ATST-DOC-30900-01-02 TMA Operation Manual

Doc. No.: ATST-DOC-30900-01-02 Issue No.:

Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012

Title: TMA Operation Manual Page: 1 of 87

TELESCOPE MOUNT ASSEMBLY (TMA) TMA Operation Manual ATST-REP-30900-01-02

Name Date Sign

Prepared by Arne Petersen 15-Oct-2012

Approved by Steffen Seubert 15-Oct-2012

Released by Oliver Dreyer 15-Oct-2012

Reviewed for IMT Engineering by Joe Jirak

Reviewed for IMT Project Dept. by Todd Trieloff

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

Issue No. Issue date No. Of pages

Pages changed, added, deleted

Description of Change

01 28-Nov-2011 26 All Outline issued

02 15-Oct-2012 87 All New complete issue (as a draft

document)


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Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................... 2

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 7

1.1 SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT ............................................................................................................................................... 7 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT ........................................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 SYSTEM CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................................................... 8 1.4 TECHNICAL DATA DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 10 1.5 INTERFACE OF THE SERVO SYSTEM ................................................................................................................................... 11

2 DOCUMENTS AND ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................................... 12

2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................................................................. 12 2.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................................................................... 12 2.3 CODES AND STANDARDS ................................................................................................................................................ 12 2.4 CERTIFICATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................... 13 2.5 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................... 14

3 SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 15

3.1 RESPONSIBILITIES ......................................................................................................................................................... 15 3.2 EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS AND NOTES............................................................................................................................ 16 3.3 USE & OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENDED PURPOSE ....................................................................................... 17 3.4 IMPROPER USE & OPERATION ........................................................................................................................................ 18 3.5 ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE .......................................................................................................................................... 18 3.6 SAFETY AND PROTECTION FACILITIES ................................................................................................................................ 18 3.7 INFORMAL SAFETY MEASURES ........................................................................................................................................ 18 3.8 TRAINING OF THE PERSONNEL ......................................................................................................................................... 18 3.9 SAFETY MEASURES DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS ............................................................................................................. 19 3.10 DANGERS CAUSED BY ELECTRICAL ENERGY & POWER .......................................................................................................... 19 3.11 SPECIFIC DANGER SPOTS AND ZONES ............................................................................................................................... 19 3.12 SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE, ELIMINATION OF MALFUNCTIONS............................................................................................ 20 3.13 STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE TELESCOPE ............................................................................................................... 20 3.14 ACCIDENT PREVENTION REGULATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY GUIDELINES ........................................................................... 20

4 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION/SYSTEM OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 21

4.1 PLACES OF WORK ......................................................................................................................................................... 23 4.2 SOFTWARE OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................................. 24

4.2.1 Relationship with TCS ...................................................................................................................................... 26 4.2.2 Relationship with MMCS / CMCS .................................................................................................................... 27 4.2.3 Relationship with GIS....................................................................................................................................... 28 4.2.4 Beckhoff ........................................................................................................................................................... 30

4.3 HARDWARE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................. 31 4.3.1 Location of Equipment .................................................................................................................................... 32

4.3.1.1 Mount Level ............................................................................................................................................................................ 32 4.3.1.2 Coudé Level ............................................................................................................................................................................. 35

4.3.2 Mount Azimuth Motors and Drives ................................................................................................................. 37 4.3.3 Mount Altitude Motors and Drives .................................................................................................................. 38 4.3.4 Coudé Azimuth Motors and Drives .................................................................................................................. 39


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4.3.5 M1 Cover ......................................................................................................................................................... 40 4.3.6 Deployable Bridges .......................................................................................................................................... 41 4.3.7 Enclosure Alignment Camera .......................................................................................................................... 42 4.3.8 Power Supply of TMA Components ................................................................................................................. 42 4.3.9 UPS Power Supply of TMA Components .......................................................................................................... 42

5 OPERATING DEVICES ......................................................................................................................................... 43

5.1 GENERAL SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 43 5.2 SAFETY HORN .............................................................................................................................................................. 44 5.3 INDIVIDUAL OPERATING ELEMENTS AT THE CABINETS .......................................................................................................... 45 5.4 INDIVIDUAL OPERATING ELEMENTS AT THE MOUNT LEVEL ................................................................................................... 46

5.4.1 M1 Cover Control Panel ................................................................................................................................... 46 5.4.2 Motorized Platforms Control Panels ............................................................................................................... 47 5.4.3 Hand Crank for Locking Pin Manual Drive ....................................................................................................... 48 5.4.4 Hand Crank for Manual Operation of OSS....................................................................................................... 49

5.5 ENGINEERING LAPTOP ................................................................................................................................................... 51 5.6 EMERGENCY STOP PUSH-BUTTON ................................................................................................................................... 52 5.7 HAND HELD DEVICE ...................................................................................................................................................... 58 5.8 INTERFACES FOR HAND HELD DEVICE (HHD JUNCTION BOXES) ............................................................................................. 60

6 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 62

6.1 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS ................................................................................................................................................... 62 6.2 SYSTEM POWER-UP AND SHUTDOWN .............................................................................................................................. 62

6.2.1 System Power-up Procedure ........................................................................................................................... 64 6.2.2 System Shutdown Procedure ........................................................................................................................... 65

6.3 PARK POSITIONS .......................................................................................................................................................... 66 6.4 MODES OF OPERATION ................................................................................................................................................. 67

6.4.1 Remote Operation Mode ................................................................................................................................. 67 6.4.1.1 Telescope Control System ...................................................................................................................................................... 68 6.4.1.2 MCS Engineering Screen ........................................................................................................................................................ 68

6.4.2 Rate Mode ....................................................................................................................................................... 68 6.4.3 HHD Operation ................................................................................................................................................ 69

6.4.3.1 Activation of the HHD ............................................................................................................................................................ 69 6.4.3.2 Resetting Errors and Interlocks ............................................................................................................................................. 69 6.4.3.3 Moving with the Hand Held Device ....................................................................................................................................... 70

6.5 MODE SWITCHING ........................................................................................................................................................ 71 6.6 TELESCOPE LOCKING PROCEDURE .................................................................................................................................... 72 6.7 TELESCOPE MANUAL OPERATION .................................................................................................................................... 73 6.8 M1 COVER OPERATING PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................................... 75 6.9 MOTORIZED DEPLOYABLE BRIDGE OPERATING PROCEDURE .................................................................................................. 77 6.10 ERRORS AND WARNINGS ............................................................................................................................................... 78

6.10.1 Maintenance after serious error conditions .................................................................................................... 79 6.10.2 Bit mode coded system warnings .................................................................................................................... 80 6.10.3 Bit mode coded system faults.......................................................................................................................... 80 6.10.4 Bit mode coded interlocks ............................................................................................................................... 80 6.10.5 Bit mode coded communication faults ............................................................................................................ 81 6.10.6 Bit mode coded error status ............................................................................................................................ 81 6.10.7 Bit mode coded warning status ....................................................................................................................... 83


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6.11 INTERLOCKS ................................................................................................................................................................ 84

6.11.1 Hardware Interlocks ........................................................................................................................................ 85 6.11.1.1 Emergency Limits ............................................................................................................................................................... 85 6.11.1.2 Emergency Stop ................................................................................................................................................................. 85

6.11.2 Software Interlocks .......................................................................................................................................... 85

7 WIRING DIAGRAMS ........................................................................................................................................... 86

8 OEM DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................................... 87


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Proprietary Note This technical document is our exclusive and legal property and may under no circumstances be neither reproduced nor supplied to third parties nor be used for the purpose of construction or manufacture without our consent. MT Mechatronics GmbH Weber Straße 21 D-55130 Mainz In case of any questions concerning this document, please send them to the following contact address:

MT Mechatronics GmbH Weber Straße 21 55130 Mainz / Germany Steffen Seubert Tel.: +49 / (0) 61 31 / 27 77 – 283 Fax: +49 / (0) 61 31 / 27 77 – 205 E-mail: [email protected]


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1 Introduction

1.1 Scope of the Document

The document at hand is the operation manual for the ATST TMA Mount Control System. The ATST TMA Mount Control System is referred to throughout this and other ATST documentation as the Mount Control System or more usually by its acronym the MCS. The purpose of the MCS is to provide a high quality stable image of a specified point on the solar disk or corona to instruments at the Gregorian or Coudé focal planes. The TCS achieves this by coordinating and controlling the activities of its subsystems under instruction from the Observatory Control System (OCS). Note that this operation manual only covers the operating devices of the TMA. The description of the engineering screen as well as operating procedures for the MCS software are not in the scope of this document. Please refer for further instructions in this case to the software operation [RD03]. This issue of the document represents a draft status submitted for FDR. Certain information needs to be added in the upcoming project phases, where indicated in the text (-> e.g. “TBD”).

1.2 Purpose of the Document

The intention of this document is to describe the different operating procedures that constitute the ATST TMA Mount Control System. All important steps necessary to fully operate the MCS are explained. This includes basic system description as well as steps to start and stop the whole ATST Mount Control System, how to use the Hand Held Device, and how to get an axis out of the emergency limit via an override procedure. The intended audiences of this document are:

- The users and operators of the MCS who are to run and control it - The engineers who may need to diagnose and inspect the system when it is not operational - The reviewers of the MCS - The developers of the TCS sub-system work packages - The developers of the OCS and instrument systems

The layout of this document is as follows: The first section gives an introduction to the ATST Project with some general information about the TMA. Section 2 contains the references and abbreviations for this document. Section 3 provides safety instructions for operating the ATST Telescope Mount Assembly safely. Section 4 gives an overview of the software and hardware components of the TMA. Section 5 shows the operating devices available for interacting with the TMA equipment. Section 6 provides operating instructions for using these operating devices. Attached to this document are the wiring diagrams in section 7 and the OEM documentation in section 8.


