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0THE BATTLE OF SMID SOU ZWD

Combat Studfies, Institute.....Fort Lea vwnworth, Karua!.a

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COMBAT

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f CSI BATTLEBOOKS contain information compiled by CGSC student officers as a requirement of theregular course. The contents have not been edited or checked in detail for factual veracity. The[views expressed in CSI BATTLEBOOKS are those of the authors and not necessarily those of CSI,CGSC. the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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COMBAT ST11IES INSTIE

The Combat Stude Institut wa saMbiseds on 18 June 1979 a a nperali dactivity w"tin the U.S. "rm Command &d GeCa" Staff Colege FoM Levew ei Mmth Wass.the pirpose of accomosit I mIi ssio

1. Conduct researc got historical toic pertinent to doctrina concern ofth Arm anW"blsthe result in a variety of mas he the ActW A y d er I no.

2. Prepar &Wd pr~n instructio mA er histor at CG &C a "d ass ft ehrCS eete

3. Serve as the. M WOO eMau" agNot he fth de olpmes and1 me din anim ft- dp vpr lomt r h"" tM i."uructi in t TIAD seO Ie" *I'

4. Direct the CAC h*;Icalprogram

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1he attl of idiSou Zid

14 February 19431

Tunisia, North Africa

Defensive, Encircled Forcevs

* Submitted by:

Sta+f Group D, Section 4

In P'artial Comipletion of Course P65L

Staff Group D Members.

Colonel BedellMajor ArreguiMajor BoccolucciMajor CassetariMajor Chandler

-Major EngeisMajor Grantmajor GrossmanM~ajor kierseyMajo- Mc I ntyr emajor' SullivanMaJbr TaichflanMajor Thurman

*1-W O110 16

COMMON REFERENCEs Sidi Bou Zid

TYPE OPERATIONs Defensive., Encircled Forces.

tWPOSI NG FORCESs U.So, Combat Command Alet Armored Division

Germant 10th and 21st. PanzerDivisions

SYNOPSISa On 14 February 1943,, the German' Fi fthPanzer Army in North Africa launched, a lImitedoffensive to drive Allied forces out o+ Tunisia'sEastern Dorsal.. The 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions

* struck Combat Command A, let Armored Divisoln, at. SidiBou Zid in the western exit of Faid Pass. ConvergingGerman el ements overran the American 'artillerypositions, drove off a tank battalion with heavy, loss,and surrounded the U. S. 164th Infantry- Regiment.Although the encircled farces, defended their positionsstubbornly, an armored counterattack. to relievw theefailed disastrously on 15 February, Leaving the thBth

* no al ternati ve but to attempt a breakout on. the nightof 16-17 February. Only a handful of soLdiers

* succeeded in reaching Allied lines,

* DSIBLIOORAP~4Y

* Howke, George F. Northwest Africa# Setting the ________

Initiative in the West. Aco.suiin For

B lumensan, Martin. Kasserine Pass.WIC ?AN *

Detson, CPT William R. 0U1di sou Li-- Case Histo(yof Failure.* Arm"or Nov-DeC 1962.________

* Distribution/* . Aveilablityý Cod"e

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V. Sidi bou Zid

Part I - Define the Subject

The-battle of Sidi bou Zid began on 14 February1943 and attempts to break out of the encirclementlasted until 16 February 1943. The hattle occurred intha vicinity of the small village of Sidi bou Zid,which is located west of the Faid'Pass on the road toSbeitla'Pass in southern Tunisia. The !Oth and 21st.Panzer D:Ivisions struck Combat Com,,and A, Ist Armored

,, Division.

Sources of information concerning the battleinclude books, military journal articles, unit logs andbattle accounts, and-letters from participants.

Comprehensive Bibliographies

a. Desert Warfare: A Selective Bibliography,19219-1982.

(1) Report date: May 1982

(2) Abstract: This bibliography lists books andgeneral periodical articles dealing with the history

and tactics of desert warfare. Many of the itemsdiscuss particular battles in North Africa in1940-1943, or in the Arab-Israeli wars, 1947-1973.(author)

(3) SBI site holding symbol: TRAL

(4) AD number: A132264

b. Bibliography from masters thesis, "Role of theFieli Art4.llery in the Battle of Kasserine Pass,"*or itten by Major David W. Hazen, CGSC, 1973.

fl' Report date: 1973

. (2) Abstract: -The report analyzes the role of thefield artillery in the.Battle of Kasserine Pass. Thebibliography, is extensive and far more broad than

Part I-I"3,

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Sthe Sidi bou Zid bat tle alone. It would be useful toanyone working on the Tunisian Campaign.

(3) SBI site holding symbol: TRAL

(4) AD number: B061564L

c. Annotated bibliography for this battleanalysis (below.)

Oral History Possibilities

Though none were used by this study group, lettersreceived by CPT William R. Betson in response to hisARMOR article indicate that there are several survivorswho maintain an interest in the battle. Copies ofthese letters are included as inclosures. Addresses ofthe writers are:

Henry E. Gardiner (see bibliography)P. C. Box 1931Bozeman, MT 59715

Laurence Robertson (Plt Ldr, Co A, 1st Armd305 Cherry Lane Regiment, Ist Armd DivTeaneck, NJ 07666 at the time of battle.)

Herbert F. Hillenmeyer (Plt Ldr, Co H, 1st Armd413 Springwood Lane Regiment, 1st Armd DivLouisville, KY 40207 at tho time of battle.)

COL Lyndon B. Cole315 Limestone Creek RdSan Antonio, TX 78232

Annotated Biblioqraphy

Book .

BLUMENSON, Martin. Kasserine Pass. Now York: TowerPublications, 1973.

The book is written about the climacticbattle for Tunisia which occured near a tiny NorthAfrican village called Kasserine. It includesapproximately 50 pages about the battle which tookplace around the area of Sidi bou Zid. Both

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friendly and enemy planning and execution actionsare aadressed. The author provides a goodoverview, but not many specifics about the place,the equipment nor the combatants.

EISENHOWER, Dwight David. The War Years. Vol II ofThe Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower. Edited byAl+red D. Chandler, Jr. 4 vols. Baltimore: JohnsHopkins Press, 1970.

This volume of The Papers Of Dwight DavidEisenhower encompasses the time period of November1942 to September 1943. Inclided in these papersis correspondence between Eisenhower and numerouskey figures oi the time, to include militaryleaders and stotesmen. Important issues examinedin this volume are the Tunisian Campaign, Sicily,and the fall of Mussolini. This book provides aninteresting and informative base for research intothis time frame.

ROMMEL, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. B. H. Liddel Hart,w.'ith the assistance of Lucie-Maria Rommel, ManfredRommel, and Fritz Bayerlein. Translated by PaulFindley. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953.

Rommel has very little to say about theBattle of Sidi bou Zid. What he does say is anindictment against the German High Command; thatis, that success was not exploited.

RUTHERFORD, Ward. Kasserine: Baptism Of Fire. NewYork: Ballntina Books,1970.

This book is part of a Ballentine Bookscollection -- Ballentine's Illustrated History ofWorld War II. It is unclear as to why this bookwas written. It cont3ins a short :9 book)bibliography, but nu footnotes to indicate theextent or which references were used. The writer

* is a British journalist who experienced Germanoccupation in Jersey in 1927. Advice and

* .ass.istance received is unclear. It i% a basicallyundocumented interpretation from secondarysources.

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"iU. S. MILITARY ACADEMY. (nl ratiins in theMediterranaan and Picific Theaters. Vol. I1 of AMilitary History of Wcrld War Il. Edited my T.Dodson Stamps and Vincent Esposito. West Point,New York: AG Printing Office, 1953.

Written for study at the US Army MilitaryAcademy. This v:'Lume, 565 pages, covers theoperations irn tie Mediterranean and Pacifictheaters, cor,:ntrating on the war in NorthAfrica, the war in Sicily and Italy, and the warwith Japan. The Battle o4 Kasserine Pass iscovered on pages 60-65. It provides a goodsynopsis of Sidi bou Zid. It also provides atactical sequence of events and an evaluation ofkey errors madewhich impacted on the battle.rhis is a good reference for grasping the broadaspects of Sidi bou Zid as they apply to theBattle of Kasserine Pass.

Journal Articles

BETSON, William R. (CPT, USA). "Sidi bou Zid - A CaseHistory of Failure.' Armor,. XCI, No. 5, November-December '182, pp. 3e-44.

A concise article which examines the battleof Sidi bou Zid from start to finish, concludingwith lesson% learned. The author's intent is tocompare the characteristics of this battle whichwould prove similar to combat by NATO forces inthe future. It appears to be a non-olasedapproach based on an in-depth study. A veryrefreshing and easy-to-read article.

FLUMENSON, Martin. "Command at Kasserine Pass." Army.,Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1967, pp. 32-34.

In this article, Blumenson provides a case"hjtory on the contrasting styles of several USmilitary leaders involved in the planning andexecution of-battle plans in North Africa,Tunisia, the Kasserine Pass, and Sidi bou Zid.His article provides good insight into thecharacter of and conflict between Major GeneralLloyd R. Fredendall and Major General GrlandoWard.

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."The Agony and the Glory." Infantry,July-August 1967.

A detaiiled description that took place duringthe opening hours of the battle of Kaserinepress. It describes the disposition of forcesunder the Commander 168th Infantry Regiment andthe actions in the proximity of Sidi bou Zidbetween the 14th and the 20th of February, 194Z.letaiied report of force strengths and losses --

naies of subordinzte commanders.BU.BA, Edwin H. (LTC,USA). "The Battle of Sidi bou

Zid: 15 Feb 43," The Field Artillery Journal,XXXIII, No. 9 (September 1943), pp. 643-644.

This is a very short and at times hard tofollow article that accounts for a portion of theartillery operations at Sidi bou Zid. It bearsout the theme of much of the artillery training,doctrine of that time: disperse vehicles,'empflze

* weapons so that they are mutually supporting andestablish a comprehensive, all-around warningsystem. In addition, it emphasizes theartillery's need 4or skill in dismountedpatrolling (by day and night); individual abilityto move cross country at night, either Mounted or

- on foot, will frequently spell the differencebetween safety and capture.

SGARDINER, Henry 0 (COL, USA). "We Fought atKasserine." Armored Cavalry Journal, March-April1948.

- The article has good, descriptive commentsSabout the terrain in t ie vicinity of Kasserine

Pass. There are no dieect references to Sidi bou"" Zid.

* ROBINETT, Paul .(BG, USA). "The Axis Offpnsive inCentral Tunisia - February 1943." Armour,

S I .May-June,1954.

