G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES,petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO,respondents.HERMOSISIMA, JR.,J.:pOn March 7, 1983, a Complaint1for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs and their mothers family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:(a) Regular support and educational expenses;(b) Allowance to use his surname;(c) Payment of maternal bills;(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.7. The plaintiffs are thus, incontinuous possession of the status of(illegitimate)childrenof the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.2Petitioners denied all these allegations.After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered 1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:xxx xxx xxx4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as attys fee;8. Cost against the defendants.3Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out of time.A Petition for Prohibition andCertiorariwith prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.Hence, this Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:ARESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.BRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.CRESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.DRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.The law cited reads:Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) Theopen and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child],except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested or acquired right, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future.5InTayag vs.Court of Appeals,6a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as Claim for Inheritance but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, we had occasion to rule that:Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case ofRepublic of the Philippines vs.Court of Appeals,et.al.7where we held thatthe fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.xxx xxx xxxAccordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.Tayagapplies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.8WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.

HELD:The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]ERNESTINA BERNABE,Petitioner,vs.CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.Statement of the CaseBefore us is a Petition[1]for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2](CA) Decision[3]in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution[4]denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.[5]The FactsThe undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case ofUyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,the complaint is now barred x x x.[6]Orders of the Trial CourtIn an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.Ruling of the Court of AppealsOn the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.Hence, this appeal.[7]IssuesIn her Memorandum,[8]petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:IWhether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.IIWhether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.IIIWhether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]The Courts RulingThe Petition has no merit.First and Second Issues:Period to File Action for RecognitionBecause the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.[10]Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11]Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.[12]Bustos v. Lucero[13]distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.[14](Citations omitted)Recently, inFabian v. Desierto,[15]the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, thejudicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive lawand for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; butif it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17]is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, inAruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18]the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.Not Limited to Natural ChildrenTo be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not anaturalchild.A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, inDe Santos v. Angeles,[19]the Court explained:A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case ofAruego,which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.Moreover, in the earlier caseDivinagracia v. Rovira,[21]the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.Theprescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.[22](Citations omitted, italics supplied)Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones.[23]However,Roviratreats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24]the State asparens patriaeshould protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.Third Issue:Failure to Implead the CAUnder Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is infact the correct procedure.WHEREFORE,the Petition is herebyDENIEDand the assailed Decision and ResolutionAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD:Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

[G.R. NO. 181556 : December 14, 2009]IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,Petitioner,v.STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course.2Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court, reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets.After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied)Relying thereon, PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings, praying that an Order be issued for:1. The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein petitioner, PDIC, in the amount ofP3,795,096.05;2. The provision ofP700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.;3. The write-off of assets in the total amount ofP8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof;4. The write-off of liabilities in the total amount ofP1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof;5. The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex "Q" hereof;6. Authorizing petitioner to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the lapse of said period, unclaimed payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Rule 91 of the Rules of Court;7. Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations after the lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.By Order of July 5, 2006,Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer, respectively praying for the approval of the Final Project of Distribution and for authority for PDIC "to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated . . . for creditors" of Intercity Bank.In granting the motion, the trial court resolved in the negative the sole issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals7before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse should be to this Court through a Petition for Review onCertiorarisince the question involved was purely one of law. By Resolution of October 17, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008,PDIC filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

G.R. No. 181089 : October 22, 2012MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAS,Complainant,v.LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decisiondeclaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. llOn May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaz, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaintfor Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Informationlfor Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThat on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities. On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.In its Orderdated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tanwhere we held: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x xllAs to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsiderationclaiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,the dispositive portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.rllbrrSO ORDERED.In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryI. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability. Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us. Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said: In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x xNevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. llIn this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:x x x x2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.We rule in the negative.In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28rllEven if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.We are not persuaded.In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryAs far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThe fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.rllbrrSO ORDERED.DIGESTED

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondents clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.