ASSIGNMENT NO. 4- CASE DIGESTS

JAYSON ABABA

Carmen DanaoMalana, Maria DanaoAcorda, Evelyn Danao, FerminaDanao, Leticia Danao And Leonora Danao, The Last Twoare Represented Herein By Their Attorney-In-Fact, Maria DanaoAcorda,- Versus -BenignoTappa, Jerry Reyna, SaturninoCambriAnd Spouses Francisco And Maria LigutanG.R. No. 18130; September 17, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents alleging that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Petitioners inherited the subject property from AnastacioDanao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.

Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the LupongTagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. However, such complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accionreivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint. And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.

The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

 Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,

contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

 An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real

property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

  

The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.

Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or Rule 63, Section 1 (declaratory relief) is properly invoked in the instant case.

HELD:

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

 Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

 In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the LupongTagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

 Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accionpubliciana or an accionreivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accionpubliciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accionreivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

 Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accionreivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

Planters Development Bank vs. James Ng, et. al.G.R. No. 187556May 5, 2010

Facts: James Ng and his brother Anthony (respondents) obtained loans from petitioner amounting to P25,000,000.00 to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and covered by TCT Nos. 79865 and 79866 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation; hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public Stephen Z. Taala.The Notice of Auction Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage  at the Main Entrance of the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City.The Notice was published in Metro Profile, a newspaper of general circulation.

The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, lodged before RTC-QC, Branch 77. In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, raffled to RTC-QC, Branch 221 which issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and committing any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents’ right of ownership.

RTC-QC, Branch 77 denied the issuance of a writ of possession.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied,  it filed, before this Court, the present petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law, in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance of the writ of possession is valid

Held: It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage.

 The court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited respondents’ opposition to petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

By crediting respondents’ opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo pre-empted its co-equal branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over respondents annulment petition was laid, from determining the merits of respondents’ claim-basis of said petition. Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; x xx Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy.  Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function. The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.

In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so when, as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the purchaser.

In fine, it was grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.

G.R. No. 160208; June 30, 2008RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S. CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B. YAPE, LEONORA R. PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G. HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and ARTHUR L. VEGA,*Petitioners,

- versus –

NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,Respondents.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed before the RTC of Caloocan City, by petitioners against the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), herein respondents, and Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo.Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from respondents who directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).

However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to its representations and the subdivision plan. They were thus compelled to spend their own resources to improve the subdivision roads and alleys, and to install individual water facilities. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to ensure Shelters completion of the subdivision. Instead, respondents ignored their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelters failure to complete the subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino. Hence, they prayed that respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages.

Moreover, petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the RTC that their right as house and lot buyers to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to fully develop the subdivision also applied to respondents who released their loans directly to Shelter; and that during the suspension of payment, respondents should not assess them accrued interests and penalties. Petitioners further prayed that they be allowed to pay their housing loans without interest and penalties.

In its June 17, 1998 Order, the RTC set the preliminary injunction hearing, On July 9, 1998, the RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents from foreclosing the mortgages on petitioners houses.The writ was issued on July 14, 1998.

On August 10, 1998, the NHMFC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its person or over the subject matter of the case.

In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of the subdivision should have been brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judicial declaration can be made because the petition was vague. The RTC assumed that the subject of the petition was Republic Act No. 8501 or the Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998 which was cited by petitioners. But the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state which section of the law affected their rights and needed judicial declaration. The RTC also noted that, as stated by petitioners, respondents still foreclosed their mortgages, a breach of said law which rendered the petition for declaratory relief improper. The proper remedy was an ordinary civil action, the RTC concluded

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.

ISSUE.Whether declaratory relief is not the proper remedy

HELDYes, declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.

under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extra-judicial sale and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already suspended paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No. 957 and relied upon -- correctly or otherwise -- by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:

. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order

DARIO vs MISON176 SCRA 84Status and CharacteristicsCreation, Reorganization, and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:

SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:

(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the BatasangPambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution.

On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated, and prescribed several grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel.

Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the government service. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.

The President’s Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote, in part: Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this year of personnel as a result of the government reorganization.

On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.

Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.

On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials.

A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirty one mentioned above came directly to this Court. The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.

On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees. On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court.

On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees. On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution in this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs is valid

RULING: Yes. There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization — insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions.

RATIO:Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.

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TOMATIC ARATUC VS COMELECG.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Facts:Petitioners are independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim BatasangPambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan. They complained of alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, and eleven towns in Sultan Kudarat, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. The Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of petitioners, declaring all eight KBL candidates elected.

