Coffey 2004 Whole Rahner on Supernatural Existential

7/28/2019 Coffey 2004 Whole Rahner on Supernatural Existential

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Theological Sludjcs65 (2(Xl4

T H E W H O L E R A H N E R O N T H E

S UP ER N A TU R A L E X IS TE N TIA L

DAVID CnFTT

[The allflwr J1Ule.~tllUt ~(!riow> discrepollcie apparentl\' l!xi.\,t bl:-tween Rallller's illititlI {llIdlater fomlLl.latiolls ( J f hi~ theolf)'::), regard-ing Ille sl/pernolllral exist(,l/tial. SI/ch {/conc:l l/ \' iol l, i f correLl, wOl/ldpres/!m a problem because Ra/mer\ /irst formu/ution has com-

monlv been tleel1lt'd f(, hI! tl l'lJrrectil'(! to a w?ritm!\ lI'eaklle_~s ill deLul)(ic's theology which I/nderpinned I/U' nouvelle thologie IIWl'e-mellt, In order to .w/le rllis "l'parent allomaly. rhl' owhor propose.\a II/ore comprehensive theology of Ille existentwl hy elaborarillgRa/Uler'.I rheology of xrace fur ilS /lfrillsic (1111(,('IIII/mical vallie.}

ORDeR TO DESIGNATL the orientation or human beings to a supernatu-ral end. thaI is. to sulvation in the Christ ian sense. Karl Rahner (19

1984). in his intervention in lh(; ,wI/I'ell, rhologie debale in j950, coinedtbc expression "supcrnaturnl existential:'! As with so mnny of his originaltechnicalterJ11s. h~ evidently presumed Ibal its meaning would be instantlckar to his readers. Even in a work as late as FoundatlOlV> of Chr is t tI llFairli (Gnnan original 1976) he wa~ stiU m~lniresting. this presumption.There hi~ first words of explanation are thai the supernatural existential "i!

DAVID COIIIo.Y received his S.T.D. [rom thl.: Catholic In~tilute of Sydney. Aus-

lralia, in 196U. He currently holds tlle William J. Kelly. SJ. , Chair of SystematicTheology at Marqucll .e Univc. :rsi ly. I Ie has publbhcd wide I) on Ihe th~olog) of theTriune God and cspeciall) on the Holy Spirit . His recent pull licalions include n ,/!

'acrnnll'fIIof Recmldlianoll (Liturgical . 2001) and "The 'Unit ies' of the EpiscopalOffice," in Unfailillg Paticnce lind SOl/lid Teachilll{: U('f/ecrJllsnn Epi,\copal/\ilin-;.\lr)/ ill 1l00lorC l ! Rembert G. \V~/lkl(/II". O.S.B .. ed. David A. Stosur (Liturgical,200:n. He is now rc-editing a col1ecllon of his earlier article!. on PneumaloJogy.

1 Karl Rahllt:r, "Eine Antwort," Oriel1lil'rt/.~lg 1-4(1950) 141-45, This arLicit: wasrepublished in slighLly ~lmeDded I'orm a~ "Ubcr das Verhllnis von Natur un

nude." in Schrifrel1 ::'/1,. rheolllgie j (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1954) 323-45. undeventually in Cornelius Ernst 's English Iran:;lation, "Concerning tllC Relationshipoctween Nature nd Grace." in Tlli'olowcal fl/l'I'f/igalillns j (Baltimore: Helicon.


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nlEOLOGICAL STUDII-"

prC!'Ient in ali human beings," but "as an existential IExisrelltial] of Iheirconcrete existenet' r Dasein ] . '. 2

Fortunately. the mcaning of the expression as il occurs in this text can begleaneJ from Rahner's explanation as it unfolds. Thus, the first pari of Ihequoted statement requires no elaboration beyond pointing ouI that tht:existential is a consequence of God's universal saving will; the secondassertion means that it is an elemenl of the existence rather than of Ih

,ence (nature) of hUIll


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ItALR AH JR

"grace" or "the seU-communication of God" (wh.ich seems to identify it

already with the grace of jUlltification).hatever the ultimate verdict on this stale of arfairs, it is incontestabl

that Rahner's advantage was not as great as it might have been an perhap!'hould have been, for it contained weaknesses that allowed. even facili-

tated, th~ emergence of the later difficulties. Onc weakness that he frankladmitted ni the time (though not Wi a weakness) was Ihat hit would benecessary to examine more closely how the supernalural existential is re-lateulo grace itself. and in what sense il is distinct from iL'''' ru other words,when he wrote lhis, Rahncr had no clear idea or the nature or the rela-tionship of the existential to grace. This admission on his part reveals a

more fundamental weakness: he was unable to say whtlt the supernaturalxistenLial was. He could say what it did (it oriented us la God) and whatit was not (it was not a constituent of human nature). Simply 10 call it laHei.degger an "existential" was to leave untouched the question of itproper identity, I-knri de Lubac. Rahner's opponent in the debate (thoughan indirecl one), was placed nt n disadvantage by these weaknesses. First,he could not tell the difkrenct: between whal he anu what Rahner \V a

aying; second, he did not accept lhat Rahner's use of Heideggerian ter-minology in an essentially Scholastic debate was "necessary or evcn op-

portune:''; Had Raltner uscd Schola'itic terminology, his innucnce on deLubac miglll bave been more positive and rruitful.

