Concepts: Steering Committee Mutual Enticing Opportunity...

The Processes of International Negotiation Project Network Newsletter 242005

ConceptsMutual Enticing Opportunity (MEO)

From the PINSteering Committee

It will soon be twenty years since thecurrent PIN network was conceived

and initiated PIN began as a projectfor one book and has ended upmdashsofarmdashwith fifteen published books oninternational negotiation with twomore due to appear this year For eachtopic the editorsmdashdrawn from the PINSteering Committeemdashhave broughttogether experts from many domainsand countries making this endeavor atruly international and integratedachievement

Beyond these facts it is essentialto emphasize the intellectual founda-tion of the PIN program and ourstrategy of conducting a series ofdiverse research topics while main-taining the overall consistency of theprogram This effort to build knowl-edge about international negotiationshould not however be seen as a kindof mosaic that combines the variouspieces in an artistic way but as a realedifice complete with pillars andarches The pillars are the domainswhere we have tried to fill theknowledge gaps the arches are theinterdisciplinary concepts that wehave elaborated adapted and used tolink the various domains

We have systematically worked ontwo tracks theory and applicationEach of these tracks has its ownrationale and our goal and challengehas always been to bridge thesethrough constant exchanges betweenthe two In so doing we have providedarticulation between for instancenegotiation and organizations sys-tems approaches and negotiation andobjects (such as environment andclimate) and negotiation

One goal among several has beento delve into conceptual fields such

ahead of the procedural approach theWay Out takes over from the HurtingStalemate The seeds of the pull factorbegin with the Way Out which isvaguely perceived by the parties aspart of the initial ripeness but thisgeneral sense of possibility needs tobe developed and fleshed out to be thevehicle for an agreement Thus the

(continued on page 2)

B oth practitioners and analystswould like to think there could be

a more positive prelude to negotiationthan the Mutually Hurting Stalemate(MHS) that along with the perceptionof a Way Out (WO) could constitutethe elements of Ripeness (Zartman1997 Zartman 2001) Could the pullof an attractive outcome replace thepush of a painful deadlock to open theway to negotiation The concept isintriguing but the cases are few Andthe cases are so few for the strong andsimple reason that negotiators do notknow ahead of time the outcome thatcould pull them through negotiationsuntil it is all over Negotiators them-selves must craft a Mutually EnticingOpportunity (MEO) from their deliber-ations in order to pull the negotiationsto a successful conclusion Althoughnot an alternative to the push of anMHS in preparing negotiations anMEO is important in the broadernegotiation process and has its placein extending ripeness theory into theagreement and postagreement phases

While the MHS is the necessary ifinsufficient condition for negotiationsto begin the negotiators mustmdashduring the processmdashprovide theprospect of a more attractive future topull themselves out of their negotia-tions into an agreement to end theconflict That as Pruitt (1997) Pruittand Olczak (1995) and Ohlson (1998)have pointed out is the function of theMEO The push factor has to bereplaced by a pull factor as the motorelement of the negotiations the pullfactor must be in the form of a formulafor resolution and a prospect oftransformation that the negotiatingparties design during negotiationsHere the substantive aspect of nego-tiation in analysis and practice pulls

ContentsFrom the PIN Steering Committee 1Concepts Mutual EnticingOpportunity (MEO) 1Good Sales Reported forNegotiating European Union 4The Topic of Change inInternational Negotiations 5Chairing InternationalNegotiation Processes 6Second InternationalBiennale on NegotiationNEGOCIAmdashPARIS 2005 7Empowerment of DevelopingCountries in International Talks 8International NegotiationNow in Chinese 9Global Negotiations 11Report on PIN Side Event atCOP 10 in Buenos Aires 12Neacutegociations A New InternationalJournal in the French Language 12PIN at the AAAS AnnualConference 13The Negotiation Process concerningthe United Nations Convention onJurisdictional Immunities of Statesand their property of 2004 14PIN Books 15Just Out Peace versus Justice 16

2

perception of a Mutually EnticingOpportunity is a necessary but notsufficient condition for the continua-tion of negotiations beyond simpleagreement to a successful conclusionof the conflict

Negotiations completed under theshadowmdashor the pressuremdashof an MHSalone are likely to be unstable andunlikely to lead to a more enduringsettlement they will represent only anattempt to cut the costs of conflict getthe bug rather than the bear off the backof the parties arrive at an agreeingformula for a cease-fire in the absenceof a resolving formula and then stopunmotivated to move on to a search forresolution The agreement is likelyeither to break down as soon as one orboth parties think they can break thestalemate as the 1973ndash1975 evolutionof the situation in Vietnam amongothers illustrates or to remain truncatedand unstable even if the parties reach aconflict management agreement tosuspend violence as in the 1984 Lusakaagreement in southern Africa or the1994 Karabakh cease-fire (Zartman1989 Mooradian and Druckman 1999)

Like the MHS the MEO is a fig-ment of perception a subjectiveappreciation of objective elementsbut unlike the MHS it is an inventionof the parties (and their mediator) andis internal to the negotiation processnot the result of an objective externalsituation It must be produced by theparties using their analysis of theconflict and its causes their apprecia-tion of their interests and needs andtheir creativity in crafting a mutuallyattractive solution It contains forward-looking provisions to deal with thebasic dispute with unresolved left-overs of the conflict and its possiblereemergence and with new relationsof interdependence between theconflicting parties (Zartman andKremenyuk 2005)

Thus an MEO is a resolving formulathat is seen by the parties as meetingtheir needs better than the status quoThis is an unavoidably soft judg-mental and conclusionary definitionlike many definitions in social science[The standard behavioral definition ofpowermdashthe ability to move anotherparty in an intended direction (Tawney1931 Simon 1952 Dahl 1957

as culture power multilateralismescalation and justice Another goalhas been to push further on appli-cation domains such as environmentclimate the European Union nuclearsecurity international regimes andpreventive diplomacy

Research is a type of explorationand we have tried to break newground here with books such as HowPeople Negotiate which drawslessons from the Bible as well as fromthe various ways in which tribalpeople from the remotest parts of theworld resolve their differences

All this we have done on a volun-tary and unpaid basis devoting ourtime and energy to science and knowl-edge In carrying out our task wehave stuck as firmly as possible tobasic values such as being systematicin our approach using an intellectualmethodology that is both inductiveand deductive and reflecting auniversalistic trend in terms ofconceptualizing or framing problemsand issues on an intercultural basis

Finally although our publishershave always been well-known onesthat have made our work continu-ously available to potential readerswe do not rely on the success of ourpublished books alone Throughoutthe years we have also developed ourown strategy for disseminatingknowledge through what we call ourldquoroadshowsrdquo We have traveled andheld lectures all over the world tolaunch assist and strengthen localinitiatives as well as to developresearch groups We have alsoorganized round-table discussions oninternational negotiation and conflictresolution wherever we have founda need and an opportunity This iswhere we now stand after twentyyears of action to develop andpromote a topic that is so vital for thefuture of humanity

Rudolf AvenhausFranz Cede

Guy Olivier FaureVictor Kremenyuk

Paul MeertsGunnar Sjoumlstedt

I William Zartman

Thibaut and Kelley 1957)mdashis alsoconclusionary and tautological toboot (Zartman and Rubin 2001)] Itsvalue lies not in its predictability butin the fact that it identifies the neces-sary elements that explain the adoptionof an MEO and lead the negotiator andmediator to the elements that need tobe achieved in negotiation

But the MHS cannot disappear Itneeds to carry into the negotiationsthemselves and the perception ofripeness has to continue during theprocess if the parties are not to reeval-uate their positions and drop out inthe revived hopes of being able tofind a unilateral solution throughescalation Thus arrival at an enticingand resolving formula depends onkeeping alive the supply side of therebelsrsquo terms of trademdashthe conflictviolencemdashuntil the demand side isfirmly in place The rebelsrsquo supply sideis already limited by the characteristicMHS if the two sides were not stale-mated they would simply continuethe war ultimately to the point ofeliminating one side or the other asthe rebels threatened to do in CostaRica in 1948 and did in Liberia andLebanon and as the government didin Angola Sierra Leone and AlgeriaThe current literature on uncertaintyin decisions to use violence thus fitsdirectly into ripeness theory Therebelsrsquo challenge is to keep the elementof violence alive throughout the nego-tiations in sufficient quantity to buythe required concessions on thedemand sidemdashMHS against MEOFor the most part however the supplyof violence is latent and contingent (asis the other sidersquos supply of con-cessions as in any negotiation untilthe deal is closed)mdasha threat to be usedif negotiations break down (Schelling1960)

Therefore negotiations and espe-cially mediation work on both sidesof the equation keeping the supply ofviolence under control and seeking totailor demands to meet the amount ofconcessions acceptable to the otherside If the mediators can show howcontinued or renewed violence wouldlose a party international respect andsupport the violence can be kept at thethreat level in case of failure rather thanat the actual level during negotiations