Appeal was taken by the petitioners to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winners. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that the COMELEC committee grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:WON certiorari is the proper remedy

Ruling:This is as it should be. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.

We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions of the parties in this cases.

EMELINDA ABEDES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Sometime in 1996, respondent ReliaQuizonArciga filed an action before the RTC of Pasig City against Wilfredo, husband of herein petitioner EmelindaAbedes, seeking support for her daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga. A Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by the RTC of Pasig City to support Danielle Ann. A writ of execution was issued. Unfortunately, the Sheriff's Return showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. Later, a real property was discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo in the Province of Tarlac. Herein petitioner filed a Third Party Claim. Petitioner alleged that the property belongs exclusively to her, and Wilfredo had no present and existing right thereto.

Therefore, it may not be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered against her husband Wilfredo. Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice of Sheriff's Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and to the highest bidder. For such purpose, a public auction was scheduled. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO which was also granted.

The RTC of Tarlac City opined that the property is petitioner's paraphernal property. As her exclusive property, it may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo. Even assuming that the property is part of the conjugal partnership, it may not be held liable for the support of Danielle Ann who is an illegitimate child of Wilfredo. Hence, the RTC enjoined respondent Sheriff RonbertoValino from conducting the public sale of the property. However, CA reversed the decision. Abedes filed a motion for reconsideration raising issue of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper

Held: No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. We have underscored that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at bar, the Resolution of the appellate court which denied reconsideration of its Decision was received by petitioner on 2 August 2005. She had until 17 August 2005 within which to perfect her appeal. However, none was made. Instead, she comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage her lost appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Petitioner was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petition is dismissed.

G.R. NO. 165001             January 31, 2007

NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due, petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. RTC issued a Stay Order appointing Manuel B. Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition.

One of petitioner’s creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets left. Respondent bank also alleged that the financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets, affidavit of general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan submitted by petitioner are misleading and inaccurate since its properties have already been foreclosed and transferred to respondent bank before the petition for rehabilitation was filed, and petitioner still owes respondent bank deficiency liability.

RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case.Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC. Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied by the CA by sustaining the findings of the RTC that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to continue with its operations and answer its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it as improper, appeal being an available remedy.

RULING: No. The CA did not err in upholding the RTC’s dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation in view of the fact that the titles to petitioner’s properties have already passed on to respondent bank and petitioner has no more assets to speak of, specially since petitioner does not dispute the fact that the properties which were foreclosed by respondent bank comprise the bulk, if not the entirety, of its assets.

The Interim Rules was enacted to provide for a summary and non-adversarial rehabilitation proceedings. This is in consonance with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case, which is aimed to be resolved expeditiously for the benefit of all the parties concerned and the economy in general.

As provided in the Interim Rules, the basic procedure is as follows:

1) The petition is filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court;

2) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court shall issue a Stay Order, which shall provide, among others, for the appointment of a Rehabilitation Receiver; the fixing of the initial hearing on the petition; a directive to the petitioner to publish the Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks; and a directive to all creditors and all interested parties (including the Securities and Exchange Commission) to file and serve on the debtor a verified comment on or opposition to the petition, with supporting affidavits and documents.

3) Publication of the Stay Order;

4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any comment and/or opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial court is satisfied that there is merit in the petition, it shall give due course to the petition;

5) Referral for evaluation of the rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation receiver who shall submit his recommendations to the court;

6) Modifications or revisions of the rehabilitation plan as necessary;

7) Submission of final rehabilitation plan to the trial court for approval;\

8) Approval/disapproval of rehabilitation plan by the trial court;

In the present case, the petition for rehabilitation did not run its full course but was dismissed by the RTC after due consideration of the pleadings filed before it. On this score, the RTC cannot be faulted for its summary dismissal, as it is tantamount to a finding that there is no merit to the petition. This is in accord with the trial court’s authority to give due course to the petition or not under Rule 4, Section 9 of the Interim Rules. Letting the petition go through the process only to be dismissed later on because there are no assets to be conserved will not only defeat the reason for the rules but will also be a waste of the trial court’s time and resources.

The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs VILMA ALMENDRAS y ZAPATA ET. AL.(G.R. NO. 145915 April 24, 2003)

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Almendras were arrested by the PNP NARCOM of Calamba, Laguna for selling “Shabu” at the Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol between the hours of three to six in the morning of June 18, 1998.

The prosecution rested its case and reception of defense evidence was then set for for May 12, 13, and 17, 1999.

On May 10, 1999, defense counsel move for leave to a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence and the admission of said Demurrer with alternative prayer for bail. The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and ruled that what is material in a prosecution for sale of an illegal drug is proof that both the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court.