The author served as the Commander of CombatCommand B, 1st Armored Division in Tunisia during

* the early days'of World War II. 'At the time of* the writing, Brigadier General Robinett was the

'Chief of the Special Studies Division, Office ofthe Chief of Military History, 'Droartment of theArmy. Written from an American rommander's point.of view, the author used personal recollections

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Iand several boors (listed in the article's ei."notes) to develop this article.

iHe deals with the general situation insouthern Tunisia, the terrain and climate, threebattles (Sidi bou Zid is addressed on paoes

10-11), and with lessons learned. GeneralRobinett tells how the Germans pushed the Alliedforces oiJt of Kasserine Pass and how we reacted tothis setback, turning the tide of battle against athen-more-experienced enemy. During the first twodays, in which the battle of Sidi bou; Zid was+ought, Robi,.:tt's CCE' was British First Armyreserve, located more than a hundred miles fromthe battle. He was, therefore, not in the initialfighting and provides only reflective comments

concerning Sidi bou Zid. He does provide a goodsynopsis of the situation, weather, and terrain incentral Tunisia. His analysis is short,, butuseful to get an overall appreciation o*f how thisbattle fits into the general Kasserine Pass arerScampaign.

Letters to Military Journals

HOWZE, Hamilton H. (GEN, USA). "Sidi bou Zid: AnotherView." Letter to Armor, XCII, No. 2, Marchi-April1783, pp. 3-4.

RIGGSBY, Raymond M. (LTC, USA). "Sidi bou Zid: ASergeant's View." Letter to Armor, XCII, No. 2,March-April, 1983, pp. 5-6.

Unpublished Military Material'

CAREY, ARTHUR T. (COL, USA). "rhe Effect of ULTRA onthe North African Campaign." AD Ntmber: A118830(microfiche), CARL, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This is an individual study project'for theArmy War College. The au thor used several booksand articles as well as unpublished manuscripts(listed in his bibliography.) The article providesa new 'point of view. "The first lesson is thatdecrypts of this nature provide accurate rawinformation that must be properly analyzed andcompared with other sources. Second: ULTRA.inormailion can give capabilities and

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probabilities but not intentions. Again analysisis the key. The'last major lesson is that thebest intelligence is no substitute for goodComma~nd strategy and tactics." (frcm the author'sabstract)

HAZEN, David W. (MAU',, USA). "Role of the FieldArtillery in the Battle of the Kasserine Pass,"Master's Thesis, CGSC, 1973.

Written in an easy to read styl'e, this thesiswith its accompanying~maps thoroughly describ~esand analyzes the role of the field artillery inthe Battle of ilasserine Pass to include Sidi bouZid. It examines artillery organization forcombat, fire-and maneuver on the battlefield,assignment of artillery tactical missions, and theartillery's influenceon the battle.

LANG, Rudolf (Oberst a. D.). "Battles of KampfgruppeLang in Tunisia (10th Panzer Division), December1942 to 15 April 1943." (Typewritten manuscriptof the commander of Kampfnruppe Lang.) Ga~rmisch,Germany: Office of the Chief of Military History,Historical Division USAREJR, 8 june 1947.

rhis manuscript was written from a Germfancommander.'s point of view from memory. It is anundocumented, original contribution based on therecollections of the writer. Pages 22 and 23 dealbriefly with the Sidi bou Zid battle. He creditsAmerican units with stiff resistance, thoughsurrotanded and outgunned,

U. S. ARMY. "Observer's Report of LTC 6. E. Lynch,GSC, .Observer from Headquarters, Army GroundForct-s to North Africa, for the Period 30 December1942" to 6 February 1943." (not dated). Fl. # N

This report covers the period of when forceslanded in North Africa in November until 3.1January 1943. The observer was apparentlyresponsible t6 report on all units in North Afrfca-during the time. His comments are written iflsections as they pertain to primary staff areas ofconcern, i.e., 01,1 62, 631 and 64. While-thereport does not provide any information directly

*impacting on the batt le at Sidi bou Zid, it does

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- provide a good general background of what theunits had encountered up through the end ofJanuar'y.

Other .laterial

BETSON, William R. (CPT, USA). Letter to Major GregoryFontenot (attached).

Captain Betson wrote the Armor articlereferred to above. The letter containsclarification on the task drganizations (Alliedand Axis), notes on a conversation he had with MG(Ret) Peter C. Hains (commander of Combat Command

A during the batt!e), and enclosing the lettersreferred to in the possible oral history sourcesabove.

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Sidi bou Zid

Part II - Strategic Situation

By mid-1942 German military might had reached its

* zenith. In the East, German armies had surrounded

* Leningrad, over-run central Pus~sia, siezed the southernoil fields, and were threatening Stalingrad. In theWest, tiey occupied most of France and the low countrieswhile preparing to repulse the inevitable invasion ofthe continent. In Africa, the "Desert Fox" had proventhe downfall of several Allied commanders, althoughimmense distances and limited logistics had conspired

". to deny him a complete victory.

The Allies, on thR other hand, foundthemselves onthe ropes. British shipping had suffered tremendouslosses from German submarines and the army had yet tofully recover from its physical and psychologicaldrubbing in France. Only the nightly British air raidsover ,Europe and the entry of the United States into thewar offered any hope of success. However, the US hadyet to provide significant forces for the fight,although material was arriving in steadily increasingamounts. On the Eastern Front, Russia had lost morethan a million casualties in the previous year, not tomention much of her industry and her breadbasket, theUkraine. Unless the Allies coul'd open a second groundfront soon, Russia might have to seek a separate peace.

Yet the location of that new front was a matter ofhot debate at the highest levels. Led byGeneral

a, Marshall, the, American Army strongly f~avored a landingon the continent and a drive directly into Germany atthe earliest date. Unfortunately, even the mostoptimistic planner soon realized that a shortage ofcritical, equipment (especially landi'ng craft). couldmake such an operation impossible until at least late1943 - too late to respond to Stalin's demands for.,hel p.

For their part the British, 2,till scarred by theterrible losses of the First World War, preferedChurchill's famous peripherial approach through "thesoft under-belly of Europe." Of course, operations in

* the Mediterranean could hardly be mounted while Rommel

Part 11. 1

held North Africa, especially since the French forcesthere had yet to declare their clear allegience to theFrench government in exile. The compromise solutionwas Operation Torch.

While Rommel was busy with Montgomery in Tunisia,the Western Allies mounted the largest amphibious

Slanding yet seen in the war. Three task forcestotaling r'iore than 100,000 men departed ports inBritian ind the US to land in Morocco and Algeria on 8November, 1942. The effect was to pose a potentialthreat to Rommel 's rear only days after he had suffereda defeii at El Alamein and while he was stillwithdrawing westward. However, the Germans reactedwith unexpected speed, slowing the Allied advance and

- fianlly preventing a link-up with Montgomery.

By January of 1943 the German strategic situationhad worsened perceptably. The Russian counter-attackat Stalingrad threatened to engulf all of VIth Army.In the West, large numbers of German troops- were tied

- down in occupation duties and preparing for theanticipated Allied landings. In Africa, Rommel heldtwo fronts roughly one hundred miles apart.Strategically, the initiative was clearly shifting tothe Allies through the power of the offensive. WhileAllied military strength in Africa steadily increased,German resources were drawn off by higher priorities.Seeking the initiative as always, Rommel planned acounter-stroke through the Americans and behind theBritish and French forces to his west. The stage wasset for the first battle of Kasserine.

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Sidi bou .id

Part .izr- Tactical Situation

1. STUDY OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Climate and Weather.

During the period of the Axis offensive, February1943; the weather in and around Sidi bou Zid wasvariable. Although February is normally consideredearly spring in central Tunisia, wind, rain, hail, andeven snow were still encountered. While the sun wasout the weather could be pleasant, but when tha cloudsrolled in a penetrating cold prevailed. Axis forceslocated initially in the sunnier lowlands and dressedin light summer uniforms were attacking into the Alliedforces whose defensive locations were generally inhigher ground to the east where the weather wascharacterwzed by cloudier and wetter weather. 1

On Saturday, the 13th of February 1943, theweather which had been miserable during the pastseveral days, with snow flurries and violent winds,suddenly improved. Although the sky remained ha.lfcovered with heavy clouds, high winds persisted aid thetemperature remained cold, the atmospheric conditions

S became favorable for offensive operations. 2

The following day, the 14th, a strong westerlywind picked' up, and by 0400 hours started a sandstorm.The German staff weatherman had accurately predictedthese conditions, and when combined with the-normalearly morning haze, observation of the Faid Pass exithad become impossible ,from the American positions atDiebels Ksaura and DioJebelsLqssouda.

Primarily due to the-difficult weather conditionsthe screening elements forward of the Americanpositions, the attached 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry and the'81st Reconnaissance Battalion failed to interceptattacking German forces and the car'fully preparedartillery concentrations on the pass exits went

9 unfired. 3

Part III-1

Some communication outages which were reported"throughout the morning of the 14th can possibly beattributed to the atmospheric conditions which werepresent.

Visibiltity limitations hindered surveillance andtarget acquisition to such an extent that the Americanartillery was overrun 'around the rear of Lessouda.Additionally, a clear picture of the size ar•tcomposition of German forces was not telaypd to theCommanding General of the 1st Armored Division.

Weather and climate did not significantlyinfluence night operations, weapons systems, troop"morale, or movement by air during this battle.

a. Terrain (OCOKA).

(1) Observation and fire.

The American scheme for containment of Germanforces at Faid was centered upon the key terrainfeatures of Diebel Ksaira to the south and DiebelLessouda to the north. Artillery observation posts onboth hills provided visual coverage of the exits fromFaid Pass and of the road from Maknassy to the south.

The troops on the heights were only able toSinfluence the battle on the plain aroUnd them by their

observation and adjustment of artillery. The planresulted in rigidity and the artillery was leftuprotected on the valley flocr. 4

(2) Concealment and cover.

Concealment and cover was limited in the battlearea. With the exception of the wadis,.the terraLn wasflat providing good long range acquisition. Fastmoving vehicles raised dust which gave away positionsand added to recognition problems. Trm could befound in irrigated groves in and around the town ofSidi bou Zid. Due to a lack of cover and concealmentthe American forces suffered casualties from frequentGerman air attacks.

Part III 2

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(3) Obstacles.

With the exception of isolated minefields whichhad been emuplaced by the American engineers, very fewman made obstacles were employed during the battle.

Sand became a natural obstacle to the Germanforces as they attemapted to push through the MaizilaPass. When forced to deploy from the roads, sand"slowed their movement.

(4) Key terrain.

Key terrain was identified as the hills ofLessouda and Ksaira. These hills were identified as,"islands of resistance." 5 Unfortunately, theoccupation o4 these hills by American infantry robbedthem of their mobility. The two locations wereseperated by such a great distance that mutual supportwas not possible with the organic weapons available.

The occupation of these two hills by the Americaninfantry proved to be an unforseen stroke of luck forthe attacking German forces. Each position was quicklysurrounded during the battle, and the survivingAmericans were required to break out and attempt toevade the Germans during the hours of darkness. Duringthe breakout attempts large numbers of Americansoldiers were captured.

