STATE OF FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIFTH DISTRICT

GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, APPELLANT, VS. CASE NO.: 5D13-4276

L.T. CASE NO.: 12-DP-117 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AND J.A., THE FATHER, APPELLEES. ____________________________/

INITIAL BRIEF OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Osceola County, Florida

Jennifer S. Paullin Florida Bar No. 896519 Appellate Counsel Guardian ad Litem Program Post Office Box 7800 Tavares, FL 32778 352.343.2736 tel 352.343.0257 fax Counsel for Guardian ad Litem Program

E-Copy Received Mar 18, 2014 2:43 PM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Citations ............................................ ii

Statement of the Case .......................................... 1

Statement of the Facts ......................................... 1 Summary of Argument ............................................ 1

Argument and Authorities ....................................... 1

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the father’s motion to withdraw the default judgment and in denying the GAL’s motion for rehearing .................................... 5

a. The law does not require that process summons be translated into Spanish. ............................ 7

b. The law does not require that paternity be

established prior to proceeding on a termination petition based on abandonment ...................... 13

Conclusion .................................................... 29

Certificate of Service ........................................ 20

Certificate of Compliance ..................................... 20

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TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Canakaris v Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (FL. 1980) .............. 7 E.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 878 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004) ............................. 7 Florida Department of Children and Family Services v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 2009) ................................... 6, 7 Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1992) ..................................... 6 Guardian ad Litem Program v. O.R. 45 So. 3d 974 (3rd DCA 2010) .................................. 11 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. V. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007) ................................. 6, 15 Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984) ....................... 6 In re A.N.D., 883 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ................ 7 J.M. v. Dep’t of Children and Fams., 833 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ............................ 11 Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises–Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004) ....................................... 6 Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.2007) .................... 6 State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2004) .................... 6 Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) ........ 7

Florida Statutes § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2012) ................................ 16 § 39.503, Fla. Stat. (2012) .................................. 13 § 39.801, Fla. Stat. (2012) ............................... 13, 14 § 39.803, Fla. Stat. (2012) ................................... 13 § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) .............................. 2 § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012) .............................. 2 § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2012) .............................. 2 § 63.062(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) ............................ 16, 17

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Rules Rule 8.400, Fla. R. Juv. Pro. (2012) .......................... 10 Rule 8.500, Fla. R. Juv. Pro. (2012) ....................... 9, 10 Rule 8.505, Fla. R. Juv. Pro. (2012 .................... 9, 10, 15 Rule 8.510, Fla. R. Juv. Pro (2012) ........................... 18 Other Authorities Part V, Forms for use with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Committee Comments (1991 Amendment) ................. 9

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a dependency case that originated in Seminole

County and transferred venue to Osceola County. The GAL Program

is the appellant, who is challenging the trial court’s order

granting the father’s motion to set aside default entered after

he failed to appear for an advisory hearing on a termination

petition, and challenging the trial court’s order denying the

GAL’s motion for rehearing on the same motion.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

F.P.B. was a newborn when she was removed from the care of

the mother.1 R. Vol. I, pp. 13-16, 20-30, 32-35. The shelter

petition reflects that the mother identified J.A. as the father,

but that he lives out of state and wants nothing to do with the

child. R. Vol. I, p. 22. Because the mother had had numerous

children removed from her care, and because the prospective

father was not around, the Department filed an expedited

termination petition. R. Vol. I, pp. 72-83. The petition, which

was filed in October 2012, alleged J.A. as the putative father

with an address in Mississippi. R. Vol. I, pp. 72-83. The

grounds alleged against the father included abandonment and

1 The mother failed to appear at the termination hearing and a consent by non-appearance was entered. R. Vol. I, pp. 193-194. She has not challenged that finding and is not a party to this appeal.

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continued harm irrespective of services. The allegation of

abandonment was based on the father’s failure to establish or

maintain any relationship with the child. The allegation of

continued harm alleged that the father had sexually abused one

of the mother’s other daughters when that child was 14 years

old. R. Vol. I, pp. 73-74.