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1.3 System Context

“The 4-m ATST is the logical successor to the 0.8-m and 1.5-m general-purpose solar telescopes built in the 1960.s and 1970.s and currently operated by the National Solar Observatory, and it complements planned space missions such as SOLAR-B, Solar Probe, and the Solar Dynamics Observatory. We anticipate that the ATST will be a powerful, flexible system that will serve the US and international solar physics community for at least two decades. Recent major achievements in technology and instrumentation, including functioning solar adaptive optics systems in the visible and infrared, high-precision vector polarimeters, and an open-air solar telescope that provides diffraction-limited images now make it possible to realize the ATST. Testing of theoretical models

and simulations require the ATST.” (Quoted from http://atst.nso.edu/files/docs/ddprop/proj_summary.pdf)

Figure 1 Planned observatory

The TMA encompasses the large structure that supports the optics and instruments of ATST‡. It includes all the

various mechanical subassemblies, bearings, controllers, drives, and equipment that are used to point, track, and slew these optics and instruments during science operations.


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Figure 2 Reference design

A detailed project summary and all additional information can be found on the projects web site

http://atst.nso.edu/


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1.4 Technical Data Description

• General Data • Azimuth • Altitude • Coudé

Motion limits -90° / +310° +7° / +104.5° ± 270°

Final limit Switch set up -90.82° / +310.82° +5.89° / +105.15° ± 278.03°

Operation limit Switch set up -90.1° / +310.1° +6.95° / +104.09° ± 270.1°

Mechanical buffer contact -91.48° / +311.48° +4.59° / +106.45° ± 285.3°

Mechanical buffer end -93.08° / +313.08° +3,39° / +107.65° ± 288.5°

Stow pin position N/A +14.0°and +104.0° N/A

Motors 4 2 4

Max. velocity 2°/s 2°/s 6°/s

Max. Acceleration during normal operation 0,5°/s² 0.5°/s² 0.5°/s²

Max. Acceleration during E-Stop 3.24°/s² 2.09°/s² 2.3°/s²

Max. Motor torque 720Nm 17900Nm 910Nm

Max. Motor torque during E-Stop ramp execution 612Nm 15215Nm 773.5Nm


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1.5 Interface of the Servo system

The servo system includes different cabinets for Azimuth/Altitude located at the Mount base level and for Coudé located at the Coudé level .Also there are several junction boxes which are equipped with servo components. Section 4.3 gives an overview of these components. The telescope axes are controlled by two motion control units (one for azimuth/altitude and one for coudé) described in [RD01]. These motion control units are controlled by the Mount Control System which is part of the TMA and is explained in more detail in [RD02]. A brief overview of the software components of the TMA are found in Chapter 4.2. For the safe operation of the telescope, the brakes of the telescope must be in perfect condition. This applies also to the gears and the complete steel structure and engine construction. The minimum braking torque of the brakes which are mounted at the gearboxes must be as big as or higher than the maximum driving motor torque. The altitude axis of the telescope should be balanced. The park position for all telescope axes is defined and explained in Chapter 6.3. In addition, the altitude buffers must be always mounted. The telescope and the servo system must be maintained according to the documentation and specification. The TMA cabinets are externally supplied by 120V UPS. Chapter 4.3.9 gives an overview of the topology of the UPS system.


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2 Documents and Abbreviations

2.1 Applicable Documents

[AD01] Telescope Mount Assembly Specification Document, SPEC0011 Rev. B [AD02] Telescope Mount Assembly to Telescope Control System, ICD1.1/4.4, Rev. F [AD03] Common Service Framework User’s Manual, SPEC0022-1, Rev. D [AD04] Common Service Framework Reference Guide, SPEC0022-2, Rev. B

[AD05] Java Engineering Screens User Manual, TN-0089 Rev. A7 [AD06] Hazardous Zones Fully Automated Control Access, SPEC-0133, Revision B [AD07] ATST Interlock Design Report, ATST-REP-30700-90-02 [AD08] ATST Telescope Control System Software Operations Manual, SPEC-0127, Rev. D [AD09] ATST Interlock System Design Report, ATST-REP-30700-90-01 [AD10] ATST TMA Design Requirements to LIC, ATST-SPE-30000-11-04 [AD11] ATST ICD -LIC to cabinets, ATST-SPE-30000-17-01

2.2 Reference Documents

[RD01] ATST Control System Design Report, ATST-REP-30600-01-04 [RD02] ATST Software Design Report, ATST-REP-30600-02-04 [RD03] ATST MCS Software Operations Manual, ATST-DOC-30900-03-01

2.3 Codes and Standards

Codes, regulations and standards shall form a partial basis of compliance for the work. The most current released edition available shall be used. In case of conflict between published standards the contractor shall present such and provide a solution to be approved. Contractor substitution may be permitted to obtain improved performance or reduced cost, but said substitution is subject to written approval. Applicable codes:

• ANSI American National Standards Institute

• IBC International Building Code

• IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards

• NEC National Electrical Code


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2.4 Certifications

All sub-systems connecting to the facility Interconnects & Services shall minimize electromagnetic interference (EMI) with scientific instruments and other telescope systems. Emissions and immunity to EMI shall be considered in every part of the subsystem design. Electronic equipment shall be EMI certified and comply with FCC regulation Part 15:

• Class B limit for emissions in the telescope area; and

• Class A limit for emissions in the control and computer room.

All electronic equipment shall be certified as follows:

• IEC 1000-4-2 or better for electrostatic discharge (ESD) immunity;

• IEC 1000-4-3 and IEC 1000-4-6, or better, for radio frequency interference (RFI) immunity;

• IEC 1000-4-9, IEC 1000-4-13 or better for immunity to power-line disturbances;

• IEC 1000-4-4 or better for electrical fast transient; and

• IEC 1000-4-5 or better for surges.


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2.5 Abbreviations

ATST Advanced Technology Solar Telescope CM Container Manager CMCS Coudé Motion Control System CLIC Coudé Local Interlock Controller CSF Common Services Framework DWG CAD drawing format GIS Global Interlock System HHD Hand Held Device HW Hardware IPC Industrial Personal Computer JES Java Engineering Screens LIC Local Interlock Controller MCS Mount Control System MMCS Mount Motion Control System MLIC Mount Local Interlock Controller NIC Not In Contract OCS Observatory Control System SIP Servo In Place TBD To Be Defined TCS Telescope Control System TMA Telescope Mount Assembly TwinCAT The Windows Control and Automation UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply


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3 Safety Instructions

This operation manual contains important information to operate the ATST Telescope Mount Assembly safely and efficiently. The Telescope can only be operated after the Operation Manual is noticed and understood.

3.1 Responsibilities

The knowledge of the fundamental safety notes and the safety regulations is a basic prerequisite for the proper handling and operation of the Telescope to ensure that safety aspects are observed and malfunctions do not occur. These operating instructions and, in particular, the safety notes, must be complied with by all persons using the Telescope. The Telescope has been built according to the state of the art and the recognized technical safety guidelines. Nevertheless risks for the user and / or third parties as well as malfunctions of the Telescope may arise through its operation. Therefore the Telescope must only be used:

• for operations in accordance with its intended purpose;

• in a perfect operating condition with respect to technical safety aspects. Any warranty and liability claims in case of personal injuries and property damages shall be excluded if they can be attributed to one or several of the following causes:

• operations of the Telescope that do not comply with the intended purpose;

• improper mounting, commissioning, operation, and maintenance of the Telescope;

• operation of the Telescope with defect or de-activated safety facilities (e.g. bridging of the safety switch) or safety and protection devices, which are not properly installed or are not functioning.

• unauthorized modifications of the Telescope;

• operation outside of the admissible range of input voltage;

• insufficient monitoring of components, which are subject to wear and tear;

• improper execution of repairs;

• catastrophes and disasters through external attacks and force majeure.


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3.2 Explanation of Symbols and Notes

To refer to risks and dangers, the following terms, symbols, and signs are used in the operating instructions:

DANGER

This symbol refers to a direct threat and danger to the life and health of persons. The non-observance of these notes has serious adverse effects on the health of persons including life-threatening injuries or death.

DANGER

This symbol refers to a direct threat and danger caused by electrical energy. The non-observance of these notes has serious adverse effects on the health of persons including life-threatening injuries or death.

WARNING

This symbol refers to a situation that is potentially dangerous for the life and health of persons. The non-observance of these notes may have serious adverse effects on the health of persons including life-threatening injuries or death.

CAUTION

This symbol refers to a situation that is potentially dangerous for persons or may lead to property damages. The non-observance of these notes may have lead to minor injuries and / or to property damages.


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Important

This symbol refers to application notes and recommendations as well as to other useful information.

Pictograms for dangers:

Mechanical hazard like crushing, shearing, hits etc.

Floating load hazard

Slip or stumble hazard

While working at the Telescope you have to wear your personal protective equipment.

Use hard-toed shoes!

Wear safety gloves!

Wear helmet!

3.3 Use & Operation in Accordance with the Intended Purpose

The Telescope must only be used for the designated use case.


