Chapter Defense Policies of Countries · world peace and stability with its comprehensive national...

Section 1 The United States

1 Security and Defense Policies

1 The NSS comprehensively indicates political, economic, military and diplomatic policies aimed at protecting and achieving goals.2 The NDS affords the president and secretary of defense the utmost strategic fl exibility, decides the force structure to meet needs, and supports the latest national security strategy.

It has been pointed out that the Trump administration,

which was inaugurated in January 2017, has signifi cantly

changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world

amidst the formation of a new security environment,

including a shift in the global balance of power,

attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in

Ukraine and the South China Sea, the development and

improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear

weapons and ballistic missiles which have become

an unprecedentedly serious and urgent threat, and the

intensifi cation of the activities of international terrorist

organizations. On the other hand, it can be considered that

while the United States is focusing on global competition,

the United States has been continuing to play a role for

world peace and stability with its comprehensive national

power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the

values and infl uence of the United States, bolstered by

its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more

prosperous.

The Trump administration, under the “America

First” vision for governance, has set forth a policy for

rebuilding the U.S. Forces and placing importance on

allies under the banner of peace through strength. In

addition, in less than a year since the inauguration, the

Trump administration unveiled its policies on security

and national defense by publishing the National Security

Strategy (NSS),1 followed by the National Defense

Strategy (NDS)2 and the National Posture Review (NPR).

Regarding regional security, the United States has

clarifi ed its stance that it will emphasize the security

of the Indo-Pacifi c region. In particular, under the

recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is an

urgent, unpredictable threat to the United States and

its allies, it has maintained sanctions and continues its

efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North

Korea. In addition, taking into account China’s current

movements in the South China Sea, the United States

has expressed its stance that it will continue “Freedom of

Navigation Operations,” and during his November 2017

trip to Asia, President Trump emphasized the importance

of freedom of navigation when he revealed the vision for

a “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c” (see 1-3 of this Section).

The United States has also been dealing with security

issues outside of the Indo-Pacifi c region. In response

to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria

since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis testifying at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review on February 6, 2018.

[Photo: U.S. Department of Defense]

Defense Policies of CountriesChapter 2

53 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Defense Policies of CountriesC

hapter 2

Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation

against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In addition, following

its assessment that the Assad administration of Syria had

used chemical weapons in April 2018, together with the

United Kingdom and France, the United States carried out

missile strikes3 against Syria’s chemical weapons-related

facilities, and clarifi ed its stance of developing powerful

deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of

weapons of mass destruction. In August 2017, the United

States announced its strategy on Afghanistan and South

Asia which made clear its continuous involvement with

Afghanistan, and in September 2017, Defense Secretary

Mattis disclosed that reinforcements of over 3,000 U.S.

military personnel would be sent to Afghanistan. In

light of Russian actions concerning Ukraine, in order to

strengthen involvement in NATO security and deterrence,

the investment for the European Deterrence Initiative4 is

being increased from US$4.8 billion in the previous fi scal

year to US$6.5 billion in the FY2019 Department of

Defense budget request. On the other hand, in its security

policies, the United States considers that certain allies

which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden

of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United

States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility.

Under such a perception, the United States has requested

NATO member states to swiftly meet their commitments

to increase their national defense spending to 2% of GDP.

One year has passed since the inauguration of the

Trump administration, and amidst the indicated direction

of security and defense policies in strategies such as the

NSS, specifi c security and defense policy trends advanced

under the aforementioned strategy will draw attention.

In addition, it should also be noted how the changing

situations in the Asia-Pacifi c region, the Middle East and

the EU, as well as the November 2018 mid-term election,

will affect the U.S. security and defense policies.

