T-6B JPPT 1542.166B

Simulator Event Briefing Guide

JPPT 1542.166B C2103

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C2103 Briefing Guide

(Worksheet)

Planned Route:

Takeoff: KNSE, Rwy 05 Altitude: MOA Limits Route: North MOA Training Device: UTD/OFT

SYLLABUS NOTES: Students will strap-in for all events in this block.

Students shall use an unaltered Quadfold NATOPS Checklist for all events in this block

Special Syllabus Requirement Blindfold Cockpit Check – Student demonstrates a safe knowledge of location of the following: emergency firewall shutoff handle, CFS handle, PCL cutoff, flap selector, landing gear handle, emergency gear handle, back-up VHF radio, bus tie switch, PMU switch, PROP SYS circuit breaker and pressurization control switch.

Discuss

a. All Normal Operating Procedures Answer any question the student may have from previous events

b. Aborted Takeoff Reasons to conduct an aborted takeoff Critical Action Items How to obtain Maximum Braking Action

c. Aircraft Departs Prepared Surface Procedural Steps Activation of CFS or Ejection considerations

d. CFS and Ejection procedures from the ground Safety considerations and seat limitations

Maximum abort speed definition

Calculate Max Abort Speed (wet runway)

Ejection Seat Sequence Mitigation Procedures

T-6B Contact Cockpit Procedures C2100 BLOCK

STUDENT GRADE SHEET DATE __________________ INSTRUCTOR __________________________ MEDIA: UTD VT- ________ BRIEF TIME: ________ NAME: _________________________________ EVENT:_______________

# MANEUVER MIF C2101 C2102 C2103

1 GEN KNOWLEDGE / PROCEDURES 3+ X X X 2 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3+ X X 4 BASIC AIRWORK 2 5 INFLIGHT CHECKS / FUEL MANAGEMENT 2+ X X X 2 ABORT START 3+ X 2 FIRE WARNING ON GROUND

(FIRE ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED) 3+ X

2 EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN 3+ X 2 EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS 3+ X 2 ABORT TAKEOFF 3+ X 2 AIRCRAFT DEPARTS

PREPARED SURFACE 3+ X

8 COMMUNICATION 2 9 MISSION PLANNING / BRIEFING /

DEBRIEFING 2

10 GROUND OPERATIONS (ALL NORMAL CHECKLIST)

2+ X X X

SPECIAL SYLLABUS REQUIREMENTS 1 X X Note: The student shall bring all required flight gear and practice strapping in on every event in this block. SSR’s C2102 Loss of Start Ready Light during start sequence C2103 Blindfold Cockpit Check – Student demonstrates a safe knowledge of location of the following: Emergency firewall shutoff handle, CFS handle, PCL cutoff, flap selector, landing gear handle, emergency gear handle, back-up VHF radio, bus tie switch, PMU switch, PROP SYS circuit breaker, and pressurization control switch. The following procedures will be discussed and performed by the student on the indicated event: C2101: Introduce basic checklist procedures, seat and rudder pedal adjustments, UFCP, basic FMS setup, voice reports. C2102: All normal operating procedures, abnormal starts, loss of START READY Light during start sequence , engine fire on the ground, emergency engine shutdown, and emergency ground egress. C2103: All normal operating procedures, aborted takeoff, Aircraft departs prepared surface, CFS and ejection procedures from the ground. DEPART ______________ ARRIVE ______________ SIDE # ______________ SIM TIME ___________

JPPT 1542.166B MAR 2017

3-5

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

* 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL

* 3. Emergency ground egress - As required

EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS

NOTE

In a situation requiring immediate groundegress, the ejection system has the capabilityfor 0/0 ejection.

If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1),perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to acomplete stop and the engine has been shut down:

* 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO

Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector isset to SOLO may result in the inadvertentejection of one or both seats.

* 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins(if occupied) before ground egress may resultin inadvertent activation of ejection sequenceand subsequent injury or death when per-forming emergency ground egress.

* 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required

* 4. Canopy - Open

IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATIONREQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS:

* 6. CFS handle - Rotate 90° counterclockwise and pull(BOTH)

• If the canopy fracturing system malfunctionsin conjunction with a canopy latch failure inthe locked position, ejection may be the onlyoption remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrewshall remove the ejection seat safety pin andensure shoulder straps, lap straps, and legrestraint garters are still attached prior to pull-ing ejection handle.

• To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is onand visor is down prior to actuating the CFSsystem.

• Each internal CFS handle activates only theCFS charge for the respective transparency.Both internal CFS handles must be activatedin order to fracture both transparencies (ifrequired).

