DIAGNOSTIC REVIEW OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: THE …...factors to determine the cultural factors of...

Abstract

Cultural factors influence the genesis, lifetime, and demise of an insurgency. To understand insurgency and the environment that breeds it, one has to understand culture. In other words, without understanding the culture of a given population, one will not understand the insurgency within it. The knowledge of one's 'enemy' and his culture and society may be more important than the knowledge of his order of 'battle'. This paper views culture as a key factor to understanding insurgence. It examines culture from a security, in particular, military perspective and adopts the analytical methods and models of Mao Tse-tung and Bard O'Neill to exemplify the key elements of insurgency. The cultural factors are applied to the insurgency key factors to determine the cultural factors of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Preamble

This paper looks at culture and its importance in defining insurgency. The paper examines culture from a security, in particular, military perspective. Prevalent and recurring ideas of military origin are considered to develop a common definition of

DIAGNOSTIC REVIEW OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

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culture that establishes factors to judge whether or not a situation is culturally related. The paper also examines the question of insurgency by considering definitions and models of Mao Tse-tung and Bard O'Neill as theirs exemplify the key elements of an insurgency. The cultural factors are applied to the insurgency key factors to determine the cultural factors of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The adoption of the Boko Haram insurgency does not preclude, where relevant, the mentioning of other insurgencies in Nigeria.

Culture Defined

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2004) provides the official definition of culture used by the United States Department of Defence (DOD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It defines culture as “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings and canals, boundary lines and in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.” The limitation of this definition is indicative of the US military's limited understanding of culture. Although this definition focuses on the material aspect of culture, it ignores the broader, more comprehensive meaning of culture involving the internal workings of man. The more complete definitions of culture are usually found in non-military writings. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary (2004) defines culture as:

a. the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behaviour that depends upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations

b. the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group

c. the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that

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characterizes a company or corporation

Instructive in this definition is the inclusion of values, attitudes, goals, beliefs, and behaviours. Professor John A. Lynn, former Foreign Policy Aide to President Clinton, current political scientist at Harvard, and author of Battle (2003: xix-xx) defines culture or “conceptual culture” as “values, beliefs, assumptions, expectations, preconceptions, and the like.” Samuel P. Huntington, Professor at the prestigious Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, describes culture in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (1996: 41-42) as “the common theme in virtually all civilization” manifested in the “overall way of life of a people” involving “values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations have attached primary importance.” Huntington adds that the “crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures.” Ambassador Edward L. Peck, former State Department Chief of Mission in Iraq from 1977-1980 and former Executive Secretary for the American Academy of Diplomacy states that culture is the dominant group's “values, beliefs, attitudes and behavioural norms which influence their outlook on life and acceptance to change.” (2004) Edgar Schein, Professor at the Sloan School of Management at MIT and author of the Theory of Organisational Culture, writing in Organisation Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives edited by Mary Jo Hatch (1997: 210) asserts that “culture is not a single belief or assumption, but it is a set of interrelated beliefs and assumptions.”

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski (1944: 36, 69), renowned anthropologist and scientist, defines culture as an “integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs” which “includes also some elements which apparently remain intangible, inaccessible to direct observation, and where


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neither form nor function is very evident,” such as “ideas and values... interests and beliefs.”

As resonated by Michael L. Davidson (2005), a senior military officer of the United States, these various definitions provide recurring ideas describing culture. Culture primarily involves values, attitudes, beliefs, goals which are displayed in some form of religion, behaviour and customs. Thus, the working definition for culture that is adopted for this paper is the values, attitudes, beliefs, and goals that are manifest in especially religion, but also in behaviour and customs. The Webster's New World College Dictionary (2002) affords us the definitions that follow. Values are the social principles or “standards held or accepted by an individual, class or society.” (p.1579) Attitudes are the dispositions, opinions, or mental sets held by individuals or groups of people. (p. 91) Belief is the “mental acceptance of something as true” especially a doctrine, creed, or tenet. (p. 132) Goals are objects or ends that a person or group strives to obtain – an aim or aspiration. (p. 607) These four factors – values, attitudes, beliefs, and goals – are prevalent and common in most civilizations and cultures and therefore adopted as a yardstick to determine if a situation is or not cultural.

Insurgency Defined

This section of the paper examines, simultaneously, the methods and writings of Mao Tse-tung, and the analytical model of Bard E. O'Neill, developing a general definition of insurgency.

Guerrilla (insurgent) warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors.

Mao Tse-tung, 1937 (On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961, p. 46)


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The Maoist strategy is the most conceptually elaborate and most widely copied insurgent strategy in the world. The strategy is multifaceted and emphasises the interrelation of popular support, organisation, and environment. The three phases of the Maoist insurgency strategy are organisation-terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile-conventional warfare.

The organisation-terrorism phase focuses on political organization and mobilization through gaining popular support. First, insurgents create a network of cells (cellular networks) in order to disseminate political propaganda more efficiently and mobilize popular support. Key leaders from the community are actively recruited to facilitate the important task of detaching the populace from the government. Next, social groups are established to both accommodate the needs of the people and spread insurgent ideology in that area. In cases where members of the community resist or reject the insurgent ideology, terrorism is used against them. Selectively using terrorism demonstrates the government's ineffectiveness to protect itself and its people and persuades or intimidates obstinate members of the community who oppose the insurgency. The organisation-terrorism phase ends with the insurgents constructing shadow-government structures (parallel hierarchies) in order to institutionalise support and provide de facto control of the population.

The second and longest phase of the Maoist insurgency strategy is the guerrilla warfare phase. The goal of this phase is to use guerrilla warfare tactics to win insurgent victories that will demoralise the government, garner defections from the government and create a sense of apathy in the government. The guerrilla warfare phase itself is broken down into three stages – populace isolation, regional control expansion, and infrastructure establishment. The first stage, populace isolation, focuses on isolating the people from the government. The insurgent military conducts hit and run


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tactics against the government in order to provoke the government to develop a strategic defensive posture, disperse its forces, and protect potential target from the insurgents. These targets are usually economic, military, or infrastructure related and of great importance to the government. The hit and run tactics may also provoke the government to enact counterterrorist measures that injure innocents, upsetting members of the populace and garnering their support. The second stage, regional control expansion, involves the insurgents expanding their region of control and organisational size. As regional forces emerge, full time forces unite with them and connect villages into the larger political networks. The parallel hierarchy is more visible, resembles the state apparatus, and has auxiliary organisations that are controlled by revolutionary cells linked to the central government. The latter portion of regional control expansion focuses on the establishment of arsenals, arms productions facilities, and hospitals. During this period, the military recruits full time guerrillas, creates and trains regular army units, and establishes a reserve system. The military organises into three levels – regional, district, and local – with all levels being coordinated by a central headquarters in pursuit of common military and political objectives. With the military organised, the parallel hierarchy set up, and operating bases secure; the insurgents continue to avoid large governmental military sweeps, patrols and positional battles to demonstrate the government's impotence and inability to destroy them and emphasise their permanence in the society. However, the insurgents continue to send their agents into governmentally controlled areas to implant new guerrilla cells and networks.

The third and final phase of the Maoist insurgency strategy is the mobile-conventional warfare phase. This is the offensive phase of the strategy and is characterised by open civil war between the insurgent forces and the government. The overall goal of this phase is the displacement of the established regime. During this phase, the regularisation of guerrilla forces into conventional forces and


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the utilisation of mobile-conventional warfare occur. The insurgent military focuses on destroying the government forces while the insurgent political body focuses on displacement of government authorities. The scale of operations throughout this phase demands high-level leadership skills, effective communications, and an efficient logistics system.

The Maoist strategy of insurgency warfare has been copied and used for years by numerous revolutionaries seeking to overthrow their government. It theoretically entails an orderly progression through the three phases – organisation-terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile-conventional warfare – in order to secure victory. However, the factor most pivotal to the success of each stage and the overall strategy is the gaining and sustaining of popular support. Gaining and maintaining popular support sustains the insurgency throughout all the phases by providing food, shelter, able bodies, expertise, and momentum to the insurgents. Without popular support the insurgency would fail.

Bard O'Neill provides a framework for the systematic analysis of insurgency warfare. O'Neill's framework borrows a lot from, and is an improvement on, the Maoist insurgency strategy. To comprehend the nature of insurgency, one must identify and understand the goals, means, and strategy of the insurgent. O'Neill's model enables us to examine an insurgency and determine the goals, means, strategy, and the probability of the insurgency's success. O'Neill defines insurgency as “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organisational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.” (O'Neill 1990, p. 13) Critical in this definition is the focus of the insurgent party namely, to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the aspects of politics; and the means by which they will


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accomplish it is through violence and political resources.

The aspects of politics represent the political apparatus of the ruling government. There are four aspects of politics namely, the political community, the political system, the authorities and policies. The political community comprises those who act on a daily basis in the process of making and executing decisions. The political system comprises the salient values, rules and structures that make up the basic framework guiding and limiting the making and execution of binding decisions. Values are of utmost importance in the political system and represent the general ideas of the desirable such as equality, justice, liberty, and individualism whereas rules are used to encourage the desired patterns of behaviours in the society. The perception of legitimacy or illegitimacy in one of the political aspects determines whether an insurgency will develop or not. There are four types of political systems – traditional autocracy, modernising autocracy, authoritarian, and pluralistic – each emphasises a set of values. Traditional autocracy emphasises the leader's right to rule based on birthright and religion. Its key values are elitism, ascription, and personalism. Modernising autocracy's key value is building state power; however it still depends on birthright, elitism, and religion to legitimise leadership and ensures the masses do not participate in governing. The authoritarian political system's key values are consensus and equality with a goal of completely controlling all aspects of political, economic and social life of all its citizens. The pluralistic system's values are the individual freedom, liberty, and compromise and it accomplishes this through a democratic form of government. Usually, it is discontent with this aspect of politics that gives rise to an insurgency. The third aspect of politics is the authorities. Authorities are those invested with the power to command or act on behalf of the ruling group. When the nonruling group considers specific individuals illegitimate because their behaviour is either inconsistent with existing values and norms or


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viewed as corrupt, ineffective, or oppressive, an insurrection can arise. The final aspect of politics is policies – rules or plans that embrace the general goals and acceptable procedures of government. If the nonruling group believes that the state's policies discriminate against them because of their ethnic, religious, racial, or economic standing; they may resort to violence to change existing social, economic, or political policies they believe discriminate against particular groups.

The goal of the insurgents and the aspect of politics that the insurgents focus on to achieve that goal identifies the type of insurgency with which one is dealing. There are seven different types of insurgencies; anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist and preservationist. The first four types of insurgencies are revolutionary because their goal is to completely change the existing political system. The primary goal of the anarchist is to eliminate all institutionalised political arrangement. The main goal of the egalitarian is to impose a new political system based on the value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to radically transform social structure and mobilise the populace. The primary goal of the traditionalist is to displace the political system with an autocratic system and leader supported by the clergy, military, and nobility. The value they articulate is rooted in ancestries and religion. The main goal of the pluralist is to seek revolutionary transformation by establishing political structures that are differentiated and autonomous. Their goal is to establish a system that values freedom, liberty and compromise. The primary goal of the secessionist is to separate completely from the state and develop a new, independent government. The main goal of the reformist is for increased political, social, and economic benefits for their constituents; however, unlike the secessionist, they want to keep the same government. The primary goal of the final type of insurgency, the preservationist, is to maintain the status quo or


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current political system.

The ability to differentiate between the goals of each movement enables one to identify, understand and differentiate between the various types of insurgencies. However, difficulties can occur identifying the different types of insurgencies when insurgent movements experience goal transformation, goal conflicts, goal ambiguity, utilise misleading rhetoric, or have multiple participants.

Six Key Factors: The Example of Boko Haram

The most prominent feature of the O'Neill analytical model is the six key factors he deems crucial for the success of an insurgency. The six factors are popular support, the environment, organisation, cohesion, external support, and the government's role.

Mao Tse-tung's and Bard O'Neill's models provide insightful definitions for insurgency. O'Neill incorporates Mao's definition and model of insurgency into his. Thus the six key factors of insurgency are representative of both O'Neill's and Mao's models. These factors serve as standards for evaluating and assessing the military, political, and strategic effectiveness of an insurgency and are so applied as a framework for analyzing the Boko Haram insurgency. The cultural factors of the Boko Haram insurgency require viewing the key insurgency factors through a cultural lens. In this section of the paper, each insurgency factor – popular support, environment, organization, cohesion, external support and government response – is examined to derive the four aspects of culture namely, values, attitudes, goals and beliefs. The four aspects of culture are fore grounded in each insurgency factor.

One of the most important factors in determining the success of an insurgency is popular support. The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people and for many insurgent leaders


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popular support is the overriding strategic consideration. To fully understand popular support, one must understand the two types of popular support, the role of the intellectuals and masses, and the different techniques utilised by insurgents to gain support.

Jama atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda awatih wal-Jihad which translates into the adopted official name – The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad – also known as People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad, but better known by its Hausa name – Boko Haram – is a violent insurgent organisation based in the northeast of Nigeria. Before colonisation and subsequent annexation into the British Empire, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign Sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. The Bornu Sultanate emerged after the overthrow of the Kanem-Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years. The Bornu Sultanate of the Kanuri is distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate of the Hausa/Fulani established in 1802 by the military conquest of Usman dan Fodio. Both the Bornu Sultanate and Sokoto Caliphate came under the control of the British in 1903. Activities of early Christian missionaries as a consequence of British colonisation, who used Western education as a tool for evangelism was viewed with suspicion by the local population. The history as narrated, the allegiance of the people to the Bornu Sultanate, and increased dissatisfaction with the activities of the British gave rise to many fundamentalists among the Kanuri and other peoples of northeast Nigeria and explains the genesis of sympathy and popular support for Boko Haram. One of such famous fundamentalist was Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, who was at the height of his notoriety during the 1970s and 1980s. He was sent into exile by the Nigerian authorities; he refused to believe Mohammed was the Prophet and instigated riots in the country which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people.


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It makes a lot of sense to view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots.

There are two types of popular support; they are active and passive support. Active supporters are those willing to risk personal sacrifices on behalf of the insurgents. They provide intelligence, concealment, shelter, supplies, and sometimes perform acts of disobedience against the government. Passive supporters are those who merely sympathise with the aim and activities of the insurgents. While passive supporters do not directly provide aid to the insurgents, their refusal to betray the insurgents is a key factor because it enhances the insurgent's ability to elude government officials. Active and passive supports enhance the insurgents' ability to continue to resist and thwart the government's ability to conduct an effective counterinsurgency.

Populations in which insurgents seek support are usually heterogeneous and the insurgents use this to their advantage. Varying economic classes, races, ethnicity, religion, and education levels necessitate that insurgents comprehend the culture from which they are recruiting. Utilising ideological arguments that foster governmental discontent, insurgents actively recruit from universities and middle level government positions. The intellectual class is crucial to the insurgency because it provides the insurgent leadership with strategic vision, organisational know-how, and technical competence. There are six methods insurgents use to gain support and recruits: charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government counter-terrorism, and demonstration of potency. Charismatic attraction describes the force of the leader's personality, which becomes the principal reason that people support the insurgency. Many times, the leader is so persuasive because is usually able to tap into the psyche and the traditions of the culture. Esoteric appeals are focused at the intellectual community or strata and


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seek to clarify the environmental conditions by putting them in a theoretical context that neat, orderly interpretations and explanations for all perceived social, economic, and political realities. Both ideology and theology are esoteric in nature. Exoteric appeals focus on the real grievances of the masses and the intelligentsia. Grievances of the masses are on genuine matters such as the need for food, medical assistance, jobs, corruption and repression by local officials, and land reform. The intelligentsia grievances are underemployment, unemployment, and the psychosocial problems (loss of status, recognition, etc) related to it. When exoteric and esoteric methods fail to obtain popular support, insurgents turn to the use of terrorism. The selective use of terrorist acts by the insurgents is intended to gain popular support by demonstrating the government's inability to stop insurgent plans.

In 1995, Boko Haram was said to be operating under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation with Mallam Lawal as the Leader. When Lawal left to continue his education, Mohammed Yusuf took over the leadership of the group. Yusuf's leadership allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity. Ironically, Yusuf was a charismatic leader, highly educated who lived a lavish life. Yusuf officially founded Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri. Boko Haram uses the internet to propagate its activities and enhance its radicalisation and circulation of extremist ideologies suggesting it has members of the intelligentsia and high profile Nigerians as members. It is involved in a recruitment drive targeting Muslims between ages 17 and 30, and freed prisoners through prison breaks. Boko Haram has adopted selective terrorism and attacks both Christian and Muslim worship centres to trigger reprisal attacks in all parts of the country, thereby distracting authorities so they can unleash attacks elsewhere, unhindered.

The fifth method of obtaining popular support, the provocation of


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government counter-terrorism, focuses on instigating and intensifying government counter-terror and repression in order to further alienate the populace. This demonstration of potency has two dimensions: meeting the people's need through an administrative apparatus that provides social services (medical care, schools) and gaining the military initiative. Boko Haram through Mohammed Yusuf established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. The centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future jihadists to fight the State. In 2004, the religious complex was relocated to Yusuf's home State of Yobe in the village of Kanamma near the Niger border. It is instructive that Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. Prior to this incidence, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the group. When government swung into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. The group's founder and then leader Yusuf was killed during this time while in police custody. After Yusuf's killing, a new leader, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, emerged. He is aided by Kaleed Abdulbanawi and Abubakar Adam Kambal, both of whom have close ties and links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. After the killing of Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno State in January 2011. It resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of frequency and intensity.

The second key factor critical to the overall success of an


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insurgency is the environment. Two general components of the environment are the physical aspect and the human dimension. The physical aspect refers to the terrain, climate, and transportation-communication system. The human dimension concentrates on demography, social structure, economics and the political culture and system. Many scholars of insurgency focus on the physical aspects of the environment; however, the human dimension of the environment is just as significant. The social structure of the environment has a large impact on progression of insurgency. Societies are structured both vertically and horizontally. Vertically they are divided along the lines of race, ethnicity, and religion. Horizontally they are divided by class and caste. The vertical societal division – race, ethnicity, and religion – is the prominent division that insurgencies most commonly exploit. Societal cleavages along racial, ethnic and religious lines are frequently among the root causes of insurgency and can be either helpful or detrimental to the progression of an insurrection. Insurgents usually look for and find the disadvantaged group in a population, identify its general attitudes, various goals, and its specific beliefs and grievances; and gain its support through propaganda and ideology. Focusing on the ethnic, racial or religious stratifications found in the social structure enables insurgents to craft propaganda or ideological messages in line with the populace's beliefs and attitudes and mobilise them to action.

Boko Haram is an Islamist movement which strongly opposes man-made laws. The organisation is a Jihadist group that seeks to establish Sharia law in Nigeria. The nomenclature “Boko Haram” comes from the Hausa word boko meaning “western education” and the Arabic word haram figuratively meaning “sin”, literally “forbidden”. Thus, loosely translated from Hausa, the nomenclature means “western education is forbidden”. The group has a strong opposition to anything Western, which it sees as corrupting Muslims. The group publicly extols its ideology despite


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the fact that its founder and former leader, Yusuf, was a highly educated man, a graduate who spoke proficient English. The members of the group do not interact with the local Muslim population and have carried out assassinations in the past of anyone who criticises it, including Muslim clerics. Boko Haram is composed of two arms – a larger organisation which focuses primarily on discrediting the Nigerian government and a smaller mundane of this group which is increasingly sophisticated and deadly in its objectives and tactics.

The third key factor of an insurgency is organisation. Efficient organisation enables insurgents to compensate for their material inadequacies and the resource superiority of the state. Insurgent organisations have three structural dimensions – scope, complexity, and cohesion – and two functions – instrumental services and channels for expressive protest – that are of primary interest. Scope refers to the numbers and kinds of people across the political spectrum who either play key roles in the movement (political cadres, terrorists, guerrillas, and regular soldiers) or provide active support. Complexity refers to the organisational structure of an insurgency. It is the ability of the insurgent leaders to identify, integrate, coordinate, and diversity their organisation into military operations, communications, transportation, logistics, and training. Increasing the complexity enables insurgents to more effectively perform the expressive and instrumental functions that attract adherents. The instrumental and expressive functions of parallel hierarchies are simple. Participation in an insurgency provides low self esteem individuals, loners and failures with a sense of belonging to a cause. It also provides them with structure, an avenue to vent their frustration, and a new family. In addition, if the insurgency has material – food, medical supplies, agricultural tools – it can improve the welfare of its members. Carefully examining the organisations of insurgency provides good insight into the progress of the insurgents and the degree of threat they will


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present the government.

