CHAPTER III - Shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/66844/7/07... · 2018-07-07 ·...

CHAPTER III

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BJP

In April, 1980, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh was renamed as the Bharatiya

Janata Party (BJP) "which saw itself as the Janata Party's heir". 1 This change in

nomenclature was probably indicative of the fact that the Party searched for a

new political orientation.2 Atal Behari Vajpayee likened the emergence of

Bharatiya Janata Party with J P's vision of a glorious lndia.3 "For Vajpayee, it

was imperative above all, to avoid any comparison with Jana Sangh which had

been condemned to an existence on the very fringes of mainstream politics." 4 A

study of the documents released by BJP clearly showed that it wanted to remove

its past image of the BJS. 5 The new party sought to create a new image for itself

through its ideological rhetoric. 6 In his inaugural address, delivered in December,

1980 in Bombay, for instance, Vajpayee, the founding President of the Party,

emphasized upon the fact that the Bharatiya Janata Party was not simply a new

name for the former Jana Sangh and went to the extent of saying that it

represented the inspirations of Jay Prakash Narayan. 7 He declared, "His dreams,

his labour, his struggle and his unflinching commitment to certain values are a

part of invaluable legacy that we have inherited. The BJP is pledged to pursuing

his unfinished tasks." 8 He further said, "I believe that the country's crisis is

essentially a moral crisis. The biggest curse of our life is that moral values have

given way to self-seeking and power-lust and politics has become a pure power

game." 9 He held that this moral degradation had eaten into the Indian society

and polity; they needed to revive the programmes and policies advocated by

Mahatma Gandhi, Jay Prakash Narayan and Pandeet Deen Dayal Upadhyay. 10

To reach such a goal, Vajpayee called upon the new party to mobilize the"poor,

peasantry, workers, the harijans, the tribals and other exploited sections of the

population." 11

In a bold attempt to depart from the chauvinistic Hindu nationalism of the

Jana Sangh and to present itself in more moderate and humanistic garb the BJP

Problems and prospects of the BJP in West Bengal 0 26

leadership put forward five principles as the bases of the Party ideology. The

Party leadership described these five principles as 'our five commitments'. "The

first principle was, nationalism and national integration; second, commitment to

democracy; third, a belief in the policy of positive secularism, "which means

distillation of common moral values whether derived from different religions or

from other historical and civilisational experiences and approach which always

remained integral to the Indian civilisation", fourth, "the ideology of the BJP

would be, broadly speaking, 'Gandhian Socialism'. Bread, freedom and

employment are Gandhian first principles. BJP would make these principles the

central cone of development strategy and try to make national consensus around

them"; and fifth, "The BJP would strive to build up a value-based politics and

thus seek to cleanse the filth abounding in public life today". 12

Article II of the BJP Constitution which contained the 'Aims and

Objectives' of the Party, reads, 'The Party shall be committed to furthering

national integration, democracy, positive secularism, 'Gandhian Socialism' and

value-based politics. The Party stands for decentralization of economic and

political power." 13 It may not be out of place to mention here that many

delegates at the Party's first Plenary Session held on in Bombay had expressed

their reservation relating to the inclusion of 'Gandhian Socialism' as one of the

principles the party is supposed to be guided by. Vijaya Raje Scindhia was one

such delegate on behalf of this group. She circulated a note challenging the

validity of 'Gandhian Socialism' as one of the party's article of faith because in

her eyes the concept of 'Integral Humanism' incorporated elements of social

harmony which the word "Socialism" with its notion of class conflicts and

materialism lacked. And, above all, 'Gandhian Socialism' was a contradiction in

terms since 'Socialism' related it to the State whereas the message of Gandhi

was one which emphasized on decentralisation and 'rural-self-sufficiency'. 14

Many delegates rallied behind Mrs Scindhia and criticized the concept of

'Gandhian Socialism'. Altogether 257 amendments to the resolution on

'Gandhian Socialism' were allowed to be tabled; but the leadership made no

concessions of any importance. Only five delegates out of more than 50,000

defied party dictates and voted against it. 15


There is no doubt that, "between 1980 and the next Lok Sabha elections

in 1984, the BJP consciously pursued a moderate line, downplaying the

RSS connection, seeking greater independence from it and electing a leadership

opposed to aggressive Hindu nationalist posturing. It's declared ideological

perspective was now Gandhian Socialism." 16 The 1980-84 period was

characterised by efforts made by the BJP to pose itself as a centrist force

interested in being more practical in its alignments with political forces and in its

ideological commitments.

But the 1984 electoral debacle, when it got just 2 seats in the Lok Sabha

and 7.4 per cent of popular votes, compelled the BJP to change its strategy. The

National Executive meeting of the party held in Calcutta, on 15 March 1985,

formed a twelve-member Working Group and it was entrusted with the double

tasks of reviewing the Party's functioning, achievements and shortcomings

during the past five years and drawing up a 'Five Year Action Plan for the future

on all fronts - ideological, organisational, constructive and electoral'. 17 It had

recommended that 'Integral Humanism', a concept which was enunciated by

Deen Dayal Upadhyay, ideologue and leader of the erstwhile BJS, should

henceforth be regarded as the basic philosophy of the Party.