Having explained the rclevont rerminology and the nature of the prob-lem raised hy Rahncr's later writmgs, I now stale what 1 hope Lo accom-plish in lIlls present arlicle and why I consider the exercise important. My

bjecl is to establish Lhe thesis tbat. despite appearances, there is no con-tradiction between Rahner"s late and carly slatements on lhe supernaturalexistential. What appear in the laler writings as conlradicUol1s are in factcorreCI approximatil)ns of a trulh whose entirety eluded him hecause it had

not been fully thought through. It will bc for the reader lo judge ho\'uccessfully 1 succeed in achieving. the theory of the supernatural exil'oten-

liai thai Rahner could have produced himself. The exercise seems impor-tant been use in the nrdu


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9 THEOLOGICAL STUDIE.

r begin with a summary of Rahner's position on the supernatural exi:,,-tential in his first published essay. Ithen continue with a presenlation of hiposition in his laler writings. An illlegration of these positions is then

ffered by a precise Scholastic theory of the existenliaJ and ils relationshipto grace. In my conclusion, 1consider the contemporary rekvance of thewhole question.

R AH N ER 'S F IR ST AR TIC LE O N T H E S UP ER N AT U RA L E X IS TE N TIA l

Here 1Llo not give a full account of Rahner's first essay on the super-natural cxistemiaI.6 Inslead, Iam content to extract what i~ relevant to m ypresent study. In his first essay Rahner was responding to Un article

"D:,7 an anonymous writer who defendeLl de Lubac against the severriticism he incurred over the theology of gra presented in his bookIImatllrel.8 To explain his position D had provided a systematic presen-

tation of what he understooLl de Lubac's theology to be, for which Rahneras graleful since il made it easier ror him as a systematician to come t

grips with it." Tbe central point or this theology was lhat all buman beinghave by nalure a spiritual orienlaon to the one true God revealed in Jesu

hrist. The !lingle element of this to which Rahner took exception was thphrase "by nature." That all human beings are oriented to the God of

revelation, far from being in dispute. was affirmed by Rahner with a zealequal to thal or de Lubac and his confreres. All panies wen: uniled in theuopposition to the duplex ordo characteristic of neo-Scholasticism of theday, according to which in buman beings the nalura! and the supernatural

rclers coexisted as separate "layers" (with the supernatural imposed onthe natural). That theology. designed to protect the lranscend~nce of Godhad produced the unintended effect of rendering the Christian religion andall tbat belonged to it, namely: divine revel


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RA I INER ' PERNATURAL EXJSTEl\'TIAL

The st11kes were high. not only between the duple..\ ()rdo theologian~ onthe one hand and the I/Ofll'ellt' thologie supporters on the olher, but be-tween D/dc Lubac and Rahner, In the first instance. tbe issue was tbrelevance of Christianity. In the second. the issue was the no less crucialquestion of the absolute gratuity or grace, The first issue was lTiumphantldecided in ravor of de Lubac and coUeagues (including Rahncl') by the

ccond Vatican Council in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in thModern World, GaLldiLlnt er spes. The second. in which Rahner took theopposite view to de Lubac (via D), remains controversial to this day. PiuIthought he had sclcd the mallcr with his statemeni in the encyclical

lilltllOlli generis Ihat "others corrupt the 'gratllily' or the supernatural or-

der, since they hall! that God couLd not create beings enowed with intel-lect without ordering ami calling them to the beatific vision,,,lIl BUI de

ubac denied tbat this rebuke wal> intendcd for him," an so the disput

continued.uilable point or departure for prcsenting Ruhner's case against 0i

found jl) the following words from his first article ou the supernaturalexistential: u lf God gives creation and above all man a ~upernatural endand this end is first in illlellfione, then the world and man isby that very factaJways and everywhere inwardly other in structure than be would be if hedid not have this en. and hence other as wcll before he has reached thicnd partially (the grace which justifies) or wholly (the beatific \tision)."I~Firs!. we may disregard what Rahner says here ahout the world. not lhat itlad,s importance. bUI because il is not strictly l'devant la the presentinquiry. In any case, the structure of this ~entencc of Rahncr reveals thatfor him loa it is of secondary importunce in this conkxL13 Secondly. Rah-ncr here affirms the common ground between himsclf and D, namely tbatall human beings have as their concretc cnd the true God revealed in Jesus

hrist. This God is expressed not in ohjccth'c terms as Ihave jusI done. butin subjective terms. where lhc "subject" is the human person ordered t:rod by sanctirying grace (hereafter referred to simply as 'grace"). Thi:rination is already a partial possession of th..: cnd ano tbe heginning or

luMy translaton. Th..: Latin reaus: UAlii autem 'gr3LUitatcm" orulnis supernatu-ralis corrumpunl. cum ilutUl11nent Deum enlin inteJ1eclU praedil8 condcrc nonposse. quin eadm


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100 'n-tEOLO(;J('AL STUDII.

Lotal possession, Ihe beatific vision.'-l I con-d in objective terms. A theologically

atisfactory wa y of doing this is to say "God a~ God is in himself," whichfor the sake of breviLY and inclusive language.l abbreviate La "God in self."Also. pertaining to the common ground, il>the Scholastic principle that theend is first ill i"rellrione, meaning that the cncl clclennines everything elseaboul the being under considera tion. Thirdly , Rahner goes on 10 sa) thathuman beings with th is end arc o lber than they would he if they did nothave this end. One needs to go beyond the sentence just quoted to discoverthe reason fOf ihis. But we should notice thaI Rohner abstains from specu-lation ahout Ihe "naturalh end that the human person has or woul have if

the supernatural end were not bestowed. Perhapc; the reason [or this is th.athe did not want la get caught up in the seemingly needless and controver-ial question of whal the natural end of human beings is or would be. Here

il suffices for h im s imply to aff irm that such an en exists. This loo is a. ,ubject to wtUch we m U S I return. At this point , fourthly, i t suffces to notelhat Rahner assumes the perduring identity of the human person in boththese scenarios. Ln facL '') '. havc a supcmatura l end, but ir God bad nol

iven "me" th is end, h ' " would sli ll exisl. but then wilh a purely natura]cnd. Rahner 's point aboul pt:rduring identi ty had bcn denied by de Lubac.who had written: "Ln another universe another being than I.possessing anature analogous tu mine, ' . ..ould have had Ih is more humble destin[namely, a natural end]."15 BUl Rahner's point here is impoliant becauseperduring identity is essential ror the gratuity of the beatific vision (andgrace). The beatific vision is rOTme gratuitous only ifI could have not hadit as my end.