Cohesion, the fourth factor in determining the success of an insurgency, has been argued by some authorities as being the critical principle behind all effective insurgent strategy. Centralised command aids the insurgents' ability to inflict damage on the government and garner popular support. Although cohesion has been shown to have a profound impact on the success of an insurgency, the absence of it does not always result in failure. When the government loses its will to resist, it offsets the effects of the insurgents' disunity.

The fifth key factor, external support, can be in the form of moral, political, material, and sanctuary support. Moral support involves a public announcement by a foreign body or government that the insurgency is just and admirable. Political support involves a foreign nation championing and supporting the insurgency's strategic goal in the international arena such as the United Nations. Material support entails the foreign nation actually providing monetary, weapon, medical, and training support to the insurgency. Sanctuaries are areas provided by the foreign government, in which insurgents can train, stockpile arms, plan operations, and escape home government retribution.

Shabab of Somalia, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region, and Boko Haram have explicitly and publicly voiced their intent to target Westerners, the United States specifically, and to collaborate closely and synchronise their efforts. This suggests, strongly, that Boko Haram has international links and sympathy. While the organisation initially relied on donations from members, its links with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom,

the Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic World Society. Interestingly, too, some governors of the northern States have


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funnelled money on a monthly basis to Boko Haram.

The sixth and final factor critical to the success of an insurgency is government response. Of all the factors that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than the government's response. Government response is the most important factor because the government possesses the ability to correct or negate the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. What the government does or neglects to do and how it performs has a direct bearing on the strategies and forms of warfare the insurgents choose and the nature and extent of challenges the insurgents must cope with as they seek to accomplish their aims. The more government responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined and disciplined, the greater the burden on the insurgents.

Conclusion

Decades of poor governance has degraded Nigeria's health, education and transportation infrastructure. Despite hundreds of millions of dollars in oil revenue, Nigeria has virtually no functioning rail system and only half of the population has any access to electricity. Nearly one hundred million Nigerians live on less than one dollar a day and nearly one million children die each year before their fifth birthday. This is poverty, and Nigeria's poverty is as a result of government neglect, government corruption and government abuse. The reluctance of the government to address the needs of the people, to grow the economy, and to create jobs, has generated a sense of hopelessness among many. It has also helped fill a popular negative that the government simply does not care.

Boko Haram has grown stronger and increasingly more sophisticated over the past three years and defeating Boko Haram would require a sophisticated and comprehensive domestic


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response that has both a security strategy and a social economic strategic component for addressing the social and economic conditions of the northern Nigeria especially, and Nigeria generally. Security efforts aimed at containing Boko Haram's violence must avoid excessive violence and human right abuses and make better use of police and intelligence services to identify, to arrest and to prosecute those responsible for

Boko Haram violent acts. Boko Haram thrives because of social and economic problems in the north specifically, but in Nigeria generally, that the government must find a way of addressing. A coordinated government effort to provide responsible, accountable government for Nigeria while creating opportunities for economic growth will diminish the political space in which Boko Haram operates.

An understanding of the environment has been shown as the key element in addressing the cultural factors that have led to the emergence of insurgence. It has been observed that we need to understand this cultural environment in order to address and curtail the activities of this new group. An integrated approach that sees the problem as a critical part of the failure of government will enable us face insurgence as a critical item on our national agenda.


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Introduction

This paper seeks to achieve the following objectives: -

1. to clarify insurgency as a crime and a human rights violation;

2. To profile Northern Nigeria and the paradox of Boko Haram insurgency and the impact of insecurity on IDPs;

3. To examine the factors responsible for the new security challenges facing Nigeria and the mounting pressures on the criminal justice system;

4. To highlight the responsibility to protect and address the factors fuelling insurgencies and insecurity in Nigeria;

5. To determine the limit of law in promoting peace and security;

6. To conclude with viable options for Nigeria.

Insurgency as a Crime and a Violation of Human Rights

Insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the State or of

DIAGNOSTIC REVIEW OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: THE LEGAL DIMENSION

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1taking part in insurrection.

Insurgency as defined above becomes violative of the Nigerian Constitution, Criminal Law and Nigeria's international treaty obligations in the following circumstances: -

i) When it constitutes an attack on defenceless civilians and their property resulting into injuries, loss of lives and property as well as forced or massive internal displacement of people out of their habitual places of residence;

ii) When it drives business/investors (local and foreign) away from an insecured nation;

iii) When it constitutes the elements of any of the following domestic and international crimes punishable by law: Treasonable felony, terrorism, murder, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Insurgency as a Crime and a Human Rights Violation

First, insurgency, as described above, is a crime against public order because it is a pattern of internal disturbances and tensions that poses serious problems of public safety and public order for the relevant authorities, which can eventually lead to situations that threaten the life of a nation and tempt the government in power to proclaim a state of emergency.

Internal disturbances involves situations of confrontational acts of violence, which can assume various forms, of the way from the spontaneous generation of acts of revolt to the struggle between more or less organized groups and the state authorities in power. In

1See S.I. Inchi (1996): The Nigerian Law Dictionary, 1st edn., Tamaza Publishing Co. Ltd, Zaria, Nigeria, at p.175.


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these situations, the authorities in power call upon extensive police 2forces, or even armed forces to restore internal order.

As for internal intensions, the term usually refers to: - a) situations of serious tension (political, religious, ethnic, social, economic, etc),

3or b) sequels of internal disturbances or an armed conflict.

Hence in the above circumstances, insurgents engaged in the crime against public order could possibly be prosecuted for the offence of 'Treasonable Felony' as defined by sections 41 of the Criminal Code and 412 of the Penal Code (Northern Region) Federal Provisions Act.

Further, insurgency becomes a crime of Terrorism when insurgents use arbitrary violence or threat of force deliberately aimed at causing fear, harm or kill by attacking defenceless civilians and their property or undermining peace by disrupting the social, political and economic life of a nation or any part thereof. This explains the definition of Terrorism under section 1 of the 2011 Terrorism Act.

Furthermore, insurgents could possibly by prosecuted for the Crime Against Humanity as defined by Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Legally binding on Nigeria having signed on 1st June, 2000 and ratified on 27th September, 2001 and Draft domestication bill 2011 submitted to the Federal Executive Council by the Attorney-General of the Federation in 2012.

Crime Against Humanity means any of the following acts when

2See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Geneva, (1988) International Review of the Red Cross No. 262, pp. 12-13.3Ibid.


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committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population: - murder, extermination, torture, persecution, forced disappearance...… and other inhumane enforced acts.

Moreover, insurgents could also be possibly prosecuted for the crime of Genocide as defined under the Rome Statute by Article 6 as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: - a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, etc.

Hence undoubtedly, insurgency constituting any of the above characterized crimes violates the constitutional and internationally guaranteed human rights to life, human dignity, liberty, freedoms of movement and religion, conscience and thought etc.

However, there are no silver bullets and no country has been able to combat insurgency by Criminal sanctions or military might alone or be totally immune from domestic terrorism without addressing the factors fuelling it.

Profiling Northern Nigeria and the Paradox of Boko Haram Insurgency: - Impact of Insecurity on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS)

Northern Nigeria consists of 19 out of 36 states clustered into 3 geo-political zones of North-West, North-East and North-Central. It is a region characterized in the last ten years by violent, ethno-religious and political conflicts, rising violent crimes and widespread corruption resulting into socio-economic and political insecurity and forced internal displacement of population largely due to bad governance, socio-economic and political imbalances, injustices


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4and inequities, as well as insensitivity to the plight of their citizens.

In terms of absolute poverty line by geo-political zone, the North-East has retained the title of the poorest zone in Nigeria since 1985, with the highest incidence of poverty (Ranging between 54.9% -

572.2%) followed by the North-West and North-Central.

Recently, the North-East is reported to be the home of the state with the highest unemployment rate in the Federation, that is Yobe State

6at 60.6% as at the end of 2011.

Further, it is the zone with the highest number of IDPs totaling 11,360 in the 1st quarter of 2012; and in 2010-2011, with the 3rd highest number of forced displacement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (about 22% or 82,000, North-West with 31% or 116,207 and North-Central with the highest 42.4% or 162,281 out of 377,701) due to identity-based conflicts – such as ethno-religious and political conflicts and violent clashes between the religious militia/armed group (Boko Haram) and Government forces. Hence within this period of coverage, the North accounted for 95%

7of IDPs in Nigeria.

It is a paradox that Nigeria is a rich country inhabited by the poor

4Ladan M.T. (2012): Impact of Insecurity in the North on Internally Displaced People and Migration Flows between Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries.Being a paper presentation made at the forum of European Union Working Group on Migration and Development; Organized by the Delegation of European Union to Nigeria. Venue: EU Meeting Room 1, (Portakabin) 21ST Crescent, off Constitution Avenue, CBD, Abuja. Date: - May 31, 2012 at p. 35See National Planning Commission and National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja (2006): - Economic Performance Review at pp. 63-67; also see National Bureau of Statistics (2006-11): - CWIQ Survey Social Statistics Report (2009) and Nigeria in Figures.6 National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja (2011) quoted the Statistician General of the Federal, Dr. Kale Oyeyemi, in the Daily Trust Newspaper, Abuja, Friday, January 6, 2012 at p. 20.7 See National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Abuja (2011): - Records of IDPs in Nigeria: - October 2010 – October 2011). See also National Commission for Refugees (NCFR), Abuja (2011) Table 1, of the Federal Commissioner's Presentation to the Canadian Embassy delegation (Jan. 2011).


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and accounts for about 13% (1.4 million) of Africa's 11.1 million people internally displaced by conflict and generalized violence as at 10 January 2011 (NCFR). Between October 2010 – October 2011, NEMA accounted for a total of 377,701 IDPs in Nigeria. This does not include internal displacement induced by development

8projects that are regulated by states.

In Nigeria, most of the incidences of internal displacement occur because of violent conflicts with ethnic, religious and political undertones.

9Recent findings have shown that the plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria is rooted in complex causes, phases and types of displacement; the need for return to a safe and secured environment and reintegration assistance, but unfortunately in a fragmented humanitarian response.

Recent statistical data, on the volume and spread of IDPs in Nigeria reveals the existence of about 1.4 million displaced persons that are being hosted by Akwa Ibom (200,000), Cross River (115,000),

8 In 2010, the 21 African States monitored by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) accounted for 11.1 million people that were internally displaced by conflict and generalised violence at the end of 2010. See www.internal-displacement.org/countires/Nigeria - visited on Jan 10, 2012.In January 2011, the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR), Abuja, revealed the existence of about 1.4 million IDPs in Nigeria due to complex causes. See NCFR, Abuja, a paper presented by the Federal Commissioner to the Canadian Embassy delegation on Jan 10th 2011, table 1 titled: - Persons of concern to the NCFR in Nigeria9 Ladan M.T. (2011)” Overview of International and Regional Frameworks on International Displacement: - A case study of Nigeria. A paper presented at a 2-day multi-stakeholders conference on International Displacement in Nigeria. Organised by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, Abuja in Collaboration with IDMC and the Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva. Held on November 21-23, 2011, at Bolton White Hotels, Abuja, Nigeria.


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Ebonyi (80,000), Bauchi (45,000), Kebbi (50,000), Jigawa (200,000), Plateau (250,000), Taraba (25,000), Benue (48,000), Gombe

10(100,000), Edo (250,000), and Borno States (16,000).

Moreover, the N/E is the home of the paradox of Boko Haram, an armed group that was capitalizing on popular discontent with bad governance in Nigeria in general and the North in particular, promotes a sectarian violence of a different dimension that has engulfed the entire zone in the history of Nigeria – that is neither inter nor intra-religious but essentially against the corrupt western

11educated Muslim elites and government.

In July 2009, Yar'adua deployed the Nigerian Army to roundup the leadership of Boko Haram and bring them to justice. The leaders were captured alive, or arrested from their homes and placed in police custody, who extra-judicially executed them. The sect believes that the then Governor of Borno State and the Commissioner of Police took the decision to wipe out its leadership, regrouped and went on what was essentially a revenge mission targeting the police, the Borno State Government and other uniformed services of the Federal Government. That is how Boko Haram insurgency evolved from a largely anti-corrupt western educated Muslim elites and governments, to a VENGEFUL sect and currently an anarchist threat to the Nigerian nation and economy.

According to the World Investment Report of UNCTAD, the Nigerian economy recorded a reduction in foreign direct investment from US$6.1 billion in 2010 due to the fear of Boko

10 Source, NCFR, Abuja (2011) supra note 8.11 See Abdulkareem, M. and M. Haruna (ed.) (2010): - The Paradox of Boko Haram. Moving Image Publishers, Kano, Nigeria, at pp. 27-39.


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Haram. The Nigerian tourism sector which is worth N80 billion naira annually has lost more than half of its value due to fear of terrorist attacks. The domestic air transport industry which generates some N3 billion naira annually has been hard hit by flight cancellations of destinations in the North, with nearly half of the revenues lost. Normal social and economic life is unlikely to return soon to states like Kano, Yobe, Borno, Plateau and Kaduna.

It is a paradox that such a movement that is opposed to the acquisition of knowledge emerged in Borno State, the capital of the Kanem – Borno Empire and the 1st Islamic State in pre-colonial Nigeria that was established on the basis of knowledge and

12excellence in scholarship, resulting in the movement's distortion.

It is a paradox that such a situation should emanate from the minds of those who believe that they are asserting their religious identity, reforming Islam and restoring it to its pristine purity by maiming and killing innocent civilians, destroying private and public

13property and rupturing peace.

For a detailed account of the chronology of the Boko Haram Insurgency, the emergence of its ideological stance, and its transformations over the years, see Abdulkareem Mohammed's book: - The Paradox of Boko Haram (2010), Moving Image Ltd, Kano (ed. Mohammed Haruna, with foreword by Bilkisu Yusuf).

Undoubtedly, the Boko Haram Insurgency essentially endangers public safety, security and peace; retards economic growth and development; undermines the state and democracy; constitutes crimes against public order, crimes against humanity and terrorism. Above all, it violates the fundamental human rights to life, human dignity, liberty and freedom of religion, conscience and

12 Ibid at pp. 40-57.13 Ibid at pp. 69-103 and 109-147.


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thought etc.

Impact of Insecurity on IDPs

Conflicts and crimes create enormous insecurity in the society with tremendous impact on individuals, social groups, communities and the nation in general. The impacts of the violent conflicts and crimes in the North on IDPs include:

a. Loss of thousands of lives and millions worth of property: examples include the recent tit for tat in the Jos carnage 2009-2012 and in Borno, Yobe, Kano and Kaduna states between 2010 – March 2012.

b. Social dislocations and displacement – Examples would include the recent Borno, Kano and Kaduna explosions of devices in which about 20,000 people were displaced from their homes, villages, communities and states.

c. Social tensions and new patterns of settlement – Muslims moving to Muslim dominated areas and Christians migrating to Christian dominated areas. Typical example is the situation in Jos North/South of Plateau state.

d. Crisis over the question of citizenship. Hostility between 'indigenes' and 'settlers'. Typical example is the 2011 crisis in Southern Kaduna State and the plight of IDPs.

e. Disruption of family and communal life

f. General atmosphere of mistrust, fear, and frenzy especially between Northern Christians and Muslims; and between Northerners and Southerners resident in the North.

g. Dehumanization of women and children e.g. Rape, child neglect/abuse

14 Ladan M. T., Supra note 4.


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h. Deepening of hunger and poverty in the society

i. Atmosphere of political insecurity and instability including declining confidence in the political leadership and apprehension about the system.

Hence the challenge is how to address effectively the above mentioned impact.

Understanding the Factors Responsible for the New Security Challenges Facing Nigeria and the Mounting Pressures on the

15Criminal Justice System.

First, is the paradox of Nigeria, a land of poverty, high unemployment rate, endemic corruption and wide income inequality, in the midst of plenty. According to the 2007 Human Rights Watch Report, the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria has led to the loss of US Dollars 380 billion between 1960-1999. A Global Financial Integrity Initiative Report dated January 2011 estimated that US$ 130 billion dollars worth of illicit financial dollars to the fuel subsidy racket alone brings our national loss due to corruption to over $500 billion dollars between 1960 and 2011. Hence, corruption diverts resources into graft-rich public works projects, at a cost to education and health services. Corruption destroys a nation's social and human capital, by discouraging corruption is even more damaging than terrorism/insurgency, perhaps it is the single greatest obstacle to both human and

16national development.

15 Ladan M. T., (2012): The Criminal Justice and the New Security Challenges in Nigeria. Being a public lecture delivered at the Quarterly Public Lecture Series organized by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Date: - Monday 12TH September 2011. Venue: - Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja.


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Income inequality is another serious problem. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), in 2010 65% of Nigeria's wealth is owned by just 20% of the population (i.e. 32 million out of 160 million). Thus 80% of the population share between them only

17about one third (1/3) of the nation's wealth.

Nigeria is richly endowed with human and natural resources particularly oil and gas as well as 43 solid mineral resources such as gold, coal and sulphur. With a nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $280 billion dollars in 2011, Nigeria is the second largest economy in Africa; the sixth fastest growing economy in Africa with a Real GDP economic growth rate of 6.9% in 2011; the largest producer of oil in Africa and the seventh largest in the world in 2011. With a population of about 160 million in 2011, Nigeria is by far the most populous country in Africa, accounting for 47% and

182% of West Africa's and global population respectively.

Despite this rich human and natural resource endowment, Nigeria's GDP per capita is only $1,200 dollars; average life expectancy at 51.9%, average years of schooling at 5.0% rate and poverty is widespread, with about 70% of the population living below the poverty line in 2011. Hence, Nigeria was ranked by the

16 Quoted from Nasir, A. E. (2012): Between Terrorism and Corruption – Implications for Nigeria. http://seunfakze.wordpress.com/2012/05/04 at p.2.17 Ibid. at P.418 See Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja: - Annual Reports of 2008-2009 at P. xliii; See also national Planning Commission, Abuja, July 2006: - Economic Performance Review at P.62. Further see the United Kingdom Dept for International Development (DFID), “Nigeria Country Strategy Paper 2000-2002, (September 2000), pp.1-2. Also see Ladan M.T., The Criminal Justice and the New Security Challenges in Nigeria. Being a public lecture delivered at the Quarterly Public Lecture Series organized by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Date: - Monday 12TH September 2011. Venue: - Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja.


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UNDP 2011 Report on UN quality of life/Human Development Index as the 156 out of 187, among the “least human development” countries globally in terms of income, education and life

19expectancy.

Despite a plethora of development policies and programmes, Nigeria's level of economic development over the past five decades has been disappointing. The country's economy is dominated by the primary production sector, with agriculture, which is predominantly practiced by peasantry with low and declining productivity, accounting for 41.6% of GDP, followed by crude oil 15% in 2011, while the secondary sector, especially manufacturing, has stagnated at 3.7 to 3.9% of GDP in 2011. This makes Nigeria one

20of the least industrialized countries in Africa.

For an agricultural nation, it is a paradox that 41% of Nigerians, nearly 70 million (out of 160 million), are classified as “food poor” in 2010. The zonal distribution tells a deeper story. About 52% of the people living in the North-West and North-East, 39% of the North-Central, 41% of the South-East, 36% of the south-South and 25% of the South-West are hardly able to feed themselves.

Hence, the paradox of Nigeria with widespread and endemic poverty in the midst of plenty. The question then is, Why does the second wealthiest nation in Africa and a country not lacking in resources or manpower, have a human development index that is lower than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa? Why do the great

19 See 2011 UNDP Report on UN Qualify of Life/Human Development Index. www.undp.org20 See National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja, 2010-11 Annual Report quoted in Ladan M. T. (2012): Security Implications to Economic Development being a public lecture presentation at a Book Launch Organized by The Kings Land Foundation, Abuja. Venue: - Sheraton Hotel, Abuja. Date: - Saturday, 17th March, 2012. Also see Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja: MGDs Nigeria Mid Point Assessment Overview, September 2008 pp 4-5.


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majority of Nigerians lack access to clean and safe water, electricity and other basic necessities? Why are over 14 million educated youths unemployed, forcing them to engage in fraudulent and cybercrimes? Why do the most vulnerable groups in Nigeria lack access to justice as a human right in the justice sector reform

21initiatives?

Though Nigeria is a country of paradox, overall, the country has the potential to build a prosperous economy, reduce poverty significantly, and provide the basic social and economic services its population needs. However, several years of military rule, poor public expenditure management, over-dependence on oil and unmitigated rent-seeking behavior to amass wealth from the nation's treasury have conspired to undermine the country's

22development.

Second, is the problem of undue emphasis (in both policy and practice) on the pursuit of National/State Security to the disadvantage of human security. The goal of national security is on the defence of the state from external threats. By contrast, the focus of human security is the protection of individuals against both violent and non-violent threats to their lives and human dignity.