It also recommended that one of the five commitments of the Party,

'Gandhian Socialism' should be changed into Gandhian approach to socio

economic issues which will lead to the establishment of a society, free from all

kinds of exploitation. 18 As such, the resolution put forward by the National

Executive at Gandhinagar in 1985 had suggested that the phrase 'Gandhian

Socialism' be changed to 'Gandhian approach to socio-economic issues'. But

following the discussion of the matter, the party's National Council decided to

revise its proposal there by retaining its five Commitments in the original form. 19

The working group recommended that 'integral humanism' be accepted as the

basic philosophy of the party and the party complied with it. 20

Integral Humanism

In 1965, late Deen Dayal Upadhyay, the General Secretary of the Jana

Sangh, came up with the slogan 'integral humanism'. In this year, taking

advantage of the declining influence of the Nehru-led Congress (triggered by


India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, followed by Nehru's death in 1964,

and growing economic problems), the hitherto insignificant Jan Sangh, sought to

capture the political space by spreading its tentacles beyond its traditional North

Indian trading class and West-Punjabi and Sindhi Hindu refugee constituencies.

It tried to win over the freethinking non-insular sections of the middle class and

the influential media, which seemed to be disenchanted with the Congress, with

a pretentious ideological concept called 'Integral Humanism' whose aim was,

according to its founder, Deen Dayal Upadhyay, to create a harmonious

society. 21

The philosophy of Integral Humanism, following the fundamentals of

Bharatiya Sanskriti (Culture), seeks to discover the unity underlying diversity. It

takes an integrated view of both society and individual and sees that basically

there is no stand off between them. Without the individual, there can be no

society and without society the individual can hardly exist. 22 So goes in

Hinduism that an individual's moral and material progress is possible only when

he is guided by 'Dharma'. 'Dharma' is not religion as its English translation is

made out to be. Dharma means "those eternal principles that sustain an entity -

individual or corporate - and abiding by which that entity can achieve material

prosperity in this world and spiritual salvation in the next." 23 In the context of

society, 'Dharma' is defined as "the enunciation of all those duties and

obligations of everyone, both as an individual and as a member of the society, at

different stages in life and different roles for the attainment of the ultimate

purpose of human existence." 24 As a political programme, 'Integral Humanism'

meant certain concrete visions centering around two themes-- morality in politics

and swadeshi and small-scale industrialization in economics - all Gandhian so

far as their general thematic is concerned but clearly Hindu nationalist in the

characteristic style of 'integration'. 25

Again, according to the proponents of 'Integral Humanism', Dharma

sustains the individual, society, state and rulers. Dharma Rajya, so believe the

Integral Humanists, should be the goal of the Indian State and it is the rule of

law, in which individuals have both rights and duties. Such a rule recognizes

religious diversity, showing regard for the teachings of all religions. 26 BJP offers


the philosophy of Integral Humanism as developed by Deen Dayal Upadhyay as

an alternative to Socialism as thought of by Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's ideology,

to them was a justification of cultural domination of India by the West both in

economic and political terms, while Upadhyay's thinking is closer to the

Gandhian world view and hence genuinely Bharatiya (lndian).27 The revival and

reassertion of Integral Humanism by the Hindu nationalists in recent years

should be seen as a reassertion of the Bharatiya Cultural identity. 28

BJP's enchantment with 'Integral Humanism' of Deen Dayal Upadhyay is

also seen in its Election Manifesto of 1996. In this manifesto, emphasis was put

on 'social harmony' and a section was devoted to the party's 'social philosophy'

which drew its inspiration from Upadhyay's 'Integral Humanism'. What the

manifesto said on this is:

The Bharatiya Janata Party's social philosophy, which is the bedrock of

its social agenda, is rooted in integral humanism. It rules out

contradictions between society and the individual, or for that matter,

between the family, the basic building brick of our social structure, and

the individual. 29

Although, to the Hindu nationalists, 'Integral Humanism' of Upadhyay is an

alternative model of India's economic, social, political and technological

development, it is full of contradictions both at ideological and practical levels.

"They advocate acceptance of religious diversity and respect for others'

teachings yet, as seen earlier, display little tolerance for non-Hindu minorities

especially for the followers of Islam. They advocate extension of political

democracy to economic and social spheres without specifying how such ideals

could be achieved". 30 Again, although Upadhyay was a critic of capitalism, "in

reality a large majority of Hindu nationalists are ardent advocates of capitalism

and free enterprise." 31 The concept of Dharma, as propounded in classical

Hindu thought with its emphasis on carrying out of an individual's duties

commensurate with his status and occupation in the society, is nothing but 'a

reiteration of the Hindu concept of Varnashram Dharma.' 32 But the hard fact is

that this is not applicable in a society like India which is changing so fast in a

globalized world.

