Chapter III MILITARY RECRUITMENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND...
Transcript of Chapter III MILITARY RECRUITMENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND...
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Chapter III
MILITARY RECRUITMENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS
Comprehensive social system defines Military organization as a whole that reflects the
social, political and cultural values of each particular society of the country. Since the
Iili~itary organization is formed as national units, it represents the consequences of
historical and traditional values1, and also social and national character of the country.
Certain characteristics of military organization explain both its capacity of strength in
terms of numerical strength and skill, and its cohesive ability to influence or intervene in
politics as well as s~stainability after such intervention. Such characteristics depend upon I
the organizational format of military. Its orientation or education, history or background,
ideology, and its social origin and cohesion are vital for studying and understanding the
political behaviour of the military institution of a country that reflect the level of
professionalism2•
In addition, the professionalization is also dependent on the military policy of the
statesmen and their capacity. to execute the policy objectively while the military
institution is in the process of selection, recruitment or commission, promotion,
organization, advanced and established education (general and special), etc. It is further
influenced by the adtpinistrative capacity of the military leader of the organization, how
he initiates efficient staff system, and develops a sense of corporate unity and
responsibility with the recognition of the limit of professional competence. It seems
superior and dominating in nature organizationally because of "its three political
advantages over the civilian organization". Firstly, marked "superiority in organization"
with "unity and hierarchy'' that provides the institutional ethic and professional
discipline, through unity and peremptory obedience to the orders of its superior,
permanency, prestigio¥s perception and its highly peculiar structural feature. The second
is a highl~ emotionalized symbolic status among the state institutions accepting it as a
1 Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in Roger W. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications 1971, p.13.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, · Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957; Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in . Roger W. Little ( ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications 1971.
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national pride or defender. Lastly, it makes others feel inferior because of its "monopoly
ofarms with specialization ofviolence"3•
The government sets the goal and allocates the resources to be used in attaining the goal.
Against the theoretical background, the chapter examines whether the Nepal Army (NA)
is responsible to the elected government or not, being an apolitical professional
organization. The chapter further examines whether the military can represent the social
character of the Nepali state or not. It evaluates to what extent the recruitment,
promotion, retirement and punishment systems are transparent. The chapter further deals
with the development process of institutional structure of military, the trends of
recruitment, education and orientation. It also covers its mobilization for the warfare,
involvement in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) and the
developmental activities in the country until 2007.
Standing Army as Institution in Nepal
Historical,ly, the kings ofBaisi and Chaubise Rajya4 (Principalities) used to make a policy
to organize and deploy the army for the three purposes: (1) territorial security of the
principality from the external threat posed by other principalities, i.e., defensive action,
(2) peace maintenance within the principality, i.e., internal security, and (3) expansion of
th¥ territory of the principality, i.e., offensive action. For fulfilling such purpose through
enforcement of state mechanism, there were two kinds of annies: permanent and
tTmporary5• Among the permanent, only three kinds of armies could be found within the
territory of Nepal: army on foot, horse riding army, and elephant riding army. Both
permanent and temporary armies called Umraos at local level were under the
quathnayaks6, generally from the Rajput family, who were directly under the king. There
3 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, p.72.
4 Ancient and medieval Nepal was fragmented into 22 and 24 (Baise and Chaubise in Nepali language, respectively) small states called Rajya.
5 Because of the small size of the permanent army, the subject of the state could be used to collect the temporary army especially during the war through Jhara and Bisti, if it was required for defensive and offensive action of the state. And permanent army was not so organized. It was mainly deployed for security purpose in the strategically important places in terms of economy, culture, political and social fervour for security purpose, except warfare.
6At the local level, one of the major posts of the army was that of quathnayak who used to be recruited
fi:om either the nearest person of the king of the principality or from the feudal family that had influence and control over the society. The king was the head as its Commander-in-Chief of the army.
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was no caste discrimination except in leadership, so somehow the military strength
re11resented the social'structure of the army at the local level. Thus, naturally the anny I
had been dominated by some castes in accordance with the social structure within the
principalities. In the eastern principalities, 'Kirat force' was in existence within the
'Limbuwan' area, i.e., between Arun River and Sikkim border. But Chhetris, Mallas,
Shahis and Magars mainly dominated the military organization in the principalities of the
western part of Nepal. Before the modem age, the chief of army personnel was in the
third position of state next to the king and prince. In the middle age, the kings were more
ingaged in the art and cultural development within the country than to strengthen and
organize military7• King P.N. Shah of Gorkha inherited the Gorkhali forces from his
father, King Narabhupal Shah. The soldiers tenned "Bisti" or Jhara comprising people in '
the age limit of 12-80 years, were being used as temporary soldiers at the time of war.
Under the Jhara system, soldiers could neither get honorarium for their duty of security
nor during the battle, except a little quantity of food as tiffin8•
The number of Jhara soldiers used to increase in the ratio of enlargement of military
op~ration. Each household was required compulsorily to send a person to the army
carrying his own weapons9• They could function as farmers as well as soldiers, and were
also given training in the use of weapons periodically. After having failed twice in the
Nuwakot attack, first the king felt the necessity of more trained regular soldiers to engage
them purely in military duty for making the military conquest possible, and then
developed regular soldiers including the commanders who were generally recruited on a
permanent basis for performing civil functions generally during the peace time. He
started the tradition of regular field commanders and soldiers, and promoted the
traditional Jhara soldier system using them for fighting in battles, transpo1iing weapons
and food, involving them in construction repairing of the roads and forts ( Gadhis), and
performing garrison duty at fq~s, etc. Secondly, he realized the lack of modem weapons
in his army and made an in-depth study of arts of warfare, the system and organization of
the Indian armies in different states, and then understood the usefulness and efficiency of
7 Tulsi Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993.
8 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995. 9 Ibid, p.9.
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the standing army10•
P.N. Shah later raised an army in Gorkha, after observing the British army in India,
popularly known as "Tilang" in Nepal 11 giving training based on the European pattern
and adopting the organizational pattern of Bengali army12. He hired Indian experts to
train armed forces in handling guns, formed five companies in a year dividing his armies
into three groups-first: bearing traditional weapons such as khukuri, khuda, spear,
javelin, second: with archers;, and the third with guns. The first two groups were used to
mount attacks in the beginning, and the third one to launch sudden attacks for softly
annihilating and chasing enemies. In the same way, he fonned military unit tenned as
company, and the soldiers constituted in the companies were conceptualized as gun
bearing regular soldiers with the concept of chain of command of the institution under the
king who was at the top. The Mukhtiyar who looked after civil affairs as well as
performed as Commander-in-Chief, as in recent understanding, and Bhardars,
Chautariyas, Kazi (having sufficient civil authority), Captain, Sardars, etc., used to lead
the army in the field. No concept of military headquarters was prevalent till the reign of
B$adur Shah and one company had 101 gun-bearing soldiers under the command of
Subedar13• Later the military term, Captain, was introduced by Bahadur Shah, second son
ofP.N. Shah, after the death of his elder brother, Pratap Singh Shah.
Bhimsen Thapa, the1first powerful civil-leader, took several steps to advance the military
administration and organization. Lal-Dhadda (military record) was initiated under his
instruction in 1809 to maintain the military record systematically. Making a classified
military organization with designations, he added the post of General and Colonel by
delineating their responsibilities to look after and command the soldiers of Kampu and
Companies stationed in Kathmandu Valley and outside Kathmandu, respectively. He
10 See in detail, Krishna Kant Adhikari, Nepal Under Jang Bahadur: 1846-1877, Vol.l, Kathmandu: Buku, 1984; Ludwig F. Stiller, The Rise of the House of Gorkha: A Study in the Unification of Nepal: 1768-1816, Ranchi: Patna Jesuit Society 1973, reprinted in 1975; Bikrama Jit Hasrat, History of Nepal: As Told by Its own and Contemporary Chroniclers, Punjab: Bikrama Jit Hasrat,1970.
11 According to Dibyopadesh, he got the idea of raising a standing army after he observed the British army in India and he was impressed by the Tilang, most popular army in Southern India, which had received training on the European pattern and structured on the basis of Bengal army. The same structure was adopted in Nepal army for forming fue standing army, thus prompting the people to call it as "Tilang" in Nepal also.
12 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p.29.
13 Ibid, p.l3.
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.. int~oduced Kampu, Platan and Company, and clearly differentiated them - the military
companies located in the Kathmandu Valley, which were under the command, of General,
were called Kampu, and outside the valley were called Platans. He created military posts
like Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and General, and Kampus as a whole was kept under
the command of Commander-in-Chief, and Platoons under the command of General, with
differentiation in their roles in the hierarchical military institution. The General had an
authority of mobilizing the military officers, dismissing them, or giving physical
punishffient to those military men who did not obey his order. He
consciously/unconsciously · confined the role of the Commander-in-Chief in the
administrative chief of the army staff rather than that of the Chief of the Field Marshal of
the military institution, as General Bhimsen Thapa was not only Commander-in-Chief of
the military institution but as Mukhtiyar of the civil government having full authority of
both powers. Similarly, he established the tradition of fragmentation and distribution of
companies that fixed 200 and 100 gun-bearing trained personnel under the command of
Chautariya and Kazi, respectively14• The tradition established by General Thapa provided
spa~e to every civil-military functionary by involving them in the power game of the state
directly, in which each could try to exercise their power to influence military for '·
upgrading their position. The military distribution in accordance with the position in the
power system sharply boosted the ambition of the Chautariyas and Bhardars, who started
exercising military might under them to gain the ultimate power. This initiated not only
in polarizing and fragmenting the military, but also in getting involved in power politics.
In addition, Bhimsen Thapa institutionalized the military establishment in the country by
creating different administrative departments systematically with various roles, functions . I
and responsibilities. He established a headquarter of the company called Sardar Kampani . I
Dafdar Khana in 1809 having the responsibility of maintaining the record of companies
as well as the Jagir lands owned by the companies, according to the Vamsavali.
Similarly, he established Kampu Dafdar Khana (Kampu office) to keep the service record
of military personnel and to depute Jamadars, who had knowledge of operating common
and other weapons, in strategically important areas as approved by the Kampu Dafdar
Khana. It had the authority to conduct inspections of strategic areas and deploy
14 Ibid, p.32.
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excluding brigade. The role of Commander-in-Chief was confined mainly for
administrative work and Jangi Lath was the de-facto head of the military institution
during the Rana political system where military had been given the responsibility of the
civil police to handle the day-to-day cases or to engage in simple public affairs at the
l?callevel. Bhim Shamser reclassified the military force after the First World War into
three Divisions: Infantry, Artillery, and Calvary18.
After establishing democracy in 1950, there was no change in military organization for
two years. Only in 1953, Nepal Army began its new history. The King regained his
position and established his control over the army. Institutionally, the militia system was
removed, 9 battalions and 23 companies were formed decreasing from the two brigades,
30 ·battalions and 39 companies existing till 1953 19. Modem communication systems
within and among the military units, and units to headquarter, were introduced: and a
military school was established to train military personnel. Military barracks were built.
Several posts, which were created by Rana rulers at different times, for their service were
ren:10ved; military A in was formed. The tradition of providing military training to officer
corJ>s from foreign expertise, especially from India, was established. After introducing
the· Panchayat system by King Mahendra, the name of Nepal Army was changed to Royal
Nepal Army, and the military headquarter became Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda. Self
contained war-craft system was developed creating a section within the military for
introducing the role of airforce in Nepal Anny. Establishment of military training at night
was introduced for the help of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Helicopters were
provided to the military to enable it to expedite action for mobilizing a self-contained
system, thereby making effective military action possible. During the royal regime,
military engagement in construction was started for providing additional financial support
to soldiers engaging them in road and bridge construction. The military unifonn, which
was modernized later is still in use today. Birendra Military School was opened. A ten
year military plan was introduced. Adda Nos. 2 and 3 were formed. Sipahi, the annual
journal ofNA, was introduced to make the public aware of the military activities, and to
18 Tulsi Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993; also Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.
19 Ibid, pp.545"547.
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motivate and orient lower level military about the military policy at the national and
international level. Finally, the present organizational structure, hierarchy, education and
training, and infrastructure ofN epal Army were developed after 195020.
AU the developmental evidences show that the ambitious rulers have not only
modernized military by providing sophisticated instruments, but also supported the
military personnel by providing several kinds of facilities for their professional and
family enhancement. Similarly, military also provided help to fulfil their rulers' ambitions
to be powerful and to rule the country with the backing of military. The history before
and after the Rana oligarchy exposed that the military of Nepal has been showing its
loyalty to those who provided more facility to the institution and personnel. Hence, it
seems that the relationship of rulers and military was determined by the mutual
understanding and benefits for both. The exchange of support of military to the strongest
ruier and his quid pro quo to the military established both personal and professional
rapport between the rulers and the army in the country. It thus helped create the ruler
military tandem making military as an independent variable. Those who enjoyed the
confidence of the military could become the de facto strongmen, as had happened to the
kings not only after the 1950 change, but also after 1990 when democracy had been
restored by the Mass Movement.
Social Composition of Nepal Army
Before the unification of modern Nepal by P.N. Shah, no principalities of Baisi and
Chaubisi had standing armies except Umraos, royal favourites from different localities
for mobilizing militia, Dhakte and Jhara recruited in emergency closing unauthorized
tracks, maintaining check posts, and detaining criminals. However, during the unification
process, focusing on physical and mental fitness and skills of the axmy as weH as guerrilla
warfare policy and tactic, Shah used Pandey as a shield, Basnets (Chhetris) as weapons21,
and Brahmins as strategists, ana made a policy to include other castes in army "without
20 Ibid; and also, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995; and Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.
21 Morris Janowitz, "Military Organization", in Roger W. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, California: Sage Publications, 1971, p.13.
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companies to report about these to the concerned authority15.
The categorization of military force as Kampu, Platan and Company by Bhimsen Thapa
was continued by Jang Bahadur Rana who started the system of militia by mobilizing
temporary soldiers with physica~. fitness under the command of Umrao for the third time
during Nepal-Tibet war16• Ranodip Singh divided the militia into two categories -
permanent and temporary, keeping these under the control of militia Goswara, where the
command-in-charge, commanding General, was under the supervision of Jangi Pared.
The militia system was abandoned in Nepal in the 1950s17•
Similarly, in 1858, Jang Bahadur divided the Dafdar Khana into many units and carried
out the provision of the Jang(Ain (Military law) 1854, defining the Kampu Dafdar Khana I
as an office for dealing with the salary and dues payable/due recoverable. He also I '
established the Jangi Adda (Military Headquarter) at the central level making separate
arrangements through this office for conducting surveys, as well as conduction of
courses to operate guns and machine-guns and looking after the Khangi (entitlement),
pay, medical treatment and other functional benefits of the anny personnel. This also
functioned as a Jan.gi Adalat (Marshal Court) to take up and deliberate on the different
types 0f cases of military personnel, trails for culprits, take disciplinary action, make
judgements and give verdicts for punishment. It used to arrange for translation of books
pertaining to military administration and law into Nepali language and preserve them.