Security of state does not automatically mean security of peoples. Protecting citizens from foreign attack is certainly a necessary condition for the security of individuals, but it is not a sufficient one. Indeed, during the past century, far more people have been killed by their own governments than by armies from abroad.

21 Ladan M. T. (2012): Justice Sector Reform: Imperatives for a Democracy. Being a paper presentation made at a two-day National Seminar on Justice Sector Reform and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria. Organized by Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Abuja. Venue: Rockview Hotel, Royale Abuja. Date: June 6-8, 2012 at p.222 Ibid at p 2.


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Human security and national security should be – and often are – mutually reinforcing. But this is not always the case. Human security can be threatened both by weak states which allow armed groups, warlords and militias to flourish, and by strong states which themselves commit abuses such as torture and summary execution.

The “broad” concept of human security, first outlined in the 1994 Human Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme, argues that human security rests on two pillars: freedom from want and freedom from fear. The broader view of human security includes food security, adequate shelter, security from poverty, and sometimes from “threats to human dignity”. Its proponents rightly argue that hunger, disease, and natural disasters kill far more people than war, genocide, and terrorism combined. And these threats are often inter-related.

Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risks, and taking remedial action where prevention fails. A human security approach therefore highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and ensure the safety of people in the future. In short, human security provides an enabling environment for human development. Where violence or threat of violence as we have in Nigeria today makes meaningful progress on the development agenda impossible, enhancing safety for people becomes a prerequisite. Indeed, promoting human development can also be an important strategy for furthering human security.

The above problem is manifested in the paradox of Nigeria earlier discussed; and further manifested in the poor implementation of the constitutional obligations imposed on the government (at all levels) by chapter two of the Constitution, namely, to promote the security and welfare of the people as the primary purpose of government (section 14(2)(b) and to ensure the progressive


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realization of the fundamental social, economic, political, educational, foreign policy and environmental objectives for the common good of all (sections 13-20 of Cap. 2 of the 1999 Constitution).

The third factor stems from the unaddressed problem of the deculturised youths, who could become potential recruit into the terrorist cells. The deculturised youths, inter alia, suffer from poverty, unemployment, destitution, lack of education, or even, disillusionment after education and ultimately become frustrated and alienated from society. This reserve of individuals thereby become ready to put their own and other peoples' lives at risk in the carrying out of especially violent crimes in society. This class of youths sees no one being interested in them, and they, have no approval reference point anymore within the legitimate society. Therefore, organized criminal syndicates certainly finds them useful, and usually gives them help, protection, and an element of identification with an authority figure, but harnessing their aggressive and destructive drives for the benefit of their syndicates.

The question here is, whose responsibility is it to help Nigerians verify claims of responsibility for all the bombings and kidnappings in the last one year, allegedly committed by local militant groups BOKO HARAM or MEND; or is any criminal syndicate group facelessly responsible but making claims in the names of BOKO HARAM and MEND due to their vulnerability to organized criminal syndicates and past negative records of behavior?

The above paradox is not a license for any militant sectarian group to engage in acts of violent crime. At this point it is noteworthy that neither Ethnicity nor Religion per se is a source of conflict except where they are politicized or manipulated for selfish ends.


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From the perspective of Islam, as a misunderstood, misconceived, misinterpreted and misapplied by both muslims and non-muslims, the Holy Quran warns muslims against extremism and declares terrorism as both sinful and a crime against humanity (where loss of lives of innocent and defenceless civilians are involved). Islam, as a religion of truth, peace and justice for all, urges state authorities to bring to justice all perpetrators of crimes without fear or favour but in accordance with due process of law.

The fourth factor is about the restrictive perception of the problem of crime prevention and the impact of crime on national development ONLY from the law enforcement perspective. This denies our criminal justice system the ability to effectively address some of the root causes of cr ime and threats to democraticgovernance as well as increase the crime prevention profile.

Some of the root causes of acts of kidnapping, terrorism and violent acts in Nigeria needing urgent attention include: - a) poor implementation of constitutional measures to address endemic and widespread corruption; past socio-economic and political injustices, inequities and imbalances and a feeling of, among the diverse Nigerian populace, a sense of marginalisation, discrimination, exclusion and disadvantage; (b) failure by the state to effectively prevent and control the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their possession by militant sectarian and ethnic militia groups, among others; (c) the negative culture of do or die politics and the struggle for the sharing of national cake at the centre (distributive federalism) arising from undue concentration of power and resources at the federal level (centre) to the disadvantage and impoverishment of the federating units (states and LGAs); (d) rising unemployment rate among youths; (e) politicization of ethnicity and manipulation of religion by the elites for their selfish ends thereby providing a fertile ground for extremism, intolerance, ethno-religious violent conflicts and


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perpetual cycle of recriminations or revengeful killings.

The above three broad factors point to the perceived new security challenges facing Nigeria. Some of which are identified as follows: -

i. The challenge of embracing faithfully the paradigm shift from state security to prioritised human security consistent with the constitutional obligations placed on all levels and arms of government in Nigeria (Sections 13 to 20 of Cap. 2).

ii. The challenge of building and sustaining trust and confidence between law enforcement/security agencies and the public, particularly communities, civil society groups and the private sector, as equal stakeholders in crime prevention and control as well as peace building efforts consistent with the National Peace Policy (2009).

This is very critical for communities and groups in many parts of the country who recently see the government as sanctioning alleged extra-judicial killings, summary executions, forced disappearances, other excesses as a form of abuse of legal power committed against their locals in the name of law and order or JTF domestic operations in Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau States etc.

iii. The challenge of strategic efforts in combating transborder crimes, movement and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the ECOWAS subregion consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. These articles are specifically devoted to taking preventive and control measures, among others, against the illegal circulation of small arms in West Africa.

iv. The challenge of effective coordination and collaboration in intelligence gathering and sharing between law enforcement


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and other security agencies about the existence, growth and activities of militant groups, for effective crime prevention and control and the promotion of peace and security nationwide.

v. The challenge of enhancing access to justice in criminal matters. Failure of states to provide citizens with protection from crime and access to a justice system (which dispenses justice fairly, speedily and non-discriminatory) impedes sustainable development. All people have a right to go about their lives in peace, free to make the most of their opportunities. They can only do so if the institutions of justice and law and order protect them in their daily lives. States with poorly functioning criminal justice system and poor crime prevention and control mechanisms are unattractive to investors, so economic growth also suffers.

The resultant consequence of the above challenges is the mounting pressures on the criminal justice.

23Pressures on Criminal Justice

When discussing the task of enhancing criminal justice, it is important to have some sense of the multiple pressures that are being placed on criminal justice systems. These pressures include increasing demands for access to justice. These demands for access to justice come from many quarters and are placing increasing expectations on criminal justice systems throughout the world.

23 Ladan M. T., Enhancing Access to Justice in Criminal Matters: - Possible Areas for Reform in Nigeria: in The Nigerian Bar Association, Abuja (2011), Nigerian Bar Journal. Vol. 7 No. 1 August 2011 at pp 31-64.


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One demand for access to justice is the need to respect the rights of those suspected and accused of crime, basic rights reflected in the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and related standards. The need to respect these rights is particularly great given the increased emphasis on security and anti-terrorism efforts in recent years.

Another demand for access to justice is the need to protect vulnerable groups whether they are racial, ethnic, or religious minorities or those with disabilities who experience high rates of crime victimization or the victims of gender-based violence and abuse of children. The victims of crime, including groups who are disproportionately subject to crime victimization, demand better protection and at times an enhanced role in the criminal justice system. They look to the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power as well as to other international standards relating to the rights of women, children and the rights of minorities to be free from discrimination.

There is also national, regional and international pressure to deal with serious crimes such as terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking and trafficking in drugs and firearms. International co-operation is required to fight these crimes and national systems must comply with international commitments. The Rome Status creating the International Criminal Court speaks to demands for accountability for the most serious crimes. Such forms of accountability cannot always be achieved within domestic systems of criminal justice.

There is also an increasing recognition of the important role of criminal justice in achieving good governance and Millennium Development Goals such as peace, security, poverty alleviation, human rights, democracy, good governance and the protection of the vulnerable. This is especially the case with respect to


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transitional democracies. In such contexts, there is a need for capacity building and compliance with basic international and regional standards. At the same time, these developments should proceed on the basis of an increasing awareness in many developed nations that putting more money into policing, prosecutions and prisons have not necessarily produced greater satisfaction with

24criminal justice or an increased sense of security of justice.

25The Responsibility to Protect and to Address the Factors Fuelling Insurgencies and Insecurity in Nigeria

The Responsibility to Protect

Basic Principles:

a) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

b) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

Foundations: The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in: a) obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; b) the responsibility of the Security council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; c)

24 Ladan M. T., (2012) Supra note 15 at p. 1225 See International Development Research Centre, Canada, (2001): Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect at pp. 1-91 for detail discussion on the subject.


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specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; d) the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.

Elements: The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities:

a) The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

b) The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

c) The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

Priorities:

a) prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.

b) The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

Principles for Military Intervention


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The just cause threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: a) Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or b) Large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended whether carried out by killing forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

The Precautionary Principles

a. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

b. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

c. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

d. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the


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consequences of inaction.

3) Operational Principles: a) Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. b) Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command. c) Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state. d) Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to internal humanitarian law. e) Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective. f) Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.

Addressing the Boko Haram Leadership's Misconception and 26Misinterpretation of Islam: - The Responsibility of Muslim Ulama

(Scholars)

Jihad, Terrorism, Extremism and Islam

Islam is a religion of peace that set up limits to war and humanitarian principles. There are three conditions that legitimate war and make it a just war: defense of Islam, self defense, and defense of the oppressed. Jihad which is primarily intellectual, self-purification (or Tazkiyatin-nafsi) and just war is therefore limited and peace is the normal state of life.

Islam promotes mercy, moderation or balance not extremism in peace and war: The ethics and main principles of Islam prescribe

26 See Ladan M. T., (2010): Brief presentation on the Islamic Perspectives to the selected modules in the GTZ/WACSI/KAIPTC Conflict Prevention Resource Pack for Contextual Utilization/Application in Borno and Plateau States of Nigeria. GTZ NG-GGGP Project, GTZ-NG, Jos, Plateau State, December 2010 at pp.29-31.


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tolerance, mercy and the granting of amnesty when dealing with harsh situations, and deemed that strictness, intransigence or cruelty in excess of the normal limits be avoided, in accordance with the nature of the Islamic Message as described by Almighty God addressing the Prophet in these words: “We sent thee not, but as a mercy or all creatures.” In other words, human beings, animals, jinn and inanimate beings, and indeed all things, must be treated as thus prescribed. After the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet, peace be upon him, was tolerant towards the Quraysh, the former ruling tribe there, who had excessively injured him. He told them: “Today, there is no blame on you, go, you are set free.

Terrorism and Islam

Terror organisations, in accordance with the ideologies they espouse, claim that their aim is to remove a government or change a world as illegitimate and cruel, imbalance and, in so doing, that they will reach their goal of establishing a happier and more just way of life. However, this is not a realistic claim. In the Holy Quran, in the first verses of Suratul Baqara, Almighty God issues this command to those who think in this way: - “When they are told,” Do not cause corruption on the earth, they say, we are only putting things right. No indeed! They are the corrupters, but they are not aware of it” Q 2:11-12.

Terror and Religion are completely opposed to each other. Terrorism adopts the way of aggression, murder, conflict, cruelty, and misery. But according to the Quran, all these things are kinds of oppression. God enjoins peace, harmony, good will and compromise. He forbids terror and every kind of act that does not promote peace, and condemns those who commit such acts: -

“But as for those who break God's contract after it has been agreed and sever what God has commanded to be


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joined, and cause corruption in the earth, the curse will be upon them. They will have the Evil Abode” – Q 13:25.

Further, the Quran speaks of the character of such people: - “But do not obey any vile sweater of oaths, any backbiter, slander, monger, impeder of good, evil aggressors” – Quran 68:10-13.Furthermore, the Quran forbids all acts of terror and anarchy: Quran 7:33

Moreover, the Quran commands Muslims to respond to evil with goodness and reject any form of cruelty: -

“A good deed and a bad deed are not the same. Repel the bad with something better and, if there is enmity between you and someone else, he will be like a bossom friend.” (Quran 41:34) “Let not the hatred of a people who once obstructed you from the sacred mosque lead you to transgress. Help one another in benevolence and piety, and help not another in sin and transgression” (Quran 5:2).

It can be seen that terrorism is nothing other than a totally diabolical source of bloodshed. Whoever supports this cycle of savagery is defending a satanic system. If a terrorist uses religious language and symbols, this must not deceive anyone. Terrorists who hide under the cloak of religion are doubly guilty, both of the blood they have shed and for the anti-religious propaganda they have spread while committing these crimes in the name of religion.

Hence the need for the Muslim Ulama (Scholars) to intensify their efforts in preaching to their followers the necessity to embrace the right path of tolerance, moderation and non-violent approach to ventilating their grievances no matter the justified cause.

Addressing the Distorted Religious Scholarship and the Almajiri Child Phenomenon and Child Protection in Northern Nigeria: - The Responsibility of State and Local Governments to Integrate and


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27Regulate.

Recent studies have shown that the traditional Koranic education pupil, otherwise known as the “Almajiri” child in the Northern Nigeria Hausa language, equivalent to the Arabic term, “Almuhajir”, meaning an immigrant and hence a travelling student, refers also to a child below the age of 18 years.

The Almajiri child belongs to a group of vulnerable children (called the 'Almajirai) who constitute the subjects of the prevalent practice in parts of Northern Nigeria where parents or guardians send their children from the rural areas and from the neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad, Benin and Cameroon to the urban centres to acquire Koranic education under the tuleage and mentoring of Koranic teachers (otherwise known as Mallams in Hausa language or Mu'allim in Arabic language).

Dating back countries, evidence abound of the migratory tendency of this group of vulnerable children with their teachers within and across West and Central African countries as well as the Sudan in search of Koranic education and on tour during the dry season.

Further, that for decades, in most urban centres, these Almajirai- children fend for themselves and for the upkeep of their teachers by begging for alms or food or serve as domestic servants or porters to other people and by doing odd jobs that are hazardous, detrimental to their health, exploitative and violative of their basic rights to survival and development as well as protection from all forms of violence, discrimination, abuse or neglect by parents or guardians and exposure to moral danger.

27 Ladan. M. T. (2010): Introduction to Jurisprudence: Classical and Islamic. Malthouse Press Ltd. Lagos at pp. 272-3 /UNICEF Nigeria, Abuja (2008): Report of Survey to Document Innovative Interventions on Almajiri Child in Nigeria at pp. 1-3.


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Recent studies have also shown that the almajirai children constitute the bulk of child workers on farmlands that are exposed to labour exploitation due to the seasonal migration and the fact of their situation as immigrant children. The resultant consequence is their vulnerability today as victims of child trafficking, ritual killings and of manipulation, because they are easily instigated or recruited to commit acts of terror or to serve as agents of destruction in times of civil disturbances, especially, ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. In such situations, they also become victims of deprivations of their rights to life, to human dignity, to qualitative and quantitative education, to health and access to health care services, to grow up within a family with care, love and affection, and to a safe or secured environment free from violence, exploitation and all forms of abuse.

Moreover, the apparent lack of integration into the formal education, standardization, certification, remuneration, monitoring of the Quranic schools and their Mallams (teachers) or operators constitute a serious setback to the products having lost the opportunity of receiving adequate literacy skills to function effectively in a rapidly changing world of technological innovations and opportunities.

Hence, governments and other stakeholders need to provide direct intervention programmes to address the resource constraint of the Quranic schools, integrate and standardize them, remunerate and certify the Mallams and the pupils, regulate the movement of almajirai-children within their states, as well as create opportunities for gainful employment of the product of this system of education in order to prevent and protect them against manipulation and exposure to moral and physical danger and economic hardship.

Addressing the Underlying Root Causes of the Demand For, and 28Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Salw)


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Addressing the underlying root causes of the demand for, and proliferation of SALW is necessary, because in the Nigerian context, the proliferation of SALW is a correlation of two major and mutually supportive factors: -

a) the demand for SALW (motivating factors) and

b) the supply or sources.

The sources of illicit weapons used by armed robbers, political thugs, criminal gangs, insurgents or terrorist groups are both external and internal which must both be plugged: - a) Cross-border smuggling; b) security sector black-racketeering (i.e. a large portion of illicit firearms consist of leakages from members of the police and armed forces both serving and retired. This includes the remnants from the Nigerian Civil War and leakages from returnees of peace keeping operations); and c) Local manufacturing of SALW (especially by unlicenced local craftsmen located in different parts of the country, who produce on the aggregate, a substantial quantity of illicit arms, in contravention of section 22 of the Firearms Act). The lack of due diligence, transparency and regulation of their activities as required by international standards, makes their products difficult to trace and the SALW position of Nigeria opaque.

The demand for or need to possess SALW in Nigeria is motivated by a combination of factors which can be grouped under three major heads: -

a) Widespread socio-economic and political insecurity: - arising

28 See UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Geneva, Switzerland (eds. A. Ayissi and I. Sall)(2005): - Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: - Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, pp. 45-98.


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from unemployment, poverty, corruption, greed, money politics, poor standard of living, profligacy, bad governance etc, as the primary causes of crime and violent conflicts.

b) Prevalence of internecine conflicts and crime: - promotes the culture of violence and increase in the demand for illicit SALW. This explains the emergence of armed groups like Boko Haram and MEND etc.

c) Privatization of security: arising from the failure of government to guarantee human security and freedom from fear, thereby, providing a basis for private security arrangements for individuals and groups to shield themselves against criminal gangs. This further explains why the unaddressed weakness of law enforcement agencies exacerbates the culture of impunity and robs the criminal justice system of its deterrence role.

Hence, Nigeria's counter-insurgency strategy must ensure the domestic implementation of Nigeria's treaty obligations under the 1999 Revised ECOWAS Treaty, especially article 58 which places obligation on member states to address insecurity, combat crime and promote peace, conflict prevention and resolution.

Further, obligations on SALW are provided by the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, peacekeeping and Security. While article 3 of the Protocol obligates member states to formulate and implement 'policies on anti-corruption, money-laundering and illegal circulation of small arms, articles 50 and 51 provide for the control of the proliferation of small arms and preventive measures against illegal circulation of small arms, respectively.

Article 50 on control measures provides as follows: -

“While taking into account the legitimate national defence and security needs, and those of international peacekeeping


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operations, ECOWAS shall establish effective measures to:

a) Control the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and eradicate the illegal flow of such arms;

b) Register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stocks;

c) Detect, collect and destroy all illicit weapons;

d) Encourage member States to collect and destroy all surplus weapons.

”Article 51 on preventive measures provides as follows: -

“ECOWAS shall take all the necessary measures to combat illicit trafficking and circulation of small arms. These measures shall include:

a) Developing a culture of peace;

b) Training for military, security and police forces;

c) Enhancing weapons control at border posts;

d) Establishment of a database and regional arms register;

e) Collection and destruction of (surplus and) illegal weapons;

f) Facilitating dialogue with producers and suppliers;

g) Reviewing and harmonizing national legislation and administrative procedures;

h) Mobilizing resources.”

29Role of Law in the Promotion of Peace and Security: - Any Limit?

In its relationship with society, law is viewed as an instrument of social change or transformation by the sociological jurists. This is based on the premise that society in which law operates, must be of


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respect for the rule of law and human rights in order to have an orderly, stable and prosperous society.

That law in society can play three distinct roles: - a proscriptive, protective and instrumental roles.

i. In its proscriptive role, law is essentially concerned with proscribing certain forms of conduct and imposing sanctions as a consequence of non-compliance or breach of societal norms and values cherished most and selected for protection by the law of crimes in society.

ii. In its protective role, law seeks to protect individuals and groups from adversity consequent upon their status and vulnerability in society. Hence laws protecting against discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, disadvantage, injustices, inequities and socio-economic and political imbalances, labour, sexual and economic exploitation, abuses and other human rights violations of one's privacy, human dignity etc are examples of this protective role.

iii. The instrumental role of law in society is perhaps the most far reaching and proactive, for it seeks more than just to regulate the relationships between individuals in society, but also to help change the underlying values and patterns of social interaction that create vulnerability of people to practices, policies, conflicts, epidemic etc in society.

The character of the Nigerian society that is founded on unity in diversity in order to pursue divergent interests and at times both

29 See Ladan M. T. (2011): - Law, Religion and National Security: - The Challenges for Nigeria. Being a paper presented at the 2011 Annual General Conference of Muslim Lawyers Association of Nigeria (MULAN) on the Theme: - Ethno-Religious Crisis in Democratic Nigeria: - The Law as Panacea for Peace. Venue: - Kaduna. Date: - 9 – 11th November, 2011 at pp. 3-4.