* 7. Upper fittings, lower fittings, and leg restraint garters- Release (BOTH)

Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side ofseat or use individual quick-release connectors on legrestraint garters.

NOTE

Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com-munication leads, and anti-G suit hose willpull free while vacating cockpit and legrestraint lines will pull through leg restraintgarter D rings if released with quick-releaselever.

* 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF

* 9. Evacuate aircraft

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision totakeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should bebased on the following:

• Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi-tions and area traffic.

• If adequate directional control cannot be maintained orany system emergency affecting safety of flight isexperienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoffshould be aborted.

ABORT

If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate onmaintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control,while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. Toabort a takeoff, accomplish the following:

* 1. PCL - IDLE

* 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED

Refer to Section II for description of maximum brak-ing.

* 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH)

A1-T6BAA-NFM-100 IC 020 A1-T6BAA-FCL-100 IC 019 ATTACHMENT 7

3-7

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

After a stop which required maximum effortbraking and if overheated brakes are sus-pected, do not taxi into or park in a congestedarea until brakes have had sufficient time tocool. Do not set parking brake.

BARRIER ENGAGEMENT

Aircrews will not call for a raised barrier in the event of anaborted takeoff. If a raised barrier is already up, aircrews willsteer around it, to include departing the prepared surface ifnecessary, or ejecting before engagement.

• Significant aircraft damage can be antici-pated when engaging a raised web barrier andwebbing may preclude normal canopy open-ing.

• If contact with a lowered BAK-15 is immi-nent, discontinue braking before reachinglowered barrier, then recommence once pastbarrier. In the unlikely event that webbingcatches on aircraft, there may be unexpecteddirectional control problems.

AIRCRAFT DEPARTS PREPARED SURFACE

If it appears likely that the aircraft will depart the preparedsurface, execute the Emergency Engine Shutdown On TheGround procedure.

TIRE FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF

IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO STOP:

1. Abort

IF TAKEOFF IS CONTINUED:

2. Gear and flaps position - Do not change

3. Straight-in approach - Execute

Land on side of runway corresponding to thegood tire (put drag in the middle). Maintaindirectional control using rudder, brakes, andnose wheel steering as required.

ENGINE FAILURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF

(SUFFICIENT RUNWAY REMAINING STRAIGHT

AHEAD)

A complete engine failure immediately after takeoff is anextremely critical emergency requiring immediate actionand decision making by the pilot. Indications are a total lossof power and a fairly rapid reduction in airspeed. A positivenose down pitch change will be needed to maintain a safeflying airspeed. If sufficient runway remains, the best optionis to continue straight ahead and land. If that is not possible,careful consideration of the recovery situation must be made.An early decision to eject may be the best option. Anticipateincreased brake sensitivity when braking above 80 KIAS. Inall cases, control the aircraft energy state through prudentuse of altitude, airspeed, and configuration.

• If insufficient runway remains to landstraight ahead, consider immediate ejection.

• Do not sacrifice aircraft control while trou-bleshooting or lowering gear with emergencysystem.

* 1. AIRSPEED - 110 KNOTS (MINIMUM)

* 2. PCL - AS REQUIRED

NOTE

The pilot should select IDLE to use theincreased drag of the not yet feathered pro-peller or select OFF to reduce the sink rate.

* 3. EMER LDG GR HANDLE - PULL(AS REQUIRED)

NOTE

With a loss of hydraulic pressure, landinggear and flaps cannot be lowered by normalmeans.

* 4. Flaps - As required

IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES

ENGINE FAILURE DURING FLIGHT

In the event of an engine failure, a decision to eject, land, orairstart must be made. The altitude at which the engine failswill determine the time available to perform the followingprocedures.

Initial indications of engine failure/flameout are: loss ofpower and airspeed; rapid decay in N1, torque, and ITT; andpropeller movement towards feather due to loss of oil pres-

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

2-29

ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) LANDING

Angle of attack (AOA) landings utilize the normal landingpattern in Figure 2-8 or Figure 2-9 while maintaining opti-mum AOA throughout the final/approach turn. On down-wind, slow to optimum AOA (on-speed amber donut onindexer) prior to the perch/abeam position. After the perch/abeam position, maintain on-speed AOA with pitch andmaintain controlled descent rate with power. Maintain anappropriate angle of bank and line up on runway centerline.On final, coordinate stick and power inputs to land at desiredtouchdown point while continuing to fly on-speed AOA.Round out and touch down normally.

MAXIMUM BRAKING

Maximum braking effectiveness is obtained with a steadyapplication of brakes.