1 Perception about security environment

The National Military Strategy (NMS) released in July

2015 during the former Obama administration explicitly

cites Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist

3 At 21:00 on April 13 Eastern Standard Time (10:00 on April 14 Japan time), the United States together with France and the United Kingdom conducted strikes against three chemical weapons-related facilities of the Syrian administration. The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it believed that all 105 cruise missiles used hit their targets. Of these, the U.S. Forces fi red 30 tomahawk missiles from two destroyers, 30 missiles from one cruiser, and six missiles from one nuclear submarine, as well as 19 JASSMs from two B-1B strategic bombers.

4 This initiative reassures allies and partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the United States is committed to their security and territorial integrity by increasing the presence of the U.S. Forces in Europe, conducting further bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with NATO allies and other countries, and strengthening the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe. Until recently it was called the European Reassurance Initiative, but the name was changed to the European Deterrence Initiative in the FY2019 Budget Blueprint.

states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the

international order and are acting in a manner that

threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions

that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are

becoming imminent threats.

On the other hand, the NSS released in December

2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power

can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests.

It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the

United States and its allies and partners, which are the

“revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue

states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat

organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of

these, China and Russia are said to challenge American

power, infl uence, and interests and attempt to erode

American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and

Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States

and its allies.

In addition, the NDS published in January 2018

points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not

terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with

China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia

are undermining the free and open international order

constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is

increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a

world consistent with their authoritarian model.

Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried

out in Syria in April 2018, President Trump stated that

establishing strong deterrence against the production,

proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important

interest for the national security of the United States.

In consideration of this recognition, the United

States deems as security threats nations and organizations

that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its

allies and threaten the international order. While the

Trump administration has fundamentally accepted the

threat perception of the previous Obama administration,

it is addressing threats posed by China and Russia with

particular emphasis as priority issues and appears to be

continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North

Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production,

proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.

54Defense of Japan

Section 1The United StatesDefense Policies of Countries

Chap

ter 2

2 Security and National Defense Strategy

The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the

America First policy and realism in which power plays a

central role in international politics, and stresses the need

to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based

on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their

inclusion in the international community would turn them

into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the

NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests

in this competitive world: 1. Protect the American people,

the homeland, and the American way of life, 2. Promote

American prosperity, 3. Preserve peace through strength,

and 4. Advance American infl uence.

Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S.

military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening

capabilities in many areas including space and

cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage

the balance of power in the Indo-Pacifi c, Europe, and

the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies

and partners are a great strength of the United States

and close cooperation is necessary, the United States

has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate

the will to confront shared threats and contribute the

capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United

States is responding to the growing political, economic,

and military competition throughout the world, by

ensuring American military power is second to none and

fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power,

the United States will seek areas of cooperation with

competitors from a position of strength.

The NDS drawn up by Secretary of Defense Mattis

based on the NSS considers the long-term competitions

with China and Russia as the principal priorities of

the Department of Defense because of the magnitude

of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity

and the potential for the threats to increase. Moreover,

to expand the competitive space, the following three

lines of effort are raised: 1. Building a more lethal Joint

Force, 2. Strengthening alliances and attracting new

partners, 3. Reforming the Department of Defense for

greater performance and affordability.

Among these, 1. Building military power prioritizes

preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression

5 At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting on February 4, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis who was visiting Japan at the very early timing of just two weeks after the inauguration of the new Trump administration, emphasized that the Asia-Pacifi c region remains a top priority for the United States and that the United States would strengthen its commitment by maintaining the presence of the U.S. Forces in the region. Also, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, he stated that the Asia-Pacifi c region is positioned as a priority region and that the United States would strengthen alliances, empower regional countries, and strengthen the U.S. Forces capabilities in the region. He also stated 60% of all U.S. naval warships, 55% of the army, and about two thirds of the Fleet Marine Forces were assigned to the Pacifi c Command area of responsibility, and soon 60% of overseas tactical aviation assets would be assigned to the theater.

by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression

elsewhere, it advances building fl exible theater postures

and force deployment that have mobility, resilience,

and modernize key capabilities such as nuclear forces,

space and cyberspace, C4ISR, missile defense, advanced

autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its

commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the

stance that dynamic military force employment, military

posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability

to adversary decision-makers. For 2. Strengthening

alliances, the following three matters are emphasized:

i. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility,

priorities, and accountability, ii. Expand regional

consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning,

and iii. Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there

are expectations that allies and partners contribute an

equitable share to mutually benefi cial collective security,

including effective investment in modernizing their

defense capabilities.

