Catherine Malabou-Hegel y El Tiempo

8/13/2019 Catherine Malabou-Hegel y El Tiempo

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The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, DialecticAuthor(s): Catherine Malabou and Lisabeth DuringReviewed work(s):Source: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 4, Contemporary French Women Philosophers (Autumn, 2000),pp. 196-220Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of Hypatia, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810686.

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TheFuture fHegel:Plasticity, emporality,ialectic1CATHERINEMALABOUTranslatedyLisabethDuring

At the centerof Catherine'sMalabou's tudy of Hegel is a defenseof Hegel'srelation o timeandthefuture.Whilemanyreaders,ollowingKojeve,havetakenHegelto beannouncingheendof history,Malabou indsa moresupple mpulse,open o thenew,theunexpected. hetakesasherguidinghreadheconcept f plas-ticity, and showshowHegel'sdialectic-introducinghesculptor'srt intophiloso-phy-is motivated ythedesireor transformation.Malabousa cannyand aithfulreader, ndallowsherclassic maitre ospeak, fnotagainsthisowngrain,at leastagainst traditionooattachedo closure ndsystem.Malabou'sHegel s a plasticthinker, ot a nostalgicmetaphysician.

INTRODUCTION:HE PROBLEMATICA. IS HEGEL'SPHILOSOPHY THINGOFTHEPAST ?

The Futureof Hegelis a title that presentsitself in the affirmative,as if itknows there is a positive answer to the question it anticipates, DoesHegelhave a future? nevitably,at the end of this century,the question muststillbe posed. For in this time, philosophy,while acknowledgingthe statureofG. W.F Hegel and its debt to his thought,has suspectedspeculativeidealismof submitting to a totalizing or even a totalitarianstructure. If speculativephilosophyhas not been entirely rejected, it has been at the very least keptat a distance. It is impossible,therefore,to considerHegel'sfuturetoday assomething alreadyguaranteed,as an establishedandrecognized act. This fu-ture itselfneeds to happen.Itremains o bedemonstrated,and to be examined.Such an examination is what the presentworkintends to provide.Hypatiavol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2000) by LisabethDuring


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By futureof Hegel, one must understand first of all the future of hisphilosophy. Future avenir)has the ordinarymeaningof the time to come(futur),the time yet ahead.Etymologyconfirms this connection: the future(la-venir) means that which is to come (ad-vient).But it denotes also thatwhich is capableof lasting:to have a future s to be capableof having a pos-terity.Now, and this is the fundamentalproblem,can the philosophyof Hegelhave a genuine posterity?Can it still hold out a promise?Can it still cause astir?Can it continue to makean impacton the tendencies of ourtimes (com-mentpourrait-elle.. orienterestemps),when time has shown it to be an en-terprisehatbrings imeto an end?Time: it's with time that everything began; it is because of time that thedivorce between Hegel and contemporaryphilosophywas announced. To acertaindegreethe famousconclusionto the PhenomenologyfMindsignedthedeath sentence of Hegelianism:

Time is the Notion itself that is thereandwhich presentsitselfto consciousness asemptyintuition;forthis reasonSpiritnec-essarilyappearsn Time, and it appears nTimejustaslong as ithas not graspedts pureNotion, i.e., has not annulledTime. Itis the outer, ntuited pureSelf which is notgrasped y the Self,the merelyintuitedNotion; when this lattergrasps tself it setsasideits Time-form(hebt eineZeitformuf), comprehends hisintuiting, and is a comprehendedand comprehendingintuit-ing, Time, therefore,appearsas the destiny and necessity ofSpirit that is not yet complete within itself (dernicht in sichvollendetist).Hegel 1977,487; Hegel 1941, 2:305;Hegel 1970,3:584-85)

Many interpretershave concluded fromthis discussionthat time was forHegel nothing but a moment o bepassedby.And it does appear hat time it-self, unwilling to forgiveabsoluteknowledgeforhaving ordained its dialecti-cal supersession,has demandedreparations.This demand is articulatedmostpowerfullyby MartinHeidegger,who arguesthat the time transcended(auf-hebt)byspiritat the momentof absoluteknowledgeis simplythe vulgarnotionof time. The vulgarunderstandingof time is a conception that Heideggerbelieveshasdominated the entirehistoryof metaphysicsand hasnow come toan end with the completion of that epoch. Heidegger's tereotypereachesitsradicalconclusion in aparaphrase:TheHegeliannotion of timerepresents,asno one has properlynoted, the most radicaldevelopment at the level of theconcept of the ordinaryunderstandingof time (Heidegger1984, 428).2Aristotle was the first to give conceptual elaboration to this ordinaryunderstandingof time, whichhe understands s asequenceof nows, assingbywithoutbeginningor end andmakingupthe uniform luxwithin which thesequence of events unfolds: Timeappears o the vulgarunderstandingas a

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succession of nowsconstantly present-at-hand, hatpassbyandarriveat thesame moment. Time is understoodas a sequence, as a flux f nows, like thestreamof time (Heidegger1984, 422). In Heidegger'sview, the paragraphsdevoted to time in the Encyclopediaf thePhilosophicalciences implyreiteratetermbyterm the Aristotelianproblematicof the stigme ( point )evelopedin Book IV of the Physics.Hegel fulfillsthe classical idea of the instantaneousby determiningit conceptuallyas punctuality Punklichkeit).t is Hegel whomaintains that:

The negativitywhich relatesitself to spaceaspoint (diesichalsPunktauf den Raumbezieht)and develops its determinationswithin it asline andplane,existsalso assomethingfor-itselfandfor its determinations in the sphereof exterality (desAufer-sichsein); et at the same time aspositingthose determinationsin the external space, it appears ndifferent to the immobilejuxtapositions(dasruhigeNebeneinander)f space.Posited thusfor-itself,negativity is time. (Hegel 1970, 1:229)

A spatialdetermination-the point-serves to characterizea temporalde-termination-the instant. But suchaconcept of time, seemingto reducetem-poralityto nothing but the formof juxtaposition,strikesus today as a tem-porality strippedof all future.The ordinaryunderstandingof time is what constitutesforHeideggertheunity of the philosophical tradition summedup for him in the name meta-physics. This tradition conformsto an understandingof Being reduced topresence ousia, Anwesenheit), hus privilegingthe present tense (Gegen-wart)with respectto the other dimensionsof time. From hat perspective,thepastand futuremustnecessarilyappearas either a presenttime which is justpast,3or a presentwhich is to come ( anot yet now ).To conceive time as ahomogenousmilieu in which things occur-a milieu in which nothing thathappens can truly come unexpectedly (survenir)-represents for Heideggerthe dominant view in philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Husserl.Hegelstands out from the otherphilosophersbecause he takesto its logical conclu-sion this traditionalprivilegingof the present.In the speculativeconceptionof time,the future s not even a time ikeother imes:t lacksthe powertopreserveitself, giving way to the lead-that is to say,the ontological priority-of thepastunderstoodas the previousmode of the present.In his lecturesof 1930 on Hegel'sPhenomenologyfSpirit,Heideggerclaimsthat [u]ndoubtedlyHegel occasionally speaksabouthaving been, but neverabout the future.This silence fitswith the fact that (forhim) the past is itselfthe decisive characterof time, andfora good reason:time is both the passingitselfand what passes; t has alwayspassedaway Heidegger1988, 82; trans-lation modified).4