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competing and conflicting interests by various interest groups, needs the rule of law to always prevail in our society. This is necessary because without it the Nigerian society will not operate as an orderly, stable, secured and prosperous one.

Cultivation of Value Standard as a Crime Prevention and Control 30Strategy

There is the need for the maintenance in a society of certain levels of conduct by the cultivation of value standards. This aspect of Crime Control and prevention should not be excluded simply because it carries moral or even ideological overtones. It is clearly very much more difficult for adults to avoid stealing or theft from work when everyone around them is doing so, and when they are viewed as being abnormal if they don't. It is more difficult to be honest when handling other people's money if there is a tradition, perhaps even an expectancy, of self-interest and dishonesty. In business or professions there is a similar need to foster standards which reinforce whatever may be the legal minima of service to the public. It can be argued that if the practice of dishonesty or other anti-social behavior becomes widespread, then it is more normal than abnormal, and the law should be adjusted accordingly. Whilst this is true, it is also important to recognize that every law, even the most widely accepted, needs the support of non-legal standards or norms.

The Criminal Law alone is insufficient for the prevention and control of crime and insurgency/terrorism. The moral tome of the society must be raised. If this is done, members of the public would, hopefully, internalize these values and thus be more predisposed to

30 See Ladan M. T. (1998): - Crime Prevention and Control, and Human Rights in Nigeria. ECONET Publishers, Zaria, at pp. 525-6.


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obey the law or to act in the national interest. The help of Mosques, Churches and other related institutions may be solicited. Since example is better than precept, open and acknowledged discipline, probity, justice, lack of ethnic, sectional or religious bias by those who led will go a longer way to turn the society around. These things must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to be done. Actions, utterances and lifestyles that are capable of being misinterpreted must be avoided by our leaders, so as not to demoralize the general public. Certainly, the cultivation of such value standards will, hopefully, reduce if not eradicate the commission of crimes against property and against the economy which have dishonesty or fraudulence as states of mind (mens rea) of the offenders.

Conclusion and Viable Options for Nigeria

It is evident from the above analysis that Nigeria is currently experiencing some measure of terrorism with the attendant pressures being mounted on the criminal justice system and new security challenges happily noted by the Council of State (on Tuesday, 6th September 2011 emergency meeting in Abuja on insecurity in Nigeria).

Accordingly, the following are the viable options for Nigeria: -

1. The urgent need for greater inter-agency collaboration and cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence gathering and exchange for effective prevention and control of terrorism and terrorist financing as defined and criminalized by the most recent Anti-Terrorism and Money Laundering Acts 2011.

2. Addressing the root causes of youth involvement in violent crimes and ethno-religious violent conflicts entails the promotion of good governance and prioritizing investment in human security and human development in a sustainable


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manner.

3. Pursue vigorously enhancement of the capacity (human, technical, material and financial) of criminal justice personnel through training, reform and re-organisation, information gathering and exchange, research analysis, and dissemination of information on terrorism and terrorist financing as well as proliferation of SALW in West Africa.

4. Conflict Prevention and Peace – Building: -The country has witnessed recurrent conflicts since the attainment of independence. Government response to these conflicts which is largely characterized by a “fire brigade” approach, points to the absence of a systematic and institutionalized way of obtaining early warming signal. If such is in place, it would be possible to anticipate conflicts by detecting the various flashpoints of violent conflicts that have torn many communities asunder.

For the purpose therefore, of designing effective conflict prevention and peace-building strategy, government needs to put in place the structure, requisite personnel and equipment for monitoring conflicts and transform existing conflict situations into enduring and sustainable peace.

However, it is a requirement for success that such conflict management schemes be inclusive to include community leaders (of both “settlers” and “natives”), religious leaders, traditional rulers, CBOs and NGOs involved in conflict management and human rights, intellectuals and researchers, and women groups and leaders.

In recognition of the role of the media in promoting conflicts through information (mis)management, it is necessary to expose media practitioners to the importance and need for moderation, less sensationalism, integrity and professionalism. This can be


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done through continuing peace education workshops and seminars aimed at sensitizing media practitioners to the national political objectives of building a united, strong and prosperous society in the context of diversity and pluralism.

For a durable solution to the plight of IDPs in Nigeria, the following key principles of the Kampala Convention and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement drawn largely from international human rights and humanitarian laws should guide all activities and strategies of the Nigerian state:

1) The primary responsibility to provide durable solutions for IDPs and ensure their protection and assistance needs to be assumed by the national authorities. Hence, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and National Commission For Refugees (NCFR) need to ensure at a minimum that the necessary legal and policy frameworks are in place to secure the rights of IDPs, to establish effective government structures to coordinate the national and local response, to facilitate provision of humanitarian and development assistance, and to ensure that adequate funding, through national budgets as well as international aid, is allocated to support the process.

2) National and local authorities should grant international humanitarian and development actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, rapid and unimpeded access to assist IDPs in funding a durable solution.

3) The rights, needs and legitimate interests of IDPs should be the primary considerations guiding all policies and decisions relating to internal displacement and durable solutions.

4) All relevant actors need to respect IDPs' rights to make an informed and voluntary decision on what durable solution


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to pursue.

5) A person opting for local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country in the absence of a prospect of return does not lose the right to return once return becomes feasible.

Under no circumstances should IDPs be encouraged or compelled to return or relocate to areas where their life, safety, liberty or health would be at risk.

Towards a Rule of Law- Human Rights Based Counter-Insurgency Strategy for Nigeria

First, we must avoid voicing the common states' objection to lack of reciprocity by insurgents or terrorists for their refusal to observe the rule of law and respect human rights in their counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism measures. By their very nature, insurgents ignore the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is clear that, unless states are prepared to respect the humanity and legal norms which they accuse insurgents of desecrating, they will lose their moral claim and community support to win the war on insurgency/terror. In this way, it is the very lack of reciprocity which allows states to continue their battle against

31insurgent/terrorist groups.

Second, on a practical level, states have nothing to lose by submitting to the Rule of Law-Human Rights Counter-insurgency regime. The reciprocity of this regime operates not between the state and the insurgents, but between the state and other states in


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31 See C. H. Powell and G. Abraham (2006): - Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law; in African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law at pp. 118-147.

their sharing of intelligence information, their extradition agreements and other forms of mutual assistance in criminal matters. The more confidence that states have in each other's respect for the legal system, the more effective the cooperation will

32be.

Third, insurgencies or internal disturbances and tensions can lead to a situation in which a government is no longer convinced of its ability, under the prevailing conditions and with the measures it normally has at its disposal, to control it. For such situations the

33International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains important provisions in its Article 4, which are set out below.

The ICCPR, in Article 4, creates the possibility for States Parties to take “measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant”, but only “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed”. Even though an emergency situation may be readily apparent, the derogation of rights under the Covenant constitutes a violation of international law unless the emergency has been officially announced by the domestic body empowered to do so. Official proclamation is a conditio sine qua non and serves the purpose of domestic supervision, especially by the legislative and judicial branches. This proclamation must take the form of public notification of the population affected. Therein lies its essential significance: the population must know the exact material, territorial and temporal scope of application of emergency measures and their impact on the exercise of human rights. In particular, the proclamation requirement is intended to

32 Ibid at p. 14533 Ratified by Nigeria on 29-7-1993.


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prevent de facto derogations, as well as subsequent attempts to 34justify human rights violations that have already been committed.

Derogation measures may be taken under a state of emergency only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. This is a clear reference to the principle of proportionality. The degree of interference and the scope of the measure (in terms both of territory and of duration) must be commensurate with what is actually necessary to combat an emergency that threatens the life of the nation. In addition to this requirement, the measures taken are not allowed to be “inconsistent with [the State's] other obligations under international law and [must] not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”.

In Article 4(2) of the ICCPR cross-reference is made to a number of inalienable rights, i.e. rights which cannot be derogated from. They are:

a. the right to life (Article 6);

b. the prohibition of torture (Article 7);

c. the prohibition of slavery and servitude (Article 8);

d. the prohibition of detention for debt (Article 11);

e. the prohibition of retroactivity of criminal law (Article 15);

f. the right to recognition as a person before the law (Article 16);

34 See Daily Trust Newspaper, Abuja (2012): - “Don't Extend Emergency” Monday July 2nd, 2012 Vol. 29 No. 86. pp.1 and 5. President Jonathan issued the proclamation on the state of emergency on December 31st 2011 for a period of 6 months in 15 Local Government Areas of Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger States, which expired on Saturday June 30th 2012.


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g. the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18)

None of these rights can be suspended or abrogated under a state of emergency. Each right exists for all persons in all circumstances. A State cannot, therefore, use the imposition of a state of emergency as an excuse for failing to protect and uphold each of these “inalienable rights”.

Article 4(3) of the ICCPR stipulates that any State Party “shall immediately inform other States Parties, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons by which it was actuated”, i.e. provide prompt notification of the State of emergency.

With regard to detention during states of emergency, the following humanitarian principles are of importance and observation of them is recommended:

Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949:

1. humane and non-discriminatory treatment of persons in detention;

2. prohibition of violence to live and person, murder of all kinds mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

3. outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

4. the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

It is important to stress once again that observance of those provisions of humanitarian law can, at best, only be recommended,


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as there is no legal basis for enforcement of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

35Fourth, we must resist the temptation to unleash terror on human rights in the name of fighting terrorism. In Resolution 60/288, the United Nations General Assembly identifies the “conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism” to include “prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance” but emphasizes that “none of these conditions can excuse or justify acts of terrorism.” Accordingly, the Assembly resolves to “consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whoever, wherever and for whatever purpose”. However, the Assembly reaffirms that “effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing”; in consequence of which “States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law” and “make every effort to develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal

36justice system… with due respect for human rights.” As the Israeli Supreme Court rightly points out:

This is the destiny of a democracy—she does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are

35 See Dakas C. J. Dakas, “Terrorism in the Aviation Sector: - The Human Rights Dimension of the Use of Body Scanners”, in Law and Security in Nigeria, (2011) NIALS, Lagos, at p.20.


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not always open before her. A democracy must sometimes fight with one arm tied behind her back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and individual liberties constitutes an important aspect of her security stance. At the end of the day, they strengthen her spirit and this strength allows her to overcome her

37difficulties.

Finally, an effective counter-insurgency strategy requires coordinated and sustained legislative, administrative and judicial approaches that address the factors encouraging demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and concurrently tackle the

38outlet through which illicit arms are proliferated.

36 Ibid, Quoted from the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNGA Res.60/288 60th Session, Agenda Items 46 and 120, A/RES/60/288 of 20th Sept., 2006.37 Ibid. Quoted President A. Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court in HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 845.38 See NIALS, Lagos (2011): - Law and Security in Nigeria, supra note 35 at pp.255-317.


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Works Cited

Davidson, Michael. L., 2005. “Culture and Effects-based Operations in an Insurgency”. A Monograph.

Hactch, Mary Jo, eds., 1977. Organisation Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P., 1996. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone.

Lynn, John. A., 2003. A History of Combat and Culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Malinowski, Bronislaw, 1944. A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

2004.Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.

2002. Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Cleveland OH: Wiley Publishing Inc.

O'Neill, Bard. E., 1990. Insurgency and Terrorism. Dulles: Brassey, Inc.

Peck, Edward. L., 2004. CSI Lecture Series. “The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation in International Relations and in War”.

Tse-tung, Mao, 1961. On Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc.

US Department of Defense, Joint Publication I-02, 2004. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.


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Introduction: Terrorism and Insurgency Security Threats in Nigeria

The September 11th 2001, popularly referred to as 9/11 terrorist bombing of World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon in New York and Washington DC respectably, marked a new epoch in current concern to global security. Since then, the global community has become more sensitive and in many restive terrorist security threats as a result of incessant terrorist bomb attacks on civilian populations by different terrorist organizations in many parts of the world. Terrorism has become the most security threat of the 21st century to world peace and tranquility.

In Nigeria, the 9/11 event has its impact. It raised the tempo of security threats as local terrorist organizations drew their terrorist operational tactics after the Afghanistan brewed al Quida terrorist organization. The growing incidence of terrorist activities in the country drew the attention of the United States of America Department of Defense to beam on Nigeria's security environment than ever before. The increased concern about terrorist activities in Nigeria is borne out of Nigeria being a major oil producer and

DIAGNOSTIC OVERVIEW OF INSURGENT AND GROUP TERRORISTS ACTIVISMS IN NIGERIA: PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

Amechi Nweze

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supplier in Africa and as such a potential target for terrorist attacks. The Nigeria media reports show that more and more Nigerians lose their lives than ever before to terrorist attacks. Available statistics show that between 21st September 2010 and 17th June 2012, a total of over 86 terrorist attacks by Boko Haram took place in different parts of North Eastern, North Central and North Western states of N i g e r i a h t t p : / / w w w. l o n g w a r j o u r n a l . o rg / t h re a t -matrix/achives/2012/boko haramsuicde bombers tar php. The terrorist attacks which included the June 16th attack on Louis Edet House, Police HQ Abuja and the 26th August attack on the United Nations HQ Abuja, claimed over 840 lives, with a greater number left wounded. The consequences of incessant Boko Haram attacks have led to population displacement and mass exodus of people from the Boko Haram terrorist endemic areas. The growing security threats in Nigeria no doubt constitute the major challenge to the country's national security.

Before we discuss the topic of terrorism in Nigeria, we first outline the concepts of terrorism and insurgency as weapons of security threats world wide.

Defining Terrorism and Insurgency

Terrorism and insurgency are both violent weapons for groups to seek redress, register grievances, demonstrate disaffection with government and other social status quos and in many cases advance the cause of extremist religious and political ideologies. Terrorist and insurgent groups share some similarity particularly in the use of violence and objectives of fighting social injustice, oppression, economic inequality and marginalization, and as noted above advocate extremist religious and political ideologies. Terrorist and insurgent activities also often labeled “criminal acts”. However there is no international legal consensus in labeling terrorism and insurgency as criminal offences (Williamson, 2009,


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Schmidt, 2011). The similarities between the two concepts, not withstanding, the concepts can be differentiated in conceptual definitions.

Terrorism

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in contemporary history of world peace. As a social problem, it has just been brought to the forefront by recent upsurge in terrorist attacks globally. According to MacMillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, ((MacMillan, 2007), terrorism is defined as the use of violence to achieve a political, social or ideological motive or ambition. The dictionary definition can only be accepted as operational, hence no acceptable international legal consensus of the definition (Schmid, 2011). Various legal systems and government agencies simply use definitions that suit them. The outcome of the 60th General Assemly of the UN of 7th October 2005, shows that the international community is currently slow in formulating a universally acceptable legal definition of terrorism. The difficulty according to the report is borne out of the following facts: 1) the term "terrorism" is politically and emotionally charged, particularly with situations when people are fighting for their rights and freedom under the law, 2) there is the tendency by some unscrupulous governments and their agencies to criminalize all forms of struggles as crimes of terrorism. The operational definition of use of mass violence as a weapon of terrorism may be acceptable, but the conceptual meaning particularly when it is being generalized may not. Terrorists therefore choose violence as terror weapon to create fear and emotional tension in order to achieve their set objectives. Terrorism derived its modern conception and global application in the second half of the 20th century, and rooted particularly in specific economic, social and political grievances of the period. While the validity of some of the grievances for which terrorist activities may gain some sympathy,


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many other grievances are of course debatable. Every terrorist movement needs a particular cause to justify the use of terror tactics both to their own psyche and to the audience members hope to reach. Most terrorist groups often become highly organized and plan their tactics well, while others do not. From every terrorist point of view, terror tactics are logical, valid in as much they help to achieve the particular goals.

The goals of terrorism are diverse and depend on the grievances and concerns of the terrorists fighters. The general goal may deal first with morale-building within the terrorist group. This is often achieved through training and indoctrination. The second goal is to successfully advertise and announce the groups' existence and place its concerns before the target audience. Terrorists have traditionally used propaganda mechanism to induce public alert and debate on their goals supposedly with the media. Nearly all terrorist organizations pursue nearly same goals which include among others to: -

1. Produce wide spread fear in the immediate envamonronment

2. Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause

3. Attract the attention of the media

4. Harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that government overreacts and appears repressive

5. Steal or extort money and equipment, especially weapons and ammunition vital to the operations of their group:

6. Destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create doubt that government can provide for and protect its citizens

7. Discourage foreign investments, tourism, or assistance programs that can affect the target country's economy and


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support of the government in power

8. Influence government decisions, legislation, or other critical decisions

9. Free prisoners

10. Satisfy vengeance

Where incessant terrorist harassments do not produce immediate results, the use of terror can turn the tide into a guerrilla war by forcing government security forces to concentrate their efforts in urban areas, while allowing the terrorist group establishes itself among the local populace in rural areas.

Insurgency

Insurgency is defined as an armed rebellion against a constituted authority such a national government. In such a situation, those taking part in any rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. According to Oxford English Dictionary, second edition 1989 an insurgent is a person who rises in revolt against constituted authority. Insurgent operations are fought through counter insurgency warfare, the measures of which are to counter and undermine the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime (Bernard 1965).

In many cases, all insurgent actions are not revolutionary. This is true of the activities some activist organizations in Niger Delta Nigeria. In certain other situations, revolutionary operations can easily turn into guerrilla warfare. This was the situation in some Latin American countries in the 1980's when Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala and Peru were engulfed in serious insurgencies that metamorphosed into guerrilla warfare in these countries to the point of involving military intervention that succeeded in completely wiping out the guerrilla movements, that committed


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several atrocities among both civilians and armed communities in the process.

When insurgency is used to describe a movement's unlawfulness by virtue of not being authorized by or in accordance with the laws of the land, its use is neutral. When it is used by a state or another authority under threat, "insurgency" often carries an implication that the rebels' cause is illegitimate, whereas those rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate.

A number of terms, such as rebellion, uprising and unlawful assembly or movements whose legitimacy is not recognized are used to describe the actions of insurgent groups particularly in non-revolutionary contexts such as civil revolts. Indeed insurgencies are not identical because they are guided by different objectives: political, economic, religious, ethnic, or a combination of them as well as weapons of operations

When an insurgent movement is not authorized or in accordance with the law of the land, it carries the implication of illegitimacy. When it is used by a state or any authority under threat, "insurgency" often carries an implication of justified whereas those rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate (Metz, 2007).

The use of the term insurgency recognizes the political motivation behind those who participate in an insurgency, while the term brigandry implies no political motivation (Ticehurst, 1997). At present distinction between uprising, insurgency or belligerency is not clear and such not covered by the internationally accepted laws of war. It is on this score that the concept of insurgency remains elusive.

Terrorism and Insurgency in Global Perspective

Since the turn of the 20th Century, terrorism and insurgency have


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become the new wave of crime in many countries of the world. Terrorist group movements gravitate around different social, political and ideological concerns and criteria. The only common qualification to all terrorist and insurgent groups is that they are radical group movements, employing terror tactics to achieve their political, social, ideological and religious goals and in the end score points. Many terrorist groups come under the following labels:

a. Separatist Group Movements - Separatist groups as the name implies, are those groups with the goal of separation from existing national states, opting for independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or dominion. The roots of the ideologies of separatists include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power.

b. Ethnic Nationalism Movements - Groups of this persuasion see race as the defining characteristic of a society, and therefore a basis of cohesion. There is usually the attitude that a particular group is superior because of their inherent racial characteristics.

c. Nationalistic Movements - Different from ethnic nationalism, nationalistic struggle strives at loyalty and devotion to a nation, and the national consciousness derived from placing one nation's culture and interests above those of other nations or groups. This can find expression in the creation of a new nation, or in splitting away part of an existing state to join with another that shares the perceived "national" identity.

d. Revolutionary Struggle.Movements - Dedicated to the overthrow of an established order and replacing it with a


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new political or social structure. Although often associated with communist political ideologies, this is not always the case, and other political movements can advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals.

e. Political/Ideological Movements - The PLO organization as a terrorist group is both nationalistic and political. Political motivated terrorism is also ideological concerned with the structure and organization of the forms of government and communities.