3

The vulnerability gap betweencease-fire and full integration into thepower structures of the state whenrebel disarmament leaves them opento attacks from the government forceshas been identified as a crucialmoment in peace-agreement imple-mentation requiring external guar-antors to fill the gap (Walter 2001)MEO formulas can also help fill thisgap by incorporating immediatepower sharing and power dividing intheir provisions so that the rebels arealready placed in positions of au-thority particularly over the newlyintegrated armed forces Obviously itis difficult to distinguish betweenguarantees of future involvement andreturn to past combat as both areassured by the continuing existence ofrebel forces But it is after all thepossibility of revived combat thatkeeps the implementation process ontrack just as it was the presence ofarmed rebellion that brought theconflict to negotiation in the firstplace It is the potential for renewedhostilities that keeps the MHS currentand the peace process honest

As in any bargaining problem thepoint of agreement is determined bythe intersection of supply and demandthus either the supply of at leastpotential violence must be raised tocover the demands or else the demandsmust be lowered to correspond to theavailable threats of violence It istherefore most likely that the rebelswill brandish a little violence fromtime to time to keep their ldquosupply siderdquocredible There is no telling where thelines will cross parties and mediatorsalike make their estimates of thefirmness and softness of demands andsupplies on either side (Bueno deMesquita and Lalman 1992 Masonet al 1999 Raiffa et al 2002)

This challenge is generally beyondthe grasp of mere bargaining orconcession-convergence behaviormdashzero-sum reductions of demands ona single item until a midpoint agree-ment is reached Of the three typesof negotiationmdashconcession compen-sation and constructionmdashit takes atleast compensation (the introductionof additional items of trade thereframing of issues to meet both sidesrsquoneeds) to produce the positive-sum

outcome that constitutes an MEO Asusual in line with prospect theory(Farnham 1994 McDermott 2005)threats of losses work better than in-ducements as the cases unfortunatelyshowmdashagain a reason why an MHSneeds to continue through the searchfor an MEO Where economic aid fordevelopment is seen as part of theresolving formula it may contributeto providing an enticing prospect asdropping it would mean a loss But ingeneral aid packages and otherinducements come into the nego-tiations only in adjunct with negativepressures and are not as widely usedor as effective as sanctions (includingthe threat of sanctions Cortright1997) The tension between theeffectiveness of implied losses and theneed for positive compensations andconstructions to produce an MEOunderscores the narrowness of thefield of play open to those who wouldprepare an attractive resolving for-mula and thus deserves furtherinvestigation

If the ingredients of an MEO andthe process by which an MEO isobtained are identified why werethese not achieved in cases of failureBoth internal and external reasonsemerge from concept and practice

(1) The MHS may sag The dis-cussion shows that the continuedexistence of the MHS is necessary toprod the parties to develop their ownMEO Therefore if the impulsion tonegotiate weakens the parties nolonger have any incentive to look fora joint solution but simply proceedto work on their own for a unilateraloutcome

(2) There may be absolutely noMEO The parties may not be able toconceive of an outcome that satisfiesboth of them Sometimes one of theparties is a spoiler interested only inwinning even though unable to esca-late to victory (Stedman 2000 Zahar2003) But the other party cannotescalate to victory either until the endwhen it eliminates the spoiler andmakes a negotiated settlement pos-sible The classic illustrations areSavimbi in Angola and Foday Sankohand his lieutenants in Sierra LeoneThese situations have the makings ofintractable conflicts where there is no

single salient solution (Zartman2005b)

(3) There may be relatively noMEO Spoilers or not parties mayfail to find an MEO preferable to thestatus quo even when an objectivelygood and fair one is offered Forthem the status quo of conflict ispreferable to the offered or conceiv-able terms and the stalemate inwhich they find themselves is an S5

situation (a soft stable self-servingstalemate) without any pain that theycannot absorb But again no MHS ispresent in these situations to bring theparties to negotiations or once theyare in negotiations to give a fullconsideration to the formulas offeredA comfortable status quo in AngolaMozambique Sudan El SalvadorLebanon Macedonia and CostaRica led one or both parties to rejectthe formula that they eventuallyaccepted to end the conflict inmostmdashperhaps allmdashcases this per-ception was not one of eventualvictory but simply the ability toendure continuing conflict in prefer-ence to the terms offered Evenobjectively good and fair formulasfor resolution such as federationautonomy in Cyprus (offered in 2004)Karabakh (mooted on occasion)Sudan (tried in 1973ndash1983) andSri Lanka (negotiated in 2003) andinstitutional reforms in Lebanon(discussed since 1975) were rejectedby the parties in favor of continuedconflict that did not hurt the leader-ship too badly (although it hurt thepopulation mightily)

I William ZartmanReferencesBueno de Mesquita B and Lalman D 1992

War and Reason Yale University PressNew Haven CT USA

Cortright D ed 1997 The Price of PeaceRowman amp Littlefield Lanham MD USA

Crocker CA Hampson FO and Aall P eds1999 Herding Cats Multiparty Mediationin a Complex World United States Instituteof Peace Press Washington DC USA

Dahl R 1957 ldquoA Rejoinderrdquo American PoliticalScience Review 51(4)1053ndash1061

Farnham B ed 1994 Avoiding LossesTaking Risks University of MichiganPress Ann Arbor MI USA

McDermott R 2005 Prospect theory andbargaining in IW Zartman and GOFaure eds Escalation and NegotiationRowman amp Littlefield Lanham MD USA(in press)

4

Mitchell C 1995 Cutting Losses WorkingPaper 9 Institute for Conflict Analysis andResolution George Mason UniversityFairfax VA USA

Mooradian M and Druckman D 1999Hurting stalemate or mediation The conflictover Nagorno-Karabakh l990ndash1995 Journalof Peace Research 36(6)709ndash727

Good Sales Reported forNegotiating European Union

P algrave Macmillan have reported first-rate sales for the PIN bookNegotiating European Union edited by Paul W Meerts and Franz Cede

The book is an ldquointroductionrdquo to the intricacies of the enormous bilateraland multilateral process of internal and external negotiation that characterizesthe European Union and is the work of twelve authors experts in their fieldfrom different corners of Europe Negotiating European Union is acomprehensive work it analyzes negotiating processes actors and interestsevaluates power effectiveness and trust and comments upon strategies skillsand styles The popularity of the book is unsurprising in the sense that it is thefirst of its kindmdasha unique probe into the relatively unknown arena of negotiationprocesses in the European Union

With recent developments regarding the adoption of a European constitutionthe structure of the European Union and its decision-making processes areagain in the limelight and it is currently unclear what the future path of Europeanintegration will be As the editors remark with some insight in their Forewordto Negotiating European Union the book is a ldquovery valuable attempt to obtaina better understanding of the character and the characteristics of negotiationsprocesses as an opportunitymdashor as an obstaclemdashto European Unionrdquo

Ohlson T 1998 Power Politics and PeacePolicies Repro-C HSC Uppsala UniversitySweden

Pruitt DG and Olczak P 1995 Beyond hopeApproaches to resolving seemingly intract-able conflict in B Bunker and J Rubin edsConflict Cooperation and Justice Essaysinspired by the work of Morton DeutschSage Publications NY USA

Pruitt DG ed 1997 Lessons learned from theMiddle East peace process InternationalNegotiation (Special Issue) 2(2)175ndash176

Raiffa H Richardson J and Metcalfe D2002 Negotiation Analysis The Scienceand Art of Collaborative Decision-MakingHarvard University Press CambridgeMA USA

Schelling T 1960 Strategy of ConflictHarvard University Press Cambridge MAUSA

Simon H 1952 Comments on the Theoryof Organization American PoliticalScience Review 46(4)1130ndash1139

Stedman SJ 2000 Spoiler problems in peaceprocesses International Security 22(2)5ndash53

Tawney RH 1952 Equality George Allenand Unwin Ltd London UK

Thibaut JW and Kelley HH 1959 The SocialPsychology of Groups Wiley NY USA

Walter B 2001 Committing to Peace TheSuccessful Settlement of Civil Wars PrincetonUniversity Press Princeton NJ USA

Zahar M-J 2003 Reframing the spoiler debatein peace processes in J Darby and RMacGinty eds Contemporary Peace-making Palgrave Basingstoke UK

Zartman IW ed 1978 The NegotiationProcess Theories and Applications SagePress Beverly Hills CA USA

Zartman IW and Berman M 1982 ThePractical Negotiator Yale UniversityPress New Haven CT USA

Zartman IW 1989 Ripe for ResolutionOxford University Press Oxford UK

Zartman IW 1997 Concepts in negotiationRipeness PINPoints 112ndash3

Zartman IW 2000 Ripeness The hurtingstalemate and beyond in PC Stern and DDruckman eds International ConflictResolution after the Cold War NationalAcademies Press Washington DC USA

Zartman IW 2005a Cowardly LionsMissed Opportunities for Preventing StateCollapse and Deadly Conflict LynneRienner Publishers Boulder CO USA

Zartman IW 2005b Analyzing intractabilityin C Crocker FO Hampson and P Aall edsGrasping the Nettle Analyzing Cases ofIntractable Conflict United States Institute ofPeace Press Washington DC USA

Zartman IW and Faure GO eds 2005Escalation and Negotiation CambridgeUniversity Press Cambridge UK