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Time in Hegel'sthought is understoodasthe pasttense of spirit:spiritmustpassover (ubergehen)nto time in orderto fulfillits own identity as absolute,eternal, and in itself. That identity, in its turn, is itself a past but a past notyet temporallypast.5It is the timeless antiquityof presence, he Parousiaof the absolute. From its standpoint,everythingthat occurs can be only theindication of what has alreadycome to pass; everythingstill in the future issimplya potential return to self.Infact,forHegel, isn'tit the casethat everythingwhich occurshasdone sotoo late?Isn'tyouthitself,in itsverynovelty,alreadybelated? n the Philosophyof Spiritof TheEncyclopediaf Philosophicalciences,at the moment whereheanalyses the natural seriesof the agesof life, Hegel demonstratespreciselythat the characteristicof youth is to believe in the future,to think that theworldis not yet all it reallyis: The exaltedspiritof the youth does not recog-nize that the substantialuniverse,in its essence,has alreadyachieved in thisworld its development and its actuality (Hegel 1971, 55). The youth mustwait to growold to understand hat the world possesseshe absolutepowertoactualize tself and that it has done so in ourtime;that it is not so impotentthatit needs firstto await its effective realization Hegel 1971, 55).The absolute does not wait,has never been expected (ne s'est amaisatten-du), will never be awaited;the intense turningtowards he unexpected (l'in-attendu)sonlyone ofyouth's llusions,one which Hegelhimselfremembers shis own before the crisis of Frankfurt.But too late. In its twilightdiscourse,atthe beginningof itsnight, philosophymaybe nothing but the announcementof this truth: it is too late forthe future.This announcement bringswith it a feeling of constriction,as if ontologyhas closed us in. The System thus seems to be a tight loop which envelopseverything-all exteriority,all alterity,all surprise.Hegel asserts hatspirithasno absolute other than itself, for the absolute here s no absolutealterity: Forspirit, nothing exists which is absolutelyother than itself. That is why [a]llaction of spirit is nothing but a graspingof itself, and the aim of all genuinescience is only this, to know that spirit recognizes n itself everythingthere isin heaven and on earth (Hegel 1971, 1).

Spirit, whose task is to graspitself, to anticipate the finding of itself ineverythingthat is now and is to come, can never encounter anything whollyother, can never come face to face, in a sense, with the event.What place,therefore, s there in Hegelianthoughtfor the questionof the future, f every-thing has alreadybeen permeatedby spiritand, in this fashion,alreadycom-pleted?Scatteredthroughoutrecentphilosophicalwriting,we find no shortageofanalysesdrawingattention to this arrested,congealed,mortifiedcharacterofspeculativethought.AlexandreKojevehimself,althoughcommitted to stress-ing the timeliness of Hegelian thought as a means with which to think the

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future,nonetheless defines absoluteknowledgein terms of the end of time.Now is there any temporalitywhich can correspondto this end of timeexcept time's stasis in the congealed form of a perpetual resent?Heideggeragrees: TheHegelianpresentationof the true notion of being ... with whatit says about time, it is nothing other than a farewell to time as the routetowardsspiritwhich is eternity (Heidegger1988, 147).6Has Hegel's farewell o time reversed into a farewellof time to Hegel?Indeed,is not time as it exists forspeculativephilosophynot actuallytime atall, but rather the flatteningor leveling-down (Nivellierung) f time itself, ofthat genuine time called by Heidegger primordial emporality ?Primordialtime can not be conceptualized throughthe present,for its most fundamen-tal exstasis s the future. Primordial emporality,Heideggerwrites, tempor-alizesitselfprimarilyut of the future 1996, 329). Thus the authenticfuture,in Heidegger, sno longerasimplemoment of time,butisconflated n acertainwaywith time itself.I do not intend to stage a confrontation between the Hegelian and Hei-deggereanconceptionsof time. However,it is impossible o be unawareof thechanges in the way the futurehas been thought about over the course of thetwentieth century.If we were to ignore,so to speak,the future ife of the ideaof the future,then we would be ourselvesguiltyof leveling-down hatfutureand, in a sense, laggingbehind it.Indeedthe readingventuredhere is far fromwantingto be reactionaryornostalgic.The success,the future f this approachwill dependon its capac-ity to remainopen to those arguments hat opposeit. In particulart mustre-main open to that analysisaccordingto which the absenceof a conception ofthe future n Hegel impliesthe absence of a future orthe philosophyof Hegel.To say,with Heidegger,that Hegel never speaksabout the future amountstosayingthat Hegel does not have a future.Against this, by affirminghat ndeedthere s a future f Hegel, the present work contests the validity of Heideg-ger'sassertion,all the while acknowledging he significanceit is owed,as wellas the philosophicalconcerns it continues to provoke.B. THE PROMISEOF PLASTICITY

With this end in view,we intend to construct a concept, that of plastici-ty, as foreshadowedn ourtitle: TheFutureof Hegel:Plasticity,Temporality,Dialectic. To forma concept in the sense intendedheremeansfirstof all totake up a notion (plasticity), which has a defined and delimited role in thephilosophyof Hegel, only in orderto transformt into the sort of comprehen-siveconcept that can grasp saisir) he whole. Here the double senseofgrasp,taking prendre) nd understanding comprendre),s authorizedbythe ety-mologyof the word concept. Transforming lasticityinto aconcept isa mat-