Religious Extremist and Fanatic Religious Inspired Movement

Extremist terrorists like the Hamas and al Queda are on the rise, particularly given Islamic fundamentalist movement since the 1980's and 1990's. Apart from Islamic fundamentalist movements, some world religions have tried to push extremist views that have often taken to violence to further their perceived religious goals. Religiously motivated terrorists see their objectives as holy war and therefore infallible and non-negotiable

a. Extremist Social Order Movement - Often particular social policies or issues will be so contentious that they will incite extremist behavior and terrorism. Frequently this is referred to as "single issue" or "special interest" terrorism. Some issues that have produced terrorist activities in the United States and other countries include fighting to protect animal rights, abortion, ecology/environment, and minority rights.

b. Domestic Based Socio-Political Movements - These terrorists are "home-grown" and operate within and against their home country. They are frequently tied to extreme social or political factions within a particular society, and focus their efforts specifically on their nation's socio-political arena.

c. International/Transnational Terrorist Groups - Some terrorist organization are born and hatched in a particular


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country to fight a given cause. Subsequently they spread their operations to othe countries in the form of religious movements. Hezbollah grown in Lebanon has cells worldwide, and operates in multiple countries, but is primarily concerned with events in Lebanon and Israel. Others are al Qaeda formed in 2001 in Afghanistan by Usama Bin-Laden and which ultimate ambition was to pursue a world wide Islamic Caliphate, HAMAS located in West Bank and Gaza, targeting Israel and all her allies. They are recognized as transnational terrorist organizations operating internationally. Their membership made up of many nationalities, and based their operations in multiple countries simultaneously, and conducting operations throughout the world.

Terrorist and Insurgent Security Threats in Nigeria

In the past few years, terrorism has become a household word, constituting the most serious security threat and impediment to national development in Nigeria. This unfortunate development in Nigeria's match to and all its evil manifestations tend undermine the most cherished values and fundamental principles of democracy, human rights, and freedoms under the law and even doubts about the stability of the country.

It must be realized the threat to peace and security in the country has a long developmental history. Since the end of the 30 month civil war hostilities in Nigeria ((July 1967-January 1970), the country has continued to face increases in communal conflicts, ethno-religious crises and violence and other high level criminal activities that threaten, neutralize and mortgage the country's peace and overall internal security. These crises and conflicts are obviously brought about by frictions in the social, economic, political, religious and ethnic configurations of the country. The


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nature, history and scope of communal, ethnic and religious motivated crises and confects particularly in Northern Nigeria have been comprehensively overviewed by a number of authorities in the field (Agi, 1998; Gofwen, 2004; Alubo, 2006. The nature and scope of these crises and conflicts remained in many cases parochial and limited to affected communities. They were however able to be contained and controlled by existing traditional enforcement operations law. Other regarded the crises and conflicts as the relaxes and byproducts of the past civil wa experiences particularly as noted they were contained quickly by the normal internal security outfit of the Nigeria Police

From the decade of the 1980's, a turning point was recorded in the history of security threats in the country. Nigeria's internal security landscape experienced the first episodes of the fanatic Islamic religious sect known as the Maitatsine Islamic movement led by one Muhammadu Marwa which started in Kano (Isichei, 1987; Kumolu 2001). The Maitatisie unleashed serious terror, fear, tension and horror among the citizens of Kano resulted in the death of over 4,000 innocent persons with heavy property destruction (Kamolu, 2011, Ajunwa, 2011). The activities of the group spread like wild fire, touching other parts of North Eastern states, notably Bauchi, Gombe Bornu, Bulunkutu in Maidugri and Jemeta in Yola in quick succession leaving behind similar trails in deaths of innocent Nigerians and destruction of property. Though the atrocities of the Maitatsine terrorist sect got halted following the death of the leader Muhammadu Marwa during the military intervention in December 1980. This was however not the end as his lieutenants and followers never gave up as their activities sustained in some parts of Maidugri Bornu State. It is the opinion in many circles that the adherents of the Maitatisine sect eventually joined the Boko Haram

The country was greeted in the early 1990's by a group of militant


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communal and ethnic motivated conflicts under the group response popularly referred as the Niger Delta crises and conflicts. The Niger Delta crises added a very serious dimension to Nigeria's domestic security threats by introducing the problem of youth militancy (Obasi, 2002). Though the Niger Delta technically refers to the geographical and political boundaries of nine states comprizing: Abia,,Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, the major theatres in the conflicts were the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic group communities. This is understandable because before this time, few Nigerians knew or appreciated the extent of devastations and ecological ruins in these communities which are caused oil exploitations in and around the communities. The Ogoni and Ijaw protests to the oil exploitation come in two levels. The conflicts were first at inter-communal levels. They were based on remuneration and management of oil revenues among them. The second level of the conflicts was between the ethnic communities and the oil companies. These factors constituted the background to subsequent greater Niger Delta insurgent terrorist activities. This issue is treated in greater details later.

Before 2010, little was known about the fundamentalist Islamic religious terrorist Boko Haram until the group started raining terror, horror, havoc and destruction on Nigerians, Indeed one can argue that terrorism though existed on low level scale some years back, it became highly recognized as a serious security challenge in the country when terrorism started wearing some international coloration both in form and outlook. This was largely consequent on the return of young Nigerians who took apprenticeship and tutored in the tactics of suicide bombing and explosive manufacture in Afghanistan under the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. One can then say that terrorism and insurgency became recognized as serious crime when they made their entry into the Nigeria's criminal law in May, 2011 by the National. Assembly passing the bill under the Terrorism Prevention Act and


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President Goodluck Jonathan signed the bill into law on June 3, same year. The new law did not however clearly specify which security agency would serve as the lead agency to investigate suspected terrorist crimes in line with the EFCC in the case of fraud.

Terrorism in Nigeria may be difficult to appreciate like in many other countries because of disagreement in the definition of terrorism as earlier noted in this discussion. There is because of overgeneralization of the concept by government and its agencies stakeholder interest parties in the country.. For example, at the, early years of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta region, the Ogoni people had under Ken Serowa protested against the exploitative attitudes and approach of oil exploration including the destruction of the environment which constituted the means of livelihood of the people by multinational oil companies in the region. This protest was not given any due consideration, until subsequently other militant ethnic groups joined the cause of protecting the region from ecological destruction and devastation. To the multinational oil companies the activities of the communities were viewed as terrorism. Their protests eventually turned violent and sour and as such became terrorist in nature and coloration, particularly given the level of violence and destruction of the civilian population. Their violent activities may be viewed as terrorist but different in nature from the classical terrorist operations. This prompted Oyeniyi (2010) to argue that use of terrorism label by the Nigerian government in cases of struggle by a people against destruction of their environment and marginalization of the people, may not be suitable to designate the activities of militants in the Niger Delta. He also wondered whether groups agitating for purely parochial interests of ethnic, religious and social groups identity can be branded terrorists groups as derived the UN and the US classification of terrorism. The posture taken by Oyeniyi seemed to have been overtaken by the current pendulum of militancy expressions in Niger Delta since


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2005. For example on 29th December, 2010, the first improvised car bomb explosion occurred in Bayelsa. This was followed by the October Ist. 2010 bombing in Abuja during Nigeria's 50th Independence anniversary celebration, which the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility and Henry Orka, leader of the movement is being tried under treasonable felony in South Africa. Amaraegbu (2011) captioned the change from militancy to terrorism in the Niger Delta as an old problem taking a new dimension. Though the Maitisine religious insurgent group operated in the country between 1980's and mid 1990's, the members were merely foot soldiers without use of bomb explosive devices to drive home their demands and position.

One can rightly argue that Nigeria started experiencing terrorist violent episodes when young Nigerians got training in terrorist operations locally and others returned from international training in the Middle East under al-Queda in Afghanistan. Having acquired expertise in explosive device manufacture, bomb explosion mechanism and suicide bombing, these returnees offered their newly acquired technologies in perpetrating terror among Nigerians. Among the first test experience was the August 26th 2011, bombing of United Nations building in Abuja by 27 year old Mohammed Abdul Barra from Maidugri. The incident led to the death of 24 persons with 115 other persons wounded, (BBC News Africa, August, 26th 2011).

Classification of Terrorist and Insurgent Activities in Nigeria

The Nigerian terrorist and insurgent violent activity scene is viewed into three major area purposely for better appreciation. The classification is adopted bearing in mind the typical situations in Nigeria. We chose this classification or rather grouping as representation of the structure, organization and operational tactics of the groups


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Separatist Islamic Mode of Worship Sect Movement

This group is represented by the notorious Maitatsine group movement of the the early 1980s. The group led by one Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa (alias Tatsie who is said to have originally come from Marwa one time in the Cameroon, settled in Kano.after his education about 1945. In Kano, he became known for his controversial preaching on the Qur'an. Maitatsine claimed to be a prophet (Isichei 1987). He also saw himself as an image of Sheikh Usman dan Fodio, (Adesoji Abimbola, (2011). Although a Koranic scholar, he seemingly rejected the hadiith and the sunna, regarding the reading of any other book but the Koran as paganism. Maitatsine spoke against the use of radios, watches, bicycles, cars and even the possession of more money than necessary (Mervyn, 1987). He also follower, rejected Mohammed as a prophet portraying rather himself as prophet see Pete (2006).

Further profile of his life showed that he was sent into exile by the British colonial authorities earlier in the Cameroon, perhaps because of uncompromising Islamic faith posture for fear of inciting people. He returned to Kano shortly after Nigeria's independence in October 1960. By 1972 he had a noticeable size of what may be regarded as militant followers of his teaching. In 1975 he was again arrested by Nigerian police for slander and public abuse of political authorities. Gradually he began to receive acceptance from religious authorities, especially after participating in the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. As his following increased in the 1970s, so were confrontations between his adherents and the police. His preaching attracted largely a following of youths, unemployed migrants, and those who felt that mainstream Muslim teachers were not doing enough for their communities. By December 1980, the group the Maitatsine struck their first attacks on other religious figures, civilians and the police. This forced the Shagari administration to involve the Nigerian army in putting


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down the uprising. As has been noted earlier the terror and horror caused by the notorious religious sect quickly spread to other Noictim of death rth East states of Bauchi, Adamawa, Bornu claiming 5,000 people by death including a sizable number of police causalities. Muhammadu Marwa was also a victim of death in the hands of military. The period of Maitatsine crisis was a black spot in Nigeria's national security terrain

The interesting aspect of the movement and activities of this notorious religious sect in Kano is that early and close surveillance and monitoring were not kept on them until they struck with such heinous force leading to great terror and lass of life and property in Kano. Again, both the law enforcement agency and the citizens of Kano underestimated the level of their organization, use of dangerous weapons and influence on the followers of Marwa'.

Extremist Islamic Religious Sect Movement with Abhorrence for Western Education and Value Orientations

This group is, represented by the Boko Haram terrorist sect which according to a major field report on the activities of the sect by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) of MacDill Air Force Base, Florida USA, the sect constitutes of largely foot soldiers, impoverished and alienated young men that started their terrorist mission in parts of Northern Eastern states of Nigeria (see, JSOU Report, 2011). The name Boko Haram according to the report means abhorrence to Western education and its civilization. Though a locally derived phenomenon, the group's abhorrence of Western education and value orientation followed former leader Mohammed Yusuf's posture that education “spoils the belief in one God”,.(Sani, 2011).The sect's full name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" with ultimate aim of creating an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria


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by, seemingly, whatever means it has at its disposal and at whatever human cost it deems necessary.

The operations of the organization included recruitment, training and committing acts of terrorism while attempting to allude government and its agencies.. Before 2011, Boko Haram was a little understood, dangerous but parochial Islamic sect believed to be in decline after a purge by Nigerian security forces in 2009. Now, given the tempo of its ruinous and destructive operations in the communities, it is clear that Boko Haram yet to be fully understood has evolved as Nigeria's most serious security threat, one which shows no sign of abating.

Boko Haram has been blamed for thousands of deaths in the last few months alone striking in quick succession places of worship, open areas, security agencies formations. One can describe the efforts of government and security agencies as desperate as the attacks go ahead with warnings.

The sect is thought by some people to have its roots in the Sahaba group, which Mohammed Yusuf came to lead in the late 1990s before reorienting the group as Boko Haram. Yusuf was a favorite student of prominent Nigerian Islamic scholar Sheikh Jafar Mahmud Adam. It is been reported that the two fell out over Yusuf's extremist positions, with Boko Haram, then known by some as the Yusufiyya sect, moving from Kano State to Yusuf's hometown of Maidaguri, in Borno State, in 2004. Jafar was murdered in 2007. Kano clerics are of the opinion that Yusuf loyalists, who reportedly interrupted Jafar's sermons after their falling out, were behind the murder (Adesoye, 2011).

Ethnic Nationality Movements for Self Determination

Principally this movement is represented by groups from ethnic nationalities claiming representing their people in the struggle for self determination for their people. The groups include: Movement


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for the survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP); Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); Oodua People's Congress (OPC); Ijaw National Congress (IYC) (see Vom Kemedi,2005)

Nigerians are all aware that the Niger Delta region represents a hot spot in the country. It is a region of great economic asset for the country as well spot for grave security challenge. The statement is an obvious one, bearing in mind that the region is responsible for Nigeria's wealth accounting for over 70% of the country's revenue base. As a spot for grave security challenge, this is exemplified by growing outburst of militantancy, separatist movement and agitation for autonomy. A recent report by Urhobo Historical Society described the situation as “ The Swamps of Insurgency: Niger Delta's Unrest” (see, International Crisis Group African Report, 2006). The region can also be described as a region of great contradictions, where there is abundant wealth on ground but the communities the owners of the soil where the wealth is made live under severe poverty, are victims of environmental pollution and degradation, underdevelopment with the people benefiting less fro the oil wealth. These constitute the genesis of the demands, agitations, uprisings, militancy, terrorism and insurgency endemic in the region. The agitations for government and the oil companies in the past to heed to the plights of the Niger Delta Communities are said to have fallen to deaf ears. The communities have also felt that instead of heeding to the genuine agitations for equitable, the oil wealth has rather given rise to mass corruption and bad governance.

The disaffection with government and the oil companies, coupled with growing frustration, set in motion a series of violent agitation


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Political, Economic and Social Marginalization Motivated Violence and Insurgency

This factor is clearly demonstrated by the violence and insurgency in the Niger Delta region over the past one decade. The insurgency which started in the early 1990s was obviously the result of tensions between the Niger Delta communities and foreign oil companies. These communities particularly the minority ethnic groups who felt that they were being exploited, socially and economically marginalized and their marine resources greatly devastated. Initially the agitations and violence were led by the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic groups which later spread to other ethnic in the sub-region. Considering themselves as the vanguard of the people, the youths took over the mantle of agitation which metamorphosed into youth militant insurgency that reached a crescendo between the 1990s and 2007 when the regime of late President Umaru Yaradua seemed to have offered some reprise in the Amnesty Program that recognized the injustice perpetrated to communities in the Niger Delta

The Psychological Dimensions of Terrorism

The various social science disciplines approach the study and analysis of terrorism from different perspectives, taking a macro social perspective. The macro-social perspective predominantly looks at such issues as recruitment and induction patterns of terrorist organizations, the structure of terrorist organizations, their operations, leadership and funding of their activities. Psychological approaches to the study of terrorism are concerned with the micro-social perspective ie the study of terrorists' profiles (personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, emotions and family backgrounds, which bear on the lives terrorists in society and recruitment into terrorist groups (Ozdaman, 2008). These factors are believed to impact on the behavior of terrorists, including their


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mind set (Victoroft, 2005). These micro social or psychological factors largely explain the here and now behavior of the terrorist. The psychological approach deals with the ultimate questions of: who is the terrorist; why does a person choose a terrorist career or join a given terrorist group, stay or leave terrorist organizations? It is the answer to these questions that imply the psychological perspective. In his recent book, Randy Barun, Director of Psychology of Terrorism Initiative at the University of Florida, further added that contemporary psychological research on terrorism should also be directed to finding out the extent psychopathology is relevant in understanding or preventing terrorism; the extent to which individual personality is relevant in understanding or preventing terrorism; the extent of individual's life experiences are relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism; the role of ideology in terrorist behavior and what distinguishes extremists who act violently from those who do not.

While many African countries continue to battle with increasing security threats arising from terrorist activities in the region, there is a dearth of empirical literature on the phenomenon, based on the experiences (Hamelin; Aznay; Monitte and Kalpanian, 2006). Much of the research literature on Terrorism in Nigeria for example is limited largely to media reports and analysis in place policy directed research and of course technical research reports from foreign agencies. The agencies are largely US based. In the mid 1990's, the US Library of Congress sponsored a research on the sociology and psychology of terrorism, based on the theoretical question of who becomes a terrorist, (Congressional Research Service, 2007). In a similar way the United States Government, Department of Defense under the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) sponsored a research on the Boko Haram in Nigeria. The research report has been published under the title “Confronting the terrorist Boko Haram in Nigeria” (Forest, 2012).


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Contemporarily, research information drawn from Europe and North America, on the psychological dimensions of terrorism is robust (Cooper, 1977; Knutson, i981; Borun, 2004; Ozdaman, 2008; Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009; McCauley, 2007) and point to the following underpinnings that: 1), it does not appear to be a single terrorist personality or a unique psychological profile or trait that identifies a terrorist. The only personality characterization that can be indicted is that terrorists are seemingly action-oriented and aggressive people who are stimulus-hungry always seeking for excitement. 2) Individuals join terrorist groups to project personal, social, political, religious and ideological disaffection with the statuesque. 3) A number of social and psychological factors, which include narcissistic personality, low self-esteem and emotional/mental health status are associated with joining terrorist groups. 4) Family background and social environment and vulnerability factors can combine to push a person to identify with and join a terrorist group.

While Nigeria is yet to commission policy directed research on the social and psychological dimensions of terrorism and insurgency in the country, we can only extrapolate from the findings of studies outside Nigeria to explain the situation in the country. Thus the accompanying analysis is borne out literature review and personal experiences as a psychologist and not from immediate field work.

Frustration-aggression

The frustration-aggression link to violence as put foward by scholars in the field: Ted Richards Gun and J. C. Davis is based on the relative-deprivation hypothesis, (Gurr 1970 and Davies, 1973) argues that when a gap exists between an individual's rising expectations and need satisfaction, there is frustration which is followed by aggression as a psychological mechanism. They further posit that every frustration leads to some aggression and


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that every aggressive act results from prior frustration. It must be emphasized that any feeling of frustration is perceptual and that such a frustration must have reached clinical point before overt manifestation of aggression. Another advocate of the hypothesis, Margolin (1977: 273-4), argues that "much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of failure to meet various social economic and personal needs and objectives." Other scholars have dismissed the frustration-aggression hypothesis as very simplistic, as it is based on the erroneous assumption that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. Ferracuti (1983, 1990), argued that a better approach would be a subcultural theory, which he explained that terrorists live in their own subculture, with their own value orientations. Political scientist Paul Wilkinson (1974: 127) faults the frustration-aggression hypothesis for having "very little to say about the social psychology of prejudice and hatred" and fanaticisms that play a major role in encouraging extreme violence. He believes that political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the development of terrorist, ideologies, beliefs and life-styles (p. 133).”

Identity Crisis and Confusion

It was Erick Erikson the German born British psychologist who put forward the theory of identity formation as part of personality development (Erickson, 1979). We have noted earlier that personality is an important psychological construct that has a lot to explain about human behavior. Current clinical psychology literatures shows that negative self identity can account for negative behavior patterns including emotional illness conditions including vulnerability to join criminal gangs, cults and terrorist groups. The late political psychologist Jeanne N. Knutson (1981) suggests that a terrorist consciously assumes a negative identity. One of her examples is a Croatian terrorist who, as a member of an


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oppressed ethnic minority, was disappointed by the failure of his aspiration to attain a university education, and as a result assumed a negative identity by becoming a terrorist. Negative identity involves a vindictive rejection of the role regarded as desirable and proper by an individual's family and community. In Knutson's view, terrorists engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives. Her political science-oriented viewpoint seems to coincide with the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Personality and Terrorism Link

Defined as a psychological construct or trait that uniquely marks a person out from other persons, personality trait disposes a person to behave in characteristic or unique ways different from other people. In the same consideration, a person responds consistently to issues in the social environment in certain predictable ways. Personality dispositions influence other aspects of life: how a person perceives reality and events in life, relationship with other people, perception of health and social well-being and above all participate in criminal activities or join clandestine and terrorist organizations. The relationship between personality and terrorism is however not straight because all terrorists are not pathological or have disordered personality and all personality disordered persons not terrorists are. There are two dominant personality disorders that are claimed to have links with terrorist inclination. They are psychopathic and narcissist personality traits.