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3.4 Improper Use & Operation

The Telescope must not be used for any other purposes. In particular, it must not be used for moving suspended loads.

3.5 Organisational Measure

The required personal protective equipment must be provided from the operation company and must be functional at any time. All existing safety facilities must be inspected in regular intervals.

WARNING

• Off limits to unauthorised personnel

3.6 Safety and Protection Facilities

Before activating the Telescope, all protection facilities must be mounted properly and must be functioning. Protection devices may only be removed after the control unit has been turned off and blocked against any new activation. All existing safety facilities must be inspected in regular intervals.

3.7 Informal Safety Measures

• The operating instructions must always be kept in the immediate vicinity of the system. All safety and danger signs and notes affixed on the Telescope must be maintained to ensure that they can be read. If required, they must be replaced.

• In addition to the operating instructions, documents including the generally valid and local regulations applicable to mains supply, accident prevention, industrial safety, and environmental protection must be provided and observed.

3.8 Training of the Personnel

• The Telescope may only be operated by qualified and trained staff.

• The responsibilities of the personnel with respect to the operation, maintenance, and service shall be defined by the operator of the Telescope.

The user of the Telescope may only eliminate malfunctions and perform maintenance work, which were defined within the framework of a statement of work. All other failures must be repaired by corresponding knowledgeable specialists.


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3.9 Safety Measures during Normal Operations

The Telescope may only be operated when all safety facilities (interlock system) are fully functioning. Before turning on the motion control unit, make sure that nobody can be endangered by the drives. The Telescope must be inspected in regular intervals to detect any damages, which can be recognized from the outside, and to ensure the operability of the safety facilities. In case of malfunctions, which can impair the safety of the Telescope, the Station must be turned off, and the malfunction must be eliminated. The Telescope may be operated again only after such malfunction has been eliminated.

WARNING

• No objects in the area around the moving parts of the telescope

• Off limits to personnel during operation at the Telescope

• To protect the Telescope during maintenance of the OSS: move to stow position and block the telescope by the stow pin.

• Overvoltage protection devices installed to protect electronic equipment Further information regarding hazardous zones can be found in the Hazardous Zones Fully Automated Control Access specification [AD06].

3.10 Dangers caused by Electrical Energy & Power

The electrical equipment of the Telescope must be inspected in regular intervals. In case of malfunctions of the electrical equipment, the Telescope must be turned off at once, and the damage must be repaired by a qualified electrical engineer. The Telescope may only be turned on again after the electrical equipment has been inspected and malfunctions do not exist any longer.

3.11 Specific Danger Spots and Zones

• Dangers caused by the voltage applying to electrical facilities and switch cabinets.

• Bruising and shearing risks caused by the movements of the drive axles associated with the Telescope.

WARNING

• Protection covers, doors, switch cabinets etc. must always be closed. During maintenance or repair

works only authorized personal can open the equipment or doors. Further information regarding hazardous zones can be found in the Hazardous Zones Fully Automated Control Access specification [AD06].


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3.12 Service and Maintenance, Elimination of Malfunctions

WARNING

• Off limits to unauthorised personnel

• Switch off remote operation and use service mode

• During adjustments of equipment only movement under visual control allowed

• The prescribed setting, maintenance and service activities must be performed in accordance with the defined dates and intervals.

• Limited Lifetime of electronic safety equipment

• All operating media such as compressed air or electric power must be protected against any unintended activation.

• During all maintenance, service, and repair activities, the system must be off-circuit and de-energized. The main switch must be protected against any unauthorized activation. A sign indicating “under repair” must be affixed. After the end of the maintenance work, the operability of the safety facilities must be checked before the system is turned on again.

• All spare parts have to be stored according to manufacturer’s instructions

• Before dismounting a device, the Telescope must be in locked safety position and the system must be switched off and de-energized.

• All dismounted materials have to be sorted and properly disposed

3.13 Structural Modifications of the Telescope

• Without the written approval of the manufacturer, no changes, additions and / or modifications must be carried out. All modification measures require the written approval of MT Mechatronics GmbH.

• Any components, which do not function properly, must be replaced at once. Only original spare parts, wearing parts, and consumables may be used.

3.14 Accident Prevention Regulations and Industrial Safety Guidelines

The rules and regulations applicable to the on-site accident prevention and the industrial safety guidelines must be absolutely observed.


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4 Technical Description/System Overview

In the ATST architecture the mount control system is responsible for all TMA, Mount and Coudé, related aspects. The TMA Control System with its subsystems has responsibility to deliver the light from the light’s entrance in the enclosure, through telescope optics to the instrument focal plane. To ensure that, the TCS sends trajectory data for positioning of the several TMA and Coudé mechanisms (e.g. mount altitude and azimuth axis and coudé azimuth axis) to the Control System. It is the responsibility of the Mount Control System, in that case the Motion Control System as one subsystem of the TMA Control System, to accept the trajectory data and correctly transfer it to the TMA hardware by communicating with the Mount Motion Control System (MMCS) and the Coudé Motion Control System (CMCS) in a correct and timely fashion. See Figure 3 for an overview of the ATST Telescope Mount Assembly and Figure 4 for a diagram of the involved hardware in the TMA. The safety aspect of this control system is the responsibility of two of its subsystems, the Mount Local Interlock Contoller (MLIC) and the Coudé Local Interlock Controller (CLIC) which both interface to the Global Interlock Controller (GIC).

Figure 3 ATST Telescope Mount Assembly Overview


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Lines colors:

- Dark blue: ATST Normal Ethernet, - Yellow: ATST Safety Network, - Violet: Siemens ProfiNet IRT - Black single: Normal hard wired connections - Black doubled: Safety related hard wired connections

Figure 4 Hardware diagram


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4.1 Places of Work

Usually the optical telescope system is operating automatically from the OCS remote control system by an operator. The telescope control room is located in the Support and Operations Building (seen Figure 5).

Figure 5 ATST Observatory Facility Overview

There are 15 interface junction boxes for the Hand Held Device to allow maximum flexibility and overview for local works on the telescope. The Engineering Laptop can be used at each of those interface locations. It allows access to the MCS controller as well as the two mount motion control systems and the MLIC/CLIC. Access to the MCS is established via the MCS Engineering screen using Linux. Furthermore it is possible to access the MMCS and CMCS via a remote desktop connection using Windows. The location of the HHD junction boxes can be found in Chapter 5.8. Located at the Nasmyth Platforms are two control panels for the bridges. They allow maintenance personal access to to the lower OSS area and to the rear side of the OSS rack cabinet. It is possible to manually move the OSS with a hand crank. A description of this device can be found in Chapter 5.4.4 and the procedure to manually move this axis is provided in Chapter 6.7. For maintenance work it is possible to secure the OSS with locking pins. These pins are manually operated at the Nasmyth Platforms. For more information about the locking pins refer to Chapter 5.4.3 and Chapter 6.6.


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4.2 Software Overview

The MCS software context is bounded between the TCS and MMCS/CMCS. The TCS is the higher-level system (in respect to its closer proximity to higher-level observatory operations) from which the MCS accepts configurations. The MMCS/CMCS is the lower-level system (in respect to its closer proximity to lower-level hardware operations) that the MCS communicates with hardware and receive hardware status information.

Figure 6 MCS context diagram

There are several principle actors on MCS operations:

1. The human operator is responsible for controlling the MCS operational lifecycle state (e.g. Initialized, running, etc). During normal operations the operator will control the MCS lifecycle through the Observatory Control System (OCS). During engineering the operator will use the MCS engineering screen.

2. During normal operations the TCS is the system from which the MCS is receiving its demands (except

those operating on its lifecycle) and that will subscribe to MCS events. All permitted interactions between TCS and MCS are detailed in the ICD 1.1/4.4 [AD02]. During engineering all operations available to the TCS will be available to the operator/engineer through MCS engineering screen. These will use a superset of the operations available to the TCS to perform testing and maintenance tasks.

3. The MMCS is the system the MCS will receive all Mount hardware information from and MMCS is the system the MCS will send commands to move hardware.

4. The CMCS is the system the MCS will receive all Coudé hardware information from and CMCS is the system the MCS will send commands to move hardware.

5. The CSF (ATST) database is used to store the application data and controller properties.


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6. The GIS is the system the MCS will receive interlock status.

Figure 7 MCS controller hierarchy

The principle internal operators of the MCS are the MCS’s ATST CSF controllers:

1. The MCS management controller atst.tcs.mcs, responsible for the lifecycle of all other MCS controllers (its sub-controllers), and accepting configurations and either acting upon them or propagating them to its sub-controllers.

2. The MCS sub-controllers responsible for an individual mechanism: atst.tcs.mcs.az responsible for the Mount Azimuth axis including its associated cable wrap drive, atst.tcs.mcs.alt responsible for the Mount Altitude axis, atst.tcs.mcs.coude responsible for the Coudé Azimuth axis including its associated cable wrap drive, atst.tcs.mcs.cover responsible for the Mount Cover Mechanism, atst.tcs.mcs.aux responsible for the Ancillary Mechanisms


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4.2.1 Relationship with TCS

The relationship between TCS and MCS is defined in the ICD 1.1/4.4 [AD 2]. The MCS accepts configurations defined, and subscribe to and generate the specified events. Configurations will contain the current mode required e.g. off, active or tracking, and other parameters used to define how the hardware should be moved. MCS is subscribing to two events: trajectory and interlock. The trajectory event (atst.tcs.mcsTrajectory) is generated at 20 Hz and contains the trajectory data used to position the tracking mechanisms. MCS sub-controllers are communicating this data in the same form (polynomial coefficients) to the MMCS/CMCS that are responsible for converting of this representation into the position/velocity demands. The trajectory event contains a trajectory id. A trajectory is considered to be valid only if a commanded configuration contains the same id as the trajectory event The MCS is subscribing to the interlock event, which is always set to be atst.gis.interlock. These events are posted by the GIS and when the value of at least one of the event attributes is true the MCS is going to interlock behavior. When the value changes back to false the MCS is ceasing performing its interlock behavior. However, to resume the processing of input commands the error memory table must be cleared by means of reset command. This procedure is explained in the ATST Software Operations Manual [RD03]. For more information regarding the relationship to the TCS refer to [RD02].