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ter of showingthat plasticity captures prend) he philosophyof Hegel andallows the reader o comprehend t, appearingat one andthe same time asastructureand as a condition of intelligibility.Toformaconcept meansin the secondplaceto developto the fullestextentan example(uneinstance)capableof impartinga formto that which it grasps.Hegel indeed asserts his manytimes: if the concept is a logical form,it mustnot be considered ike an empty receptacle,ratheras a powerwhich can fash-ion its own content. By giving plasticity a mediating position between fu-ture and temporality, mytitle: TheFutureofHegel: Plasticity,Temporality,Dialectic, already ndicatesthatplasticitywill be envisagedas the instancewhich gives ormto the future and time in Hegel'sphilosophy.That is to say,their relationshipis constructed n the mode of plasticity;time and the futurearemutually nvolved in a dialogical processgoverned byplasticity.Fromthisit follows that the concepts of the futureand of plasticityneed to be treatedconcurrently:one clarifyingthe other as a title is clarifiedby its subtitle.This relation of synonymy s turned around in the second place into arelation of asymmetry.ndeed, to posit the future as, in effect, plasticityamounts to displacingthe establisheddefinition of the future as a moment orperiodof time. And indeed in the title such a displacementwas announced:thefuture I'avenir),hat which is tocome, will not be restricted n mean-ing by the immediate,predictableconnotation, that of the future s futuretime. Thus it is not a matter of examiningthe relationsbetween past, pres-ent, and the conventional sense of the futurepresentedin the discussionsoftime in Hegel'sdifferentversions of a Philosophy f Nature (1970).7 Rather,these texts themselves demand that we renounce the well-known and fa-miliarmeaning of the futureand, as a consequence, the well-known defi-nition of time.The possibility hat one temporaldetermination-the future-can be thought differently,beyond its initial, simple status as a moment oftime-of thatwhich isnow to come -makes it immediatelyclearthat time,forHegel,cannot be reduced o anorderedrelationbetweenmoments.Rather,we will understand plasticity s primarily heexcessoffutureover thefuture;while temporality, s it figures n speculativephilosophy,will mean insteadthesurplusof timeovertime.

These preliminaryremarksndicate at the startof the gamethat my workwill not followthe pathsetoutbyAlexandreKoyreandKojeve,althoughbothdopursue his questionof the future n the philosophyof Hegel.The former,in his article on HegelatJena, he latter in his IntroductionotheReading fHegel,agree: n the Systems f the Jenaperiod,the futurehad prevalenceor alternately,priority,over the pastand the present.Thus both writersshowherethe proximityof the thoughtof the young Hegel to that of Heidegger.Butthe kind of treatmentrepresentedby KoyreandKojeve,despiteits interestandits significance,does not give us the meansto respondto the questionof the

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The possibilityof affirming he futureof Hegel -in the doublemeaningof a future of his philosophyand a future within his philosophy-dependsin the first nstance on posingthe questionof the futurewhere one does notanticipate it. Consequently it is plasticitywhich will be presented as theunforeseen f Hegelian philosophy.To this extent, the futureof the notion of plasticitymust be put into play.Its viability depends on the success of an epistemological operation whichresembles,in its method, that definedby Georges Canguilhemin terms thatwould become famous:

To workon a concept is to explorethe variationsin its exten-sion andits intelligibility.It is to generalize t by includingin itthe traitsof its exceptions. It is to exportit outsideits own do-main, to use it as a model or converselyto look for a model forit, in short it is to give to it, bit by bit, throughorderedtrans-formations,the function of aform. (Canguilhem1970, 206)Such an operationwill guideus, throughoutthe entire scope of this work,

in testing theplasticity f thenotionof plasticitytself.HEGELIAN HILOSOPHYND THETEST OFPLASTICITY

A. ORDINARYMEANINGSOF THECONCEPTOFPLASTICITYTo workon the concept of plasticity will, followingCanguilhem'suse,amountto givinga formalfunction to a termwhich itself, in its firstsense,

describesor designateshe actof giving orm.The Englishand Frenchsubstan-tives plasticity or plasticiteand their German equivalent, Plaztizitat, n-tered the language n the eighteenth century.9They joined two wordsalreadycurrentwhich had been formed fromthe same root: the substantive Plasti-city (diePlastik),and the adjective plastic plastisch).All three wordswerederivedfrom the Greek plassein,which means to model, to mould. Plas-tic, as an adjective,means two things:on the one hand, to be susceptibleochanges of form, malleable-clay is a plastic material-and on the otherhand, havingthe powerto bestowform,the powerto mould, as in the ex-pressions plasticsurgeon and plasticarts. This twofoldsignification s metagain in the Germanadjectiveplastisch.Grimm'sdictionarydefines it thus:thatwhich takes orgives shape,orfigure, o bodies (korperlich.. gestaltendodergestaltet).10 a plasticite,or plasticity, ust like Plaztizitatn German,describes he natureof that which is plastic, hat which is at once capableofreceivingand of giving form.These definitionshelp to clarifythe hermeneuticcircle in which my ap-proachhas been caught ever since the formation of the concept plasticityrequired hat the worditselfbe defined.The definingand the defined arethe

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same.Admittedly, fwe areto separateone fromthe other, theextension mustbe changed. But these alterations themselves take advantageof the signifi-cation of the term plasticity :ndeed, the word'sevolution in the languagerevealsalready ts exportationoutside its originalterrain. The homelandofplasticity is the field of art. Plasticity is clearly intrinsic to the art of mod-eling and, in the first instance, to the art of sculpture.The plastic arts arethose for which the centralaim is the articulationanddevelopmentof forms;amongthese are counted architecture,drawing,andpainting.Now, byexten-sion, plasticitysignifiesthe general aptitudefordevelopment,the powerto bemoldedby one'sculture,by education. We speakof the plasticityof the new-born, of the child'splasticity of character.Plasticity is, in another context,characterizedby suppleness nd flexibility,as in the case of the plasticityof the brain,yet it means as well the ability to evolve and adapt.It is in thissense that one callsupon in speakingof a plasticvirtue possessedbyanimals,plants,and living things in general.The extension have been drawingout mustbe understood n a particu-larway.By analogyto a malleablematerial,childrenaresaid to be plastic.However,the adjective plastic, f it is certainly opposedto rigid, fixed,and ossified, s not to be confusedwith polymorphous. hingsthat areplas-tic preservetheir shape, as does the marble in a statue: once given a config-uration,it is unableto recover its initial form. Plastic, hus,designatesthosethingsthatyieldthemselvesto beingformedwhile resisting eformation.Fromthis it is possible to understanda further extension of this term into theterrainof histology,for which plasticity epresents he abilityof tissueto re-form itself aftera lesion.

Plasticity'srange of meaningshas not come to a halt and it continues toevolve with and in the language.Plasticmaterial s a synthetic materialwhichcan take on different shapes and propertiesaccordingto the functions in-tended. Plastic n its own is an explosivematerialwith a nitroglycerineandnitrocellulosebase that can set off violent detonations.The plasticityof theword itself draws t to extremes,both to those concrete shapesin which formis crystallized sculpture)and to the annihilation of all form(the bomb).B. HEGEL'SNOTIONOF PLASTICITY

To construct the concept of plasticity as it figuresin Hegel'sphilosophyrequires irstof all thatwe uncoverthe wayin which Hegel himselfgivesshapeto this idea.Throughsuchan elaboration,we find that three areasof meaningaremutually mplicated.In each casethat doubleconnotation of the adjectiveplastic s present:capacityto receive form and capacityto produceform. Itis this double significationwhich enables us to treat the adjective as itself a

speculativeword, n Hegel'sspecial sense.