The "otherness" that Rahner asse rts o f human pcrsons wilh a supt:r-natu ral end wuuld not be so rad ica l a s to precipitate a IO r aJ change o r

identity iCthey were deprived of il. Nevertheless, fjfthly, it is an Olhcrncs"in structure." This makes it sound onto logical, and indeed Rabner hasalready said as mucb a few lines earlier, where he calls the supernaturalexistential "an interior ontologiC


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RAIINER'

concrete quiddilY lerllllUlrl'e,,'lh So the existential is ontological. hut nol aubSlancc, Does this mean lhal it is an accil!l:nl? Lopold Maleve7 certainl

UlOughl SO.17 But then we are led 10 ask wbal sort of accident il might

bc-not an eallY question 10 answer. That conslitute:-o another malleI' towhich we must return. Failhrul to Ranner's intention. the translalor ha.,used the word '-quiddity" (Wesen) in conjunction wilh "concrete" lo des-ignale the actual human person with a supernatural end. This IS to indicate

distinction rrom "nalure" (Nawr) which would designate the same personwithoUllhe supernatural cnd but with a purely natural cnd. in other words., I concrete instance or "pure naIure'" Thc word rerminarire is Latin. anadverh meaning ntenninalively." In other words, in Rahner's understand-

ing. Ihe existcntial is a definitive determinanl or a concrele human nature.this point we have been able to summarize a large pari of Rahner'

first article on the supernalural cxiskntial by "unpacking" a on must have thi~ delltinauon nfllways:"x IlinOl as though pure nature existed [irsl in ils own right and was then de-termined. Rather, creation and detennination take place together, thoughcreation belongs to the level of nalure, und ueterOlination in some way tthe level of grace. Nor is the existential simply added to nature; il lrans-rorms nalure in ilS coming into being. And lhe transformation will remainforever. unaltered by aJl)'thing the person mayor may not u o subsequently.

;econdly, il would be a misinterpretation or Rahner 10 read him a

posiring "nalure" (a s defined above) a.s merely hypothetical. For him il ian actunlly existing realilY. lhough it exists never by itself but always alaken up into Ihe "quiddity" (again as ddined above). This explains wh,for him "nature" is a "remainder,'-l'! or n "remainder concept" (Resrl>e-~rifJ).2() in oU,er words. that which remains when evaything pertaining tthe supcrnaiural is sublracted.

Thirdly, the necessity of tbe theology of the exishmlal flows rrom thegratuity or grace, To pUL this anolher way. without a theology of the exis-

I"R h "C I h R l ll hi b N l ' d G " 302

lU]


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tential, grace would lose it~ essential quality or gratuity. This is hO\\- RahnerexpresseJit:

10 this mor~ recent viw rot' the tLOuI'dle Ih~()lug;el. Lbis ordination 10 the beatifiision on the one hand was considered an inner. inamissibJe const.itu(;nt of humHnnature, and on the other hand was so conceived lhat the Wilhholding of th~ goal oflhis ordination was considered incompatible with the wisdom and goodness of God.And in lhis sense [ the ordinat ion] was declar.:d uocondiLional [unhedingt] (pro-

idcd the creAture did not [aillO r0t1ch its goal through il" own fault). In our view,wiUl these presuppo.!>ilions grace [Jod the bCiltilic vis ion can no longer be calledunowcd 19ratuitousl.:21

clariIy this quotation one needs to explain what "unconditional"means in this context. With the flvl/velle t/u!ologie, Rahner shared thecon\'iction that every human being has han unconditional desire for God."Two things nced to be explaincJ about this expression. First. this desire iessentially an unconscious yearning which becomes conscious only uponlhe preaching of the gogpel. And secondly. it is unconditional (or absolute)in the sense that God in self has already constituted himself the end ofevery human heing. Then:: arc no conJitions remaining to be met-b

od-before human beings actually have God in self as their ultimate end.Hence their desire for GoJ is "unconitional." IrGod had not yet so given

himself, then any desire a human might have ror God inself would b~ only"conditional." and would rem


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RAtINER' nA! 10'"

'natural" end for human bdogs; the 'iecond is the tanlalizing clue he pru-vides 10 his later position on the supernatural existential when he says thatpossession of lhe existential entails exposure to the permanent dynamismof grace:;2 1 hove alread) drawn attention to Rahner's reticence on the

ubjcct of a natural t:nd for human beings. He refers to ilonly twice in theart.iclc. and then obJiqudy. The first referencc is foun in his brief accounl

the "average textbook" theology of grace, the e/uplC' . \ ore /o Iheology thenurrentY [n this theology, he ays,-'supernatural grace ... can only be tbeuperstructurc lying beyond the range or experience imposed upon a hu-

man 'nature' which e\'~n in the prScnt economy turns in its own orbit(though with a relationship peculiar LO itself la Ihe God or creation):'~-1 T

say that human nature turns in iis own orbit is another way of saying thatunderlying ill>supernalural end, which is God in self. it has and retatn!> anas yet unspecified natural entl. And tbc vague rden:nce to Ihe God ofcrealion suggests that this natural cnd might be God thus conceived.