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02 15-Oct-2012


4.2.2 Relationship with MMCS / CMCS

The Mount Motion Control System and the Coudé Motion Control system are responsible for operating the hardware (drives, brakes etc.) of the TMA. They are implemented as a software PLC using TwinCAT from Beckhoff. The interface between MCS and MMCS/CMCS is realized by means of special Java classes providing communication between MCS and MMCS/CMCS using the TCP/IP protocol. There will be 3 dedicated TCP/IP connections for each of the control units (MMCS and CMCS). These connections are used to transfer three types of data: HW status (from MMCS/CMCS to MCS), commands and trajectory data (both from MCS to MMCS/CMCS). The MCS monitors all MMCS/CMCS hardware components by analysing the status information and control them by sending commands and trajectory data. For more information regarding the relationship to the MMCS/CMCS subsystems refer to [RD02].


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4.2.3 Relationship with GIS

An interlock is a device used to help prevent a machine from harming its operator or damaging itself by stopping the machine when tripped. The Local Interlock System consists of two independent safety systems, MLIC and CLIC ensuring the safe operation of the Mount and Coudé. To do that, it is connected to the overall GIC to react to safety related information received and send its own safety related information. A safety network is used for that purpose. It is also connected to the Control System equipment as safety rated encoders or axes limit switches, other limit switches that e.g. supervise the doors of the cabinets or the locking pins positions. With this information it evaluates the status the TMA is in and decides whether or not it shall allow movement by letting the MMCS or CMCS open the brakes and energize the drives and motors. The MLIC and CLIC will remove power to the drive system and brakes when evaluating the need to bring the TMA in a safe stop. The overall TMA LIC is made up of two separate LIC elements.

• The mount LIC (MLIC) is concerned with devices and ancillary equipment associated with the mount structure. Included in the scope of MLIC is interlocking and monitoring which involves the mount azimuth and mount altitude servo axes.

• The coudé LIC (CLIC), is concerned with devices and ancillary equipment associated with the coudé rotator. Included in the scope of CLIC is interlocking and monitoring which involves the coudé rotation servo axis.

The MLIC and CLIC each provide monitoring and interlocking within their respective section of the TMA. In this capacity they function as self-contained area-specific safety controllers. Each LIC monitors for hazardous conditions, invokes interlocks, and disables hazardous sources of energy as required to safely secure its designated area. MLIC and CLIC are also individually connected to the distributed Global Interlock System (GIS) safety network employed throughout the ATST project. The GIS network supports communication with the Global Interlock Controller (GIC) which monitors, supervises and coordinates the activity of all individual LICs in the GIS. The MLIC and the CLIC do not communicate directly with each other via the GIS network Figure 8 shows the components of the MLIC and CLIC. The MMCS and the MLIC, the CMCS and the CLIC respectively, are individual systems only interacting through the Siemens drive system. The MMCS and CMCS is able to read the status of the SS1 from the Siemens drive system that is actively controlled by the MLIC or CLIC. A dedicated design report [AD07] is available that describes the structure and functionality of the MLIC and CLIC in greater detail.


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Figure 8 Components of MLIC and CLIC


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4.2.4 Beckhoff

The Beckhoff TwinCAT software system turns a normal PC into software PLC system. Windows XP embedded and the real-time operating system TwinCAT resides in parallel to each other on the PC hardware. Powerful communication lines between both operating systems exist. A system-crash of Windows XP does not influence the real-time operating system TwinCAT. Figure 9 shows the concept of the TwinCAT software PLC. Since the TMA system does not provide a display for both the MMCS and CMCS the only way to access those system is to use a remote desktop connection via TCP/IP. However, using this remote connection or changing part of the Beckhoff Firmware is neither part of this document nor the software operation manual [RD03].

Figure 9 Operating System Concept

Important

In the event of problems with the Beckhoff Systems running on the MMCS/CMCS motion controller contact MT-Mechatronics.

Important

It is possible to change the MMCS/CMCS configuration files, but the Beckhoff Firmware shall not be changed. The description for changing the configuration files can be found in the Software Operation Manual [RD03].


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4.3 Hardware Overview

The Control System is functionally structured in several parts. The following main parts can be identified and can contain hard-, software and firmware (see Figure 4):

- Mount Control System (MCS) o Mount Motion Control System (MMCS)

� Mount Control Cabinets (MCC1 and MCC2) � Mount Drive Cabinets (MDC1, MDC1a and MDC2, MDC2a) � Mount Local Interlock Controller (MLIC, included in MCC1 or MCC2) � Mount Encoders � Mount Drive Systems

o Coudé Motion Control System (CMCS) � Coudé Control Cabinet (CCC) � Coudé Drive Cabinets (CDC1 and CDC2) � Coudé Local Interlock Controller (CLIC, included in CCC) � Coudé Encoders � Coudé Drive Systems

Chapter 4.3.1 provides an overview of the equipment involved in operating the TMA. For more information regarding the involved equipment refer to the ATST Control System Design Report [RD01] or the OEM documentation in Chapter 8.


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4.3.1 Location of Equipment

4.3.1.1 Mount Level

Figure 10 Position of the cabinets, view 1

Figure 11 Position of the cabinets, view 2


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Figure 12 Position of Mount Electrical Equipment, view 1

Figure 13 Position of Mount Electrical Equipment, view 2


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There are six electronic racks below the center span in a symmetric arrangement. Five of them are used as followed:

MTM ID Description

MDC1 MTM Mount Base Drive Cabinet 1

MDC2 MTM Mount Base Drive Cabinet 2

MCC MTM Mount Base Control Cabinet

MLC1 Mount Base LIC rack

MEJ1 Mount Base power and control junction box

MFJ1 Mount Base fluid junction box

MER1 Mount Base electronic rack

MER4 Mount Base electronic rack

MER1 and MER4 are free for use by AURA. The following cabinets can be found on OSS:

MTM ID Description

OER1 OSS electronic rack 1

OER2 OSS electronic rack 2

OEJ1 OSS electronic junction box

OFJ1 OSS fluid junction box

ONJ OSS Fiber cable distribution box

OEJ2 OSS MTM electronic junction box


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4.3.1.2 Coudé Level

Figure 14 Location of Coudé Equipment, view 1

Figure 15 Location of Coudè Equipment, view 2


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The following cabinets are accessible from the Coudé room:

MTM ID Description

CDC1 MTM Coudé Drive Cabinet 1

CDC2 MTM Coudé Drive Cabinet 2

CCC MTM Coudé Control Cabinet

CLIC Coudé LIC rack

CPJ Coudé power distribution junction box

CFJ Coudé fluid distribution junction box

CCJ1 Coudé control junction box 1

CCJ2 Coudé control junction box 2

CER1… CER16

Coudé extension ring racks


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02 15-Oct-2012


4.3.2 Mount Azimuth Motors and Drives

The azimuth drive system is used for the rotation of the telescope mount system. It consists of the following main components:

• Azimuth drive units (4x): synchronous torque motors, a gear pinion, to allow controlled movements of the azimuth rotation

• Azimuth Encoder: Optical incremental encoder, for the position read out with reference marks.

• Azimuth Multiturn Encoder: For the detection of limits and rotation being greater than 360°.

• Azimuth Cable Wrap: The cable wrap allows the cable routing between the rotating azimuth and fixed building. The cable wrap is limiting the range of motion in azimuth.

• Azimuth Cable Wrap motor: synchronous servo motor to allow controlled movement of the cable wrap.

Figure 16 Mount Azimuth motor assembly


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02 15-Oct-2012


4.3.3 Mount Altitude Motors and Drives

The altitude drive system allows the rotation of the altitude structure, OSS. It consists of the following main components:

• Altitude drive unit (2x): synchronous direct torque motors to allow controlled movements of the altitude structure, OSS.

• Altitude Encoder: Optical incremental encoder, for the position read out with reference marks.

• Altitude Multiturn Encoder: For the detection of limits.

• Altitude cable wrap to guide cables during the rotation.

Figure 17 Mount Altitude motor assembly


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02 15-Oct-2012


4.3.4 Coudé Azimuth Motors and Drives

The coudé drive system allows the rotation of the coudé axis. It consists of the following main components:

• Coudé drive units (4x): synchronous torque motors, a gear pinion, to allow controlled movements of the azimuth rotation

• Coudé Encoder: Optical incremental encoder, for the position read out with reference marks.

• Coudé Multiturn Encoder: For the detection of limits and rotation being greater than 360°.

• Coudé Cable Wrap: The cable wrap allows the cable routing between the rotating coudé and fixed building. The cable wrap is limiting the range of motion in coudé.

• Coudé Cable Wrap motor: synchronous servo motor to allow controlled movement of the cable wrap.