The American commander, MajorGeneral Fredendall,and his staff had apparently never reconnoitered theterrain they elected to defend, even though seniorofficers of thei1st Armored Division had expressed somedoubts about th plan.

(5) Avenue of approach..

The two av nues of approach available to theGermans were aling roads leading through the Faid Passand, the Maizila Pass. & These two avenues were largeencuyh to accommodate attacking forces once they hadcleared the pasies. Trafficability off the existingroads was not much of a problem, but some delays couldbe expected whe large wadis cut across the route ofmarch. This siluation could dramatically changehowever if significant rainfall occured. Off roadtrafficability ould then be a nightmare of mud andrain swollen wac s.

Part III S'3

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While in the passes constriction of the avenuespresented a lucrative target for interdiction byartillery or aircraft, but the quick dispersal offorces could be easily accomplished once through thepasses.

2. IMMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF EACH ANTAGONIST.

a. Missions of Opposing Forces..

Axis Forces:

The mission of the Axis Forces was to cut through theDorsals, take Le Kef and to continue northward to theMediterranean, isolating the Allied forces facing Tunis andBizerte. 'The 10th Panzer was to attack S'idi bou Ziddirectly through Faid Pass. The 21st Panzer would emergefrom Maizala Pass, swing behind US positions at Sidi bou Zidand strike from the rear.

Allied Forces:

The mission of the Allied Forces was to prevent alinkup of the two Axis armies. Specifically they were tohold the mountain passes in the Eastern Dorsales andconduct limited offensive action, to the East in order tosever Rommel's communications with the Axis forces to theNorth.

b. Immediate Objectives Selected.

Axis Forces:

The objective of the attack was not agreed upon by the'two armies involved (the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions

•. along with the division sized element from the DeutscheAfrika Korps of Panzer Armee Afrika)., It was generallyhoped that a severe blow could be dealt to the greenAmerican units from which they would be slow to recover.

Allied Forces:-

The ultimate objectives was to expell the Axis powersfrom Africa. At the time of the battle of 'Sidi bou Zid, theobjective was to seze back most of the ground lost to theAxis in Central and southern Tunisia in order to pave theway for a major offensive in March.

Part III - 4

c. Relationship of Immediate Objectives to

Strategic~and Tactical Goals.

Axis Forces:

The Axis forces succeeded in their efforts to throw theAllies off balance; to drive through to the coast; and toprolong the eventual showdown in Tunisia by several months.This was consistent with their strategy of preserving theirline of communication to the Algerian oilfielLs.

Allied Forces:

The British had argued that the conquest of NorthAfrica would provide a base from which to invade thesoft underbelly of Eýtrope; it would eliminate the NaziVichy-French governments control of Algeria; it wouldfree the vital Mediterranean Sea lanes; it wouldrelieve pressure on the British 8th Army defending theSuez canal; and it would draw German air strengths fromthe Russian front. Inasmuch as the Alled froces hadcut Rommel off from his supplies in northern Tunisia,their objectives were consistant with strategic andtactical goals.

P

SPart III - 5 'K\

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Sidi bou Zid

Part III - Opposing Forces

1. STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION.

a. Friendly forces.

(1) The British First Army.

(a) Organization (see figure 3-1). 7

(b) Discussion., German defenses had stopped theallied offensive. Allied forces were on the defensiveall across the front, bringing up supplies andreinforcements while preparing to resume the offensive.A British Corps was in the north, XIX French Corps inthe center and II U.S. Corps was defending in thesouth. The allies expected a herman counteroffensive

S- to fall on the center of the allied line andconsequently thickened defenses there. 8

(2) The II Corps.

(a) Organization (see figure 3-2). 9

(b) II Corps, the southernmost of the three allied

corps in line, was not expected to have to bear theenemys main attack. II Corps received orders toprotect the flank of XIX Zorps, to the north where themain attack was expected, and to defend in sector. IICorps consisted'of 1st AD(-), the 168th RCT, a Britisharmored cavalry regiment and Force Welvert(miscellaneous French units comprising approximatelyone division in strength). In its sector, II Corps"dctermined that the enemy's most likely avenue ofapproach was through Faid Pass to Sidi bou Zid. IICorps' most powerful unit, the 1st Armored Division(-), reinforced by most of the infantry from the 168th

RCT, was assigned to this sector. The remainder of IICorps forces were given screening missions to the Corps

* front and southern sector. II Corps did not establish- a corps ressrve per soi* Some engineer, tank destroyer,

and infantry units assigned to rear area security wereexpected to double as corps reserve until British First,.

,Army reserves could be shifted from the north to help.10

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(3) The 1st Armored Division.

(a) Task Organization on 14 February (seefigure 3-3). 11

(b) Discussion. The 1st Armored Division had onlytwo combat command (CC) headquarters. Combat CommandC was built around an existing battalion headquarters -

possibly the 701st Tank Destroyer (TD) battalion. Itwas placed in line with the 61st Armored ReconnaisaanceBattalion1 (ARB) to asist in guarding the divisionssouthern flank. eGB Combat Command B (CCB) wasdetached to Army reserve while CCA occupied the mostlikely avenue of approach - the area around Sidi bouZid. The division reserve consisted of one light tankbattalion and one armored infantry battalion. Inaddition to the three manuevar battalions lost to armyreserve in CCB, two maneuver battalions were in theforce screening the corps southern flank, and oneadditional battalion was in the Army rear area.conducting rear area security operations. So out of apossible 13 manuevat battalions, 1st AD had only sevenwith which to defend in its sector. 12

(4) Combat Command A.

(a) Task Organization (see f igsr 3-4).. 13

(b) Discussion. CCA had virtually no options interms of its size, its dispositions or in thedevelopment of it defensive plan. Its size, sector,and positioning had been prescribed by the II Corpscommander. He directed that one infantry heavybattalion combat team be placed on the northern hill, areinforced infantry battalion on the southern hill, andthat a reinforced armor battalion be held in reserve.Task Force Waters (2-168) was positioned on thenorthern hill (Di Lessouda) while TF 3-168 was placedon the southern hill (DJ'Ksaira). Unfortunately, thecorp's commander 'and his staff did not appreciate theterrain. The two hills were approximately eightkilometers apart and not mutually supporting. Theplanned battalion strongpoints were in actuality twoisolated outposts. The Commander of CCA made someadjustments to the plan by patrolling with infantrybetween the hills at night and occupying blockingpostions with armor during the day. 14

b. Enemy Forces.

Part 111- 7

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(1) The German 5th Panzer Army.

(a) Organization (see figure 3-5). 15

(b) Discussion. Field Marshall Albert Kesserlingwas the overall commander of Axis forces in theMediterranean. General Juergan Van Arnim commanded theFifth Panzer Army. He placed General Heinz Zeigler, hisdeputy, i.' direct command of FRUELINGSWIND- the pinceroperation at Sidi-bou Zid. Ziegler's force includedmore than two hundred tanks, half tracks and guns. 16

(2) The 10th Panzer Division.

(a) Organization (see figure 3-6).

(b) Discussion. The l0ti Panzer Division was aproud and veteran formation. It had long years ofexperience in France and Russia before arriving inAfrica. The lOth's mission was to attack Sidi bou Zidthrough Faid Pass. For this battle, the division wouldconsist of four maneuver battalions.

(3) The 21st Panzer Division.

(a) Organization (see figure 3-7).

(b) Discussion. The 21st Panzer Division hadbeen the first German division in Africa and hadperhaps more desert experience than any other unit oneither side. The 21st Panzer Division, had a mission toattack through Maizla Pass, about 15 miles to the southof Faid Pass, and attack Sidi bou Zid from the rear.For this battle, the-division consisted of sevenmaneuver battalions.

2. TECHNOLOGY.

The most sophisticated weaponry of both forceswas employed in the battle at Sidi bou Zid.ýUnfortunately for the Allied forces, German weaponryand "how to fight" doctrine was superior. The Germandesert battle experience had taught them to takefullest advantage of the weather and terrain to closewith 'and destroy allied forces. Additionally, theirexperience in working land forces (infantry and armor)and air forces in combined operations helped to makethem even more effective against allied forces in their

Part IX -I I

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initial engagements. But, perhaps the most significantadvantages owned by the Germans in the battle at Sidibou Zid was in their tank weapon systems - especiallyin the Tiger tank. It had a larger caliber main gunwhich fired a higher velocity round from greaterdistances than American or British tanks.' The Germantank also gave its crew~better protection than Alliedtank crews in terms of armor thickness and in thecapability to fire from more of a defilade position ina wider target range than the American M3 General GrantTank or even their new M4 Sherman tank - which wasbeing issued during the battle. 17

The M3, as previously stated, was a much inferiortank. Its 75mm gun could not penetrate the armor of aTiger tank at the ranges being fought. *It's traversewas so limited that it could only fire in the dirctionin which it was facing. More over, the gun was set solow that almost the whole tank had to be exposed before

* it could be brought to bear on a target. Thetre was noslope on the side armor and the .30 caliber gun-in thecupola, which was for defense against aircraft, was

* *.*worses than useless. The highly volatile gasolinefu el, vulnerability of fuel tanks-and position ofescape hatches made the tank a literral iron coffin forits crew. The tank was extremely vulnerable againstGerman tanks in any situation whether it be thedefense, a running tank battle or a withdrawal.

The M4 Sherman tank was a great 'improvementtechnologically over the M3 G~rant tank. It greatlyimproved upon most o4 the shortcomings noted in th M3except for the problem of dependence on volatilegasoline for fuel. Unfortunately, tactiital, employmentor techniques to fight the still superior German tankshad not yet evol'ved when the battle at Sidi. bou Zid wasfought. LTC Louis V. Hightower~s tank battalion CCCA

* reserve-force) "as completly outfitted with the how M4Sherman tank prior~to hip~ coonterattack to rescue theisolted forces on D~J Lfessouda'and Di Ksaira. But,even though' the Sherman tank was nearly a technologicalmatch to the German tank, the tactics were not.Hightower's force was Ambushed and almost totallydestroyed in a 'matter of a couple of hours of fighting.16 It was not until later in-the battle, for KasserinePass that the Allied forces Altered their tacticalapproach to combat with the LSerman's.

* This battle at Sidi bou Zid weont to the Axisforces because of their technological advantage in the

Part 11-1 9

main weapon system employed, the tank, and because oftheir skillful ability to employ combined arms forces.The Germans knew the capabilities of their weaponssystems and hed learned how to maximize those"capabilities. The Allied forces, especially theAmericans who were the Allied combatants in thisbattle, had not yet learned how to differentiate"parade ground" and "map bound" tactics from actual"battle ground" tactics. In the final analysis, thisweakness had a far greater impact on their 'defeat thandid their shortcomings in the technological arena.

S3. LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS.

a. Friendly Forces.