Later, Chandra Shamser separated the office introducing Jangi Lath as the head office,
·which began to function for conducting inspection of barracks, issuance of ordinances,
publication of magazines, Kampu Kot, factories, weapons and stores. Similarly, military
posts such as Jangilath, Hajuriya, General, Commanding General, Major General,
Commanding Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major Captain, Lieutenant, etc., were tenned
an~ created. After the fall of Bhimsen Thapa, King Rajendra Bikram Shah restarted the
posts of Chautariya,' Kaji and Sardar instead of Generals and Colonels. The military was
restructured in 1883 into three divisions and each division had eight platoons. Again it
was reformed in 1890 dividing the military into seven brigades, including artillery and
15 Ibid, p.32. 16 .• . Ibid, pp.33-34. 17 Ibid, 34.
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discrimination" on the basis of skill, experience, and ability2• Military conquests and
annexations of P.N. Shah and his immediate successors were not so remarkable in
themselves as for the manner in which they led to a feeling of unity and patriotism among
the people as a whole. The discriminatory policy in the recruitment of people in military I
had been started after conceiving the concept of permanent army, while P .N. Shah got
suggestions from his maternal uncle, Udyog Sen, King of Palpa, as follows23 •
. . . riding on the Brahmin was meant riding on the bull and the act was sinful, riding on the Thakuri was meant riding on the lion and there was a chance of being betrayed, riding on the Magar meant riding on the ordinary horse and that would move slow, but riding on the Khasa (Kshetriya) was meant riding on the Turki horse, so the work would be completed soon if one would ride Khasa.
The common people, belonging to different castes and creeds, used to participate in the
army as Jhara or militia; though not all were allowed in the actual fighting service, their
divided tasks were in. accordance with the traditional professional castes. Even during the '·
conquest in the east and west, Shah did not accept the soldiers of tribes of the controlled
area except Khas, Magar, Gurung, etc. He never thought of recruiting Newars in his
·defense army but made it a policy to provide opportunities to them in other areas,
especially administration, assuming that the Newar rulers (especially in Kathmandu
Valley) were his most powerful threats who could be supported wholeheartedly by the
Newar people all over the country, as he did not want to give them any chance to betray
by turning his army against him and his rule. Pursuing the same policy of appointment of
soldiers in the army, the Sunwars, the Rais and the Limbus were allowed to bear arms as
.Jhara soldiers during the Nepal-China war, but were not recruited in the regular army
. that was trained for defense field. Only the Ranas recruited these people in the militia and
·regular army, but other tribals including Newars appointed in the army were given
: alternate responsibilities such as mechanics, tailors, official workers, accountants, store-
keepers, etc., but not in defense. To a great extent, P.N. Shah had tried to prioritize the
~romotion of the physically and mentally fit or qualified persons among the recruits to
. the post of soldiers. The criterion was based on their performance and the warfare
· 22 Ibid; p.l3. 23
, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p.47; Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996; Tu\si Ram et al. Vaidya, Nepalko Sainikltihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda 1993.
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skills/experience they possessed~4 • He recognized one's contribution by continuing his
job, promoting him in his profession, and punishing those who were not sincere and loyal
to their assignedjob. He dismissed such unwanted persons throughpajani.
T~e subject population of the Gorkha Empire was divided into two categories, eligible
and ineligible on the narrow social and territorial base. Four communities - Khas,
Thakuri, Magar and Gurung, were accepted as eligible, while other several etlmic groups
and other communitie& collectively called as praja (subject) - Rai, Limbu, Kushel, Darai
KU:mhale,• Danuwar, Chepang, etc., were ineligible. Newars of Kathmandu Valley, as
well as people from Tarai and Himalayan regions, were ineligible for military recruitment
because of absence of warrior tradition among these communities25• Similarly, P.N. Shah
did not include Brahmins in his army generally in practice, except to use their intellect as
consultants and strategists in warfare policy-making, statecraft and guerrilla warfare. This
kind of mindset of the Shah ruler in categorizing the people for civil administration and
J11lilitary purpose on the basis of so-called Hindu orthodox division of labour was
.responsible for determining the present composition of military organization and power
structure of the state.
The success of unification of P.N. Shah could be attributed to his military ability,
selection of commanders and tactical policy. The senior officers of the anny were drawn
from the king's own "Rajput" relatives and from a number of Khas families, most of
whom had been associated with the Shah dynasty for several generations. However,
because of some sort of simplicity to respect the quality of military personnel and to treat
them all equally, P.N. Shah was able not only to organize, establish and develop the
military, but was also able to control and command it comfortably, at a time when there
were no modem means of communication, and commanders under him were dispersed in
different parts of the country for defensive and offensive purpose. The situation
continued till Bahadur Shahs' regency. Even quathnayak of rival principalities, who could
24 Shaha's evaluation basis onpajani were: A company of 100 barrels should be formed; the Subedar (head of the company) should be appointed from those who had already encountered four or five battles; the Subedar should appoint his seven subordinates from those who had also faced two to four battles; the seven deputies should appoint Huddas from those who would be ready even to sacrifice their lives with them, and the Hudda should appoint Sepoys after examining them, Ibid, p. 49.
25 Nava Raj Pant, Sri 5 Prithvinarayanshahako Upadhesha (Teachings of King Prithvi Narayan Shah) in RNAHQ nd., p.327; D.R. Regmi, Modern Nepal: Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadahyay, 1961.
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really be key figures to know about the weakness of the respective principalities and
~elpful in making a military strategy to attack them, used to recruited in Gorkha military
during his period. Until the end of the 18th century, a large proportion of Nepal's military
force at local level was made up of irregulars raised and maintained by officers known as
Umraos. They were generally Rajputs26• The system of delegation of authority to local
·military units was discontinued by Rana Bahadur Shah after the troops were raised, paid
and largely concentrated centrally under the direct control of the king or his
representatives. The system developed by P.N. Shah in terms of recruitment, evaluation
and promotion was misused during the regency of Queen Rajendra Laxmi Shah,
victimizing the Bhardars, who sacrificed their lives for the countrl7 presuming that they
were supporters of Bahadur Shah, her brother-in-law. The civilian leaders, Bhimsen
Thapa, Mathbar Singh Thapa including the Ranas, misused the system appointing their
.male family members, close relatives and favourites in the top posts, without assessing
their capabilities and qualifications, and at the same time victimizing their non-favourites
and sacking their opponents in the name of doubtful loyalty.
These structural features are characterized by (1) central command, (2) hierarchy, (3)
discipline, (4) inter-communication, and (5) esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation
and self-sufficiencl8• It runs entirely in the system bounded by the law in tenns of
recruitment, promotion and retirement, so that military character, ethics and discipline
can be maintained. However, the military in Nepal was weakened professionally not only
because of the recruitment of non-military in senior military posts randomly, but also
because of a psychological division between the favourite and unwanted among the
· military personnel. Good understanding could not be developed among the commanders
in different levels of command, and between the military commander and Bhimsen Thapa
himself, thus creating a gap between the commander and soldiers, and military and civil
.· cum-military leaders. In the later days of Bhimsen Thapa, several power centers were I
created and groups of military personnel were kept under other civil-cum-military
functionaries such as Chautariyas and Kajis. The recruitment policy of Bhimsen Thapa
26 John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 1991, p.14.
· 27
Baburam Acharya, Aba Yasto Kahi/yae Nahos (Never Again), Kathmandu: Sri Krishna Acharya, 2004. 28
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957, p.72.
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helped not only in decreasing the quality of the professional military in spite of his effort
to ,train and modernize it, but also in weakening himself. Random recruitment of his
favourites, who had neither professional qualification nor combat skills and experience,
made the army further weak during his time29. As a result, the military could not rescue
him while he was sacked from the post by using power of pajani by the king and kept
him in jail under humiliating conditions up to the end of his life. The reality was that after '·
weakening the military, Bhimsen Thapa, simple guard of the then king, was upgraded to
General and Commander-in-Chief of military, having full authority of Kazi ~y the king.
He had neither any interest in being developed as a professional military man, adopting
military as a career, nor had he any emotional relations with military professionalism and
establishment. Because he had never been involved in combat activities nor commanded
any military unit, his every effort for enhancing military strength and capability was just
grabbing the political authority and power. For that, military itself cuuld be a threat, if it
was purely professional.
Furthermore, the Rana system was operated entirely by the military command that did not
elevate general people beyond the post of Colonel. It created a class within the military
that also prevented the military from being a highly powerful institution in the country. It
categorized the system ofpajani that assured the continuation of job for their favourites 30
and created uncertainty to the general people. Fresh land grant as Birta was confined only
to the Rana family as Jang Bahadur stopped the land as Jagir in Tarai and then started
cash salary for non-Rana civil-military functionaries. The discrimination in the Jagir
between Rana and non-Rana officers and soldiers ultimateiy helped emerged the corrupt I
tradition of Mukhtiyari Salami a't the time of appointment, continuation and promotion of
Jagir. It is said that the military officer had to present some amount of cash money--even '
valuable materials as a gift for making him happy--to the Maharaja as in the tradition of
Darshan Bhet in Shah reign, discouraged the non-Ranas from continuing the job, for
which the salary paid was too low for maintenance of livelihood. In addition, other
29 Bambahadur Thapa, Rastriya Akhandata ra Swabhimanko Surakshaka Khatir Amarshingh Thapako
Yogdan (contribution of Amarshingh Thapa for National Integration and Self respect), Sipahi (Yearly)-41, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 12008, pp. 90-92.
30 During the Rana period (1846-1950), there were four categories of pajani: (1) Commander-in-Chief and
· the General, (2) Guru, Purohit, Kazi and Sardar, (3) members of the Rana family, and ( 4) the remaining others such as district administrator personnel. It used to be on the basis of report of head of the service
· and Bada Hakim of the concerned districts.
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service I holders, except ruling class people, were also compelled to provide not only
money and materials to the ruler in the name of Gaddi Mubarak and Chumban, but also
other taxes at stipulated times3 1•
For the first time, Bhimsen Thapa, the first civilian military leader and first Commander
in-Chief of army, started random recruitment of his relatives in the military for
consolidation and longevity of his power and position. Since then, the Chhetri domination
in military that was' established by the Shah King himself on the basis of Dharmasastriya
division of labour was glorified32• The control and command of the military was
monopolized by Chhetris as was done by the king before. After establishment of Rana
oligarchy, Chhetria domination, ~n officer's level was remarkably increased because of
their policy to recruit the members of Ran a family in the top posts of military, as given in
the table below.
Table 111.1
Caste-wise Study of Military Officers
:Khas rrhakuri Magar ~ewar Other
Brahmin (Chhetri) (Rajput) k:astes
No. of !Year No. of Year INo. of Year No. of !Year INo. of Year INo. of Year Military
I Military Military Military !Military !Military Officers Pfficers Officers Officers Officers Officers
~ 1841 14 1845 51 1841 17 1841 4 1841 1 1841 14 1854 61 1854 4 1854 ~ 1854 7 1854 3 1854
NOTE: The table has been fonned from the infonnat10n gtven in John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Rise of Jang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 19991, p.l98.
After being Commander-in-Chief and PM, Jang Bahadur recruited all his brothers and
rplatives in the top posts of military and distributed the military portfolios of officer corps
(Colonel to General) to infants of Rana family shortly after his birth and in some cases
before. All members of Rana were placed on the roles, holding military titles with the
rank of a Lieutenant Colonel to begin with. Non-members of the Rana family could not
aspire for any rank higher than that of a commanding colonel in the army and that of
31 Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995. 32 The main cause of increasing Chhetris as military officers was the recruitment of Ranas. But the Chhetris
in military from other nobilities were decreasing because of using pajani by the Rajaim (kingly authority).There were 12 and 10 Basnet, 16 and I Pandey, 6 and 3 Thapa and Kuwar 3 and 26 officers in 1841 and 1854, respectively. On the other hand, Magar, Gharti and Newar military officers were increased in military because of laying down the Muluki A in in 1854, as given in the table.
126
B~da Kazi in civil service. Though he used other castes seeking to strengthen his hold
over the army by taking advantage of ethnic diversity, he was aware of the possible
mutiny by excluding majority of the people in the power structure of the state against
Rana oligarchy.
Until 1846, troops had been recruited from mainly two ethnic groups - Magar and
Gurung. Certain families were treated as "honorary Khas/Chhetris", whilst ordinary
Magars and Gurungs, who possibly accounted for Non-Commission Officers (NCOs) and
privates33, were dispersed throughout all units of the army. Similarly, Jarig Bahadur
altered the rule through open recruitment of the Kiranti tribes (Rai and Limbus) of eastem
Nepal and decided to segregate the different groups in their own regiments in 1847 with
1e intention of minimizing the danger of the mutiny spreading from one regiment to the
other. He formulated the units of three different ethnic groups - the Indo-Aryan, Gurung
~md combined Kiranti, and "Tamang" -in the Kampu34• With the outbreak of war with
Tibet in 1854, separat~ corps was also set up comprising Bhotias, a tribal community
with Tibetan cultural affinity. Nepal military, by tradition, was not confined only to its
professional responsibility, but also had a capacity to influence state power and
administration. Hence, to get an opportunity for being recruited into military as an officer
means to be included in the ruling class and get power, prestige and prosperity as well;
because only the civil-military functionary could get the land as Birta and Jagir in the
name of sacrifice and contribution. To be deprived of the opportunity meant to be Raiti
(subject), where one had no access to and control over state power, administration and the
source of power, the land.
Gurungs and Magars were to be admitted to the Raja Paltan (select regiments or
phitoons) composed earlier by pure Khas through declaration of the Royal Order in 1863.
It opened up military ranks up to Colonel only to these two ethnic groups. The trends of
inclusion in terms of recruitment, promotion and retirement of caste and ethnic groups in
military were established by making the law. However, the opportunity could be provided
on· the basis of the Nigaha '(favour) of the ruler that formally ended in 1950, after
33 John Whelpton, Kings, Soldiers and Priests: Nepalese Politics and the Raise of lang Bahadur Rana, 1830-1857, New Delhi: Manohar, 19991, p:201.
34Kampu is the biggest military unit located in Kathmandu, especially for the security of the Singha Dm·bar, residence of PM and Commander-in-Chief of military and central administration of the Rana government.
127
establishment of democracy, by making a neutral policy of recruitment, promotion and
~etirement, giving equal opportunity to all on the basis of qualification35• It was not only
the civil-military institution, but also all organs of government were separated36
.
However, the tradition, deeply rooted in the minds of ruling class, state institutions and
society for about two centuries, could not be rooted out in the true spirit of democracy. It
became one of the main obstacles to include traditionally deprived people of an equal
footing even after 1990. The considerable increase of hill ethnic groups in military
service has been recorded with 38.10 percent of the officer rank of Brigadier General and
above. However, the percentage cannot represent all ethnic groups and tribes, except
some historically known as warrior groups. The situation in the table below shows the
caste and ethnic background of officers during 1994-2007
Table 111.2
Social Composition of the Officers/Senior Offices in (R)NA ' h R ti fP I f P mt e a o o opu a IOn ercentage
s. Caste and Population in Senior Senior Officers Officers No. Ethnic Groups .(%) . (2001 Officers Officers in 2004 in 2007
Census) in1967 in 2003 1. Chhetri (including 15.80 74.4 38.10 54.13 55.34
Rana) 2. Brahmin (Hill) 12.74 6.5 7.90 19.80 15.21 3. Gwung (Hill 1.47 6.5 15.90 8.91 4.49
Ethnic) 4. Newar 5.48 6.5 6.30 5.28 9.20 5. Magar (Hill 7.14 0.5 7.90 3.63 3.85
Ethnic) 6. Limbu 1.58 - 9.50 1.32 0.57 7. Tamang (Hill 5.64 1.1 1.60 0.99 1.49
Ethnic) 1
8. Thakuri 1.47 Others 9.50 8.91 6.06 9. Sun war (Hill 0.42 3.8 - 0.33,j(37 Others"
Ethinc) 5.0 10. Rajbanshi (Tarai 0.42 - 0.33*5 ~
Ethnic) 11. Rai (Hill Ethnic) 2.79 1.1 3.20 - 0.95
35 HMG/N, SainikNiyamawali (Military Act)-2015, Kathmandu: GMG/Nepal, Ministry of Law and Justice, 1959.
36 HMG/Nepal (1951), Interim· Government of Nepal Act, 2007, Kathmandu: Ministry of Law and Justice 37 * Sunwar (hill ethnic) 0.33% and Rajbanshi (Tarai ethnic) 0.33%, all together 0.66% of the military
officers, are not recorded in 2003; .# Sanysi occupied the largest number among the rest (1.08%) or 34 officers in 2007. Other 18 castes and ethnic groups cover the rest (in percentage): i.e, Kami (0.06), Damai/Dholi/Gandharba (0.25), Sarki (0.06), Kuwar (0.3), Thakali (0.09), Dusad/Paswan/Pasi (0.12), Te1i (0.03), Hajam/Thakur (0.03), Raji (0.38), Darai (0.06),Jirel (0.03), Thami (0.03), Pahari (0.03), and Rajdhob/Pela (0.09). ,
38 ibid
128
Source: "Appendix D ... Senior Army Officers, 1967", Kumar Pradhan, The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal, with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal, Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.273; Jana Astha, Nepali National Weekly, 13 August 2003; Ekaishaun Satabdi, Nepali Fortnightly, 7 September 2003, Shivapuri (Annual Journal of RNA, Kathmandu: Coinmand and Staff College (CSC)','1994-2004 as cited in Amresh Kumar Singh, The Rise of Ethnic and Regional Movements in Nepal: A Case Study of Madhesi Movement, M.Phil. Dissertation, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2005; NA (2007), Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p 51.