Figure 18 Coudé Azimuth motor assembly


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4.3.5 M1 Cover

The main function of the M1 Mirror Cover Assembly is to interrupt the incoming light path and protect the primary mirror M1 when the telescope is not observing. It consists of the following main components:

• Linear drive unit (2x): linear drive modules with driven and non-driven trucks with synchronous opposed motion.

• Roof segments (6x): attached to trucks of drive units, closing and opening occurs through up- and down folding.

• Locking device (2x): For a mechanical locking of the driven trucks on each drive unit during maintenance.

• Limit switches (4x): For detecting of end positions of the M1 Cover (open / closed) and the detection of the locking devices (engaged / disengaged).

Figure 19 Location of M1 Cover

M1 Cover


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4.3.6 Deployable Bridges

There are two motorized deployable bridges available in the TMA:

• The +X Nasmyth Platform Bridge allows access to the lower OSS area.

• The –X Nasmyth Platform Bridge allows access to the rear side of the OSS rack. The control panel of these bridges is explained in Chapter 5.4.2 and Chapter 6.9 provides instructions for using these bridges. Another access to the lower OSS platform with its OSS rack is from the –X Nasmyth Platform side. There is a manually deployed step, fixed to the Nasmyth Platform. It closes the gap of 680 mm between the Nasmyth Platform and the OSS (caused from design restrictions). It will be opened manually.

Important

The retracted position of these bridges is furthermore LIC controlled.


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02 15-Oct-2012


4.3.7 Enclosure Alignment Camera

The Enclosure Alignment Camera checks the alignment of Azimuth and Enclosure. It is controlled by the MMCS in the way that it can be either activated or deactivated. Location: End of OSS leg +X

4.3.8 Power Supply of TMA Components

To be completed in next project phase.

4.3.9 UPS Power Supply of TMA Components

The uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for the whole TMA is externally supported. A phase monitor is responsible for detecting the loss of the infrastructure power supply and will switch to UPS to supply all electric components with power. Figure 20 shows the topology of the UPS power distribution for all TMA cabinets. For description of cabinets refer to Chapter 4.3.1.

Figure 20 Topology of TMA UPS distribution

Furthermore both motion control systems (MMCS/CMCS) have batteries included that guarantee a safe shutdown of the operating system. They supply the IPC’s for at least 10mins after power has been cut.


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5 Operating Devices

5.1 General safety instructions

• All flashings, covers must be mounted.

• All access doors and entrances must be closed during operation.

• During normal operation the access to the facility is prohibited. (This must be ensured by the operator) • All cabinets and boxes must be closed during operation.

• Access to the telescope and machine environment is prohibited during operation. This must be ensured by the operator.

• The access during maintenance is limited to authorized and trained personnel.

• The telescope must be in perfect condition with functional safety equipment device for the observation and operational mode.

• The altitude axis can be locked can be locked at 14° and 104°.

• The bridges have to be in closed during operation of the telescope

• The mirror cover has to be in the opened state during operation of the telescope.


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5.2 Safety Horn

The TMA is equipped with a safety horn. The horn will sound for 10s after the motors have been activated. Afterwards the Horn is deactivated. Location of the horn to be completed in next project phase


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5.3 Individual Operating Elements at the cabinets

Each of the TMA cabinets has a line disconnecter switch outside the cabinet. This allows cutting the power for maintenance work at a specific cabinet without shutting down all cabinets. The location of these cabinets can be found in Chapter 4.3.1. Layout and picture of the cabinets to be completed in next project phase.

CAUTION

The servo amplifiers are equipped with an intermediate circuit buffered with large capacitors. Even if the main power is off, it can take up to 10 minutes until the voltage at terminal TBD at the servo amplifiers is below 50V DC.


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02 15-Oct-2012


5.4 Individual Operating Elements at the Mount Level

5.4.1 M1 Cover Control Panel

Additional to the operation of the M1 Cover through the MMCS, a Control Panel, as seen in Figure 21, can be used to operate the cover. This M1 Cover Control Panel is located at the -X - Nasmyth Platform. This control panel consists of two indicators, two push buttons and an emergency stop button. The operation is described in chapter 6.11.

Figure 21 M1 Cover Control Panel Figure 22 Location of M1 Control Panel

CAUTION

In an event of an interlock the M1 cover will close automatically (if it is not already closed). Before opening a blind cover on any of the junction boxes the operator has to make sure that no person can be harmed by a closing M1 Cover

M1 Cover Control Panel


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5.4.2 Motorized Platforms Control Panels

There are two motorized platforms available for maintenance work in the Mount. They allow access to the lower OSS area and to the rear side of the OSS rack cabinet. Location of the control panels for these platforms is at the X - Nasmyth Platform and can be seen in Figure 23. The control panel set up is the same as for the M1 Cover. It consists of an emergency button, two indicators and two push buttons (see Figure 21). All motorized platforms and their accesses are protected against fall hazard by railings and self closing gates at the passages.

Figure 23 Location of the bridge control panels

Motorized Platforms Control Panels


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5.4.3 Hand Crank for Locking Pin Manual Drive

The Altitude axis can be locked with two locking pins. The OSS Locking Pins are designed to secure the OSS in case of maintenance work. An unbalance can be the result of maintenance at equipment on the OSS as it may need to be taken off the structure for repair. There are two stow positions available:

• –14 degree altitude angle position

• –104 degree altitude angle position The three positions for the locking pins are:

• Retracted, in the sense that the motion to the altitude axis is free and the MCS can operate normally

• Deployed, in the sense that the motion to the altitude axis is blocked/secured by the locking pins.

• Test position, in the essence that the motion of the altitude axis is limited to a certain range for testing and verification of the actual unbalance.

The Locking Pins are attached to the dog houses of the +X Tower and the –X Tower and are accessed and operated from the Nasmyth Platforms. Figure 24 shows one of the manual drives for a locking pin. The same manual drive can be found on the other side of the Nasmyth platform. The procedure for operating the locking pins is provided in Chapter 6.6.

Figure 24 Location of the Hand Crank for the Locking Pin

Locking Pin Manual Drive


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5.4.4 Hand Crank for Manual Operation of OSS

It is possible to manually move the altitude axis with a hand crank. To slew the OSS with the manual drive the pinion needs to be joined with the gear by turning the spindle until the gearbox is in working position (see Figure 26 and Figure 27). A footswitch is used to open the brakes and allowing the hand crank attached to the gearbox to move the OSS. The location of the equipment for manual operation is shown in Figure 25. The procedure for operating the telescope manually can be found in Chapter 6.7.

Figure 25 Position of Hand Crank for Manual Operation

Gearbox with Hand Crank

Brakes

Spindle


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Figure 26 Manual drive disengaged Figure 27 Manual drive engaged


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5.5 Engineering Laptop

The Engineering Laptop is used to access both the MCS and the MMCS/CMCS from different locations in the TMA shown in Chapter 4.3.1. This laptop is equipped with all needed software to maintain, configure and administer the several subsystems of the TMA by trained personal. The engineering laptop provides two operating systems as a dual boot option with following options:

• Access MMCS/CMCS -> Windows

• Access MLIC/CLIC -> Windows

• Access MCS Engineering Screen -> Linux

Important

There should be only one engineering laptop or hand held device attached at any of the interface locations at a time! If more than one device is attached, the MCS respectively the MMCS/CMCS will reject any issued commands!

Important

Since both the MMCS as well as the CMCS will reject any commands from the TCS/MCS Engineering Screen while the HHD is attached it is advisable to disconnect the HHD first before using Engineering Laptop.

Important

Using the Engineering Laptop for debugging is not a usual operating task. It is possible to change the configuration files of the Beckhoff System, but the Beckhoff Firmware shall not be changed. MT Mechatronics does not guarantee safe operation when the MMCS/CMCS Beckhoff systems are modified by untrained personal.


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02 15-Oct-2012


5.6 Emergency Stop Push-button

The emergency stop push-buttons trigger the interlock system, which causes a shutdown of the azimuth drives, the altitude drives, the coudé drives, and the cable wrap drives. All installed emergency stop push-buttons are self arresting. The Emergency Buttons are distributed throughout the mount- and coudé level. Furthermore many operating devices have their own E-Stop Button:

• Each of the HHD Junction Boxes

• Motorized Bridge Control Panels

• M1 Cover Control Panel

• Hand Held Device

CAUTION

Pushing an emergency button will trigger an interlock event by the GIS. In the event of an interlock the M1 cover will close automatically (if it is not already closed). Note:

• The ropes at Mount and Coudé Level have not been implemented in the 3D Model yet.

• Some E-Stop Location will change in the future and will be completed in next project phase.