Preinvasion planning had projected Tunisia as a,.,. British theatre of operations. This included the

entire line of supply in concept, organization andcontrol. Since each Allied force was unfamiliar withthe manner in which other Allied forces operated,, manyunexpected difficulties were encountered. Politicalconsiderations, differing national interests, andlanguage barriers compounded logistical problems.Fortunately American forces had seen limited action

" ' since their arrival in North Africa in November of1942. This allowed time for their movement todefensive positions in the Kasserine Pass area andliAitwd build up of badly needed supplies prior to thebattle at Sidi bou Zid. 19

A baiiic deficiency existed 'in transportation. Thenarrow gauge railroad between Constantine (Eisenhocer'sforward command post) and Tebessa, the main supplydepot for the American forces in Tunisia, could carryonly about one third of the daily requirements of the

S 9 I1 Corps. Truck convoys supplemented the. railway, butby the end of Janurary, the six thousand trucks weremechanically worn out or deadlined for spare parts. Aloss of a single vehicle became almost a tragedy to thelogistical planners. The II Corps'was suffering acuteshortages in all types of equipment. There wereshortages of spare tanks, binoculars, machine guns,repair parts, assemblies such as engines,transmissions, starters, generators, headlights, tirepatches and much more. 20

'At the beginning of February, Eisenhower created a

Part I11" - 10

Services of Supply organization to handle thecomplicated aspects of logistics and supply forAmerican forces. But not until March was theorganization effective enough to support the U.S.troops stationed in Tanisia - too late for the battleat Sidi bou Zid. 21

In t he II Corps, resupply policy was from the reardepot a. Tebessa to the front units near Sidi bou Zidc,a dista ce of approximately 100 miles. In actualityresupplly was mnore frequently laterally by sectionbecause trucks could not reach the units on DJ Ksairaor Di Lessouda. 22 Resupply of those units, as itturned cut, was not a significant factor In them beingencircled and abandoned during the battle. In fact,the forces of CCA had received several truck loads ofammunition and some brand now bazookas (weapons whichno one had ever fired) on Saturday the 13th ofFebrurary. 23

CCA had also recieved a shipment of two hundredreplacement troops only a couple of days prior to thebattle but they could hardly be considered an asset."Each man arrived carrying two heavy barracks bags fullof clothing and personal belongings. Some lackedweapons, some had never fired a rifle, nons hadentrenching tools or bayonets, and many were not even,trained. The arrivals were sent to Drake who had themdistributed out among the companies on Dj Ksaira. 24

b. Enemy forces.

The German forces were veterans in the NorthAfrican theatre. They had learned to survive in spiteof their long lines of communications and shortage ofsupply. They had become masterful scavengers of thedesert. They recovered their own damaged equipmentfrom the' battlefield even as the war mw being fought.Tanks immobilized but' capable of .firIngwwerw towed byother tanks during the battle while others were putback into service as quickly as possible or, if notrepairable, stripped down and cannabilized for repairparts. Additionally, the Germans, made the maximumpossible use but of captured supplies and equipment.

Intelligence reports indicated that the Germanforce was staged for at least three days east of theFaid Pass waiting for favorable weather conditions.Thsi time provided ample opportunity for them to refit

'Part III -_11

i 'I

and rearm prior to their attack.

c. Impact.

Victory was so quick that logistical andAdministrative systems had little impact on the outcomeof the initial battle at Sidi bou Zid for either Alliedor Axis forces. Even the best resupply systems of theday could not have prevented the Axis victory or theencirclement of American forces on Di Lessouda or DJDsaira. But, had the newer M4 Sherman tank, bazookasand other items of equipment been supplied in thequanities needed early enough from the Industrial baseof the U.S. to allow proper training, perhaps thecounter attack would have turned out differently, andthe American forces on Lessouda and Dsaira would nothave had to have been abandoned.

4. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

a. Command and Control.

Unquestionably, the dominant character in thisbattle was the II Corps commander, MG Lloyd R.Fredendall.. His dislike for the British First Armycommander served to foster an alienation betweenBritish and American Forces in the theater. While his'hatred or loathing of the French was probably the causefor his not assigning a mission to French forcesattached to II Corps. 25 But, perhaps even moredetrimental , was his personal distrust of GeneralWard, 1st Armored Division commander. This distrustresulted in him preparing and issuing the battle planto the 1st Armored Division Combat Commands without anyinvolvement or input froA MG Ward or his staff. Theplan literally froze 1st Armored Division units to thedesert floor and left almost no opportunity forimprovision or planning at lower levels. Only a smallreserve was maintained. 26

Fredendall intended to control the battle. overland lines (field wire) of communications from-hisheadquarters approximately sixty miles west of Sidi bouZid. Fredendall's.personality'and style had severlystrained his relationships with higher and lowerechelons. His battle plan was. poorly thought.outresulting in weakly, organized forward positions on DjKsaira and DJ Lessouda along with a reserve too weak

Part III 12

and too far from the forward employed forces to be ofconsequence in the battle. 27

Ward, and McQuillan (CCA Commander) attempted tomake the best of a bad situation. Since the twoforward postitions were not mutually supporting, theyplanned for infantry to patrol the area between thehills at night and for tanks to occupy fightingpositions during the day. They had troops on the hillsdig in strong defensive positions as best they couldand they prepared plans for employment of the reservesunder LTC Hightower. 28 Command relationships from thedivision commander down to the units were healthy withmutual respoect being rendered between commanders.Ward was aware of Fredendall's method of~direct contactwith the Combat Commanders but did not allow it toaffect' his relationship with his subordinatecommanders. 29

b. Communications.

Communications were limited. The primary meanswas by field wire but it took a great amount ofresources to install - especially since the corpscommander's headquarters was so far away. Additionally,

the life expectency of wire could be as little as threedays if uninsulated. 30 Radio communications were usedduring the battle. However, the shortage ofbatteries, 31 the number of perople who had access toradios (usually only commanders and artillery FO's),and their restricted range limited their value incontrolling manuevar forces. If the commanders radiofailed or if his tank was hit, manual signals had to beutilized. The poor communications often resulted inlong delays in getting important information to the 11Corps and 1st Army Commanders. The result was thatdecisions were made too late to allow the forces on DiKsaira and DJ Lessouda to withdraw to alternatedefensive positions. 32

Communications security was practiced to somedegree - at least by Fredendall. An example of amessage he telephoned to CCB ist *tove-your command-,that is, 'the walking boys, pop guns, Baker's out4fit andthe outfit which is the reverse of Baker's outfi. andthe big fellows to M, which is due north of where you

'are now., as soon as possible. Have your boss report totfe French gentleman whose name begins with J at aplace which begins with D which is five grid squares tothe left of M. 33

Part 111 - 13

- . r

c. Intelligence.

American perceptions of'the British 1st Armycommander, *LTG Anderson, as being too conservative andpessimistic, were entirely accurate-when discussing hishandling of intelligence data. Early intelligenceinformation indicated that the enemy forces in Tunisiawould use the lull in activity to attack and defeat theBritish First Army before allied units could bereinforced. The Intelligence Estimate suggested thatthe attack would fall on the XIX French Corps - thecenter of the British First Army line. Andersonthickened this part of the front xnd positioned his !ireserve of a British Armored Division and a U.S.Combat Command where they could be used quickly in thebattle. 35 Unfortunately, even though laterR. intelligence gathered by Fredendall's intelligenceofficer indicated that the attack would be in theS~southern sector, Anderson refused to recognize or even

discuss the possibility of an attack in the South.Anderson's faulty belief and insistance that the attack.would be in the center sector had a critical effect onthe operation. The Army reserve forces were too fara-4ay to be employed in II Corps sector before the'I battle at Sidi bou Zid would be lost. Even after Ward's1st Armored Division suffered defeat Anderson refusedto believe the main attack would be in the southern-sector, and reluctantly released only CCB from Armyreserve to reinforce II Corps as it withdrew towardsSbeitla. 36

Intelligence collection assets were essentiallythe same in both Allied and Axis forces. Each sideutilized reconnaissance foot patrols, reconnaissance d;flights, observation from high terrain features,,interrogation of prisoners of war, questioning ofrefugees and host nation loborers, observation ofartillery fires, monitioring of communications etc.Primitive or unsophisticated as some of those means mayseem by todays standard, each side obtained accuratedata on the other. For example, the II Corps -

intelligence officer compiled an impressive body o4evidence from sources like those previously listed toaccurately predict that the German main attack would bein the II Corps sector. 37 Likewise, the Germanintelligence collection effort was complete enough forthem to not only know the location of Allied forces on ri

. DJ Ksaira and DJ Lessouda but that the positions were j

Part i!l - 14 "•

not mutually supporting. They were also able to time anair strike on CCA's reserve force just as it wasreadying to counterattack. 38

The greatest allied shorcoming in the area ofintelligence seems to have been in Anderson's refusalto seek and and use intelligence information wisely.Had he done so, perhaps the forces on Di Ksaira and DiLessouda need not have been abandoned.

6. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE.

a. Friendly Forces.

By American standards, the overall combateffectiveness of allied units was Judged to be high,'but in actuality the tactical doctrine and trainingtechniques of allied forces at Sid bou Zid wereprimitive in comparison with their German foe. Many ofthe practices and concepts were of World War I vintage.Americans were still relativel;y new to the theatre andhad not yet learned to fight effectively in the

i ,deserts of North Africa. They had not learned how toeffectively employ combined arms farces includingintegrating air force assets. Some lesser experiencedcommanders even used parade ground tactics to attack adefending enemy. 39 While these tactics looked to beas impressive as a field of British Colonial redcoatsmarching to battle, it proved to be just as deadly.The German's would lay in wait with their largercaliber, higher velocity weapons and quickly destroyallied forces employed in such a mannner.Unfortunately for the Ist Armored Division, it was notuntil after the battle at Sidi boau Zid that Americantactics changed to counter the threat capabilities.Fredendall's concious dicision to alter doctrinalpolicy of decentralized command and control caused theAmerican force to lose the battle mare quickly than itmight otherwise have done. Rather -than allowing Wardthe opportunity to prepare for the fight in his ownsectorl.Fredendall prescribed the composition,disposition and emplacement of Wards'units- He did sowithout surveying the terrain the uwit was directed tooccupy. 40 The result was that'two of Ward's unitswere isolated approximately 100 miles to the front ofthe II Corps Headquarters and 10 miles apart from eachother. They could not be supported by each other orr or

Part III - 15

1 - - -- -- - - - - -

by the few division units left under Ward's control.The U.S. doctrine for a strong continuous mutuallysupporting defense was more like isolated outposts inthe desert. 41

Allied forces were considered trained in the useof weapons systems in their possessiuon at the start ofthe battle. However, as personnel and equipmentreplacements arrived the situation worsened. Many ofthe replacements had never fired a personal weapon.Let alone received training on equipment like tanks,tank destroyers, or artillery. The issuance of the M4tank to replace the M3 losses. also created someproblems, because even th experienced tankers at Sidibou Zid had never trained with or even seen the newSherman, tank. 42

b. Enemy forces.