he distinction between Gl)d in self amI the God o r creation shaulL! DOLbe dismissed out of hand. The suggeslion being made was nol that therewere two gods. but thai there were two ifferent aspects under which lbeone true Ood might be encouotered: a lower aspect under which he wasknown. whether by reason alone or through revelalion, simply as crealor of

the world. and a higher aspect under whieb through revelation he becamknown in his inner being and life, the first giving aCCCl>S to his unity. theecond lo his Trinity. We need to bear in mind that Rahnr's slatement

here occur in his account of a position he is criliciLing. 1 L is therefore notclear what he thought of the suggestion that the nalw-al end or humanbeings m.ighl he the Ood of creation. 1 return to this idea in lhe third~cction of my article. What i. \ clear is lhal he rejected the centnil idea of thedllplex ordo theology. namely. that a twofold human end gives rise to t

ntirely separate though juxtaposed human order~, one natural and the

other supernatural.Rahner's second reference to a natural end occurs late in the article

where be :-pcaks of the "openness" of the human spirit for the supel11aturalexistcnlial.2.'i This openness, he says. must be conceived as "noi uncondi-lional," thaI is, L IS conditional. Thus, "pure" human nalure. thal is. with theexistential bracketed out (though in Ia c r it is always present), can "confi-denUy"2/> he identified al> "the unlimited dynamism or the spirit" of whichD had spoken. thaI is. the spirit's unlimited. and hence unconditional drive

URahner. "Concerning the Rel3tion~hip hetween Nature


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104 L STUDILS

toward the lolality of being. in a word. self-transcendence toward being asueh. Here, then, the cnd of pure nature is implicitly asserted to be th

IOtality of being. But this lotality cannol include God in self. for Ule simplreason that for Rahner a natural human desire for God thus conceivedcould only be conditional. Concretely. then, wh:ll is this cnd? Once againRahner passes up the opportunity of expressing an opinion on this maller.

'inally (and this is the second or the Iwo comments which Iearliernndertook to make). Rahner's claim Ihat the existential entails that we arexpmed lo ..the permanent dynamism or grace,',:!7 is surprising in thaI noreason is provided as to wby this should be so. In section three I argue thatRahncr's claim is de facto correct, and that the fact thnt he was able I

make il here can mean only that, without b(;ing ahle to aJ'ticulate it, he musthave operated rrom tbe outset with some sort of intuition of an intrinsic

llnection between lhe existential and grace. It was not. therefore. some-thing appel.lring (or tbe rirsl time in his later writings on the basis of arundamental change of position,

R AH N ER '5 lA TE R W R IT IN G S O N T HE SU PE RN AT U RA L E XIS TE NT IA L

In his laler writings Rahner says nothing that directly contradict~ the

position of his firsl article on the supernatllJ"a] existential. The questionrises, therefore. whether he contradicts il indirectly. that is to say. whether

he wrote anything incompatible with il. M y presenl study contends that bdid nol. Corroboration of lhis thsis is found Ul the fact lhat in the laterwritings he repeats the findings l1f the first article, which would be incy-plicable 011 aoy other hypothesis.

In his article "Nature and Grace" in volume 4 or the Schriften (Lierman1960. English 1964)2X Ralmer c1jstinguisbes the "formal object of the natu~raj spirit~ aod .. tbe formal object of the slIpernatlUaJly elevated spirit:2'. 1First he defines the term 'rormal objec!" as "the C l priori hori/on given inconsciousm:ss, under which, in grnsping the inuividual (( pos/prior! object,everything is known thaI is grasped as an object slricUy spcaking.':lU Thenatural formal object of Ihe spirit is then declared to be "transcendencetowards being in general, the natural openness [or being as a whoJe:dl

while its supernatural counterport is "supernatural tr3nscenllence of thepiril, opened and borne by gruce:'32 In Ule German it is clear that "opened

nSet: n. 22.!~RahDer. "Nature and Grace:' i D I1reologic:ullfll'C!slguIol1l' U65 ....8K The origl-


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RAHNER'

and borne by grace" qualifies '"transcendence," not hl:tpirit:'\\ Rabncr thenassens that precisdy lhi~ transcendence "is always present in every humanbeing who has reacbed the age of moral reasun:'J-! This means that il is not

nly the grace of justification that he is concerne with hen;, but theupcrnatural existential. In that case. then. what does Rahncr mean bying lhat supernatural transcendence is ';opellt::d and borne by grace"?

The answer must lie in his personalistic understanding of grace and thpriority he awards such grace over all (orm~ of crealed grace: "Grace isGod himself, the communiclltion in which he giv(;s him!\clf to humans Bthe divinizing. ractor which he is himself:,35 Tn other words, grace in (hiiensc produces the existential us its first (lnd inalienable errect., und later,

on the basis of the human heing's free assent of faith. justification ali it"econd effect. Rahncr nlso cmphnsi..:es the dynamic charnctcr of this grace.by calling it the "offer" of grace and declaring il to be continuous andpermanent rather than "intermillcm:,3(' He goes on to say Ihat the tworormal ohjecLs are "not opposed to each other like two things that lie sideby


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t06 L DIESTf-I

itse1J (being the self-communication of God). is --entitalively" supematural.nd third. the existential is the "deficient mode" of grace. These are iOl-

ponant statements.

In his ent!) on "Existential. Supernaturalh in the KleillC!s The()I()gi~c:heWrterbuch [rom 1961 (English J9(5), Rahner restates much of what icontained in his original article.J'J He then speaks of the existential ahadded [siel indeed to Ithe humun being'sj nature by grace ...J(JIn this caseas in some others, the Gennan original avoids confrontation through itcareful choice of words, speaking of the exiSlenlial as added to nature. notby hgracc" (Gnade) but "graciously" (gnatlellllaft). The distinction inti-mated here became explicit in Max Seckler's characterization of the exi~-

tenlial as "gnadenhart, ohne 'ie' Gnade zu sein:.J1 which wc ma) translatas 'gracious. without actuaJJy being grace." but Seckler frankly acknowl-dged that it was difficult "to characterize this existential more pre-

cisely.,,"2

In the paragraph numhered C~) of his entry on "Graceh in the samwork,") Rahner is concerned wilh the reception of grace and hence with iLrecipient. the "addressee" of God's offer. The laller is declared to be"human llGture" and not directly the human person as such. not. therefore.a concrete buman nature already elevate by lhtl existential as one might