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The firstrelevantfield of signification s that of the plasticarts. The wordsplastisch nd Plastikappear frequentlyin Hegel'sdiscussionsof Greek art,especially in the Aesthetics,where sculptureis definedas theplastic artparexcellence. This more familiar sense of plasticity, when drawnupon andextended, permitsthe philosopherto develophis notion further: t acquiresagreaterrangeand complexityin its secondsignifyingfield,where it appliestothose he entitles plasticndividuals r plasticcharacters.n Hegel'saccount,plasticity escribes he natureof those Greekfigureswho representan indi-viduality he names exemplary exemplarische)nd substantial substan-

tielle). Pericles,... Phidias,Plato,and above all Sophocles,as well asThucy-dides,Xenophon, Socrates are plastic ndividuals : Theyaregreatandfree,grownindependentlyon the soil of their own inherentlysubstantialpersonal-ity,self-made,anddevelopinginto what they (essentially)wereand wanted tobe (Hegel 1975a, 719).Hegel insists on the fact that: Thissense for the perfectplasticityof godsand men was pre-eminentlyat home in Greece (dieserSinnfir dievollendetePlastikder Gottlichenund Menschlichenwar vorehmlich in Griechenland ei-

misch).In itspoetsandorators,historiansandphilosophers,Greece is not to beunderstoodat its heart unless we bringwith us as a key to ourcomprehensionan insight into the ideals of sculptureand unless we consider from the pointof view of their plasticity not only the heroic figures n epic and dramabutalso the actual statesmen andphilosophers.After all, in the beautifuldaysofGreece, men of action, like poets and thinkers, had this same plastic anduniversalyet individualcharacterboth inwardlyand outwardly(diesenplas-tischen,allgemeinen nd dochindividuellen, achauj3enwie nachinnengleichenCharakter) Hegel 1975a, 719).11These plasticcharacters iveformto the thespiritual n itsembodiment(Korperlichkeites Geistigen).Thus the theme of plastic individuality itselfrepresentsa middle term, mediatingbetween plasticity in its firstsignifyingdomain,that of sculpture,12nd its third:philosophicallasticity.The expression philosophicalplasticity must be understood n two differ-ent ways. On the one hand, it characterizes he philosophical attitude, thebehaviorspecificto the philosopher.On the otherhand, it appliesto philoso-phy itself, to its formand mannerof being, that is to say,to that rhythm inwhich the speculativecontent is unfolded and presented.In the Preface to The Scienceof Logicof 1831 Hegel states: A plasticdis-course(einplastischerVortrag)demands,too, a plastic receptivityand under-standingon the partof the listener (einenplastische inn desAufnehmens ndVerstehens);ut youthsand men of such a temperwho wouldcalmlysuppresstheirownreflectionsand opinions in which originalhought is so impatienttomanifestitself, listenerssuch as Plato feigned,who would attend only to thematterathand (nurderSache olgender uhorer),ould have no place in a mod-

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the unfoldingof the Substance/Subject.n the process,Substance withdrawsfrom itself in orderto enter into the particularityof its content. Throughthismovement of self-negationSubstancewill posit itself as Subject.As BernardBourgeoisremarks, (t)he Subject is that infinite activity,or,moreprecisely,negativity,whose identity is in this way made true, concrete, and mediated,and which actualizes tself in its internalself-differentiation,n its division ororiginalscission(ursprunglicheeilen), hat is to say, n its 'judgment' Ur-teil).The identitythat belongsto the subjectaffirms tself in its differencewhereasthe identity at the level of substance can only be affirmed n the negation ofdifference which is also implicit in that identity (Hegel 1988, 201, Note 3).Self-determination s the movementthroughwhich substanceaffirmstselfas at once subjectandpredicate f itself. In the Scienceof Logic n the Encyclo-pedia Hegel defines the relationbetween substantialityand accidentality,or the AbsoluteRelation, as the activity-of-form Formtatigkeit)Hegel1991a, 225). Indeed it is this activity hat indicatespreciselythe very plas-ticityofsubstancetself, itscapacityboth to receive formand to give formto itsown content. With this considerationof self-determination, een as the orig-inaryoperationof plasticity, we arriveat the veryheart of the present study.C. THE DIALECTICAND THE WAITAND SEE

This heart has a pulse, whose rhythmsare spelled out by the last termof my title- The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,Temporality,Dialectic. Themovement of self-determination s in fact the veryprincipleof the dialecticalprocess.Itsenergyis bor fromthe contradictory ension between the preser-vation of determination as something particularand the dissolution of ev-erythingdeterminate in the universal.In the Encyclopedia cienceof Logic,Hegeldemonstrates hat this sametensionisoperative n the waya firsterm,posited in and for itself, a moment which has the appearanceof self-sub-sistence (absoluteself-identity),displays tself as the other of itself by dis-solving the fixityof its position (Hegel 1976b, 833-34).15In the logical unfoldingof the substance-subject, he possibilityof thisdynamicofpreservationanddissolutiontakesshape,as is clearlyshown in thePreface to the Phenomenology:On account of its simplicityor self-identity(Sichselbstgleichheit)t appearsixed(fest)andenduring(bleibend).Butthis self--identity is no less negativity,thereforeits fixed existence passesover into itsdissolution(Auflosung) Hegel 1977, 34; 1941, 42).The dialecticalrocess myitalics) is plastic ecause,as it unfolds, t makeslinks between the opposing moments of total immobility (the fixed )andevacuation ( dissolution ),andthen links both in the vitality of the whole, awhole which, reconcilingthese two extremes,is itself the union (conjugaison)of resistanceWiderstand) ndfluidity(Fliissigkeit). he processof plasticityis

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dialectical becausethe operationswhich constitute it-the seizureofformandthe annihilation of all form,emergenceand explosion-are contradictory.16Now we can see the connection linking the three concepts- Plasticity,temporality, nd dialectic. Forthis isnothing less than theformation f thefuture itself. Plasticitycharacterizes he relationbetween substanceand acci-dents. Now the Greek word symdedakos, accident, derives from the verb

symdanein, which means at the same time tofollowfrom, to ensure,and toarrive,to happen.Thereby it can designatecontinuationn both senses of theword,asconsequence,hat is, what ollows n the logical sense, and asevent,that is, what ollows n a chronologicalsense. Self-determination s thus therelation of substance to thatwhichhappens.Followingthis line of thought weunderstand he future a-venir) n the philosophyof Hegel as therelation, heconnection,which ubjectivitymaintainswith the accidental.To understandthe future other than in the ordinary mmediatesense ofamoment of time requiresbythe same token anopening-outof the meaningof time: an extension madepossible by the very plasticity f temporality tself.The deploymentof the Hegelianconception of time is not fixedby referenceto the places and the times-to the moments -of its treatmentwithin theSystem.Time is an agency(uneinstance)characterizedbydialecticaldifferen-tiation; if it finds itselfdivided into definitemoments,these determine it onlyfor a moment.