3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacifi c Region

While the Trump administration has stopped using the

key phrase “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacifi c region” set

forth by the Obama administration, it has shown a stance

of placing importance on the region through the United

States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its

presence since the inauguration of the administration.5

In particular, under the policy to continue sustaining

maximum pressure on North Korea, which is continuing

its nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Trump

U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz conducting a joint exercise with MSDF destroyers in the western Pacifi c Ocean on

November 12, 2017. [Photo: U.S. Navy]

Part Ⅰ Security Environment Surrounding Japan



hapter 2

administration is exhibiting its recognition that a military

option plays an important role in backing up diplomatic

efforts, and also is clearly showing its readiness to

respond with overwhelming power in retaliation to any

attack by North Korea.

To show military presence against North Korea,

following on from the deployment in the Sea of Japan of

two carrier strike groups, the Carl Vinson Strike Group

and the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group in June 2017,

three carrier strike groups, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS

Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz strike groups were

deployed in the Sea of Japan in November 2017. The

nuclear submarines USS Tucson and USS Michigan also

made port calls in the ROK in October 2017. In addition,

during the joint U.S.-ROK regularly-held aviation

exercise Vigilant Ace in December 2017, F-22 and F-35

aircraft participated for the fi rst time ever in the exercise.

Furthermore, between May and December 2017, B-1B

strategic bombers fl ew over the Korean Peninsula every

month. In addition, following the deployment of 62

launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

(THAAD) system6 by the U.S. Forces in the ROK in April

2017, in September 2017 four launchers were added and

a total of six sites commenced operation.

In March 2018, responding to North Korea’s

statement of intent for denuclearization and other

developments, President Trump indicated his forward-

looking intent to hold a U.S.-North Korea Summit

Meeting, which resulted in the holding of the fi rst-ever

historic summit on June 12, 2018. Both leaders clearly

indicated willingness for jointly making efforts to build a

lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,

and based on the reaffi rmed commitment expressed by

Chairman Kim toward complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula, both leaders confi rmed that follow-

on negotiations would continue. Responding to this

discussion, on June 18 and 22, 2018, the U.S. Department

of Defense announced the suspension of all planning for

the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-

Freedom Guardian scheduled for August, and two the

Korean Marine Exchange Program7 training exercises

scheduled to occur in the following three months.

Regarding this point, at the joint press conference

following the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting

6 A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. It tracks and intercepts targets at high altitude in the upper atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense systems.

7 The Korean Marine Exchange Program (KMEP) is an annually-held joint exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa and the ROK Marine Corps. 19 exercises were planned under the KMEP in 2018, and 11 exercises had been carried out as of June 22, 2018.

held on June 29, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that

the decision was taken to create space for their diplomats

to negotiate strongly, and increasing the prospects for a

peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula, and that the

United States maintains a strong, collaborative defensive

stance to ensure its diplomats continue to negotiate from

a position of unquestioned strength. On the other hand,

the United States showed a clear stance that it would

maintain sanctions until North Korea took concrete,

verifi able measures for ending its nuclear development,

and that it would keep the U.S. Forces in the ROK. (See

1-5 of Section 2.)

During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in

consonance with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c

Strategy,” President Trump expressed his intention to

emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting

the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he

would promote a free and open Indo-Pacifi c region, as

well as strengthen alliances in the region.

In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China

seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacifi c

region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having

mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to

limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer

hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacifi c region

strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom

of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and

maritime disputes in accordance with international law,

the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral

cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop

a strong defense networks with its allies and partners.