XpCCl. Rahuer is not being inconsistent here. He is thinking personalisti-cally. but is coupling the existential with God in God's selfcommunicationthrough grace rather thfln with the humaJl being. recipient of grace.Though he is nOl saying so explicitly, he mllst be envisionin.g the existential

the beginning of the self-communication of God. Otherwise he wouldnot have been able to call the addressee a "n.ature" in the sense of "purnature" as he does here. (ThaI this is the sense in which he uses the woris clear from the cross reference he gives. namely, to the enlry 00 "nalureand grace ..') Once again Rahneris saying that hnature" in this sense. which

. Ihat of a Restbegrifj: is an actual reality aod oat a merely hypotheticalne. Thil>. however. docs not mean that he sees il as exisling in its own

right.In "History of the World and Salvation History:' in volume 5 or th

'cllriJleI/ (German llj62, English 1966).-14 Rahncr has two pages (German

J


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RAHNER'S SUPERNA I URAL EXISTEN! JAL

l2l-:~,J: English, ]()3-4;) in which he says some puzzling !hings about theupernatufi:ll existential an grace. The topic adressed in these pages is the

possibility or saving faith Jor non-Christians. For our purposes it is not

necessary to l>ummarize the urgumem of this passage beyond noting thatthe supernaluraJ existential figures prominently in il. an in terms nov

familiar lu us.~hc problem is thai the existential is not mentioned explicitly. though

the context reveals thut the reference is to lhc existential. allel1st some-times. Take, ror example. the very Una semence or the passage, "It is partor the Catholic statement of faith that the supernatural saving purpose of

od extends to all human being!> in all ages i:!0l1 places in history'" As vbave noted, the universal effect of this divine purpose is thl: e~istential. Inother places in the passage. Rahner uses the tenn "grace" in its proper",mse. So. for example. in the second sentence: "Everyone is offered sal-ation, \\ hich means that everyone, in so far as he does not close himself t

this orfer by his own free and grave guill, is offered divine grace-and i"[fered it again and again (even when he is guilty).'4.'i Here the decisive

factor is the maniJestly exiwt'lI/iellnature of the offer and lhe response, In'lill otber plat:es, even though thc teml "grace" is not used, it is clear thaIgrace in the full sense is the reality intended. Sometimes it is difficult to tell

whether Rahner is speaking of the existential, or uf grace, or of bOlh.o J

( )

Morc clarity emerges in the third sentenc(;. in which a distinction imadc. Of tbe two realities distinguished. lhe second is clearly grace. graceut the momcnt ofjusufication grasped rTOm the human perspective as 'thcaccepttlll or the self-communication or God in grace and glury.'47 Thu'>we arc enuble to iJenliry the fir:.t reality. the "existenlial situation to\\ hieh belongs Ihe obligation of striving towards a supernatural goal ofdirect union with the absolute God in a direcl vision." as the supernaturalexistential bestowed at crcalion. A.,sumed i'ia propOSItion we have already

tablished. namely. that the existential implies the pennnncnl existentiell

5.115-35: "HisLOI') of the World ~lI1dSalvauon-Hislory." in fheological/nvl'srif{fI-tlOII.\ 5,97-] lt

IS Th~ English trao:.lalOr has endetl the senlence al this point. though in theoriginal it continues to include what in le translation is the third sentence. But thi!>docs not ch::JTlge anything fmm our pOlOtuf view.

Ifi On the middle of page LO~the word "grace" appears in single quotation milrL.which might kad the reatler to thin"- lhat the reference i ! > to lhe e"islcnlial ratherlhan grace. II should therdon: be noled that in the Germon the corresponding wortl

Gllade ocs nol hear these r any other distingubhing l11i\fks._17 M y liteml tr311


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J O TIil::.OLOGICAL DIE

offer of grace, and this because it (the existential) is the begiml/lf: of theelr-coml11unication of God ill gr

The step forward that Rahner has taken bere is that he has identified fI1. '(,"ordinations" lO the beatific vision, the second of which, namely, Ih"genuine subjective possibility of reaching this goal," or justirying grace,one can eaU Ihe proximate ordination. The first, the "existential situation'referred 10 above. thai i~.the superntural existential. can LJ1erefore bedescribed as the remote ordination to this goal.4~ panicuJarly as it is envi-sioned as the beginning of grace.

In SacramellflUn Mltll/i, Rahncr makes several statements on the super-Datural existential. aU but the last of which can be omitted. since they cover

familiar ground. 49 The last statement is found in the article "Zid dMenschen" (Goal of Man) (German, [196914.1432; English. in the article..r.rder' 4.301, section d). Onc sentence in the G~rman is rendered ill the

nglish text as five separate sentences. In the illtcrcstb or exactness andauthentic emphasis Ig)vc a literallranslntion or thil>longadding punctuation where necessary:

Here alrcm.Iy we mu~1 .:mpha:.ize that Liu : ":,upcmalUral" goal of man. freely e:.-I


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RAIINl:K~ SUPER

had probably long. been implicit. He speaks or th~ supcrnalural existentialimplllnted at the creation () f each human being.. But he is no longer con-c~med with the moment of creation. lIe is now considering this person in

his or her adult life. Because the e.xislential assures the perma.nent andonlinuous orfer of grace, this person ha!' already mode. perhaps "anony-

mously'" a dt:dsion about God. Hence for this perc;on the existential novexists either in the mode or frc acceptance. that is. raith and grace, or inthe mode of frce rejection throug.h !>in.This rrcedom of choice, however, i.

rcised only within the "tran'lccndental" necessity of having to make adecision one way or the 01 her. The process lll.~gin:)with the universal savin\\ il! of God. This produces in each perSOl1 the supernalUral existential.

