CS 5306 INFO 5306: Crowdsourcing and Human Computation ... › ~hirsh › 5306 › Lecture13.pdf ·...

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CS 5306 INFO 5306: Crowdsourcing and Human Computation Lecture 13 10/5/17 Haym Hirsh

Transcript of CS 5306 INFO 5306: Crowdsourcing and Human Computation ... › ~hirsh › 5306 › Lecture13.pdf ·...

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CS 5306INFO 5306:

Crowdsourcing andHuman Computation

Lecture 1310/5/17

Haym Hirsh

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Extra Credit Opportunities

• Today, 4:15pm, Gates G01, Michael Bernstein, Stanford“In A Flash: Crowdsourcing Computationally-Augmented Teams and Organizations”,

New:

• 10/6/17 12:15pm, Gates G01, Ray Mooney, UT Austin (live-streamed remote talk)Robots that Learn Grounded Language Through Interactive Dialog

• 10/19/17 4:15pm, Gates G01, Tom Kalil, Office of Science and Tech PolicyAuthor of “Leveraging cyberspace", IEEE Communications Magazine, 34(7), pp.82-86, 1996.http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040320/bba3333e6c4ece6b0e94f17ae95c1b92/OSS1996-02-08.pdf

• 10/26/17 4:15pm, Gates G01, Tapan Parikh, Cornell TechRelevant projects:- Umati: Grading CS Exams with a Crowd-sourcing Vending Machine- Captricity: Turning Paper Forms into Data using the Cloud and Crowd

• 11/16/17 4:15pm, Gates G01, James Grimmelmann, Cornell Law

• 12/1/17 12:15pm, Gates G01, Sudeep Bhatia, Penn Psychology

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Prelim

10/17/17

(in class)

Students in CS 5306: Gates G01

Students in INFO 5306: Gates 114

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Infotopia, Chapter 6Recommendations for Deliberation

Pulling it all together (to a first approximation)

“Under what circumstances should one or another approach be chosen?”

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Infotopia, Chapter 6Recommendations for Deliberation

1. Use prediction markets

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Prediction Markets ☺

“For the prices of commodities, the answer is absurdly easy:Markets are best.”

• “They provide strong incentives for the use and revelation of relevant information”

• “Markets … reflect taste as well”

• “whenever institutions and groups want access to highly dispersed information”

• “The Internet makes this extremely easy.”

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Prediction Markets

• “prices can reflect errors, fads, and confusion, sometimes for a long time”

• “we do not yet know exactly when prediction markets will work”

• “when people lack information to aggregate, prediction markets are not particularly helpful”

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Infotopia, Chapter 6Recommendations for Deliberation

2. Voting and averaging

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Voting and Averaging ☺

• “when there is reason to trust those who are being surveyed, the group average is likely to be trustworthy as well”

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Voting and Averaging

• “Where people’s answers are worse than random, and where there is a systematic bias, the average answer it not going to be accurate”

• Examples:• “the color of my dog”

• “number of human deaths that will be attributable, by 2100, to global warming”

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Infotopia, Chapter 6Recommendations for Deliberation

3. Deliberation

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Deliberation ☺

• Successful “where the answer, once announced, appears correct to all”

• “eureka-type problems”

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Deliberation

• “People may not say what they know”

• “information contained in the group as a whole may be neglected or submerged”

• “no systematic evidence that deliberating groups will arrive at the truth”

• “it is not even clear that deliberating groups will do better than statistical groups”

• “when individuals tend toward a bad answer, the group is likely to do no better than a statistical group” and “might even do worse”

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Deliberation

• “When we silence ourselves in deliberating groups, it is partly because of social norms---because of a sense that our reputation will suffer .. for disclosing information that departs from our group’s inclination”

• “Hidden profiles remain hidden in large groups remain hidden for this reason; those who disclose unique information face a risk of disapproval”

• “low-status groups … carry little influence in deliberating groups” (cfprediction markets, wikis)

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• “Groups should take firm steps to increase the likelihood that people will disclose what they know”

• “institutional reforms” make it “possible to reduce the risk of hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization”

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• “groups … should attempt to create their own incentives for disclosure”

• “the overriding question is how to alter people’s incentives in such a way as to increase the likelihood of disclosure”

• “Social norms are what make wikis work .. And they are crucial here”

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• “Groups should take firm steps to increase the likelihood that people will disclose what they know”

• “groups … should attempt to create their own incentives for disclosure”

• “Social norms are what make wikis work ... And they are crucial here”

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• Redefine “what it means to be a team player”: “those who increase the likelihood that the team will be right---if necessary by disrupting the conventional wisdom”

• Examples:• Success of companies with contentious corporate boards

• Success of democracies in WWII

• (WMD, NASA)

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• Make individual success a function of group outcome, not individual contribution• Example: Whistleblowing

• “Groups produce much better outcomes when it is in individuals’ interest to say exactly what they see or know”

• “It might be speculated that [if rewarded for individual rather than group success] hidden profiles, cascades, and group polarization would be reduced dramatically”

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• Leadership:

• “the risk that unshared information will have insufficient influence is much reduced when that information is held by a leader within the group”

• “leaders and high-status members can do groups a great service by indicating their willingness and even desire to hear information that is held by one or a few members”

• “Leaders can refuse to state a firm view at the outset and in that way allow space for more information to emerge”

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• “people might be asked to state their opinions anonymously”

• “Many institutions should consider more use of the secret ballot”

• Delphi technique

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• “ask some group members to act as devil’s advocates, urging a position that is contrary to the group’s inclination”

• “Those assuming the role … should not face the social pressure that comes from rejecting the dominant position within the group”

• (but has less impact than authentic dissent)

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Deliberation: Recommendations

• Assign people specific roles

• “Hidden profiles should be less likely to remain hidden if there is a strict division of labor, in which each person in knowledgeable .. about something in particular”

• “Independent subcommittees might be asked to generate new views, possibly views that compete with one another.” (cf competitions)

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Crowdsourcing and Education

• Peer assessment

• Learning how to teach from the crowd (of students)• Personalization & engagement

• Providing rich feedback to students

• Content:• Content creation & curation

• Improving learning materials from the crowd (of students)