At the mother’s advisory hearing in October 2012, an order

was issued to commence DNA testing between J.A. and the child

F.P.B., utilizing prior DNA obtained from J.A. R. Vol. I, p.

88. The clerk notes reflect that J.A. was identified as the

putative father but that he is not on the birth certificate. R.

Vol. I, p. 90. J.A.’s advisory hearing was then set for December

12, 2012 and he was personally served with process. R. Vol. I,

pp. 102-103. The father failed to appear despite proper notice

and the court issued an order, which reflected that, the “father

is defaulted assuming he is proved to be the bio father”. R.

Vol. I, pp. 130-131; T. (12/12/12), p. 4. A reunification case

plan was never prepared by the Department nor approved by the

trial court. The December 2012 judicial review order finds that

a case plan/reasonable efforts to reunify are not required when

the Department files a termination petition pursuant to section

39.806(1)(b) – abandonment, 39.806(1)(c) – continued harm, or

39.806(1)(f) – egregious harm. R. Vol. I, pp. 132-137.

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The court notes for a hearing held in February 2013 reflect

that the DNA test established J.A. as the biological father of

F.P.B. and that the default entered against J.A. for his failure

to appear at the advisory hearing will stand. R. Vol. I, p.

178. The hearing for the mother’s termination trial was set for

March 22, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 179. The clerk notes for that

hearing date reflect that the father was not present. R. Vol.

I, pp. 194-195.

The record reflects that May 28, 2013 was the first day

that the father appeared in court. R. Vol. II, pp. 224, 225; T.

(5/28/13), pp. 2, 8. The trial judge explained to the father

that he had been served with process and had been defaulted when

he failed to appear in court in December 2012. T. (5/28/13),

pp. 3-5. The father admitted he had never seen F.P.B. who was

just over one year old. T. (5/28/13), p. 7. The trial court

appointed counsel for the father. T. (5/28/13), p. 11.

The father filed a motion to set aside default in June

2013. R. Vol. II, pp. 234-247. In his motion, the father alleged

that the notice for the termination petition was improper

because he was not noticed of the pending dependency case, that

he had not been appointed counsel, and the summons was not

translated into Spanish pursuant to the forms contained in the

rules of juvenile procedure. R. Vol. II, pp. 234-247. An

evidentiary hearing was held on the motion in July 2013. In

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October 2013, at a subsequent hearing, the trial court granted

the father’s motion to set aside default, finding that the

notice was not adequate because it does not comply with the

rules of procedure, and that the father acted with due diligence

in seeking to set aside the default. T. (10/30/13), p. 16.

The GAL filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the

trial court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the

default because the father can read and write English and did

not need interpreter assistance. R. Vol. II, pp. 369-373. The

GAL also alleged that the father failed to act with due

diligence, failed to demonstrate excusable neglect and failed to

demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to the

termination petition. R. Vol. II, pp. 369-373. The trial court

denied the GAL’s motion for rehearing and issued a written order

stating that despite a request, no party submitted case law on

the issue. R. Vol. II, pp. 374-375.

The GAL filed a timely notice of appeal, and the following

is the initial brief on the merits.

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The father was served with process that complied with the

rules of juvenile procedure yet failed to appear at the

termination advisory hearing; therefore the default was proper

and should not have been set aside. When the father motioned to

vacate the default, he did not act with diligence, he did not

establish excusable neglect and he did not establish a

meritorious defense to the termination petition.

The default should not have be been vacated by the trial

court because there is no requirement in the rules of juvenile

procedure to translate a summons into Spanish. Although the

summons form, contained within the rules, has a Spanish

translation, the utilization of such form is not a requirement

by the rules. There is also no requirement for the Department to

establish paternity prior to proceeding on an expedited

termination petition. There is no requirement to provide court

appointed counsel until the father presents himself to the

court, which he did not do until well after the default had been

entered. There was no basis in the law to support the trial

court’s orders granting the motion to vacate default or denying

the GAL’s motion for rehearing; therefore the trial court

committed error as a matter of law and reversal is warranted.