Drawn into what could be called a dialecticalcomposition, he conceptsof the future, plasticity, nd temporality orm a structureoriented to-wardsanticipation, a structureoperative in subjectivityas Hegel conceivesthat. To distinguishthis structurefrom the futureas ordinarilyunderstood,we will name this structure he Waitand See (le voir enir ),obeyingHeg-el's insistencethat we philosophizein the language tself. Voirvenir n Frenchmeansto wait while observing,as is prudent,how events aredeveloping.Butit alsosuggests hat there are intentions andplansof otherpeoplewhich mustbe probedand guessedat. In this way an expressioncan refer at one and thesame time to the state of beingsurewhat is coming ( etre urdecequivient )and notknowingwhat willhappen nepassavoir equivavenir ). t is on thisaccount that the waitand see can represent hat interplay,within Hegelianphilosophy,of teleologicalecessityandsurprise rnovelty.The structureof wait and see creates its own specific boundaries.Onthe inside of the system,there is the limit controlling its functioningwithinHegel'sthought;externally,there is a limit which will decide on the futureof Hegel'sthought.Our method is to workon all the occurrences n Hegel ofhis concept of plasticity,and then at the same time to alter he understand-ing by meansof a regulated extension of its meaning.But this amountstothe following:revealingthe link between these two boundaries, nternalandexternal,and, no less,discoveringthe way form ppears lamanieredontlaformeprend )n the Hegelian systemand afterit.

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carrieson here this sameunderstandingof the synthesis.In referenceto spacehe writes: It s inadmissible o speakof spatialpointsas if theyconstitutedthepositiveelement in space,(becauseon accountof its lack of difference),spaceis merely the possibility,not the positednessof a state of juxtapositionandwhat is negative (1970, 1:223;1969-1979, 9:42).

Space, to the degree that it is a synthesis, is the originarypossibility fseparation.19Much the same is true fortime, whosesynthetic unity is calledbyHegel anegative unity. The dialectic of SenseCertainty n the Phenom-enologyof Spiritexplicitly revealsthe differencebetween the here and the

now understoodon the one hand aspunctual phenomena,and on the otheras that synthesiswhich represents he now which is manynows.In this capacityto differentiate tself from tself time showsexactlythe signof its plasticity.Yet this differentiation itself furtherrequiresa twofoldunder-standing.For it is, on the one hand, synchronic-the Hegelian concept of timedoes not reduce to a singularmeaning.And on the other hand, it is diachron-ic-to saythat time is not alwayswhat it is signifiesalso that it differentiatesitself from itself in time, that it has, to put it anotherway,a history.B. CHRONOLOGICALIFFERENTIATION

In the Encyclopediaaragraphsn spaceandtime, the implicitreferences oAristotle and Kant make it possibleto clarifya fundamentalcharacteristicofHegel's thought. The wait andsee, the structureof subjectiveanticipation,which is the originarypossibilityof all encounter (vis-a-vis), s not thesame neverymomentof its history,t does not seethings coming (voirvenir)in thesameway, tdoesnothavethesame uture(avenir).Subjectivityitself comes obe (advient) n two fundamentalmoments:theGreekmomentand themodemmoment,which proveto be, both in their logical unityand in theirchronolog-ical succession, subjectas substance and substanceas subject. Hegelianphilosophy synthesizestwo understandings:ousia-hypokemenon-theGreeksubstance-subject; ubjectum-substantia-themoder substance-subject.In the advent of Christianity,which he saw as the axison which the his-toryof the world turs (Hegel 1991b,319), Hegel saw the emergenceof themodem conception of subjectivitywhich dialectically sublates (relive) theearlierGreekconception. The subjectthus differs romitselfchronologicallyand logically.Firstthe substance-subject howsitself as a substance-subject,then as a substance-subject;ne needs to respect the accentuationhere, in-sistingon, to repeatthe termsof BernardBourgeois, Thesubstitution of theprimacyofChristianthought,which issubjectivist('the subject ssubstance'),for the primacyof pagan thought, which is substantialist('substanceis thesubject') Bourgeois1992, 68).

We will attemptto bringto light both the logical andchronologicaldiffer-

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entiations of these two trials proces)of the waitandsee. They appear, nHegelianphilosophy,as the two greatmomentsof subjectivity's oming-to-be,the first he epoch that standsunderthe nameofAristotle, the second the onewhich belongs to Kant.The powerof Hegel'sthought comes from his transformationof the rela-tion of these two modalities of the waitand see from a historical successionto a faceaface encounter at the level of philosophy.The firstmodalityarisesfromwhat it ispossibleto call the originaryynthetic nityofa teleologicalmove-mentin potentialitynd in action. The other modalitystems fromtheoriginarysyntheticunityof apperception,he foundation of representationVorstellung).Now it is the double sense of the locutions in itself and foritself whichdemonstrates his claim.The speculativecontent itself followsthe movementshapedbythiscontrastbetween the initself andthe for tself, a movementconceivable in twoways.On the one hand, it opposeswhat is potentiality owhat is actual 20;n the other hand, it opposesthe truth known in the formof certainty truth'ssubjectivemoment) to the truth known in the formoftruth truth'smoment of objectivity).

At the core of his philosophy, Hegel determines a speculative relationbetween the teleologicalircularitynd the representationalinearity,which re-calls representation o its Greekpastand announcesa posteriorio Greekphi-losophyitsrepresentativeuture.Inreturn,Greekthoughtappearsas much thefutureof representationas representationthe futureof Greek thought. Thisgameof the double waitandsee makesreadingHegel moretryingthan read-ing almost any other philosopher.ReadingHegel amounts to findingoneselfin two times at once: the processthat unfolds is both retrospectivend pro-spective. n the presenttime in which readingtakesplace, the reader s drawnto a doubleexpectation:waitingfor what is to come (accordingto a thoughtwhich is linear),while presupposinghat the outcomehas alreadyarrived ac-cordingto the teleological ruse).There has not yet been anystudydedicated to uncoveringwhat these twogreatmoments of subjectivity promise:nothing less than the immanenttemporalizationof the System. For these two moments don't belong to thesame rime. By configuring tself in both perspectives,Hegelian thought an-nouncesthe arrival I'advenue) of a new time. And here awaitsthe underlyingquestionof mywork: f there is a time that is the synthesisof its own content,thus as much a logical form as a chronologicalone, how can we explain itsnature?C. SPECULATIVEXPOSITION ND TRANSCENDENTALXPOSITION