In the same way, the NDS points out that China is

leveraging military modernization, infl uence operations,

and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries

to reorder the Indo-Pacifi c region to their advantage and

is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free

and open Indo-Pacifi c provides prosperity and security,

and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and

partnerships in the Indo-Pacifi c to a networked security

architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining

stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Furthermore, regarding China’s maritime expansion,

at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, Secretary of

Defense Mattis stated that the scope and effect of China’s

56Defense of Japan


Chap

ter 2

construction activities in the South China Sea differ from

those in other countries in several key ways, including

the nature of its militarization, China’s disregard for

international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests,

and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of

issues; and that the United States cannot and will not

accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo.

Moreover, while committing to protecting the rights,

freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea, and the ability of

all countries to exercise those rights in the strategically

important East and South China Sea, Secretary of

Defense Mattis stated that the United States would

continue to fl y, sail, and operate wherever international

law allows, and demonstrate resolve through operational

presence in the South China Sea and beyond. It is

reported that in May, July, August, and October 2017, as

well as January, March, and May 2018, the U.S. Forces

conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within

12 nautical miles of the islands and reefs in the South

China Sea that are claimed by China.8 Also, in May 2018,

the U.S. Department of Defense stated that China had

deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles

to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out

that the placement of these weapon system was only

military use. As an initial response to China’s continued

militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United

States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim

of the Pacifi c Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018.

Based on such a perception of China and regional

strategy, it can be considered that the United States is

advancing efforts rooted in the concept of free and open

Indo-Pacifi c region.

In addition, as part of its activities around

strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacifi c region, in

January 2017, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps

specifi cation F-35B fi ghters to MCAS Iwakuni. In

October 2017, 12 Air Force specifi ed F-35A fi ghters were

deployed at Kadena Air Force Base for the fi rst time ever

in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Also, in January 2018, nuclear-

capable B-2 bombers and B-52 bombers were deployed

8 It is regarded that the Trump administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Dewey in May 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Stethem in July 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS John S. McCain in August 2017, surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Chafee in October 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal by the destroyer USS Hopper in January 2018, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef by the destroyer USS Mustin in March 2018, within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Higgins and the cruiser USS Antietam in May 2018.

The Obama administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Lassen in October 2015, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur in January 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS William P. Lawrence in May 2016, and surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Decatur in October 2016.

9 The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft technologies of the 1970s.

to Guam, and in place of the amphibious assault ship USS

Bonhomme Richard, the amphibious assault ship USS

Wasp that is capable of carrying F-35B fi ghters arrived in

Sasebo. Furthermore, in March 2018 the aircraft carrier

USS Carl Vinson made the fi rst port call by a U.S. aircraft

carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam.

4 Innovation Initiatives in the National Defense Field

In November 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel

announced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) that

aimed to achieve military superiority through innovation,

and stated the expectation that this would develop into

the Third Offset Strategy.9 Also, in 2015 as a part of DII,

then-Secretary of Defense Carter established Defense

Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley

to be a bridge between the Department of Defense and

civilian groups, in order to introduce innovative civilian

technologies into military fi elds.

The Trump administration stopped using the

names DII and Third Offset Strategy, but in August

2017 Secretary of Defense Mattis visited DIUx and IT

companies and discussed utilization methods of new

technologies for the Department of Defense. To the

accompanying press corps, he stated that Department of

Defense innovation initiatives are a matter of maximum

priority and pointed out the importance of DIUx. Also,

the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must

harness innovative technologies that are being developed

outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The

NDS also states that the Department of Defense needs

innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for

extensive investment in military application of autonomy,

artifi cial intelligence, and machine learning, including

rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to

gain competitive military advantages. In view of these

circumstances, it can be considered that the United States

will continue to place emphasis on innovation in the

national defense fi eld.




hapter 2

5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

The NPR released in February 2018 stated that, although

the United States had reduced the role and number of

nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United

States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other

states would follow, the global threat conditions have

worsened markedly since the most recent NPR10 released

in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and

uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their

nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of

nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these

circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of

U.S. nuclear forces: 1. Deterrence of nuclear and non-

nuclear attacks, 2. Assurance of allies and partners, 3.

Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and 4.

Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Also, while the United States would only consider

the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United

States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states

that extreme circumstances could include signifi cant

non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States

and its allies, and a “no fi rst use” policy is not justifi ed

today. It also indicates that the United States remains

the policy to retain some ambiguity regarding the

precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear

response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United

States would apply a tailored approach to deter across

a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in

addition to that, it would ensure effective deterrence

by enhancing the fl exibility and range of its nuclear

capabilities through nuclear modernization and the

development and deployment of new capabilities.

Specifi cally, in addition to sustaining and replacing the

nuclear triad,11 as new capabilities, in the near-term, the

United States would modify a small number of existing

SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in

the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-

launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing

10 The NPR released in 2010 called for a world without nuclear weapons, with goals that included reducing the role of the U.S.’s nuclear weapons and maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels.

11 The nuclear triad consists of Minuteman III ICBM, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) armed with Trident II D5 SLBM, and strategic bombers B-52 and B-2.12 The RKV is an improved counterattack vehicle in terms of reliability, manufacture, examination, and cost effi ciency.13 Together with increasing object identifi cation capability, the MOKV development program improves interceptor missile performance by developing the capability to destroy multiple objects through

enabling one interceptor missile to load multiple kill vehicles.

technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability

onto the forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35

as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable

aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its

commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if

necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability

with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside

Europe, including Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, there has not yet been an offi cial

announcement on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review

(BMDR) that President Trump had directed to be

formulated alongside the NPR. Regarding this, in March

2018, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood

testifi ed in Congress regarding missile defense that while

the review work was still being advanced, the new review

would be decided on as the Missile Defense Review

(MDR) based on the existing threats of missile strikes

by cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, other

than ballistic missiles. Moreover, in order to deal with

threats to the U.S. mainland by rogue nation missiles,

he set forth strengthening the mainland’s missile

defense through additional deployment of 20 ground-

based interceptor missiles, strengthening the capability

of ground-based interceptor missiles by Redesigned

Kill Vehicles (RKV),12 and deployment of new missile

tracking and identifi cation sensors in Alaska, Hawaii,

and the Pacifi c. Regarding missile defense in Europe, the

Middle East, and the Indo-Pacifi c region, he mentioned

strengthening readiness through additional deployment

of Patriot missiles, THAAD, and SM-3. Also, together

with ensuring the missile defense capabilities of allies

and partners, he also indicated a policy to strengthen

cooperation for improving interoperability with the U.S.

missile defense system. Furthermore, regarding advanced

technologies, he stressed commitment in such areas as

improving identifi cation capability of missile defense

system sensors, boost phase missile interception lasers,

new sensors deployed in space, and Multi-Object Kill

Vehicles (MOKV).13

58Defense of Japan


Chap

ter 2

6 FY2019 Budget

As the budget defi cit of the U.S. Government is

deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act

enacted in August 2011 stipulated a signifi cant cut in

government spending by FY2021.14 Also, in March

2013, the sequestration of government spending

including defense expenditure was started based on

the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However,

after this, sequestration was eased for the budgets from

FY2014-FY2017 due to the bipartisan acts passed

twice.15 Furthermore, amid the Trump administration’s

policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in

order to rebuild the U.S. military, the Bipartisan Budget

Act was passed in February 2018, and a defense budget

framework was approved that drastically raised the limit

set by the sequestration for FY2018 and 2019.16

In these circumstances, the defense budget request in

the Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February

2018 allocated US$617.0 billion for the base budget,17

representing about a 7% increase over the previous

year. For the overseas contingency operations budget, a

total of US$69.0 billion would be appropriated per the

request, including budget escalation in the OIR and the

European Deterrence Initiative.18 Also, the goals for

14 In January 2012, the Department of Defense announced that the specifi c national defense annual expenditure reduction based on the enacted act would amount to roughly US$487 billion over the 10 year period between FY2012 and FY2021 (roughly US$259 billion during the fi ve year period between FY2013 and FY2017).