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the father’s motion to withdraw the default judgment and in denying the GAL’s motion for rehearing.

When the trial court granted the father’s motion to

withdraw default judgment, the trial court erred and reversal is

warranted. The standard of review is de novo, because the issues

involve construction of a statute. State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d

408, 410 (Fla. 2004). The Florida Supreme Court summarized this

standard of review in the case of Florida Department of Children

and Family Services v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009):

This issue is one of statutory interpretation; accordingly, our review is de novo. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007). Legislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to discern that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain meaning. Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises–Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004). Where the statute's language is clear or unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent. See Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). Further, “[i]t is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992).

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Factual determinations are reviewed under abuse of discretion

standard of review. Canakaris v Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197,

1202-1203 (FL. 1980).

a. The law does not require that the process summons be translated into Spanish.

The Florida Supreme Court case of Florida Department of

Children and Family Services v. P.E., explains how a

constructive consent may be set aside under a three-part test.

14 So. 3d at 236-237. The moving party must act with due

diligence, must demonstrate excusable neglect and the existence

of a meritorious defense to the termination petition. Id.

(citing to E.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 878 So.

2d 493, 497 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004) and In re A.N.D., 883 So. 2d

910, 914 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here the father has failed to

act with due diligence, he failed to establish excusable neglect

and he failed to establish a meritorious defense; therefore, he

has failed to meet any part of the three part test as required

by P.E. Even though the trial court determined that the father

did act diligently, no finding was made concerning excusable

neglect or that a meritorious defense was established;

therefore, the elements outlined in the P.E. case were not met

by the father and the motion should have been denied.

Despite failing to meet the required threshold, the trial

court still granted the father’s motion, finding that service on

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the father was insufficient under the rules of juvenile

procedure. R. Vol. 2, pp. 346, 374-375. The trial court did not

make specific findings in the written order as to the

insufficiency of the notice, but at the hearing, the court made

an oral pronouncement, stating that the summons form utilized by

the Department is not generally accepted. T. (10/20/2013), p.

16. Additionally, the order denying the GAL’s motion for

rehearing clarifies the trial court’s findings: the father did

not receive proper notice, the father was not aware of his

paternity at the time of the default, the father was not

represented by counsel at the time of the default, and the

father acted with due diligence in seeking to set aside the

default. R. Vol. II, pp. 374-375. All findings of the trial

court are in error and should be reversed, as illustrated below.

Within the motion to set aside default, the father concedes

that he was served with process; however, he challenged that

because the process form served was not translated into Spanish,

service was not valid. R. Vol. II, p. 235-236. The father’s

motion states that the father does read and write English, but

his grandmother does not. R. Vol. II, p. 235-236. At the hearing

held in July 2013, the father testified that he moved to the U.S

when he was six years old and that he reads and write English.

T. (7/19/13), pp. 17-18. Despite those admissions and proper

service, the trial court vacated the default finding the notice

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was not adequate. Even if the rules require the summons to be

translated into Spanish, such translation would be irrelevant

here as the father reads and writes English perfectly well.

Such a technical interpretation of the rules should not operate

to excuse any party from appearing in court.

Irrespective of the father’s position, the rules of

juvenile procedure do not require a translation of a summons

into Spanish; therefore the trial court erred as matter of law.

The motion to vacate alleged, and the trial court agreed, that

the Department’s process summons did not match the forms as

identified and provided within the rules of juvenile procedure,

which are translated into Spanish. However, such forms are not

part of the rules and parties are not required to use those

forms as they are provided for convenience only. See, Part V,

Forms for use with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Committee

Comments (1991 Amendment)(“These forms have been updated to

conform to revisions to chapter 39, Florida Statutes, and the

Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. As the court has stated

before, the forms are not intended to be part of the rules and

are provided for convenience only.”).