Psychopathic Personality

According to the two widely established systems for classifying mental disorders :the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) by the WHO and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental


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Disorders (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), Psychopathy is a personality disorder that has been identified with the following behavioral traits: superficial charm, shallow emotions, intolerance attitude, lacking empathy and guilt, cold-heartedness, egocentricity, manipulative, lacking in behavioral control, irresponsibility, impulsivity and anti-social behaviors, such as parasitic lifestyle and criminality ( APA, 2000, Hare and Neumann, 2008). Despite these clinical observations psychopathic personality, there is no consensus that the symptoms reside exclusively with terrorists. The debate is still ongoing regarding the issue of essential features of terrorist personality. This is because of the interlocking similarity in the diagnosis of psychopathic personality and anti-social personality disorder which can be found co-existing in same person. Thus there are behavioral similarities between psychopathy and anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). The diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is usually based on manifest behavioral patterns whereas psychopathic behavioral assessment includes both manifest behavioral patterns and indirect observation using psychometric instruments. Another clinical observation is that more people with anti-personality disorders are found among prisoners than psychopaths. Terrorists are sometimes looked upon as psychopaths, for obvious reasons of clinical association with such traits as antisocial violence, selfish worldview that precludes welfare for others, lack of remorse or guilt, and blaming external events. In addition, it has been noted that coordinated terrorist activity requires organization, loyalty and ideology; traits such as self-centeredness, unreliability, poor behavioral controls, and unusual behaviors may be disadvantages, (Hogan, 2006). Recently Hakkanen-Nyholm and Nyholm (2012) discussed the possibility of psychopaths being associated with organized crime, economic crime and war crimes.

Analytically, psychopaths are found be associated more with


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violence, no wonder they are more likely to join violence groups and extremist religious and terrorist groups Joining such groups gives a sense of loose belongingness, with no strong bonds required which suit their personality type. Group membership also gives them a sense of power that they can use for violence and influence. When a psychopath joins an extreme religious group, and if the leader is another psychopath which may be the case many times, the group is likely to perfect their terrorist activities. Another aspect is that because people with anti-personality disorder (ASPD) are clinically identified with a sense of inadequacy and inferiority, if they join terrorist groups, it is to compensate for their sense of inadequacy and inferiority.

Narcissistic personality and the terrorist

Narcissism is an unhealthy personality trait. It is also a personality disorder, Narcissism is known to be a construction of a false self, and therefore the individual will exhibit behavior that is pathological (not real) in nature. It is a disconnection from the inner reality of personal peace, leading to the development of narcissistic characteristics. Narcissism or narcissistic personality depicts the individual as excessively preoccupied with issues of personal adequacy, power, prestige and vanity. First formulated in 1968, it was historically called megalomania, and it is closely linked to egotism. At one end of the self-loving spectrum is the charismatic leader with an excess of charm, who's only vice may be his or her inflated amour-propre. At the far end of the spectrum reside individuals with narcissistic personality disorder, whose grandiosity soars to such heights that they are manipulative and easily angered, especially when they don't receive the attention they consider their birthright. Here's how to figure out whether the big talker in your office really believes his own hype.


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Cognitive/Perception link

Randy Borum demonstrates that there are internal and external factors that can affect one's perception of provocation or intent (Borum, 2004). Crenshaw (1988, 12) suggests that the principles of social cognition apply both to terrorists and to oreir organizations. She notes that 'the actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are Psychology of Terrorism filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.' Advertising, political campaigns, and other persuasive media messages are all built on the premise that behavior follows attitude, and attitude can be influenced by the right message delivered in the right way. Social Marketing could prevent aggressive, terrorist behavior through attitude

Terrorist Motivation

Motivation as a psychological construct is define as the urge behind any human action. It the answer to the why of behavior or why a person becomes a terrorist or why he joins terrorist group or commits public acts of violence. Though there are many psychological theories or explanations of behavior but none is as more than the theory of motivation. Motivation is really an important explanation of terrorist behavior, otherwise why would a well qualified professional like the medical doctor an engineer and their likes decide to join a terrorist group.

Most psychological analyses of terrorists and terrorism, according to psychologist Maxwell Taylor (1988), have attempted to address what motivates terrorists or to describe personal characteristics of terrorists, on the assumption that terrorists can be identified by these attributes. However, although an understanding of the terrorist mindset would be the key to understanding how and why


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an individual becomes a terrorist, numerous psychologists have been unable to adequately define it. Indeed, there appears to be a general agreement among psychologists who have studied the subject that there is no one terrorist mindset. This view, however, itself needs to be clarified.

Terrorism and Mental illness Link hypothesis

The connections between mental illness and terrorism, has been area that has attracted much diagnostic analysis. The theoretical position from clinical psychology perspective is that violence, like any other criminal activity is an abnormal and therefore any person who perpetrates crimes of violence on people is an abnormal person. However, most social scientists have discounted the causal relationship between mental illness and terrorism, on the ground that it is not always the case within terrorism studies. Accordingly the supposed linked seems be largely from media, and political circles who over blow the psychology of terrorism often expressed in the language of mentalists, and theories of pathologization. This article reaffirms the view that apart from certain pathological cases, there is no causal connection between an individual's mental disorder and engagement in terrorist activity. The individual terrorist's motivations can be explained by other factors, including behavioural psychology. However, there may be a connection between an individual engaging in terrorist activity and developing a mental disorder[s]. Certain stressors that occur because of terrorist activity may result in psychological disturbance in terrorist individuals. These factors may partially explain terrorist group instability and should be taken into account when detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects.


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Religious Fanaticism link with Terrorism

Today terrorism is usually linked to religious fanatism, much more with Islamic faith. Though such a perception may not sit well with many, the reality is that many terrorist Islamic figures like Osama bin Laden and Noordin M. Top manipulate religion by citing verses of the Koran to justify their terrorist acts. In realizing the power of religion in people's life, religious fanatic leader go the extent of inciting suicide

Social and Psychological Vulnerability

Under age, low educational level, poverty and destitution are key factors that render a person highly susceptible and prone all kinds of external influence. Extremist religious preachers, political and ideological propagandists have found this group a ready and available population for recruitment for various unpopular and clandestine operations. Destitution, hunger and low age level directly affect the functions of the brain and even the psyche, such that the individual becomes pliable

Psychological Escapism

There are two ways of dealing with life problems. The two ways are either a person deals with the problems realistically by fighting to come through them or ignore or remain passive instead. Escapism is one popular method of fleeing unpleasant realities. Escapists tend to lose their social adaptation skills. They do not know how to approach or confront life problems. In the process they become exposed to a fair amount of stress. Depending on what their personality formation is and their background life experiences are, they hang on with wrong people and find outlet in negative


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responses and become also prone to crimes and terrorist career.

Escapism is a psychological mechanism of adapting or adjusting to life challenges. Some form of escapism may be passivity, ignoring or diversionary. As opposed to use of violence, they may not mean harm to other people, but clinically not positive adjustment.

In relation to taking the course of oppositional or criminal behaviors, the psychological theory of negative adjustment posits that when perceived personal failure or inability to achieve realistic goals by conventional means, particularly among youths, they become highly vulnerable to become victims ideological or religious messages by religious fanatics or international mafia and criminal groups who use terror and intimidation to achieve their objects, Through the choice of their targets, may often be symbolic or representatives of society, organized economic institutions or religious organizations. The use of terrorism and violence is viewed as attempt to create a high profile impact on the public and their targeted enemysion or enemies despite the limited material resources available to them. In doing so, they hope to demonstrate various points, 1) that the targeted government(s) cannot protect their own interests or their own people, or that by assassinating a specific victim they can teach the general public a lesson that they are serious about their viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own. For example, by assassinating Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, a year after his historic trip to Jerusalem, the al-Jihad terrorists hoped to convey to the world and especially Egyptians

Family nurturance and link with problem behavior

One of the social factor variables in problem behaviors is the type of family upbringing. It is clinically demonstrated that early parental loss or total absence of parental care, deprives a child parental


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figure to identify with. This makes it difficult for the child to establish emotional attachment and identity that the child requires at the critical childhood or adolescent age. In another context, social conditions often depicted by congested urban squalor, often characterized by breakdown of social norms and regulations, undesirable peer models and influence create a climate of alienation for the growing youth. The situation also creates difficulties for self adjustment and a climate of hostility towards the larger society. The social environmental picture painted above often produces a type of psychopaths and delinquents that become available and potential commodity as recruits for all forms of criminal operations and terrorist activities.

Unfortunately many children, adolescents and adults in Nigeria come from family and social environmental situations as above. They may include street children, Motor Park touts, area boys and street children (see Ojiji, 2007).

Factors Associated with Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria

A number of social, economic, political and psychological factors can be held responsible either precipitating or sustaining the militancy, terrorism and insurgent activities in contemporary Nigeria. Some of these factors are either, remote, p proximate, internal or externally disposed and can be classed as either macro or micro

Poverty and Corruption Factor

The root causes of Niger Delta insurgency are well known to any average Nigerian. Oil exploration started in the region in 1958. The conflict whch started in the i1970''s by Ogoni people was in


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response to the apparent neglect by the Shell BP company operating in the region. The people had complained of slow pace of response for reforms in the way Shell operated in the region, lack of jobs for their youths, electricity, water, schools and clinics in large parts of Delta and above all the massive poverty. These have been the catalysts that boosted support to insurgent groups such as MEND. This was also the kind of that prompted ethnic Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa to protest the military-led government and Royal Dutch/Shell before his execution in November 1995.

From the above, poverty and corruption are obviously behind much of the militant insurgent threats in Nigeria reliability as a major oil producer. Since January 2006, the new group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which is currently the coalition of the various militant groups in the region set battle with government forces, sabotaging oil installations, taking foreign oil workers hostage and carrying out lethal car bombings. In MEND position this in pursuit of demands on government not only to withdraw troops, release imprisoned ethnic leaders and grant oil revenue concessions to Delta groups, but more importantly as reaction to the wave of high level of poverty among their people and the corruption that trails oil exploration in the region.

Marginalization in social, economic, political and educational opportunities

The youths and minority ethnic groups are largely victims of this. Sometimes these can be real or imaginary. The situation of the Niger Delta exemplifies much of these realities. Indeed much the ethnic and intra-ethnic violence that has been part of the revolt in the Niger Delta is part of this. On the part of youths of the country, much of the crime and violence among them have their roots on lack of education and unemployment. We know that exposure to


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good education changes the mind. Education gives value and opportunity to achieving personal goals and life. Denying education to the youths means many thing: denying the individual the opportunity for selt realization. This is exactly the case in many states in Nigeria, particularly some Northern states where the Almagari concept prevails. These children and youths become highly vulnerable to all sorts bad influence and ready to be mobilized by fanatic religious zealots

Inadequate Community and Youth Development Agenda

Effective grass-root and youth development scheme for a developing economy like Nigeria sums up every thing. Because of the apparent low level, youths are known to flock the capital cities, some of who have no meaningful skills, are largely unemployed and in many cases unemployable. Many of them become motor part touts and urchins, area boys all ready to give themselves up for any kind of enlistment for various nefarious criminal activities. This is largely the situation in our country.

Porous Nature of Nigeria's External Borders

This has been an issue that has ben give much case studies empirical research and commissions. However the situation remains that a lot of illegal aliens from neighboring states still find their way easily to Nigeria. Some criminal records have implicated non Nigerians who have no legitimate business in the county. It is on record that some members of the notorious Boka Haram are no Nigerians. Further to this is that large quantities of arms and armunition that find their way to the country did not fly, they came through the borders


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The Globalization Factor

The wave of insurgent and terrorist activities in Nigeria largely draw their orientation, tactics, determination to succeed and the modus operand from what is currently taking place in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The world acclaimed leader and sponsor of terrorist activities Osama Bin Laden has become a figure or mentor to terrorists all over the globe. Indeed Afghanistan has become the training capital for world terrorists. Even Nigerian terroris are known to have obtained their lessons from Afghanistan.

Nature of Our Internal Security Operatives

Though the training package for the Nigeria Police reflects good standards particularly in the combatant area, hence they are able in a large majority of cases to fight criminal. One observes some gap in the area of surveillance and information gathering. The police in many cases especially in this era of terrorism and insurgency take these groups for granted in terms of the level of their organization, strength, efficiency in handling of arms and above all their field operational tactics. These facts can only be obtained through effective surveillance and undercover operations which activities of subversive element and insurgent groups require. The impression is there that members of the police in Nigeria incur more death tolls fighting terrorism than in many other countries. This was the experience during the Maitatsine uprising.

The Country Nigeria Factor

Nigeria as one of the most populous and a wealth African nation is a security threat factor itself. Her population in mixture and diversity of social, ethnic and religious diversities provides a hiding place for criminals from less privileged who seek fortune in


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the country and become vulnerable to participating in crime.

Government Reservations dealing with terrorists

Government as corporate entity and representatives of the people applies restraints and reservations in applying hard measures in dealing with terrorists. This is borne out of the fact that the political and economic motivated violence has some measure of emotional support by some people more so when the terrorists are fellow citizens seeking their “rights”. It is not out of place to argue that many youths in the Niger Delta simply take advantage of this situation.

Muslem-Christian Divide

The Muslem-Christian divide in the country may be viewed as having some effect on the Muslem-Christisn conflicts because of the emotions and sentiments Nigerians on either side shared in situations of religious conflict. Many leaders on either side often fail to speak because of shared religious sentiment. It took some Northern leaders some time to speak out in condemnation of the activities of Boko Haram at the initial stage until it became obvious that they did not mean well for any body irrespective of religious, ethnic, social and political affiliation. Others kept mute because they fear reprisal attacks or failure to continue gaining from either side.

Conclusion

The critical issue in the discussion is that terrorism and insurgent violent activities have constituted a major security concern in Nigeria particularly since the emergence of the Maitatisine insurgent religious group and currently dreaded Boko Haram.


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Further to this, the violent and restive youth activities in the Niger Delta and the experiences of 9/11 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center New York and the Pentagon in Washington, collectively changed Nigeria's security landscape. Indeed the casualty rate in human life and infrastructural destruction has been unprecedented and comparatively higher than causality rate from any other cause within the same time period in the country. The consequences of terrorism and insurgent violent attacks in the country cannot be easily quantified. Currently Nigeria is being portrayed in the eyes of the world as one the world's terror zones, while Boko Haram ranking is one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in Africa after Somalia and Mali. A disturbing issue is that young Nigerians are being recruited into terrorist groups as a result of certain vulnerability factors which include low level education, unemployment poverty and perhaps in some respects insufficient parental nurturance particular at the early formative stages of life. Indeed the experiences of terrorist attacks in some states in the North East, North Central and North West regions of the country have given rise to population movements particularly away from the most seriously terrorist attacks affected areas, thus leading to serious population displacement. Business enterprises and commercial activities are not spared. At the moment the entire security system and governance in the country are undoubtedly under serious threat.

The discussion is being brought to a close with the following policy recommendation:

a) Emphasis should be laid on accelerated educational policy especially at the grass root. The current Federal Government and Northern state governors is a much welcome development especially as much is being addressed to the neglected Almagari group. This will obviously correct the harm done in the past by the neglect of th is potential


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Nigerians by some previous state governors

b) Provision of enhanced youth employment scheme. It is a well known reality that any country with over 50% of her youth are unemployed, such a country is likely sitting on a keg on gun powder. Where the unemployed drift to the urban areas in search of jobs that are not there, we can only imagine the consequences

c) Community developments are undoubtedly part and parcel of national development. If communities are not development the entire nation is not developed. Development at the community level helps to hold back rural urgan migration. Our major urban cities are being over stretched because of uncontrolled urban rural migration. Community means increase in rural infrastructure as part of the overall development of the nation

d) On national security consideration, police selection and training scheme require to be addressed. At present the police training scheme is obviously cued much to operation of crime combat. In the area of surveillance attempt must be made to enhance of what DIG Udah had earlier called sustainable surveillance and security information gathering particularly given the new wave of security threats caused by the current episode of terrorism and insurgency

e) Collaboration and joint training between and among security agencies should be encouraged. This would give opportunity to sharing information and reduce the rancor and misunderstanding between security agencies.

f) Strengthening public knowledge and awareness on the role of every citizen in security through effect community watch and slogan “security is every body's concern' follows the provisions of the National constitution. This aspect of


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community education should be handled by the National Orientation Agency.

g) Creation of effective security data bank that is important in facilitating storage and classification of every aspect of security information in the country. Absence of effective security information data bank creates gaps in security information particularly for research, police crime investigation and prosecution

H) Sustaining the tempo of Christian--Muslem dialogue, as one of the most viable opportunities for promoting dialogue and communication among Christians and Moslems should be vigorously pursued. This will no doubt reduce the walls of Chritian-Muslem divide.


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Introduction

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious developing federation which is richly blessed with good climatic condition, vast and fertile arable land for a thriving agricultural sector, splendid vegetation scenery, robust and thriving tourism sites, virile, enterprising and dynamic citizens, diverse human and material resources, etc. Indeed Nigeria is so immensely endowed with both human and material resources that if the country had cultivated a patriotic, disciplined, responsible and visionary leadership at independence, it would have long cast off its unenviable third world identity and joined the elite club of developed countries. Regrettably, the leadership question remains at the core of Nigeria's persistent underdevelopment with wide ramifications of negative consequences. Lack of equitable development is posing a grave threat to the weak foundation of national unity and integration. The adoption of a federal model for managing the complex diversity (Tyoden, nd: 184) which characterizes Nigeria has not significantly fostered national cohesion and harmony. This poor performance of the federalist ideology in the critical enterprise of building a socially cohesive, politically stable, economically prosperous and peaceful Nigeria is fundamentally attributed to the

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weak commitment of leadership to the cultivation of 'federal spirit.' In a more explicit sense, successive governments in Nigeria since independence have miserably failed to cultivate in sufficient quantity, integrative principles and strict adherence to them in the enterprise of governance. This critical expectation was made the more difficult by the protracted authoritarian military rule and the arbitrariness that characterized military style of governance. In a sense, Nigeria is a plural and deeply divided society trapped in the throes of nation building (Osaghae, 2005; Tyoden, 2006; Egwu, 2003; Bach, 1989; Lijphart, 1977). As with every plural and divided society, Nigeria is buffeted by some set of oppositions such as North-South, Islam-Christianity, indigenes-Settlers and a host of other fissiparous tendencies. All of these have conspired to generate groundswell opposition to the country's effort at building a legitimate, stable, cohesive and developmental state and fast turning the it into the likes of Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc..

Many scholars (Osaghae, 2005; Ojo, 2005; Olufemi, 2005; Amuwo, 1998; Egwu, 2003) have attributed the persistence and growing potency of these fissiparous tendencies to the failure of the federal framework to manage and accommodate these contradictions that have remained the enduring attributes of the Nigerian society. The conscious adoption of some federal instrumentalities such as federal character, quota system, unity schools, National Youth Service Scheme and many others have not significantly succeeded in resolving some of these contradictions in the polity. In fact as the country grows older new forms of contradictions such as citizenship-indigeneship controversy, shariah- versus non shariah states, etc. are emerging on the political scene and with older ones acquiring greater potency and resilience. The citizenship versus indigeneship conundrum which has come to occupy the centre stage of national political discourse is not only sensitive but also intensely emotive. Violent conflicts (Alubo, 2006) have erupted in


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virtually every part of Nigeria which significantly derived their source from the citizenship-indigeneship dichotomy. At the core of this serious national problem which is threatening to roll back the frontiers of the thin national unity and integration so far attained is the issue of “inequitable access to power and resources accentuated by the perceptions of relative deprivation, exclusion, marginalization, and domination” (Osaghae,2005:v). The point must be underscored that protracted authoritarian military rule has not only deepened some of these contradictions that characterize the Nigerian federalism today but also in a more fundamental sense, heightened their potency as consequence of protracted catastrophic governance..

Nigeria's successful transition to democratic rule in May 1999 was greeted with widespread and effusive outpouring of joy and relief from the pangs of several years of military bad governance. It was the shared expectation of most Nigerians; especially the traumatized segment that democratic governance environment would breed a robust and enduring climate of peace, security and political stability as critical precondition for effective delivery of services for enhanced socio-economic wellbeing of the mass of Nigerians who have endured with equanimity of mind the harsh effects of bad governance by the military. Contrary to this widely shared expectation, Nigerians became entangled in the web of insecurity largely engendered by frequent outbreak of violent and deadly conflicts in different locations in the country such as the Shagamu clash between the Hausa settlers and the native Yoruba in 1999, Jos conflict between the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere indigenous groups on one hand and the Hausa/Fulani on the other in 2001; the 2000 miss world induced violence in Kaduna; the Tiv and Alago conflict in Azara in 2000; the Alago and Eggon violent and deadly clash in 2012 and a host of others. All these violent conflicts erupted at varying times along ethno-religious and communal fault lines thereby undermining social cohesion and

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national harmony. The cumulative effects of all these conflicts have threatened in a fundamental sense, the security and peace of the country. The most serious threat to the corporate survival of the Nigerian federation is that posed by the Boko Haram Islamic sect which has killed considerable number of lives, precisely speaking the military source has estimated that not less than 3,000 lives (Thisday Newspaper, 2012; Paden, 2012) have been lost to the deadly operations of Boko Haram insurgency and destroyed property in different locations in Nigeria. Since the emergence of this deadly insurgency group in 2009, the security landscape of Nigeria has been badly affected. Initially targeted at security agencies, especially the police as the critical target, the insurgents expanded the scope of their targets to include churches, media houses, individuals and corporate organizations such as banks. The Boko Haram insurgency is targeted at undermining the authority of the Nigerian state and this fits into the view of insurgency as armed rebellion against constituted authority of the state (Steven, 2007). The insurgency group has employed the use of terrorism to construct in the minds of the citizens the image of a weak state that has lost the capacity and capability to secure them. Instilling mass fear in people could lead to withdrawal of both tangible and intangible supports from the political system thereby quickening the pace of its collapse as calculated by the insurgents.