Indeed the PhilosophyfNaturehasalreadydriventime out ofnature,there-byrevealingthat the concept of time exceeds its initial definition.This excess

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is not, however, exhibited for itself within the System. No moment of thespeculative exposition can occupythe overarchingposition:there is no spec-ulative arche-moment. The waitand see does not enjoy a transcendentalstature.Any transcendental nstancenecessarily inds tself in apositionof ex-teriorityin relation to that which it organizes.By its nature,the condition ofpossibilityis other than that which it makespossible.Yet the Hegelian con-ception of asystem mpliespreciselythe opposite:the absenceof any outsideof the System.Dialecticalphilosophy ssystematicallyon-transcendental.hereis no place, in Hegel, for a specificanalysisof the concept of time, one thatwould demonstrate ts plastic character.In this regard,ourapproach hall be not so much thematic sstrategic.t is astrategydrivenby the two concepts-of plasticity nd voirvenir -whoseconstruction is the keystoneof this project.An economyof sensible ranslation-to borrow the Kantian definition of hypotyposis 21-is tself figuredsen-suously by these concepts. This translation of the concept into the form ofthe sensuous is in essence systematic,an operationwhich the transcendentaldeduction cannot account for.

In the Phenomenologyf Spirit,Hegel declares, Thesingular ndividualis,on its own terms,the transition of the concept into externalreality;it is thepure schema itself (dasreineSchema) Hegel 1977, 143; 1941, 1:201). Theliving beingcan constructitsownschema foritself,andthis, the unificationofthe concept with empiricalexistence, cannot be explained by anything ex-ternal to the system.The scarcityofreferences o the notion ofplasticity s thusevidence of its distinct mode of presence,which is that of the originarysyn-thesis,maintainedonly in the interval betweenpresenceandabsence.It isforthis reason,becauseplasticityworkswithin the body(au corps)of the system-atic presentation,without everextendingaboveit oroverdeterminingt, thatit is revealed as the concept capable of accounting for the incarnation,orincorporation,of spirit.

IV. A READINGOFTHEPHILOSOPHY FSPIRITAt this point it is possible to bring together the lines of force which

determinethe strategyof this reading.The waitand see (voirvenir) tands orthe operationof synthetic temporalizing n Hegel'sthought, which means itis the structure of anticipation through which subjectivityprojects tself inadvance of itself,andtherebyparticipates n the processof its own determina-tion. Plasticityfor its part guarantees he differentialenergywhich moves atthe heartof the waitandsee, appearingas the condition ofpossibility orthisprojection.The waitandsee sdoublydifferentiated.Logically,t gathers ogetherthedifferentsignificationsof the Hegelian understandingof time: a whole and a

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relation ofmoments(past,present,future),asyntheticstructure self-determi-nation), a sensuoustranslationof the concept. Chronologically,t has itself ahistory,which is unfolded in historywithin being reducible to it. The sub-stance-subject s seento come (sevoirvenir) hroughtwo moments of its ownidentity,the Greek and the modem. These two majormomentseach possesstheir own conception of the relation between the ecstasesof time,one havinga conception of it as synthesisor self-determination,he other as hypotyposis.Furthermore,he infiniteelasticityof the absolute form(unendliche lazizitatderabsoluteForm), romwhich follows the temporalizationof the process fthe substance-subject,s that which can determine, in every moment of thesubstance-subject,ts form Form) Hegel 1971, 291). The form,we can say,is the relation (Verhaltnis)which self-consciousness takes to the body oftruth (284).Tostudyhow this device (dispositif)unctions in each of its epochs,we willenter into the forwardmarchof spirit, mbracing tstemporaldeploymentinthe placeswhere time issupposed o be absent: n the PhilosophyfSpiritof theEncyclopediafPhilosophicalciences.The last edition of 1830 will be the basisforthisreading.In his Remark o sec. 387 (Hegel 1971, 25), Hegeldisplays heprocessof spiritual nticipation:

andso in spiriteverycharacterunderwhich it appearss astagein a processof specificationand development, a step forward(Vorwartsgehen)owards tsgoal (seinemZiele), n order o makeitselfinto, and to realize n itself,what it implicitlyis.Eachstep,again, is itself such a process,and its productis that what themindwasimplicitlyat the beginning (andso for the observer)it isforitself-for the specialform,what spirithas in that step.... In the philosophicalvision of spiritassuch,spiritis studiedas self-instruction and self-cultivation in its veryessence, andits exteriorizations seineAuJ3erungen)restagesin the processwhich bringsit forward o itself (seinesSich-zu-sich-selbst-Her-vorbringen),inks it to unity with itself (seinesZusammensch-lieJ3ens itsich),and so makes it actualspirit.

The readingoffered here intends to payparticularattention to that struc-turewithin the Philosophyf Spiritwhich leads from the sleepof spirit SchlafdesGeistes)-the passivenous of Aristotle (Hegel 1971, 29)-to the intel-ligence which thinks itself :Aristotle's idea presented in the citation fromMetaphysics hich closesthe EncyclopediaAristotle 1984a, 7, 1072b, 18-30).The Philosophy f Spirit ormsa space extending fromnous to nous.However,between potentiality and act there develops in another place a time whichdoes not move forwardaccordingto a teleological deployment:the time ofrepresentation,

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which gives to the instances of the content of the absolutespirit,on the one hand, a separatebeing, makingthempresup-positions towards each other and phenomena which succeedone after he other(aufeinanderfolgenderrscheinungen).Hegel1969-1979, 10:3)

