and its significance. *>.001 ** >.01 *>.05. Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2008 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.

European trust in parliament, 1997-2008

Note: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The national parliament.” Proportion responding ‘Tend to trust’. OLS regression analysis was used to monitor the effects of time (the survey year) on trust in the national parliament, generating the unstandardized beta coefficient and its significance. *>.001 ** >.01 *>.05. Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2008 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.

European trust in political parties, 1997-2008

1997 2008 1997-2008 Net Change Year Sig

Luxembourg 39 29 -10 -.426 N/s

UK 20 13 -7 -.641 ***

Greece 21 17 -4 -.324 N/s

Netherlands 43 40 -3 -.552 N/s

France 12 10 -2 -.308 N/s

Italy 14 13 -1 .114 N/s

Austria 28 30 2 .253 N/s

Portugal 16 19 3 .320 N/s

West Germany 15 19 4 .021 N/s

East Germany 14 18 4 .215 N/s

Ireland 22 27 6 .285 N/s

Sweden 18 28 10 1.056 ***

Denmark 34 50 16 1.600 ***

Finland 15 31 16 .381 N/s

Belgium 11 28 18 1.363 ***

Spain 22 40 18 1.237 *

Total 21 26 4 .368 **

Note: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. Political parties.” Proportion responding ‘Tend to trust’. OLS regression analysis was used to monitor the effects of time (the survey year) on trust in political parties, generating the unstandardized beta coefficient and its significance. *>.001 ** >.01 *>.05.Source: Eurobarometer surveys 1997-2008 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.

European satisfaction with democratic performance

1973 1980 1990 2000 2007 1990-2007Net change

Year Sig

Portugal 74 50 36 -38 -0.015 ***

Germany-West 44 78 82 64 71 -11 -0.005 **

Luxembourg 59 78 79 79 73 -6 0.004 ***

Ireland 56 51 68 79 69 1 0.007 ***

Belgium 66 40 64 63 66 2 0.002 N/s

Germany-East 60 41 66 6 0.002 N/s

Netherlands 58 53 73 77 80 7 0.005 ***

Great Britain 45 55 53 69 62 10 0.003 *

France 47 40 52 64 65 13 0.003 **

Italy 27 21 26 36 40 14 0.007 ***

Spain 59 76 77 18 0.010 **

Denmark 46 63 73 77 94 21 0.010 ***

Greece 54 40 52 63 23 -0.002 N/s

Northern Ireland 27 42 45 69 27 0.011 ***

Total 50 51 60 62 66 6 0.002 ***

Note: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” Proportion responding ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied. OLS regression analysis was used to monitor the effects of time (the survey year) on trust in political parties, generating the unstandardized beta coefficient and its significance. *>.001 ** >.01 *>.05. Selected years presented.

European satisfaction with democratic performance

Note: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” Proportion responding ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied. OLS regression analysis was used to monitor the effects of time (the survey year) on trust in political parties, generating the unstandardized beta coefficient and its significance. *>.001 ** >.01 *>.05. Selected years presented.

Key findings

• No inevitable downward spiral in support evident across US or Western Europe

• Fluctuations more common than linear falls• Enduring contrasts among countries and

institutions• Therefore short-term explanations focused on

probity and performance more likely than long-term secular shifts in cultural values

IV: ANALYSIS:WHAT DRIVES SATISFACTION?