Rather, Rules 8.500 and 8.505 of the Florida Rules of

Juvenile Procedure enumerate the requirements for the content,

process and service of termination petitions. Rule 8.500(b)

states that a termination of parental rights petition must

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include the name and last known address of the parents,

information regarding the children, facts supporting the

allegations of the petition, information about birth

certificates, and information about the provision of a case plan

if applicable. Rule 8.500(b), Fla. R. Juv. Pro. (2012).

Likewise, Rule 8.505 details the requirements regarding process

and service of termination of parental rights petitions. Rule

8.505, Fla. R. Juv. Pro. (2012). The rules do not mandate that a

copy of the petition, nor the notice or processes served, be

translated into Spanish or any other language.

Compare these rules to Rule 8.400(b) of the Florida Rule of

Juvenile Procedure, which requires “The case plan must be

written simply and clearly in English and the principal language

of the parents, if possible.” Thus, case plans must be written

clearly and in English; however, translation into the parent’s

principal language is not required. There is no like provision

regarding termination petitions, summonses, or service of

process. If there were, it would only elevate translation into a

suggestion, not a mandate.

Any requirement of a translation of a termination of

parental rights petition or summons in a parent’s primary

language would necessarily be explicit in the rules of juvenile

procedure if translation was intended to be mandatory. Because

the rules of procedure are specific, they must control over any

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general provision or forms, whether such forms are customary or

not or suggested or not. J.M. v. Dep’t of Children and Fams.,

833 So. 2d 279-282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(specific rules control

over general rules). In sum, the Department was not required to

utilize the form (which included a Spanish translation) provided

for by the rules of juvenile procedure, as such forms are mere

suggestions and not mandated by the rules. Therefore, the trial

court erred as its ruling equated to a requirement for such

translation.

In 2010, the Third District Court of Appeals, in Guardian

ad Litem Program v. O.R. 45 So. 3d 974 (3rd DCA 2010) quashed an

order of the trial court that mandated translations of motions

into a parent’s native language. The case explicitly states:

“[E]ven though the imprisoned respondent father is literate only in that language, we conclude that the trial court’s order in this dependency proceeding that, before its motions may be heard, the Guardian ad Litem Program must provide Spanish translations of its ‘Motion for Best Interest Finding’ and its request for an ‘Order for the Department to Provide an Adoption Case Plan,’ is not justified by the law. See Jimenez-Ramos v. U.S., 2008 WL 227975 (“Jimenez-Ramos has cited no law, and there is no law, requiring the Court to provide Jimenez-Ramos copies of the pleadings translated into Spanish.”)...as in every other legal situation, a trial court may not, in effect, restrict a litigant’s access to the court, by imposing a condition not authorized by law – in this case a costly one – just because she thinks it is a good idea or the fair thing to do.”

Id. at 974.

Simply stated, there is no statute or rule that requires

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dependency court documents, including termination summonses and

petitions, be translated into a party’s principal language. GAL

v. O.R. is directly on point and unequivocally states that the

court may not impose a condition not authorized by law simply

because it is a good idea or a fair thing to do. Here, the

record does not support any conclusion that English is not the

father's primary language. In fact, the evidence established the

contrary. Even if Spanish were J.A.’s primary language, because

there is no requirement for a Spanish translation, the trial

court erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient that

the father received proper notice to appear at the advisory

hearing. Such a finding places an undue burden upon the

Department where the law places no such burden, and reversal is

warranted.

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b. The law does not require that paternity be established prior to proceeding on a termination petition based on abandonment.

The Department’s duty is to provide notice of the

termination petition. The Department does not have a duty to

establish a prospective parent's paternity. Because the mother

early on in the case identified the father as a prospective

parent, the Department complied with section 39.801(3)(a)(6)

that requires notice via summons (personal service) on any

prospective parent identified under sections 39.503 or 39.803.