Problems and prospects ofthe BJP in West Bengal 0 30

In Integral Humanism socialism is conveniently straight jacketed into a

unrefined and limited this worldliness and some failed historical system, there is,

likewise, neither a comprehensive theory of capitalism nor its critique. 33

Capitalism is looked at as no more than another form of materialism based on

the concept of mutual conflict against which a vague concept of harmony is

counterpoised. At the same time, while its competitive and materialist character

is rhetorically criticized, the labour relations and forms of social organization that

is given birth to by that order are meekly accepted.34 Again, to the

Hindutvavadis; socialism is to be condemned more than Islam as it is more

dangerous than Islam. In this respect Tapan Basu et al. remark:

Doctrinally, socialism is more disturbing for Hindutva than the ideology of Islam,

for the RSS-VHP world view is singularly ill-equipped to deal with questions of

social conflict. Its own argument poses no alternative socio-economic

perspective that can possibly cope with the fundamental questions of inequality

and exploitation raised by socialist doctrines. 35

From Integral Humanism to Aggressive Hinduism

Coming to the post-1984 political scenario, there was a change of

leadership in the BJP following the electoral debacle in the 1984 Lok Sabha

election. L K Advani replaced Vajpayee as the Party President "which meant a

reassertion of tighter control by the RSS over the Party and a rejection of

'Gandhian Socialism' for traditional Sangh ideology only this time propagated

and pursued much more aggressively than ever before." 36 According to one

noted political commentator,

Between 1980 and 1984 the Jan Sangh sought to weaken its links with the

RSS, to move to the Centre and to dilute its ideological message through

advocacy of a largely incomprehensible 'Gandhian Socialism'. This

eventually gave way to 'Gandhian Socialism', a covering label coined by

Deen Dayal Upadhyay (a Hindu nationalist leader of less self-confident

times) and then to an aggressive and open form of Hindu nationalism.37

From 1984 the BJP has become a party looking for issues on which to

peg its messages. It has sought to spread its social and political base by moving

right assiduously pursuing the politics of polarization on the issue of secularism


and the cultural self-definition of the Indian nation and state. 38 In his Presidential

Address Advani gave some inkling about his strategy, emphasizing issues,

which were of importance to the majority of the Hindus. 39 He went to the extent

of denouncing cow-slaughter in many states of India and the destruction of

Hindu temples in Jammu and Kashmir. 40 He further said:

If anyone were to ask me which is the most distinctive trait of BJP's

personality, I would say that BJP is the voice of unalloyed nationalism,

ours is a Nation-first party. It aspires to be the heartbeat of lndia.41

The BJP's Plenary Session in Agra on 8 April, 1988 was a watershed in Indian

politics.42 Because Advani, who had on 4 April, 1980, committed himself to

protecting the 'composite culture' of India, suddenly discovered that "emphasis

on the composite character of Indian Culture is generally an attempt to disown its

essentially Hindu spirit and content".43 At an RSS meeting held in Coimbatore in

1987 he said : "India's culture is essentially a Hindu culture and it "should be

reflected in the various policies, programmes, attitudes and positions we take". 44

From this time on the BJP openly started saying that it was committed to

protecting the Hindu interests. On 30 September 1990, in Mumbai, Advani went

to the extent of complaining that today's leaders had no temerity to speak for

Hindus. In the same breath he sermonised the minorities to accept this country

and its culture as their own. 45 A day earlier in Ahmedabad, Advani said that

even after long forty years of independence almost all political parties which had

got the opportunity to rule over this country had done nothing for the welfare of

the Hindu community but did not hesitate to take special interest in appeasing

the minorities for their own political interests.46 The next day he further said in

Bombay, "When Muslims, Sikhs and other communities practise their religion,

then we call them secular but if parties like the BJP and the Shiv Sena practise

Hinduism, then we are branded as communal." 47 Again, it will be in order to

quote Advani to prove the fact that Hindutva is the real ideology of the BJP. On

the eve of the Somnath-Ayodhya Yatra, Advani said, "Ideologically, I am ranged

against all political parties because of this issue. All political parties think alike".48

"It was not the Ram Janambhoomi issue. It was a crusade in defence of Hindutva

and a crusade against pseudo-secularism." 49


Advani declared:

For many politicians and political parties, secularism has become only a

euphemism for political appeasement of minority sections which tend to

vote en bloc. These politicians unabashedly propound the thesis that

there is no such thing as minority communalism. 50

The BJP's post-1984 aggressive articulation of the Hindu nationalist ideology

and overemphasis on 'Cultural Nationalism', along with its strong condemnation

of the 'appeasement of minorities', especially the Muslims, allegedly by the

Congress and other pseudo-secular parties armed it with a powerful Hindu

identity. 51 After1989, BJP put the maximum emphasis on the Hindu mobilization

centred on the reconstruction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya.