Alternative explanations of satisfaction with democracy

1. Institutional performance?• Citizens rationally assess the quality of democratic

institutions, such as respect for human rights, free and fair elections, corruption, and civil liberties within each state

• Bratton and Mattes/Evans and Whitfield

Institutional performance indices and democratic satisfaction, 2005-7

Performancemeasured with a 10-year lag (mid-1990s)

Performance measured with

a 5-year lag(2000)

Performance measured

with no lag (2005)

Indicators Source R Sig. R Sig. R Sig.DEMOCRATIZATION

Liberal democracy Freedom House .364 * .335 * .257

GOOD GOVERNANCE Voice and accountability, Kaufmann-Kraay .296 * .316 * .362 *

Political stability Kaufmann-Kraay .430 ** .377 ** .475 **

Government effectiveness Kaufmann-Kraay .500 ** .435 ** .447 **

Regulatory quality Kaufmann-Kraay .539 ** .465 ** .360 **

Rule of law Kaufmann-Kraay .451 ** .450 ** .459 **

Corruption perceptions Kaufmann-Kraay .444 ** .410 ** .419 **

Summary good governance Kaufmann-Kraay .489 ** .430 ** .443 **

HUMAN RIGHTS Gender empowerment GEM, UNDP .500 ** .562 ** .529 **

Human Rights CIRI .286 .260 .253

Freedom of the press Freedom House .315 * .378 ** .365 **

‘Good’ governance institutions and democratic satisfaction

Note: Democratic satisfaction: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” The summary good governance index is created by summing the six items (listed in Table 10.1) contained in the Kaufmann-Kraay indices, 2005. Source: World Values Survey, 2005-7

Multilevel models, institutional performance indices and democratic satisfaction, 2005-7

Model A Model B

Age (in years) .486*** .524***

(.102) (.103)

Sex(male=1) -.189* -.183*

(.092) (.093)

Household income 10-pt scale 2.20*** 2.15***

(.109) (.110)

Education 9-pt scale -.470** -.514***

(.112) (.113)

Democratic knowledge .447*** .499***

(.106) (.107)

PERFORMANCE INDICES

Liberal Democracy, 2006 (Freedom House) 3.24*

(1.53)

Good governance index, 2006 (Kaufmann-Kraay) 4.94**

(1.50)

Constant (intercept) 63.6 63.6

Schwartz BIC 504,283 494148

N. respondents 55,953 54,817

N. nations 44 43

Alternative explanations of satisfaction with democracy

1. Institutional performance?• Citizens rationally assess the quality of democratic

institutions, such as respect for human rights, free and fair elections, corruption, and civil liberties within each state

• Bratton and Mattes/Evans and Whitfield

2. Or policy performance? • Public evaluates the government’s record on delivering

more specific economic, social, and foreign policy issues

• Hay/ Dalton/ Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg

2. Policy performance & democratic satisfaction, ECONOMIC N. Year R Sig

Economic development World Bank, GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity 49 2006 .309 **

Economic Growth World Bank, Mean GDP annual growth rate (%) 46 2000-2005 -.354 **

Unemployment rate World Bank, as % of total labor force 41 2004 -.158

Inflation rate World Bank, Consumer Price Index 46 2004 .346 *

GINI Index UNDP, measures income inequality 45 2004 -.003

Human poverty index UNDP, % population living below the specified poverty line, 21 2004 -.325

Tax revenue Tax revenue as % of GDP 35 2004 .256

Public expenditure Central government expenditure as % of GDP 40 2005 -.089

SOCIAL POLICY

Human Development Index UNDP, Human Development Index 46 2004 .216

Infant mortality World Bank, Rate (0-1 year) per 1000 live births 48 2000 -.032

Life expectancy UNDP, average years at birth 46 2000-2005 .080

Literacy rate UNDP, Adult literacy (15+) 46 2004 -.205

Education Combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary & tertiary schools

47 2002 .222

HIV Prevalence of HIV, total % pop aged 15-49 45 2003 .064

Measles UNDP, One-year olds fully immunized, % 48 2002 .037

Health spending Public health expenditure (% of GDP) 48 2001 .233

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Carbon emissions World Bank, per capita metric tons 47 2003 .044

Commercial energy use World Bank, per capita energy use, oil equivalent 44 2004 .134