Some units and battalions, including Muslim and other religious minorities, have had
been formed by composing different ethnic castes and religious minorities such as Mule
company. For example, Kali Bahadur Battalion and Purano Gorkha formed purely by the
Magar,,the Gurung and the Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups39• The trends of participation of
different castes and ethnic groups provided the room to the general people generally to
serve in the· army but could not end the legacy of some castes/ethnics- Aryan ethnic
gr<;>ups and Gurung-Magar- in top posts that could play an important role in decision
making. Regionally people from some parts of the hill area have been recruited in NA.
Low-castes and all Madhesis and Bhotias (Thakalis) have not been easily promoted to
higher posts. Only the elite section of society or members from selected families who had
been serving in the military during the Shah and Rana regime are mainly privileged to
hold higher echelons in the NA 40•
Hence, the reality ' is that p~ople having poor econom1c background and from
marginalized social groups, lower caste, and so-called "illegible" or traditionally deprived
ethnic and indigenous groups have been deprived of recruitment as Commission Officer
(CO) and promotion as Non-Commission Officer (NCO), including other higher posts,
because of lack of qualification. No government has ever made a positive discrimination
policy for including those who have lack of education and access in the de-facto
administration of NA that played an important role to select, train, groom and promote
c~didates. The main 1problem is to achieve the post higher than Colonel; staff college
I
exam and war college training is a must, but it is conducted by NA Headquarters (HQ)
excluding Ministry of Defense (MoD) with less transparencl 1• No women have been
39 General Rukmangad Katuwal told so in an interview taken by the researcher during the field visit. ~0 Jana Astha, 13 August 2003 41 On the basis of interview taken by the researcher with ex-Defense Secretary of the HMGIN, Vishnu
Datta Upreti.
129
inCluded in the senior officer's level in the RNA, except in the health sector in the Am1y
Hospital and in reaching.jobs in Army School, no Dalits, Muslims, Tarais and Bhotias
were senior officers until 2002. One Dalit (Damai) was promoted upto Major General of
NA. As of now the military hierarchy and posts are as given below: Chief of the Anny
Staffs, General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier General, Colonel,
Lieutenant Colonel, I Major, Captain, Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant, Subedar Major,
Subedar, Jemdar, Sergeant, Lance Corporal, Corporal, respectively42•
Table 111.3 Social Composition of Senior and Junior Officers in NA, 2007
Senior Officers Junior Officers s.~o Castes Remarks
•· No. % No. Yo
1. Chhetri 30 44.8 499 18.6 Senior officers 2. Brahman 6 8.9 405 15.1 range from 3. Thakuri 11 16.4 175 6.5 Brigadier General
4. Guning I 8 11.9 123 4.6 to full General
5. Magar 3 4.5 89 3.3 6. Newar 4 6 230 8.6 Junior Officers 7. Damai 1 1.5 8 0.3 constitute 8. Limbu 4 6 24 0.9 2/Lieutenant and 9. Rai - - 29 1.1 above, to full 10. Others (32 castes) - - 1,101 41.0 Colonel
Total 67 100 2,683 100 Source: Rajesh Chamlmg "Senabhttra Jatlya Tukutt", Mzyo (natiOnal monthly magazme), Vol. 2, 15
January-14 February, 2007, p.7.
The table shows how the inherent promotion system within the NA organization helps to
tbake Chhetri as a dominant caste group in NA. The senior officers who are engaged in I
the policy/decision making process of NA are mostly from Chhetri caste group covering
roughly 45 percent. The gap between the Chhetri and others is vast--that is not easily I
bridgeable. But the scenario of junior officer level given in the table is seen as optimistic-
-that provides a chance to promote officers from marginalized groups up to senior level,
he~ce obviously helpful in making gradually NA inclusive in the near future in terms of
social character.
Issue of Inclusion in NA
The issue of inclusion (Samabesikaran) of people from different castes/ethnic groups,
42 Rajesh Chamling, "Senabhitra Jatiya Tukuti", Miyo (national monthly magazine), Vol. 2, 15 January-14 February.2007, p.8.
130
ge~ders and regions 'has been a hot issue in Nepal after 1990 as Nepal has 103 I
castes/ethnic groups and more than 93 languages according to the population census
2001 43• People have been demanding that Nepal Army be accepted it as "National Army
of Nepal", and must maintain a national character primarily in terms of representation of
all castes, ethnic communities, genders, regions and religious groups in a ratio directly
proportional to the population. However, the Government of Nepal never made any
formal policy on inclusion in the state organs except making 33% women representation
i.h every area of governmental sector in 2007. Militarily men claim that Nepal Army, .I
which is the only institution in Nepal having a system of reservation for five different
castes/ethnic communities-Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Kiranti/Limbu and Madhesi,
creating different com~anies, is a more inclusive institution than others in the country44.
But it is not true that the military institution is really inclusive in the real sense. The total
strength of these five battalions is about 3,950 which makes 4.4 percent of the current
strength, which is really nominal in terms of their population. Such increase in percentage
has not been determined by the intention of inclusiveness but it has been done with a
view to pacifying these groups that can eliminate the possible revolt against
discrimination.
Participation of Kiranti in the hill indigenous communities, and Tharu and Rajbanshi in
'rarai, among several other castes, is worth mentioning within these special battalions.
Even within the Madhesi community, there are several sub-castes but only Rajbanshi and
Tharu. are in dominant position in the Mulla Company. The rest of the fonnations, units
and subunits where all castes/ethnic groups, religious and regional communities are given
equal opportunity based on open competition 45 have provided space to only a handful of
people from marginalized groups. But institutionally, realization can hardly be found, NA
took such advocacy and initiatives as a ploy to disintegrate the population of the country.
It rationalized the logic that every NA member is the first Nepali, then only other
identities based on caste, gender, region, religion and ethnicity. The table gi~en below is
comparatively the various castes and ethnic communities represented in Nepal Army with
43 See, NA Website, http://www.cbs.gov.np/PocketBook2006/content.htm 44 Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Anny: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, . Kathmandu: NAHQ. ~008.
45 Ibid.
their respective population size.
Table 111.4
State of Castes/Ethnic Inclusion in NA
(As of December 30, 2007)
S. . Castel Population INo. !Ethnic Groups (2001
~ens us) (a) (b) (c)
1. : Chhetri !Brahmins
.. Magar . · Tamang
5. Newar40
6. Kami 7. ~i 8 .. Gurung
. !Dhamai/Dholi! 9
· Gandharba
,593,496 ,896,477
1,622,421 1,282,304 1,245,232
895,954 635,151 543,571
~90,305
10. Limbu ~59,379 11. Thakuri 334,120 12. Sarki 318,989 13.' Gharti/Bhujel 117,568 14. Sanysi 199,127 15. Kuma! ~9,389 16 ~hakali 12,973
· Sherpa 16,7585
17 frharu q33,879 · Rajbanshi ~5,812
18. Dusad!Paswan/ Pasi47 158,525
19. ~eli 304,536 ~0. lfiajam!Takur 98,169 21. [Muslim 971,056 22 .. Mechhe 13,763 23. !Zaji 12399 ~4. Majhi 72,614 2_5. IR_arai 14,859 26. Danuwar ~3,229
27. ire! 5,316 28. Thami ~2,999 ~_9. Chepang 152,237 ~0. Pahari 11,505 ~ 1. !Rajdhob, Pela
rrotal 18115,029
% of Tota1;Flepresentation % of !Population 'n NA Total
[R.epresentation d) (e) 1)
15.80 12.74
.14 5.64 5.48
.94
.79 '· 2.39
1.72
1.58 1.47 1.40 0.52 0.88 ~44 p.o6 0.68 6.75 0.42
p.70
1.34 0.43 4.27 0.02 p.Ol 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.10 0.23 tl.05
179.90
7,762 8,979 8,696 5397
,981 2,435
,562 ,053
1,909
~52 ~.358 ~43 645 924 461
139
~,765
34
14 437 26 47 12 1305 142 116 61 62
24 8 ~0 274
1.85 9.95 9.63 5.98 6.62
2.69 2.83 J.38
~.11
1.05 3.72 1.04 0.71 1.02 0.51
0.15
5.28
0.03
0.01 Q_.48 p.oz 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.06 KJ.02 0.02
100
131
n. % o1 1nepresentation Offi 'n Officer leer
C Flepresenta
orps t' ( )
lOll
g h)
1735 55.34 77 15.21
121 3.85 7 1.49
283 9.02 2 0.06 30 0.95 141 ~.49
8 0.25
18 ' 0.57 190 6.06 2 ~.06
34 1.08 I 0.3
3 p.09
17 0.54
4 0.12
1 0.03 1 0.03 r -
12 0.38
2 0.06
1 0.03 1 0.03
1 0,03 3 0.09 ~,135 100
Source: Wikipedta for columns {b) and (c).NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 30 December 2007 for (d) to (g), as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.
'46Dhobi, Chyame/Pode, Kusle, Nau are also included. 47Rajput and Marbadi included.
132
There are 50 castes and 49 ethnic groups - all together 109 castes/ethnic groups -
identified by the population census conducted by the government in 2001. Among them,
only 36 castes and ethnic groups covers roughly 80% out of the total population -
22,736,93448• Among various castes and ethnic communities, Chhetri is in the most
dominant position in Nepal Army. Other fifteen castes/ethnicities (Magar, Newar, Rai,
Gurung, Damai!Dholi, Gharti/Bhujel, Thakuri, Sanysi, Kumal, Hajam/Thakur, Darai and
Jirel) are also slightly over-represented in comparison to their respective populations;
whereas Brahmin, Tamang, Kami, Limbu, Sarki, and Tharu are slightly under
represented. Various Madhesi castes (Serial Nos. 18-25 in the above table) make 14.25
percent of the total population, whereas only 6.26 percent serve in the army.
Very senior to junior service holder officers and most retired senior officers, except the
Generals who are involved· in party politics after their retirement - Gopal Bohara and
Kumar Fudung - expressed logically that recruitment is voluntary, people of each and
every caste and community should not be forced to join Nepalese Army in the name of
Samabeshikaran (inclusion). Such inclusion will not prove to be helpful for
professionally developing the military and maintaining its existing qualification and
discipline.
The provision that every qualified Nepali citizen has an equal opportunity to serve in the
Nepal Army has have been applied since 1959. Quality of military should not be
compromised in any case49• Our neutral knowledge shows that only "Madhesi leaders are
demanding reservation for Madhesi people in military on the basis of population, but
Madhesi people neither are highly enthusiastic to apply for their recruitment in NA nor
are able to adopt the profession after recruitment"50 as the former COAS claimed. If one
examines the issues objectively, the environment and treatment for the people of Madhesi
origin and Dalits may not be favourable in the army. Even equal ranking personnel in the
48 Khanal, Krishna, Rajyako Punarsamra Chana: Ek Prastab (Restructuring of State: A Proposal), Samasamayik Lekhmla- 9, Kathmandu: NCCS, 2004, p.9; HMG/Nepal (2002), Population Census 2001:
, National Report, Kathmandu, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 49Interview with fonner COAS, General Prajwal Shamsher Rana, Retd. Lt.General C.B. Gurung, Retd.
Major General Govinda Gurung, Retd. Major General Dilip Karki and Retd. Lt.General BaJa Nand Shanna.
5° Fernier COAS Prajwal Shams her Rana
133
institution undermine the Madhesis, calling them Dhoti (wrapper of Dhoti), a pejorative
word used for identifying them with the Indians who also wear a similar dress in the '
plains. "Madhesis" are compelly,d to leave the job even after recruitment due to lack of
respect and dignity within the friends circle, group, society and institution. Secondly,
Madhesi people do not have the habit of climbing up and down on the hills because of the
difficult terrain and topographical features. After recruitment, one should fulfil the
criteria fixed for physical training in which running, and climbing up and down with
heavy instruments is required at the initial stage, as it is fully contradictory to their
working habit. Thirdly, it is the system of knowledge production or knowledge
recognition. The motlier tongue of Madhesi people is not helpful for recruitment and . I
promotion system of the Nepal Army, because only Nepali language and English, to
some extent, for officers is required51.
The system is also a barrier to the other indigenous and ethnic communities who have
their own culture, tradition, language and social system that make them ineligible to meet
the criteria fixed by the state. Madhesi people do not have the tradition of joining the
military and generally do not develop the ambition from their childhood to become
~litary men. On the contrary, they want to be technicians in health, forest and other
administrative fields for their career. "The rationale for less inclusion seems to be lack of
interests of people to join the NA"52 "because of lack of hope to be selected and
promoted as well", as given in Table Nos.III.2 and III.? respectively.
Similarly, in the 21st century, the priority of youth of ethnic communities was to be
recruited in Gorkha British Army that paid handsome amounts with more facilities for
their families and children. Its pension also was enough for a family to live comfortably
after retirement. The additional attraction to Gorkha British Army is that every child born
in Britain could settle there and others could get education as its citizen. If one gets
recruited in the army, the second generation of the family could be upgraded to the elite
51 Indra Adhikari, "Basis of Recruitment in Nepal Army'', The Rising Nepal, available at http://www.gorkhapatra.org.npldetail.php? article id= 7 517 &cat id= 7
52 When Silwal asked his Sipahi Deependra Yadav ~orking in Supply & Transport Battalion, Kathmandu, about relatively less recruitment of Madhesis in NA, he said it is primarily due to rugged training. Madhesis prefer to join the Police and other government sectors rather than the Nepalese Army. See in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008.
134
class of the country economically, socially and educationally. Their second priority is to
be recruited in Gorkha Regiment in Indian military, which provides better salary, family
quarters and pension after retirement compared to that of Nepal Army. Children could get
education there and medical treatment for their dependants. Comparatively, one small
family of a soldier of Nepal Army can hardly sustain on the salary of his service even if
he spends the whole life in the arm/3• Their "rich culture is really expensive that can
hardly be maintained by a soldier of Nepal Anny"54• Nowadays, educated youth of
Indigenous communities are attracted to Commission Officers in NA directly because of
the charm of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).
Competition by Different Castes/Ethnic Groups in NA
A voice is raised that the discrimination based on ethnicity is existing in the process of
recruitment in NA even for the post of Sipahi (soldier). The table helps to find a realistic
picture of the hopeful aspirants from various castes and ethnic communities for joining
the.NA in the post of soldier. The statistics show the aspirants who registered their names
to join the NA in January 2007 in Dhading, Patan, Sarlahi, Dang, and Okhaldhunga
recruitment centres as given in the table below. Out of 13,363 applicants, only 1,149
(8.6%) Madhesi and 683 (5.1 %) Dalits have shown their interest in joining NA.