The physical limitations of the tire and brake system make itextremely difficult to consistently achieve maximum brak-ing action, particularly at high speeds where the weight com-ponent is reduced due to lift. A smooth, single application,increasing as airspeed decreases, offers the best brakingopportunity. Great caution should be used when braking atspeeds above 80 KIAS. Locked brakes are difficult to diag-nose until well after the fact. Braking should be discontinuedat the first sign of directional control problems and then cau-tiously reapplied. At speeds below 80 KIAS, the chances ofapproaching maximum braking action are greatly increased.

• The aircraft is not equipped with anti-skid oranti-lock protection. Do not apply wheelbrakes until the aircraft is firmly on theground and the weight is fully on the wheels.If a wheel brake locks up before the weight ofthe aircraft is fully on the wheels, the brakemay not release even with the full weight ofthe aircraft on the wheel. The result may be ablown tire and possible degradation of direc-tional control on the ground.

• After a landing which required maximumeffort braking and if overheated brakes aresuspected, do not taxi into or park in a con-gested area until the brakes have had suffi-cient time to cool. Do not set parking brake.

• If brake pressure appears to fade duringapplication, or brakes are not responding asexpected, fully release brakes, then re-apply.

Both crewmembers must fully release brakesfor this to be effective.

NOTE

All stopping distances computed fromAppendix A are based on maximum braking.Maximum braking is very difficult toachieve. Variables such as brake and tire con-dition, pilot technique, etc., may increasecomputed landing distances.

AFTER LANDING

1. ISS mode selector - SOLO or CMD FWD (Verify ISSmode selector lever is locked in SOLO or CMD FWD)

• Both seats will eject if the ISS is in BOTHand an unpinned ejection handle is pulled,even if the other seat is pinned.

• With the ISS mode selector set to CMDFWD, the crewmember in the rear cockpitinitiates ejection of the rear seat only, and thecrewmember in the front cockpit initiatesejection for both front and rear seats with therear seat ejecting first even if the rear seatejection handle safety pin is installed.

2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

• Ensure ejection seat safety pin is fullyinserted to preclude inadvertent seat actua-tion.

• In the event of a dropped ejection seat safetypin, do not use the CFS handle safety pin toattempt to safe the ejection seat. The ejectionseat safety pin and the CFS handle safety pinare not interchangeable. Using the CFS han-dle safety pin in place of the ejection seatsafety pin could result in inadvertent seatactuation.

3. PROBES ANTI-ICE switch - OFF

4. Flaps - UP

5. Trim interrupt button - Depress (Verify TRIM OFFand TAD OFF message illuminated and TAD switchmoves to OFF)

6. Trim - Set for takeoff

JPPT 1542.166A C2103

CFS and Ejection procedures from the ground

• A little bit of crew coordination will go a long way as far as safety is concerned if faced with using CFS during ground operations. The idea is coordinating the “CFS – Rotate and Pull” if using the internal CFS handles between front and rear cockpits. There a few techniques to accomplish this task and will be briefed between crewman during the NATOPS preflight brief prior to flight.

• If required, right side egress is possible with use of CFS - ensure oxygen mask is on and visor is down prior to actuating the CFS system. Internal CFS handles activate CFS charge for the respective transparency. External CFS handles activate both CFS charges for each cockpit.

• In a situation (e.g., fire or imminent collision) requiring immediate ground egress, the ejection

system affords a 0/0 ejection capability.

• You should ensure the canopy is going to open before un-strapping (i.e., ensure that it is not jammed by the incident that has led to your Emergency Ground Egress) so as to still be able to eject, should that option of egress need to be exercised.

A3-2

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

Runway Available

Runway available is the runway length minus the aircraftlineup distance.

Takeoff Ground Run Distance

Takeoff ground run distance is defined as that runway dis-tance from brake release to lift-off. It is achieved by follow-ing the normal takeoff distance associated procedures for agiven rotation speed, at the mission-specified weight, ambi-ent temperature, pressure altitude, runway wind and gradi-ent, and appropriate takeoff configuration.

Maximum Braking Speed (VB)

Maximum braking speed is the maximum speed from whichthe aircraft can be brought to a stop without exceeding themaximum design energy absorption capability of the brakes(3.96 Million ft-lb).

Maximum Abort Speed

Maximum abort speed is the maximum speed at which anabort may be started and the aircraft stopped within theremaining runway length. Allowances included in the dataare based on a 3-second reaction at Maximum Abort Speedto recognize decision to abort and select idle power, duringwhich time acceleration continues. Additional allowanceincludes a 3-second period to apply the brakes after idlepower is selected. Speed may increase up to 20 knots duringthis 6-second period. When the abort speed is above rotationspeed, rotation speed (VR) becomes the abort speed.

