VILFREDO PARETO AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

BY BRIGITTE BERGER

Jl areto's monumental sociological opus, largely through the

good offices of Talcott Parsons, has come to be acknowledged as a classic in the field. Apart from the incorporation of some Paretian themes within Parsons1 own theoretical system, this canonization of the opus mainly expresses the fact that nobody really knows what to do with it. This is regrettable, since Pareto's Trattato (known to American sociologists as Mind and Society) can be useful for a number of problems of sociological analysis, particularly in political sociology.1 It is the contention of this article that Pareto's sociological approach can be particularly useful in the area commonly designated as the sociology of knowl-

edge and, indeed, that it is possible to obtain a much clearer

understanding of the theoretical significance of the Paretian opus if it is thus linked with the sociology of knowledge. Conversely, a utilization of the Paretian approach may lead to a theoretically more comprehensive conception of the sociology of knowledge.

Parsons himself, who has identified the sociology of knowledge with the rather narrow conception of Karl Mannheim, has dis- cussed Pareto's theory of ideology.2 The connection between

iThe whole of Pareto's sociological writings has been published in three languages: Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di Sociologia Generale, (Florence, 1916), 2nd ed., 1923; Vilfredo Pareto, Traite de Sociologie générale, 2 vols., (Paris, 1917); and Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, 4 vols., (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), and 2nd edition, 2 vols., (New York: Dover, 1963). The English edition has been used throughout this article and following established practice citations from the Trattato refer to the paragraph rather than the page number.

2 Talcott Parsons, Structure of Social Action (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 269-277. Cf. Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge", Transactions of the IVth World Congress of Sociology, (Louvain: International Sociological Association, 1959).

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Pareto and a more general sociology of knowledge has been seen by two commentators, Gerard DeGré and Werner Stark.3 DeGré discusses in some detail the possibility of relating Pareto to the sociology of knowledge, though he argues that Pareto's approach needs to be supplemented by structural considerations. Stark is much more negative in his evaluation and concludes that Pareto's approach to the sociology of knowledge leads into a blind alley. Neither DeGré nor Stark developed the implications for a so-

ciology of knowledge found in Pareto's own presuppositions. There have, of course, been widely divergent conceptions of

the sociology of knowledge. It cannot be the purpose of this article to arbitrate among these. The broad definition given by Robert Merton will serve, however, as a working one for these considerations, namely, that the sociology of knowledge is "con- cerned with the relations of knowledge and other existential fac- tors in society or culture." 4 Against the background of this definition, it is possible to follow through Pareto's own treat- ment of the forces active in society and, by a slight "translation" of his often bizarre conceptualizations, to arrive at a much more positive picture of his theoretical contribution.

Society is essentially interpreted by Pareto through an analysis of "knowledge," that is, of the manifold and commonly deceptive ways in which society interprets itself. Pareto's original work was in economics, that most "logical" of social sciences. His

turning away in later life from the field of economics proper was motivated by his insight (which developed particularly dur-

ing his study of socialist theories) that the reasons men give for their actions are not at all the real reasons.5 Pareto's sociological

3 Gerard L. DeGré, Society and Ideology: an Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge, (New York: Columbia U. Bookstore, 1943); Werner Stark, Sociology of Knowledge, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

* Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 456.

»Vilfredo Pareto, Les Systèmes Socialistes, Paris, 1902-1903, and also G. H. Bousquet, The Work of Vilfredo Pareto (Minneapolis: Sociological Press, 1928), pp. 22-23.