The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court gravely abused its judicial disretion in denying their demurrer to evidence and their prayer for bail.

On March 20, 2000, defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings of the trial court pending the final disposition by the Court of Appeals on their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus.

The trial court resumed and promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.

ISSUE:

Whether trial court erred in proceeding to resolve the case without awaiting the resolution of CA in the appellant’s petition for certiorari?

RULING:

The case for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction, which was filed by the defense counsel with the CA to assail the trial court’s denial of their demurrer to evidence, did not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceedings.

Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. There was none in the instant case.

Case remanded to the trial court for reception of defense evidence.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, NANCY L. TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., respondents.

Facts: Banco Filipino Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch site holdings but contemplated further expansion of its operations and Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty which was conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major stockholderof Banco Filipino. After the issuance of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to TalaRealtys certificate of registration, the board of directors of Banco Filipino authorized negotiations for the sale of some of its branch sites, through a Board Resolution with other numerous real properties owned by the former being treated the same to the latter.

The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots in Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two million one hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00) Tala Realty then leased them back to Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a period of twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The lease contracts of the other branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions, except for the amount of the rent.

Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. Due to Banco Filipinos failure to comply with TalaRealtys terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust.

The court rendered judgment in favor of Tala Realty to wit;

A thorough and careful perusal was made by the undersigned Presiding Judge of the arguments of opposing counsels, ventilated in their respective memoranda. Opposing counsels cited the pertinent Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the Rules of Court and related Decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their arguments.

After weighing the foregoing, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the contention of the defendants in their motions to dismiss, etc., is meritorious.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the defendants separate motions to dismiss are hereby granted Therefore, let this case be, as it is hereby Dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration.Banco Filipino received a copy of said order of denial July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco Filipinos petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioners recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos. Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to correct by certiorari the dismissal order by the rtc and that respondent court gravely erred in ruling that a writ of error should be the proper remedy instead of a petition for certiorari under rule 65

HELD: Banco Filipinos proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.We have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.

Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipinos bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.

The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[36]

Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipinos recourse to a special civil action for certiorariwas borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.

It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.

Banco Filipino from the order of the RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen (14) days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise, when it filed its petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have already passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. There must be exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules, we cannot find any such exceptional circumstances in this case and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to prove the existence of any. Another elementary rule of procedure applies and that is the doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal

Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 121438               October 23, 2000

FACTS:Sometime in July 1984, a probate court allowed the sale of the lot located in Cebu for P200,000.00 to the spouses Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida, the heir of the decedent, agreed to rescind the said sale. On January 1988, the probate court again issued an order allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200,000.00 already paid by the Enriquez spouses. On April 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for P1,000,000.00 payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of squatters.

On July 1991, IntervenorSagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of he decedent. He claimed that the lot could be sold for P1.5 million pesos. Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by Aida and her counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario Morelos, and Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land. During the conference, Atty. Cabilao revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the seller undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with the buyer shouldering the expenses to clear the lot of its present occupants. Aida objected to Atty. Cabilao's statement. She explained that the latter's offer was made only after the sale to Sanchez was already approved by the court.

On August 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said that the court's order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and executory, and that she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value. She added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by the administratrix.

On November 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier approved on the basis that the Administratrix deliberately concealed from the Court the fact that Sanchez had extended

to her a loan of P300,000.00 before the execution of the Deed of Sale and that the said amount was already deducted by Sanchez from the down payment of P500,000.00 where the procedure jointly resorted to by the Administratrix and by Sanchez was tantamount to a foreclosure of their loose mortgage agreement, a procedure that is not allowed to take place in a probate court.

Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million.

On January 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of P1.6 million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The motion was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the sale to Atty. Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a compelling reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the property was bought by Felix Uy Chua, Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy Chua, the clients of Atty. Cabilao who are now petitioners before this Court.

Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent Judges Abarquez and Aliño-Hormachelos abused their discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they issued the questioned orders.

The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45?

HELD:The Court held in the negative. The Court held the proper remedy was to appeal under Rule 65. Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and precedents.

A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Both have original concurrent jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As early as Crisostomo vs. Endencia, we held:

". . . The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter of the remedy."

The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had become final and executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

(20) Solano

(21) Ingan

(22)

ROMY’S FREIGHT SERVICE, vs. CASTROG.R. No. 141637             June 8, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondent Castro and Veloria were hired by petitioner as a mechanic and as a carpenter , respectively. Castro suffered a stroke while Veloria suffered an accident when the overheated water coming from the radiator of a car he was repairing spurted onto his face, burning it.