Not only it demonstrated the powerful potential for communalising religion

but had also relatively relegated the Party's mobilisation centred on

socio-economic issues into the background. People's issues were, in

reality, if not in theory, simply subordinated to the rhetoric of Hindutva,

Hindu nationalism and cultural nationalism. 52

The BJP adopted a resolution on Ayodhya in its National Executive meeting at

Palampur on 11 June 1989, at Palampur. The resolution "demanded that 'the

sentiments of the overwhelming majority in this country - the Hindus' be

respected and the site in dispute should be handed over to the Hindus and a

mosque built at some other place." 53

The BJP's electoral gains were substantial. In the 1984 Lok Sabha

election, it won just two seats with 7.4 per cent of votes. In 1989, it won 85 seats

with 11.5 per cent of votes, unprecedented in its history since the days of the

BJS.54 The Party attributed this success to its ability to project its identity in a

way which is different from other parties.55 In this connection, it will be very

appropriate to quote Advani who, in an interview on the occasion of the tenth

anniversary of the BJP in 1990, said:

The Distinct features of the BJP's personality are our stand on Article 370, our

demand that the Minorities Commission be replaced by a Human Rights

Commission, that the Directive Principles of State Policy in respect of uniform

civil code be implemented and that a Rama Mandir (meaning the temple for

Problems and prospects ofthe BJP in West Bengal :] 33

Lord Ram) be constructed at Ayodhya at the site believed to be the birth place

of Sri Ram a. 56

BJP's performance in 1991 election improved much when the Party won

120 Parliamentary seats with 20 per cent of popular votes. "Political Hinduism

was on the verge of capturing power at the centre." 57 In December, 1995, BJP's

Hindutva plank got strengthened when the Supreme Court in a judgement

relating to a statement made by the Shiv Sena Chief Minister of Maharashtra,

Manohar Joshi, about the establishment of the first Hindu state in Maharashtra

opined:

In our opinion, a mere statement that the first Hindu state will be

established in Maharashtra is by itself not an appeal for votes on the

ground of his religion but the expression, at best, of such a hope. 58

The BJP termed the judgement as very conducive for the Party.59 Advani

reminded his colleagues of the fact that the BJP is 'not merely a political party'

but 'a part of a national movement for rejuvenating lndia'.60 Since the Supreme

Court had declared that any reference to Hindutva was not as good as the

violation of the electoral code prohibiting any reference to religion, the Party was

not lacking in confidence on this count. 61 In the words of a senior leader of the

Party:

Hindutva and Indian nationhood are synonymous terms. All those living in

this country are Bharatiya or Hindus. There is no contradiction between

the two. Here, no one should take exception to this truth. Everyone has a

right to profess his own faith as is guaranteed under the Constitution. The

fundamental rights are guaranteed to every citizen without discrimination

of caste, creed and sex. But no one can be allowed to profess extra

territorialloyalties.62

From what has been discussed above, it has become crystal clear that

Hindutva I Cultural Nationalism I the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra is the

main ideology of the BJP. It is also clear that the BJP is nothing but a political

wing of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh. According to Professor C P

Bhambhri, a noted political scientist, "BJP is the political face of the believers

and practitioners of Hindu Rashtra and the RSS is the real controller of the BJP

MPs, MLAs, Ministers and Prime Minister." 63


The BJP is distinguished from every other political party of India by its

exclusivist Hindutva ideology and its ability to mobilize its well-trained and

ideologically committed cadre force to work for the Party of the Hindus. The real

backbone of the BJP is the RSS and other various Hindu outfits like the VHP,

Bajrang Dal, etc.64 It is a misconception that the BJP is different from the RSS

and the RSS is nothing but a 'cultural' organization. "RSS and BJP are

indistinguishable both at the level of organization and ideology because they are

two sides of the same coin of Hindu Rashtra." 65 We may quote Anderson and

Damle here:

This study focuses on the 'family' of organizations around the RSS especially its

political affiliate. The affiliates all have a centralized authority structure very

similar to that of the RSS. All of them recruit their cadre largely from the RSS

and the RSS trained cadre occupy the organizational positions. 56

The Hindutva politics of the Sangh Parivar is not a recent phenomenon. It owes

its origin to the formation of the Hindu Mahasabha and then to the Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangh in the first half of the 201h century. The Hindu Mahasabha

and the RSS were the organizations, which were the champions of Hindutva

politics in the colonial period. The present Hindutva politics as practised by the

BJP and other affiliates of the Sangh Parivar is nothing but its continuation with

more vigour and zeal.

Savarkar was the man who coined the term 'Hindutva' in 1923. This term

gained currency against the backdrop of the consolidation of Brahmanism into

Hinduism. In the words of Savarkar:

The Aryans who settled in India at the dawn of history already formed a

nation, now embodied in the Hindus .... Hindus are bound together not

only by the ties of the love they bear to a common fatherland and by the

common blood that courses through their veins and keeps our hearts

throbbing and our affection warm but also by the ties of the common

homage we pay to our great civilization, our Hindu Culture.67

Hindutva, according to him, rests on three pillars - geographical unity, racial

features and common culture.68 Then, Savarkar went on to elaborate the


concept of 'Hindu'. A 'Hindu', he wrote, "means a person who regards this land

of Bharatvarsha from the Indus to the seas as his fatherland (Pitribhum1) as well

as his holy land (Punnyabhum1), that is the cradle land of his religion.'.s9

Savarkar's definition of 'Hindu' unlike Hindutva is narrow as he kept the

Christians and the Muslims beyond the ambit of nationhood. He had alleged that

the Muslims and the Christians "belong or feel that they belong to a cultural unit

altogether different from the Hindu one." 70 To Savarkar, the important test is

two-fold (a) Pitribhumi (Fatherland) and (b) Punnyabhumi (Holy land) which must

be identical. According to him:

That is why in the case of some of our Mohammedan or Christian

countrymen who had originally been forcibly converted to a non-Hindu

religion and who consequently have inherited along with Hindus, a

common fatherland and a greater part of the wealth of a common culture

. . . . Language, law, customs, folklore and history .... are not and cannot

be recognized as Hindus. For though Hindusthan to them is fatherland as

to any other Hindu yet it is not to them a Holy land too. Their holy land is

too far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and god men, ideas

and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently, their names

and their outlook smack of a foreign origin. 71

Savarkar, thus, rejected the concept of 'Territorial Nationalism'. "This was

the kind of nationalism known the world over and which the Indian National

Congress espoused since its birth; everyone born in the territory of India is an

Indian by birth.'' 72 "Implicit in it is the concept of India's secularism, democracy

and its 'composite culture'. We are one nation with cultures as diverse as our

land itself, yet, knit together by a common loyalty to India." 73 After rejecting

'Territorial Nationalism', Savarkar moved on to elaborate his favourite concept of

'Cultural Nationalism'. In his own words:

We Hindus are bound together not only by the tie of the love we bear to a

common fatherland ... but also by the tie of the common homage we pay

to our great civilization - our Hindu culture which could not be better

rendered than by the word Sanskriti suggestive as it is of that language,

Sanskrit, . . . we are one because we are a nation, a race and own a

common Sanskriti (civilization).74


The result is that for the minorities, the hope of keeping both their faith and their

Indian nationality is completely evaporated. This is the real face of Hindu

Rashtra based on Hindutva. 75 It may be mentioned here that Savarkar preferred

to keep a certain link, however slender it may be, with 'Territorial Nationalism'

through his concept of fatherland or Pitribhumi but placed his emphasis on Hindu

'sentiments' or 'culture' with the argument that only among Hindus could

Pitribhumi and Punnyabhumi be the same. 76 "It was left to Golwalkar to bring

out the implications in all their totalitarian fullness." 77

Golwalkar took V 0 Savarkar's Hindutva as the starting point of his

theoretical writings but elaborated them into a full-fledged concept of 'Cultural

Nationalism'. 78 On cultural nationalism, Golwalkar wanted to learn a lesson from

Adolf Hitler, the German dictator. In his We or Our Nationhood Defined he

stated:

German national pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep up

the purity of the nation and its culture Germany shocked the world by her

purging the country of the Semitic races - the Jews .... a good lesson

for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by. 79

Now, he wants to apply the lessons he learnt from Hitler to India. So he

remarked:

From this standpoint sanctioned by the experience of shrewd old nations,

the non-Hindu people in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture

and language, must learn to respect and revere Hindu religion, must

entertain no idea but the glorification of the Hindu nation, i.e., they must

not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ingratitude towards this

land and its age long tradition, but must also cultivate the positive attitude

of love and devotion instead, in one word, they must cease to be

foreigners or may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu

nation claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential

treatment, not even citizen's rights.80

Golwalkar's vision of a Hindu nation included five components. The idea

contained in the word 'nation' is a compound of five distinct factors fused into

one indissoluble whole, the famous five unities: Geographical (country), Racial

(Race), Religious (Religion), Cultural (Culture) and Linguistic (Language). 81


According to Golwalkar, " ... the Hindus only have qualifications to become a

nation. Hindustan, the land of the Hindus ... a definite geographical unity,

constitutes a country." "The Hindu race is united together by common traditions,

memories ... culture ... language ... (and) customs and thus constitutes a race."S'J.-

Now it becomes easy for Golwalkar to come to the conclusion, "This country,

Hindustan, the Hindu race with its Hindu religion, Hindu culture and Hindu

language, complete the Nation Concept." 83

What will be the place of the non-Hindus in the Nation as propounded by

Golwalkar? Golwalkar had his answer ready:

All those not belonging to the national, i.e., Hindu race, religion, culture and

language naturally fall out of the pale of real 'National' life. We repeat: in

Hindustan, the land of the Hindus, lives and should live the Hindu nation -

satisfying all the five essential requirements of the scientific nation concept

of the modern world. Consequently, only those movements are truly

'national' as aim at rebuilding, revitalizing and emancipating from its

present stupor, the Hindu nation. Those only are nationalist patriots, who,

with the aspiration to glorify the Hindu race and nation next to their heart,

are prompted into activity and try to achieve that goal. All others are either

traitors or enemies to the National cause, or to take a charitable view,

idiots. 84

According to Golwalkar, these idiots are not that they cannot be cured. The

prescription Golwalkar offered is:

The foreign races in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and

language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion,

must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and

culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must loose their separate existence

to merge in the Hindu race or may study in the country, wholly

subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no

privileges, far less any preferential treatment - not even citizen's rights.