15 Through the passing of the 2013 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was lowered by US$22 billion and US$9 billion in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. Through the passing of the 2015 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$25 billion and US$15 billion in FY2016 and FY2017 respectively.

16 Through the passing of the 2018 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$80 billion and US$85 billion in FY2018 and FY2019 respectively. 17 An increase of about US$35 billion from the FY2018 enacted budget level.18 The total sum of the FY2019 national defense budget request was roughly US$716.0 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$30 billion (such as the

Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$686 billion of Department of Defense budget request.

military end strength and procurement were represented

in the FY2019 budget request, such as securing 1,338,100

personnel, adding 24,100 more troops to the services’

end strength, and procuring 135 upgraded M-1 tanks

(56 tanks in the previous year), 10 battleships (8 in the

previous year), and 77 F-35 fi ghters (70 in the previous

year). In addition, regarding ballistic missile defense,

additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor

missiles in Alaska, other than 40 missiles in Alaska and 4

missiles in California, are to be completed by the end of

2023, in light of the threat of the ICBMs posed by North

Korea and Iran.

In January 2018, Secretary of Defense Mattis pointed

out that the U.S. military competitive edge has eroded in

every domain of warfare and that the defense expenditure

cap was causing a negative effect. He stated that there

was a need for a stable, predictable budget, and that while

both capability and capacity are important for building

the military, currently, building the capacity is being

emphasized. For this, the Trump administration can be

considered to be pursuing ensuring a suffi cient and stable

defense budget, emphasizing keeping a force of suffi cient

size in the short-term, and aiming for a budgetary measures

to expand capability in the mid- and long-term.

Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget) See

Fig. I-2-1-1 Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget

(％)($1 million)

Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on historical tables (outlays). 2. The amount for FY2018 is an estimate.

(FY)

Defense budget (in $1 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%)

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

(*Estimate)(*Estimate)

–10

–5

0

5

10

15

20




hapter 2

2 Military Posture

19 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead).

20 The fi gure as of February 5, 2018.21 The concept is designed to cripple the A2 capabilities of an adversary and promptly strike a target anywhere in the world using non-nuclear long-range guided missiles that hit targets with high accuracy.22 In August 2017, President Trump announced the elevation of the Cyber Command to a unifi ed combatant command.

1 General Situation

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the

individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it

is operated under the command of the Unifi ed Combatant

Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches

of the armed forces. The Unifi ed Combatant Commands

consist of three commands with functional responsibilities

and six commands with regional responsibilities. Of

these, Secretary of Defense Mattis announced that the

name of the Pacifi c Command would be changed to the

Indo-Pacifi c Command in May 2018.

The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army

soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward-

deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among

other countries. Along with a shift from the Obama

administration’s policy reducing soldiers to a policy of

increasing them, in order to deter enemies and achieve

battle victories when necessary, the Army has been

making efforts to maintain the world’s leading ground

force capability through necessary investment in ensuring

readiness. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces

capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight

force,” bridging the seam between smaller special

operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 940 vessels

(including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.36

million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East

Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th

Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest

Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacifi c; the 4th

Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the

7th Fleet in the western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,570 combat

aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In

addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of

the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the

United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including

nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama

administration proceeded with its reduction based on a

new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force

in February 2011. In February 2018, it announced that

its deployed strategic warheads19 stood at 1,350, while its

deployed delivery platforms stood at 652.20 The United

States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt

Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the

nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.21

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in

cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command was founded

in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S.

Cyber Command achieved Initial Operational Capability

(IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in

November in the same year. Furthermore, in May 2018,

the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunifi ed

command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated

to a unifi ed combatant command.22

Also, in June 2018, President Trump instructed the

Department of Defense to immediately start the necessary

processes to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch

of the Armed Forces.