Central to ouranalysis s the waythese two perspectives,Greek andmodem,are constructedand detailed.The Hegelian exposition of Aristotle'spassivenous is found in the An-thropology :he expositionof the temporalityof representationn RevealedReligion ;and it is the citation from the Metaphysicswhich brings Philoso-phy to its completion. The substance of the present workwill consist of areadingof these three momentsof the Philosophy f Spirit:he firstmomentofsubjective spirit;the penultimate and the final moments those of absolutespirit.These three times of the readingwill be titled, respectively: TheHu-manityof Hegel ( L'Homme eHegel ); TheGod of Hegel ;and ThePhi-losopherof Hegel.The choice of this triad- Humanity, God, Philosopher -intends a delib-erate allusion to Heidegger'sarticulation of onto-theology. The challengehere is to produce provoquer) n interpretationof this triadthat uncovers allthe surprises t has in reservefor a readingconcerned to present Humanity,God, and the Philosopherof Hegel not as if they were fixed and substantialentities but asperspectivespento the crossroadsf time.What does that mean?Humanity,God, and Philosopherneed to be con-sidered, o adoptHegel'sownphrase,as the steps Stufe)in the developmentof the substance-subject.One could think about this as if steps mpliedatonce a processof progressive ntensity and a succession of stages,as if the lifeof the concept weregovernedby the rhythmof Humanity,God, Philosopher,andasif it requiredan achievement of the concept byitselfwhich, althoughitis manifested n history,has no historyof its own, in the sense that it doesnothave to make ime or itself(fairesontemps).But in fact, Humanity,God, Philosopher,farfrombeing subjectsconsti-tuted in advance,turnout to be the siteswheresubjectivityforms tself.Theyarethe plasticnstances instances lastiques)where the threegreatmoments ofself-determination-the Greek, the moder, and that of absoluteknowledge-give themselves the form f moments;in other words,where they createtheir specifictemporality.Fromthis perspective,the notion of step oses itsevaluativecontent, andonly signifiesthe break r interruption-theoperationof breaking(coupe(s))- in the self-formationof time itself.If one begins with the idea of such breaks,a discourse is invited that isnot content to argueeither for the unity of the logical genesis or for that ofthe chronological genesis, but insteadtries to locate the space of their com-mon originwithin the speculative development.Such adiscourse-where the

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times meet and intersect-draws from the source of that which it tries todescribe: roma speculativesupplenesswhich is neither passionnorpassivity,but plasticity.In what follows, at each moment of this triad,we need to select for ex-aminationa primordialmodalityof substance n its self-determinationand itsrecurringnegativity. By doing this, we will take a contrary approachto thesortof discoursewhich believesit can discard he anthropological, heological,andphilosophicmaterialwhosenoveltyHegel bringsto light. Forwithin thisdetail will be revealed the unique perspectiveof a philosophy of the event.Further, f we take this thought to the limit, we find the possibility open toHegel'sphilosophyto register tself as an event. By meansof the discipline fplasticityn its reading,the Encyclopedia,he ultimateexpressionof Hegelianthought,will discloseall the gentlenessof its maturity.

NOTES

We verywarmlyhankLibrairie hilosophique. Vrin forgrantingpermissionopublish translationf thiswork.1. Firstpublished s the introductiono CatherineMalabou, 'AvenireHegel:Plasticite,emporalite,ialectique.aris:Vrin,1996.A fulltranslation f theworkntoEnglishsforthcoming ithRoutledgePress,London.Ed2.JoanStambaughranslateshispassagesfollows: Because egel's onceptoftimepresentshe mostradicalway n which hevulgar nderstandingf timehasbeengiven orm onceptually,ndone whichhasreceived oo littleattention Heidegger1996,390).For heoriginaln SeinundZeit, eeHeidegger1984, 428).Trans.3. CompareHeidegger'sormulanSeinundZeit Heidegger 984,424): aright-away hat isno longer. rans.4. I have used heFrench fHeidegger's egel's henomenologyfSpirititedbyCatherineMalabou. heEnglishranslationfthispassageeads: Hegel ccasionallyspeaks bouthavingbeen,butneverabouthe future.Thisaccordswithhisviewofthepastas the decisivecharacter f time. It is a fadingaway, omethingransitoryndalwaysbygone. Thepassage ppearsn the French ranslationyEmmanuelMar-tineau n Heidegger1984,13). Trans.]Heidegger eclaresn the same ecture eriesthatHegeldevelops fundamentaliewofbeingaccordingowhichwhat sagenuinebeing s whathasreturnedoitself Heidegger 984, 146).5. TheGermananguageaspreservedssencen thepastparticiplegewesen)fthe verb tobe'(sein);oressence spast-but timelessly ast-being (Hegel1976b,389).6. Emad ndMalygive, Hegel'sxplication fthegenuine onceptofbeing-inthepassageust ndicated,where ime s mentioned-isnothingess han eaving imebehindon theroad o spirit,which seternal Heidegger 988, 147).Malabouitesthe Frenchranslation,Hegel(1941, 224).Trans.

7.That s,the versions fJena 1804-5and1805-6)and hatof theEncyclopediaofPhilosophicciencesn its threeeditions 1817,1827,1830).

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8. In particular, Bourgeois (1991); Labarriere 1970; 1986); Lebrun (1972),especially chap. 8; Souche-Dagues (1986; 1990), especially chap. 3, History, nd(1994, Part3), Timeand History and Conclusion.9. The word entered the French language in 1785 (DictionnaireRobert).TheBrockhausDictionaryshows that Plazizititwas introduced nto German in the ageofGoethe (dead in 1832).10. I reproducehere what is written in Grimm'sdictionary under the headingPlastik, Plastiker, nd Plastisch.

PLASTIK,feminine noun, from the French,plastique, rom the Greek( techne ), the creative arts,which create organicforms out of matter(by cutting, chiseling, casting), in the narrow sense of the word, themodelingarts. The objective of all those arts, which, to honor theGreeks,we will henceforth call 'plastic,' is to displaythe dignity of thehumanthroughthe medium of the human form Goethe). Theplasticarts areonly effective on the highest level (Goethe). Paintingenjoysafar wider domain, and greaterfreedom, than anything possible to the

plastic arts Hans Meyer).PLASTIKER,masculinenoun, creative rtist. Dadelus, he firstcre-ative artist Goethe).Who dares o writepoetry,and is ashamedof languageandrhythm,is like the plastic artist,who buildspicturesout of air (Platen).Aplastic poet:our twogreatestRomantics,Goethe andAugustvonSchlegel, areat the same time ourgreatestcreative artists Heine).PLASTISCH, adjective and adverb, physically orming, shaping,orshaped,usefulorappropriateo plasticity : Belief, ove, hope... oncethey felt a plastic drive in their nature, they joined togetherwith ener-gy and produceda charmingcreation .... patience (Goethe). Plasticanatomy Goethe). Theplasticnature of men (Schiller). Plasticrep-resentations (A.W. Schlegel). Gervinus the plastic artist ; plasticpoet (Heine); his plasticpoetry, whose forms seemedto emerge rightout of the body (Heine). Topresent plastically, to paint plastically(with formsstrongly grounded), to delineate with plastic clarity (Le-nau); plasticpeacefulness Auerbach); plasticactsof violence, steal-ing treasuresof sculpture Klopstock); the act of sculpting,of model-ing. [Roughrendition of Grimm'snineteenth-centurylanguage.Trans.]