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02 15-Oct-2012


Mount Locations for all Emergency Stops: Location Description

Telescope platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box

Telescope platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box

Nasmyth platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box

Nasmyth platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box

Service ring left Hand Held Device Junction Box

Service ring right Hand Held Device Junction Box

Mount cable wrap outer Hand Held Device Junction Box

Mount cable wrap inner Hand Held Device Junction Box

Telescope platform left Hand Held Device

Telescope platform right Hand Held Device

Nasmyth platform left Hand Held Device

Nasmyth platform right Hand Held Device

Service ring left Hand Held Device

Service ring right Hand Held Device

Mount cable wrap outer Hand Held Device

Mount cable wrap inner Hand Held Device Nasmyth platform left OSS access platform

Nasmyth platform left M4 tower access platform

Service ring Stop rope service ring

Nasmyth platform right M1 mirror cover

Tab. 5-1 Interfaces for hand held device Mount Level Coudé Locations for all Emergency Stops: Location Description

Coudé platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box

Coudé platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box

Coudé room Hand Held Device Junction Box

Mezzanine level left Hand Held Device Junction Box

Mezzanine level right Hand Held Device Junction Box

Coudé cable wrap outer Hand Held Device Junction Box

Coudé cable wrap inner Hand Held Device Junction Box

Coudé platform left Hand Held Device

Coudé platform right Hand Held Device

Coudé room Hand Held Device

Mezzanine level left Hand Held Device

Mezzanine level right Hand Held Device

Coudé cable wrap outer Hand Held Device

Coudé cable wrap inner Hand Held Device

Tab. 5-2 Interfaces for hand held device Mount Level


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Figure 28 Location of E-Stops at Mount Level, view 1

M1 Mirror Cover Control Panel

Hand Held Device Junction Box

Nasmyth platform right


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Nasmyth platform left

M4 Tower access Bridge control panel

OSS access Bridge control panel


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Mount cable wrap left


Mount cable wrap right


Telescope platform left


Telescope platform right


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Figure 31 Location of E-Stops at Coudé Level

Figure 32 Location of E-Stops at Coudé Level, view Coudé Room

Hand Held Device Junction Box Coudé Room

Access door to coudé room


Coudé Cable Wrap Outer


Mezzanine Level left


Coudé platform left


Coudé Cable Wrap Inner


Mezzanine Level right


Mezzanine Level right


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5.7 Hand Held Device

As an easy and simple device, the hand-held device is used for maintenance activities where personal has to be in the vicinity of moving parts. This device has a very limited functionality and can only move an axis in rate mode with a velocity demand. This demand can be changed on the device and is limited to a rate of 0.5°/s for each axis of the control system. The HHD is able to move only one axis at a time. Depending on the interface point the HHD is connected to will determine the movable axis. There are 8 HHD junction boxes distributed throughout the mount level and 7 at the coudé level of the telescope. However, not all mount HHD junction boxes allow control of Azimuth and Altitude axis. There are 4 junction boxes equipped with two interface connections (control of Azimuth or Altitude) and 4 with only one interface connection (control of Azimuth only). More information on the location of the HHD junction boxes can be found in Chapter 5.8. The available service functions are:

• Slewing of the axis

• Emergency Stop

• Reset Error/Interlock The hand held device is shown in Figure 33. The HHD is equipped with the following control elements:

• Emergency stop push-Button

• Move to Set Point Buttons

• Move Enable Button

Figure 33 Hand Held Device


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Important

All non-used sockets must be closed with a blind cover in order to short-cut the emergency stop interlock signal lines.

Important

The HHD can only be used in conjunction with the MMCS or CMCS. For any movement the move enable button needs to be pressed. If the move enable button is released, the system will execute a stop ramp.

Important

After using the Hand Held Device disconnect the device to be able to resume control of telescope with TCS/MCS Engineering Screen.

CAUTION

The HHD can be used for maintenance. Working on the telescope is only allowed if the telescope axes are deactivated. Additionally the E-Stop must be pressed. This will avoid any kind of movement of the telescope. Activated telescope axis can always drift. The HHD is in principal working with velocity set point and not with position set points.


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5.8 Interfaces for Hand Held Device (HHD Junction Boxes)

HHD junction boxes are used to connect a Hand Held Device to the motion controller directly. There exist 15 junction boxes for the Mount Control System:

• 8 at Mount level o 4 for Azimuth o 4 for Azimuth/Altitude

• 7 at Coudé level Each HHD junction box is equipped with two power plugs for electronic equipment (such as the engineering laptop), two Ethernet connections, an emergency stop button and at least one interface for a Hand Held Device. There are 4 special junction boxes that have two interface connections for the HHD. In this case, one connector is used to control the Azimuth axis and the other one for the Altitude axis. If only one connector for the HHD is available, it is used to control the azimuth axis on mount level respective the coudé axis on coudé level.

Figure 34 HHD Junction Box


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Mount Locations for Hand Held Device Junction Box: Location Description

Telescope platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box / 2 available connectors

Telescope platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box / 2 available connectors

Nasmyth platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box / 2 available connectors

Nasmyth platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box / 2 available connectors

Service ring left Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Service ring right Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Mount cable wrap outer Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Mount cable wrap inner Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Tab. 5-3 Interfaces for hand held device Mount Level Coudé Locations for Hand Held Device Junction Box: Location Description

Coudé platform left Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Coudé platform right Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connectors

Coudé room Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Mezzanine level left Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Mezzanine level right Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Coudé cable wrap outer Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Coudé cable wrap inner Hand Held Device Junction Box / 1 available connector

Tab. 5-4 Interfaces for hand held device Mount Level The location of the of these junction boxes can also be found in Chapter 5.6.


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6 Operating Instructions

6.1 Safety Precautions

CAUTION

It is absolutely required to follow the instructions of the OEM documentation for all activities beyond normal operation (refer to operation modes).

6.2 System Power-up and Shutdown

For system power-up and system shutdown special procedures have to be carried out.

CAUTION

An external 120V UPS connection is available to supply the MEJ1a and CPJ power cabinets in case of power loss. This UPS power line is forwarded to the drive cabinets (MDC1/MDC2 and CDC1/CDC2) as well as the control cabinets (MCC1/MCC2 and CCC) to supply power to nearly all electronic modules.

CAUTION

The MMCS and CMCS IPC’s are additionally equipped with storage batteries. These UPS’s are supplying the motion controller in case of a lost 24VDC UPS Power from the control cabinets (MCC1 and CCC).


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02 15-Oct-2012


CAUTION

The servo amplifiers are equipped with an intermediate circuit buffered with large capacitors. Even if the main power is off, it can take up to 10 minutes until the voltage at terminal TBD at the servo amplifiers is below 50V DC.

CAUTION

The zero potential has to be always measured and verified with an appropriate measuring device before starting with the pending work. This applies to all subsystems.


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02 15-Oct-2012


6.2.1 System Power-up Procedure

Power-up procedure for the power supply cabinets

• Turn on main switches on the power cabinet at Mount Level (MEJ1a) and Coudé Level (CPJ) Power-up procedure for the drive cabinets

• Turn on drive cabinet switches at Mount Level (MDC1 and MDC2) and Coudé Level (CDC1 and CDC2) Control Subsystems

• The MMCS and CMCS IPC’s start automatically when supplied with power

• The system is operational after approximately 5 minutes start up time Alternatively if the IPC don’t start automatically

• Wait 5mins to be sure the UPS has reached their minimum state of charge

• The IPC can also be started by hand by switching the following fuses on and again off: o -31914CB for Mount Motion Control System IPC o TBD for Coudé Motion Control System IPC

• The system is operational if the status indicator located at the respective cabinet is turned on Starting safety system Input from IMT (TBD) Start of Control System

• For starting the MCS controllers refer to the ATST Software Operations Manual [RD03] Activation of Drives

• Activate drives

Important

It may happen that some fuses will drop during power-up caused by the high in-rush current of some devices. In that case it may either be possible to reset the fuses after all other devices have finished their power-up cycle, or the concerned devices can be individually switched on.


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6.2.2 System Shutdown Procedure

IPC shutdown

• The telescope should be in park position (refer to Chapter 6.3)

• The main drives have to be deactivated (refer to ATST Software Operations Manual Chapter 7.4.12)

• Push one emergency button

• For the IPC restart (Power up) you have to wait 5minutes Safety system shutdown Input from IMT (TBD) Procedure under error conditions

• The telescope should be in park position (refer to Chapter 6.3)

• The main drives have to be deactivated

• Push one emergency button

• Switch off the main switches on the power cabinets at Mount Level (MEJ1a) and Coudé Level (CPJ) Servo Power Supply

• Switch-off main switches on the power cabinets at Mount Level (MEJ1a) and Coudé Level (CPJ)

• Switch-off drive cabinet switches at Mount Level (MDC1 and MDC2) and Coudé Level (CDC1 and CDC2)

• Switch-off 24V DC fuses at the control cabinets at Mount Level (MCC1 and MCC2) and Coudé Level (CCC) (optional)


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6.3 Park Positions

If the power is shut off the hard stops will move out into the engaged position independent of the current position of the Mount. To prevent the stopper to touch the buffer when the telescope is parked and the systems are shut down, safe park positions are defined. Azimuth: Safe park position is at 90° for the azimuth axis.

Figure 35 Azimuth Hard Stop engaged

Coudé: Safe park position is at 0° for the coudé axis.

Figure 36 Coudé Hard Stop engaged


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6.4 Modes of Operation

The following modes of operation are available:

• Remote Operation Mode (TCS and MCS Engineering Screen)

• Rate Mode

• HHD Operation Mode

6.4.1 Remote Operation Mode

The Mount Control System can be remote controlled by either the MCS Engineering Screen or by the Telescope Control System. During normal operation the commands are sent from TCS. If maintenance is required the MCS Engineering screen is able to control the mount control system. This engineering screen is intended to run on the engineering laptop that has Linux with all necessary software components installed. To allow maximum flexibility for maintenance operation, the engineering laptop can be connected to any of the 15 junction boxes described in Chapter 5.8.

Important

For the MCS it does not matter if commands are sent from TCS or MCS Engineering Screen. If both systems send commands at the same time, they will be internally queued by MCS and the first command received will be executed first. This behavior is intended by the ATST csf framework.