VILFREDO PARETO 267

opus is essentially a quest for the real, ' 'underlying* ' factors at

work in society and history. These factors turn out to be largely "non-logical" ones. Pareto's turning from economics to sociology entailed the development of a methodology of radical debunking. To find the "real" social forces one must explode the "unreal" ones. It is for this reason that Pareto returns over and over

again to scathing demolitions of theories and beliefs of all sorts in the course of the Trattato, which could, among other things, be well described as a compendium of human fictions and follies. In this debunking procedure Pareto not only stands squarely in the tradition of the Enlightenment, but in a long line of sardonic Italian thinkers that stretches back at least as far as Machiavelli and that also includes Giovanni Battista Vico. Through his pro- cedure Pareto developed what could be called a theory of ideology (even though he does not use this term), in the sense of ideology as a distortive interpretation of social reality. However, as Mann- heim pointed out, a theory of ideology is only the necessary preamble to the sociology of knowledge. By way of his theory of ideology Pareto is thrust towards the more general question of the relationship between human thought and human society. It is this question which is the central one throughout the Trat- tato, a fact aptly caught in the title given to it by its English translators. One may say, then, that already in the starting point of his sociological thinking Pareto is pointed towards the sociology of knowledge (a starting point, it may be added, that is far removed from those of such other "classic" sociologists as Durk- heim and Weber).

Pareto studies society by way of the mental constructs of man -

theories, propositions, theologies, ethics, and so forth. These mental constructs, however, are never studied in themselves, but

always as expressions of specific social situations.6 In order to cut

through the overwhelming mass of seemingly disparate material to arrive at the basic forces at work in society, Pareto developed two

eVilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, op. cit., 7-11.

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related, yet distinct sets of concepts - the distinction between logi- cal and non-logical actions, and the distinction between deriva- tions and residues. The first distinction is the center of Pareto's theory of ideology, the second of his sociology of knowledge.

The first distinction is developed for the analysis of the relation- ship between social facts and the verbal statements that accompany them.7 Using a multiplicity of historical illustrations, Pareto shows that human actions, which have their root motives in various irrational drives, interests and fantasies, are constantly "rationalized" (in the literal sense of the word) by means of ver- biage ranging from mythological interpretations to fully devel- oped philosophical statements.8 That is, non-logical actions are made to appear logical by means of mental constructs. This proposition has far-reaching implications. Logical action is de- fined by Pareto as action in which means and ends are conjoined logically (that is, rationally), both in the mind of the actor and of the scientific observer.9 It follows that the great mass of human actions are non-logical in character. It also follows that human actions are far less influenced by ideas and other mental constructs than is usually thought.10 This in itself is not such a surprising proposition and others before Pareto have stated it more elo- quently. What is new in the Paretian analysis is the degree to which he attributes non-logical roots to human thought and ac- tivity. Pareto's is the only one among the great sociological systems that analyzes society as, above all, a gigantic construction of deceptions, self-deceptions and obfuscations. Even more radi- cally than Marx, Pareto understands the greater part of human actions as taking place in "false consciousness." The greater part of human thought, then, is the expression of human beings' "very conspicuous tendency to paint a varnish of logic over their con- duct." «

7 Ibid., 7, 12-14. s Ibid., 160, 216-217, 249-367, 410. 9 Ibid., 150. io ibid., 146. ii Ibid., 154.

VILFREDO PARETO 269

Pareto is not content, however, to stop with the debunking part of his search for the basic forces of society. Having satisfied himself that the self-interpretations of human actors are mostly "rationali- zations'* (that is, ideological in character), he goes on to ask what it is that is actually being "rationalized/* The theory of deriva- tions and residues is intended to answer this question.

Through a process of reduction Pareto thinks that he can show that non-logical actions originate chiefly in what he calls psychic states, that is, in sentiments and feelings of which the actor is not aware.12 By contrast, logical actions are the result of deliberate reasoning. The investigation of psychic states is the proper province of psychology. The sociologist has to take psychic states as data, without entering further into an analysis of them.13 In- deed, the sociologist's method makes psychic states inaccessible to him.14 However, the psychic states manifest themselves in various patterns or constellations of human motives that (or so Pareto be- lieves) appear as constants in social actions. These recurring pat- terns Pareto calls "residues." 15 The term is chosen to indicate that these patterns remain after sociological analysis (precisely the debunking operation referred to above) has cleared away the ac- cidental circumstances and the obfuscations of particular social actions. The residues (which Pareto classified in great detail and with the use of an exceedingly cumbersome terminology) are, therefore, the fundamental motor forces in society.