The parlous state of security in Nigeria today is therefore a consequence of the frequent outbreak of violent conflicts in different locations and the sinister agenda pursued by the insurgents and this has questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of the Nigerian state in the provision of common good to its citizens. This is more so against the background of the popular view and belief that the state exists primarily to secure the lives of its citizens and their property. Chapter two section 14 subsection 2b of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria explicitly provides that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary


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purpose of government” (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: 10). This is the basis upon which every citizen of Nigeria makes demand on the state with respect to provision of adequate security. Although this is a legitimate demand and aspiration of every Nigerian, the reality on ground is a far cry from the constitutional provision. Insecurity has not only pervaded the length and breadth of Nigeria but has also in a fundamental sense, generated dark cloud of doubt in the minds of Nigerians about the capacity of the Nigerian state to fulfill its constitutionally prescribed obligation to the citizens. The most striking difference between Thomas Hobbes' state of nature and the modern state lies in the fact that the modern state, unlike the Hobbesian state of nature where life is generally characterized as solitary, nasty, brutish, poor and short, is founded on a well and carefully articulated principle of rule of law expected to enthrone a stable, peaceful, dynamic and progressive social order. It means then that if the modern state should survive and remain relevant, it must cultivate sufficient political will to meet the security need of its citizens. Persistent failure of the state to guarantee the security of lives and property is a sign of steady relapse into the ugly state of nature. Could this be the experience of the Nigerian state in the 21st Century? If the response to this is no, what feasible measures must be taken to strengthen the foundation of security in Nigeria? If on the other hand the answer to the question is yes, how then can this lamentable situation of insecurity be reversed for Nigeria to be able to meet the legitimate developmental aspirations of her citizens? It is instructive to note that transitional democracies as contended by Weinberg (2006) are helplessly vulnerable to destabilizing forces in the society. The case of Nigeria is particularly so against the established fact that some forces that were comfortable with the praetorian order before the transition to a democratic order would inevitably feel threatened and could employ any means to scuttle the process of democratization. The opposition may not be clearly


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and directly expressed but could assume any shape and character and is aimed at frustrating the process of establishing a new socio-political order.

Security remains a common good which can only be provided for through carefully mobilized collective efforts in a complex society like Nigeria. In other words, the enterprise of providing security as a common good requires building a robust synergy between the citizens and the government. Security as a critical public good is at the core of the purpose of existence of the state and it constitutes the basis of citizens' habitual obedience and loyalty to the state. If citizens believe in the effectiveness of the state in securing their lives and property, the motivation to construct an alternative means of meeting individual security need will not look appealing. More often than not, citizens are driven by perpetual fear of violent death into constructing alternative platforms for meeting their security and other needs. Privatization of security is therefore an explicit symptom of an ailing and failing state. The state loses the essence of its existence once it abdicates this sacred responsibility it owes the citizenry. The emergence and proliferation of non-state actors in Nigeria's public space promoting sinister agenda is copious proof that the Nigerian state is fast delegitimizing itself in the eyes of the public. It is unthinkable that the much dreaded and deadly boko haram insurgency can hold Nigeria hostage for a considerable length of time. It is unimaginable that the Plateau crisis in general and the Jos one in particular can endure for this length of time with unwholesome consequences for the developmental drive of the state.

There is at the moment, a massive loss of faith in the capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively secure lives and property of citizens and this explains the emergence and growing number of private security companies in different parts of the country. The emergence of communally organized vigilante groups is yet another


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expression of lack of faith in the ability and capacity of the state to fulfill its constitutionally prescribed obligation to the citizens. Nigerians are passing through a challenging moment that is widely believed to be a fall out of confluence of a multitude of factors such as the diminishing capacity of the state to meet the socio-economic needs of its citizens, weak capacity of security agencies, especially the police force to effectively respond to threats, alarming scope of corruption, steady deconstruction of the moral foundation of the society, growing despondency and despair among citizens, worsening unemployment situation fueled by bad management of the economy, and a host of others too numerous to mention here. The emergence of insurgencies such as the deadly Boko Haram in the North East geo-political zone, the militancy in the Niger Delta region, the Odudua People's Congress in the South West, Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra in the South East, etc. are concrete manifestations of the challenges the Nigerian state is confronted with in the fourth republic.

It is against the background of the preceding that the paper takes a critical look at the ugly and lamentable development in Plateau state as a critical component of the national framework in the sense that it is home to Nigerians of diverse socio-cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Non-Nigerians have also found Plateau state, especially Jos, the state capital, irresistibly attractive because of the semi-temperate climate that characterizes the cosmopolitan city. The state is arguably a microcosm of the Nigerian society in terms of its complex social diversity. Preceding the eruption of violent conflict on 7th September 2001, the state was widely acclaimed as “Home of Peace and Tourism” because of the uncommon peace and tranquility that had been a unique feature of the state. However, with the outbreak of violence in 2001 and the consequent fracturing of peace, Plateau has since become a hotbed of intense and violent conflict expressed along primordial fault lines. This development has deconstructed the state into two


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opposing camps and redefined the geography of the city. One part of Jos is predominantly peopled by the Hausa/Fulani who are mainly Muslims and another part is occupied mainly by Christians. The boundary between these two settlements are so rigidly defined that there is hardly any interaction between them for now. This ugly situation could be a mere passing phase in the conundrum in the state. This is the context within which we can appreciate the emergence of minorities who feel, and are indeed, actually excluded from the mainstream socio-economic and political processes in Plateau state. This exclusion has in a sense, eroded the citizenship rights of the affected persons and made them second class citizens in a political community where all inhabitants exist under a common sovereign.

The Jos Conflict and the Boko Haram Insurgency

Plateau state, one of the key component units of the North Central geo-political zone of Nigeria was until 2001, a good buffer for some Nigerians fleeing the extreme northern part of the country because of frequent outbreak of violent religious conflicts. Many, especially Christians who fled some northern states for safety ended up in Plateau and Jos in particular because of its accommodating and cosmopolitan nature, The relative stability of the city, its peaceful and serene nature, its semi-temperate climate, and the hospitable nature of the people are some of the pull factors that drew people in and outside Nigeria to the Jos city. Until the 90s, Plateau state in general and Jos city in particular, had never experienced violent conflict. The semi temperate climate of some parts of the state such as Vom, Bukuru, Jos, Pankshin, Gindiri, Bokkos and a host of others endears it to both Nigerians and non-Nigerians who are in search of a place where they can live a fulfilled life. The State had existed since 1967 as Benue-Plateau before it was subsequently dismembered into three existing states (Benue, Nasarawa and


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Plateau) within the North Central geo-political zone of Nigeria. In 1976, the then Benue- Plateau was split into Benue and Plateau states. Again in 1996, the state was further split into Nasarawa and Plateau states. Plateau state is currently composed of 17 local government areas. It is structured into three Senatorial zones for administrative and representational purposes (Northern zone, Central zone and Southern zone). The Northern Senatorial zone comprises Bassa, Barkin Ladi, Jos East, Jos North, Jos South and Riyom Local Government Areas respectively. The Central Senatorial zone is composed of Bokkos, Mangu, Pankshin, Kanke and Kanam Local Government Areas respectively. The Southern Senatorial zone is consists of Mikang, Langtang North, Langtang South, Shendam, Quan Pan and Wase Local Government Areas respectively.

Farming is the predominant occupation of the people of Plateau state. Important crops such as maize, rice, yams, Irish potatoes, guinea corn, millet, cocoyam and many others are widely grown in the state. In addition to farming and breeding of livestock, the state is also known for profitable tin mining which started during the colonial era and which has contributed immensely to the enterprise of national development. Many of the Jos residents such as Urhobo, Bini, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani and a host of other non- indigenous groups were attracted to the state because of the gainful opportunities generated by the tin mining. Most Plateau people are of the Christian faith even though the population of Muslims is quite significant. Pockets of adherents of African Traditional Religion are found in different locations across the state. It is estimated that there are over 53 different ethnic groups inhabiting Plateau state with none enjoying significantly superior numerical strength to dominate the social, economic and political spaces. Prominent among these numerous groups that inhabit the state are: Berom, Angas, Goemai, Tarok, Mwaghavwul, Afizere, Anaguta, Amo, Fyem, Challa, Ron, Mushere, Bogghom, Kwalla, Youm, Tal,


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Mupun, Jere, Amo, Kwangka, Buji, Rukuba, Irigwe, Fier, Meryang, Fulani, Hausa, Montol, Kantana and others. Until recently, all these groups have cohabited peacefully. However, growing socio= economic hardship largely engendered by the anti-people Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had badly undermined communal trust resulting in frequent cases of inter and intra-communal clashes over land and other scarce resources in Plateau state.

Jos city started experiencing sectarian crises following the splitting of the former Jos Division into Jos North, Jos South and Jos East local Government Areas respectively by the then General Ibrahim Babangida led military government in August 1991. Ordinarily, the idea of splitting the local government area into three would have been greeted with widespread excitement by the people because it has brought government closer to them than previously.. However, the perceived sinister motive behind the exercise made the people, especially the indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta groups apprehensive of the logic behind such a decision. Many believed that the decision to split the former Jos local government area into three was primarily to provide political accommodation for the growing Hausa/Fulani population in Jos, the capital of Plateau state. The appointment of one Alhaji Aminu Mato in April 1994 as the Caretaker Management Committee Chairman for Jos North local government area by the then Military Administrator, Colonel Mohammed Mana (Gofwen, 2011) further fueled the suspicion of the indigenous groups (Berom, Afizere and Anaguta) and consequently generated groundswell opposition to what they alleged as the manifestation of General Ibrahim Babangida's 'hidden agenda'. Even though Alhaji Aminu Mato was stopped from taking over the Chairmanship of the Jos North Local Government Council Care taker Management Committee, this development had generated intense anti-Hausa/Fulani sentiment across the Jos North, Jos South and Jos East local government areas


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and since then, the sentiment has been growing in potency and resilience culminating in the 7th September, 2001 unprecedented violent ethno-religious conflict ever witnessed in the state. Of course one finds considerable sense in the position of those who maintain that the splitting of the former Jos local government area was the genesis of the antagonism that has come to characterize inter ethnic relations in the state capital, the question is, were the stakeholders consulted for input in the deconstruction of the former Jos division into three local government areas? This was very unlikely given the undemocratic nature of military government's decision making process..

Preceding the division of the former Jos Local Government Area into three local government areas, political power was alternating between the Hausa/Fulani group on one hand and the indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta groups on the other hand. If a Hausa or Fulani person was elected as Chairman, the Deputy Chairman was either Afizere, or Berom or Anaguta. If any of the indigenous groups was elected Chairman, the Deputy Chairman was always Hausa or Fulani. This was the consociational arrangement that guaranteed perpetual peace in the city before the ill motivated splitting of the division into three local government areas which bred intense climate of mutual suspicion and animosity between the Hausa/Fulani group considered as settlers and the three indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta groups. The Hausa/Fulani people felt Jos North Local Government Council was exclusively for them following the creation of Jos South and Jos East Local Government Councils believed to be for the Berom and Afizere groups respectively.

Many factors have conspired to ignite the ethno-religious flame in Jos on 7th September 2001. One of the key factors which we have alluded to earlier was the ill-advised horizontal rather than vertical fragmentation of the former Jos division into three local


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government areas. The horizontal pattern of fragmentation had followed the segmented settlement pattern of the cohabiting groups. If the fragmentation had followed a vertical pattern, the belief that was fueled by this division would not have been generated in the first place. Vertical fragmentation would have meant that each of the contesting groups would have been part of all the the three local government areas. Neither the Berom, Anaguta, Haus/Fulani nor the Afizere would have felt excluded from the indigeneship of all the three local government areas. If anything, the vertical pattern would have further strengthened the consociational arrangement that had characterized access to political power by all the contesting groups. Another important factor in the Jos conundrum was the appointment of one Alhaji Muktar Mohammed as the Coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos North local government area. This appointment was interpreted by the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups as a confirmation of their earlier expressed fears about the fragmentation of the former Jos division as a deliberate plan to cede Jos North to the Hausa/Fulani group. This development fueled the mutual suspicion and mistrust between the Berom, Anaguta and Afezere on one hand and the Hausa/Fulani group on the other. Furthermore, the three indigenous groups had cultivated the feeling that the Hausa/Fulani group in particular dominated the economy of the state through commerce and this has placed them above the natives. It is therefore not farfetched a reason why the natives have remained steadfastly opposed to the Hausa/Fulani group building a high political visibility profile through elective and appointive political positions. It is common sense knowledge that any group that is prospering in any society becomes the target of envy and attacks. What actually triggered the violence in Jos city on 7th September 2001 was an attempt by one Miss Rhoda Nyam, a resident of Congo Russia, to have her way when Muslims faithful


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had congregated to observe their Friday worship. This attempt was stoutly resisted by some Muslim youths against the determined effort of the lady to have her way. This resulted in the slapping of the girl by some Muslim youths and the consequent ethno-religious conflagration and its rapid spread like harmattam wild fire. The entire Jos city and environs went up in an unprecedentedly dark flame like swarm of locusts covering the sky. The spontaneity of the violence and the massive killings and destruction of property that followed was a clear proof that each of the contesting groups was on red alert going by the early warning signals.

The seven days violence characterized by senseless killings and arson was painstakingly brought under control by the combined team of security agencies. It lasted between 7th and 13th September 2001 albeit with intermittent explosions and secret killings going on. One can contend with considerable vehemence that the September 2001 violence which engulfed the city of Jos and environs heightened mistrust and political animosity between the two contesting groups. This was vividly expressed in May 2002 during the Naraguta Ward B Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) Congress at Eto Baba settlement of Jos North local government area. According to Best (2007), not less than 60,000 Hausa/Fulani men and women loaded in several buses and trucks stormed the venue of the Congress. This frightening number of Hausa/Fulani PDP members seen at the venue of the Congress elicited genuine fears in the other groups about the possibility of mercenaries being imported from other places to overrun them during the Congress. Predictably, the Congress ended in more pronounced violence than previously experienced. Sophisticated arms were freely used by the contesting groups. This was indeed, a sheer display of insensitivity on the part of the security forces to have allowed the ward congress to hold when it was less than one year that the September 2001 violence had been brought under control and the


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memory of the ugly development was still verdant in the minds of people, especially those who suffered some physical, emotional and psychological losses. The situation was once more brought under control by the combined team of security agencies.

Again on 28th November 2008, Jos city once more witnessed another orgy ofr intense violence engendered by the conduct of election into the Jos North local government council. The election was successfully conducted and when collation of results and counting was still in progress without a winner announced yet, violence broke out and lasted for a couple of days before security agencies were able to overcome the situation. As usual, many lives and property were destroyed. The Hausa/Fulani who fielded a candidate for the election on the platform of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) to contest against the candidate of the Peoples' Democratic Party, cultivated the feeling that the election was massively rigged in favour of the PDP candidate and were therefore robbed of victory. This is yet another fragment of evidence in support of the thesis that contestation over the ownership of Jos North local government area was at the core of the conflicts in Jos North. The former Governor Joshua Dariye had on account of the weak and fragile security environment in Jos North local government area, suspended election into the council and wisely chose to use Care Taker Management Committee even though this was in clear violation of the subsisting 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria under section 7 which provides for a 'Democratically constituted Local Government Councils'. However, this could be excused on the grounds of security consideration. His successor, Governor Jonah David Jang however felt otherwise and for the first since September 2001 violence, decided in November 2008 to conduct election into the Jos North local council. This development that followed the conduct of election into the Jos North Local Government Council was indeed, a rude and painful disruption of


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the peace that was gradually returning to the state after nearly a decade fracturing of peace. The state has since this development, been experiencing sporadic eruption of violence and planned attacks against some remote communities with weak presence of security agencies as can be attested to by the following table showing timeline of violence and attacks in Jos North local government area and other contiguous local government areas..

The table below represents the various types of Conflicts in Plateau state between 2007 and 2012.

S/N0. Date Nature/type of conflict

Issues involved Parties involved

1 28th Nov. 2008 Political conflict Jos North LGA election result

Hausa/Fulani and the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta groups.

2 Nov. 2010 Fulani/farmers clash in Barkin Ladi LGA.

Trespass over farmlands belonging to Berom farmers by Fulani herdsmen

Fulani herdsmen and Berom Farmers

3

17th Jan. 2010

Renewed violence along ethno -religious lines

Attack against Christian worshippers by Muslim youths when Sunday service was still in progress

Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous Berom, Afizere and Anaguta people.

4

7th March, 2010

Security conflict

Attack on Dogo Nahawa community in Jos North LGA

Unknown gunmen.

5

17th March, 2010

Security conflict

Attacks in Beyi and neighbouring communities in Riyom LGA

Unknown gunmen

6

Dec. 2010

Security conflict

Bomb explosions at two locations (Angwan Rukuba and Odus)

Suspected Boko Haram Islamic sect.

7

Feb. 2012

Security conflict

Bomb explosion at COCIN Headquarters Compound Church on a Sunday when service was in progress

Suspected Boko Haram Islamic sect


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Source: Field Survey, 2012

The table above shows the frequency and scope of impact of the spate of attacks since the November 2008 violence ignited by the local government election into Jos North local government council. A careful consideration and analysis of the table shows increased frequency of isolated attacks on some communities following the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. The use of improvised explosive devices in December 2010 and in other subsequent attacks is a strong evidence in support of the claim that Boko Haram has penetrated the Jos city and has established cells in places like Rikkos and Angwan Rogo settlements. It is not difficult to comprehend why the city has become vulnerable to the

8 March 2012 Security conflict Bomb explosion at Saint Finbarr’s Catholic Church in Rayfield on a Sunday when service was in progress

Suspected Boko Haram Islamic sect

9

June 2012

Security conflict

Bomb explosion at a Church location in Gada Biyu on a Sunday when service was in progress.

Suspected Boko Haram Islamic sect.

10

7th July 2012

Security conflict

Attack on 10 communities in Barkin Ladi LGA.

Unknown gunmen

11

7th July 2012

Security conflict

Attack on some communities in Riyom LGA

Unknown gunmen

12

8th July 2012

Security conflict

Attack on

sympathizers during mass burial of victims of July 7 attack in Barkin Ladi LGA.

Unknown gunmen

13 11th July 2012 Security conflict Launching of a Rocket

propel Grenade targeted at an Islamic school in Bukuru in Jos South LGA

Terrorist attack


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subversive penetration of Boko Haram insurgency which was cultivated and grown in some parts of the North East geopolitical zone of the country. The weak and fragile security environment in Plateau state in general and the Northern Senatorial zone in particular has made the place a fertile ground for insurgents to promote their sinister agemda. In 2011, a house located in Rikkos, a predominantly Muslims inhabited location was suspected to be occupied by a Boko Haram member with large stockpile of materials for preparing improvised explosive devices. Acting on intelligence report, the Security Task Force (STF) raided the house, demolished it and found huge deposit of materials used for making the IEDs. Since then, security related attacks have been launched against some communities believed to be vulnerable on account of lack of, or weak presence of security agencies. Attacks have mostly been concentrated on Riyom and Barkin Ladi local government areas. In these two local government areas, attacks have often been launched against communities whose locations are characterized by difficult terrain so as to make it difficult for timely rescue intervention by men of the Security Task Force.

Peace Building Efforts in Plateau state

Since the outbreak of violence in September 2001, both government and non governmental organizations have responded heavily and massively to the challenges posed by the frequent eruption of violence to the enterprise of peace building in Jos North local government area and neghbouring local government areas. Apart from the use of security agencies which include the military, police, civil defence corps, immigration and others, government has instituted various Commissions of Inquiry to probe the root causes of all the violent conflicts in the state and to make some feasible recommendations to forestall future security breaches. However, in the Nigerian context in general and Plateau state in particular,


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the use of this mechanism in managing and resolving conflict has remained largely ineffective in the sense that government lacks the necessary political will to implement the recommendations strenuously articulated by the Commissions. In the case of Plateau state, not less than seven of such Commissions of Inquiry reports have been left to gather thick dust due to the poverty of political will to carefully study the reports, issue white papers and implement the recommendations offered after a painstaking probe of both the immediate and remote causes of the conflict in question.

