Challenges of implementing e Gov programs

Helani Galpaya

Nagarkot, Nepal

March 2015

This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.

E Sri Lanka program architecture

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E leadership

Infrastructure

E so

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E go

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E b

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From 4 programs more inside the new ICT Agency of Sri Lanka

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ICT Leadership & Institutional Development

Re-Engineering Government Services

ICT Capacity Building

ICT Investment and Private Sector Development

Technical Architecture, standards, specifications

eSociety

Information Infrastructure

Model of e-Gov adopted in Sri Lanka

• Re-engineer government services

• Then automate

• Get private sector (software) companies to implement the software to automate

– i.e. government doesn’t develop software systems

• Service delivery channels:

– Via computers (in homes, offices, at telecenters, internet kiosks)

– Much later, focus on mobile devices as channel

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Where do you start e-Gov?

• Limited resources – Time (initially the ICT Agency had a 5-year mandate)

– Money (USD 32 Million towards eGov activities; out of 83 million)

• Prioritized list of e-Gov services – Prioritized by impact, usage

– Pick the top ones

• Reality: Entrenched interests inability to implement projects at the top of the list – End up doing what you can

– Where there’s most buy-in

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Laying the ground-work

• Practice with some pilot projects – To get our feet wet (few had done this before) – To learn from what went wrong/right – To build relationships

• Even less capacity in the recipient organization (ministry/department that gets the new system and will own it after installation) – Training programs

• Need a owner (a ‘champion’) inside the recipient (project owner’s) organization – Select, appoint, train and promote “Chief

Information/Innovation Officers” or CIOs at key recipient organizations

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Problems

• Of two types

• 1) Problems due to the institutional set up of the ICT Agency

• 2) Problems that arise in eGov projects irrespective of institutional arrangements

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Problem 1a: The ICT Agency’s setup • A company, fully owned by the government

– Not a ‘government organization’

• Merit-based hiring with salaries above market rates – Many who were moving back to Sri Lanka after decades abroad – Few people (2 initially) who came from govt. – Most people from private sector

• CEO from leading software firm – But not given a government rank (i.e. not status of Secretary of

a Ministry

• Given a national, cross-sectoral mandate – ICTs in all sectors, not just govt

• It was a ‘big deal’ – A first of its kind for the Word Bank – Much publicity

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Why is this a problem: High salaries + uncontrolled publicity High expectations (~recipe for failure)?

• Long list of detractors:

– People who applied for jobs, didn’t get hired

– People who didn’t like staff getting high salaries

– People who applied for pilot project grants, but didn’t get

– (Opposing) political parties

– …..

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Could things have been done differently?

• Could high salaries have been avoided? – Important to attract Sri Lankans living overseas – Important to attract private sector experts

• Could the CEO have been more empowered within government – Yes – Not at Secretary level practical difficulties due to

protocol

• Could ICTA have been more media savvy? – Yes; today social media but then…

• What other variables were available to play with?

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Problem 1b: The Re-engineering Government Steering Committee that never was implemented • Senior civil servants

– Secretaries of important departments [e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Administration, etc.

– Other senior actors

• Taking policy level decisions – With input from ICTA, industry – Meeting regulatory, not annually

• A vacuum when ICTA faced challenges – Politicians stepping into that vacuum

• ICTA: “the apex ICT policy making body for Sri Lanka and the implementer of the e-Sri Lanka vision” – But unable to make policies

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Why is this an issue? Implementers need policy direction during implementation, not just at the beginning • Population register

– A funder’s objections to religion/race being recorded

– Existing law/practices requires these (e.g. in inheritance)

– Changing this not a decision for the ICTA

– But technology workarounds possible

• Free & open source software – Should they be given preference in procurement

• Putting forms online – A government-wide rule change

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When politicians step into vacuum left by policy makers….it can be good

• Politicians: voice of the people – They SHOULD prioritize policies

• To speak up for the implementing agency – When it comes under attack

• In theory, it opens doors – Powerful people at the top

– Needed for cross sectoral agency

– Move from Ministry of Science and Technology Prime Minister’s Office President’s Office

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When politicians step into vacuum left by policy makers…bad things can happen

• Politicians need – ‘wins’ during their tenure

– Need to take care of their constituents jobs

– Leading to local optimums, but not system-wide optimal solutions

– May not take technocratic input into consideration when making decisions

• Results: – Requests/orders to implement projects not in priority list

– Changes in ongoing project design (telecenters)

– ‘Appointment’ letters for people

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Problem 2a: How does eGov get implemented?

