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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO ^2

IN RE: O.W. AND L.G.On Appeal from the StarkCounty Court of AppealsFifth Appellate District

Court of AppealsCase No. 2010-CA-00180

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT ULANDA W.

George L. Ramos (0058425) (COUNSEL OF RECORD)George L. Ramos, Attorney at LawP.O. Box 22561Akron, OH 44302george@attomeygeorgeramos.com330-618-8628faY• '110-767-5679

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT-MOTHER, ULANDA WAITERS

2085

^

DEC 13 2012

n_F'Rk ^^COl,lRTSUPREiVcIL (,1OUR°1 OF OHIO

Quay Compton (0071058) (TRIAL COURT COUNSEL OF RECORD)

Jerry A. Coleman (0071062) (APPELLATE COURT COUNSEL OF RECORD)Stark County Department of Job and Family Services221 Third Street, SECanton, OH 44702330-451-8781 Phone number for Attorney Compton330-451-8891 Phone number for Attonrey Colemanfax: 330-451-8769

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, STARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND

FAMILY SERVICES

Bernard Hunt (0020286) (TRIAL COURT GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR MOTHER)

Bernard L. Hunt, Esq.2395 McGinty Rd., NWNorth Canton, OH 44720330-498-8485

TRIAL COURT GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR APPELLANT-MOTHER, ULANDA

WAITERS

Thomas Cranston (0022799) (TRIAL COURT COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR FATHER;APPELLATE COURT COUNSEL FOR FATHER IN A SEPARATE APPEAL)Thomas K. Cranston & Cranston Law Office1369 Market Avenue, NorthCanton, OH 44714330-454-5612

COUNSEL FOR FATHER

James E. Brightbill (0037724) (TRIAL COURT COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR

PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER)James E. BrightbillOne Cascade PlazaSuite 1410Akron, OH 44308330-374-0300

COUNSEL FOR PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER, FRENCHY FRANKLIN

Linda Weyrick (TRIAL COURT GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE CHILDREN)

Friends of Children110 Central Plaza South, Suite 450Canton, OH 44702

TRIAL COURT GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE CHILDREN, O.W. AND L.G.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE INVOLVESSUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, IS A CASE OFPUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST,INVOLVES A TERIVIINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ANDTHE ADOPTION OF TWO MINOR CHILDREN,AND IS AN APPEAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS'DETERMINATION UNDER APPELLATE RULE 26(B)

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 4

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW 6

Proposition of Law Number I: In an appeal of a permanentcustody decision, a natural parent has right to effective assistanceof appellate counsel 6

PMosition of Law Number II: In filing an untimely applicationto reopen an appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B), anappellant need show only good cause for the delay; notextraordinary circumstances 9

CONCLUSION

CF'.RTTFTC.ATF, OF SERVICE

APPENDIX

10

10

Judgment Entry of Stark County Court of Appeals(October 30, 2012)

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE INVOLVESSUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IS A CASE OF

PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST,INVOLVES A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND

THE ADOPTION OF TWO NIINOR CHILDRENAND IS AN APPEAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS'

DETERMINATION UNDER APPELLATE RULE 26 ffl)

Background

This case involves the denial of a Appellate Rule 26(B) application to reopen an

appeal based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where that appellate counsel

failed to cite ineffective assistance of trial counsel and constitutional equal protection

issues as assignments of error, failed to disclose to his client the conflict of interest that

would have arisen for said counsel and his public defender office had he raised

ineffective assistance of counsel as an assignment of error.

However, this is not a criminal case. This is a case arising under Ohio's

dependency/neglect laws; O.R.C. Chapter 2151. The trial court granted permanent

custody of Appellant-Mother's two children, O.W. and L.G., the subject Children of this

casP, As Appellant-Mother was and is indigent, she was apointed counsel from the Stark

County Public Defender Office, who represented her in the trial court case, and in her

initial appeal. In said appeal, the appeals court affirmed the trial court's granting of

permanent custody of said Chilren to the Stark County Department of Jobs and Family

Servives (hereinafter SCDJFS), a children services agency. That happened on October

18, 2010.

Since then, and until she found undersigned counsel, Appellant-Mother

1

conscientiously had tried to find a lawyer who would help her overturn the permanent

custody order permenently depriving her of any rights and relationship with her children.

She estimates she contacted around forty to fifty lawyers during that time.

It was not until around early summer of this year, 2012, that she found

undersigned counsel.

Only Feasible Option

By the time Appellant-Mother had located and contacted undersigned counsel,

more than a year and a half had passed since the appeals court's permanent custody

affirmance. It was too late to file a direct appeal to this Court, and also too late to file a

motion for reconsideration in the appeals court.