Applicants from Brahmin-Chhetri and Janajati groups from the hills are at the top of the
figure occupying 53.4% and 32.9%, respectively. People from Tarai region have shown
lesser interest than the Dalits, in terms of population ratio.
'· Table 111.5
Candidates Applying For the Post of Sipahi (Soldier) and Follow~rs
js.No. !Recruitment Centre !Brahmin, ~ anaj atillndigenous
lnalits IMadhesi,
tfotal Chhetri !community tfharu 1. IDhading, Baireni 1294 1280 141 53 768
12. Sarlahi, Nawalpur 1764 1468 148 !289 1,569 13. IPatan, Lagankhel 14,240 2,768 258 1273 7,539 14. !Dang, Tulsipur 1,303 1473 152 534 2,462 5. Okhaldhunga 531 1410 84 0 1,025
ITo tal I 17.132 14,399 683 1,149 13,363 !Percentage ~3.4 132.9 ~~~ 10.6 100
Source: NA, Application for recrUitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/
53 Indra Adhikari, "Basis of Recruitment in Nepal Army", The Rising Nepal, see in, · http://www.gorkhapatra. org. npldetail.php? article id= 7 517 &cat id= 7
54 On the basis of a talk with a ex-Gorkha British Army, Som B~hadur Ghale, Parbat who was recruited into the British Army after leaving the job of RNA.
135
Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.
As applications for recruitment of Officer Cadet (to be commissioned as 2/Lt after
tralning) was called, 55 a total of 4,993 male youths from all five development regions and
75.districts applied for the post, making it very tough in getting selected. The table given
below shows the status of representation from various castes/ethnic groups and regions.
Table III.6
Applicants for Officer Cadet on Caste/Ethnic and Regional Basis
jS.No !Development !Brahmin,
~anajatil !Madhesi,
~ndigenous !Dalits rrotal % ' !Regions Chhetri
Community rrharu
1.. !Eastern 1411 168 9 14 602 12.05
~· Central ~.056 11_01 56 @_5 Jb848 57.03 ~. Western 651 197 ~8 10 886 17.75 14. !Mid-Western 286 137 14 14 351 7.02 5. !Far Western ~79 21 ~ 13 306 6.15
rrotal Applicants ~.683 h124 110 76 ~993 100 !Percentage I 73.8 122.5 12.2 1.5 100 100
Source: NA, Application for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p. 51
Out of 4,993 applicants for the post of Officer Cadet (2/Lt), there were 3,683 (73.76%)
from Brahmin/Chhetri community, 1,124 (22.51 %) from Janajati/indigenous community,
'110 (2.2%) from Dalit community, and 76 (1.5%) from Madhesi community. From
geographical point of view, more than 57% youth applied from the Central Development
Region, about 12% from the Eastern Region, approx. 18% from the Western Region,
about more than 6% from the Far Western Development Region, and roughly more than
7% from the Mid-Western Region.
The table given below shows 'the trend of gap between the applicants (in terms of
numbers and percentage) and those selected for training. The selection percentage in both
[IQ test (82.33) and written (85.5)] exams of high caste candidates is high compared to
the total percentage of applicants (73.5). Similarly, the gap is negative and decreasing in
55 NA, Application for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, K&thmandu: NAHQ, November 2007.
I
136
ratio for the Madhesis and Janajatis unlike Dalits whose percentage of application (2.2)
and passed in written exam (1.4) is high rather than the IQ test (1.2). . I
No.
1.
2.
Table 111.7
Comparative Results of IQ and Written Exam for Officer Cadet
Brahmin/Chhetri Janajatillndigenous Dalits Madhesi/ Total Community Tharu
No. % No. % No. % No. % Applicants/percentage 3,683 73.5 1,124 22.4 110 2.2 96 2 5,013
Passed in IQ test '1,267 82.33 237 15.4 19 1.2 16 1 1,539
Passed in written 312 85.5 46 12.6 5 1.4 2 0.5 365 exams
Source: NA, Apphcation for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet, Adjutant General Department/ Recruitment Selection Directorate, Kathmandu: NAHQ, November, 2007; as given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ.,2008, p.Sl.
The probability of selection can· be equal or approximately the same for all applicants
because of competitive exams in NA. Recruitments from Madhesi, Dalit, Mid-Western
Dev((lopment and Far Western Development Regions are likely to be relatively less
because of lack of their access to private or quality education. The social motivation
factors, individual agency and linkage or relationship with the military individually and
institutionally, also play an important role for the opportunity to serve in the NA. Without
developing unifonnit~ in the education policy all over the country, the probability of
proportional representation of all ethnic groups and regions seems less likely as in other
armies of the world. Random selection on the basis of caste only, or only on so-called
quality lines, would not solve the issue but adversely affect the professional competence
and quality of the NA.
Participation of Women in NA
Nepali women participated in the Nalapani war with the East India Company for the first
tlme in Nepali history, but their participation was neither organized nor professional.
Women were confined to their usual household work as before, and the contribution of
women in Nalapani War was limited to the oral history of Nepal. After reforms in the
Nepal Army in 1953, women were recruited into the military in 1960 initially being given
the traditional role in the military: the technical fields - especially in nursing. Service
sectors for women have been widening since 1960, as women were involved as parachute.
137
folders in 1965; as doctors in 1927; in the legal services in 1997; and in the engineering
field in 200456• Women are being recruited purely for military purpose such a's military
police, military band, military civil, military drivers, office runners, signaliers, etc., from
2005 after the Maoist insurgency was intensified following the massive involvement of
female militants. Women's role was successful in making military people-friendly. Thus,
it was not only the NA, but government also realized the importance ofwomen's role in . I
the milit¥)' and made the policy for recruitment of women for defense purpose.The
present status of women's participation in Nepal Army is given below.
Table 111.8
Women's Participation in NA
~ .. Castes/ Officer Pfficer Officer ~unior iN on-
Other No. Community 1st Class 2nd Class ~rd Class
Commission Commission ~anks [Total %
Officer Officer 1. IBrahmin 25 32 55 54 166 15.52
2/. Chhetri 3 9 ~0 35 179 195 511 47.75 3. ~i 3 14 1 5 10 23 ~.15
4. Gurung 2 11 1 4 15 ~3 3.08 5. !Magar 5 1 12 34 52 4.86 6. IDamai 1 ~ 10 0.95 7. INewar 1 ' 3 26 28 45 146 149 13.9 8. Sarki l ~ 4 0.38 9. !rhakuri 1 14 14 4 17 40 ~.74 10. frharu, Rajbansi 1 - 5 ~ 10 0.95 11. IKuman 1 14 5 ~.42 12: 'Jiri Yogi 4 G 7 0.65 13. ~ishokanna 1 14 5 0.42 14. Gharti ~ 3 0.28 15. Sherpa, Thakali 2 1 ~ 0.28 16. !Muslim 1 1 0.09 17. !ramang 2 17 23 142 3.93 18. IPasawan - I I 0.09 19. JLimbu 1 \4 5 0.42
tfotal 14 18 180 103 ~35 1430 1,070 100 Source: NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December 2007; as
given in Puma B. Silwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008, p.51.
Women constitute more than half of the total population of the country. There are I ,070
females covering all ranks57• All female military personnel are recruited in other services,
56 See.. NA website,
http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/wialindex.php?hdng=W omen%20i n%20the%20Army&pg= 1 51 Ibid; and also, Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army),
Sipahi Annual, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p.158 ..
138
$uch as doctors, nurses, helpers, etc., but few women are in the defense $ector. The junior
officers range from Second Lieutenant to Colonel, and senior officers range from
Brigadier General to G~neral. No women from defense are in the rank of "senior military
officer". Senior Generals are mostly involved in the decision making process. The table
clearly says that no women can be evolved in any major decision of the NA. Among the
total officers of Nepalese Army, females as officers - Second Lieutenant to Colonel -
occupy 6.44% as Junior Commission officers recruited directly from Second Lieutenant
18.87%, and as Non-Commission officers promoted from the non-officer posts 9.62% in
total female strength 58•
The responsibility of the military is really significant and its fulfilment in the battlefield is
a very hard task. Therefore, women representation in infantry, particularly in Special
Forces such as Armour, Artillery, etc., is less or rare. Even women's participation in
warships and fighter flights has not been noticed in other countries of the world where
strong navy and air force are in existence59. Women have been given the responsibility
for the combat support and combat services as well. It is perceived that the major cause
behind it is their biologically sensitive and social responsibilities, i.e., role in maintaining
harmony in the family. Secondly, justification from the military point of view is that '·
wqmen's mobilization in frontline of the battlefield is really risky not only for the state,
but for herself also. Several cases can be found in the history of wars w~ere women
soldiers captivated by the enemy have not only been compelled to disclose the secret
military strategy and policy of the country through torture, but are also harassed,
humiliated, raped and even killed after rape. The prime reason of low representation .of
women in military is the patriarchal mentality of senior military officers and civil-leaders
who neither recognize the capacity of women involved in warfare, nor do they expect any
creative thought from her in security policy of the state60•
In addition, most women do not show their interest to adopt the profession in the security
. .' 58 . .
NA, Adjutant General Department/Record Officer, Kathmandu: NAHQ 30 December 2007; Puma B. Siiwal "Democratization and Inclusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064,
· Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008. 59 Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual,
2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, pp.157-59. 60 It is written based on the experience of a couple of female officers in NA They shared the information
with the researcher in an informal meeting with them in the condition that the researcher should not acknowledge them, nor their name and designation in NA should be mentioned in the thesis .
..
139
sectors because of the social perception that women themselves are not secure in the
security force. It is perceived that women are being sexually harassed, verbally abused
and physically exploited in the police and army by their bosses and male counterparts,
whose role is important for their job security and professional career because of the rigid
chain of command. But there is no stringent provision of legal punishment for the
criminals and no transparency can be seen in court-martial. Furthermore, there is no
woman friendly barrack, nor can women soldiers get quarters for settlement of their
families61. A soldier with family cannot sustain out of the barrack because of the low rate
of salary, and women are hardly allowed to live alone out of home. As such, after
marriage, women soldiers can hardly balance their profession and family, except in the
case of women officers who are from the technical field, or are born in a family of I
military officers and get married to the military officers or higher middle class people I
located in cities. That is why, most women prefer the day-time administrative jobs in
non-military services.
If one compares women in NA with other armies in terms of recruitment trends, and
percentage initiation of service, the trend of recruitment of women in military institutions
of other so-called developed and most democratic countries cannot be found as
remarkably good as that of Nepal. There are approximately 20 percent women of the total
U.S. Armed Forces (military, air force and navy) serving in other countries which have a
long tradition of inclusion. India started to recruit women officers for defense purposes
from 1992, except in the technical field. Now, more than 900 women officers are
working in the Indian army, excluding navy and air force, which have just three percent
of the total officers. Similarly, 100 (1.5%) in navy and 450 (4.5%) in air force in India are '
constituted by women in officer level of the respective total strength. But 131 women are
working for defense purpose, 106 in technical field in officer level in Nepal Anny.
Altogether, women constitute , 1.2% of the total strength of Nepal Army (90,274),
dispersing: 39 in Para folder, 163 in nursing, 180 in technical field, 164 in military
administration, 58 in f\)llowers, 554 in soldiers 62, though NAhas aimed to add up to 5%
61 A female officer in NA recruited from legal background told to the researcher in an informal talk, analyzing the situation of women in armed forces on the basis of experience of her female friends in and out of the country.
62 Female strength in NAhas been dealt with by two writers from NA in its Sipahi yearly-41, published in 2008. One has dealt with the caste and post-wise participation referring to 1070 women in Puma B.
140
women in the organization63.
Similarly, neither the UN as a judge of the international legal system is able to make
women participate on an equal footing with men in peace keeping operations, nor is the
rebellion group (such as the Maoists of Nepal which had struggled in favour of the
suppressed, oppressed and discriminated groups) able to treat women equally with the
men. In addition, women in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were not above the
Vice-Commander of their brigade, though they claim that women covered more than one
third PLA during the insurgency. Women involved in PLA accepted that they could not
contribute to PLA despite their" expectation and interest before they joined it mainly
because of physical constraints. To illustrate, more than 17% women guerrillas are not
participating in military activities in the Third Division of the PLA Cantonment, which is
now under the UN supervision because of their reproductive role - bearing, rearing and
caring for children. All together, only 12% women are in ex-PLA cantonments after the
UN verification64• They also have grievances with their leaders that they could not get the
po~ition and treatment ,as their male counterparts got65.
Female soldiers in NA also are more confined to the conventional role as prescribed by
the society rather than modem one. Within the armed forces, it seems that the personnel
recruited and trained for combat purpose are felt as superior and the rest as inferior. In
addition, institutional provision of NA itself made them inferior because the duration of
training for female soldiers is softer than that of their male counterparts66. Indian Anny,
where women officers are upto the rank of Lieutenant General in Armed Force Medical
eyervice and Military Nursing Service, has promoted women neither as combatants nor for
flying fighter aircraft67• The cause, as analyzed by one of the officers in Indian Army, has
Silwal "Democratization' and InClusion in Nepalese Army: An appraisal", Sipahi Annual-41 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ. 2008. p. 51; and another dealt with the role-wise parti~;ipation referring to 1158 women in NA Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier· in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual, 2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p.158. The differentiation in the data about women participation at a time when dealt with by different writers of the same institution shows that only the trend of women participation in NA may be actual, but numerical data is confusing.
63 The COAS, General Rukmangad Katuwal, during the interview. 64 Barsa Man Pun "Ananta" indicated to the researcher while interviewing him. 65 Rabindra Shrestha, "Nepali Senama Mahila Sainik" (Female Soldier in Nepal Army), Sipahi Annual,
2064, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2008, p. 153. 66 Piyush Kumar Sanwal, "Role of Women in Indian Armed Forces", Journal of United Service Institution
of India, Vol. CXXXVIII, No. 571, January-March, 2008. 67 Ibid, p.34.
been framed in Figure No. III.l.below.
Figure 111.1 I
Cause of Inferiority of Women in Armed Forces
Causes of Female soldiers'
inferiority in Military
Law professional output and
enhanced workload due to shortage of
officers
141
Source: The diagram has been prepared on the basis of (1) information given in Piyush Kumar Sanwal, "Role of Women in Indian Armed Forces", Journal of United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXVIII, No: 571, January-March, 2008, and (2) interviews taken with Retd. senior officers ofNA.
The diagram rightly shows how the stresses manifest on women, and how not only
women but military institutions also face its implications. What seems the reality of not
promoting women to higher ranks in armed forces is that the officers are directly
142
attributed to extensive combat arms experience, but women are denied the opportunity to
compete for these positions because they have limited access to combat anns positions68.
Women in Nepal Army, unlike in Indian Army, are not provided less training compared
to that of their male counterparts, but softer treatment - separate physical tests and
standards for womenJ and modification of "service subjects" and outdoor exercise to •.·
accommodate women trainees also made women soldiers inferior in military
institutions69• Likewise, lowering physical standards, soft treatment and shorter duration
of their training in Army created resentment and attitudinal differences from their male
counterparts, as women are preconceived as inferior for their role and capabilities in
accordance with the traditional combat concept of the military.