whicb is lhe bl!gmillg of God's self-communication in grace. God thenawaits our free decision of faith. which is at the same time the product ofthe permanent offer of grace and our own authentic act. This beginning ofgrace is fulfilled, partially in the grace of justification, and ultimatdy in the

beatilc vision.ln Gmndkun" de\' Glouhe" .. (1976, 132-39; Engli~h, F(JU/u/atio/lS of

' / iri. .tII1I Fth 197R, 126-33). Rahner makes his last an most comprehen-ive statement on the supernatural existential. reprising his previous writ-

ings Oil the ummari7cd under the following five hcading~.7irst, Rohner characterizes the existential as the self-communication ofc l "present in every person at least in the mode of an offer.',sfl Thi~'

presupposes Lbat the c'upernaLUral selfcommunication of God, although not in the sense that ~very person ner-

sari!y ~lccept!) in freedom God's sclf-communculion to maJl.~1 ThirlJRahn~r expands his pre\-olls statemcnt thaI the existential exists in thmode of either acceptance or refusal. to cover lhc period in the subject\life before the dawn or freedom. where tbe offer or grilce exists in the mode

( an oCrer not yet accepted ur rejectl:d. Thus he speaks of three, Ilot justtwo po~ible moes in which the existential can exi ..t.52 Fourthly. the priorgirt of the exibtcnlial is that which enables the r-cmainl!er of the self-

10


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110 TIICOLOGICAL D J

mmunicalion or God. bes towed in justificntion, to continue to be lheeli-communication of God and not be reduced 10 a purely human real),

in other worlls to remain supernatural anu gratuitous. The beginning of thself-communication of God must already be present in C\'cry persoo for Ihecomplete self-commun ication of God to h im or her to be possible. InRabner 's words. ; 'In order to be ahle to accept God without reducing him,as i l were, in thi~ acceptance tn our fniteness, lhis acceptance mUSl beborne by God himself. ,,53 And. fifthly, the personal transformation of thehuman being by the existentia l is that which enab les its acceptance Orrefusal to be at the same time human . our own, and therefore free. InRahner's words: "aod conversely: witham prejudice to its gra tuity , God '

.,~lf-communication must be present in very person as the condition whichmakes its personal acceptance possible."~4

In summary rorm, one Oln now set down why and to whal extent Rahner.vcr time. changed his posilion on the supernatura l exis lcntia1. And one

can say unhesitatingly that the only major change that occurred was one of onlext and perspective. I louch first on context. When he was denling w ith

the /lot/vd/e rhologie, Rahner concentrated. as u id bis opponents , on thecrcution o f the human person. because the cen tra l question then underdispute was whether the or ienta tion of th is person to lheir supernatura lend, God in selL wa~ natural or supernatural. and it was agreed on bothiues that this orientatjon existed not only prior to the exercise of fedom

but "a lways:' Rahller held that. as "God in selr :' the end required in thehuman person a supernalura l e levation, which was not. however, thaI orsanctify ing grace , though it implied its permanent and continuous offer.This elevation he Lcrmed "the supernatural existential ." Later. the context

r discussion shifte away rrom creation 10 the moment o f e.ri.'>ientie/l de-cision about God (even if known only "anonymously"), because now hu-

man freedom came into pla). This meant that henceforth the exis tcntio lould exist only in the rOr1l1of either aCCepl l lJ1Ce (faith. grace of justifica-tion) or refusal (sin).

ow Itoucb on perspective. RighI from the s tart, Rahner had held forpriority of untreated grace, lhe self-communication or GaLl, ovcr aU form

f created grace~5 (which would include the existential). The reason forwhich this insight did not emerge in the Iloln'elle thologie debale was thathe was fo rced by h is opponen ts to adopt the Scholastic perspec tive 0 1 'reated grace, both because this was their natural inclination, and because

'Ihld llhid


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RAH RAL

the discus!>ion centered on the powers of created human nature. With thenstralms r~movcd, Rahncr was able to refer to the existenlial as simpl

"grace" or "the self-communication of God," though he was clear that itwas a "dericient mode" of grace properly '\0 called. a "begullling" (mlerm) of grace.

A M O RE C O M P R EH EN SIV E T H EO RY O f T HE

U P ER N A T U RA L E X IS T EN T IA L

The aim or my Lnal section is to rill in as far as possible the gaps left bRahncr in his theology of the supernatural existential. The more compre-hensive theory thu'> acquired will accommodate both his earlier and laterstatements on the subject. This theory cannot be attributed to Rahnerhimself but is implicit in his thought.

The minimal attention Rahncr gave to the question of a natural end rarhuman beings is a defect that caBs for remedy in his theology. particular!as be hcld the existence of such an end to be actual and not merely hypo-thetical. How could he hope ro understand the rel:l1ion


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1 1 2 THEL

\Vere juxtaposed. And the (irst of these allernalives Ihold to be the case.57

Tbc key here is the recognition thaI we arc not dealing with two tolaU

di.fferent ends. but with the one end. God, conceived under two aspects. theme higher and tIle othcr lower as explained earlier in my article.Rahner's concept or human "nature" as a Res/begriff implics a natural

ultimate end tbal is contained in some way within the supernatural ultimatend. and is not merely a natural end subordinated to a primary (ultimate) .