Zartman IW and Kremenyuk V eds 2005Peace versus Justice Negotiating Backward-and Forward-Looking Outcomes Rowmanamp Littlefield Lanham MD USA

5

The Topic of Change in International Negotiations

The dynamic nature of negotiatingprocesses is a reflection of the

changing environment in which actorshave to continuously adjust to new andoften surprising situations It goeswithout saying that the better preparedthe negotiator is to face the dynamicsof the game the more easily he willadapt to a concrete negotiating situa-tion His mind will be trained to thinkfrom alternative standpoints Like achess player he will develop a capacityto forecast his opposite numberrsquospossible moves and in his intellectualarsenal he will have a whole array ofschemes at his disposal to respond tonew patterns as the negotiationproceeds The shifting terrain howeveris just one of the complicating factorsof negotiations

The negotiation process is generallydetermined by the structure of thenegotiations the role of the actorsinvolved and their basic positions at theoutset of the discussions Given thesecore elements it wouldmdashin a staticsituationmdashbe relatively easy to analyzenot only the main options available butalso the major perspectives of theprocess In real-life dynamic situationshowever following a simple pattern inwhich the course of the negotiationscan be determined in a logical andstraightforward manner is much moredifficult

To illustrate this point one needonly point to factors outside theparameters of the negotiating frame-work such as the shifts in domesticand international public opinionChanges in the political landscape ofthe countries involved in the nego-tiations may also influence the ldquoballgamerdquo in ways that cannot be pre-dicted in advance Another elementthat may suddenly modify the initialequation is a ldquomega eventrdquo Unques-tionably the 911 trauma changedthe discourse on international terror-ism once and for all Suddenly thefight against terrorism popped uphigh on the international agendamdashwith obvious consequences forterrorism negotiations Indeed it ishard to think of any multilateral

political forum after 911 that wouldnot in one way or another addressthe scourge of terrorism

Obviously without these dramaticevents ongoing negotiations on thebroad issue of international terrorismwould never have gained the momen-tum they enjoy at present nor wouldthey have resulted in concrete mea-sures within such a relatively shorttime span

Triggered by 911 and by the recentMadrid bombings the whole focus onhomeland security in the UnitedStates and the antiterrorism campaignsnow being conducted at national andEU levels in Europe testify to the newdetermination to combat the evil ofterrorism In short outside eventshave a direct bearing on negotiations

Another quite different exampleimmediately comes to mind as regardsthe effect of mega events on negotia-tions namely the recent tsunamicatastrophe that claimed the lives ofover 100000 people in Asia many ofthem European tourists The tragedyof this natural disaster of giganticproportions has suddenly energizedthe debate on how best to coordinate arescue operation on a global scale Thecall for the establishment of an early-warning system has also been voicedWithin the EU discussions amongmember states have addressed thelessons to be learned from the tsunamidisaster

The impact of global developmentson world public opinion hardly needsto be further demonstrated and theireffect on negotiating processes areeasily traced

As well as outside developmentssuch as man-made or natural catas-trophes changes in the politicallandscape may significantly influencethe course of negotiations Take thecase of elections in a country that is amajor player in a concrete negotiatingexercise In the wake of an election anew government may take quitedifferent positions over a given issuefrom those of its predecessor

When a socialist government tookover from the conservative government

in Spain in the national elections heldshortly after the terrorist attacks inMadrid in March 2004 it decided onthe withdrawal of Spanish troops fromIraq This dramatic step was the logicalconsequence of a change in policy thatentailed a whole series of adjustmentsin Spainrsquos attitude toward militaryengagement in Iraq Obviously thischange became apparent in all thenegotiation processes Spain wasinvolved in At a global level a changein the US presidential administrationin November 2004 could have hadenormous ramifications for ongoingnegotiations The Middle East peaceprocess and the global climate talks arebut two spectacular instances wherethe impact of a new US admini-stration might have been felt

The speed with which internationaldevelopments unfold has shortened thehalf-life of well-defined assumptionsunderlying many negotiation exercisesAccordingly the topic of ldquochangerdquo ininternational negotiations deservescloser attention

Franz Cede

6

Chairing International Negotiation Processes

course the chair will have to com-municate or at the very least have athorough understanding of the agenda

In the face-to-face stage the presi-dent will need to manage the agendain a subtle way Heshe must be firmin sticking to the points on the agendawithout becoming too rigid Thepresidency must show impartiality andfairness In the European Union thisis achieved by separating the chairfrom its country position A statedelegation will represent the interestsof the country while the chair remainsimpartial This implies however thatthe delegation cannot separate itselftoo much from the chair which has amoderating effect on its position Inthe European Union the chair of theworking groups will need to relyheavily on the Council Secretariat forsupport In other forums the creationof a ldquofriends-of-the-chairrdquo caucus isoften a vital element for success Tostart a meeting by giving the floor tothese ldquofriendsrdquo creates a cooperativeatmosphere that is instrumental insetting the stage for a collaborativenegotiation process

Managing time is vital The chair willusually have to instigate a first phaseof exploration to search for options thatmight lead to a synergetic and inte-grative outcome This puts a lot of strainon the president who will have to seeto it that the process moves in a certaindirection while at the same timeavoiding premature outcomes thatmight forestall the agreement of moreeffective package deals Setting clearobjectives having a good ear usingeffective communication and keepingan eye on possible changes are vital inthe context of the negotiation to keepthe process under control The extentto which pulling and pushing tactics areeffective tools in any situation are theprerogative of the chair An assertivechair is certainly an asset but abulldozing president is a nuisance tothe negotiationsmdashimpartiality createsthe legitimacy the chair needs to beaccepted as an honest broker

As negotiations move in the direc-tion of an outcome the chair will need

to strike a balance between hisher owninterests and those of the collectivewhole It has already been said thatimpartiality is important Howevercomplete neutrality leaves the interestsof the country represented by thepresident virtually undefended Duringthe United Kingdom seminars par-ticipants played the ClingendaelPentagame in which they had to rotateinto the chair every twenty minutesThis proved that chairing could be aserious obstacle to effective nego-tiating In one of the games all thechairs pushed forward the possiblepackage deals like hot potatoesdelaying decision-making until theywere relieved of the chairmanship Theeffect of this was failure to reach acollective decision

In other words the fear of losing toomuch in terms of individual intereststhrough being responsible for a col-lective outcome blocked that veryoutcome This created an interestingdilemma as it implies that there willbe more assured outcomes if chairs canlegitimately maintain reasonableresistance to attempts to underminetheir national interests Completeneutrality is therefore just as damagingas one-sidedness This raises thequestion of fairness and effectivenessand how these should be defined inconnection with assured and unassuredoutcomes

Participants learned that it was vitalto have the chair when the process wasgetting close to ripeness and that theyshould be able to take a strong countryposition again at the time of decisionmakingmdashthus avoiding being the chairat that moment As this was not alwayspossible countries with extremepositions ran into difficulties Theytherefore tried to push more moderatestate representatives into the presidencyat the decisive moment They alsolearned that a chair still has to protectits own interests without becomingunfairmdashthis fine-tuning was of vitalimportance both to effective chairingand effective negotiating as they hadto be merged within the behavior of oneperson

What is it like to be an effectivechairperson of international

negotiations Although there is litera-ture on chairing meetings publicationson effective leadership of internationalmultilateral bargaining are in veryshort supply1 However as memberstates of the European Union (EU) feelit important to train diplomats and civilservants in preparation for theircountryrsquos next EU presidency therehave been some recent attempts to gaina better understanding of effectivechairing in an international contextFor example the European Institute ofPublic Administration (EIPA) and theClingendael Institute recently orga-nized a large-scale training conferenceto give Dutch negotiators a morethorough insight into target-orientedchairing

These EIPAClingendael seminarsrevealed many important aspects ofnegotiation chairing as the participantswere people with great experience inEuropean Union negotiation processesThe seminars involved introductions onthe subject matter discussions work-shops simulations and debriefingsThe following issues came out of thediscussions

Effective chairpersons should pre-pare thoroughly The chair must knowthe subject matter as well as thepositions of the participating countriesand must analyze these so as to be ableto identify common ground Ideally thechair should have a draft agreement inhisher pocket before the negotiationstarts Knowing the positions is notenough Information on needs bottomlines possible concession patterns andspecific problems concerning thenegotiatorsrsquo home front will helpgreatly The chair should understandwhat the real problems are who isgoing to negotiate and how the nego-tiation might develop The ldquohowrdquo isvery important indeed In the planningphase the chair will need to think abouthisher main strategies and the tacticsthat go with it Knowing the proceduresis of course an important point butknowing how to handle them effec-tively is even more important And of

7

responsibility for a collective processthat will end with an acceptableoutcome To perform hisher role wellthe chair will need to be fair Fairnessinvolves a substantial degree of impar-tiality But at the same time the chairhas a responsibility to hisher owncountry or organization The interestsof that party should not be too greatlyneglected as the chair has a responsi-bility to hisher home front as well Asin mediation impartiality is vital butneglect of self-interest is fatal Thechair will need to balance these twocontradicting roles using processesand procedures to maintain an accept-able equilibrium getting parties and