• ICTA controls the money (from the World Bank) • ICTA has the experts • ICTA runs the procurement to select consultants/firms

that – Do the process re-engineering – Do develop and install the new eGov system

• The recipient/owner of all this is the Ministry/Department/Govt organization whose processes are being automated

• Life changes for the owner/recipient organization – ICTA gets to do the ‘cool’ stuff

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Problem 2b: Procurement

• Money from World Bank World Bank procurement rules – Intended to increase transparency and best value for

money

• Needs expertise to run a good procurement – To pick which method to select: 2 staged, single staged,

CBS, QCBS, many other

• Need time. A LOT of it, to play by the rules – Sufficient time for bidders to prepare documents (at each

stage)

• Can’t always buy from the known/local market – High value contracts need to be open to int’l competition

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Problem 2c: promoting local software firms during procurement

• A stated goal of the eGov program was to develop Sri Lankan software firms – They bid for, and implement the country’s eGov systems – Gain experience – Helps them bid for work outside of Sri Lanoka, using Sri Lankan project

as reference.

• Challenge: – Low levels of expertise: just can’t do the job – End up with JVs with foreign firms

• Reality: – Local firms have never submitted a WB tender document – Many disqualified bids

• Reactionary solution: – The eGov and Procurement teams ran trainings

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Problem 2a and 2b in action: ePensions project

• Identified as priority project – large number of retirees; some leakage in the system; very slow processing

times

• Procurement 1: to select consultant for Process Re-Engineering + identifying System requirements – Procurement time (3 months)

• Conduct Process re-Engineering + Produce System Requirements (SR) document ; then get SR approved by Pensions Dept – 1-1.5 years – Challenges: personalities

• Procurement 2: Selection of System Development vendor (software + hardware implementer) – 2 staged selection; 6 months (including evaluation of bids)

• Implement the system – 1 -2 years (optimistic)

• Requirements are now old; people have moved on

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Much talk, no early results

• Long time needed from concept to finish

• Result: 2.5 years after inception of the 5-year termed ICTA…no e-Gov project implemented

• But HUGE expectations

– Media, others: setting expectations

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Working ‘outside’ the government system: 1919 Government Information System

• Background: need for quick win e-Gov project – Long time before e-Gov services become reality. – To counter negative perceptions

• Lack of information HOW TO ACCESS GOVT. SERVICES – Multiple trips to government office, wasted time, costs – Low internet use websites not a full solution

• Solution: a call center – Polite, helpful, fast – Service-based, not department based

• Choices – Train govt. workers to run a call center – Something faster?

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• Tapping the existing capacity at call centers – Service US/UK markets staffed at night – Empty during day time cheap, excess capacity – World class technology already existing

• Necessary conditions: information on govt process – Resistance, lack of interest, lack of vision – Use interns get each ministry to check.

• Competitive procurement – Rules vs. Rules

• “But how can private sector people answer government questions”? – Under the radar implementation – ‘Surprise’ soft launch

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First success story in e-Gov (and only success, for many years)

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• Call volume increase each year

• More calls answered than abandoned

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• Government organizations showing increasing trust

Mid-way turn-around in eGov

• Change in skill set of e-Gov team – Serious ‘techies’ hired – Chief Technology Officer Appointed

• Re-thinking how systems are designed – Government architecture, as opposed to project – Modular (break down into parts) – Identification of common parts (services) – Open source, in-house development of comment services

• Focus on mobile is key delivery channel – [plug for LIRNEasia]

• Local industry ‘taught’ how to bid, manage contract risk – High level of success in local firm participation – [another plug for LIRNEasia]]

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Today….

• UN eGov rankings

– Sri Lanka made biggest jump (41 places)

– 115th in 2012

– 74th in 2014

• High levels of actual service delivery

– Hundreds of e-Services launched since Sep 2013

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