Important

If the Hand Held Device is connected to one of the interfaces points, all commands from TCS and MCS Engineering Screen will be rejected by the MMCS and CMCS!

CAUTION

The responsible operator must make sure that no person has access to the telescope during remote operation.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.4.1.1 Telescope Control System

In normal operation mode, commands are sent from the TCS. However, describing the TCS is not part of the MCS Operations Manual. More information can be found in [AD08].

6.4.1.2 MCS Engineering Screen

In service or maintenance mode, the MCS Engineering Screen is used to provide support for the service technicians. The MCS engineering screen uses the same interface as the telescope control system. Furthermore this engineering screen is used to test the MCS to TCS interface. A detailed description about the MCS engineering screen is provided in the MCS Software Operation Manual, refer to [RD03].

6.4.2 Rate Mode

The Rate mode can be activated by sending namedPos = getlost to the MCS Management Controller (via Engineering Interface or by TCS).If the rate mode is activated the position encoder values will be ignored. The system behaviour changes the following way:

• Only velocity set points will be accepted (jogging)

• The maximum allowed velocity will be reduced

• Only hardware limit switches define the movement range of the axis

Important

The commanded drive stops, if a final-limit is tripped (lo or hi). A further motion in this direction is not possible.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.4.3 HHD Operation

6.4.3.1 Activation of the HHD

Prerequisites for the usage of the HHD are:

• Drive System is active

• HHD is plugged to one of the available interfaces, all non-used sockets must be closed with a blind connector in order to short-cut the emergency stop interlock signal lines

The HHD mode is automatically activated once it is plugged into one of the junction boxes.

Important

Since opening a socket blind will result in an interlock that needs to be reset it is required to acknowledge the interlock explained in the next chapter. After the interlock has been successfully acknowledged it is possible to use the HHD.

Important

If during motion of the TMA one of the HHD interface sockets is opened, an interlock will occur and therefore an emergency stop ramp will be executed. Open any HHD interface sockets only when the TMA is not moving and in a deactivated state.

6.4.3.2 Resetting Errors and Interlocks

If an error or interlock occurred during operation and was resolved it is possible to reset and acknowledge it with the HHD:

• Hold and press both the “+ Button” and the “- Button” at the same time This procedure will reset the error in the axis motion controller. Pressing the “Move Enabled” Button will reset the error in the GIS. If the problem was resolved it is now possible to drive with the selected axis. If it is not possible to drive with the selected axis, the problem was not resolved and still exists.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.4.3.3 Moving with the Hand Held Device

It is possible to move in both directions of an axis with the HHD. It is not possible issue any position commands, only slewing (rate mode) is possible with the HHD. Procedure for moving in positive direction:

• Hold the “Move Enabled” Button

• Press the “+ Button” for positive acceleration

• If desired velocity is reached, release “+ Button”

• To reduce velocity press “- Button”

• To stop at the desired location press “0 Button” to stop movement Procedure for moving in negative direction:

• Hold the “Move Enabled” Button

• Press the “- Button” for negative acceleration

• If desired velocity is reached, release “- Button”

• To reduce velocity press “+ Button”

• To stop at the desired location press “0 Button” to stop movement

Important

For any movement with an axis the “Move Enabled Button” needs to be pressed during the whole movement process. If this button is released, an E-Stop is executed by the motion system and an interlock will occur. When using the HHD the precautions below must be followed:

CAUTION

The Hand Held Device must only be used by trained personnel. Two operators are necessary, if eye contact to hardware, e.g. drives or limit switches, is required, or if the override procedure shall be performed.

CAUTION

An emergency-stop push-button must be within reach of at least one operator.

CAUTION

The HHD can be used from any of the 15 HHD junction boxes. Be aware of moving parts during operation with the HHD.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.5 Mode switching

Switching from Remote Operation Mode to HHD Operation Mode requires the operator to open the blind cover on the desired junction box. This will trigger an interlock that results in closing all brakes and selection of all motors. This guaranties a defined start condition for the operator and prevents handling errors.

CAUTION

Before opening a blind cover on any of the junction boxes the operator has to make sure that no person can be harmed by a closing M1 Cover. In an event of an interlock the M1 cover will close automatically (if it is not already closed).


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.6 Telescope Locking Procedure

The normal locking procedure is as follows:

1. The crank handle shall be turned and the arrestor pin lifted up till the locking pin has reached the final position where it completely fills out the structure hole. The two pins always have to be fully extended to safeguard the OSS.

2. After completion of the maintenance operation the two pins shall be retracted to the intermediate position (with the arrestor pins lifted up) which is foreseen for function test w/o risk of damage to the equipment.

3. Finally the locking pins shall be retracted back into the rest position by turning the crank handle to allow normal operation of the OSS. The arrestor pin shall lock this position.

CAUTION

The Hand Crank for the locking pin must only be used by trained personnel.

Important

To lock the OSS it has to stay in the –14 degree or in the –104 degree altitude angle position. Only in these positions the Locking Pins shall be deployed.

Important

The Stow Pins are safety devices. Normally they are retracted and in their rest position – secured by arrestor pins.

Important

All positions are limit switch controlled by the LIC. That means that the axis can’t be moved until the hand crank is put back to its rest position.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.7 Telescope Manual Operation

To activate the manual drive it has to be engaged with the toothed brake disk via a spindle at the lower side of the gearbox. The spindle is operated by its hand wheel. The exact position is reached when it stops at the adjusted pin. A second limit switch than enables the „manual“ operation of the brake. The normal manual operation is as follows:

1. Push the footswitch to open the brake „manually“. 2. Turn the crank handle to the right or to the left to slew the OSS. 3. Release the foot switch after the new position is reached.

CAUTION

The crank handle at the front of the gear box shall be hold with both hands when the break is released. In adverted movement can occur when the OSS is not balanced.

CAUTION

The Hand Crank for manual movement of the OSS must only be used by trained personnel.

WARNING

Only use the hand cranks provided at the designated rest positions. This equipment is monitored by the GIS and prevents moving of the axis when hand crank is removed from its designated resting position.

Important

Any movement will be stopped when you release the footswitch


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


Important

To get back to automatic/remote operation the manual gear box has to be retracted by the hand wheel and brought back into its final disengaged position. This position is controlled by a limit switch.

Important

The Manual Drive is attached to the dog house and is normally disengaged. The rest position is limit switch controlled by the LIC. That means that the axis can’t be moved until the hand crank is put back to its rest position.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.8 M1 Cover Operating Procedure

Normal Operation of M1 Cover: The operation of the Mirror Cover occurs through the triggering of the operation by the MMCS. The operation of the cover must be enabled. In any error case this enabling will not be activated. The normal operation of the mirror cover is as follows:

1. Triggering opening / closing command through the MMCS or the M1 Cover Control Panel. 2. Opening / closing operation occurs. 3. Cover stops automatically when it reaches its end positions and is secured by a holding brake.

The cover features a fail-safe closure. If a power failure occurs any time and the mirror cover is in any other position than its closed position, the closing operation will automatically start.

Important

For any operation the locking pins of the Mirror Cover must be disengaged and positioned in their storing position. Otherwise no enabling of the operation of the cover will occur.

Important

For any operation the manual hand drive units of the Mirror Cover must be taken off the drive train and stored at their foreseen storing positions. Otherwise no enabling of the operation of the cover will occur.

Important

Operation of the cover should only occur after checking if any foreign objects are on the cover. If this is the case any operation should be forbidden until the foreign objects are removed.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


Manual Operation of M1 Cover: The manual operation of the Mirror Cover occurs through the manual drive unit which has to be attached to the free shaft end of the drive train. The normal manual operation of the cover is as follows:

1. Attach the manual drive unit to the free shaft end of the drive train. 2. Turn the crank handle to the right or to the left to open or close the cover. 3. When the end position is reached, remove the manual drive unit from the drive train.

CAUTION

Before the manual operation starts, check if any person is in the moving range of the cover. Manual operation of the cover shall only occur if nobody is in the moving range to prevent a personnel injury. Maintenance Platforms for Mirror Cover: The Maintenance Platforms are mounted during the overall maintenance mode to provide access to systems which are mounted above the primary mirror M1, e.g. the Acquisition Telescope. The normal operation for maintenance is as follows:

1. Close the cover either through the MMCS or manually as described in the foregoing. 2. Attach the maintenance platforms on the roof vertices. 3. Secure the maintenance platforms against displacement.

CAUTION

There is not any railing in the maintenance platforms. Beware of the size of the maintenance platform. Do not make any steps near the edges. Always step in the center of the maintenance platform.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.9 Motorized Deployable Bridge Operating Procedure

The access to the lower OSS area and to the rear side of the OSS rack cabinet is achieved via the +X Nasmyth platform side by a motorized deployable bridge. The bridge is normally retracted that it doesn’t hit the M5/M6 Tower when the OSS is slewing. They are operated from their corresponding motorized bridge control panel. This control panel consists of a button for lowering the bridge and a button for retrieve the bridge. Additionally an E-Stop button is available to stop movement of the bridges in an emergency case.

Important

It is only possible to lower the bridge if the altitude axis is in the maintenance position. This position is defined to be at 104°. The two final positions of the bridge spindle drive are limit switch controlled. The retracted position is furthermore LIC controlled.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.10 Errors and Warnings

The motion control units are equipped with numerous monitoring functions in order to detect inadmissible operating conditions. We distinguish between “warnings”, “errors”, and “interlocks”. Warning messages only serve to provide information and refer to an unusual operating condition, which may lead to a restriction of functions. Errors can be the consequence of warnings. Interlocks prevent the telescope from harming its operator or damaging itself by stopping the machine when tripped.