Four stages could be observed inchairing simulations of internationalnegotiations (1) the chair has to set thestage (2) options must be explored inrelationship to countries positions(3) ldquopredecision stagerdquo where pack-ages were made ready for decisionmaking (4) decisions are finallyhammered out into agreements Thesestages should be observed or thenegotiations will end in mayhem withoutcomes not being secured

It can thus be said that the chair is anegotiator with a specific role Or toput it another way a chair has the dualrole of negotiator and mediatorHisher task is first of all to take

people to accept him or her as the pilotof the negotiation process Chairing aninternational negotiation process ismediating while negotiating Thechairperson is a mediating negotiator

But representing both national andcollective needs in a balanced wayalso depends of course on the natureof the processes and the proceduresof the platform on which thesenegotiations take place In the UnitedNations Security Council the chairreally has to combine collective andindividual interests The same is truefor the European Union CouncilWorking Groups but here at least asecond representative will speak upfor the country position of the chairThe president does not need to do thathimherself In other internationalorganizations chairs are drawn fromthe ranks of international civil ser-vants and can therefore be moreindependent as a leader of negotiationprocesses

To sum up the chair has to balanceneeds to observe different phases inthe process to understand and in-fluence the people and to use theprocedures in an effective way Ifnegotiation is to give something inorder to get something then chairingis to navigate somewhere to getsomewhere

Paul W Meerts

Note1 Two of the few insights on effective chairingof diplomatic multilateral meetings can befound in Lang (1989) and Kaufmann (1998)We find a more recent view in Walker (2004210ndash213) A view geared to the EuropeanUnion can be found in Schout et al (2004)and in Guggenbuumlhl (2004)

ReferencesGuggenbuumlhl A 2004 Cookbook of the

Presidency of the European Union in PWMeerts and F Cede eds NegotiatingEuropean Union Palgrave MacmillanBasingstoke UK

Kaufmann J 1998 Conference DiplomacyMacmillan London UK

Lang W 1989 Multilateral negotiationsThe role of presiding officers in FMautner-Markhof ed Processes ofInternational Negotiations WestviewPress Boulder CO USA

Schout A Guggenbuumlhl A and Bayer N2004 The presidency in the EU of 25Eipascope 224ndash28

Walker RA 2004 Multilateral ConferencesPalgrave Macmillan Basingstoke UK

Second International Biennale on Negotiation

NEGOCIAmdashPARIS 2005

A second international conference on negotiation will be held in Paris from17ndash18 November 2005 This conference is jointly organized by NEGOCIA

a French business school affiliated with the Paris Chamber of Commerce andIndustry the LEARN (Laboratoire drsquoEtudes Appliqueacutees et de Recherche enNeacutegociation Groupe ESC Lille) and the French PIN group (GFN) The maintopic is

NEGOTIATION AND WORLD TRANSFORMATIONSNew perspectives for research and action

Selected topicsInnovation within existing practicesConflict crisis and violence managementFairness and ethics in negotiationBusiness negotiation (new domains new practices new requirements)The cultural dimension in future negotiationsNew negotiator profilesEffective negotiation practices in a changing worldCooperation and competitionNew forms of mediationInternational conferences and world transformationsNew negotiation paradigmsNegotiation and complexity

If you wish to propose a paper on one of these subjects please consult our Website under the heading ldquoactualiteacuterdquo httpwwwnegociafr

An audience of researchers and practitioners is expected The language of theconference will be French and English with simultaneous translation for mostof the workshops A publication in French and another in English summarizingthe most significant contributions on research and practice will follow

Information can be obtained from

Dorotheacutee Tokic or Sophie RichoutransnegonegociafrTel (33 1) 44 09 31 22Fax (33 1) 44 09 35 23

Guy Olivier Faure

8

Empowerment of Developing Countries inInternational TalksA Strategy to Make Global Regimes More Effective

International regimes are becomingincreasingly important in this the

ldquoera of globalizationrdquo Many criticalissues confronting governments aretransboundary in nature and requirejoint efforts in international institutionsto be coped with effectively Someproblems can best be handled by thedynamics of international markets butmost governments agree that regula-tions and other forms of governmentalintervention are also indispensableFor example it has clearly been advan-tageous or rather necessary to have afree-trade system built up within theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT) and its successor theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) arule-based institution

International regimes frequentlyhave serious weaknesses and further-more are often difficult to assessbecause of their contradictory proper-ties Take for example the case ofthe climate regime The internationalclimate talks have produced the 1997Kyoto Protocol with its binding andcostly commitments to reducingemissions of greenhouse gases intothe atmosphere This achievementshould not be underestimated How-ever it is also clear that the climateregime needs to be developed Thereare serious implementation problemsThe number of signatories to thebinding commitments in the KyotoProtocol has to be increased radicallyThe level of emission reduction ismuch too low According to a main-stream scientific assessment cutbacksof greenhouse gas emissions need tobe lifted from the present level of some5 to 60 or perhaps 70 for thereto be a significant impact on thealarming process of climate warmingOther international regimes display asimilarly ambiguous character

There is accordingly an urgent needto continue to develop and assessmethods to sustain and develop therobustness and effectiveness of interna-

tional regimes Various approaches areconceivable which is reflected by thedifferent perspectives on regimes thatare disputed among both academicanalysts and practitioners

One school of thought looks at theactors (for example states and NGOs)that are associated with a regime andfocus on compliance with treaty obliga-tions Another school which also has alegal orientation emphasizes insti-tutions and formal organizationalprocedures A third school of thoughtincludes a concentration of scientistsand other issue experts They areparticularly concerned with the issuesaddressed in international regimes andparticularly look out for the concreteresults of international cooperation andregulation A fourth perspective wherewe conceive of a regime as a processhas been less appreciated by practi-tioners and therefore needs to behighlighted in analysis as well as indialogs between academic analysts andpolicymakersnegotiators The processperspective is typically regarded asexceedingly esoteric by practitionersThis is surprising as it has evident andimportant practical implicationsHence one theme following from thisoutlook is international decisionmaking on global issues

Making collective choices regardinginternational regimes is largely thesame as multilateral negotiationalthough some accords in the UnitedNations and other international institu-tions are formally established by meansof roll calls Multilateral talks are oftenunwieldy processes that are very time-consuming Complexity has tended tointensify in the last decades because ofmore technically difficult negotiationproblems in combination with anincreasing number of both issues andparticipants The development of theinternational trade talks in GATT andWTO (from 1994 onwards) is illus-trative The Kennedy Round in GATTtook place between 1964 and 1967 In

contrast the Uruguay Round whichwas the last negotiation under GATTrequired some eight years to conclude(1986ndash1994) In the future we may havemore or less continuous trade talkswithin WTO

Multilateral negotiations are hencedemanding enterprises for negotiatingparties causing them different kindsof difficulties One of these problemscontinues to be a high degree of asym-metrical influence between differentgroups of statesmdashand particularlybetween industrialized and developingcountries This inequality has beenparticularly marked in negotiationsthat aim to reach binding and costlycommiments in an internationalregime One example is the negotiationon the 1997 Kyoto Protocol In thiscase the signatory states made a costlycommitment to reduce emissions ofCO

2 and other greenhouse gases into

the atmosphere Essentially only the in-dustrialized countries of the Organisationfor Economic Co-operation andDevelopment in Europe (OECD) wereactively involved in the Kyoto nego-tiation and signed the accord that wasproduced

A similar pattern is discernable in theinternational trade talks in GATTWTOIt is only lately that WTO has begunto look like a UN institution withregard to its membership In thecurrent Doha round in WTO a fairlylarge number of developing countrieshave been actively involved at allprocess stages of the trade negotiationfrom agenda setting to bargaining ondetail and final agreement This is afairly new pattern The Kennedyround (1964ndash1967) was essentiallynegotiated between industrializedcountries with the participation ofonly a few developing countries

Many observers believe that theprevailing power asymmetry is stillmuch too large Numerous governmentsand nongovernmental organizationsthat assess power discrepancies from

9

a normative point of view find themunfair It can also be argued that theexisting power asymmetry is harmfulfrom a purely instrumental standpointWhen feasible global solutions aresought to global problems it isdesirable and in the longer termnecessary for all countries concernedto be brought fully into a regime thatis driven by a multilateral negotiationThis has often not been the case andagain the climate talks and the WTOnegotiations on world trade can beused as good examples of a largernumber of cases

The fact that developing countrieshave not signed the Kyoto Protocol isnow beginning to cause some diffi-culties in the process of implemen-tation as well as in the preparations forthe upcoming post-Kyoto negotiationSome governments in industrializedcountries (including the United States)argue that it is unfair for them to haveto cut their greenhouse gas emissionsif (large) developing countries do notdo the same

The situation is similar with regardto the international trade regimeUnder the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade developing countries(DCs) have had a right of specialtreatment which has primarily meantexception from agreements on theelimination of trade obstacles Theseaccords have essentially been nego-tiated only among industrializedcountries in the OECD Exception forDCs could be absolute but has usuallybeen relative in other words lessreduction or slower reduction of tradebarriers in comparison with indus-trialized countries In the presentnegotiations under WTO the ambitionis to eliminate the rules of ldquospecialtreatmentrdquo which meets both technicaland political difficulties