Military Recruitment, Policy and Trends
No literature provides the exact figure of the number of troops m the compames
established first in the country, .bY P .N. Shah. The history of establishment of professional
military institution has shown that first the Nepal Army adopted th· basic values of
western model from its establishment. P.N. Shah, founder of modern Nepal and king of
Gorkha principality, was the first person who established a military institution with five
companies in 1763 70 comprising the defeated Bangali troops with 400-500 guns of
Nawab Mir Kasim of Bengal under the British command. The troops, under the
command of Gurgin Khan, were sent for military assistance to the king of Makwanpur
one ofthe princely states ofNepal-for offensive action against the Gorkha Empire71• It
is prov~d by the term "company'' that was formed by composing the defeated the English
troops who have obviously played an important role in developing the military ethics,
values and institution. Secondly, the institution is formed by the traditional monarch
un~er his command and is traditionally loyal and obedient to him. Thirdly, the military is
commanded and controlled by a de facto ruler. Finally, the politicized role of the military
that was not separated from the civil administration cannot be ignored. As such, the
68 Ibid. p.35. 69 Almost all ex and in-service senior military officers of Nepal Army whom the researcher had interviewed
agree on the logic of the Retd.senior officer oflndian Army, Sanwal. 70
Shree Nath, Kali Buksh, Barda Bahadur, and Sabuj were formed in September 1762 and Purano Gorkha was formed in February 1963. See, Laxman B. Hamal, Military History of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir, 1995, p. 42. , .
71 D.R. Regmi, Modern Nepal: Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay. 1961, p. 65.
143
military strength in terms of quality and quantity was more dependent on the interest of . '·
the ruler, rather than the necessity of the state and the people72.
P.N. Shah, having a dream to make Greater Nepal, was aware of the limitations of
Gorkha and made a plan enhancing its military and bringing in a number of Matchlock
Rifles and a few experts skilled in the art of making traditional weapons of war73 from
Varanasi in 1744. He established workshops in Gorkha, and increased the number of
warriors by giving military training and distributing weapons to them. He used the rest of
the people engaged 1
in agriculture for defense. Moreover, he had made a policy to grant I
land to the military personnel and his family in the name of Birta and Jagir for rewarding
and promoting the military profession and started a punishment system for establishing
discipline and maintaining military ethics in the military organization. He mobilized
around 12,000 permanent and 80,000 other personnel, such as Dhakre Jhar and Umraos
during his rule (1742-75)74.
Similarly, the first civilian ruler Bhimsen Thapa (1804-37), adopted the French model in
terms of training, discipline and dress (red) for organizing the military, as he had a
perception that the French Army was well trained and stronger than that of the British,
which was at that tiii;le the biggest threat to Nepal. In spite of several efforts of the rulers
on professional development 'to make the military strong through training, new
recruitments and weapons, the military organization became weak in tenns of skill and
quality, since there was a large number and strength due to the favouritism and nepotism
in recruitment, promotion and retirement system randomly. The decreasing quality of
:t;nilitary officers and the standard of conduct after the death of P.N. Shah had been
furthered by Bhimsen Thapa, who recruited his brothers, relatives and nephews - all non
military people having1 no training - in the leading posts of military. This was proved after
the defeat of Nepal by the British during the Anglo-Nepal war in 1814-16, and was
72 lndra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Pelhi, 2006.
73 As far as production of anns and ammunition in Nepal is concerned, old-fashioned weapons such as bows · & arrows, and Khukuris were produced in large scale before unification of Nepal, but in early 1770,
crude kind of arsenal howitzers, mountain batteries, trench mortars and other necessary artilleries, and rifles of Enfield model had been used. See, Ludwig F. Stiller, The Rise of the House ofGorkha: A Study in the Unification of Nepal: 1768-1816, Ranchi: Patna Jesuit Society, 1973, p.89; Madan Kumar Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901-1929): A Critical Appraisal of Nepal-British India
1Relations, New Delhi: Madan Kumar Bhattarai and Royal Nepal Embassy 1990, p.53. 7? Rishikesh Shaha, An Introduction to Nepal, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1975, p.89.
144
proved from the review by H.B. Edwards and H. Mervale: "There is not a soldier in
Nepal; scarcely a single man that has seen a shot fired, and not one that could lead the
army. The chiefs are very poor set, effeminate debauched creatures, wanting in all the
spectable qualities"75.
He developed 155 companies (19,293 permanent and 150,000 temporary) during the war.
It was reduced to 24 companies76 after the Sugauli Treaty in 1816. He had reorganized
the military organization in 1811, introduced the Commander-in-Chief, General and . .
Colonel posts as in the Western form, ended Umraos system at local and district level, as
practiced by Mughals in Hindu states in the plains before the war. He introduced Kampu,
Platon77 and Company, commanded by the Commander-in-Chief himself, Colonels and
General, respectively78• He enhanced the institution for systematization and
. I
professionalization and adopted the western system of military structure, words of I
command, bugle sounds, accoutrement of the men, battalion maneuvers, manual exercise,
military uniform and training system79 inviting British experts from India. He provided a
huge amount of money for increased strength of the army and its traiuing by resorting to
the state for endowments80 allocating huge sums of money for military promotion and
provided a residence to military personnel known as Chhauni for their facility. He further
consolidated the military organization and introduced the post of Jamadars. However,
~ecause of the division in military and nobility of court after the fall of Bhimsen Thapa,
Mathbar Singh Thapa had exerted all power as Commander-in-Chief with the right to
punish, in accordance Vfith caste, all those who did not obey the order of Commander-in
Chief.
Rana Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Janga Bahadur (1846-56 and 1857-77)
75 Edwards and Merivale 1872:8-9 as cited in Rishikesh Shaha, Modern Nepal: A Political History 1769-1955, Vol. I, 1762-1885, New Delhi: Manohar 1990.
76 Tulsi Ram Vaidya et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda. 1993.
77Kampu was a regiment stationed at the capital and Platan was one of the military units commonly known as platoon in English.
78 Tulsi Ram Vaidya et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali JangiAdda. 1993,p.110.
79 Bikrama Jit Hasrat, History of Nepal: As Told by Its Own and Contemporary Chroniclers, Punjab: Bikram Jit Hasrat 1970, p.228.
80 Rishikesh Shaha, An Introduction to Nepal, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1975, p.l!3.
145
pl~ced all male members of his family on the role holding military titles with the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel to begin with, as his "family affair". Non-members of the Rana
family could not aspire for any rank higher than that of a commanding colonel in the , I
:arml1• ~e strengthened the military in terms of numbers, established hold on the anny
by exploiting ethnic diversity, and modified the organizational structure introduced by
Mathbar Singh Thapa. He further introduced a new rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, increased
the number of Colonels and Generals, and established standard Rifle Regiments in 1846
and adopted a somehow inclusive recruitment policy. Thus, he included other excluded
ethnic castes selectively: people - Rai and Limbu from the eastern part and employed
~ikh soldiers from religious minoritl2 and Bhotias from the Himalayan region during the
Nepal-Tibet War in 1855-56. Similarly, he granted an opportunity to the ethnic soldiers
of promotion up to Captain, especially for Gurung and Magar who were Jamadars earlier
on the one hand, and ilwluded other ethnic groups in his Regiments, Kampu on the other
through the Jangi A in (Rule of J ang Bahadur) in 1854 proclaimed by him.
Similarly, civil administration and military organization were separated m 1951 after
establishri1ent of democracy in Nepal. The new leaders initiated not only military
institution reorganization, but also decreased its numerical strength from 25,000 to 6,000.
And an effort had been made to develop it as a professional institution providing training
by Indian Military Mission since 1952. However, King Mahendra developed its strength
up to 45,000, provided more facility, and equipped it with modern weapons after taking
over power in his hands from the elected government after 1960 in order to make the
institution of monarchy more secure83• The same situation was repeated after 1996 in the
name of establishing "peace,, and security" in the country for countering the Maoists
insurgency. No substantive change in its recruitment and promotion policies in RNA has
taken place even after the restoration of democracy in 1990. The officers , from ethnic
.81 Ibid, p.l40. 82B.ut the Sikh corps of 104 soldiers and a few Hindustanis were recruited as drillmasters and artificers in
the magazines. The Indians were desisted by Jang Bahadur on the strong request of British government because they belonged to the Koka sect known for its virulent anti-British stance. See, Kanchanmoy Majumdar, Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century, Calcutta: Firma SLM 1872, p.166 as cited in Madan Kull¥lr Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901-1929): A Critical Appraisal of· Nepal-British India Relations, New Delhi: Madan Kumar Bhattarai and Royal Nepal Embassy 1990, p.55, I
83 R.S. Chauhan, The Political Development in Nepal1950-70: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity, New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971.
146
groups, especially Gurung and Magar, who were familiar with warfare, have not yet
reached the level of Commander-in-Chief till 2007. Thus, one important question had
be~n raised after 1990 how Nepali people could expect the RNA of being automatically
an apolitical professional institution that could help institutionalize democracy, as it was
led by the same group of people who led the NA before 1990, and its structure also
remained the same? Nepal Army has been occupied by the so-called "legible" "High
caste Hindu male", especially Chhetris and Raj puts from the hilly region. Out of 3 7 Chief
of the Army Staff, 26 are from Rana and 11 from Shah, Thapa, and Basnet families who
served the Gorkha Kot politics84. It thus does not mean that sacrificial change in polity
does not necessarily make structural transformation, for which behavioural change in
holistic approach is required. '·
The basic realities of the country: geopolitical situation and external environment, '
internal political situation or an ambition of the de facto ruler also creates ups and down
. in the military strength in terms of quality and quantity. The military that has rarely been
used for security of state has not only been used for getting, exerting and maintaining
power of the state, but also for getting external support to make either imperial British or
democratic India happy during the Rana regime. The military numerical and professional
strength was highly developed and used by Bhimsen Thapa, Jang Bahadur Rana, King
Mahendra and Gyanendra in comparison to others during 1804-16, 1846-77, 1960-65 and
·after 2002 to 2007, though the coordinating and coercive performance of the military
seemed poor. Even the King (Rajendra) had formed a military unit separately twice for
recapturing power from the Commanders-in-Chief and PMs- Mathbar Singh Thapa85 and
J.B. Rana - inside and outside the country. It had been increased and used mostly for
personal purpose, except in the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-16) and Nepal-Tibet war (1855-
56) waged by Bhimsen Thapa and J.B. Rana, respectively. Otherwise, the country as a
whole was militarized for the sake of security of the ruler who used to mobilize it for
fighting under the flag ofeither India after its independence or British during World yYars
84 Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New D('!lhi, 2006.
85 King Rajendra formed a military regiment, Hanuman Dal in 1838, for personal security of the king and queen and to recapture power from Mathbar Singh, PM and Commander-in-Chief of military. He formed and trained a military regiment in 1847 for collecting nobility in exile for getting back power from Jang Bahadur. Most of them w~re killed in Alau massacre.
147
I & II, including for suppression of the mutiny in India. Nepal had provided more than
49,000 and 160,000 military personnel to British India in 1915 (First WW), and 1939
when Britain attacked Gennany in the wake of the Second World War, respectively. The
table given below shows this reality. The total military strength (numbers within I
bracket~), indicates the temporary military recruited either at the time of national crisis,
or for military support to British-India86.
Table 111.9
Trends of Military Recruitment and Permanent Strength
s. !Year
!Number De facto Ruler Source No. of Strength 1. 1769 1,200 P.N. Shah Server 1993:8 2. 1802 18,000 Girvan Yuddha Bhattarai 1990:52 3. 1814 19,293 (150 000) Bhimsen Thapa l.Jandon 1928:187 4. 1834 12,000 Do- Satish Kumar 1967:27 5. 1836 18,00 Mathbar Singh Thapa Basrat 1971 :225 6. 1841 19,000 Do- Bhattarai 1990:51
~· 1847 18,000 ~.B.Rana ;Basrat 1971:323,
8. 1857 50,000 (1/4 million men mobilized in
Server 1993:123 & 90 ~epa!-Tibet war during 1755-56)
9. 1859 26,000 Do- !Bhattarai 1990:51 10. 1861 17,000 Do- iBasrat 1971:344 11. 1873 17,000 Do- Shaha 1990d:259 12. 1877 16,000 Do- IBhattarai 1990:51 13. 1883 18,000 (46,000)* !Ranudip Singh Server 1993:171 14. 1915 .•• (49,000)* k:;handra Shamsher (WW-l) Server 1993: 256 15. 1922 f'9 454 Do- •. !Bhattarai 1990:51 16. 1925 ~6,500 Do- Bhattarai 1990:52 17. 1938 160,000# Juddha Shamsher _{WW-II}_ Server 1993: 349 18. 1951 25,000 Mohan Shamsher/Tribhuvan Server 1993:399 ' 19. 1952 6,000 Do- Server 1993:399 20.' 1963 145,000 Mahendra . Chauhan 1971:235 21. 1990 35,000 Birendra Kumar & Sharma 2005:40 22. 2000 47,411 Do- Adhikari 2008:70 23. 2001 53,000 Gyanendra Mehta 2005:54 24. 2002 63,000 Do- Rajdhani Daily 25 July 2002 ~5. 2004 70,000 Do- The Kathmandu Post 17 January2004 ~6 .. 2004 85,000 Do- The Himalayan Times 11 October 2004 27. 2007 90,226 Do- NA 2007 .. Source: Indra Adhikan, Mzlztary Democracy Inteiface zn Nepal, 1990-2002, D1ssertat10n submitted to JNU,
New Delhi, 2006, p.63.
Note: *The numerical strength of standing army could not be found, but the numbers given within brackets
86 Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Inteiface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006; Laxman B. Hamal, Military Hist01y of Nepal, Kathmandu: Sharad Pustak Mandir. 1995; Tulsi Ram Vaidya, et al. Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Adda, 1993.
148
indicate only the dhakres, i.e., irregulars, I '
#The number includes the total military strength: standing army and irregulars.
Several measures had been taken by the regimes in different times of history for
1;trengthening the military organization. One was the promotion of agriculture by P.N.
Shah for defense purposes by collecting tax on more than fifty percent of production in
the hills. Second, land used to b~ granted under the scheme of Birta and Jagir directly to
military personnel and their family in the name of reward and allowance. The third, huge
portions of land, known as Guthi, were used for getting blessings from Hindu Gods and
Goddesses to motivate and strengthen the military psychologically during the Shah and
Rana regimes, where the sources of income of the state were used for defense purposes.
There was no distinction between the personal income of the PM, and the state budget
that was never known to the 'subjects'. The revenue of the state used to be distributed to
the. PM's brothers, sons, nephews and relatives, apart from receiving the most senior post I
and position, whilst the salaries of other functionaries remained static. Bhimsen Thapa
allocated a large sum of money for military promotion and provided a residence to
military personnel known as Chhauni for their facility. During the Rana regime, Chandra
Shamsher distributed a generous amount of money to the military personnel involved in
First WW and made a hospital for providing facility to them and their families. Juddha
Shamsher established a military fund for promoting the military. The defense budget was
~'eparated formally in 1951 for the first time in Nepal after the formation of the interim
government.
The trends of prioritizi.Jilg the socio-economic sectors were started and automatically the
military felt being marginalized comparatively until the 1960 coup of King Mahendra, as
it had enjoyed the whole source of the country before. King Mahendra expected to further
strengthen the position of the army in the country's political setup in order to make the
institution of monarchy more secure. Thus, he not only increased the strength of the army
by .Providing it with more facilities and equipping it with modem weapons, but also
changed its name from Nepal Army to Royal Nepal Army as personal anny of monarchy
and increased defense expenditure that reached 30% (of GNP) in 1963, "more than
international standard"87•
87 R.S. Chauhan, The Political Development in Nepa/1950-70: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity,
'·
41
149
In 1989, the defense expenditure in Nepal (29.5% of GNP) was more than that of other
South Asian countries (16.7% in India and 19.0% in Pakistan of their GNP) except Sri
Lanka (32.6%)88, which was seriously fighting for curbing the ethnic conflict (LITE)
since the early 1980s as gi ven in the Figure III.3 below. Even during Birendra's regime
(1972-90), the number of military personnel was more or less similar, but the rate of
defense expenditure had increased as given in the Figure III.2. These two figures show
the trends of defense expenditure in Nepal during 1960-198689.