.,upernatural end aLld therefore secondary. This requirement safeguardboth the integrity of human nature and the gratuity of the supernatural

od. Unfortunalely. Rahner offers no help in explaining how ]is sLte ofaffairs might be broughl about. However. a contemporary or his, Walter

Brugger. writing from a predominnnlly philosophical perspectiveuggested thaI the integnly of human nature and the gratuity of theupcrnatural end could be integrated by way of a Hegelian "sublation"

(/lll.lhebung). Brugger wrote: --Human naLUre provides the raw material forthe natural ultimate end. hut in the case of the creation does not dctermjnewhether it is in ils proper form or only as sublated in the supernatural endthat il is the actual human end"'5tl This is a briUiallt suggestion. It is sur-prising lhat Rahner, who was nol averse to using the language of sublationin other circumstances. did not think of it himself.

f course this kind or language is not appropriate is one considers thematter from the perspective of Ga. IL makes no sense to say lbat God a"creator exists


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RAllN!:.R'S SUP[R

as taken up (m;sumed, subsumed) into the higher end. Th,

l'y unicity of God is what guarante~s the legitimacy of this approach. amiat the same time ensures, against de Lubac, the perduring identity o[ thehuman person. For One is not dealing with two totally different ultimateends that would predicate two totally dirrerent beings. One is dealing withthe one end, now graspcJ and possessed und~r a lower aspect, and no\'under a higher.59 This DHows for lhe ontological elcvation of a crealed'pirit lhat retain~ iLS identity throughout. (Or t;oursc, in expressing themaLler thus 1um not suggesting that buman nature cr actuaUv existel!

with a purely natural end,)hus onc can answer D, who held thullhe "wllimiteu dynamism in ever.

reated spirit" required, h y virtue of naturc. ilo; inclination toward, itunconditional desire (or God in "dr.('(l For by whal righl would a crealedpirit aspire naturally to God in self? That to which il aspires naturally i

c t as creator. an unlimited (infinite) object in himself and the lotality ofbeing. By nature human beings can only aspire to what they can know bynature, and, according to Vatican 1, this is God only as "source and end o[all things" (rerum omnium prillcipill/11 et jillL\').M not God in self. For Godin self represents a realm beyond natural knowledge. As God in self. thetrinitarian God of grace, God can be known only hy revelation: in order t

accept revelation as true one must have faith; in order to have railh onemust have grace. at leac;t in same sense. Now these principles must applynot only on the conscious level, but on the uncon~cious level ,IS well. Thedesire of the created spirit for God in self was recogni7cd on both sides tohe bolh unconscious ami unconditional. bul in a true nonbeliever thidesire. if it existed purely by virtue of nature. could only be conditional,"ince revclation would be lacking. But a person coming 10 conscious faitbrecogni7es that tbeir faith corresponds to an lll'1comlaoml!. unconscioudesire tbey have always hud. They should therefore also recognize Lbat

their unconscious desire was itself a gift of grace, that is, as we say. a resultof the supernatural existential anl! not simply an endowment of nature.

What precisely is meant in this context by -ontological ele\ation"? Dubac, following both Thoma!) Aquinas and Bomnenture. had insisted thatnly sanctifying grace "orl!crcd" a humun being to God in self, for only Il

established between lhem tbc proportion thaI enabled the human beinnctuaIly to allain God in both this life and the ncxl."z Consistently. deLubnc maintained of hllJ11:lnnature Lhal prior to the be


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114 DIE.

Ilmion to God in self, indeed "no slightest eleml:nt of the supernatural init.'('] "Being given finality," he observ(;d, "is not the same as actuaJJ

possessing (or failing to attain) tbe end.,,(i-\There is much truth in this view. and Ra!lner was sympathetic to it. bul.has been noted, he also insisted that the supernatural existential \V a

already in same sense an ordination to God in self, an elevation. He solvedthe dilemma by IIIwing the existential a .s the "remote" und grace as the"proximate" ordination (though these are m y lerms, not his). But if theexistential does not or itselr bring abou.l justification, in what sense can itb~ even a remote ordination to the supernatural cnd? Rahncr could speakof the supernal ural end bestowing on concrete human nature an "otherne

f structure." for it now had a difrerent end from that which i t otherwisewould have had (and this is all that Imean when Icall it a transformation).But how could it be "ontologic~I" without being r~duced tlnlirely to thelevel of nature? Malevez believed he had solved this difficulty by calling itan accident. But if the existential is an accident, it certainly is not a habit.First. thcre is nothing in Scriplure Ihat is analogous 10 "sharing in tbcdivine life." to ju~ti[y (!lis movc. Sccondly, the existential would coincidewith sancfying grace. Perhaps. inasmuch as il is a passive "restructuring"by God, a case might be made [or classifying it as a 'passion." But thiswould not surfice to mnke it a work of efficient. let alone quasi-formal,causaJity. Iarguc in what 1'0110\\15 that it is a work of "material" causality.The existential is ontological in the sense that it is real.

The final quesLion, namely. the precise relation of Ole supernaluraJ ex-istential to grace. now need~ to be addressed. In dealing with this question,

ne can put to work once again certain Scholastic notions that Rahncr hadused already in his exposition of the theology of grace. For him the para-digmatic Conn of grace was uncreatcd grace, the divine indwdling, the

self-communication of God.tlS

Jt was this thai passed over into Ule beatificvision. This self-communication he explainetl in terms of formal causality.which in this case (and in the case of the Incarnation) he called "quasi-formal" causality, in order to safeguard the transcendence of God. With

quina.,. he regarded (created) sanctifying grace as L I wurk of efficienlausality. But he considered these two forms of grace to be intrinsicall

related. and therefore as nccessarily given together. In their combination

1\:1 Ibid. 95-96.< > .1 Ibid. 9 6 n. Y 6 . The French reads, "AUIre esl la finalit reue. autre lu fIll

possd.: (ou manque)" {Lt- II/l'stre du .IILrllll//lre/ [Paris: Aubier. 1965) 128 n . 2).