Fig. I-2-1-2 (Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command) See

Fig. I-2-1-2 Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command

統合参謀本部議長

輸送軍

President

U.S. Secretaryof Defense

Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff

U.S. StrategicCommand

U.S. TransportationCommand

U.S. CyberCommand

U.S. SpecialOperations Command

U.S. AfricaCommand

U.S. CentralCommand

U.S. EuropeanCommand

U.S. NorthernCommand

U.S. SouthernCommand

U.S. Indo-PacificCommand

: Functional command

: Geographic command

60Defense of Japan


Chap

ter 2

Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region

U.S. NorthernCommand

U.S. SouthernCommand

U.S. Central Command

U.S. European Command

U.S. Africa CommandU.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2017), etc. 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

Army: approx. 26,000 personnelNavy: approx. 8,000 personnelAir Force: approx. 28,000 personnelMarines: approx. 4,000 personnel

Total: approx. 66,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel)

European Region


Total: approx. 1,288,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel)

U.S. Forces


Total: approx. 110,000 personnel(Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel)

Asia-Pacific Region

ブリズベーン

トンガAustralia

Canberra

Japan

ROK

Seoul

PhilippinesManila

IndonesiaSingapore

Jakarta

Darwin

HawaiiGuam

Okinawa

* Based upon a map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (for illustrative purposes)

[Philippines]• Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence

of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014)• Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey

vessel (November 2015)• Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–)• Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing

defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016)• Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–)

[Guam]• Rotationally deploys submarines• Rotationally deploys bombers• Established a facility for aircraft carriers’

temporary port of call• Deploys unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4)

In June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army, and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the Pacific Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets will be deployed there.

[Australia]At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives:• Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia• Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia

[Singapore]• Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat

Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by end of 2017. The first ship started rotation in April 2013, the second ship in December 2014 and the third ship in October 2016)

• Rotationally deployed P-8 (December 2015)

• Signed enhanced defense cooperation agreement (December 2015)

[Japan]• Deploys F-22 and RQ-4 (Global Hawk)• Deploys MV-22 Osprey, P-8, F-35A• Deploys second TPY-2 radar• Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015)• Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer (March 2016)• Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already deployed in October

2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017)• Deployed amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, capable of carrying F-35Bs.




hapter 2

2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacifi c Region

The United States, a Pacifi c nation, continues to play an

important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the

Asia-Pacifi c region by placing the Indo-Pacifi c Command,

a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air

Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacifi c

Command is a geographic combatant command which

is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its

subordinate unifi ed commands include U.S. Forces Japan

and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective

of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of

the U.S. Forces from allies, the Indo-Pacifi c Command

headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region.

Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia

are currently serving in the Indo-Pacifi c Command as

deputy director level-offi cials.

The Indo-Pacifi c Command consists of the U.S.

Army Pacifi c, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps

Forces Pacifi c, and U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces,23 which are

all headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacifi c’s subordinate commands include

the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in

the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces

in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the

Army Pacifi c assigns approximately 2,600 personnel to

commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the

23 As of June 2018, it is unknown whether the names of the subordinate Component Commands changed along with the name change from Pacifi c Command to Indo-Pacifi c Command.24 The fi gures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2017), and could change

according to unit deployment.25 See footnote 19.

Head quarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.24

The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet,

which is responsible for the Western Pacifi c and the

Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East

Pacifi c and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet in total

controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists

of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations

in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial

lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical

national interests of the United States and its allies. An

aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and

destroyers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacifi c deploys one

Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland

and Japan. Of this force, about 18,000 personnel are

in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fi ghters and other

aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning

ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are

deployed in the Western Pacifi c.25 The U.S. Pacifi c Air

Force has three air forces, of which three air wings

(equipped with F-16 fi ghters and C-130 transport aircraft)

are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and

two air wings (equipped with F-16 fi ghters) to the 7th Air

Force stationed in the ROK.

Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Development Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region)

See

62Defense of Japan


Chap

ter 2

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