Figure 111.2
Trends of Increasing Defense expenditure(in million $)
OO T---~------~--------------.
70
Figure 111.3
Budget Allocation and expendi t ure o defense after 1960
12 -.-----~----------.
Ero 41 Ol nl
10
8
6
4
2
-gso c 41
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w ~30 r::: .!20 41 0 10
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Fiscal Year
Source: Appendix-III.2 . Source: Appendix- Ill. I
The character and composition of the army, especially of the officer corps , could not be
altered after political change in 1951 . Absolute power over the army was with the King90.
Even defense ministers used to be appointed from amongst the royal favourites or e~
military officers, and no provision of check and balance in terms of strengthening,
New Delhi: Associated Publishing House 197 1, pp.234-235 . 88 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepa l 1980-1 990: Referendum. Stalemate and Triumph of People Power,
New Delhi : Manohar, 1990, p .56. 89 See Appendix 1 and II , as given in lndra Adhikari , MilitGiy Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002,
Dissertation submitted to JNU, ew Delhi, 2006, p . l37. 90 Article 64, HMG!Nepal, Nef!al Adh irajya Ko Samvidhan-2015 (The Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal -
1959), Kathmandu, 1959
150
deploying, controlling and commanding was with the people's representatives during the
democratic era 1950-59. The King used power to control and strengthen the military.
King Mahendra '\Vas absolute King holding the top military title of Supreme Commander
in-Chief of military. He became his own defense minister in 1960-62 and brought about
the· numerous changes in the command of the army at all levels. The officers of RNA are
mostly drawn from the same castes and families which supplied the officers during the
Sh~h and Rana rule. Promotion to ranks above Lieutenant-Colonel is not based only on
professional skills and recommendations of the army, but also requires approval of the
king and the government. After establishment of the Panchayat system in 1960, the motto
of RNA is reflected in this declaration - "Raksha, Samman, ra Kalyan, aafno desh ra
naresh sarbapratham sada janu dharma, karam sipahi ko"91•
The King ·could take decisions on the welfare and training of the officers and the army
through special powers and grants bestowed on him by tradition that brought the anny
closer to the King naturally. Thus, the RNA regarded the King as the personification of
the state and had developed its perception that "there is no such thing as loyalty to the
state and the people as distinct from loyalty to the king as a person"92. The role of the
king had been limited, but the subject of liberating the psychology of military in the
context of democracy was ignored; and the separation of King from the anny was
unthinkable even during the democratic era in the post-1990 Nepal. .. The constitl;ltional provisions for a "Defense Council consisting of Prime Minister,
Defense Minister and the Commander-in-Chief did not work out because oftlle continued
interest shown by the King in defense matters. The Army, on its side, also looked upon
the King as the ultimate power centre regardless of the constitutional spirit since the April
2006 Jana Andolan II. The president had replaced most of the power and authority of the
King93, the name and structure of National Defence Council was replaced by National
I
Security Council. The diagram given above shows the present structure of the Military I
Institution ofNepal.
'· 91 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepal I 980-I 990, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1990; Ashok K. Mehta, The
Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005, p.41; Indra ,Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, I 990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006, p.66.
92 Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepal 1980-1990: Referendum, Stalemate and Triumph of People Power, New Delhi: Manohar 1990, p.25.
93 Government ofNepal, Interim Constitution ofNepal 2007, Fourth Amendment, 2008.
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Experience of Exposure of NA
The Nepal military force was not able to share its expertise, except to learn from its
counterparts even during the Second World War because of lack of knowledge about
modem weapons which had been used and for which they had been trained. The poor
performance and cohesive capacity of the Nepal Anny (NA) in the modem age, made the
govemrn~nt realize the importance of the training and exposure that make the military
men aware of the new tools and techniques for advancement of military skill and
capacity. Historically, different rulers from its establishment had trained the Nepal Anny
based on the western model at different times. After reorganizing the military by
seiecting "serviceable" elements of the old Rana army subsequent tol951, Nepal army
was trained by an Indian Military Mission for over a decade since 1952. The same
~ission was renamed as Indian Military Training and Advisory Group (IMT AG) after six I
years94• Again, IMTAG was redesigned as the Indian Military Liaison Group that was
turned, after scaling it down, into a Stores Liaison Group and worked for receipt of
military equipment for the NA until 1970. There has been an addition of Sandhurst and
Dehra Dun Military Academy-trained junior officers over the year95. The bulk of NA's
training was handled by India under the Special Aid Programmes of the Ministry of
D~fense. Moreover, the UK and the USA96, including India, have also been providing
training on military courses. In addition, Nepali military engagement continues today
through International Military Education and Training (IMET), Enhanced International
Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)97, and various conferences and seminars. The U.S.
military sends many NA officers to America to attend military schooling such as the
Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. Commander-in
Chief Pacific (CINCP A C) coordinates military engagement with Nepal through the
94 Ashok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005, p.5. Indra Adhikari, Military Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU,
. New Delhi, 2006, p.66:5. 95
Rishikesh Shaha, Politics in Nepa/1980-1990, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1990, p.25. 96T~e US-Nepali military relationship focuses on support for democratic institutions, civilian control of the
military, and the professional military ethic to include respect for human rights. Both countries have had extensive contact over the years. RNA units have served with distinction alongside American forces in places such as Haiti, Iraq and Somalia.
97EIPC. . IS an mteragency programme between the Department of Defense and the Department of State to increase the pool of international peacekeepers and to promote interoperability.
153
Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)98. The ODC Nepal is located in the American
Embassy, Kathmandu. ,
Similarly, UNPKO provided various opportunities to NA to be exposed worldwide by
participating actively in most UN activities following the UN process99, when Nepal
betame a member of UN in 1955. NA's involvement in Peace Support Operations (PSOs)
with different roles started with its first deployment as Military Observers in the Middle
East with UNOGIL in 1958. The first Nepali contingent in UNPKO (five personnel of
Purano Gorkha battalion) was deployed as an observer in Egypt in 1974 accepting the
b~ic principle of the UNPK0 100• Over 64,616 Nepalese soldiers have served in support
of UN peacekeeping endeavours in the 44-year long history of participation in the UN
peacekeeping operations101• Currently the Nepalese Anny has some 3121 soldiers serving
in 16 different Missions around the World. Nepal has a commitment to provide upto 5000
soidiers for UN operations if so requested 102•
Nepal Anny has contributed outstanding Force Commanders, elite military contingents,
impartial military observers and dedicated staff officers in the missions. The recognition
in UNPKO is good enough not only because of NA's devotion to duty and "excellent
perfonnance", but also because of their participation in some of the most difficult
operations, though some of them suffered casualties in the service of the UN. Till
D~cember 2007, 54 NA personnel have sacrificed their lives in the line of duty and 57
98 RNA website, www.ma.mil.np, 10 February 2006. . 99First, the Under-Secretary General of UN DPKO will request the Permanent Representative of Nepal at
UN HQ. The Permanent Representative will forward the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal. The request is then forwarded to Ministry of Defense (MoD), Nepal. MoD will in tum forward the request to Army HQ. Consultation takes place at Army HQ. The feasibility survey of the mission is conducted. Request for Approval is sent by the Army HQ to the Cabinet. Approval by the cabinet is sent back to the Army HQ. Letter of Acceptance is sent through Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisor to the Permanent Representative at UN Head Quarters. Then the UN Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Inspection team inspects all the equipment of the unit going to be deployed. Final approval from UN DPKO is sent to Army HQ. Memorandum of Understanding is signed and troops are then deployed.
100 Basic principles to approaching military participation in different peacekeeping operations are: (1) Peacekeeping operations should be under the command and control of the UN, (2) Formally approved mission by United Nations Security Council should synchronize with our national objectives, (3)Availability of adequate resources to accomplish the mission, professionally trained and equipped troops, and ( 4) to fulfill the com~trnent of mission as directed by UN mandate and level of risk should be taken
101 Rajendra Chhetri, Rastra Sanghiya Shanti Senama Nepali Senako Sahabhagita ra 50 barsako upalabdhi, chunauti ra sambhabana (NA participation in Peacekeeping Mission and gain, challenges and
. possibilities), Sipahi (yearly)-41, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2008, pp. 1-4. 102 NA website, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na un.php, server date 24 July 2010.
154
were disabled. Its most significant contribution has been of peace and stability in Africa.
NA has never turned down a request for troops, which has come with almost every
UNPKO. It has the distinction of having a Nepali General, Brig, Gen. C.B. Gurung, as
the first officer from the Third World as military advisor to the UN Secretary General on
PK0 103 and Lt. General Bala Nand Sharma as UN special representative of Security
General, Head of UN Mission, since 2006-07. The table below gives NA's involvement
in UNPKO until2007.
Table 111.10
Participation of NA in Different UNPKOs
S.No. !Mission [Year 1. IUNOGIL, Lebanon (Military Observers) 1958 2. UNIPOM, India/Pakistan (Military Observers) 1966 3. UNEF II Sinai, Middle East (Peacekeeping Troops) 1974 4. UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops) 1978 5. UNGOMAP IIII, OSGAP IIIIIIII (Military Observers) 1989 6. UNMOT, Tajikistan 1989 7. UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq (Force Commander) 1991 8. UNMIH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops) 1991 9. UNTSO, Israel , Middle- East (Chief of Staff) 1992 10. PNISOM; Somalia (Peacekeeping Troops)- 1993 11. IUNPFIUN PROF OR, Former Yugoslavia 1994 12. IUNGCI, Iraq (Peacekeeping Troops) 1995 13. IUNOMIL, Liberia(Military Observers) 1996 14. IUNTAES, Eastern Slovenia (Military Observers) ' 1996 15. iUNPREDEP, Macedonia (Military Observers) 1996 16. IUNMOP, Prevalaka (Military Observers) 1998 17. IUNOMSILIUNAMSIL, Sierra Leone (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 18. IUNAMETIUNTAETIUNMISET, East Timor (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 19. iUNFICYP, Cyprus (Force Commander) 1999 20. IUNMIK, Kosovo (Military Observers) 1999 21. IMONUC, DR Congo (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 22. IUNMEE, Ethiopia/Eritrea (Military Observers) ~000 23. IUNMIL, Liberia- Provost (Peacekeeping TroopS) ~003 24. IMINUCIIUNOCI, Ivory Coast (Military Observers) 2003 25. IUNOCI, Cote d'lvoire 2003 26. IMINUSTAH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops) 2004 27. IUNDOF, Israel/Syria (Force Commander & StaffiS 2004 28. IONUB, Burundi (Peacekeeping Troops) 2004 29. ~S, Sudan (Peacekeeping Troops) 12004 30. IUNIFIL (Lebanon) 2006
I 31. IUNOMIG(Georgia) 2007 32 MINURCAT, Chad (Military Observers) 2008 33 UNAMI, Iraq 2008
UNMIT, Timor-Leste 12008 Source:http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/pk/peace support operatJons.php?hdng=Peace%20Support
103 ·~shok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co, 2005
155
%200perations&pg=l. Server date 21 March, 2008; http://www.nepalam1y.mil.np/na !:!.!lJ2!m, server date 24 July 201 0.
It has demonstrated its unique capacity of sustaining large troop commitments over
prolonged periods. Presently;·Nepal is ranked as the fourth largest troop contributing
country {TCC) to the UN. As a "peace loving and non-aligned nation", NA's image has
remained ideal in strengthening the world body for international peace and s~curity. The
NA is now deployed across 31 missions around the world, namely Congo, Liberia,
Kosovo, Lebanon, Israel, Haiti, etc. In addition, NA has sent an officer to the UN HQ .. Mission Planning Cell and one liaison officer at Tampa Bay, Florida. However, the
appointment of senior officers of NA in New York and in the field has ,not been I
satisfactory as expected104• Comparatively, Senior Officers from developed countries are
I
mostly in dominant position of UNPKO in the ratio of the participation of fonned units
from different countries of the world. Similarly, the upper caste officers from Nepal,
especially from the "warrior clan", have got the opportunity of being represented in
UNPKO; officers mostly from marginalized socio-economic background and having no
linkage with military authority and royal palace get the chance. It is because there are
fixed criteria to select the officers in UNPK0105• Only the· officers who have good
exposure, advanced training and skill development opportunities can be selected, but
these opportunities can hardly be provided to the personnel from the deprived sections
and· committees in N~pal Army in comparison to the high castes.
Similarly, officers from the developing country in higher ranks of UNPKO have less I
<fhance to meet the criteria compared to those of developed countries. Several officers and
non-bfficer , ranking soldiers are not satisfied with the selection process of NA
participating in UNPKO, which is clear in document106 but not transparent in practice. '
Even wives and children of retired military officers expressed grievances that they never
got the chance to leave the country because their husbands could not become military
104 Ibid, p.3 105 Ibid. 106A commanding officer, a Subedar Major, one platoon, and a battalion flag are chosen as the nucleus. 600
soldiers are selected from across the Army and another 200 are chosen for outstanding contribution to the RNA by the method given here: (I) about 25% of the battalion strength is made up of soldiers recommended by their unit commanders for the exceptional work and bravery that they have shown during operations against insurgents in the country, and (2) working on the quotas distributed by RNA Department ofPKO to the various units of RNA, the other 75% is also selected by the unit commanders according to seniority, discipline and other factors and guidelines as prescribed by the department.
156
attaches in Nepal Embassies in overseas countries.
As· a troop contributing nation, Nepal ranks fourth m the South Asian region and
currently Nepal Army has 3,112 soldiers serving in different missions around the world.
It ~as contributed directly to the foreign policy of the state. It provides an opportunity to
be experienced having exposure that directly helps the participants for enhancing their
professional qualification. In addition, the economic benefit accruing to the personnel can
ease the financial burden of the personnel. Money sent by the soldiers is also used as WF,
'/hich can be used for the dependants of the retired and in-service soldiers for medical
treatment, schooling, vocational or skill development trainings, etc. 107
One of the attractions of a job in NA is the service opportunity in UNPKO. In spite of ad
hoc recruitment system; unattractive pay, pension and perks, and absence of a regimental
system, camaraderie gap between officers and soldiers and between officers themselves,
rampant "corruption ... at various levels, especially at the very top" 108 and low morale,
Nepali youth join the NA with an eye on a lucrative UNPKO mission. By serving one
year in the UNPKO, a soldier earns a handsome amount of money, which cannot be
earned even during his entire service period in the NA. Thus, on the suggestion of a
fl.eighbouring country, India, and some intellectuals in Nepal, to suspend UNPKO and
mo,bilize NA for counter-insurgency services to avert the threat of the Maoist insurgency
in the past, the COAS viewed that such a move would lower the troops' morale and lead
to a decline in recruitment109. Each soldier contributes 12% of his UN emoluments to the
NA Welfare Fund (WF) 110. The WF source entirely depends on the contributions of the
soldiers directly or indirectly. Not only general people, but also ex-military men started
charging the NA authority for increasingly using the WF for corruption purposes, as its
status was not publicized in spite of the claim of the concerned people for their right to be
informed. The criteria, such as collection and use of the WF, its transparency, decisive
body to change or make relevant policies, etc., has been published in 2006 111, after the
Supreme Court ordered for the fourth time in 2006 to publicize its audit. Prior to this,
107 NA, Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006, p.4-32 108 Ashok K. Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2005. 109 KantipurDai/y 3 August 2005. 110 NA Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006, p. 5.