If one problem haunting multilateralnegotiation systems is that the pre-vailing power asymmetry remainsmuch too large then another problemis paradoxically that this discrepancyis now in certain respects decreasingIn the Doha round in WTO developingcountries participated more actively ina larger number than they had in GATTFor the first time they effectivelyblocked the joint negotiation strategyof industrialized countries notably at

the Ministerial Meeting in CancunWith China cooperating closely withthe Group of 77 in the climate negoti-ation the power position of developingcountries has generally been strength-ened Nevertheless in spite of thesedevelopments there remains a signifi-cant power asymmetry in multilateralnegotiations in most issue areas

This slow progress is problematicbecause it includes only some devel-

oping countries does not go farenough and ultimately contributes toincreasing the complexity of thenegotiation process When powerasymmetry was more pronounced thanit is today the disadvantages were thatthe outcome of the negotiation wasskewed to the advantage of industri-alized countries and that the majorityof developing countries were kept onthe periphery of the negotiation

International Negotiation Now in Chinese

The Processes of International Negotiations Network is pleased to announcethat International Negotiation has just been published in Chinese There

were three main translators with forty-seven more giving additional supportThe publisher is the well-known Hua Xia and the selling price of just48 RMB (about euro 5 or US$ 6) makes the book widely accessible

The first edition of International Negotiation which came out in 1991became a best-seller and a classic in the field of global conflict resolution In2002 a second edition appeared which was substantially revised and updatedto meet the challenges of todayrsquos increasingly complex international relationsDeveloped under the aegis of the International Institute for Applied SystemsAnalysis this is an important resource which not only contains contributionsfrom some of the worldrsquos leading experts in international negotiation but alsorepresents a wide range of nations and disciplines The authors offer a synthesisof contemporary negotiation theory perspectives for understanding negotiationdynamics and strategies for producing mutually satisfactory and enduringagreements The information and insights provided are relevant for negotiatorspolicy makers and all those involved in negotiations at the international level

10

system As seen from a technicalbargaining point of view one advan-tage of the power asymmetry was thatit contributed to effective negotia-tion Communication and problemsolving was greatly facilitated by thelimited number of active partiesSpecial negotiation groups could bekept very small and because of theresourcefulness of the active countriesthere was little problem with parallelnegotiation groups With an increas-ing number of active parties partici-pating in the multilateral talks theseadvantages are being diminishedPlenary meetings grow unwieldywith less time for creativity Specialnegotiation groups are also expand-ing and becoming less-effectiveinstruments of problem solving andparallel negotiation on special topicsare tending to become more and morecontroversial

Various measures have been sug-gested and also tried out to strengthenweak developing countries in interna-tional regimes and negotiation Suchefforts need to be continued and rein-forced as the integration of devel-oping countries needs to be speededup Sustainable negotiation resultscannot be achieved without voluntarycommitment by participating govern-ments which in turn requires theseparties to have a reasonable say in theregime-building process

Capacity building has long beenone approach to enhancing the posi-tion of developing countries Forexample over the years the UnitedNations Institute for Training andResearch (UNITAR) has organizedvarious ldquoroadshowsrdquo in developingcountries with training programspertaining to the climate talks andother environmental negotiationsInternational organizations like theUN institutions and GATTWTOhave special units in their secretariatswhose job it is to provide technicalassistance and support to DCs It hasbeen proposed that more resourcesshould be transferred to developingcountries (1) to enhance their capac-ity to analyze and prepare issues and(2) to keep delegations in place at aconference site

Institution building has also beenused to support developing countries

including the establishment of favor-able procedural rules (eg constraintsregarding parallel meetings) Forexample in GATTWTO special com-mittees have been set up to considerissues that are of special interest todeveloping countries and that havebeen given a low priority by indus-trialized countries Such measures arenothing new Recall that the UnitedNations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) establishedin 1964 was meant to serve theinterests of developing countries as acounterweight to GATT and otherorganizations dominated by industri-alized countries Having been trans-formed into a regular UN institutionUNCTAD has retained this supportiverole ever since

I acknowledge that capacity andinstitution building can be and havebeen useful in supporting poor devel-oping countries in the UN system andin the context of other internationalregimes However the point I wantto make is that a more elaborateprocess approachmdashnegotiationmdashshould supplement the traditionalapproaches to helping weak countriesperform better in international regime-building processes Earlier PINprojects on multilateral negotiationgenerally in specific issue areas(environment climate economicsand nuclear security and safety) aswell in regime building and post-negotiation offer much food forthought in this regard and indicatethat significant results could beattained in this avenue An earlierproject on asymmetrical power rela-tions among states indicates thatunder some conditions counter-intuitive propositions need to beconsidered when facilitation strate-gies are designed The researchcommunity has something to offerwhen facilitation approaches arediscussed if only the practitioners arewilling to take part in a dialog

The main point of this article is thatthe negotiation perspective should beapplied more consistently and in amore far-reaching way than is usuallythe case when the effectiveness ofregime-building processes is assessedThe problem of how to assist weakdeveloping countries is a good

example If this problem is looked atthrough the lens of negotiationanalysis the remedy is neither transferof resources nor capacity building orinstitutional reform as such The keyconcept is empowerment whichrepresents an approach and a strategyto help a country to perform effec-tively in the special context of amultilateral negotiation giving move-ment and structure to the develop-ment of an international regime

Thinking in terms of empowermentdoes not make resource transferscapacity building or institutionalreform irrelevant but it does subordi-nate those factors to an analysis ofwhat happens in a multilateral nego-tiation on the road from prenego-tiation to agreement and possiblepostnegotiation What should be doneis not to expand a general pool ofresources or to enhance some generalability to understand complicatedissues like say climate warming orthe relationship between financialservices financial flows and foreigninvestments by banks or insurancecompanies Empowerment is enhan-cing the capacity of individual actors(for example states and NGOs) andcoalitions of actors to perform instru-mentally and effectively in a nego-tiation with a view to promoting indi-vidual and joint interests Obviouslyrelevant resources and capability cancontribute to making weak statesstronger but this effect becomesbetter targeted and will have a greaterimpact if these inputs are integratedinto an empowerment strategy thatcombines goal-seeking actor strate-gies with negotiation roles andprocess constraints for example thedemands on actors that differentprocess stages represent

Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

11

Global Negotiations

G lobalization is one of the mostimportant processes in the inter-

national system today optimizing theglobal processes of production andwealth distribution and makingindividual nations part of a worldcommunity Special attention shouldthus be paid to the tool that makesglobalization workmdashinternationalnegotiations

Global negotiations offer the possi-bility of creating a world where con-flicts will be solved through negotiationand not on the battlefield In the early1990s after the end of the Cold Warthere was widespread hope that the eraof conflicts was over But even in aworld that is no longer divided byideology conflicts may occur and civili-zations may clash there is inequalityin the distribution of resources betweenNorth and South and there is terrorism

There are regional conflicts that maybe regarded as the offspring of globalclashes and local conflicts that reflectglobal and regional controversiesBesides resolving conflicts globalnegotiations have acquired globalmanagement functions solving issuesof security economic developmentenvironmental protection the defenseof human rights and the promotion ofcultural research and cooperation Nolonger a tool for managing foreign policyissues that cannot be solved unilaterallynegotiations are tending to acquire auniversal importance as the only think-able way of managing world affairs

As long as there is no global govern-ment or other supreme authority ableto run the global community the maintask of negotiations will be to act as adecision-making mechanism in theworld system As a specific blend ofindividual strategies communicationmethods and decision-making pro-cedures international negotiations willbecome a major instrument for man-aging the interdependent and mutuallyadjustable nexus of global problemareas Negotiations will perform at leasttwo functions (1) they will search foroptimal solutions to specific problems(and this will be one subject of thiswork) and (2) they will perfect the

international system as it now standsand increase its robustness and fairnessthrough consolidation and cohesion(Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005)

The first of these areas is clearmdashnegotiations as a tool in and a methodof solving existing problems Theliterature on this subject is enormousand may require a more in-depth study(a topic for a future article) Thedifference is the idea of global issuesmdashtheir specificity their uniqueness andhence impact on the negotiationprocessmdashas a subject of negotiations

This second area is much morepromising for research First it toucheson the issue of the narrow impact ofnegotiations on the state of globalissues Second it affects the rules ofconduct of negotiations and the growthof the comprehensive global negotiationnetworkmdashtwo new phenomena withquite distinctive features

In global negotiations two issuescoincide global reach and global actorsThese issues also include for exampleglobal issues global solutions andglobal consequences There is or shouldbe a certain identifiable and verifiableconnection between the global mag-nitude of negotiated issues and the waynegotiations are conducted

A certain sense of the limits of pos-sible searches for solutions theissues contested exist in a definiteenvironment (limited physically andinstrumentally) and may be subjectto a limited number of solutions fortechnological intellectual or otherreasonsA certain sense of responsibilityresulting from the magnitude of theissues involved their long-termnature and global consequencesA certain sense of human solidarityresulting from human confrontationwith either man-made or naturaldisasters and a sense of history thatencourages searches for outcomesandA certain sense of the reliability ofnegotiation as an element of humanculture born of the understanding thatthe best solution to any problem is notan imposed but a negotiated solution