Pareto tries to show how the seemingly most diverse theories about one social phenomenon can always be reduced to a certain underlying structure of residues. For instance, the first class of residues in Pareto's scheme, comprising the residues of what he calls the "instinct of combination," express the human tendency to indulge in putting together all sorts of things, partly for the

12/fcfU, 161. is Compare Talcott Parsons, Structure of Social Action (Glencoe: The Free Press,

1949), p. 199, n. 4. i* Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, op. cit.y 170. io Ibid., 161-170, 189-248, 269, 306-367.

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pleasure of it, partly because there is an inborn drive to do so.16 It is this residual constellation which, among other things, is the basic force of innovation in history, of great importance, there- fore, for Pareto's theory of social change. The operation of this force is essentially haphazard and unsystematic, that is, is also non-logical. Yet various theories are constructed to make actions springing from these motives appear to be logical - such as theories of progress or of revolution. These explanations of conduct can only be understood sociologically, according to Pareto's procedure, if they are reduced to their non-logical, residual substratum. Again, the second class of residues is subsumed by Pareto under the category of the "persistence of aggregates/' expressing the residues of an instinct to refrain from tearing apart what the instinct of combination has put together.17 This class of residues expresses a principle of social inertia, of great importance for the cohesion and continuity of social institutions.18 Once more, these residues are non-logical in character, though elaborate explana- tions (such as various theories of conservatism) are concocted to

give them an appearance of logicality. At the center of Pareto's conception of social action is a formula

comprising three elements which he has also expressed diagram- matically/9 All social phenomena consist basically of given combi- nations of residues (A), the constant element, which find varying expressions in a multiplicity of social actions (2?) on the one hand, as well as a multiplicity of theories (C) on the other hand. Both social actions and theories are merely expressions of the constant element, the residues, and are therefore called "derivations." 20 The derivations express themselves in ever new forms and are subject to continuous change. What is crucial here is that social actions and theories cannot be understood sociologically, either in them- selves or in relation with one another, except by way of the resi-

xe/Wd., 864 ff. vlbid., 993 ff. i*Ibid.t 1076. i» Ibid., 162. 20 ibid., 163-291.

VILFREDO PARETO 271

dues that form their common substratum. In terms of the form- ula, no direct 5-C relationships can be analytically established. B-C relationships are either arbitrary or directly obfuscating. The

only analytically (that is, scientifically) meaningful relationships are A-B and A-C. In other words, "beliefs and conduct are not

independent, their correlation lies in their being two branches of the same tree." 21 Pareto concedes the possibility that occasion-

ally beliefs (C) may influence actions (B), but this can only happen indirectly by way of the residues (A). Very strong beliefs may act

upon the residues, reinforce or change their combination, and

consequently influence actions. These cases are rare. More com-

monly, the derivations of type (C) are the work of man's mind in

accounting for the residues as constituted.22 For Pareto, social structures are enveloped by a web of essen-

tially distortive ideation. The basic fiber of this web is language, which is the everyday vehicle for the "rationalization" of human actions.23 Then there are religion, mythology, morality, political theories and all other interpretations of social life that are capable of giving reasons for human actions. This situation, however, is not a transitory phenomenon of a particular historical moment (as is, by comparison, Marx's localization of "false consciousness" in the capitalist phase of historical development). It is endemic to society. It is repetitive in history. This does not mean that Pareto's view of society is ahistorical. On the contrary, Pareto is very much aware of the historicity of human social existence. The uniformities of human nature and their articulations in hu- man thought and social orders are constantly moving in time, re- combining and reconstituting themselves in ever-novel ways. Both the derivations and the residues change in their combinations and recombinations. Pareto even concedes that there may be

21 ibid., 166. 22 Ibid., 850. 23 Ibid., 158, 958-965. The implications of Pareto's theory of ideology for the

sociology of language has been clearly perceived by Heinz O. Ziegler, "Ideolog- ienlehre," Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaft u. Sozialpolitik, Heidelberg, 1927, vol. 57.