157
there was no transparency 112 and no one was clear about the Fund. People defame the
NA without sufficient knowledge of the use of the fund 113•
The question of the general public about how the process is being operated and how
much money is collected in the name of the 'fund', is now answered by RNA in a book
distributed to the upper ranking officers or conscious personnel and officers. However,
general soldiers and the staff are not aware of how much money they get from UN, what
expenses have been made for sending them in the mission, how much from their side has
been deducted towards WF, and how can they be benefited from the Fund. Soldiers know
what kind of facility they are getting and will be getting from the NA, but they do not
know how they are benefited from the Fund. They do have the tradition to clear soldiers'
doubts from higher officers, or concerned body ofNA, if they ask. They could easily ask
'why a small sum of two rupees was cut in Ashbin from their salary to celebrate Dashain,
but could not question about the handsome amount of money that came from the UN
directly to the NA institution for services rendered by them, and the deductions made
towards WF114• (They do not know exactly how much money they get from the UN and
how much NA cut for the WF 115). Most facilities given to the soldiers and their
dependants are managed from the WF (NA 2006). There is unconfinned rumour that out
of this fund, abuse has been reported. A case was also filed in the Supreme Court which
asked for clarification from the Military Headquarters. Only then, Kalyankari Darpan
was published clearing the doubt.
Corruption cannot be ruled out even in NA, but this does not mean that it prevailed at
each and every level. Only the high-ranking officers involved in the decision-making and
execution process, having a leading role in other units, might have the chance to misuse
and abuse their authority of power. Not only the WF, but also other funds allocated under
.. 111 Kalyankari Darpan, Kathmandu: NAHQ, 2006. 112 See, Ashok K. (Mehta, The Royal Nepal Army: Meeting the Maoist Challenges, New Delhi: Rupa
Co.2005. • 113 According to Ashok K. Mehta, each soldier contributes 30% from his UN emoluments in the fund. It is
reportedly said that one has to sacrifice more than 50% remittance for the fund but one of the retired Major General cleared "40% remittance should be contributed in Welfare Fund of Nepal Army". It seems there is some gap in understanding.about the fund even in the higher-ranking military officers. The retired officer shared his experience that a Colonel can get about US$ 1000, but $ 400 should be contributed in WF.
114 The COAS, Rukmangad Katuwal during the interview with the author. 115 Based on interview t~ken by the. researcher with Major General (Retd.) Dilip Karki.
158
different headings might be misused. "Officers leading road cor~struction, bridge
construction, artillery arrangement, logistic arrangement, selection of soldiers to send in
UNPKO are reportedly charged with corruption even from the people within the
institution, but it can be claimed that the level of corruption in NA in comparison to the
civil institutions and other security organs is "less or rare" 116• Ministry of Finance also
justified the logic, as they find well-managed documents with comparatively good
auditing117, compared to other governmental institutions.
Opportunities for Education and Training
To provide a pre-mission training for Nepali Contingents participating in PKOs in the
country, Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre (BPOTC) was established in 1986
on an ad hoc basis but it turned into a full-fledged POTC after organizing international '·
platoon sized exercise in 2002. The centre as a training institution was established
formally in November 2001 118•
Table III.ll
Military Educational Institutions and Training Centers in Nepal
~.No. IMilitarv Educational Institutions Nature of Work/Education 1. Nepal Army Command and Staff College Shivapuri ~. Nepal Army School Nagarkot 3. Military Academy Kharipati 4. Nepal Army Recruit Training Centre Trishuli 5. !Nepal Army Jungle Warfare School A.inlekhguni 6. !Nepal Army High Altitude and Mountain Warfare School !Mustang 7. !Nepal Army Intelligence School !Kharipati 8. !Nepal Army Logistics School Chhauni 9. IBirendra Peace Keeping Operations Training Centre IPanchkhal 10. rrhe Nepal Army Para Training School IMaharaiguni 11. !Engineer Training School ~irport 12 .. Signal Training School [ripureswor 13 .. ~illery Training School !Lagankhel 14. lA viat10n Training Centre !Airport 15. !Electrical and Mechanical Training School. IK.hari oati Source: Va1dya et a!., 2049 VS. (1993), op c1t; RNA website www.ma.mil.np (as cited in Adhikari 200~:71).
Actually, Nepali Army started to be trained with the establishment of the Nepalese Army
School in Chhauni in 1953. Some army training and teaching schools are established with
116 Based on interview taken by the researcher with Lieutenant General (Retd.) BaJa Nand Sharma. 117 An experienced Joint-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance shared his experience with the researcher . about the corruption case in NA.
ns "Selection Criteria of Soldiers for Peacekeeping Operations", www.ma.mil.np , server date, 16 June 2004).
159
the establishment of companies and battalions in the field. The Nepal Army Air Service
consists of both helicopters and fixed wing transports with limited gro~nd suppoti
capability. Training assistance is funded by an annual International Military Education
and Training Programme (!MET) grant, with physical training assistance provided by .. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the UK and the US. Now, NA has established many army
level academies and schools under the Directorate General of Military, Training . I
(DGMT) 119 as given above, to develop a professional performance in the military
leadership and subordinates.
NA in Developmental Activities
Nepal has been usin~ NA as "one of the most efficient or trained manpower and
resourcesj cost effective and dedicated machineries" for development and support of
national progress for many decades. Except its role in 'Malami, Shalami and Gulami'
(funeral procession, salute and buttering) popularly tenned after 1950, the NA has been
involved in civilian developmental activities like construction of roads and bridges,
construction of schools, natural conservation works and social service. The table below
shows NA's contribution in road construction in the country.
Table 111.12
Roads Constructed by NA
~.No. !Name of the Road \Length 1. IK.antirajpaht, Kathmandu-Birgunj* 60 miles 12. IPasang Lhamu Highway, Trisuli-Somdang* 105 km 13. IKattari-Okhaldhunga road 88 km 14. Salyan-Mushikot road 86km 5. IHile-Bhojpur road* 82 km 6. IMushikot-Burtibang 145 km t?. IDevasthal-Kainkanda road 131 km 8. Surkhet-Jumla road 1232 km 9. IBaglung-Beni-Jomsong road 60km 10. IBeshisahar-Chame road 65 km 11. Chhinchu-Jaiarkot road 107 km 12. IDrabya Shah Marga, Abuba-Sirandada Bhakshek, Gorkha# 145 km 13. Satdobato Nibel, Baluwa Sadak# 37 km 14. IGorkha Manokamana Road# ~9km 15. Gorkha Arughat-Arkhet Road# 145 km
Source: *Royal Nepal Army's website www.ma.mil.np, 10 February 2006
# The roads were constructed under the integrated security development programme project scheme after
119 Tulsi Ram Vaidya, eta!. Nepallw Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jiillgi Adda 2049 VS.(l993); and also RNA website www.ma.mil.np
160
2000 in the Maoists affected districts, hty?://www.nepalanny.mil.np/stn/images/Sadak.pdf, 3 January 2008.
NA has also been active in rescue missions of natural calamities such as landslides,
floods, earthquakes, fire, epidemics and other accidents related to the ground and air. It is
¥so engaged in protecting national parks and wildlife reserves. Similarly, the NA has
been instrumental in opening up remote areas through rugged mountainous terrain with a
large number of road and bridging projects at less cost. Military engagement in
construction and development activities, guarding the installation and important areas and
involvement of military in UNPKO was started during the Panchayat period and
continues till today. The engagement of military in development activities became
finimciitlly helpful in making the soldiers sustain their family. Now military officers are
worried about the side-effects that reduce the quality of soldiers, if the soldiers are
diverted for a long time in developmental activities leaving their training and education.
In their opinion, it is better to develop a separate construction unit in the military
organization to confine to such works 120•
In addition, the NA ha:s been continuously involved through its short and long range
patrolling even by foot in the conservation of National Parks and Endangered Species and
other animals 121 since 1975 AD due to the rugged geographical structure and limitation of
inotorable roads. There are 22 protected areas covering some 26,921 sq. kms in Nepal
today, including 9 National Parks (NP), and 4 Wild Life Reserves (WLF). The NA
protects no less than 11 of the most critical areas covering 9,767 sq. kms with some 4,897
troops in 13 battalions/independent companies 122• Total area of parks/reserves conserved
by' the NA is about 9,767 sq. kms. See table below on the trend of Nepal Army's
involvement for natural conservation.
120 Most retired officers have viewed that NA's involvement in developmental activities is decreasing the
quality of NA as it is a non-military job but officers in service have contradicted the view. They mentioned that the activity is the chann of NA recruiting as soldiers for whom it is an extra source of money.
121 RNA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004. 122
It was recorded in RNA website, www.ma.mil.np, accessed on 10 February 2006).
161
Table 111.13
RNA's Involvement for Natural Conservation (Parks/Reserves)
js.N·o. !Parks/Reserves ~attalion/Company ~ince BS !Area 1/sq. km)
1. Shivapuri National Park, Shivapuri rrokha Battalion 2060/9/13 144 2. !Royal Chitwan National Park, Kasara Chitwan Battalion 2060/01/1 932
~· 11-angta~ National Park, Dhunche !Rasuwa Battalion ~059/2/18 1,710 f4 .. Sagarmatha Wildlife Reserve, Namche Solukhumbu Company 12059/12/21 1,148 5. !Koshi T~u Wildlife Reserve, Kulaha Sunsari Company 12059/10/18 175 6 .. IParsa Wildlife Reserve, Adhabhar IParsa Company 2058/3/1 [499 7. !Royal Bardiya National Park, Purba Chisapani IBardiya Company 2060/2/15 608 8. Royal Bard~ National Park, Thakurdwara Bardiya Battalion 2059/1/26 J60 ~. Shey Phoksundo National Park DolQ_a Com_pa~ 2060/2/18 3,555 10. Rara National Park, Rara Mugu Company 2060/2/5 106 11.' Khaptad National Park, Khaptad Bajura Company 2059/12/15 225 12. Shahi Suklaphanta Wildlife Reserve, Majha Gaun Kanchanpur Company 2057/12/26 155 13. Royal Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve, Arjuni Kanchanpur Company 2060/8/27 150 .. Source: Nepal Army's website www.rna.mil.np, 10 February 2006 Indra Adh1kan, Mzlztary Democracy Interface in Nepal, 1990-2002, Dissertation submitted to JNU, New Delhi, 2006, p.73.
Ariother main role of units deployed for conservation is the protection of endangered wild
animals, vegetation, habitat of the parks and reserves, and for controlling the
encroachment, illegal poaching and deforestation for protecting plants and natural
'heritage as well (NA 2004). The tasks carried out for the fulfilment of that role are: (1) to
arrange foot and mounted patrols inside the areas, (2) to take necessary action, in
coordination with the forest wardens, against unlawful encroachers and poachers, (3) to
take measures to protect the forests, such as to assist in habitat preservation and research
activities, assist the local populace and civil authorities during natural calamities and
disasters, and assist the local population through social activities 123•
Similarly, the deployment of' the NA in preservation duties under the Directorate of NP
and WLF has not only assisted in protecting the habitat, but also directly helped save
many endangered species like the one-homed rhinoceros, wild buffalo, Royal Bengal
tiger, musk deer, magar/gharial crocodiles, snow leopards and various types of birds.
Government of Nepal has been deploying NA in disaster relief124 viewing the NA as an
inseparable agency in Disaster Relief Operations. Nepal's status as a developing country
. has not afforded the high costs of maintaining a separate disaster relief organization. I
· Cons~quently, the NA has been providing emergency assistance or relief during floods,
. 123 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese Army#Domestic Operations 124 - -
NA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004.
162
earthquakes, avalanches, fires, landslides, air and other transportation disasters, to needy
people all over the country because125 of the unique suitability and capability of the
armed forces to respond effectively to such incidents that is less likely from any civilian
organization.
The primary roles of the NA in disaster relief are: search & rescue missions, medical
assistance & evacuation, air rescue, mass evacuation, flood control, etc126• Nepal Anny
has already been involved in disaster relief and rescue missions in more than two dozen
operations all over the country till 3 December 2007127• The NA has been protecting
different types of rare plants llaving vital medicinal value, such as Yarcha Gumba, Panch
Amle and Jatamasi, from some areas of the country especially the high mountainous
region. It also has been providing support to various experts for research work on natural
conservation, wild species rehabilitation, maintaining a database of the number of wild
species, as well as providing bas~.c information about natural conservation128.
Role of Military Commanders
The institution of military can never be and should not be democratic, if you define
democracy as recognition of opposition129• The major character of a military institution is
a single command system on the basis of pyramid hierarchical organizational system, and
periodic change of th<i military commander systemically. The success and failure of the
command depends on his capacity to fonn unity of command regiments under him and
control them in accordance with th,e security strategy of the institution and policy of
goyernment. There is a single command system at all levels, and each command should
be informed about the expectation of the supreme command that is accountable directly
to ,the government. No one can raise any question against it and ignore the order of the '
respective command. Authority exists with the Supreme Commander, who delegates it to
tis (http/ I :www .nepalarmy.mil.np/stnlindex/php?hdng=Disaster"/o20Reli ef&pg= I). 126 Some remarkable incidents, where the NA has served the people in this regard, are the infamous and
· highly devastating earthquake in 1990 BS (1933), the damaging earthquake in East Nepal in 2045 BS (198a), the plane crash of Pakistan International Airlines, the Thai Airways jet crash in mountain terrain, etc. (NA website www.ma.rnil.np, 10 February 2006).
127 (htto//:www.nepalarmy.mil.np/stn/index/php?hdng=Disaster"/o20Relief&pg=l). 128 NA, Sipahi, No. 37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004. 129General Rukmangad Katuwal, then COAS, shared his view in an interview taken by the researcher
during field visit.
163
a lower command. It is not only' essential to conduct campaigns and combat for wars, but
also to maintain the professionalism during the peacetime. The Commander-in-Chief or '
COAS is only the 1authority to· direct and order subordinates to perform duties or to
accomplish actions to attain military objectives. Only he has the legal authority to assign
duties to all his subordinates. Therefore, the military commander is unchallengeable
within the organization and the supremacy of his leadership differs from other civil
institutions.
Vision, fteedom of action under the assigned job and responsibility are perceived as
Command philosophy, where the commander is accountable to the government and
responsible in all aspects of the organization, including operations and administration.
The commanders at all levels, who comply with different degrees of command authority
according to the concept of chain of command, are equally responsible to make a
successful Chief Commander130• All subordinates should be under their respective
command, and high-ranking commanders under the supreme command, that is called
military discipline and hierarchy. The authority of the commander differs according to
tradition, circumstances, personalities and deliberate limitations imposed by the
command process. The socio-economic background and educational status of the
commander that help to create personal character and capacity of the Chief Commander
are also equally significant for effectively organizing, maintaining, controlling and
moving the military. Similarly, the national and international political environment and
security situation also help to determine the role of military Chief in the cmTent situation.
Most importantly, it seems that military training, orientation, its culture and tradition are
.also the contributing factors to create and guide the military leadership and to determine
how he plays his professional role.
Commanders-in-Chief ofNA and their Background
The first Commander-in-Chief of Nepal Army was P.N. Shah himself, under whom the
·military was formed, controlled and commanded. The first civilian Commanding Chief of
Nepal Army was Kaji Kalu Pandey who had played a vital role during the unification of
Nepal under P.N. Shah in the initial stage. Though he has been recognized as the first
.130 NA, Sipahi- Yearly-37, Kathmandu: RNAHQ, 2004, p.87; Ratindra Khatri, "Military Command", Sipahi
(Annual)=41, Kathmandu: Nepal Army Head Quarters, 2008.