The Germans had the benefit of experience fromseveral years in combat against a number of differentoponents. They had reduced tank, infantry and airground cooperation to a science. 43 The only combinedarms weakness the exhibited was that of not tying theirartillery to their ground maneuvar as effectively asthey had done with other arms. The Germans used thenatural camoflauge of the blowing desert sands expertlyto mask their movement to the offensive on ValentinesDay. They also used the wadies and cactus patches tohide in or behind while waiting to ambush unsuspectingAmerican forces during the battle at Sidi bou Zid. 44The Germans had adopted a "creeping tactic" whenmaneuvering during periods of good visibility. Thisslow movement kept the dust down and made it difficultfor Allied forces to adjust fire on them enabling themto acquire targets of their own., 45

7. CONDITION AND MORALE./

American troops had left the United States withthe full support of their country. Newspapers werefilled with headlines indicating the success ofAmerican heros, abroad. 46 Such was the case with the,US II Corps under the command of Fredendall. Ir Corpsinvasion landed them at Oran in November, where theyperformed superbly, seizing their objectives in less"than three days. From Oran they moved to join theBritish First Army in viciolity of Kasserine. Most of"II Corp's units experienced limited battle action and

Part X1X - 16S i IY' .

what they had experienced was considered highly

successful by their leaders. 47 Therefore, troop moralewas high, discipline was good, troops believed in whatthey were fighting for and they had confidence in theirleaders. Only one half of one percent of the mail spotchecked by censorship authorities contained indicationsof poor morale. In general those complaints were aboutthe mail service which took six to eight weeks fordelivery. 48 The willingness of the soldiers to holdat all costs and their ability to fight to the end atKasaira, Lessouda, and during counter attackis attestto the condition and morale of the soldiers in the 1stArmored Division.

8. LEADERSHIP.

a, Friendly forces.

The personality traits of the major commandersinvolved probably-had as great an impact on the initialdefeat of the US Ist. Armored Division and subsequentencirclement of subordinate forces as any other singleconsideration. 49

(1) The British 1st Army Commander - LTG K.A.N.Anderson. From the early planning stages, Tunisia wasprojected to be a British theatre of operation composedof British, French and American forces. LTG Dwight D.Eisenhower had hoped for a truely allied command, butwhat he had was more of a loose coalition., WhileEisenhower could direct that American forces be. placedunder command of LTG Anderson's first Army, the Frenchwere unwilling to serve under British command. TheFrench national jealousies and wariness of the Britishprevented them from submitting their forces to becommanded by another nationality. The American leadersin North Africa thought Anderson to be tooconservative, secretive, and pessimistic. The resultwas that Eisenhower himself would excercise directcommand of the three nation force, even though he wassome 400 miles from the front. Eisenhower, realizingthat he was too far from the front to effectivelycommand and control the three nation force, establisheda forward command post under control of his chief ofstaff, but itwas too far from the front to be of anyconsequence. Therefore, LTG Anderson became.Eisenhower's advisor and forward commander for theentire Tunisian front. He was charged with monitoringand coordinating the combat forces but he never took

Part III- 17

charge. 50

(2) MG Lloyd R. Fredendall -MG Fredendall wasknown as a brassy, outspoken, imprecise in speechcorps commander, who had a firm opinion on everysubject. He personally disliked Anderson andapparently had little understanding of tht Britishprocedures for emplacement of forces-- Futhermore,Fredendall had no confidence in and little patiencewith the French. He was outspoken in his opinions ofallied forces and was inclined to be critical ofsuperiors and subnrdinates al~ike. But, of all hischaracteristics, perhaps the most fatal to the 1stArmored Division was his air of finality (he knew best,and there was little anyone could tell him); hisperceptibly excessive emphasis on security and safetyof his command post, which he located far to the rearand seldom left to visit the front; and his open.dislike for and reluctance to allow the 1st ArmoredDivision Commander the opportunity to command. 51

(3) MG Orlando Ward - MG Ward was described asquiet in speech and manner, methodical, thorough,competent, and held in high esteem by his men. He hadno use for Fredendall and considered Fredendall s directdealings with the 1st AD combat commands to be acontempotuous disregard of his own perogatives.Although Ward would do all that he could to insure hisdivision iccomplished the mission assigned byFredendall, their mutual dislike' stopped healthycommunication exchanges between them and caused seriousrepercussions to the 1st AD. 52

(4), BG Raymond E. McQuil.lan - CCA Commander, BGMcquillan was tactically well-schooled and aresponsible commander, but he had little experience inthe North African theater. He was quick to recognizethe problems inhernt in Fredendalls plan that had beenthrust upon him. In an attempt tc maintain somecontact between his forces on Di Ksaira and DJLessouda, he required aggressive patrolling duringhours of darkness and blocking positions were manned atnight. During the fight he quickly made some sounddecisions to protect his forces. Additionally he hadsome early requests for withdrawel which Were denied. 53

(5) LTC John K. Waters - 2-168 (TF WATERS)commander, Waters, executive officer of the 1st AD, wasdescribed as being an ever-ready, courteous, quiet andmeticulous man. He had placed a small covering force

Part III- 18

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in the plain below Lessouda to provide early warningshould an attack occur in his sector. The coveringforce was overrun before it could warn Waters andWaters himself was capture early in the battle. Maj.Robert R. Moore, who had virtually no commandexperience, took responsibilty for TF WATERS. The ullit,forght on until orders were recieved for them to try tomake it back to friendly lines as best they could.Approximately 300 men made it to safety. -54

(6) COL Thomas D. Drake - 168th Inf Regtcommander, Drake was known to be confident, aggressiveand a formidable disciplinarian. His request towithdraw from the diebel was denied-- apparentlybecause no-one at corps understood the scale of theenemy assualt. Once surrounded, he knew he had onlyone option open to him; to stick it out until help cameto rescue his 1600 man force. Help never came, hisforces fought on until their ammunitions ran out andthey were killed or captured. •5

b. Enemy forces.

Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, overall commanderof German forces in the Mediterranean, had two veteransoldiers with strong personalities but dissimilar ideasabout how. to fight the war in Tunisia. One, FieldMlarshall Erwin Rommel, whose forces were withdrawingfrom Tripoli to meet up with those of the Fifth PanzerArmy, wanted to move swiftly and strike deep into therear of Allied forces and to made them withdraw. Theother, General Juergan Von Arnim, commander of theFifth Panzer Army, contemplated a more limited; thrustdesigned to turn the flank of the British First Army,and throwing it back to delay and disrunt allied plans.These conflicting views were never reconciled and ledto friction between the two leaders. Arnhim won outover Rommei. He placed the veteran 10th a*nd 21stPanzer Divisions under command of General HeinzZiegler. The 10th Panzer Division was to attack Sidibou Zid directly through the Faid Pass, while the the21st Panzer Division attacked through Maizla Pass,about 15 miles to the south, and struck Allied forcesat Sidi bou Zid from the rear. 56

The leaders and soldiers were experienced, battlehardened soldiers who executed the pincer movemaentquickly and professionally. However, the conservativenature of Arnim and his plan failed to take fulladvantage o4 Axis advances through exploitation of

Part III -o19

4 Rx %. V.

routed allied forces. That failure, on two occasionsduring the battle at Sidi bou Zid, allowed Alliedforces to consolidate and reconstruct forces eventhough they lost heavily in the initial fighting,including the two large forces on Dj Lessouda and DiKsaira. 57

Kesserling acknowledged the fact that the battle incentral Tunisia had been fought and perhaps lostbecause he didn't,have a unified command structurethere. To correct the situation, on 22 Feb. 1943, heestablished an army group headquarters under Rommel inhopes that some of the difficulties arising frominternal friction could be resolved. 5B

* c. Synopsis.

The years of experience fighting in France,Russia, and Africa gave the German leaders and their-soldiers a decided advantage over the Allied forces.Not only were Axis forces experienced and battlehardened. They had refined their combined armstactical employment on the ground and integrated into

_it the power of the Luftwaffe from the air. Inaddition to their combat leadership and tactical

employment experience, the Germans enjoyed atechnological equipment advantage. These combinedfactors made for an easy initial victory at Sidi bou JZid; however, the failure of Arnim to exploit thesuccess allowed Allied forces the opportunity toregroup quickly, reestablish their defenses, and blockthe German advance. Oddly enough, it was tI.einflexibility of Anderson to change his First Armydifense plans, and the inflexibility of Frecendall toallow Ward to fight the battle, which appears to have

contributed significantly to the early~defeat of Alliedforces at Sidi bou Zid."

9. FEASIBLE COURSES OF ACTION:

a. What were the cnurses of action available tothe opposing commanders? Did these courses of actionlend themnselves to the accomplishment of the mission?

Axis forces:

Courses of action included: (1) Striking atAllied Forces in Western Tunisia, forcing the Allies

.*. back to Algeria. (2) Consolidating the German hold on

Part Il- 20

. ", M. . ..

the Eastern Dorsales. (3) A combination of the two -

holding the Eastern Dorsales , then sweeping towardTebessa.

Allied forces:

The Allies were limited to the defensive positionsin the Eastern Dorsales. To withdraw from them would.mean having to fight for them again in the Springbecause possession of the mountain passes was a"prerequisite for launching any general offensive.

4.' b. Were the courses of action feasible? Did the'a. commanders have the capacity to perform the

4 contemplated action?

Axis forces:

The Axis forces had the capacity to perform any of"the courses of action.

Allied forces:

The Allied Forces had the capacity to performtheir chosen course of action, but it was not achievedbecause of faulty intelligenceg poor leadership, anddifferences between the multi-national forces.

c. Did opposing commanders fully utilize theestimate of the situation in their decision makingprocess based on the circumstances and time available?

Axis forces:

Yes.

Allied forces:a.

• ... -Yes..

d. Were staff estimates and recommendat one*considerod in the estimate of the situation?

*, S

Axis forces:

*General Kesmelring summoned both of this_ commanders to a meeting to hear their viewpoints. He

• . settled on a compromise course of action of holding the

Part III- 21

, , ')~ ~ ~ -'.' 'i , .', . ,' .

Eastern Drosals, and then sweeping toward Tebessa.

Allied forces:

Staff estimates were used; however, a fa.ltyestimate caused the Allies to deploy incorrectly. Inaddition, MG Fredendall directed the placement oftroops without first-hand information and withoutbenefit of the on-the-scene commander's recommendation.

e. Did the commanders and their staffs consider

METT-T in their selection of the courses of action?

Axis forces:.

Yes.