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genuine historical change in human consciousness as such. All the same, the scientific analysis of history and society will, accord- ing to Pareto, bring to light the recurring contents through which alone the kaleidoscope of changes can make sense.

A slight " translation" of Pareto's concepts may now be helpful

in explicating the significance of his approach for the sociology of knowledge. The central Paretian formula for the relationship of residues and derivations may be expressed by saying that it con- cerns the relationship of pre-theoretical consciousness (A), social conduct (B), and theoretical consciousness (C). Further, the rela-

tionships envisaged by the formula may be understood in terms of a dialectic. The dialectical movement originates in the first ele- ment, that is, in pre-theoretical consciousness. To put this dif- ferently, both human society and human thought are expressions of an underlying human nature, which remains constant in its fundamental constituents. It would be erroneous, therefore, to

regard the other two elements in the formula as nothing but re- flections or epiphenomena of the first. Rather, both social con- duct and theoretical consciousness "act back" upon the pre- theoretical consciousness from which they have emerged. In other words, the relationships in question are truly dialectic ones.

Conduct emerges from the residues, but as it results in changes in the social structure it again influences the residues. Even the

configurations of theoretical consciousness, certainly the weakest link in this chain, have the capacity in time to influence the resi- dues. Both these processes of "acting back" have been clearly illustrated in Pareto's theory of class circulation.24 The interpre- tation of these processes as a dialectic between social conduct and the two levels of consciousness thus stays close to Pareto's own formulations. As Pareto himself puts it, "logical interpretations of non-logical conduct become in their turn causes of logical con- duct and sometimes even of non-logical conduct; and they have to be reckoned with in determining the social equilibrium." 25

2* Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, op. cit., the entire 4th volume. 25 Ibid., 260.

VILFREDO PARETO 273

The same point is made even more explicitly in the following statement: "Erroneous [is] the idealistic theory that regards the residues as the cause of the facts. Likewise erroneous, but at times less so, is the materialistic theory that regards the facts as the cause of the residues. In reality the facts reinforce the residues, and the residues the facts. Changes occur because new forces come into play to affect either the facts or the residues or both facts and residues - new circumstances occasion changes in modes of life." 26

Pareto's analyses of concrete socio-historical situations habit- ually begin with the derivations of theoretical consciousness, despite the fact that he considers these to be weakest in initiating changes. Pareto is pushed towards this procedure by the use he makes throughout his work of historical sources, that is, of the interpretations made of the situation in question by its theoretical "definers." From these interpretations, most of them distortive, Pareto then proceeds to "dig down" to the underlying realities. While this procedure is a debunking one (which particularly suited Pareto's polemic inclinations), it is important not to con- fuse it with psychologistic reduction in one form or another. Not only the residues but the psychic states they are supposed to ex- press are defined by Pareto in terms that can hardly be called psychologistic - namely, as products of varieties of social, eco- nomic and political circumstances.27 Further, not only are the psychic states produced by social processes, but the psychology of the individual can only be understood as resulting from the characteristics of the group to which he belongs.28 It would be wrong, therefore, to interpret Pareto in terms of a psychologistic reductionism. Rather, it is appropriate to speak of constellations of consciousness, understood as being in an ongoing dialectic relation with social conduct. Even those parts of the Paretian opus that could be called a social psychology are thoroughly socio-

26 Ibid., 1014. 27 Ibid., 167. 28 /¿M., 171.

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logical in orientation and can more properly be called a sociology of consciousness - that is, a sociology of knowledge.

Pareto contends that there are empirical uniformities in these

processes of consciousness. He has been especially attacked on this score.29 This attack, however, is typical of the criticisms made against sociology as a whole by historians, philosophers and others coming from humanistic disciplines. If Pareto can be attacked here, so can the entire sociological tradition. Once the

sociological point of view is adopted, the possibility of establish-

ing recurring regularities in the interaction between human con- sciousness and the course of human affairs is already conceded. Pareto stands just as much in the main stream of the sociological tradition in his interest in the consciousness of groups rather than individuals.