164
Chief of Army Staff only because of his role and responsibilities, at that time the post of
<6ommander-in-Chief or COAS was not termed by formalization of role and
responsibility of the post. The second and third army chiefs were both the elder and
younger sons of Kalu Pandey - Kaji Bamsha Raj Pandey and Kaji Damodar Pandey,
respectively. The fourth Chief of Nepal Army was Aviman Singh Basnet, son of Shiva
Singh Basnet, whose contribution in the wake of unification of Nepal is highly
appreciated in the military history of Nepal. Bhimsen Thapa, who started his military
profession from the post ofSubedar and ADC of the then prince- Surendra Bikram Shah,
wa~ the fifth civilian Commander-in-Chief of army staff with the portfolio of Mukhtiyar
(prime minister), then head of both civil government and military institution. Thapa was
the grandson of Bal Bhadra Thapa a renowned contributor for unification of Nepal and
sori of General Amar Singh Thapa who is different from Kaji Amar Singh 131, as
Balabhadra and Kaji Amar Singh were highly honoured for their militarily courage not
only by the Shah dynasty of Nepal, but also by the "Imperial British in India". The sixth
Commander was Kaji Rana Jang Pandey, middle son of Damodar Pandey and grandson
ofKalu Pandey. The seventh Chief of Nepal Army was Mathbar Singh Thapa, grandson
of General Amar Singh and nephew ofBhimsen Thapa132.
During the Rana regime (1846-1950) in Nepal, Rana members commanded the military
on: the basis of role of succession propounded by J ang Bahadur Rana in 1846133, though
coup and counter coups had been hatched by the strongest Rana member to get the
chance even before his role of succession. Thus, there could not be any rotational as its
spirit and the command could not go out of hand of the Ranas, because only members of
the Rana family and their loyal relatives occupied the top-most ten ranks of the military.
The subjects (general people) could serve in the military as sipahis (soldiers). The
Commander-in-Chief was the second position of the governing hierarchy of the state just
under His Highness, Sri 3 Maharaj, who was supreme Commander-in-Chief. 16 male
members on the basis of seniority were in the rotational queue of the military hierarchy.
Most of them were brothers of Jang Bahadur Rana, then his sons. The table given below
131 General was hOnored by Bhimsen to his father, but Kaji Amar Singh Thapa was a commander who fought with British East India Company during 1614-15 that concluded in Sugauli Treaty.
132 Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999: 15-53. 133 Satish Kumar, Rana Polity in Nepal: Origin and Growth, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.
2nd edition, 1967 reprinted in 1993.
165
shows the COASs during the Rana Period, and their family concoction.
J.B. Rana was the first Commander-in-Chief and His Highness of Rana family then
Krjshna Bahadur Rana, Ranodip Singh Rana, Jagat Shamsher Rana, Dhir Shamsher,
respectively had been guaranteed and commissioned later in the post of Commander-in
Chief. The sixth Commander-in-Chief of army from Rana family was Jit Jang Rana, the
second son of JB. Rana. Then five sons of Dhir Shamsher (K.hadga SJBR, Rana SJBR,
Dev SJBR, Chandra SJBR, Bhim SJBR and Judda SJBR, respectively) were continuously
one after another commissioned in the post through coup and counter coup flouting the
role of succession. Again, the sons of Chandra SJBR- Mohan SJBR, Babar SJBR and
Keshar SJBR--commanded military using merely the same method until the reforms in
the military after 1950134• Almost all chief commanders of Nepal Army before the
establishment of Rana oligarchy were members of noble families originating from
Gorkha principality - Thapa, Basnet and Pandey only. During the Shah period, the
military was the domain of the king and COAS was his confidante who was picked up
from the core group of senior officers of military. During the Rana rule, the Ranas were
designated as m,ilhary officers from their very birth. As a result, several other people such
as Gurung, Magar, Rai,' Limbu, Newar, even Chhetri K.hadka, who had been contributing
their mite to the country,' could not get the chance to control and command the military .. till today. Such a situation has continued until quite recently.
Bhimsen Thapa, for the first time, termed Commander-in-Chief of Anny as the COAS of
military organization in modem term. From that day only 35 COAS from the family
·members of Gorkha-based Bhar~ars or courtiers got the opportunity to serve the NA till
2007. General Rukmangud Katuwal is an exception as he comes from the eastern hill
district of Nepal and does not belong to the traditional elite families. Among the· COAS, 7
.were non-Rana Chlletris including Shah, but the rest were Ranas. Even Genenil Katuwal,
is a royal protege adopted by King Mahendra and Queen Ratna. His loyalty to the Palace
was the guiding factor for being appointed as Second-in-Command and was promoted by
the interim government after the end of absolute monarchical rule inN epal in 2006.
134 Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chi eft: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999.
pp.55-l 06.
Table lll.14
Chiefs ofthe Army StaffofNA from 1950 to 1990
~- !Name rostl !Recruited Education Levell !Father's !Relatives in Army ppportunity After ~0. Duration !Post/Date Institution !Designation in NA - IRetirement
1. !Field t-in-C !Direct Entrance passed !General & Former lfM Surendra B Shah, SIL lfhe first Nepali Ambassador !Marshal 12008/l/30- peneral Kolkata lc-in-C Dhir SJBR ILK Siris Chandra Shah, GS o UK in 1947, the first !His 200817/30 University, India !ADC, LK Budhendra B Shah BIL ~bassador to USA in lfiighness - IBG Sadip B Shah, GS 194 7, and Ambassador to !Keshar jcMC, MG Shanta K Malla, SIL !France in SJBR ic, ADC, Prakash Bikram Shah, SIL 1947
~- Oeneral 1951-56 !Direct !Former C-in-C !CoL Kama Bikram Shah, SIL ~ !Ambassador to UK during
~ranSJR ~
peneral ~uddha !General Rajendra Pd Shah 1973-77 including court of SJBR !Col Lalit Bikeam Shah !st. James to Notway,
IMG Dharma B Shingh, BIL Sweden, Denmark, !MJ, ADC Bharat Keshar Sing_h, C Winland and Scotland.
3. General 'J013/217- Pirect Schooling in !Former C-in-C Bir !Brothers BG Balaram SJBR and Toran 2017/217 Lt. Colonel IDarbar HS, SJBRGF, jcol. Laxrnan SJBR SJBR 197(J BS matriculation Patna, !commanding Col.
India LSc. Indra SJBR-F uncompleted
4. FMNir ~017/217- Direct Major ISanti Niketan, !Former C-in-C Major Diwakar SJBR- son SJBR ~022/1115 in 1988 BS !Kathmandu in 1Oth phir SJBR-GF
by C-in-C !class and two years !Former C-in-C Juddhaand ~tudy in Banarash ~uddha SJBR Sri3 Bhim !Hindu School, Shamsher [but uncompleted. first time of jDarbar School Nepal !Matriculation History) ~ncompleted
5. p.FM :2022/l/15- Direct !B.A. pass iflis Highness Major. Devendra BDR Shah- son & Surendra 2027/l/28 Captain ~rom Pehendra Bahadur d. Col. Srishchandra Shah, son IBahadur n 1995 Wlahabad Shah, His Highness Sri 3 Kesher SJBR, FIL Shah !University, lndia lsalyani king
8.
osephs Convent, India,
atriculation from e al
xamination assed from entral High School, dia and B.A.
.AfromBHU, dia but B.A.
ncompleted
F, Chief Col. anshing Basnet Engineer F
hakta BDR Basnet
F C-in-C Khadga father BG Hasta
JBR
F - MG Bhairab arsingh Rana & ather - Lieutenant ol. Narahari
aptain. Dibya Bdr Basnet, . Col. Prakash Bdr Basnet -
rothers, Engineer Col. Tilak Bdr imajhi- father-in-law~
ajorUjjwal Singh- son, G. Dharmapal
arsingh Thapa - SIL
ormer SP. Chiranchivi Rana- brother
rother- G Mohan Pratap Shah, ousin- Former C-in-C G. Aijun arsinghJBR
rother- Major Dhurba Narsingh na,
-in-law-GM. Gehendra Shamsher Thapa,
aughter - Major Dr. Arya Pandey, aughters-in-law- Col. Gyan
ang Thapa, & Major Dr. Rajiv Pandey (wife-husband)
F - G. Pratap SJBR Son - Llieutenant Sadaya SJBR ather-G Madhab SJBR
167
ember of Raj Shava in 2032 V ember of Commission
or Constitutional Body eform in 2032, epali Ambassador to Arab epublic Egypt during -035-39 VS.
orked as Nepali bassador to People's
epublic China during 039-042 VS.
orked as an bassador to Germany
or five years after 2042. etherlands, Greece, uxemburg, Switzerland, ugoslavia, Austria, eheran and Vatican
bassador to Pakistan ·ncluding Iran, Turkey, Syria or four years from 1988.
orked as Ambassador to Burma
*There was Commander-in-Chief in stat of COAS and the Commander-in-Chief used to be terminated after 5 years but duration the COAS was fixed just for four years.
But the term of Nepali remained the same "Pradhan Senapati" with the same responsibility. * (star) used above indicated hierarchy of Generals.
FM =Field Marshal; C-in-C =Commander-in-Chief; G =General; C =Cousin; BIL =Brother-in-law, SIL = Sister-in-Law, FIL =Father-in-law, MG = Major General.
168
The method of comrhissioning of Commander-in-Chief was changed after 1950.
Promotion and recruitment system was introduced, the strength of military was reduced
but the high-ranking officers could not be changed because no one except the Ranas
co~ld be the COAS. Similarly, the general people could not meet the required
qualification fixed, after 1950 in commissioning directly at the officer level. Since the
Rana generals and other officers enjoyed a luxurious life in the past, they were not at all
anxious to develop professionalism in the army. The members of the traditional elite
families thus continued to be the commanders in the army. The kings who were also
.relatives of the Ranas by marriage revived the old family tradition by confining the top
army post to the Rana, Shah, Thapa, Basnet, etc. After 1958, military refonn was
. introduced but could not make any departure from the past in the appointment of COAS
·and other important posts after their retirement: Member of Raj Parisad; ambassador to
·other countries; members of commissions; etc. 135• Hence, out of 10 COAS commissioned
. during the Panchayat period, 8 were Ranas, except 2, Surendra Bahadur Shah and Shimha
Bahadur Basnet, who got staff college training in Pakistan in 1951-52, prior to
establishment of Staff College in India, as officers trained in Pakistan were considered to
be ·good staff and commanders 136•
Sir,nilarly, education and training were not given preference for appointment of COAS
because upper ranking officers (lnd rulers, who did not have higher education, training in
warfare and statecraft, felt the threat from other castes and qualified persons. The old
mindset was not changed. The old officers recruited by the Rana rulers were continued
135 Kiran Shamsher worked during his service in military as Planning and Development State Minister under Tanka Prasad government in 1956; Member of Raj Sabha in 1963; Member of Planning Commission under Himalaya Bikram Shah; ADC of the kings during 1953-83 (three kings). Nir Shamsher initiated a change of Nepali Army into Royal Nepali Army and opened the lottery on the occasion of the birthday of King Mahendra. Surendra B. Shah had contributed as Member-Secretary in the process of reconstruction and reformation of militia after 1951; initiated NA in development work; Nepalized the English terms related to command structure and word of command to make military in present structure; Nepalized the military uniform which is used today; started providing health, treatment to the family members of military officers; sent RNA to UNIPOM for the first time in 6.12.2022; Sipahi magazine was started in 2025. Atjun Narasinha Rana was Member of Raj Parisad; got an Honorary General of Indian Army, and Honorary of ADC General of the king; established Birendra School for the children of soldiers. Most of the COAS during the Panchayat period (and even after 1990) were appointed as ambassadors of Nepal to other countries. See, Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999; Ratindra Khatri, "Military Command", Sipahi (Annual), Kathmandu: Nepal Army Head Quarters, 2008.
136 See, Shiva Ram Khatri, Nepal Army Chiefs: Short Biographical Sketches, Kathmandu: Sita Khatri, 1999.
169
regardless of change of governments and systems. No COAS during the Panchayat
regime had passed Bachelor's level except for getting professional training 137• It alone
became the sole criterion of promotion to higher posts. Hence, officers from other castes
regretted saying "that relationship between officer corps and non-officer soldiers, and
treatment between officers and soldiers was like the relation between landlord and tenant.
The tradition is still continuing138• However, addition qualifications such as education,
skill and capacity of men were only supplementary qualification in N A. One needs
exposures for promotion, but the opportunity could be provided only to those who have
strong influence in official level of NA. It is said that the unofficial channel was really
strong, which not only controls the official channel but was also decisive to detennine
who would get the training and other opportunities. Along with the age factor, the
opportunity ·for exposure, training, and capacity to influence through official and
unofficial channels, etc. are all important components to determine promotion and
opportunity to command the NA. However, the unofficial channel was not accessible to
general officers or soldiers. Even the ADC group of Royal family members was more
powerful than the officers in the NA. It has become essential to get training in the Staff
College in Nepal, the USA, the UK, India and Pakistan for getting promotioh in the NA.
Without knowledge and experience about modem weapons, instruments and warfare
·tactics, the military would not be professionally competent and internationally '·
recognized. Thus, NA has a criterion that Military Academy and Staff College Training is
a must for promotion for the posts above the rank of Major.
In short, among the ten Commanders-in-Chief after 1950 to 1990, seven were from the
Rana family, two were from the Shah family and one was from the Basnet family.
Similarly, the trend and tradition continued even after 1990 to 2007: two from Rana
family and two from Thapa family were promoted as a Commander-in-Chief, except ' . Rukmandad Katuwal. All together, nine from Rana family, two from Shah Family, two
I
from Thapa Family and one from Basnet Family served after 1950-2007. In 2009, the
leadership shifted to a general from ethnic community, Chhatra Man Singh Gurung. All
137 ·see, Prem Singh Basnyat, Shahi Nepali Sena Ra Pradhan Senapatiharu (Royal Nepal Army and Chiefs of the Army Staff), Kathmandu: Laxmi Basnyat and Sarwochcha Man Sing Basnyat, 1996.
138 Interview with Lt. General Bala Nand Sharma.
170
of them, except General Katuwal and Gurung139 were residents of Kathmandu Valley
migrated from Gorkha during.the unification of Nepal. No officers from ethnic or other
socio-economically marginalized people were promoted up to the level of Commander
in-Chief till Mass Movement 2006. The table below shows how the class, caste and
character of leadership in national army remained the same, even after the political
changeinin1990
Table 111.15
Chiefs of the Army Staff ofNA and their Background after 1990 , I
I Name of the S.N
CO ASs Duration Date of Birth Place
1. Sachchit 15 May 1987 to
15 January 1934 Kathmandu Shamsher JBR 14 M<lY_ 1991
2. Gadul Shamsher 15 May 1991 to
20 March 1936 Kathmandu JBR 4 May 1995
3. Dharmapal Sinigh 15 May 1995 to
17 Sept. 1939 Kathmandu Thapa 14 May 1999
4. Prajwal Shamsher 19 May 1999 to
8 Sept. 1941 Kathmandu JBR 8 Sept. 2002
5. Pyarjang Thapa 9 Sept. 2002 to
15 Sept. 1946 Kathmandu 8 S~t. 2006
6. Rukmangad 9 Sept. 2006 to
10 July 1949 Okhaldhunga Katuwal 4 Sept 2009
7. ChhatraMan 5 Sept. 2009 to 18 July 1952 Tanahu Singh Gurung Till date
Source: Rajendra Upacharak (ed.), Bimochan: Nepali Sena Biseshaanka (Bimochan: Nepal Army Special Issue), Kathmandu: Bimarsa Pvt. Ltd, 2008, pp. 83-85.
The interim government formed after the successful movement promoted and appointed
General Katuwal as COAS and the interim government formed through CA promoted
General Gurung at that level. Thus, it can be observed that the beginning has just been
made for the improvement of the NA. The appointment of General Katuwal as COAS
heralds such a beginning. As he comes from the non-elite family of the remote hill
district, his present role in making the political transition smooth is noteworthy. Other
generals in line are also likely to follow this tradition, because most of them are really
from the so-called subject class not only by birth, but also by their socialization and
education like General Gurung.
139 Katuwal is from Okhaldhunga, a remote district of the eastern hill, and Gurung is from Tanahu, western hill ofNepal.