All ied forces:

MG Fredendall failed to appreciate the terrain.He and his staff assumed that the hill masses weremutually suporting when in fact they were two isolatedgeographic formations. In fact, the area to be coveredwas too large for the number of troops available.

ob PDid the antangonists consider the relativecombat. power of the opposing forces in the selection ofcourses of action?

Axis forces:

Yes.

Allied forces:

The Allies failed to appreciate the numbers oftroops opposing them. Poor Intelligence failed toidentify. habitual relationships; hence, intelligenceofficers under-gstimated the size and number of German

Sunits and failed to realize that they were severely outnumbered.

Part Ixz - 22'

4 11

SIDI BOU ZID

PART III -ENDNOTES

.1 Be Paul M. Robinett, "The Axis Offensive inCentral Tunisia," ARMOR MAGAZINE, May - June~, 1954, pq..S.

2 Blumenson, Martin. Kasserine Pass. New York:Tower 'Oublicat~ions,, 1973, pg. 101.

3 Hazen, David W'. Mai-. "Ro 'le of, the FieldArtillery in the Battle of the Kasserrine Pass,"Masters Thesis, CGSC 1973. pg. 39.

4 lbids pg 36.,

5 Ibid, pg 36.

6 Ibid.

7 Betson, William R. Cpt. "Sidi bou Zid -A CaseHistory of Failure." ARMOR MAGAZINE, Nov - Dec 1982.

8 Betson, William R. Cpt. Letter to Major

Gregory Fonitenot (attached' toi manuscript.-

9 Batson.

10 Ibid.

It Batson, letter..

12 Betson, p 37.

13 Batson*, letter.

14 Betson-, p 36.

15 Batson, p 40.

16 Blumenson, p. 109.

17 Gardiner, Henry D. Col. Ne Fought at-

Kasserinw.' ARMORED. CAVALRY JOURNAL, March -April

Part. III 23

1948., pg. 10.

18 Ibid, pg 10.

19 Blumensen, Martin. "Command at KasserinePass." ARMY, Vol. 17, No. 1, Jan. 1967. pp 32-34.

20 Bluinenson, pp 32-33.

21 Ibid, pp 9b-97.

22 U.S. Army. "Observer's Report of LTC G. E.Lynch, GSC, Observer from Headdquarters, Army GroundForces to North Africa f or the Period 30 December 1942to 6 February 1943." (Not dated). Fl. #N 6207.

23 Blumenson, pg 113.

24 1bid, pg 113.

25 Xbid, pp 34-37.

26 Ibid, pg 99.

27 Ibid, pp 38-39.

28 Batson, pg 40.

29 Blumenson pp 36-39.

30 Observer 's Report of LTC Lynch.

31 Blumenson, pp 96-97.

3i Xbid,, pg 129'.

33Ib1d ,pg 37.-

34 Xbid, pg,37.

35 Set on, pg 38.

36 Dlu son pp 34-37.

37 Ibi ,pg 98.

30 set ,pg 40.

39 Ibi ,pp-43-44.

Part 111 -'24

40 Blumenson, pg 38.

"41 Rutherford, Ward. Kasserine: Baptism of Fire.New York: Ballantine Books, 1970.

42 Blumenson, pp 97-99.

43 Robinett, Paul M. Brig. Sen. "The AxisOffensive in Central Tunisia February 1943.m ARMORMAGAZINE. MayJune, 1954. pg 9.

44 Rutherford, pg 70.

45 Betson's letter.

46 Gardiner, pg 8.

47 Blumenson, pg 35-36i

48 Observer's Report of LTC Lynch.

49 Blumenson, pg 34.

50 Ibid, pp 32-34.

51 Ibid, pp 34-36.

52 Ibid, pg 37.

53 Ibid, pg 39.

54 Rutherford, pp 75-87.

5 Ibid, pp 75-87.

56 Blumenuon, pp 106-108.

57 Betuon, pg 40.

538 Blumeison, pp 243-244.

Part 111 25

Sidi bou Zid

Part IV -Battle Description

The Allies invaded North Africa in November 1942under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower withthe initial intent of driving eastward to capture the'Tunisian ports of Bizerte and Tunis (figure 4-1). Thisstrategy was intended to cut the supply lines of theAfrika Korps which led from Tunisia to Egypt.Logistical, tactical, and other problems prevented thisobjective from being accomplished, and by February 1943the Allied forces, now refered to as the British FirstArmy, had stalled in their offensive effort and foundthemselves on the defensive in an attempt to bring upsupplies and reinforcements prior to resuming theof fense.

The German forces in Tunisa had by this time been& reinforced by Rommel,°s army which had just returned

from Egypt. Rommel's intent was to defeat the BritishFirst Army prior to it resupply and reinforcement, thussecuring the vital Tunisian ports.

Initial indications were that the German attackwould occur in the center of the three corps Alliedline; this sector was held by the XIX French Corps,(figure 4-2). As a result, the army commander, GeneralSir Kenneth Anderson, placed his reserve, consisting ofa British armored division and a US brigade-sizedcombat command (CC), 'in this sector. As it turned out,the main German effort was to the south in the US IICorps sector inwhat was later'to be called the Battleof Kasserine Pass.

II Corps- was given a dual mission for thisoperation. The Corps was to'protect the southern flankof XIX Corps and to defend in sector. Forces assignedto the II Corps included the 1st Armored Division(-),the 168th Regimental Combat Team, the 2d Derbyshire"

Part IV-i

D.* T. E- . 1

EASTER TASK

FORCE ~~~ ofItnvt

bomg ANCL0

Figure 4-1. Allied Advance Into Africa

-Part IV- 2

C So..o

-- VON. ARNIM'

SOW LL* t""I

I)~ ~ f%1 CL 4

TOWS INTATV S.

Se~veb~a d Fe..g.~1943oe.,

Sr"%Oeow of mote"

S614#0110014 February1941943

opeft ~ Part Sinc I 3oei .sa ntvr

Yecmanry (a British armored cavalry regiment which wasactually about the size of a US squadro>i) and a French-division-sized collection of units referred to as, ForceWelvert. The II Corps sector (figure 4-3) consisted ofseveral key mountain passes which ran primarily to theeast and thus to the key ports. The mission thusbecame one of early detection of the German intent andsubsequent control of the passes.

Key terrain in the Corps sector included Faid Passto the east, Maizla Pass to the southeast, and'Sidi BouZid, a crossroad through which traffic from the passeswould have to travel. Three hill masses in thevicinity of Sidi Bou Zid (Diebel Lessouda, DjebelKsaira, and Djebe] Garet Hudid) were also key. Further-o the west in'the corps sector lay the town ofKasserine, situated near the mountains and a major pass(Kasserine Pass) which were also key to Corpsoperations.

The II Corps Commander determined that the mostlikely enemy avenue of approach was through the FaidPass and Sidi Bou Zid. To cover this avenue ofapproach he assigned the sector to the 1st ArmoredDivision(-) which was reinforced by the majority of the168th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). The armoredcavalry unit and several battalion sized units fromForce Welvert were used to screen the corps front. Thecorps reserve consisted of selected engineer, tankdestroyer, and infantry units which had a primarymission of rear area security.

The precise employment of units on the ground wasto a large degree determined by the corps commander, MGLloyd 'R. Ft-edendall. He felt that the commander ofthe 1st Armored Division, MG Orlando Ward, wasincompetent; as a result corps orders typically

* bypassed the division commander and staff to providespecific instuctions to very low levels. 1 In the case"of the defense of Sidi Bow Zid, the corps commanderissued orders down to company and battery level. 2This command environment and corps manner of operationlimited to a large degree the f'lexibility of the 1stArmored Division in establishing its initial defense.

The Ist Armored habitually"had ten organic andthree attached maneuver battalions; however, for thedefense of Sidi Bou Zid only seven of the thirteen were

Part IV- 4

* * .*7,-* ',.-. ' .. • ;. ...

4L

Figure 4-3. French XIX Corps and US II Corps Sector

14 February 2943

Part IV-'5

available. Three of the additional battalions wereassigned to Combat Command B which was designated as

• the army reserve. Two additional battalions wereattached to the corps screening force while the finaldetached battalion was used in rear area securityoperations. 3

Considering his available forces, MG Wardconsolidated the regimental combat team with CombatCommand A. The remaining two combat commands were usedwith the divisional 81st Armored ReconnassianceBattalion to guard the southern flank of the division.The division reserve consisted of one light tankbattalion and one armored infantry battalion. CombatCommand A (task organized as shown in Table 4-1)defended the most likely enemy avenue of approach. 4

of The terrain in the vicinityof Faid Pass consistedS' of two parallel roads tracking out of the pass to the

"west and between two hill masses which were situatedappromimately eight kilometers apart. As previouslymentioned, the corps order was very specific concerningactions to be taken by subordinate units. In thisinstance, II Corps specified that an infantry heavybattalion combat team (BCT) occupy the northern hill(Diebel Lessouda), that a reinforced infantry battalionoccupy the southern hill (Dieberl Ksaira), and that areinforced armored battalion be the division reserve.This greatly reduced the options open to the commanderof the 1st Armored Division and in fact drove the taskorganization of Combat Command A.

To accomplish' his mission, the commander of CombatCommand A, B6 Raymond E. McQuillan, placed TF 2-168 onthe northern hill mass, TF'3-168 on the southern hillmass, and 3/1 Armor (+) as the reserve (see figure4-4.) McQuillan understood the weakness associated withthe Corps plan in its positioning of the two battalionsso far apart in the desert. Although the troopdisposition might have appeared to. adequately cover thepass on a corps operations overlay, the battalions werenot mutually supporting.. As a result, the defense

S- became dependent on two battalion-size outposts in the.,desert. To overcome this weakness, McQuillan augmentedTF 2-168 with a medium tank company (G/3/1 Armor) and.TF 3-168 with an antitank' company (AT Co/lSthI Infantry). The Combat Command's concept called foreach of the forward task forces, to place tank andantitank elements forward in the area between the twohills during the daytime. At night, each task force

Part IV - 6'

4 .

was to conduct dismounted patrols to cover the samearea. The hope was that the nighttime patrols or thedaytime blocking positions supported by artillery firecould delay the approaching enemy long enough for thereserve (3/1 Armor +) to move to the threatened area.Obviously, the greatest vulnerability each eay was atdawn when the patrols were returning and the blockingforces were moving Lnto position.

2/168th BCT 3/168th BCT2/168th Inf (-) 3/168th Inf6/3/lst AR E/2/lbth InfRcn Co/Ist AR AT Co/168th InfPlt/A/701st TD Bn Cannon Co/168th Inf

Plt/lO9th EngRcn Plt/168th Inf

3/1st AR (+)A/7Olst TD Bn (-) CC A Control

'91st AFA BnC-)(105 mm SP)

2/17th FA Bn(155 mm towed)

Elements/443d CA(AAA)-

Legend:TD = Tank DestroyerCA (AAA) = Coast Artillery

(Antiaircrazt)AFA = Armored Field Artillery"AR = Armored RegimentBCT = Battalion Combat Team

Note: The 2/168th BCT was commanded by the executiveofficer of the 1st AR, the. headquarters of which wasattached to CC A.