The only option which seemed feasible for attempting to reopen her appeal was

an application to reopen her appeal by means of Appellate Rule 26(B). Since Appellate

Rule 26(B) applies only to criminal cases, Appellant-Mother urged the appeals court to

expand the meaning of Appellate Rule 26(B) such that natural parents who lost

permanent custody of their children may be able to use this provision to reopen an appeai

based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a right enjoyed by criminal

appellants. Also, as the 90 day deadline for filing the application has long since passed,

Appellant-Mother respectfully submitted her continuous, diligent search for counsel to

represent her to help her get her children back as good cause for the delay in filing.

Appeals Court Decision

9

The appeals court did not address the issue of Appellant-Mother's proposed

expansion of Appellate Rule 26(B) and so did not pass judgment on it. Instead, the

appeals court denied her application to reopen as being untimely filed. The appeals court

indicated Appellant-Mother's inability to find counsel to represent her in this matter did

not constiture good cause or an extraordinary cimcumstance so that her application could

be considered on its merits:

Appellant in the present motion seeks to justify her delay in filingthe present application upon her inability to find an attorney. Aspreviously noted, she is not entitled to counsel to file a motion andtherefore she has failed to establish "good cause" for waiting over a yearand 10 months to file her application. After so many years [sic], theequities weigh strongly in favor of the state of Ohio and its legitimateinterest in the finality of the judgment. We see nothing in appellant'sapplication or in her memorandum that might reasonably be described asgood cause for his [sic] delay in filing the application, and we thereforewill not reach the merits of appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. State v. Farrow, supra at ¶ 7 [Citing State v. Farrow 115 Ohio

St.3d 205, 206 N.E.2d 526, 527]

A review of the filings by appellant does not show that anyextraordinary circumstances have been raised to require a waiver of thetime requirement of App. R. 26(B). She has failed to demonstrate goodcause for a delayed filing. Accordingly, her failure to demonstrate good

hac;C fh,- dPnving her applicaiton to reopen.liause is a JuitiviviA ...,..,. ^^ -^_--^ ---a --- , ^

Court of Appeals Judgment Entry, October 30, 2012, at page 5. (A copyof said Judgement Entry is attached hereto.)

As a threshhold matter, Appellant-Mother respectfully submits she did not "wait"

over a year and 10 months to file her application; she was conscientiously and diligently

searching for lawyer who would assist her with her case. Also, it was not "so many

years;" her delay in filing was a year and 7 months, when one takes into accout the 90

day time limit to file an application to reopen an appeal under Appellate Rule 26(B).

:1

(See Appellate Rule 26(B)(1).)

Appellant-Mother respectfully submits the court of appeals erred in denying her

application, finding that that she failed to show good cause and extraordinary

circumstances for her failure to file her application on a timely basis. The court of

appeals also erred in using the extraordinary circumstance basis of App. R. 14(B) as a

factor.

The decision of the court of appeals inhibits the right of a natural parent who

seeks to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel assignment of error, but who,

even though she diligently searches, delays in being able to find counsel willing to

advocate and protect her -- and her child's rights -- on her and her child's behalf. As

indicated in the argument below, natural parents should and do have a constitutionally

protected due process right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in the first

instance, and by not allowing a parent to reopen an appeal due to a delay in being able to

find such counsel, is effectively being denied even the initial right to effective appellate

counsel. This is a matter of great importance, not only to those parents, but also to the

children involved who lose all legal rights to their parents, and also to society in general,

which seeks by it's constitutional provisions and laws, to protect the rights of parents and

their children.

In support of her position on these issues, appellant presents her argument below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

This appeal eminates from a dependency/neglect case, under O.R.C. Chapter

4

2151, below in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division

(hereinafter trial court). The complaint was filed August 20, 2008. Appellant-Mother

had two children, O.W. and L.G., the subject children of this case. They were born

August 6, 2005 and June 6, 2007, respectively. Appellant-Mother was and is indigent.

She also had and continues to have a learning disability, such that she was appointed a

guardian ad litem for herself in the trial court case. Also, due to her indigence, she was

appointed counsel from the Stark County Public Defender's Office to represent her in the

trial court case and the subsequent intial appeal.

The trial court case culminated in the granting of a permanent custody motion in

favor of Stark County Department of Jobs and Family Services (hereinafter SCDJFS), a

children services agency, and against Appellant-Mother, such that she permanently lost

all her parental rights and responsibilities with regard to her children, the subject

Children herein. The trial court granted permanent custody to SCDJFS on June 21, 2010.