On the basis of his sociology of consciousness, Pareto under- stands social change or history as essentially a succession of con- stellations of conciousness, in cyclical repetition. The distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical consciousness should make it very clear that this does not mean an understanding of history as the movement of "ideas." The latter, as crystallizations of theoretical consciousness, constitute but one moment in a much more complex dialectic, and the weakest moment at that. Thus, while Pareto's system is not reductionistic in a psychologistic or related sense, it is also not idealistic. If one accepts Pareto's socio-

logical presuppositions, his understanding of history is a tempting one, providing a ready scheme for the ordering of a bewildering multitude of data. This scheme is especially plausible if one looks at history over long periods of time and on the level of abstraction from particular events that Pareto's approach exacts. It becomes more problematic when one applies scrupulous his- torical methods to specific socio-historical situations.30

2» Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

1961), pp. 197 ff. so For instance, when one compares Pareto's interpretation of the history ot

Rome as a whole with detailed historical analyses of various periods of Roman

history seen from different perspectives.

VILFREDO PARETO 275

Pareto's view of the relationship between society and conscious- ness may be put in greater relief by comparing it with other "classic" approaches to this problem in sociological theory. A

comparison with Durkheim, Weber and Marx is particularly close at hand. Pareto shares with these scholars a broad conception of

sociology in its relationship to the humanities, a rejection of idealistic interpretations of society and history, an interest in the

methodological foundations of sociology and a rejection of psycho- logistic approaches to social phenomena.

Of these three thinkers Durkheim at first appears as the closest to Pareto.31 Like Pareto, Durkheim has been labelled as "posi- tivistic" and "sociologistic." But more importantly, phenomena of consciousness also occupy a central place in Durkheim's socio-

logy. Durkheim stresses that, in its essence, society is a product of mind. Collective representations and their congealment in the collective consciousness are the vital cement that holds society together. Indeed, society essentially is that assemblage of collec- tive representations. Further, all thought, including the funda- mental categories (such as time, space, number) are expressive of the social structure within which they originate. Durkheim in- sists, however, that society, once established, is a reality sui

generis, which not only cannot be reduced to the reality of its in- dividual members but which is independent of these individuals, having an existence above and in opposition to them. By contrast, Pareto remains constantly aware of society as a human drama,

produced and continuously "staged" by individuals. Society has no being except that which individuals bestow on it. In this

rejection of any hypostatization of social reality Pareto is actually closer to Weber than to Durkheim. There is another important difference. While both Pareto and Durkheim stress the social roots and "locatedness" of human consciousness, there is lacking in Durkheim a conception of "false consciousness" or "ideology."

ai Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950), and Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947).

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The notion that the collective consciousness of a society could be a mesh of delusions and fantasies, many of them concocted to serve specific vested interests, is alien to Durkheim's optimistic (and, one may suspect, profoundly bourgeois) spirit. Pareto has no use for this kind of optimism, scorns the liberal-bourgeois ideology to which it gave birth, and for this reason cannot agree to a sociological "functionalism" that provides a cognitive if not ethical legitimation of ideas by virtue of the fact that they work to hold society together. The very hypostatization of society that is endemic to Durkheimian sociology appears as an ideology in the Paretian perspective. It may, then, be maintained that the similarity between Pareto and Durkheim is superficial, actually misleading. Completely different orientations animate the two systems.

Pareto shares with Weber a strong concern with the role of thought in history and society.32 Further, for both theoreticians any specific social structure is always understood as a historical product. In Weber's case, this is directly related to the under- standing of society as resting on individual meanings and the concomitant rejection of any hypostatization of social reality - Weber's sociological

' 'nominalism," as against Durkheimian "real- ism." 33 Pareto clearly shares the first of these two general orien- tations. Also, like Pareto, Weber rejects any one-sided causal explanation of the relationship of ideas and society, as is indicated particularly in his concept of "elective affinity" (Wahlverwandt- schaft), referring to the manner in which ideas and social pro- cesses "seek each other out" in history.34 The similarity between Weber and Pareto in these matters is clear. So is the difference, however; Weber's approach to sociology, while lacking Durk-

32 Especially Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1951).

ss Cf. Werner Stark, The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).