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RAil

they constitute simply "grace:' grace properly so calkd.()( ' Understandingefficient causali ty as the "deficient mode" or romlaI causali ty. he graspedsanctifying grace as. at the same time, the condit ion amI the effect of God'' .elr-communication in grace.fl7 As already shown, Rahner unders tood theiupematural cx.istentialll 'i the "deficient mod~" of grace. Ihave establishedthai i t is a work neither or quasi-formal nor of efficient causality. Ihaveuggested thai i l is a work of material causality. 1 now explain what I mean

by this and how it is coheres with Rahner's thought.Rahncr recognized Ihat of the four AJ'is to te lian causes the f inal cause

as the noblest and highest, because heing hfirst in in tention:' it deter-mines all else about the being n question.6!'1 Not i lself working dectly on

the being, it o rgan i.s, gm'ems, anJ operates th rough tbc o ther th reeauses. In grace properly so called, Ibe final cause, God in self. is identicalwith lhe quasi-formal cause und the erficient cause. Tn other words. God,in tending himself as the ultimate end of human beings , creates them andcommunicates himself to them accordingly. The material cause alone of IhcaUSS is not God: it is tbe crcnturc ;n its receplivily to God in sclf, that i:.,a s disposcd by God 10 receivc hi:, sclr-communicalon. For Rahner materialcausality operates in conjunction with quasi-formal ~usaLity only when i lis question of the "las t" d isposition, namely, sanctify ing groce , which iproduced by efficient causality, and hence not in the case or the existential.Lr Ihere exists some disposition previous to sanclifying grace, it must beallributed to material causality. that is, to the rinal cause acting through thematerial cause alone. In this circumstance i t would be premature to speakof quasi-formal causality, because the form. still busy disposing the subject.has not yet been rece ived by it os a fonn. Rather. the subject is s impl"restrucrured" (Rahner 's word). given its "first" (as Jistinc\ from its "last")disposition to receive tbc form of God in sell'.

his disposition is !be supernatural existential. And ilcan now bc rcvgnized to ruJrilJ both the posit ive and the negative rCl.ju;remenls of ma-terial causalitv. Such "obedientia l" restructuring is a possihil ity ror th

, , / > Rohner expressed the mltller thus: "Because crealed grace as dl-If'osiJio li/rimacan only l'xibl along with (he actual formal causality of the Conn for \\hieh il is lhedispositiv. it is correct lO say: If cre~lled g r3 IS given. so too nl'cesl'arily b) thaI

cry fact uncreated grace, and hence the whole grace ofjU~lificatjon, is communi-cMed to man" (ibid. 341).

67 See Rahner. "Selbstl11iucilun Goltes," in LexikoJ1 {iir rheologie und Kird/C!.2nd t:d .. 9.627a: also "God's Sdf-Communicalion," in )Uaolllentllnl Mllmli (En-glish) 5.353b - 355b.

illi C h h d l th l f i l l lil i lh f

115


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116 THl:.OLOGICAl STUD

ubject because ilis ordered hy nature already to the same one, true God,though only through the humbler relation of crealure to creator. An inex-

act and mited, but hopcfully helpful. analogy might be the adjustment anemployee would undergo if made aD ofrer of personal friendship by his orher employer. The status of employee bestows no automatic right of friend-'hip with the employer, though an employee is at least situated as a pos-ihle candidate for such a friendship. The offer of friendship. if made at all.

is completely gratuitous. But the employee to whom such an offer has inract been made is, even berore it is accepted. different "ontologically" fromlhe way he or she was previously, and differenl again from thl: way he orshe will be when lbe oller is finally accepled. In this analogy lhe status of

mployee corresponds to "nature:' lhe offer of friendship corresponds tothe existential. and actual friendship corresponds to gTace. The insight thugained illuminales Rahncr's description of the existential (when the offerhas been made) as a "deficient mode" of grace (when the offer has beenaccepted). The existential is Uentitatively" natural (the employee simply a

uch) and "modally" supematurnl (an employee to whom an offer has beenmae and who. though not yet a friend, is poised 10 become one): therestructuring takes place on the level of nature, bUllbe mode of posseor the end is supernatural (gratuitous).

It remains to be explained why in the maller of grace lhere nre twoordinations. two dispositions, to tbe ultimate end. and not just olle as in thecase of other beings. The reason is that, in all material creation, humanbeings alone, as spiritual und therefore free. attain their end by God's p.lannot inexorably like other beings. butlhrough lhe exercise of lheir freedom.

nd therefore God imparts tbeir ultimate end in two stages, in the first nan exislential. prior 10 freedom,


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JSTl.:NTlALRAH"lER'"

bligalion to think through lhe i:.sue in ScholasLic krms. a way bellercalculated to convince his contemporaries. Later, wiLh the controversy be-hind him, he reverted 10 his long-held conviction of Ihe primacy of uncre-

ated grace and the interpersonal nature of the God-human relntion, and hebrought Lhis change of perspective to bear on his theology of the existen-liaI. Al the same time, he changed his conleXl of refleclion from creationT O decision, that is, la the choice Lhat all must make between faith andunbelief. The Scholastic key LOlhc relation of the exish~ntialto grace. a kcRahner nVer discovered himsclf. is an extension or his thought on thequasi-formal anel efricicnt causes to include the final and material cauIn Scholastic terms. the three subordinale causes are intrinsically related tu

each other and to the fim cause in an ascending order. with the last namedas the constant, if indirect, operator throughout. In thtl malter of gl'ace usuccessful applicalion of this scheme prcsupposes tbe deployment of tfunher conccpts abscnt (rom Rohner's thought on this question: the cre-ator God as the natural ultimate entl of humans. an the Hegelian de\'iof sublation. Tbe result will he an integraled theory of the supernaturalcxistenlial as a work of material cau1>ality.

The theology of lhe existcntial contains in germ the whole of Rahner'theology of grace, and thercfore assumes an importance thai has not yet

been sufficiently recogni7ed. While it is the humblest, Lhe exi


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II Lsn'DI

hould be, trinitarian fromme hints to thjs effect in an earlier article.

distanL future, to have the

1,'1 See my "Tilt: Spiril of ehr.", as Entelechy," Philosophy fil/(l Tlteolog) I(ZOOl) 363-98. at 393. 10 produce an article on lhe trinitarian structure of thl'x.SlcIltial would abo tlUow me to revis!: what was less lhan felicitous in Ibis earliert.:xt:rcise.


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