11. In Lectures n thePhilosophy f History Hegel 1991b), Pericles is describedasthe paradigmof a plasticindividual : Pericleswas a statesman of plastic antiquecharacter 259). It was at Pericles'instigation that there originated theproductionof those eternal monuments of sculpture :his orations were addressed to a band ofmen whose genius has become classical for all centuries (260-61). We find here thesameexamples:Thucydides,Socrates,Aristophanes.Alexander himself is character-ized as a plasticspirit : (He) had been educatedby the deepest and also the mostcomprehensivethinkerof antiquity-Aristotle; and the education wasworthyof themanwho had undertaken t. Alexander was initiated into the profoundestmetaphys-ics: thereforehis naturewasthoroughlyrefinedand liberated romthe customarybondsof mereopinion, crudities and idle fancies (dadurchwurde ein Naturellvollkommene-

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iswhere hepositiveresides.Andalthoughnature,withina specificorm,advanceswitha uniformnotmechanicallyniform utuniformlyccelerated)movement,tstillenjoysa newformwhich t acquires. s nature nters hatform, o it remainsnit, justas a shellstarts uddenlyowardsts zenithandthenrests or a moment n it;metalwhen heateddoesnot turnsoft likewax,butall at oncebecomesiquidandremains o-for thisphenomenons the transitionnto the absolute pposite ndsoisinfinite,andthisemergence f theopposite utof infinity routof itsnothingnesssa leap(einSprung). heshape,n itsnew-borntrength, t first xists or tselfalone,beforetbecomes onscious fitsrelation o another. ust o,thegrowingndividualityhasboththedelightofthe leap nentering newformandalsoanenduring leasurein its newform,until it graduallypensupto thenegative; nd n its decline ooit issuddenandbrittle undauch n ihremUntergangeufeinmal ndbrechendst) Hegel1975b,131-32).17. Sie st dasSein, das, ndemesist,nichtst,and ndemesnichtst,ist.18.Derrida dds hat it swellknown hatHeideggeronsideredHegel o havecoveredoveranderasedKant's udaciousnessnmanyrespects Derrida 982,44).19.HegelusesAuseinandersetzenn the senseof juxtaposition s well as sep-aration. rans.20.See,forexample,Hegelon Aristotle: the dunamis'sthedisposition,he 'initself,' heobjective lement: lso he abstract niversalngeneral,heIdea,nsofar smerely otentia,For tself'means in act':L'energeias theactualizinglement,nega-tivitywhichrelates tself o itself Hegel1971-1978,3:518,519).[TheEnglishrans-lationgives his: It sfirstnenergy, r moreconcretely,nsubjectivity,hathefindstheactualizingorm, heself-relating egativity Hegel1955,2:138).Trans.]21. Allhypotyposis. . consists n makinga conceptsensible,andis eitherschematicrsymbolic Kant1987,226).

REFERENCESAristotle.1984a.Metaphysics.nThecompleteorksfAristotle,d.J.Bares. Prince-ton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Aristotle.1984b.Physics.nThecompleteorks fAristotle,d.J.Barnes.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Bourgeois, ernard.991.Etemiteet historicite e l'espritelonHegel.Paris:Vrin.. 1992.Sur e DroitNaturel e Hegel1802-1803.InEtudes ge'liennes.aris:PressesUniversitaireseFrance.Canguilhem, eorges. 970.Dialectiquetphilosophie u'Non'chezGastonBache-lard. nEtudes 'histoiret dephilosophieessciences,nded. Paris:Vrin.Derrida,acques. 982.Ousiaandgramme.nMarginsfphilosophy,rans.AlanBass.Chicago:University fChicagoPress.Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich.941.Phenomenologieel'esprit. rans. eanHyp-polite.Paris:Aubier-Montaigne..1955. Lecturesn thehistoryf philosophy.Vols.-3. Trans.E.S. Haldane nd

Frances imson.London:Routledge ndKeganPaul..1969-1979. Werkenzwanzig dnden.rankfurtmMain:Suhrkamp.

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. 1970. Philosophy f nature.Part 2 of the Encyclopedia f philosophicalciences,trans.Michael John Petry.London:George Allen and Unwin.. 1971.Philosophy fmind. Part3 of the Encyclopediaf thePhilosophicalciences,trans. William Wallace and A.V. Miller. Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.. 1971-1978. Leqons ur 'histoire e laphilosophie. rans.PierreGamiron. Vols.1-4. Paris:Vrin.

.1975a. Aesthetics:Lectureson fine art. Trans.T. M. Knox. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press..1975b. Thescientificways of treating atural aw(1802-3). Trans.T. M. Knox.Philadelphia:University of PennsylvaniaPress.

1976a.Sciencede lalogique.Doctrinedel'essence.Trans.Pierre-JeanLabarriereand Gwendoline Jarczyk.Paris:Aubier-Montaigne..1976b. Scienceof logic,Trans.A. V. Miller. London:GeorgeAllen andUnwin.. 1977. Phenomenologyf spirit.Trans.A. V. Miller.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.. 1981. Sciencede la logique.Doctrinedu concept.Trans.Pierre-JeanLabarriereand Gwendoline Jarczyk.Paris:Aubier-Montaigne.. 1988. Philosophiee l'esprit.Part 3 of l'Encyclopediees sciencesphilosophiques,trans.BernardBourgeois.Paris:Vrin.. 1991a.Theencyclopediaogic.Part1 of the Encyclopediaf philosophicalciences,trans.T. F.Geraets,W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris.Indianapolis:Hackett Pub-

lishing Campany..1991b. Thephilosophyf history.Trans.J. Sibree. Buffalo:PrometheusBooks.. 1991c. PrefaceA a seconde edition de la Sciencede la logiquede 1831. Trans.Catherine Malabou.Philosophie9: 13-26.Heidegger,Martin. 1984. SeinundZeit. 2nd ed. Tubingen:Max Niemeyer Verlag.. 1988. Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spirit. Trans.Parvis Emad and Kenneth

Maly.Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press.. 1996. Beingand time.Trans.Joan Stambaugh.Albany: State University ofNew YorkPress.Kant, Immanuel. 1987. Critiqueof judgment.Trans.Wemer S. Pluhar.Indianapolis:Hackett.

.1996. Critiqueofpurereason.Trans.WernerS. Pluhar.Indianapolis:Hackett.Kojeve, Alexandre. 1947. Introduction la lecturede Hegel.Ed. RaymondQueneau.Paris:Gallimard.Koyre,Alexandre. 1971. Hegel a Iena. In Etudesd'histoirede la penseephilosophique.

Paris:Gallimard.Labarriere,Pierre-Jean.1970. Histoire et liberte.Archivesdephilosophie3: 701-18..1986. Le Statut logiquede l'alteritechez Hegel. Philosophie3: 68-81.Lebrun,Gerard. 1972. Lapatienceduconcept.Paris:Gallimard.Souche-Dagues,Denise. 1986. Le cerclehgelien. Paris:P.U.E. 1990. Hegelianismet dualisme.Paris:Vrin.. 1994. Recherchesegeliennes,nfiniet dialectique. aris:Vrin.

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