The Stark County Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter appeals court)

affrirmed the trial court's judgment October 18, 2010.

As indicated above, Appellant-Mother was represented by counsel from the Stark

County Public Defender's Office in her trial court case and in her initial appeal. In fact,

for most of the latter portion of the trial court case and said appeal, Appellant-Mother

was represented by the same lawyer.

Upon the affirmance of the trial court permanent custody ruling by the appeals

court, Appellant-Mother was told the Stark County Public Defender Office could no

longer represent her if she wished to pursue an appeal to this Court. She was instructed

5

to contact the Ohio Public Defender Office. Appellant-Mother did that, but she was told

that the Ohio Public Defender Office did not handle this type of case. She then began her

search for another lawyer to pursue her case on her behalf, and had not found such a

lawyer until she found undersigned counsel in June, 2012.

Appellant-Mother, through undersigned counsel, filed her Application to Reopen

Appeal on September 12, 2012. The appeals court denied her application, finding it

untimely due to Appellant-Mother's failure to show good cause and extraordinary

circumstances, indicating not being able to find a lawyer was not a sufficient basis for so

showing. The appeals court decision was filed October 30, 2012.

Appellant-Mother timely files her Notice of Appeal, together with this

Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, today, December 13, 2012.

As indicated previously, Appellant-Mother respectfully submits the court of

appeals erred in denying her application, finding that her inability to find a lawyer to

represent her in this matter was not sufficient for a finding of good cause or extraordinary

circumstances suich that her application could be considered timely filed.

In support of her position on these issues, appellant presents the following

argument.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Probosition of Law Number I: In an appeal of a permanent custodydecision, a natural parent has right to effective assistance of appellate

counsel.

"...[T]he right of personal choice in family matters, including the right to live as

6

a family unit, is a fundamental due process right [under the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution, and Article I of the Ohio Constitution]." State ex rel.

Heller v. Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 6,13, 339 N.E.2d 66. ". ..[T)he right to raise a

child is an "essential" and "basic" civil right." In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48,

citing In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171, quoting

Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558.

A parent's child custody right is "paramont." In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48,

citing In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 87 6 0.O.3d 293, 297, 369 N.E.2d 1047,

1051-1052.

Permanent termination of parental rights has been described as "the familylaw equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case." In re Smith

(1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16,601 N.E.2d 45, 54. Therefore, parents"must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law

allows." Id. In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48.

Appellent-Mother sought to persuade the appellate court that it had the authority

to expand Appellate Rule 26(B), indicating that this Court has indicated that

"Constitutional requirements override any statutory void involved." Heller, at 14. Thus,

Appellate-Mother respectfully submitted to the appellate court that it, likewise, had the

authority to expand Appellate Rule 26(B) pursuant to constitutional requirements as

invoked therein.

... Cases involving the involuntary, permanent termination of parentalrights are unique. In these cases, the parents are in the position ofprotecting this fundamental due process right for both themselves and thechild. Failure to give indigent parents an effective right of appeal whenother parents are given such a right impinges on both their own and thechild's fundamental interests under the equal protection and due process

clauses." Heller, at 13.

^

As indicated by caselaw cited above and as promulgated by this Court, the Due

Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions require

that counsel representing parents in an appeal of a granting of permanent custody be

effective. See Heller, at 13, supra.

Appellant-Mother still has yet to enjoy this right. Her application to reopen her

appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B) was an effort to obtain an avenue to exercise

that right. Appellant-Mother respectfully submitted she was entitled, as are criminal

defendants, in being able to reopen an appeal by means of raising an ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel issue, pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B). Unfortunately,

even though she tried, she was not able to find a lawyer who was willing to help her until

about half a year ago, long after the time for filing had expired. In her appliation to the

appeals court, she indicated her inability constituted good cause for her failure to timely

file said application.

In it's decision denying her application, the appeals court cites Morgan v. Eads,

104 Ohio St. 3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, indicating that as a basis for

finding that good cause is not shown due to not having counsel:

An applicant has no right to counsel in filing the application, andhe does not show good cause if he has no counsel to submit a timelyApp.R. 26(B) application. Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St. 3d 142,2004-

Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157.

Court of Appeals Judgment Entry, October 30, 2012, at page 3. (A copyof said Judgement Entry is attached hereto.)

After a review of Eads, undersigned counsel fails to find where that case stood for

the propostition that failure to find counsel to pursue an App. R. 26(B) application did

00

not constitute good cause for an untimely filing. Appellant-Mother respectfully submits

that the appeals court erred in relying on that case for that proposition.

Appellant-Mother respectfully submits, given the circumstances discussed above,

that her inability to find a lawyer to pursue her case, even though she diligently searched,

did constitute good cause such that her application would have been considered timely

and the application heard on its merits.