"Table 4-1

'Part IV- 7

A ? 2-6

OU ~FAID

*Fi gure 4-4. Dispositioll of Combat Command A

* 14 February 1943

The CC also had two battalions of field artillery

at its disposal for this defense. The 91st Armored.

Field Artillery (.-) was a self-propelled 105mm

battalion while the 2/17t'. Field Artillery consisted of

.155mm towed weapons. The 1st Armored Division also had

the 81st Armored Reconnaissance' Battalion'screening

from south of Maizla Pass to Paid Pass in order to

provide early warning to CC A in the event of attackfrom the southern flank.

The 1st Armored Division was opposed by the 10th

and 21st Panzer divisions, both veteran units. They

were commanded by the Chief of Staff of the Fifth

Panzer Army, General Heinz Ziegler. Ziegler's concept

of operation (codenamed '"Fruehlingswind") was to have

the 10th Panzer Division attack Sidi Bou Zid directly

through Faid Pass. The 21st Panzer Division was to

move simultaneously through Maizla Pass in a pincer

movement and attack Sidi Bou Zid from the rear (see

figure 4-5).

% %

II ' I

• , f

atl fSidi bouZi- - - I , "~P a r I , - , --9° ; i , .

"" il---'PAS

SA Figure 4-5. .5th Pan.-or Army 'Concept

Battle 0f Sidi bou Zid'

Port IV-9

The 10th Panzer, commanded by General Fritz vonBroich, had extensive experience in France and Russia,and had participated in Guderian's breakthrough atSedan in 1940. For this operation it consisted of onlyfour maneuver battalions and one heavy tank companyequipped with Mark VI Tiger tanks With reinforcingantitank and artillery units. 'General von Broichorganized these forces into three brigade-sizeKampfgruppen (KG) or battlegroups. The 10th Panzer'splan was to have the first unit, KG Gerhardt,consisting of a reinforced tank battalion and areinforced mechanized battalion, exit Faid Pass,.maneuver north of Djebel Lessouda,,and attack the USforces from the rear. The second Kampfgruppeng KGReimann, consisting of a mechanized battalion(augmented with engineers, infantryt and antitankunits) and the divisional heavy tank company were tofollow KG Gerhardt through Faid Pass and attackfrontally through Sidi Bou Zid to Sbeitla. The thirdKampfgruppen, consisting of a motorcycle battalion plusthe divisional engineers and antitank units, wereplaced in reserve.

The 21st Panzer was the first German division inAfrica and as such had more desert combat experiencethan any other unit on either side of the conflict.During the battle of Sidi Bou Zid, the 21st Panzer wasunder the command of Colonel Hans Hildebrandt andcontained the equivalent of seven maneuver battalions.It was organized into two Kampfgruppeng KG Stenkhoff(two tank and one mechanized battalions), and KOSchuette (one tank and one mechanized battalion). Asfigure 4-5 demonstrates, KG Stenkhoff was to passthrough Maizla Pass. move due weut, and hook'back to-the north to attaLK Sidi Bou Zid from the rear. KOSchuette was to pass, through Maizla Pass, turn north,and attack Sidi Bou Zid from the south. The 580thReconnaissance Battalion was to guard the Fifth PanzerArmy's southern flank while the nonmotorizud elementsof the 21st Panzer Division were to hold Faid Passuntil Sidi Bou Zid was secured. The Germans intendedto execute the operation on 14 February 1943.

At dawn or 14 February, 8/3/1 Armor(÷), attachedto TF 2-168 on DJebel Lessouda, departed its nighttimepositions to occupy its daytime blocking positions.Company 6, commanded by Major Norman Parsons,• wasreinforced by elements of the regimental reconnaissancecompany and A/701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. As

Part IV- 10

Company 6 was moving to its daytime blocking positions,it made contact with the 10th Panzer Division movingdown from Faid Pass. Indications are that MajorParson's tank, in the lead, was one of the first tanks

* to be destroyed, causing a loss of commupications. between Company 6 and headquarters, CC A. This loss of

communications prevented the company from callingartillery fire support, and it was overrun in a short,violent action.

The exchange of tank fire convinced B6 McQuillanthat an engagement of significant size'had occurred andthat he should commit his reserve. He ordered 3/1Armor(+) under the command of LTC Louis V. Hightower,to advance toward roste de Lessouda to respond to theenemy attack. 5 As the 3/1st Armor began to departfrom its assembly area, it was hit by a heavy enemy airstrike. Although suffering some losses, the unitreorganized and continued to move. A short time-laterit was engaged by long range fire from the Mark VITiger tanks of KGReimann. The 3/1st Armor was,equipped with the M3 Grant, a tank with a shortereffective range than the Tiger; as a result, thebattalion was stopped short of its objective, unable to.maneuver close enough to be effective against the enemytanks.

At this point, BG McQuillan began to receivereports of enemy activity'from all elements of thecombat command. TF.2/168th reported approximately 80enemy armored vehicles moving to the north in front of

'its position; this was KG Gerhardt (see figure 4-5).The 2-168th also informed McQuillan'that it had notreceived any information from Company 6, 3/1 Armorsince the initial contact had been reported. The2-168th next sent a message indicating that the enemy"force (still KG Gerhardt) had moved behind it,scattering B/91 Armored Field Artillery which had been

* positioned just to the rear of the 2-168th's positions.The Germans appeared to be moving south behind DiebelLessouda in an effort to reach the east-west roadleading to Sbeitla.

McQuellan next received a report from Colonel-SThomas 0. Drake, commander of' the 3-168th BCT

'positioned southeast-'of Sidi Bou Zid'on Diebel Ksaira,the other mountain selected by Corps for the defense ofFaid Pass. Colonel Drake reported that a large enemyforce (KG Reimann of the 10th Panzeri had maneuveredbetween the 2-168th and 3-168th positions and was

Part IV1-I

heading for the 1-17th Field Artillery positions. Hefurther reported that the artillerymen'had paniced andwere fleeing. This meant that the majority of the CC Aartillery had been forced out of action in- the openingmoments of the battle. McQuillan issued an order tothe 2-17th FA to displace to a safer position, but asthe battalion was organizing for the move it receivedan enemy air strike and was totally destroyed, withevery gun lost.

LTC Hightower recognized that an attack from theeast between the two BCT's would threaten his 3/1 Armorwhich was still in contact with the Mark VI Tigers.Fearing that he would be cut off by attacking elementsof KG Reimann (see figure 4-4), he directed'Company H todelay the enemy forces to the north while the remainderof 3/1st Armor withdrew under enemy pressure to SidiBou Zid. Under cover of direct fire from the 91stArmored Field Artillery(-), the 3/1st managed tocomplete the withdrawal, although it suffered heavylosses.

Meanwhile, the 21st Panzer Division had clearedthe Maizla Pass at 0600 hours and began its movementnorth and west. The 81st Armored ReconnaissanceBattallion which had the screening mission on thesouthern flank did not detect the 21st Panzer until0940 when C/1/81st ARB reported twenty unidentifiedvehicles emerging from Maizla Pass. In addition tobeing over three and one-half hours late, theinformation failed to indicate the advance of a PanzerDivision over terrain which strongly indicated the useof the mountain passes for westward movement.

KG Schutte of the 21st Panzer approached COLDrake's position (3-168 BCT) rapidly, while KG

0 Stenkhoff, which,as shown in figure 4-5 had a muchlonger distance to travel over rougher terrain, did notapproach Sidi Bou Zid until late in the afternoon."This delay was fortunate for CC A since an earlierarrival by KG Stenkhoff would have caught it in themidst of, a withdrawal and might-havnled to the defeatin detail of BG McQuillan'4 forces

Major General Ward, commander of the 1st ArmoredDivision,' did not initially perceive the seriousness ofthe situation in CCA's sector because of theinadequacy of the reports which reached hisheadquarters. He did, however, attach most of thedivision reserve (1/6 BCT with 3 armored infantry

Part IV -12

companies and 1 light tank company) to CC A,. The 1/6thBCT was told to move forward toward Sidi Bou Zid. As

*battle loss reports began to arrive at the divisionheadquarters later in the day, MG Ward began to

*-recognize the seriousness of the situation. Reports* ~indicated that '3/1 Armor had lost half of its tanks.

Additionally, the arrival of KG Schuette at the 3-188thBCT position indicated the ma.gnitude of the error madeby the 81st ARB in reporting enemy main strength in thesouth.

Finally recognizing the gravity of CC A'ssituation, Ward ordered the 1/6th BCT to form ablocking position 11 miles to the west of, Sidi Bou Zidon a piece of high ground~along-the road between SidiBou Zid and Sbeitla. The division commander furtherordered CC A to withdraw its mobile elements throughthe blocking position 'held by 1/6th BCT to. avoid being,,cut of f. The commander's intent was to have the2-168th OCT and 3-168th BCT, both lacking sufficientýtransport to move themselves, form strongpoints until acounterattack could be mounted to relieve them.

£ ~. .. As the division commander was preparing theseplans, the commander of'the 3/1 Armor found himselffacing the elements of KG Gerhardt pushing down fromthe north, to the west of Diebel Lessouda. Hightower'sBCT was now attrited 'to approximately company size,9 butwas able to hold off the German advances from the northlong enough to allow the' headquarters and serviceelements as well as the artillery elements. of CombatCommand A to withdraw to the west. Later In the.afternoon, Hightower detected the advance of KGStenkhoff as it approached'Sidi Bou Zid from the south.He reacted to this threat personally by moving hiscommand track south of the Sidi'Dou Zici road andengayfrg elements of KG Stenkhoff as they approached.

* He knocked out several German vehicles and drove offthe rest Just before a final enemy round destrdoyd histank. Hightower and his crew were able to escape fromthe damaged tank and-3/lst'Armor thus managed to keepthe road from Sidi Dou Zid through the blockingposition occupied by the' 1/6th BCT open f or ' the.withdrawal of those elements of CC A which could stillmaneuver..&

This withdrawal ended the first phase of thebattle of Sidi Bou Zid. At th* conclusion of thisphase, the 2ý-168th OCT was cut offI on Djebel Lessouda,the 3-168tlh DCT was cut'offI on Dimbel Ksaira, the

part IV,- I11 .

2/17th Field Artillery had been totally destroyed, andboth the 3/1 Armor and the 91st Armored Field Artillery

* were attrited to the point of being combat ineffective.Equipment destroyed included fourteen tanks, ten of

"* twelve tank destroyers in A/7Olst Tank Destroyer• Battalion, and nine of the twelve 105mm guns belonging

to the 2/17th Field Artillery. 7 The only positivenote was that the efforts of the 3/1 Armored hadman3ged to save many trained tankers and artillerymenwho would be critical in the later reconstitution ofthe battalions in Combat Command A.