There is, at least, should be, no other course for them to adopt. We are

an old nation; let us deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with the

foreign races, who have chosen to live in our country. 85

It is clear from what Golwalkar prescribes in the above that in order to stay or live

in India the non-Hindus have no other alternative but to conform to everything


Hindu and must accept everything in this country as their own. This is simply a

dangerous attempt at ensuring an extreme form of homogenization: Fascistic

traits are very much in evidence. "Fascism advocates the superiority of only one

race, sect, region, religion, language and culture and relegates' the rest of

mankind to the inhuman slavery. It preaches racial superiority and hatred." 86

Fascism strongly believes in the concept of "one country, one nation, one leader,

one people, one culture." 87 The fascist proclivities of the leaders of the RSS

have been expos.ed by many scholars. The Italian scholar Marzia Casolari has

shown on the basis of archival evidence, the RSS's connection with and praise

for Mussolini's fascist regime. 88 Fascist traits too characterize the present day

affiliates of the Sangh Parivar in India. It has been the declared goal of the

Sangh Pal'lvaf> to establish Hindutva in India. This can be substantiated with the

help of its conception of secularism and an objective study of the Election

Manifestoes of the BJP.

The BJP is against pseudo-secularism of all other political parties and in

favour of 'positive secularism'. In this respect Arshi Khan remarks:

The positive secularism of the BJP means positive inducements by the

state to the Hindus and discrimination against the minorities in India.

Positive secularism means a close linkage between the Hindu religion

and the Indian state; otherwise, secularism, according to the BJP, leads

to immoral politics. 89

. A secular state, they argue, can neither mean 'Nldha1'mi State', that is, a state

without Dha1'ma, nor can it mean 'Dhmma NfPapeksha', that is, indifference to

Dha'i'ma. And to call a state 'Nldharmi' or 'Dharma Nlrapeksha' is fundamentally

erroneous. 90 Again, according to the Hindutvavadls:

"If the state is Nidharmi, it will be a lawless state and where is the

question of the existence of the state?" 91

"The state can only be a Dharma Rajya and nothing else". 92

But the irony is:

The BJP favors a strong, centralized state 'that puts a premium on

defense to promote India's power in the region. It would redefine

secularism to eliminate safeguards of minority rights - if not to eliminate


minorities themselves - and to identify the state with the interests of the

Hindu majority. 93

In this respect, Achin Vanaik remarks:

It, thus, seeks to destroy the fundamental underpinning of political

democracy- the concept of an Indian Citizenship which must necessarily be

abstracted from the possession of any particular attribute (religion, race,

language, etc.) that is not in principle universally available and achievable

regardless of specific communitarian loyalties.94

Positive secularism as advocated by the BJP has two dimensions. Besides

implying religious tolerance of the followers of different faiths: "It also means

distillation of common moral values whether derived from different religious or

from other historical and civilizational experiences and approaches which always

remained integral to the Indian Civilization." 95 "on the other hand, it also implies

that the Indian State would never discriminate among followers ,of different faiths that it

is committed to 'Sarva Dharma Samabhava' (All religions are equal). According to these

principles, members of the majority and the minority religions would be treated

equally .... the Indian state under the BJP would not offer any special protection or

privileges for the followers of any minority religion, because such a practice leads to the

development of two classes of citizenship." 96

The BJP, in its election manifesto of the 1998 Lok Sabha election, had also

defined the concept of positive secularism in the following manner

We are committed to establishing a civilised, humane and just civil order

that which does not discriminate on grounds of caste, religion, class,

colour, race or sex. We will truly and genuinely uphold and practise the

concept of Secularism consistent with the Indian tradition of 'Sarva Panth

Samadara' (equal respect for all faiths) 97

In this respect, Achin Vanaik remarks that:

Once secularism is redefined as tolerance, then the truly secular state

comes to mean the truly tolerant state. From here it is an easy step to

advocating a Hindu rashtra and implicitly a Hindu State, or one which is

in some basic sense affiliated to the 'majority religion'. After all,


Hinduism, it is claimed, is the most tolerant of all religious systems and

therefore, most conducive to true secularism. 98

The Hindutvavadis will say that 'a genuinely secular' Hindu Rashtra will protect

the non-Hindus 99 and "the present state is ruled by traitors to Hindu nation,

'pseudo-secularists' who 'appeased' Muslims in their pursuit of a politics of 'vote

banks." 100 The Hindutvavadi charge of 'Muslim appeasement' is completely

absurd. Tapan Basu et al. remark, "the minority community is grossly

unrepresented in every kind of contemporary elite (whether administrative,

police, military, business, academic or professional) and Muslims have

comprised the vast majority of riot-victims in post-Independence communal

clashes." 101 Though Muslims have a share of 13.4 percent of the country's

population, their representation in government jobs is a mere 4.9 percent. 102

Again, Muslims employment in various governmental sectors are as follows -

PSUS -- 7.2%, lAS, IFS and IPS -- 3.2%, Railways - 4.5%, Judiciary - 7.8%,

Health- 4.4%, Transport- 6.5%, Home Affairs- 7.3%, Education- 6.5%. 103

Now, we will turn to an objective study of BJP Manifestoes to prove our

point that Hindutva I Cultural Nationalism I Hindu Rashtra is the mainstay of BJP

or for that matter, the Sangh Parivar ideology.