Proposition of Law Number Il: In filing an untimely application to reopen anappeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B), an appellant need show only good cause

for the delay; not extraordinary circumstances.

As discussed above, the appeals court cited as past of its reason for denying

Appellant-Mother's Application to reopen her appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B),

was that she failed to show extraordinary circumstances under Appellate Rule 14(B) in

her delay in filing due to her inabilty to find an attorney on a timely basis. (See Court of

Appeals Judgment Entry, October 30, 2012, at page 5; a copy of which is attached

hereto.)

That portion of App. R. 14(B) relates to the late filing of an application for

reconsideration or en banc consideration pursuant to App. R. 26(A). (See App. R. 14

(B).) Appellant-Mother did not file an application for reconsideration or en banc

consideration pursuant to App. R. 26(A). Instead, she filed an applcaiton to reopen her

appeal, pursuant to App. R. 26(B). Thus, the "extraordinary circumstances" provision of

App. R. 14 (B) does not apply.

9

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this case raises substantial constitutional

questions, is one of public or great general interest, involves a termination of parental

rights and the adoption of two minor children, and is an appeal of a court of appeals'

determination under Appellate Rule 26(B). Appellant-Mother respectfully requests the

Court accept jurisdiction of this case, so that these important issues presented can be

reviewed on their merits.

Respectfully submitted,George L. Ramos, Counsel of Record

George L. Ramos, Attorney at Law

Ohio Supreme Court # 0058425

P.O. Box 22561Akron, OH 44302george@attomeygeorgeramos.com330-618-8628fax: 330-762-5679

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTULANDA WAITERS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that this document is being served to, by regular first class US mail

(unless otherwise noted below), postage prepaid, this 13th day of December, 2012, to:

- Quay D. Compton, Esq., and Jerry A. Coleman, Esq., attornies for Appellee, SCDJFS,

221 Third St., SE, Canton, OH 44702;

10

- Bernard Hunt, Esq., guardian ad litem for Appellant-Mother, 2395 McGinty Rd., NW,

North Canton, OH 44720;

- Thomas Cranston, Esq., attorney for Father, 1369 Market Ave. North, Canton, OH

44714;

- James E. Brightbill, Esq., attorney for Paternal Grandmother Frenchy Franklin, One

Cascade Plaza, Suite 1410, Akron, OH 44308;

- Linda Weyrick, Guardian ad Litem for the Children, Friends of Children - Stark County

Family Court CASA/GAL Program, 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 436, Canton, OH

44702.

George L. Ramos

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTULANDA WAITERS

11

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO 1.^^ A^ J^ ^.3^

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN RE: O.11V. AND L.G.

; JUDGMENT ENTRY

; CASE NO. 201 t}-CA-{7D180

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to appellant Ulanda W.'s motion to

re-open her direct appea! pursuant to App.R. Z6(R). This Court recently upheld the

judgrnent of the Stark County C^ourt of Cornmon Pleas, Juvenile Division granting

permanent custody of O.W. and L.G., minor children to the appellee, the Stark County

Ucp'ar ir^e^ It of Jcus :•̂ . d Fa'"il, Se^'j`^s {hereinafter SCDJFS}. See, rn re: o. W. and

^.G., 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-0019^, 2010-Ohic^-5100.

App. R. 2^ tE^) states:

(B} Application for reopening..I,^ fnr rannAnitl(7 {lf khE

(1 } A defendant in a crirninai case I+lay ppN^r ^^•^ ^^r^ ^-- -^ -

appeal frorn the judgment of conviction and sentence, based on a claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. An application for reopening

shall be filed in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within

ninety days from journalization of the appeklate judgment un9ess the

applicant shows good cause for filing at a later tirne.

t2) An application for reopening shalf contain all of the following:A,^RUE COpY ° fE C^E^

^At^CY, S. ftE1NSOL^^g

gy ^.1^^=:^:t:^:^.®^^ ^f'^! f.:, %

I • ^G' • ^, ^ '^Y.il^ tt64aboo'otaoet^Koosssso^aases

Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-001802

(a) The appellate case number in which reopening is soUght and

the trial court case number or numbers from which the appeal was taken;

(b) A showing of good cause for untimely filing if the application is

filed more than ninety days after journalization of the appeliate judgment.