The 41 Corps and First Army staffs believed thatthe action in Sidi Bou Zid was a result of an attack bythe 21st Panzer Division alone. The 10th PanzerDivision had not been specifically identified and theestimated 90-120 tanks which had been reported couldhave come from the 21st Panzer. Thus it was thoughtthat the German main attack would sill occur in theFrench XIX Corps sector spearheaded by the 10th PanzerDivision. As a result, the only reinforcement sent toassist the 1st ArmoredDivision was a tank battalionfrom the Army reserve. The Army order to IL Corpsstated, "As regards the action in the Sidi Bou Zidarea, concentrate on clearing up the situation thereand destroying the enemy."

The nature of the order indicates the lack ofknowledge at the Army level concerning German troopstrength and disposition at Sidi Bou Zid. The 1stArmored Division, on the other hand, had betterinformation with which to plan. M1 Ward was aware thatthe attacking force had at least 90 tanks and wasattacking in such a manner (i.e., along multiple axisthrough two passes fifteen to twenty miles apart) thattwo major maneuver elements were probably involved.Despite this, Ward decided to counterattack: with Combat

* Command C under the command of Colonel Robert I.Stack.

Combat Command C consisted of2211 Armor, 3/6Armored Infantry, 6/3/13 Armor, and supportingartillery and tank destroyers. Thus, CC C was tocounterattack to destroy a force known to be of atleast division size -- an enemy which had Justencircled or routed CC A, a force largerthan CC Citself. The mission of the counterattack 'orce was tomove to rescue 2-168th BCT on NJebel Lessauda and3-169th BCT on Djebel Ksaira, both over thirteen. milesaway. -To accomplish this, the brigade-sized CC C would

Par 'IV 14bvA

have to deal with two Panzer divisions; the attempt wasdoomed to failure.

Combat Command C's poor execution of the"counterattack plan further contributed to the failureof the operation. CC C crossed its line of departureat Diebel Hamra where 1/6 BCT had established ablocking position to cover the withdrawal of CC A. Themovement began with battalions in column along theroad, led by the 2/1st Armor BCT, followed by the 68thArmored Field Artillery, 3/6th Armored Infantry BCT,and 6/3/13 Armor as the CC reserve.

The 75mm half-track tank destroyers from B/7OIstTank Destroyer Battalion were positioned on the wing ofthe lead battalion. Accounts of the battle do notindicate the employment of front or 'flank security forthe formation. Colonel Stack decided to position hisI' command post on top of Diebel Hamra so that he couldobserve the movement of the force all the way to SidiBou Zid. This left the commander of the 2/1st Armor

BCT to control not only his own BCT, which was the mostSlikely to be engaged first, but also the remainder of

the counterattack force on the ground. Because of thelong distances to be traveled by some elements of thecounterattack force, not to mention enemy air raidswhich repeatedly struck the assembly area of CC C, thecounterattack was delayed until about 1240 hours on the14th. By this time the entire combat command wasfinally on the road moving to the southeast toward SidiBou Zid (see figure 4-6).

As the unit moved eastward, the Germans positionedantitank batteries directly to its front in a blockingposit~on. Air strikes and artillery barrages furtherdelayed the command's progress and spread confusion in

* its ranks. Simultaneously, KG Gerhart attacked from* the north and KG Stenkhoff attacked from the south.

The combined effect was a massing of fires on CC C fromthe front, right, left, and above.

The axis of advance for the counterattack crossedthree wadis (figure 4-6), but each of these wadis couldonly be crossed at selected points. At the first wadithe platoon of tank destroyers on the northern flank 'ofthe counterattack force was destroyed by an air attack.At the second wadi the lead tank company made contactwith an enemy antitank battery, engaged it, and knockedit out. By this time, however, the enemy artillery hadranged the attackers and the tanks were forced to

Part IV 15

Sbutton up, seeeylmtn hi visibility. As thecommand reached the third wadi, it came-within range of

* companies with effective fire, knocking out severalvehicles. This fire caused the 68th Field Artill~ery to

F.0

lo Iw

Figure 4-6. Counterattack of Comnbat Command C

deploy and prepare to return fire. As the 68th FAdeployed and the 3/6th BCT to its rear began to passthrough, an enemy air strike hit both units, furtherdisrupting the advance. As the- aircraft departed,flank attacks by KG Gerhardt from the north and KS

Part IV'- 16

Stenkhoff from the south struck the formation at thesame time. In the intense fighting which followed, LTC

* Alger, the tactical commander of the counterattackforce, lost his tank to the enemy fire.

* Reacting to the flank attacks, Company E moved toblock the northern attack and Company F moved to blockthe southern approach. This caused the Germans toextend further to the west in an attempt to encirclethe entire force. This extension to the west by the"southern force (KG Stenkhoff) was blocked momentarilyby fire from the 68th Artillery. The reserve, 6/3/13Armor, was sent to block' the extension westward by thenorthern German force (KG Gerhardt), but went too farto the northwest and missed the enemy entirely. Atthis point, most of the American forces attempted arapid withdrawal. By 1740 hours the 3/6th BCT, heayilyattrited but intact,had managed to withdraw under thecover provided by the 68th FA. The 2/1st Armor 'BCT wassurrounded and,,with the exception of four tanks whichmanaged to escape, was destroyed.

The counterattack had failed completely and the2-168th BCT and 3-168th BCT were left surrounded onDiebel Lessouda and Diebel Ksaire without any hope ofrelief. Both BCT's were ordered to destroy theequipment they could not carry out and exfiltrate back,'to friendly lines. The 2-168th managed to get morethan 200 men back, but no soldiers from the 3-168thescaped. Those members of the 3-168th who were notkilled outright were captured and moved to Sfax from,which they were transported by train to Tunis, by planeand ship to Italy, and finally by train again toprisoner of war camps in Germany and Poland. The firstacticn in which American soldiers were pitted againstGerman panzers had ended in disaster.

"Part IV -17

SIDI BOU ZID

PART IV -ENDNOTES

1 H. Essame, Patton, A Study rn Command, NewYork, 1974, p.67.

2 After Action Report, 1st Armored Division,, 3Feb. 1943 to 16 Feb. 1943.

3 CPT William R. Betson,, "Sidi Bou Zid -A Case.History of Failure," Armor, Nov-Dec, 1982, p. 38.

*4 George P. Howe, Northwest Africa; Siezing the

Initiative in the West, Washington, D.,C., p. 378.

5 Howe, p. 411.

6 Howe, p. 415.

.7 Howe, p. 415.

Part IV -, 18

Sidi bou Zid

Part V - Conclusions

From a strategic point of view, the Battle of SidiBou Zid was of little immediate importance. Certainlythe Germans showed their tactical superority over thegreen Americans in their smooth coordination, of fireand maneuver. Their victory also cracked tva Allieddefensive barrier, allowing the German forces to gainthe initiative while bolstering their confidence inthemselves. It also disrupted Allied efforts to mounta coordinated attack and relegated them to a defensiveposture.

The fact that they had so roughly handled theAmerican Aemy in its first outting gave the Germans atremendous psychological advantage. For ,their part,

* the Americans began to recognize the complexities ofmodern war; tactics born of stateside training andpre-war constraints were simply inadequate for theAfrican Theater. As a result, the American Army beganto train anew; the process came to fruition at theSecond Battle of Kasserine Pass, where the Americansproved quick learners.

The Germans did gain an immediate tacticaladvantage in that they routed the American forces and 'made them vulnerable to exploitation. The battle ofSidi Bou Zid was the first step in a'German drive tocapture areas commanding the mountain passes, thusthrowing the allied forces off balance and keeping themfrom mounting a coordinated attack. However,,

* hesitation on the part of the German high commandS . allowed this advantage to slip through their fingers.* As aresult, the Allies werestill able to achieve

their major strategic objective of. building strengthand a logistics base for a major campaign in Africa in

* spite of their initial drubbing at Sidi Bou Zid.

Wtile the Allied defeat was not of long-termstrategic importance, the German failure to capitalizeon their success was eventually decisive. This failure,to exploit the situation together with subsequentfailures at Sbeitla-and Kasserine Pass (the second

Sbattle) allowed the US forces to bolster their

PartV-1 .... .***

defenses, take corrective tralning action, andeventually mount the major offensive which drove theAxis forces out of North Africa. Thus, if any aspect

C of the Battle of Sidi, Bou Zid was decisive,, it was notthe American defeat but, ironically, the German failureto follow up on their resounding success.

The lessons to be learned from this battle areneither new nor surprising, but they are so importantthat they bear repeating in detail.

a. All forces must be mutually supporting. Theuse of independent strong points in a main defensiveline invites disaster. Only a coordinated defense canrepel a serious assault by a combined arms force.

b. Commanders must not dictate actions to theirsubordinates in such rigid, detailed fashion that theystrip their subordinate commanders of initiative andthe authority to conduct the battle. Issuing specificinstructions two echelons down is a dangerous practicewhich is only justified by unusual circumstances.

A C. Commanders must lead from the front,positioning (and constantly re-positioning) themselvesto see the battle, instead of relying solely on maprecon. Fredendahl never went to the front and did nothave a good appreciation of the field of battle.

d. Command Posts must be positioned well forward ZA,

so that command and control are not hampered by'distance and communications failures..* a

*c. The principle of mass is decisive ori thebattlefield, particularly when armored forces are

U invioved. In this batt-le the US forces-failed toconcentrate at critical times and places, and neverfought as a team. The contrast between US peicemealcommitment of, forces and the coordinated German attack'spe-Iled the difference between victory and defeat.Successful coordination of German Air attacks andinadequate coordination of US air defense was also acritical element of ,the German victory.

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.Part V 2

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d. Both ground and air recon on the US side werevery poor. Even the poor American tactical. plan mighthave been saved if the commanders at all levels hadreceived timely, accurate information concerning enemy-locations, strengths, and movements. US'procedures Forpassing intelligence between levels of command alsoproved inadequate.

e. Training must continue right up to the momentthe troops are committed, to include periods ofdeployment and while waiting for action. Learningcurves decay rapidly; only through constant, repetitivetraining can soldiers maintain a combat edge.

f. US doctrine must be adapted to the specialgeographic considerations of any area of operations.In this battle commanders tried to apply doctrinedesigned for Ft. Knox directly to their battle in thedesert.

g. Reserves must be properly configured for theenemy they are likely to fight (not an armored infantryunit designated to counterattack against a tankattack), and properly positioned and briefed fortimely employment.

h. Command relationships must be properlydeliniated before the battle begins; command echelonsmust not be ignored in the heat of battle.

i. Artillery must be assigned to and employed byan artillery commander.

j. There is no substitute for the combined armsteam. The employment of forces by combat speciality isan invitation to'disaster.

Part V-3