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

Life satisfaction World Values Survey, 10-pt scale (V20) 49 2005-7 .585 **

State of health World Values Survey, 4-pt scale (V11) 49 2005-7 .566 **

Subjective happiness World Values Survey, 4-pt scale (V10) 49 2005-7 .581 **

Financial satisfaction World Values Survey, 10-pt scale (V68) 49 2005-7 .660 **

Subjective well-being index Combined life satisfaction, health, happiness, and financial satisfaction 49 2005-7 .684 **

Policy performance and democratic satisfaction, 2005-7 Multilevel Regression

Economic Development Human development

Subjective wellbeing

Age (in years) .484*** .458*** .618***

(.103) (.105) (.102)

Sex(male=1) -.199* -.172 -.096

(.093) (.095) (.093)

Household income 10-pt scale 2.15*** 2.14*** .596**

(.110) (.112) (.117)

Education 9-pt scale -.507*** -.546* -.665***

(.113) (.116) (.112)

Democratic knowledge .450*** .468*** .433***

(.107) (.109) (.106)

PERFORMANCE INDICES

Economic development, 3.24*

(1.39)

Human development index, 2005 1.86

(1.29)

Subjective well-being index 4.45***

(.116)

Constant (intercept) 63.3 64.0 63.4

Schwartz BIC 495,565 474,666 438,254

N. respondents 54,987 52,676 54,494

N. nations 43 41 44

Alternative explanations of satisfaction with democracy

1. Institutional performance?• Citizens rationally assess the quality of democratic institutions, such

as respect for human rights, free and fair elections, corruption, and civil liberties within each state

• Bratton and Mattes/Evans and Whitfield

2. Or policy performance? • Public evaluates the government’s record on delivering more specific

economic, social, and foreign policy issues • Hay/ Dalton/ Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg

3. Power-sharing institutions• Institutional rules shape the distribution of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’• Winner-take-all rules maximize public dissatisfaction• Chris Andersen et al. ‘Loser’s Consent’ (OUP 2005)

Dem satisfaction and institutions

Unitary state

Non-Unitary

Parliamentary monarchy

Presidential republic

Mixed executive

Monarchy

Majoritarian

Mixed

Proportional

Fede

ralis

mEx

ecuti

veEl

ecto

ral s

yste

m

64

65

70

68

60

64

67

61

64

Note: For the classification of institutions, see Norris (2008). The figure shows the mean levels of democratic satisfaction, measured by the standardized 100-point scale.Source: World Values Survey 2005

Dem satisfaction and institutions

Unitary state

Federal state

Parliamentary monarchy

Presidential republic

Mixed executive

Monarchy

Majoritarian

Combined Independent

Combined Dependent

Proportional rep

Fede

ralis

mEx

ecuti

veEl

ecto

ral s

yste

m

64

63

73

71

59

54

64

62

71

70

64

69

69

64

60

66

67

68

67

64

Losers WinnersNote: For the classification of institutions, see Norris (2008). Electoral ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are defined by voting support for the largest party in the lower house of the national legislature.Source: World Values Survey 2005

Institutions

CONTROLS Demographic characteristics

Age (in years) .470*** (.102)

Sex(male=1) -.202* (.092)

Socioeconomic resources Household income 10-pt scale 2.19***

(.109)

Education 9-pt scale -.449** (.112)

Democratic knowledge .454*** (.106)

INSTITUTIONAL INDICES Proportional Representation Electoral System .497

(1.63)

Type of Executive: Parliamentary monarchy 2.78 (1.43)

Federal state .715 (.168)

Electoral support: Winning party 1.45***

(.097)

Constant (intercept) 63.6Schwartz BIC 504,060

N. respondents 55,953N. nations 42

Table 10.5: Institutions and democratic satisfaction, 2005-7

V: CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

• Institutional Performance?– Democratic satisfaction is strongly related to all the

contemporary and lagged indicators of how well regime works, reflecting the quality of democracy and good governance

• Policy performance?– Democratic satisfaction unrelated to many indicators of policy

performance eg social indices, unemployment, and poverty rates

• Power-sharing institutions?– Mixed results

• Details: www.pippanorris.com