(c) One or more assignments of error or arguments in support of

assignments of error that previously were not considered on the merits in

the case by any appellate court or that were considered on an incomplete

record hecause of appellate counsel's deficient representation;

(d) A sworn statement of the basis for the claim that appellate

counsel's representation was deficient with respect to the assignments of

error or arguments raised pursuant to division (B) (2) (c) of this rule and

the manner in which the deficiency prejudicially affected the outcome of

the appeal, which may include citations to applicable authorities and

references to the record;

(e) Any parts of the record available to the applicant and ali

supplemental affidavits upon which the applicant relies.

By its express terms, App. R. 26(B) is limited to"criminaJ defendants." However,

assuming arguendo that the rule applies in a permanent custody setting, we would

nonetheless deny appellant's motion in the case at bar.

Our original judgment was filed on October 18, 2010 and appeilant's application

was filed September 14, 2012. Accordingly, appellant's application was not timely filed

within ninety (90) days of the journalization of our opinion in appellant's case.

Stark County, Case No. 2019-CA-00189 3

As mandated by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), an application for reopening must be filed

within ninety days of journalization of the appellate judgment which the applicant seeks

to reopen. The applicant must establish "good cause" if the application for reopening is

filed more than ninety days after journalization of the appellate judgment. State v.

Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio

St.3d 88, 1995-C?hio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784.

App.R. 14(B), "Enlargement or reduction of time," states:

For good cause shown, the court, upon motion, may enlarge or

reduce the time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act,

or may permit an act to be done after the expiration of the prescribed time.

The court may not enlarge or reduce the time for filing a notice of appeal

or a motion to certify pursuant to App.R. 25. Enlargement of time to file

an application to reconsider pursuant to App.R. 26(A) shall not be granted

except on a showing of extraordinary circumstances.

The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted App.R. 26 and App. R. 14, stating that

hnth were °intended to allow the belated presentation of colorable claims that

defendantslappellants were prevented from presenting timely by particular

circurnstances. Lack of effort or imagination, and ignorance of the law, are not such

circumstances and d© not automatically establish good cause for failure to seek timely

relief." State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 1998-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784.

An applicant has no right to counsel in filing the application, and he does not

show good cause if he has no counsel to submit a timely App.R. 26(B) application.

Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-8110, 818 N.E.2d 1157.

Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-001804

The Supreme Court has upheld judgments denying applications for reopening

solely on the basis that the application was not timely filed and the applicant failed to

show "good cause for filing at a later time." See, e.g., State v, Keith, 119 Ohio St.3d

161, 892 N.E.2d 912, 2008-Ohio-3866; State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-ahio-

4755, 814 N.E,2d 861; State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812

N.E.2d 970.

In State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 647 N.E.2d 784(1995), the Supreme Court

stressed,

Neither Murnahan nor App.R.26( f3) was intended as an open

invitation for persons sentenced to long periods of incarceration to concoct

new theories of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in order to have

a new round of appeals. Rather, both were intended to allow the belated

presentation of colorable claims that defenciantslappeiiants were

prevented from presenting timely by particular circumstances. Lack of

effort or imagination, and ignorance of the law, are not such

^-m,,,t ,4n nnt ^ionmatir:aliv establish qood cause for failure to

seek timely relief.

Id. at 90-91, 647 N.E.2d at 786, discussing State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584

N.E.2d 1204(1992). Further, in Stafe v. Farrow 115 Ohio St.3d 205, 206, 874 N•E-2d

526, 527 the Supreme Court observed,

Consistent enforcement of the rule's deadline by the appellate

courts in Ohio protects on the one hand the state's legitimate interest in

the finality of its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims

,#ark County, Case No. 2014-CA-00180Q 5

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and

resolved. State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Qhio-4755, 814

N.E.2d 861, ¶ 7. State v. Sweeney 131 Ohio App.3d 765, 768, 723 N.E.2d

655, 657 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.1999).

Appellant in the present motion seeks to justify her delay in filing the present

application upon her inability to find an attorney. As previously noted, she is not entitled

to counsel to file a motion and therefore she has failed to establish "good cause" for

waiting over one year and 10 months to file her application. After so many years, the

equities weigh strongly in favor of the state of Ohio and its legitimate interest in the

finality of the judgment. We see nothing in appellant's application or in her

memorandum that might reasonably be described as good cause for his delay in filing

the application, and we therefore will not reach the merits of appellant's claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Farrow, supra at 117.

A review of the filings by appellant does not show that any extraordinary

circumstances have been raised to require a waiver of the time requirement of App.R.

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failure to demonstrate good cause is a sufficient basis for denying her application to

reopen.

Stark County, Case No, 201 G-CA-001806

For the foregoing reasons, appellant's motion to re-open her appeal is hereby

DENIED.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

HDN. W. SCC} GWIN

4wnm. PATRICIA A. DE1^INEY

^^-Q- . ^ ULE A. EDWARDS