34 Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 202, 713, 732.

VILFREDO PARETO 277

heim's "functionalist" optimism, also lacks Pareto's debunking animus. It would, indeed, be possible to glean from Weber's work a theory of ideology, especially by way of an analysis of his concept of "legitimation." But these aspects of social reality are much less central in Weber's work than in Pareto's. This means, undoubtedly, that Weber's sociological system is broader, more balanced, less infected with the passions of special pleading. By the same token, Pareto's system is more directly and more mas-

sively relevant to the sociology of knowledge. The most remarkable similarities are to be found between

Pareto and Marx, especially if one concentrates one's attention on the view of society presented in Marx's early writings.35 The two theoreticians share a basic intention of showing up the fictions ("mystifications," as Marx likes to call them) that overarch the social structure. More importantly, both are concerned to show the social rootage of all thought. In Marx's work, this concern is shown most clearly in the sub- and super-structure scheme. In the early writings, at least, it is clear that these two structures stand in a dialectic relationship with each other. The sub-structure is not just the productive forces of society in the narrow economic sense

(as it came to be understood in later Marxism), but the whole realm of human activity, including the structures of society, by which man produces his own reality and finally produces himself. If one understands the Marxian sub-structure as the whole range of man's social activity, and then understands the super-structure as the domain of consciousness being produced and in turn pro- ducing this social activity, then the affinity with the Paretian scheme becomes quite striking - except for the not unimportant fact that, in Paretian terms, the first moment of the Marxian dialectic lies in social conduct (B) rather than in a pre-theoretical consciousness that is an expression of a constant human nature (A). It is here, despite all theoretical similarities, that the two

as Karl Marx, Die Fruehschriften, (Landshut edition, Stuttgart: Kroener, 1953).

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spirits divide, with the fundamentally revolutionary Marx con-

cluding logically that human nature itself is a product of human

activity, while the fundamentally conservative Pareto must main- tain that human nature remains the same no matter what men do.86

It is pertinent that Pareto knew Marx's work and respected Marx as a sociologist (though not much as an economist). Pareto had, of course, no use for the revolutionary and Utopian aspects of Marx's work. Again, despite the similarities, a greatly different

spirit animates each system. Pareto also lacks Marx's philosophi- cal interests and would, indeed, regard these as having no place in a scientific sociology. All the same, of the three "classical" thinkers briefly compared here with Pareto, it may be main- tained that it is to Marx that the latter is closest. Pareto's work

gains interest if one accepts this view, because it then indicates some ways by which certain Marxian insights (especially those concerned with the dialectic relationship of society and conscious-

ness) might be incorporated into a comprehensive sociology of

knowledge, unburdened with the utopianism of the intellectual tradition derived from Marx.

If, in conclusion, Pareto is compared with the two theoreticians who conceived and developed the sociology of knowledge as a

special field, Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, he stands out

above all by the way in which he copes with the problems assigned to this field within a comprehensive system of sociology.37 This

was done neither by Scheler nor by Mannheim. For Scheler, the

se Actually it is an interesting problem for the sociology of knowledge that

conservative social theories tend to regard human nature as given, while revolu-

tionary theories tend to deny this givenness. It may also be possible to say that

conservative thought tends to resist dialectical interpretations of human nature.

Pareto follows this pattern to the extent of having a dialectical view of history, but exempting human nature from it.

«7 Max Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Bern u. Muenchen:

Francke, 2nd ed. 1960), and Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York:

Harcourt, Brace & Co., paper, n.d.).