CAUTION

Temperature warnings have to be checked directly within maintenance, because of fire hazard risk. In Case of warnings the operators have to react directly and park the telescope in a safe position. As soon as an error is detected, the relevant drive axis will be disabled and a stop ramp function will be carried out. When zero speed is reached or upon the expiration of a predefined period of time, the motors will shut down and the brakes will be closed. The other main axes of the telescope continue to be ready for operation. Any errors must be acknowledged by a reset command before the axis can be re-activated. In many cases error messages are supplemented by additional warning messages providing more details. Since the servo amplifiers run an error processing routine by and in themselves and inform the respective motion controller of their failures, many failures are detected by both servo amplifiers and the motion controller software. Basically, the servo amplifiers are intrinsically safe.

In the event that the cause of an error cannot be detected and the error can be acknowledged, it will, first of all, be possible to continue the operation of the drive system (e.g. in case of temporary voltage fluctuations). In such a case, the drive should be operated – at the beginning – with minor loads and, as a rule, low rates. During the subsequent operation, the behavior of the drive system must be observed. Any repeated occurrence of the error refers to a possibly existing malfunction, which must be analyzed in detail, e.g. repeated shutdown of a drive caused by overloads on account of excessive wear. The messages will be transferred to the status data which the MCS will receive and make accessible to TCS and MCS Engineering Screen. The interlocks, errors and warnings of the motion system will be transmitted to the remote interface in bit coded mode. Even though the information is briefly described in the software design report [RD02], it will be detailed in this section.

CAUTION

Errors which are indicating problems with the rate loop and position controller have to be analyzed by specialists. It is recommended to inform MT-Mechatronics. Until this kind of error isn’t solved the telescope can’t be used for observation. The telescope may no longer be operated.

Important


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.10.1 Maintenance after serious error conditions

The telescope and servo system has to be maintained after the following error conditions: These errors can damage parts of the telescope.

• In case of problems with the one of the motion control systems (crash, shutdown, aso.)

• In Case of problems with the UPS systems or broken devices (electronic modules, clamps, inverters, ...).

• In Case of problems with the brakes. The Emergency stop ramp will be always executed in case of an error, also against closed brakes.


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.10.2 Bit mode coded system warnings

MMCS: Bit Name Description

00 sw_Temp_MMCS Temperature warning control cabinet MMCS

01-09

sw_Temp_XX Temperature warning control cabinet XX (XX=MCC1,MCC2, etc. )

10-22

not used

23 sw_hostCommErr Connection error with the actual controlling device

24-31

not used

CMCS: Bit Name Description

00 sw_Temp_CMCS Temperature warning control cabinet MMCS

01-09

sw_Temp_XX Temperature warning control cabinet XX (XX=CDC1, CDC1, etc. )

10-22

not used

23 sw_hostCommErr Connection error with the actual controlling device

24-31

not used

6.10.3 Bit mode coded system faults

Bit Name Description

0-4

not used

5 sf_taskComm Internal task communication problems

6-31

not used

6.10.4 Bit mode coded interlocks


1 swi_swIntLockCmd An interlock command is sent from the MCS

3 swi_HHD Wrong handling of the handheld device connection or both hand held devices are connected at the same time

4-5

not used

6 swi_shutdown A shutdown of the control computer will be executed

7-31

not used


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.10.5 Bit mode coded communication faults


0 comm_MMCS_IO_stateErr Ethercat communication State error of the +MMCS slide in 19” module

1-31

not used

6.10.6 Bit mode coded error status


0 err_Error_Active At least one error is set

1 err_Rate_Loop

The rate loop is in error state. Possible reasons are:

• At least one motor is not in ready state

• At least one motor could not be activated

• At least one amplifier reports overload

• At least one amplifier/motor system reports a communication

error (EtherCAT)

• At least one amplifier/motor system reports the maximum

tolerable velocity of the motor is reached

At least one amplifier/motor system reports “motor error servo”, refer to chapter “Motor warnings” for detailed description of the possible causes

2 reserved

3 err_Override The override mode is activated while the handheld panel is not activated or in override mode or the service mode is not active

4 err_Safety_Dev At least one of the safety project reports an failure, please refer to Beckhoff documentation KL6904, KL1904, KL2904

5 err_Extern The appropriate encoder system is not initialised properly

6 err_Power At least one main power supply of the system is faulty.

7 err_Brake Brake error active. Possible reasons are:…

8 err_Mot_ready Amplifier system of at least one motor is not ready for operation. Inverter module not ready


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


9 err_Motor

Motor failure, possible reasons are

• At least one of the servo power supply modules (KW) reports

an motor error

� Amplifier temperature

� Motor temperature

� Speed of rotation not in valid ranges

� Maximum torque exceeded

� Maximum power exceeded

� Excess temperature of cooling system

� Excess temperature of external components

� Excess temperature of power supply module

� Excess temperature of the KE module

� Tension is not in valid range

• The intermediate circuit power is not in the specified range.

10 err_Mot_Tacho The motor tacho of at least one motor is faulty

11 err_Mot_Comm

The communication ACU <-> Amplifier is faulty. Possible errors are:

• EtherCAT communication error

• Service channel communication error

• The Amplifier system is not on torque mode while the

ACU software commands torque set points

12 err_Mot_Timeout Activation timeout of at least one motor. Not all motors are activated during the configured timeout time. The activation timeout time is set in the configuration file “P160_t_MotTimeout”

13 err_v_Mot_Exceed The maximum tolerable velocity of at least one motor is exceeded. The maximum velocity is set in the configuration file “P052_v_Max”

14 err_v_Dev_Exceed The maximum tolerable velocity deviation is exceeded. The velocity deviation is set in the configuration file “P153_v_AbwMax”

15 err_Mot_Overload At least one of the servo power supply module (KW) reports a power limit fault that is preset for a defined time. The time is set in the configuration file “P161_t_iQuad_tTimeout”

16 err_Em_Limit_Dn The emergency limit down hardware limit switch is reached; to get out of this position the override mode is needed

30 err_SS1_STO Axis active while SS1_STO activated

31 not used


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.10.7 Bit mode coded warning status


0 wa_Param_Fault The axis is not initialized and can’t be used. The configuration file must be checked

1 wa_Rate_Mode

The axis is set to rate mode, the readout from the encoder will be ignored as well as all software position limits. For driving the axis only the hardware limit switches are used. While the axis is in rate mode the maximum velocity is reduced. The velocity for rate mode is set in the configuration file “P183_vSlewHHP”

2 wa_swLimit_Up The upper software limit has been triggered

3 wa_swLimit_Dn The lower software limit has been triggered

4 wa_opLimit_Up The upper operational limit has been triggered

5 wa_opLimit_Dn The lower operational limit has been triggered

6 wa_SS1_STO SS1_STO activated from the safety system


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.11 Interlocks

Interlocks are generated by the Global Interlock System. They decelerate the respective drives and inhibit their further motion by blocking the power of the servo amplifiers. The brakes will be closed by the respective motion controller when the zero motor velocity threshold of each motor is reached or upon the expiration of a predefined period of time. The feedback stand-still window of the motor, read out from the servo amplifiers, is configured inside in the inverter controller cards. The drive power enable signals are switching off the motors, upon the expiration of a predefined period of time like for the brakes. The Interlock behaviour is the same like for errors. Additionally the motion controllers are monitoring the software interlocks.

CAUTION

Interlocks do not make the telescope voltage-free. They just insure a stop of all main drives.

CAUTION

The self-arresting emergency stop push-button may only be retrieved, if the emergency situation is not existent any more. The emergency stop push-buttons can be retrieved by small turn. After that a reset command needs to be sent to the MCS system via HHD, TCS or MCS Engineering Screen to reset the motion controller and the GIS.

CAUTION

Before opening a blind cover on any of the junction boxes the operator has to make sure that no person can be harmed by a closing M1 Cover. In an event of an interlock the M1 cover will close automatically (if it is not already closed).


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


6.11.1 Hardware Interlocks

For more information refer to ATST Interlock System Design Report [AD09], ATST TMA Design Requirements to LIC [AD10], and ATST ICD -LIC to cabinets [AD11].

6.11.1.1 Emergency Limits

Each drive axis is equipped with a Multiturn Encoder to monitor the movement limits. These limits will only be tripped if a previous fault prevents the drive system from stopping at the end of the position range. Because the safety controller disables drive power, a special override procedure must be followed to move the drive back into its normal position range. Input from IMT (TBD)

6.11.1.2 Emergency Stop

Input from IMT (TBD)

6.11.2 Software Interlocks

The software interlocks are created by the MMCS/CMCS systems. These systems constantly monitor the status of the hardware and in case of hardware failures report a software interlock. The software interlocks are not safety related and therefore not monitored by the GIS. Information’s regarding software interlock messages can be found in the previous Chapter. The Chapter 6.4.3.2 provides information related to reset software interlocks with the HHD: For a procedure to reset these software interlocks with the TCS/MCS Engineering Screen refer to the ATST Software Operation Manual [RD03].


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


7 Wiring Diagrams


Issue Date:

02 15-Oct-2012


8 OEM Documentation

ATST-DOC-30900-01-02 TMA Operation Manual

Documents

Transcript of ATST-DOC-30900-01-02 TMA Operation Manual