(See R. Vol. I, p. 22, the shelter petition where the mother

identified J.A. as the prospective father and stated that J.A.

lives somewhere in Mississippi and that he does not have any

contact with the child and wants nothing to do with the baby).

The father’s testimony at his motion hearing underscores

that fact. The father was aware of F.P.B.’s birth. T. (7/19/13),

p. 23. F.P.B. is the second child of the father with the same

mother. T. (7/19/13), p. 31. The father had a sexual

relationship with F.P.B.’s mother. T. (7/19/13), pp. 32, 36.

Although the father had a sexual relationship with the mother,

he did not have any other sort of relationship with her, and did

not assist the mother while she was pregnant and did not provide

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for F.P.B or for the first child he had with the mother. T.

(7/19/13), pp. 31, 36-37, 38.2 The father admitted F.P.B. could

have been his child and that he did nothing to determine whether

the child was his or not. T. (7/19/13), p. 37. The mother had

called (or texted) the father, advised him she was pregnant, and

the father did not believe her, he did not take her seriously.

T. (7/19/13), pp. 56, 57. The father did not register with the

putative father registry. T. (7/19/13), p. 59.

The father contended, and it appears that the trial court

erroneously agreed, that the establishment father’s paternity

was required prior to the entry of a default by non-appearance.

Such a requirement simply does not exist. Section 39.801(3)(d)

states:

"If the person served with notice under this section fails to personally appear at the advisory hearing, the failure to personally appear shall constitute consent for termination of parental rights by the person given notice. If a parent appears for the advisory hearing and the court orders that parent to personally appear . . ."

§ 39.801(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).

The section makes clear that any person, which includes

parents, legal custodians, a living relative of the child where

the parent is deceased or unknown and otherwise, served with

notice under section 39.801 would have been entitled to notice

if served and subsequently fails to appear at the advisory,

2 The father does not possess parental rights to that child, A.C. R. Vol. II, pp. 262-267, 277-280.

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consents to termination. See also Rule 8.505, Fla. R. Juv. Pro.

The legislature used the word ‘person’ and in the next sentence,

they distinguished ‘parents’ from ‘persons’. Id. By specifically

using the term ‘person’ initially, the legislature distinguished

that group from ‘parents’, who would be ordered to appear for

trial and failure to appear would constitute consent for

termination. See also Heart of Adoptions, Inc. V. J.A., 963 So.

2d 189 (Fla. 2007) where the FL Supreme Court held that a

putative father has a parental interest that can be terminated.

Had the father chosen to heed the admonition in the summons

and appeared for hearing, he would have been given the

opportunity to become a party to the proceedings by filing a

sworn affidavit of parenthood and he would have been appointed

counsel. Instead, when the father was served with the summons he

“didn’t pay no mind” to the papers. T. (7/19/13), p. 23. The

father did not merely neglect the proceedings, he admitted to

deliberately absenting himself by ignoring the summons. J.A.

received all the notice he was due under chapter 39 and the

juvenile rules. He was properly noticed and afforded an advisory

hearing. He is entitled to nothing more. However, by vacating

the proper default, the trial court permitted the father to

defeat termination and permanency for F.P.B by siting at home

and doing nothing. And his motion, based on an improper

technical interpretation of the rules, seeks to capitalize on

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his inaction. The trial court should not have permitted this.

The father was aware the mother was pregnant and admitted

to having a sexual relationship with the mother. T. (7/19/13),

pp. 56, 57. The father did not file a paternity action, nor did

he sign an affidavit of paternity. T. (7/19/13), p. 59. The

father testified that he did nothing to support the child since

he became aware of the DNA results in February 2013. T.

(7/19/13), p. 45. The father did not send letters, gifts or

money for the child. In sum, the father did not attempt to see

the child or establish a relationship with the child in any

meaningful way, both after the child was born and after the

father had the DNA proof that the child was his biological

child.