One aim of the proposed research isto make use of some of the results ofother IIASA research in the area ofglobal issues such as population growthand its consequences land and waterresources and their distribution andglobal climate changes and globalenvironment These programs providethe opportunity to conduct ldquofeedbackrdquoresearch to analyze the system of nego-tiations from the standpoint of existingglobal problems and their successfulsolutions They include assessment of

The dichotomy between global issuesand global solutionsThe arsenal of global solutions withspecial attention to negotiationsThe existing structure of negotiationsand how they are organized (regimessystems standing committees) andThe existing methods theories andpractice of global negotiationsThe next steps should be to identify

what is special about negotiating globalissues actors strategies structuresprocesses outcomes First it would behelpful to analyze the scope of the globalactors (who may be categorized as suchand why) in managing global issues Thesecond task would be to identify thescope of issues that may and should ratedas global to analyze what makes themldquoglobalrdquo and why they should be treatedglobally The third task would be to makean inventory of global negotiatingmechanisms (using case studies eg theOzone Layer Conference) and to analyzetheir scope authority performance andmodus operandi

The aim of the study should be agroup of issues that may be labeled asldquoglobal governance through negotia-tionsrdquo and the group of problems thatconstitute the global negotiationnetwork its structure rules of operationmembership relevance and compliance

Victor Kremenyuk

ReferenceZartman I W and Kremenyuk V eds 2005

Peace versus Justice Negotiating Backward-and Forward-Looking Outcomes Rowmanamp Littlefield Lanham MD USA

12

Report on PIN Side Event at COP 10 in Buenos Aires

the sole benefit of participants in theCOP sessions and subsidiary bodies ofthe Convention They are scheduled soas not to conflict with the UNFCCCnegotiating process and slots areawarded on a first-come first-servedbasis The PIN Program was luckyenough to get a slot on what was acompletely overbooked list of eventswith the help of IIASA and HelmutHojesky from the Austrian EnvironmentMinistry in Vienna who registered ourside event through the Ministry and alsoacted as a presenter at the introductorypart of the session

Four colleagues working on theproject Gunnar Sjoumlstedt NorichikaKanie Larry MacFaul and DirkHanschel gave presentations on theirjoint undertaking and offered ideasand views as to how the climatenegotiations might be facilitated

Gunnar Sjoumlstedt (Swedish Instituteof International Affairs) highlightedthe value of social science inputs intothe climate talks in particular andmultilateral negotiations in generalNegotiation analysis can help scien-tific experts and NGOs better under-stand the logic of negotiation and theconstraints and opportunities repre-sented by the different stages of theprocess Sjoumlstedt stressed the need todevelop long-term strategies forstructuring the negotiation processand recommended (1) using profes-sional facilitators in future meetings(2) launching capacity-buildingprograms for delegates and NGOs innegotiation techniques and (3) usingregional forums to promote politicalcoordination and exchange of views

Norichika Kanie (Tokyo Institute ofTechnology) discussed how the par-ticipation of NGOs in the climate talkscould be made more effective statingthat international decision processesmdashnegotiationsmdashneed to become moredemocratic or transparent if that ob-jective is to be achieved He proposedinstitutionalizing NGO participation inthe climate process by creating multi-stakeholder dialogs and incorporatingNGO representatives into governmentdelegations Kanie presented inter-esting quantitative data showing howthe rate of participation of NGOs ingovernment delegations has changedfrom one COP meeting to the nextadding that the practice of somegovernments to constrain the role ofNGOs should be discontinued Kaniementioned the important role thatNGOs can play in informing thegeneral public about internationaltreaties He also highlighted theircontribution to assisting and sup-porting the implementation of bind-ing commitments in internationalagreements

PIN is currently organizing a bookproject entitled Facilitation of the

Climate Talks Dealing with StumblingBlocks The project coordinatorGunnar Sjoumlstedt along with severalchapter authors attended COP 10[the tenth session of the Conferenceof Parties (COP) to the 1992 UNFramework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC)] in Buenos Aireswhere they also put on a ldquoside eventrdquoon Friday 17 December 2004

Such side events are usually organizedby Parties observer states the UnitedNations and observer organizations for

Neacutegociations A New International Journalin the French Language

A new journal Neacutegociations has been launched in French The negotiationsdomain has been developing in European societies and there is now a

place for a journal that deals with what is happening both within and outsideEurope A whole host of innovations is evident in current practices and thetheory now has to catch up with the reality

In the new political entity that is the European Union new models arebeing tested and classical hierarchical institutions are being challenged andmodified if not replaced while ordinary bargaining practices tend to prevailin a number of situations other issues such as values are being more andmore discussed beyond partisan interests From whatever angle you approachthe problem one fact remains negotiation is becoming a basic tool ofeveryday life We have reached the ldquoAge of Negotiationrdquo and a new journalto illustrate this is therefore fully justified

This new knowledge must be shared with the research community andtransmitted effectively to practitioners whether diplomats managersscientists or ldquothe man in the streetrdquo The journal aims to bring its own originalcontribution to the growing intellectual impetus being given to negotiationand conflict resolution

Neacutegociations publishes original theoretical and empirical works coveringall areas pertaining to negotiation (international negotiation social negotiationorganizational negotiation collective bargaining mediation negotiatedinteractions environmental negotiations business negotiations etc) It isinterested in articles that investigate these topics from multiple disciplinaryperspectives (sociology psychology political science organizational behaviorindustrial relations law etc) as well as from academic and theoreticaltraditions Synthetic reviews new conceptual frameworks and case studiesare viewed as essential parts of the body of knowledge while fruitful negotiationexperiences contributed by negotiators and diplomats will also be published asmaterial for further analysis

More detailed information may be found at

httpuniversitedeboeckcomrevuesnegociationsE-mail revuenegociationsguestulgacbe

Guy Olivier Faure

13

Models in (or around) inter-national negotiations constitutesomething in between the other twoThey may serve as guidelines eitherat the beginning ofmdashor at somepoint duringmdashthe negotiation pro-cess in order to structure furtherprocedures fair division schemesmay be mentioned as an exampleFrom the sixteen different contri-

butions to the project presented anddiscussed at the two workshops atIIASA four were selected that insome way represented the categoriesjust mentioned The four authors ofthese contributions together with theSymposium organizer and presenterscame from different scientific back-grounds and five different countriesthus representing the truly interdisci-plinary and international character ofboth PIN and IIASA

The Symposium was organizedas follows The organizer RudolfAvenhaus first introduced IIASArsquosPIN program and the Formal Modelsproject then the speakers and theirsubjects Speakers were MarkusAmann from IIASA who reported onthe RAINS model for internationalnegotiations developed at IIASA anddescribed its use in internationalecological negotiations Akira Okada

PIN at the AAAS Annual Conference

On 18 February 2005 members ofthe PIN program presented their

Formal Models project at a ninety-minute Symposium at the annualconference of the American Associa-tion for the Advancement of Science(AAAS) in Washington DC Thetheme of this yearrsquos conferenceWhere Science meets Society couldnot have been a more appropriate oneas far as the PIN Symposium wasconcerned

It was after a second workshop atIIASA in June 2004 that the finalstructure of the PIN project FormalModels of for and in InternationalNegotiations was established Guidedby William Zartmanrsquos concept that theworld is made up of prepositions theworkshop defined three types ofmodels as follows

Models of international negotia-tions are descriptive analyses thatmay provide insight into the out-come of past negotiations or aidcomprehension of problems ofongoing or planned negotiationsModels for international negotia-tions may be considered as heuristicdynamic mechanisms establishedwith the help of external data that canbe used to provide information aboutthe process of negotiations and

Larry MacFaul (United KingdomVerification Research Training andInformation Centre) addressed thecritical issue of the implementationof the binding commitments of the1997 Kyoto Protocol and in partic-ular how verification can help obtainsatisfactory compliance MacFaulexplained how verification works andthe prerequisites for its effectivenessHe noted that the climate regime hasa strong compliance mechanism incomparison with other environmentalagreements with national communi-cations and greenhouse gas inventoriesbeing effective tools for verifyingboth policies and results MacFauladded that a verification mechanism

should not be evaluated only on thebasis of its inherent technical proper-ties and that the political context inwhich it will function also needs to beconsidered For example uncertaintyabout the second commitment periodof the Kyoto Protocol is likely toreduce incentives for complianceduring the first commitment periodOn the other hand the existence of acredible verification mechanism canbe expected to facilitate bargaining onfuture binding commitments

Dirk Hanschel (University ofMannheim) discussed how negotiationis influenced by its structural contextindicating more specifically the oppor-tunities of institutional design He

reported on a project under way inMannheim to develop a tool kit forinternational lawmaking that wouldprovide practical guidance to nego-tiators and enhance the effectiveness ofmeetings Hanschel mentioned a fewexamples of institution-related facili-tation measures for the climate talks(1) improved channels of communica-tion between the UNFCCC Secretariatand subsidiary bodies (2) innovativeways of coping with issue linkages(3) the hiring of independent expertsto identify winndashwin situations and(4) a majority voting procedure atCOP plenary meetings

Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

from Hitotsubashi University Tokyopresented his game theoretic modelof the Kyoto Protocol negotiationswhich is considered as being of thein type As Michel Rudnianski fromReims and Paris universities was illhis contribution was summarized bythe organizer This summary coveredthe use of relatively simple modelsof international negotiations and wasillustrated by reference to the IslandsFisheries conflict and the SpratlyIslands negotiations Finally BarryOrsquoNeill from the University ofCalifornia Los Angeles raised thequestion as to what formal modelscan tell us about real negotiations

After the presentations WilliamZartman chaired a discussion thestarting point of which were his viewson the usefulness to practitioners of thedifferent types of formal models Asexpected the questions and commentsfrom the very interested audiencecentered around this issue It is hopedthat interest in the book on formalmodels which should be availabletoward the end of the year will be asas strong as at the interest at the AAASConference

Rudolf Avenhaus

14

In view of the general uncertainty ofthe legal regime of state immunitymdash

a general rule of international lawderived from the sovereign equalityof states the International LawCommission (ILC) as early as 1949had already included the topic of stateimmunity among the issues that wereamenable to codification

However the elaboration processstarted only in 1977 when the GeneralAssembly invited the InternationalLaw Commission to start its work onthe topic of jurisdictional immunitiesof states and their property1 As usualthe ILC appointed a Special Rapporteur(Sompong Sucharitkul) and requestedthe Secretary-General to invite govern-ments of member states to submitrelevant materials on the topic includ-ing national legislation2 decisions ofnational tribunals and diplomatic andofficial correspondence3 In the follow-ing years a first complete draft textwas elaborated and subsequently afterthe states had an opportunity tocomment on it a second final text with22 draft articles and a commentary4

compiled under the guidance of asecond Special Rapporteur (MottoOgiso) This second text was submittedto the General Assembly with therecommendation of convening aninternational conference of plenipo-tentiaries for the conclusion of aconvention on the subject

However this moment was markedby the breakdown of Communismand by fundamental changes in theeconomic system of states which hada substantial impact on the substanceof this text States were not yet preparedto accept the ILC text Consequentlythe General Assembly decided toestablish an open-ended WorkingGroup of the Sixth Committee underCarlos Calero-Rodrigues to reconcilethe divergent views on the issue5 Themost disputed issues were the defini-tion of the state the definition of acommercial transaction state entities

contracts of employment and mea-sures of constraint However theWorking Group was unsuccessfuland the General Assembly6 thussuspended the discussions until 1997when it decided to resume consid-eration of the issues of substance Inthe following year it decided toestablish an open-ended WorkingGroup of the Sixth Committee andinvited the ILC to present preliminarycomments on those substantive issuesto facilitate the task of the WorkingGroup7 As the normal procedure ofthe ILC did not provide for a thirdreading of the text it established aWorking Group under Gerhard Hafner(Chusei Yamada acting as Rapporteur)and delivered a report including thegenesis of the disputed questionssummaries of the recent relevant caselaw as well as suggestions for apossible solution8 for the SixthCommittee

The Working Group subsequentlyestablished within the framework ofthe Sixth Committee which was ledby Gerhard Hafner embarked on adiscussion of the major issues and thepossible outcome of the work on thetopic A number of delegations werein favor of a convention as this wouldhave to be applied by national courtsOthers supported the creation of amodel law that would provide formore flexibility in an evolving areaof law9 In the light of these diver-gences the chairman presentedsuggestions in the form of principlesas well as alternative texts for thedraft articles10

In 2000 the Working Group wasconverted into an Ad Hoc Committee11

In view of the progress in the negotia-tion process in particular the progressachieved within the European Unionan outcome in the form of a conventiongained more and more support Thiswas made possible by the addition ofUnderstandings attached to severalarticles

However a crucial point for theacceptability of the convention was howthe articles and these Understandingsshould be linked together Only at itsthird and last session in March 2004did the Ad Hoc Committee succeedin including these Understandings inthe Annex forming an integral part ofthe Convention and in adopting thetext of the United Nations Conventionon Jurisdictional Immunities of Statesand their property12 Within the SixthCommittee the Chairman clarifiedthat the Convention did not apply tocriminal proceedings to militaryactivities and to immunities rationepersonae The question arose as to thelegal qualification of this statementand this issue was settled by a compro-mise according to which reference tothis statement was included in thepreamble to the resolution Theresolution itself explicitly confirmedthe inapplicability of the Conventionto criminal proceedings The Con-vention was adopted by the GeneralAssembly on 2 December 2004without a vote13 and opened forsignature on 17 January 2005

These negotiations had some inter-esting features although states hadample opportunity to comment on thedraft articles during the first periodof work within the ILC they did notaccept the outcome but requiredfurther changes only when they weredirectly involved in the negotiationprocess The length of the process ofelaboration shows that they also hadto be given sufficient time to enablethem to evaluate their negotiatingsituation review their position andif necessary convince their nationalauthorities It was also interesting tonote that with a membership finallyof 25 the European Union statesbecame the most important actor inthis negotiation process a role thatwas accepted by the other states Onlyafter the adoption did AmnestyInternational voice an objection to the

The Negotiation Process concerning the United NationsConvention on Jurisdictional Immunities of Statesand their property of 2004

15

Convention as the latter did notprovide for the denial of immunity inthe case of grave violations of funda-mental human rights such as tortureThis issue had however been dis-cussed during the negotiations butrejected as being not yet generallyaccepted It was very clear that theinclusion of such an exception to theimmunity within the Conventionwould have excluded any possibilityof achieving a generally acceptabletext As it stands now there is a realchance that the Convention will enterinto force in the foreseeable future

Gerhard Hafner

Notes1 GA Res 32151 of 19 December 19772 National legislation on the subject of Stateimmunity exists mainly in common law coun-tries USA Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act(FSIA) Public Law 94-583 28 USC sectsect13301602-1611 15 ILM 19761388 modified byPublic Law 100-669 28 ILM 1989 397United Kingdom State Immunity Act (SIA)1978 17 ILM 1978 1123 Australia ForeignStates Immunities Act 1985 25 ILM 1986715 Canada State Immunity Act 1982 21ILM 1982 p 798 as well as in South AfricaPakistan and Singapore See Ch SchreuerState Immunity Some Recent DevelopmentsCambridge 1988 at 33 UN Doc ACN4343 incl AddendaReproduced in the United Nations LegislativeSeries Materials on Jurisdictional Immunitiesof States and their Property (Sales No EF81V10)4 YBILC 1991 Vol II Part Two 13 - 615 GA Res 4655 of 9 December 19916 GA Res 4961 of 9 December 19947 GA Res 5398 of 8 December 19988 YBILC 1999 Vol II Part Two Annex9 Report of the Chairman of the WorkingGroup AC654L12 12 November 1999para 7 et seq Reference was made to theUNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalCommercial Arbitration 1985 A4017Annex I10 Report of the Chairman of the WorkingGroup 10 November 2000 AC655L1211 GA Res 55150 of 12 December 200012 See infra subchapter 36 A592213 ARes5938

PIN BooksPeace versus Justice Negotiating Backward- and Forward-LookingOutcomes IW Zartman V Kremenyuk editors 2005 Rowman amp LittlefieldPublishers Inc Lanham MD USAISBN 0-7425-3629-7

Negotiating European Union PW Meerts F Cede editors 2004 PalgraveMacmillan Basingstoke UKISBN 1-4039-4161-0

Getting It Done Post-Agreement Negotiations and International RegimesBI Spector IW Zartman editors 2003 United States Institute of Peace PressWashington DC USAISBN 1-929223-42-0

How People Negotiate Resolving Disputes in Different Cultures GO Faureeditor 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers Dordrecht NetherlandsISBN 1-4020-1831-2

Professional Cultures in International Negotiation Bridge or RiftG Sjoumlstedt editor 2003 Lexington Books Lanham MD USAISBN 0-7391-0638-4

Containing the Atom International Negotiations on Nuclear Securityand Safety R Avenhaus VA Kremenyuk G Sjoumlstedt editors 2002Lexington Books Lanham MD USAISBN 0-7391-0387-3

International Negotiation Analysis Approaches Issues 2nd EditionVA Kremenyuk editor 2002 Jossey-Bass Inc Publishers San FranciscoCA USAISBN 0-7879-5886-7

Preventive Negotiation Avoiding Conflict Escalation IW Zartman editor2001 Rowman amp Littlefield Publishers Inc Lanham MD USAISBN 0-8476-9894-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-8476-9895-5 (paper)

Power and Negotiation IW Zartman JZ Rubin editors 2000 TheUniversity of Michigan Press Ann Arbor MI USAISBN 0-472-11079-9

International Economic Negotiation Models versus Reality VA KremenyukG Sjoumlstedt editors 2000 Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Cheltenham UKISBN 1-84064-167-3

Negotiating International Regimes Lessons Learned from the United NationsConference on Environment and Development (UNCED) BI SpectorG Sjoumlstedt IW Zartman editors 1994 Graham amp Trotman Limited LondonUK (Now a subsidiary of Kluwer Academic Publishers)ISBN 1-85966-077-0