Both received show cause letters requiring them to explain why they should not be disciplined. Petitioner filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against Castro and charged Veloria for qualified theft of the missing tools. Because of petitioner’s acts against them, both joined in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.

For its part, petitioner denied that private respondents were dismissed from their employment, asserting that private respondents abandoned their work. Executive Labor Arbiter JesselitoLatoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and attorney’s fees.

Private respondents moved for the clarification of the decision, specifically on the award of backwages in their favor. While the decision discussed their entitlement to backwages, it was not included in the computation of the judgment award in the dispositive portion of the decision. The labor arbiter, in his order, recognized his inadvertence and granted the motion. He amended the decision and increased the award to P985,529.20 to include backwages.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its decision, reversed and set aside the labor arbiter’s ruling. It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.3

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by petitioner.

The appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents, hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal.

The CA held that the respondents’ failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and that they had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA is correct that the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have been dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the petition for certiorari with the CA.

HELD:

Yes. SC affirmed the CA decision.

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents’ petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.

The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.

The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase ‘grave abuse of discretion’ has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties’ respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.

The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents were illegally

dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorney’s fees.

VANGIE BARRAZONA,Petitioner,

versus   REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY andSAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU,Respondents.

FACTS:

San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located at Naguilian corner Asin Road, Baguio City. VangieBarrazona, petitioner, has been leasing portions of the building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2) years, commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.

Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.

On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therein clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). 

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Barroza, petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis.

On the other hand, respondent RTC Baguio City, in praying for the dismissal of the petition, contends that (1) the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and (3) the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether Motion for reconsideration should have been filed prior to filing certiorari;(2) Whether denial of motion to dismiss which is an interlocutory order be subject of a

petition for certiorari

RULING:

(1) YES. While the complaint is captioned Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, the allegations therein show that respondents action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Hence, the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the case.

While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non appeallable, however, if the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from such order of denial.

In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(2) YES.The Supreme Court cannot go along with respondents contention that petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari. While the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such rule is not without exception. 

The SC have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower court’s ruling, such as: a. where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity;b. where the question is purely of law; c. when public interest is involved; d. where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great and irreparable

damage; and e. where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this case

(24) Dayag

(25)

Militante vs. Court of Appeals330 SCRA 318

Facts: Petitioner PiloMilitante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcels are covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.

President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and 73960, and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018. 

The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the upgrading of basic facilities and services and the disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants in accordance with the national Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP).It set aside P40 million as the maximum amount of just compensation to be paid the landowners.

The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in 7 phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.

Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone. Proclamation No. 1893 was amended by Proclamation No. 1967 which identified 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.

P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHA under the supervision of said Department.Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body attached to the DHS.Petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land Reform Program of the government.  HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificate declaring petitioners lots "outside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone." 

With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a letter to Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families occupying petitioners lots.

The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the removal/ demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."The squatters did not attend the meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.

NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on petitioners property within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the SapangPalay Resettlement Project. 

The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioners properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. Mayor Asistio replied that "considering the said properties are private in character, the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or underwrite the development of said properties."

BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation under the governments Community Self-Help Program.The NHA, through General Tobias, approved an emergency fund of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots. NHA started negotiations with petitioner. Petitioner, through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00 per square meter. Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA General Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHA’s maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his lawyer.

Petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters.NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in BagongSilang Resettlement Project for the 24 families. 

Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioners land. Carangdang claimed that petitioners land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.

Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.

The respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of the decrees constitutionality.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus

Held: Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:

"Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.x xx."

Prohibition is a preventive remedy.It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdang’s refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.

The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65 provides:

"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant."

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.

Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner.  If superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not entertained.In the instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act.The General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over the operations and internal affairs of NHA.

ENG VS LEE

FACTS:

Nixon Lee’s father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his mother. Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel his mother to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.

Allegedly, Lee had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.

KiaoEng traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. She denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to Lee and to his siblings.

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent Lee’s evidence, petitioner KiaoEng demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will.

She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition and that they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.

RTC denied the demurrer but granted the same upon motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied and the case was dismissed.

Aggrieved, Lee appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which was denied or lack of merit. However, it was granted when respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court amended its decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will anchored on the basis that this time respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.

KiaoEng moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Left with no other recourse KiaoEng brought the case before the Supreme Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in denying her motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy

RULING:

NO.

The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that 

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.  Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the

name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. 

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere

technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.  As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. 

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. 

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. 

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here is the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.

The petition for review on certiorari was granted.