In Chapter 39, unmarried biological fathers are ‘alleged’

or ‘prospective’ parents only if their parental status falls

within the meaning of the terms contained in section 63.062(1),

Florida Statutes. § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2012).

The terms contained in section 63.062(1) are as follows:

1. The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the mother;

2. The minor is his child by adoption;

3. The minor has been established by court proceeding to be his child;

4. He has filed an affidavit of paternity pursuant to § 382.013(2)(c); or

5. In the case of an unmarried biological father, he has acknowledged in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, that he is the father of the

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minor, has filed such acknowledgment with the Office of Vital Statistics of the Department of Health within the required timeframes, and has complied with the requirements of subsection (2).

§ 63.062(1)(b)(1-5), Fla. Stat. (2012). The father did not

comply with any of the above conditions: he is not married to

the mother and he did not adopt the child. The father has not

filed an affidavit of paternity, nor a written acknowledgement

that he is the father. By failing to comply with any one section

of § 63.062(1)(b), J.A. failed to fall into the definition of

‘parent’ as defined by Chapter 39. He was thus only a

prospective parent, or ‘person’ as identified by chapter 39 and

the Department complied with all such requirements concerning

persons.

The trial court also erred by finding that because J.A. was

unrepresented by counsel at the time of the default, the default

should be set aside. J.A. was capable of seeking legal advice

after service of the petition rather than simply ignoring it.

The only other time J.A. could have been served with process was

at the time of shelter; however, that was not possible as the

father was not a caregiver or a part of the child’s life when

the child was removed from the mother and his whereabouts were

unknown. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-11, 20-30, 32-35. Because the

Department filed an expedited termination petition, the first

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notice to the father would have been for the advisory hearing.

The Department complied with the rules of procedure.

Moreover, an advisory hearing is where all parties, persons

or prospective parents are first advised of their right to

counsel in termination proceedings. That is the afforded due

process. See Rule 8.510(a)(2)(A), Fla. R. Juv. Pro. Had the

father appeared he would have been appointed representation for

the termination hearing. His failure to appear cannot operate to

thwart the default, as court appointed attorneys are not

assigned to persons or parties who are defaulted.

Thus, pursuant to the above, the trial court failed to

apply the correct law, and J.A. failed to demonstrate anything

to the contrary. He failed to appear for the advisory hearing,

he was on notice that the Department sought termination based on

his abandonment of the child, and no due process violation

occurred.

Apart from speculative due diligence as determined by the

trial court in its oral pronouncement and within the order

denying the GAL’s motion for rehearing, the requirements of the

P.E. case have not been met. Therefore, because the notice was

proper and J.A. failed to establish a meritorious defense and

excusable neglect, the trial court erred as a matter of law and

reversal is warranted.

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CONCLUSION

The trial court’s orders granting J.A.’s motion to withdraw

default and denying the GAL’s motion for rehearing should be

reversed. The case should be remanded to the trial court to

reinstate the consent by default against J.A. and to issue an

order for termination of his parental rights once manifest best

interest evidence is established.

Respectfully Submitted,

____/s/______________________ Jennifer S. Paullin Florida Bar No. 896519 Appellate Counsel Guardian ad Litem Program Post Office Box 7800 Tavares, FL 32778 352.343.2736 tel 352.343.0257 fax Counsel for Guardian ad Litem Program

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Initial Brief was served

electronically this 18th day of March 2014 as follows:

Rosemarie Farrell Rosemarie_farrell@dcf.state.fl.us

Michael Brownlee michael@brownstonelaw.com

____/s/______________________ Jennifer S. Paullin Florida Bar No. 896519

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this computer generated brief is composed in

12-point Courier New font and complies with the font

requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure and

9.210(a)(2).

____/s/______________________ Jennifer S. Paullin Florida Bar No. 896519