The 1996 election manifesto of the BJP minced no words in stating:

Hindutva I cultural nationalism shall be the rainbow which will bridge our

present to our glorious past and pave the way for an equally glorious

future: it will guide the transition from Swarajya to Surajya. 104

In its election manifesto of 1998, it was categorically stated:

The five-fold concept of "Suchita" (probity in public life}, "Suraksha"

(Security}, "Swadeshi" (economic nationalism}, "Samajik Samarasta"

(social harmony) and "Hindutva" (cultural nationalism) will constitute the

core content and ideological pillars of the BJP. 105

Again, the 1996 manifesto of the BJP had the following to say:

The BJP is committed to the concept of one nation, one people, one

culture - our nationalist vision is not merely bound by the geographical or

political identity of India, but defined by our ancient cultural heritage.

From this belief flows our faith in 'Cultural Nationalism' which is the core

of Hindutva. That, we believe, is the identity of our ancient nation -


Bharatvarsha ... on coming to power, the BJP government will facilitate

the construction of a magnificent Shri Rama Mandir at Janmastan in

Ayodhya which will be a tribute to Bharat Mata. This dream moves

millions of people in our land; the concept of Rama lies at the core of

their consciousness. 106

The 1998 election manifesto of the BJP went to the extent of providing a more

detailed exposition of the same:

The BJP is committed to the concept of 'one Nation, one people and one

Culture'. The unique cultural and social diversity in India is woven into a

larger civilizational fabric by thousands of years of common living and

common and shared values, beliefs, customs, struggles, joy and sorrow, as

well as symbols of high degree of unity without uniformity. Our nationalist

vision is not merely bound by the geographical or political identity of Bharat

but it is referred by our timeless cultural heritage. This cultural heritage which

is central to all regions, religions and languages, is a civilizational identity

and constitutes the cultural nationalism of India which is the core of Hindutva.

This we believe is the identity of our ancient nation 'Bharatvarsha' .... The

BJP is convinced that Hindutva has immense potentiality to re-energize this

nation and strengthen and discipline it to undertake the arduous task of

nation building .... It is with such integrative ideas in mind; the BJP joined the

Ram Janmabhoomi movement for the construction of Shri Ram Mandir at

Ayodhya. .. . The BJP is committed to facilitate the construction of a

magnificent Shri Ram Mandir at Ram Janmasthan in Ayodhya where a

makeshift temple already exists. Sri Ram lies at the core of Indian

consciousness. The BJP will explore all consensual, legal and constitutional

means to facilitate the construction of Shri Ram Mandir at Ayodhya. 107

In the 1991 election manifesto of the BJP, we find a paragraph devoted to Shri

Ram Mandir at Janmasthan:

BJP firmly believes that construction of Sri Ram Mandir at Janmasthan is

a symbol of the vindication of our cultural heritage and national self

respect. For BJP, it is purely a national issue and it will not allow any

vested interests to give it a sectarian and communal colour. Hence party

is committed to build Shri Ram Mandir at Janmasthan by relocating

superimposed Babri structure with due respect. 108


From the above, it becomes crystal clear that the BJP is committed to the

concept of 'one nation, one people, one culture' showing a similarity between

BJP Hindutvavadis and the Fascists. The BJP wants all Indians irrespective of

their religious beliefs, faiths and cultures, to conform to Hindutva I Cultural

nationalism as this 'one culture'. They want to trample underfoot the cultural

pluralism, the essential age-old cultural trait of India. Their attitude is that if

anybody wants to live in India or share her glories, he or she must accept

Hindutva as his or her culture.

Coming to power at the Centre in 1998 and 1999 did not deter the BJP

from furthering its ultimate objective. Although it put issues, which are the core of

its ideology, i.e. Ram Temple, Article 370 and Uniform Civil Code in the back

burner in 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha Elections, it had been scrupulously

smuggling its own agenda. "Even the Prime Minister did not hesitate to speak

his mind when the occasion arose." 109 "On his visit to the US, at the Staten

Island, the Prime Minister with a couple of Sadhus and leading lights of the VHP

in tow, addressing a public meeting swore that he was a 'Swayamsevak' to the

core."110 Not stopping at that, Vajpayee made it clear beyond doubt that if the

BJP gets a two-thirds majority, "We will build the India of our dreams."111

Vajpayee asserted that "a two-thirds majority would unable the BJP not only to

build the temple but also fulfil the RSS dream of accomplishing the Hindutva

agenda." 112 Recently, the Hindutvavadis have acquired the habit of sermonising

the minorities to 'lndianise' themselves. According to K S Sudarshan, former

RSS supremo, "2011 will mark the end of Sankraman Kal for Bharat. We have to

prepare ourselves for leadership and because we can't throw out Muslims and

Christians into the sea, we have to lndianise them." 113 In this respect, H K S

Surjeet remarks:

All that is required of them is that they be 'Political Hindus' and

'nationalists'. Now they must also be 'swadeshi'. The Hindutva brigade will

have no quarrel with those from amongst the Muslims and Christians who

reconcile to the idea of a Hindu Rashtra. 114

In conclusion, following A G Noorani, it can be said, "An unbroken ideological

thread binds Savarkar, Golwalkar and the BJP." 115


References

1. Christophe Jaffrelot, The Indian Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to

the 1990s, p. 315.