International Multilateral Negotiation Approaches to the Managementof Complexity IW Zartman editor 1994 Jossey-Bass Inc PublishersSan Francisco CA USAISBN 1-55542-642-5

International Environmental Negotiation G Sjoumlstedt editor 1993 SagePublications Newbury Park CA USAISBN 0-8039-4760-7

Culture and Negotiation The Resolution of Water Disputes GO FaureJZ Rubin editors 1993 Sage Publications Inc Newbury Park CA USAISBN 0-8039-5370-4 (cloth) ISBN 0-8039-5371-2 (paper)

Processes of International Negotiations F Mautner-Markhof editor 1989Westview Press Inc Boulder CO USAISBN 0-8133-7721-8

16

Just Out

Peace versus JusticeNegotiating Forward- andBackward-Looking Outcomes

Edited byI William ZartmanVictor Kremenyuk

Published by Rowman amp Littlefield Publishers Incin cooperation with IIASAISBN 0-7425-3629-7 PaperISBN 0-7425-3628-9 Cloth

This book examines the costs and benefits of ending the fighting ina range of conflicts and probes the reasons why negotiatorsprovide or fail to provide resolutions that go beyond just ldquostoppingthe shootingrdquo What is the desired and achievable mix betweennegotiation strategies that look backward to end current hostilitiesand those that look ahead to prevent their recurrence

To answer that question a wide range of case studies is marshaledto explore relevant peacemaking situations from the end of theThirty Yearsrsquo War and the Napoleonic Wars to more recentsettlements of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuriesmdashincludinglarge scale conflicts like the end of WW II and smaller scale sometimesinternal conflicts like those in Cyprus Armenia and Azerbaijan andMozambique Cases on Bosnia and the Middle East add extra interest

Published in cooperation with IIASA this important research is expertlyedited by renowned conflict scholars I William Zartman and VictorKremenyuk and includes original case studies from scholars andpractitioners around the globe including Janice Gross Stein DanielDruckman and Beth Simmons among many others

List of ContributorsPatrick Audebert-Lasrochas Juan Carlos M Beltramino Franz CedeDaniel Druckman Christophe Dupont Janice Gross Stein VictorKremenyuk Robert B Lloyd Terrence Lyons Paul W Meerts Vitaly VNaumkin James C OrsquoBrien Marie-Pierre Richarte Valeacuterie Rosoux BethA Simmons I William Zartman and Irina D Zvyagelskaya

About the AuthorsI William Zartman is Jacob Blaustein Professor of Conflict Resolutionand International Organizations at the Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies (SAIS) of The John Hopkins University

Victor Kremenyuk is deputy director at the Institute for USA and CanadaStudies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow

mdashAdapted from the Rowman amp Littlefield Web site wwwrowmanlittlefieldcom

For orders and information contact

wwwrowmanlittlefieldcom

The Processes of International Negotiation Project

Copyright copy 2005International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis

A-2361 Laxenburg AustriaTelephone +43 2236 807267

Telefax +43 2236 71313E-mail piniiasaacat

Managing Editor Guy Olivier Faure

IIASA is a nongovernmentalinternational research institution

sponsored by scientific organizationsfrom 16 countries

IIASA has member organizations inAustria China Czech Republic

Egypt Estonia FinlandGermany Hungary Japan

Netherlands Norway PolandRussian Federation Sweden Ukraine

United States of America

2

perception of a Mutually EnticingOpportunity is a necessary but notsufficient condition for the continua-tion of negotiations beyond simpleagreement to a successful conclusionof the conflict

Negotiations completed under theshadowmdashor the pressuremdashof an MHSalone are likely to be unstable andunlikely to lead to a more enduringsettlement they will represent only anattempt to cut the costs of conflict getthe bug rather than the bear off the backof the parties arrive at an agreeingformula for a cease-fire in the absenceof a resolving formula and then stopunmotivated to move on to a search forresolution The agreement is likelyeither to break down as soon as one orboth parties think they can break thestalemate as the 1973ndash1975 evolutionof the situation in Vietnam amongothers illustrates or to remain truncatedand unstable even if the parties reach aconflict management agreement tosuspend violence as in the 1984 Lusakaagreement in southern Africa or the1994 Karabakh cease-fire (Zartman1989 Mooradian and Druckman 1999)

Like the MHS the MEO is a fig-ment of perception a subjectiveappreciation of objective elementsbut unlike the MHS it is an inventionof the parties (and their mediator) andis internal to the negotiation processnot the result of an objective externalsituation It must be produced by theparties using their analysis of theconflict and its causes their apprecia-tion of their interests and needs andtheir creativity in crafting a mutuallyattractive solution It contains forward-looking provisions to deal with thebasic dispute with unresolved left-overs of the conflict and its possiblereemergence and with new relationsof interdependence between theconflicting parties (Zartman andKremenyuk 2005)

Thus an MEO is a resolving formulathat is seen by the parties as meetingtheir needs better than the status quoThis is an unavoidably soft judg-mental and conclusionary definitionlike many definitions in social science[The standard behavioral definition ofpowermdashthe ability to move anotherparty in an intended direction (Tawney1931 Simon 1952 Dahl 1957

as culture power multilateralismescalation and justice Another goalhas been to push further on appli-cation domains such as environmentclimate the European Union nuclearsecurity international regimes andpreventive diplomacy

Research is a type of explorationand we have tried to break newground here with books such as HowPeople Negotiate which drawslessons from the Bible as well as fromthe various ways in which tribalpeople from the remotest parts of theworld resolve their differences

All this we have done on a volun-tary and unpaid basis devoting ourtime and energy to science and knowl-edge In carrying out our task wehave stuck as firmly as possible tobasic values such as being systematicin our approach using an intellectualmethodology that is both inductiveand deductive and reflecting auniversalistic trend in terms ofconceptualizing or framing problemsand issues on an intercultural basis

Finally although our publishershave always been well-known onesthat have made our work continu-ously available to potential readerswe do not rely on the success of ourpublished books alone Throughoutthe years we have also developed ourown strategy for disseminatingknowledge through what we call ourldquoroadshowsrdquo We have traveled andheld lectures all over the world tolaunch assist and strengthen localinitiatives as well as to developresearch groups We have alsoorganized round-table discussions oninternational negotiation and conflictresolution wherever we have founda need and an opportunity This iswhere we now stand after twentyyears of action to develop andpromote a topic that is so vital for thefuture of humanity

Rudolf AvenhausFranz Cede

Guy Olivier FaureVictor Kremenyuk

Paul MeertsGunnar Sjoumlstedt

I William Zartman

Thibaut and Kelley 1957)mdashis alsoconclusionary and tautological toboot (Zartman and Rubin 2001)] Itsvalue lies not in its predictability butin the fact that it identifies the neces-sary elements that explain the adoptionof an MEO and lead the negotiator andmediator to the elements that need tobe achieved in negotiation

But the MHS cannot disappear Itneeds to carry into the negotiationsthemselves and the perception ofripeness has to continue during theprocess if the parties are not to reeval-uate their positions and drop out inthe revived hopes of being able tofind a unilateral solution throughescalation Thus arrival at an enticingand resolving formula depends onkeeping alive the supply side of therebelsrsquo terms of trademdashthe conflictviolencemdashuntil the demand side isfirmly in place The rebelsrsquo supply sideis already limited by the characteristicMHS if the two sides were not stale-mated they would simply continuethe war ultimately to the point ofeliminating one side or the other asthe rebels threatened to do in CostaRica in 1948 and did in Liberia andLebanon and as the government didin Angola Sierra Leone and AlgeriaThe current literature on uncertaintyin decisions to use violence thus fitsdirectly into ripeness theory Therebelsrsquo challenge is to keep the elementof violence alive throughout the nego-tiations in sufficient quantity to buythe required concessions on thedemand sidemdashMHS against MEOFor the most part however the supplyof violence is latent and contingent (asis the other sidersquos supply of con-cessions as in any negotiation untilthe deal is closed)mdasha threat to be usedif negotiations break down (Schelling1960)

Therefore negotiations and espe-cially mediation work on both sidesof the equation keeping the supply ofviolence under control and seeking totailor demands to meet the amount ofconcessions acceptable to the otherside If the mediators can show howcontinued or renewed violence wouldlose a party international respect andsupport the violence can be kept at thethreat level in case of failure rather thanat the actual level during negotiations

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Victor Kremenyuk



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Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Franz Cede

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Paul W Meerts


















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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Franz Cede

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Paul W Meerts


















Guy Olivier Faure

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Franz Cede

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Paul W Meerts


















Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Paul W Meerts


















Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Paul W Meerts


















Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



12

















Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt

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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Global Negotiations















Victor Kremenyuk



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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

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Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Guy Olivier Faure

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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

14













15


Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Gunnar Sjoumlstedt



Rudolf Avenhaus

14













15


Gerhard Hafner

















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Just Out
























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Gerhard Hafner

















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Gerhard Hafner

















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Concepts: Steering Committee Mutual Enticing Opportunity...

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Transcript of Concepts: Steering Committee Mutual Enticing Opportunity...