As a result of this observed weakness on the part of government arising from its inability to bring to book those indicted, a culture of impunity has unwittingly been fostered in the polity. This has provided strong motivation for conflict entrepreneurs to carry on with business as usual in all parts of the federation. They are encouraged by the fact that government is not capable of bringing them to book even if exposed through painstaking investigations. The culture of impunity has become so deep seated that citizens are fast losing faith and trust in the established legitimate mechanisms of conflict management and resolution such as the courts, tribunals, commissions of inquiry and a host of others. Beyond the conventional deployment of security forces and the institution of Commissions of inquiry by government, there is nothing else government can do to elicit favourable responses from citizens. Much of the peace building effort in Plateau state is undertaken by nongovernmental organizations through problem solving workshops, peace rallies, rendering of humanitarian services to victims of the conflict and helping to build capacities of the affected communities to enable them cope with the stresses and strains engendered by the conflict. In the post violence phase of the conflict in Jos and neighbouring local government areas, many organizations such as the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies of the University of Jos, the Institute of Governance and Social Research, Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria,


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Inter-Gender, Search for Common Ground and many other organizations which we cannot mention all have been deeply and passionately committed to the enterprise of peace building in Jos. The Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies in particular has been very visible in the peace building process in Jos. Through the support of the Royal Embassy of Netherlands in Abuja, the Centre has undertaken a wide range of peace building related activities including series of capacity building workshops organized for various stakeholders such as traditional/ community leaders, youths, women, media and security agencies; peace advocacy visits to some violent prone and non violent communities in and outside Jos North local government area; donation of relief materials to some badly affected communities to alleviate their hardship; confidence building measures through mutual exchange of visits by parties in the Jos conflict; careful documentation of the grievances of all stakeholders for necessary governmental consideration and action, etc. The Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies has also undertaken extensive research on the Jos conflict and at the moment, the research reports are being collated for publication for wider circulation. Through all these activities, the dominantly established attitudes of hate and avoidance are fast melted. The rigidly divided city with no cross interaction is gradually resuming normal social relationships. There is a deeper understanding among stakeholders that there is a common ground on which all parties can congregate to promote their collective and individual developmental aspirations without let or hindrance. For instance, whether in conflict or in peace times, they all go to the same market, hospitals, use of physical infrastructure such as roads, educational institutions, etc.

The state government has, with the approval of the Federal Government, established what is known as 'Operation Rainbow', a security outfit to complement the scanty presence of conventional


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security agencies that cannot effectively covered the critical flashpoints. It is mainly funded by the state government with Air Vice Marshal Danbaba (Rtd) as the Coordinator. How effective this structure has been is debatable. One thing that is crystal clear is that even with this structure in place, deadly attacks are still being carried out by some unknown gunmen against unarmed and vulnerable civilians.

Concluding Remarks

The paper has examined insurgency in Nigeria and how this has affected Plateau state which has since 2001 been immersed in perpetual violent conflict. It is contended that what is playing out in Plateau state is a violent expression of an aspect of the national question which has historically been begging for a mutually agreeable response to it. The indigeneship and settlership dichotomy as an aspect of the national question in Nigeria poses a potent threat to the corporate, stable and dynamic survival of the Nigerian federation. Not even the bloody civil war fought between 1967 and 1970 had provided a modicum of effective response to the national question since the exit of the British colonialists. Plateau state provides a good laboratory for testing the feasibility of any policy targeted at fostering peaceful coexistence in Nigeria because of its peculiarly complex heterogeneity which presents it as a microcosm of the larger Nigerian society. The diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups had coexisted harmoniously with one another in the period preceding September 7, 2001. This established culture of peaceful coexistence would have remained an enduring social feature of Plateau state if the fragmentation of the former Jos division into three local government areas had not followed the colonial pattern of decision making process utterly devoid of principles of consultation and consensus. The disharmony engendered by this undemocratic fragmentation and


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the consequent sectarian violence which erupted in September 2001 bred a conducive social climate for the deadly Boko Haram insurgency group to penetrate Jos city and unleashed deadly attacks on Churches and some communities in the Northern Senatorial zone of Plateau state thereby exacerbating the state of insecurity. This situation has brought about the deployment of security all over the state to assist in the restoration of law and order. Civil society organizations have also come in handy to contribute their quota to the enterprise of peace building in the state. Apparently in response to the inadequate security personnel spread all over the state, the state government has sought and obtained permission from the federal authority to float what is referred to as 'Operation Rainbow'to complement and strengthen the security personnel. The state government is fully responsible for the upkeep of this outfit in addition to taking car of the federal security forces.. The indigeneship and settlership dichotomy must be abrogated through the current constitutional amendment process to allow the notion of civic citizenship to thrive and foster a robust social cohesion and harmony in Nigeria. Also, improved governance can constrict the frontiers of vulnerability of the country to both internal and subversive forces. When citizens are made to radiate with happiness and contentment, they are challenged to develop greater sense of attachment to the state than when they feel despondent and hopeless.


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Introduction

Increasing insecurity in Nigeria has resulted in thousands of civilian deaths and significant population displacements as well as dangerously exacerbating economic, political and religious divisions within the nation. The underlying causes of violence include poverty, inequality and youth unemployment as well as poor governance and political exclusion.

While the circumstances and causes of conflict in any country are unique, the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) has reviewed the lessons from other countries that have experienced increased instability due to radicalisation and extreme

39violence and considered its relevance to Nigeria. Drawing on the experience of Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Guatemala and Northern Ireland eight main lessons were identified. These are summarised below.

LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR NIGERIA

Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)

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Eight Lessons about Responding to Complex Insurgencies:

Ÿ An intel l igence- led approach to securi ty and counterterrorism must respect core counter-insurgency principles: Central to these principles is gaining (or regaining) the confidence and support of local communities by making it a priority to assure their safety and security, treating them with respect, and working closely with them.

Ÿ Where force is used, it must be proportionate and accountable: The security forces must be seen to respond proportionately, to act within the law, and to make every attempt to minimise the risk of civilian casualties. Excessive violence by security services against militant groups or civilians only spurs further grievance, alienates communities and erodes the legitimacy of government, leading to a further cycle of violence and instability. The evidence shows that wider population can be 'won back' – even if they have earlier been alienated – if security tactics change.

Ÿ Dialogue is essential: Without dialogue, a practical and sustainable resolution to violent conflict is unlikely to be reached. Initial communications between government and militant groups may need to be publicly denied by both sides. Nevertheless, such dialogue can be invaluable.

Ÿ Avoid ethnic and religious labels: Groups that define themselves through some collective identity (e.g. their ethnicity or religion) often use that identity to articulate their grievances and mobilise for violence. It is important to refer to perpetrators by their acts (bombers, killers, criminals), and not by any religious or ethnic label, which only helps to cement their identity and encourage others to take their side.

Ÿ Sever international links: National militant groups are often manipulated by international terror groups who will “recruit” them to their international cause. They will offer


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them financial, training and tactical support. It is important to minimise the 'pull' of international terror groups by addressing national grievances quickly, through the offer of dialogue (no matter how unpalatable), and by working with regional and international partners to fight international terror networks.

Ÿ Address political and economic grievances and social exclusion: Long standing political and economic grievances can lead any population to seek radical alternatives, especially if state systems are perceived as corrupt or unfair. Educated young men without jobs, whose expectations have been dashed, are particularly susceptible to recruitment by radical groups. Both short-term employment provision and longer-term strategies for expanding economic opportunity and social empowerment are needed to reduce the vulnerability of populations to radical messages. Demonstrable moves towards more accountable and democratic governance and more consultation with affected communities can also be effective in defusing the drivers of discontent.

Ÿ Promote conflict sensitive and balanced reporting by national and local media: Militant groups are often effective in using or manipulating media to deliver their messages to the public. Strategic communications – and supporting a stronger independent media and conflict sensitive reporting – can reinforce a society's resilience.

Ÿ Recognise that grievances get transmitted into action through social networks (family, friends, places of worship, mobile technology). To counter such influence, local and social networks can be encouraged to communicate more constructive messages around moderation, the need for dialogue, and the resolution of conflict through non-violent means.


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Applying Lessons from other Countries to Nigeria

The lessons from other countries indicate the need for a three-pronged approach to the increased instability in Nigeria:

1. An intelligence based security and counter-terrorism response driven by counter-insurgency principles;

2. A comprehensive and inclusive, political process; and

3. A significant economic and development strategy for the north.

Security and counterterrorism response:

Lessons from other countries suggest that the following could be useful in Nigeria:

a. The approach to security should adopt tried and tested counter-insurgency (COIN) principles and methods in order to take forward an intelligence-led approach to security and counterterrorism;

b. It would be useful to systematically train the security forces in key COIN approaches, in practical ways of engaging with local communities to (re-) gain their confidence and support;

c. Work with regional and international partners, particularly within ECOWAS and African Union, to break links between international terror networks and the militants;

d. End impunity within the security forces by conducting independent investigations of cases of alleged abuse;

e. Ensure strong civilian oversight of all security forces, including clarifying the relationship and responsibility between forces;

f. Repair the relationship between the police and local


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communities, for instance establish an independent commission on security and policing, including possible deployment of independent monitors.

Political process

It may prove useful if the federal and northern state governments seek a political solution to northern radicalisation and instability involving:

a. Consultations with affected populations around their grievances (initially those related to security responses, but later the context of governance and economic and social development);

b. Adopting measures to mitigate poor governance and improve political processes;

c. Engaging in meaningful dialogue with those elements of JAS willing to engage and in a position to negotiate and implement significant change;

d. Increasing dialogue and agreement with Nigerian religious groups (and broader coalitions) to promote moderation and non-violence;

e. Provide conflict-sensitive media training for media houses and government officials and provide greater support for an independent media;

f. Engage in a major public communication initiative which would publicise the main security, political and economic measures being taken to restore stability to northern Nigeria, especially those relating to the tactics, behaviour and independent monitoring accountability of the security forces.


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Economic and development strategy

This attempts to address some of the more underlying factors contributing to violence and radicalisation. The state governments, supported by the federal government, should develop and implement economic and development strategies which would credibly:

i. Provide short-term employment creation across northern Nigeria for men and women (where appropriate drawing upon subsidies from the federal level);

ii. Increase investments in agriculture in a way that increases food security and exports but also draws young men and women back to the sector and provides opportunities for long term employment;

iii. Increase transparency in public capital investment decisions, to improve the efficiency of infrastructure development and to reduce public grievances around political influence in decision making;

iv. Improve the delivery of social services to the poorest local communities (e.g. education, health, water and sanitation), in partnership with civil society groups and the private sector;

v. Initiate additional empowerment programmes for women and girls so they can play a more substantial role in community and national decision-making, including in forums dedicated to countering violence and building peace.

None of these measures is of course a panacea. Building a secure stable society is long difficult process which needs constant and careful attention. However, if implemented with will, rigour, and


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coordination, these security, political and development interventions could build resilience and stability, and thereby reverse the dangerous and accelerating trajectory that Nigeria is now facing.


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Introduction

Definition: Dictionary Definitions

a. Insurgency

1. “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than organized revolution, and that is not recognized as belligerency”

2. “rising in opposition to civil authority or established leadership”.

3. Insurgent- a person who takes part in an armed rebellion against the constituted authority (especially in the hope of improving conditions).”

b. Our Operational Definition

a. A condition of violent revolt against constituted authority or established leadership through sabotage and harassment in order to

A REVIEW OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

J. Isawa Elaigwu

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13

undermine its authority. It is not an organized war with recognizable belligerents in the field.

b. It must be remembered that many communal cases of violence can get transformed into insurgency.

c. Similarly, TERRORISM refers to the systematic use of violence or destructive acts to intimidate or cause fear in a population or government, with the objective of securing demands or concessions.

Questions

a. Why have there been numerous cases of violent communal (ethnic, ethno-religious, religious, land and others) violence since May 1999? {There were over 600 cases of violence in which at least one person and /or property destroyed}.

b. Why has there been an upgrading of communal violence to insurrection?

c. How have Nigerian authorities handled the new challenges?

d. What are the challenges ahead?

e. What can be done to cope with these challenges?

Suggestions

1. security is the first order of the State – for without security, peace and/or law and order, all other functions of the State cannot be effectively carried out;

2. security threats in Nigeria have advanced to the level

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of insurgency and terrorism.

3. since may 1999, there have been greater challenges of security than at any point in time in our history, thus rendering our political stability fragile, democratic institutions and processes fluid, and our economy debilitated;

4. government, political leaders and followers, and all Nigerians, must have the courage and honesty to get to the root causes of the country's current state of insecurity, underpinned by criminality and terrorism;

5. Nigerians leaders and followers have taken the issues of security for granted; yet urgent and immediate steps (short and long–term) must be taken to consciously respond to current threats by architectonically designing and building a security system which would create a stable and relatively peaceful environment, conducive for national development;

6. security is the duty of all Nigerians, who must take their own destiny into their hands, determined to face the future with confidence, discipline, patriotism and demonstrable honesty.

Sources of Insecurity and Insurgency

Causality is difficult to ascertain in human actors

Intrinsic Sourcesa. Foundations of Nigerian Federalismb. Structural adjustment of the Nigerian Federalism, and

majority/minority dividec. Competition for the control of resources;d. Decisions of government

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A REVIEW OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

e. Migration and the indigene/settler problemsf. Deliberate manipulation of ethnic and religious

identitiesg. Traditional social stratification and ethnocentrismh. Partisanship of security agenciesi. Economic woes and povertyj. Unemploymentk. Corruption conundruml. Lack of political willm. Security, law and order, and conflict management

Political: The Challenge of Democratic Governancea. Democracy and Democratic Deficit

I. The electoral process (Electoral Malpractices)ii. Leadership and Statesmanship

b. Electoral Violencei. The Politics of Federalismii. Revenue Distributioniii. Political Partiesiv. INECv. Use of Security Agenciesvi. The Judiciaryvii. Attitudinal

a. Attitude to democracyb. Political culturec. The culture of violence in politics

viii. Monetization of politics.

Towards Security and Peace: Recommandetions1. Socio-economic issues

a. The development of early warning signalsb. Mutual respect and recognition of claims of

others

338

c. Indigeneship and settler problems: towards residency requirements:

d. Depoliticization and de-radicalization of ethnic and religious groups

e. Establishment of framework for constant dialogue:

f. Efficient and effective delivery of servicesg. Improving the economy and managing

unemploymenth. Taming the corruption monster

2. Political/Democratic Governance Issuesi. Government sensitivity in decision and Policiesii. Political Maturity of leadersiii. Control of electoral malpractices and

management of political intoleranceiv. The federation – revenue distributionv. Politicians – as crises dampners or generatorsvi. Traditional/religious leaders and moral

suasion3. Security, Law and order

a. The Armed Forcesb. The National Guardc. Border Guardsd. Crack Anti- Insurgency Squade. A new Police Forcef. State Policeg. Other Intelligence and Security Agenciesh. Coordination of security agenciesi. Security Emergency Fundj. Early warning outposts in all states and local

governments.k. Utilization of resources in Research Institutions

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– the imperatives of networking and early warning systems development.

4. Political Will of Leadership5. Symbolism and Nationalism – a revisit of the National Anthem.Nigeria, we hail thee,Our own dear native land,Though tribe and tongue may differ,In brotherhood we stand,Nigerians all, are proud to serveour sovereign motherland.

Our flag shall be a symbol,That truth and justice reign,In peace or battle honoured,And this we count as gain. To hand on to our childrenA banner without stain.

O Lord of all creation,Grant this our one requestHelp us to build a nationWhere no man is oppressed;And so, with peace and plenty,Nigeria may be blessed.11

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CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE

A. PREAMBLE

The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS),

Kuru, with the support of the UK Department for International

Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP), Abuja, organized the Eminent Persons and

Experts Group Meeting (EEGM) on complex insurgencies in th thNigeria from 28 – 30 August, 2012 in the Unity Hall of NIPSS.

The well attended meeting attracted Eminent and Expert Groups from all walks of life. The opening ceremony had representatives of the President and the Vice President of Nigeria, Former Heads of State, serving and retired military officers, former Inspectors General of Police, serving and retired Police Officers, delegations from the National Defence College, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, National Defence Academy, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, civil society groups, National Council for Woman Societies, traditional rulers, the clergy and the United States Embassy.

Distinguished resource persons presented papers at both plenary and technical sessions. A keynote Address was presented by Ambassador Oladapo Fafowora.

A. OBJECTIVES

The goal of the EEGM was to develop a comprehensive and widely acceptable strategy for peace, security and stability in Nigeria. Specifically, the meeting had the following objectives:

a. Providing a platform for Eminent Persons to interface with

Expert Groups on the current security situation in Nigeria.

b. Facilitating a diagnostic review by the Eminent Persons and

Expert Groups of the challenges posed by insurgencies to

peace, security and stability of the country.

c. Developing an effective response strategy, with clear

Endstate, Ways and Means to adequately address the

challenges of insurgencies in Nigeria.

B. OBSERVATIONS

After exhaustive deliberations the following observations were

made:

1. There is an increasing wave of insurgencies in Nigeria, with

their attendant violence, which has constituted a serious

threat to peace and stability of the country.

2. Security forces often use disproportionate force to respond

to insurgencies, which only spurs further grievances,

alienates communities and erodes the legitimacy of the

government, resulting in a cycles of violence and instability.

3. The underlying causes of insurgencies in Nigeria include

injustice, marginalization, poverty, and electoral fraud,

abuse of power, corruption, poor leadership,

unemployment, religions manipulation and ethnicity, all of

which have combined to accentuate the current situation.

4. Complex insurgencies in Nigeria have resulted in

thousands of civilian deaths, especially of women and

children, significant population displacement as well as

economic, political and religious divisions within the

country.

5. Without dialogue with insurgent groups, a cessation of

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violence is unlikely to hold.

6. Nigeria’s large number of unemployed young men and

women, whose aspirations have been dashed, are

particularly susceptible to recruitment by insurgent

groups.

7. Long-standing economic and political grievances, when

not addressed, can easily lead a population to radical

alternatives especially if state systems are perceived to be

corrupt, apathetic and unjust.

8. Security agencies in the country are ill-equipped, poorly

motivated and lack capacity to effectively respond to the

challenges of insurgencies in the country.

9. The social media has become a veritable avenue for

transmitting radical and hate messages.

10. Insurgent groups in Nigeria have links with international

terror groups that provide them with financial, training

and tactical support.

11. The intractable conflicts in Jos Plateau have become a

major cause for concern for national security.

12. The weakness of a frame work for political reconciliation,

genuine reforms, mass mobilization and governmental

capacity-building has accentuated grievances which

enhance support for the insurgencies.

13. The increasing rate of impunity in the country is not

unconnected with the failure of government to effectively

enforce laws, protect human rights and promote public

safety.

14. Long detention without trial as well as extra-judicial

killing of insurgents, have a potential of generating

sympathy from the populace.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There is an urgent need to stem the tide of insurgencies in Nigeria to guarantee peace and stability.

2. Security forces should be educated on the need to observe the rule of law in dealing with insurgencies.

3. The political leadership should provide good governance that will ensure justice, inclusiveness, address poverty and promote the electoral process.

4. Government at all levels should provide immediate humanitarian relief along with essential services to all victims of insurgencies as well as develop infrastructure and capacity for legitimate income generating activities.

5. Government should dialogue with all insurgent groups in the country to attend to their grievances.

6. Government at all levels and the private sector should create job opportunities for the teeming unemployed youth and encourage entrepreneurship.

7. There should be mechanism in place to address economic and political grievances as they arise.

8. The federal and state governments should strengthen the capacity of security agencies to respond effectively to insurgencies.

9. The Government should take adequate interest in engaging the social media as a means of mobilizing and refocusing the youth towards peaceful co-existence and national unity.

10. The Government should collect sufficient intelligence on the links between international terror groups and insurgent

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groups in Nigeria with a view to severing such links.

11. The Federal and Plateau State Governments, as a matter of urgency, should find durable solutions to the protracted conflicts in Plateau State.

12. The Federal Government should establish a framework for political reconciliation, promote genuine reforms and build governmental capacity to address adequately the challenges posed by insurgencies.

13. The Federal Government should provide physical security against insurgent violence by enforcing laws, promoting human rights and public safety.

14. The Attorney General of the Federation should prosecute without delay all suspected insurgents that are in detention and should avoid extra-judicial killings.

Adopted today, August 30, 2012 by all participants at the Eminent Persons and Experts Group Meeting.

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