For operation with a tailwind, maximum braking speed lim-its should be observed (Figure A3-2). If the abort speed isgreater than the maximum braking speed less 20 knots, themaximum braking speed (less 20 knots) becomes the abortspeed.

Lift-off

Lift-off is the moment during takeoff at which 100% of theaircraft weight is first supported by aerodynamic forces andno tires are in contact with the runway.

Distance to 50-foot Obstacle

Distance to 50-foot obstacle is the sum of the takeoff groundrun distance, plus the airborne horizontal distance needed toaccelerate and climb to the 50-foot obstacle height at orabove the obstacle climbout speed.

Rotation Speed

Rotation speed (VR) is the speed which permits attainingobstacle speed at the 50-foot obstacle height above the run-way.

Obstacle Speed

Obstacle speed (VOBS) is the target speed at which the air-craft crosses the 50-foot obstacle height while acceleratingto 140 KIAS at a 15° pitch attitude.

Stall Speed (VS)

Stall speed is the higher of:

1. The airspeed at which the aircraft ceases to fly due to theloss of aerodynamic lift with the input of slow smooth con-trol movements; or

2. The minimum controllable steady flight speed.

Climb Gradient

Climb gradient is the measured change of geometric altitudeversus horizontal distance, typically feet per nautical mile.Charts which present climb gradient are calculated on actual(gross) climb performance.

FACTORS AFFECTING TAKEOFF

Wind Corrections

Accounting for wind when planning takeoff requires thatthe wind direction and speed known. The headwind, tail-wind, or crosswind component can then be determinedusing the Takeoff and Landing Crosswind chart in FigureA3-6.

Headwind and Tailwind

The wind grids include factors of 50% for steady state head-winds and 150% for steady state tailwinds. Reported windcomponents may therefore be apllied directly to the chart.

Crosswind

When determining the crosswind component, enter theTakeoff and Landing Crosswind chart with the sum of thesteady wind value plus the gust increment. The maximumdemonstrated dry runway crosswind for takeoff and landingis 25 knots.

Gusts

The gust increment is obtained from ground meteorologicalsources. It is the difference between the reported steadywind velocity and the reported peak gust velocity. Increase

A3-9

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY (NAVAIR) A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

Figure A3-4. Maximum Abort Speed - Flaps TO

40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160

ABORT SPEED ~ KIAS

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ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS:SET 3O% TORQUERELEASE BRAKES AND SET TAKEOFF POWERABORT TAKEOFF AT OR BELOW ABORT SPEEDMAXIMUM BRAKING WITHOUT SKIDDING TIRESHARD SURFACE RUNWAY

AIRPLANE : T-6BENGINE : PT6A-68DATE : MAR 2OO8DATA BASIS : FLIGHT TEST

& ESTIMATE

MAXIMUM ABORT SPEED - FLAPS TAKEOFF

Given Conditions: Temp: 20C/70FPA: 200 ftA/C wt: 6900 lbs Rwy Avail: 6000 ft Slope: 0%HW: 10 kts RCR: 12 (wet)

Find:Max abort speed = 76 KIAS

Your max abort speed is LESS THAN your rotate speed.

SOMETHING TO CONSIDER!

Ejection Seat Sequencing Mitigation Contingencies

• FCP Incapacitation 1. ISS Mode Selector – BOTH 2. RCP – Eject

• ICS Failure • “Face curtain” signal serves as the prepatory command

during a controlled ejection. A thumbs up from each occupant is required to initiate ejection sequence.

• FCP shall initiate ejection sequence with three “raps” of the canopy

• RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “rap” • FCP occupant shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 seconds

AFTER third “rap”

Misc • Unqualified personnel prohibited

• Must be NATOPS qualified, enrolled in a formal aviation syllabus, or an observer qualified Naval Flight Officer, Flight Surgeon, or Aeromedical Safety Officer

• Delaying ejection below 2,000 ft AGL is not recommended

• Any delays may negatively impact the ejection envelope

• FCP occupant initiates ejection NET ~0.5 sec AFTER third “EJECT” call or immediately after confirming the RCP occupant has ejected

• Proper manual ejection sequencing requires the RCP occupant to eject prior to the FCP occupant

CRM • RCP Delaying Ejection

• May lead to collision with FCP seat • RCP shall not hesitate or delay ejecting • RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “EJECT” call

• FCP Initiating Ejection Too Soon • May lead to collision with RCP seat • FCP shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 sec after third

“EJECT” call

Procedures • Dual Flights

• ISS Mode Selector – SOLO in flight (Before Takeoff checks) • RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “EJECT” call • FCP occupant shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 sec AFTER

third “EJECT” call

• Solo Flights • Normal NATOPS Procedures Apply • Ensure ISS Mode Selector is in SOLO