VILFREDO PARETO 279

sociology of knowledge was a way-station on a much more general philosophical journey, the destination of which was to be the foundation of a philosophical anthropology firmly protected against historical relativity. More than anything else, Scheler's sociology of knowledge was intended by him to cope with the problem of relativity, and to get it out of the way, so that the proper philosophical task could begin. Such philosophical re- flections are completely alien to the spirit of the Trattato. Also, Scheler's conception of the sociology of knowledge really leaves no room for a notion of "false consciousness." Each type of con- sciousness is "true" insofar as it is a perspective on the one truth from a particular socio-historical standpoint. For Pareto, such a notion of truth is "metaphysics" and in itself an ideology. Scheler's approach leads towards the general philosophical prob- lems of consciousness, Pareto's towards an empirical study of specific phenomena of consciousness within the general frame- work of sociology.

In this interest Pareto is closer to Mannheim than to Scheler. What distinguishes him from Mannheim as much as from Scheler is his emphasis on the pre-theore tical aspect of "knowledge" in society. For understandable reasons to be found in the German intellectual milieu out of which both Scheler's and Mannheim's thinking came, their interest in "knowledge" was centered in "ideas." Pareto realized much more clearly that ideation is, after all, only a small part of the sum total of mental constructs opera- tive in human society. Both a Scheler-oriented and a Mannheim- oriented sociology of knowledge, despite various important differ- ences, appear principally as sociological perspectives on the history of ideas.38 Among other things, this explains why a sociology of knowledge thus oriented has remained marginal to the sociologi- cal enterprise as a whole. The utilization of the Paretian system for the sociology of knowledge overcomes this limitation. In

38 For the differences between Scheler and Mannheim cf. Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit.

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Mannheim's later work there appears an interest in placing socio-

logy at the service of democratic and reformistic "reconstruction." This, of course, would have been repugnant to Pareto's view of the uses of sociology. ,

In sum, Pareto's Trattato expounds a notion of sociology in which the problems of the sociology of knowledge (provided that one understands these as spanning the levels of theoretical and

pre-theoretical consciousness) are central. Social conduct and institutions are founded in pre-theoretical consciousness. It is not ideas that generate social conduct and institutions, but all three kinds of factors are manifestations of the same underlying com-

plexes of human nature. Society is not the deliberate realization of certain ideas, nor is it a "functional" organization of certain activities. Rather, society is a haphazard, unintended and largely unreflected phenomenon, having its roots in the struggles and

manipulations of everyday existence. Intellectual activities spring from the same roots, as men try to "explain" their existence to one another and (not least) to themselves, thereby systematically obfuscating what has actually taken place. Society is thus more a fabric of fantasy and folly than either an ideational design or a

functioning system. Indeed, men's ideas are generally the pro- ducts of irrationality and the society defined by these ideas func- tions precisely because men are foolish enough to believe their own irrationalities. It is this image of society that Pareto's socio-

logy of knowledge evokes. Pareto's work is useful because the

preservation of this image in sociological theory is important. More specifically, Pareto provides a sociology of knowledge

with far-reaching implications in several areas. The Trattato shows how a concept of social stratification may be developed in the perspective of a sociology of knowledge. Social strata are not

primarily seen as determined by economic or other external factors, but as constellations of consciousness.39 Pareto also de-

«»In Paretian terms class consciousness is due to a different constellation of

residues in different social classes.

VILFREDO PARETO 281

velops a comprehensive theory of social change based on his soci- ology of knowledge. Change in society means above all change in the consciousness of social groups. This conception is devel- oped in Pareto's well-known theory of the circulation of elites, but there is no theoretical necessity of confining it to this special problem.40 In its broadest aspect, the Trattato shows how a gen- eral sociological theory of history can be attempted. Since it is precisely the divorce from historical perspective and method which is one of the most serious theoretical weaknesses of con- temporary American sociology, both Pareto's sociological system in general and his sociology of knowledge in particular deserve far greater attention than they currently receive.

¿o Throughout the fourth volume of Mind and Society one becomes aware of this possibility.