2. Partha Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism- from periphery to

centre, p. 86.

3. Geeta Puri, Hindutva politics in India - Genesis, Political Strategies and Growth

of Bharatiya Janata Party, 'Introduction', p. XX.

4. Christophe Jaffrelot, op. cit., p. 315.

5. Geeta Puri, op. cit., Introduction, p. XX.

6. Yogendra K Malik and V B Singh, Hindu Nationalism in India: The rise of the

Bharatiya Janata Party, p. 37.

7. Ibid.

8. Quoted in Geeta, Puri, op. cit.

9. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India at the Crossroads, p. 4.

10. Yogendra K Malik and VB Singh, op. cit., p. 37.

11. Bharatiya Janata Party, Our five commitments, pp. 1 - 20.

12. Geeta Puri, op. cit, pp. XX-XXI.

13. Partha Ghosh, op. cit., p. 86.

14. Christophe Jaffrelot, op. cit., p. 319.

15. Ibid.

16. Achin Vanaik, Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization,

p. 311.

17. Geeta Puri, op. cit., p. XXIX (Introduction).

18. Ibid., p. XXX (Introduction).

19. Ibid.


20. Ibid.

21. Sumanta Banerjee, 'Civilising the BJP', Economic and Political Weekly, 16 July

2005.

22. Yogendra K Malik and V 8 Singh, op. cit, p. 17.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave, Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in

Modern India, p. 85.

26. Yogendra K Malik and V 8 Singh, op. cit., p. 17.

27. ibid, p. 18.

28. Ibid.

29. Election Manifesto, BJP, 1996, p. 5.

30. Yogendra K Malik and V 8 Singh, op. cit., p. 18.

31. lbid,p.19.

32. Ibid.

33. Tapan Basu et. al., Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags, p. 71.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Achin Vanaik, op. cit, p. 312.

37. Ibid., p. 46.

38. Ibid., p. 312.

39. A G Noorani, The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour, p. 76.

40. Ibid.

41. Quoted in Partha Ghosh, op. cit., p. 89.

42. A G Noorani, op. cit., p. 63.


43. Ibid

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Qt;Hlted in Ibid., p. 58.

49. Ibid.

50. Quoted in Partha Ghosh, op. cit., p. 89.

51. Geeta Puri, op. cit., p. 260.

52. Ibid., p. 274.



55. Ibid., p. 94.

56. Quoted in Ibid., p. 94.

57. Ibid., p. 95.

58. Ibid., p. 10.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.


62. Vijay Kumar Malhotra, 'Religion and Politics', Hindustan Times, 2 February 1996.

63. C P Bhambhri, Bharatiya Janata Party, periphery to centre, p. 10.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Walter K Anderson and Sridhar D Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, The

Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism, p. 4.


67. Quoted in Ram Punyani, Communal Politics: facts versus myths, p. 215.

68. Ibid.

69. A G Noorani, Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection, p. 64.

70. V D Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 101.

71. Ibid., p.113.

72. A G Noorani, op.cit., p. 61.

73. Ibid.

74. V D Savarkar, op. cit., pp. 91-92.


76. Tapan Basu et al. op. cit., p. 26.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

79. M S Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined p. 27.

80. Ibid., p. 52.

81. Ibid., p. 18.

82. Ibid., p. 40.

83. Ibid., p. 43.

84. Quoted in A G Noorani, The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour, p. 20.

85. Quoted in Ibid.

86. Amitabha Chandra, 'The Politics of Saffronization in Contemporary India: How to

combat it ?' Socialist Perspective, Vol. 32, Nos. 3-4, December 2004 - March

2005, p. 235.

87. Ibid.

88. Marzia Casolari, 'Hindutva's Foreign Tie-up in the 1930s: Archival Evidence',

Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, 2000.


89. Arshi Khan, 'Dragon Teeth of BJP', Mainstream, 13 April1991, p. 19.

90. Amlan Dash, 'Aspects of BJP's Ideology: A Critique', Mainstream, 18 May 1991, p.

11.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. David Ludden (ed.), Making India Hindu-Religion, Community, and the Politics of

Democracy in India, p. 60.

94. Achin Vanaik, op. cit., p. 318.

95. Bharatiya Janata Party, Our Five Commitments, p. 4.

96. Atal Behari Vajpayee, op. cit., p. 11.

97. Election Manifesto, BJP, 1998.

98. Achin Vanaik, op. cit., p. 318.

99. Tapan Basu et al. op. cit., p. 37.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, 'Community on the Margins', Frontline, 15 December

2006, p. 7.

103. Ibid., p. 6.


1 05. Election Manifesto, BJP, 1998, p. 3.



108. Election Manifesto. BJP, 1991, p. 4.

109. H K S Surjeet, BJP Exposed- No More ofthis Government, p. 8.

110. Ibid.


111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., p. 9.

113. A G Noorani, 'Signalling a wide', Hindustan Times, 6 June 2007, p. 6.

114. H K S Surjeet, op. cit., p. 11.

115. A G Noorani, Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection, p. 79.

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