G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANC 1!2, "UEZON CIT#, $%& CONSUELO '. GO'EZ(VALDEZ, respondents. VITUG, J.:pThe petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in CivilCase No. Q-!-"!#$. %etitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern thedispositionof afamilydwellinginasituationwhereamarriageisdeclaredvoid abinitio becauseof psychologicalincapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.&ntonio 'alde( and Consuelo )ome( were married on *# +anuary ",". -egotten during the marriage were .ve children./n a petition, dated !! +une "!, 'alde( sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to &rticle $0 of the1amily code 2doc3eted Civil Case No. Q-!-"!#$, Regional Trial Court of Que(on City, -ranch "*!4. &fter the hearing theparties following the 5oinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of ! +uly "6, granted the petition, viz789:R:1;R:, 5udgment is hereby rendered as follows72"4 The marriage of petitioner &ntonio 'alde( and respondent Consuelo )ome(-'alde( is hereby declared null andvoid under &rticle $0 of the 1amily Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply withtheir essential marital obligationsH &T T9&T T/?:4 9/= C9;/C: &= T;89;?, -:T8::N 9/= T8; %&R:NT=, 9: 8;F>H >/P: T; 9&': CF=T;HO ;':R 9/= %:R=;N.11/n the %etition for $ertiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions7T9: C;FRT ;1 &%%:&>= )R&':>O &-F=:H /T= H/=CR:T/;N 89:N /T R:1F=:H T; =:T R:=%;NH:NTJ= ?;T/;N1;R /NCR:&=:H =F%%;RT 1;R T9: %&RT/:=J =;N 1;R 9:&R/N).12T9:R: 8&= N; N::H 1;R T9: C;FRT ;1 &%%:&>= T; /NCR:&=: +&'OJ= ?;NT9>O =F%%;RT ;1 %"#,***.** -:/N))/':N -O %:T/T/;N:R :':N &T %R:=:NT %R/C:=.13/N R:=;>'/N) R:=%;NH:NTJ= ?;T/;N 1;R T9: /NCR:&=: ;1 +&'OJ= =F%%;RT, T9: C;FRT ;1 &%%:&>= =9;F>H9&': :N&?/N:H T9: >/=T ;1 :N%:N=:= =F-?/TT:H -O R:=%;NH:NT /N T9: >/)9T ;1 %:T/T/;N:RJ= ;-+:CT/;N=T9:R:T;, /N=T:&H ;1 ?:R:>O &==F?/N) T9&T +&'O /= :NT/T>:H T; & %#,*** /NCR:&=: /N =F%%;RT &= =&/H&?;FNT /= @T;; ?/N/?&>.@14>/P:8/=:, T9: C;FRT ;1 &%%:&>= =9;F>H 9&': )/':N %:T/T/;N:R &N ;%%;RTFN/TO T; %R;': 9/= %R:=:NT/NC;?: T; =9;8 T9&T 9: C&NN;T &11;RH T; /NCR:&=: +&'OJ= =F%%;RT.158ith regard to the .rst issue in the main case, the Court of &ppeals articulated7;n &ssignment of :rror C, the trial court, after .ndings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of theparties particularly the defendant-appellee but li3ewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on thebasis of &rticles !", !!", and !!! of the Civil Code of the %hilippines.Thus, thelower court foundthat plaintiC-appellant deceivedthedefendant-appelleeintomarryinghimbyprofessing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parentalpressure to marry and thatbecause of pride he married defendant-appellee< that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his careerwasandalwayswouldbehis.rstpriority< thathewasunabletorelatenotonlytodefendant-appelleeasahusband but also to his son, +avy, as a father< that he had no inclination to ma3e the marriage wor3 such that intimes of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantQappellee and their son< that he had nodesire to 3eep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile aftertheir separation< that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suCer mental anguish, anBiety,besmirchedreputation, sleeplessnightsnot onlyinthoseyearsthepartiesweretogetherbut alsoafterandthroughout their separation.%laintiC-appellant assailsthetrial courtJsdecisiononthegroundthat unli3ethosearisingfromabreachinordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. 8hile it is correct thatthere is, as yet, no decided case by the =upreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of maritalobligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may bemade.Hefendant-appellee, in her amended answer, speci.cally prayed for moral and eBemplary damages in the totalamount of , million pesos. The lower court, in the eBercise of its discretion, found full 5usti.cation of awarding atleast half of what was originally prayed for. 8e .nd no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on &rticles !!", and !" of the Civil Code, which read as follows7&RT. !!",. ?oral damages include physical suCering, mental anguish, fright, serious anBiety, besmirchedreputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc3, social humiliation, and similar in5ury. Though incapable of pecuniarycomputation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proBimate result of the defendantJs wrongful act oromission.&RT. !". &ny person who wilfully causes loss or in5ury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, goodcustoms or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.Thetrial court referredto&rticle!"because&rticle!!"17 of theCivil Codeenumeratesthecasesinwhichmoraldamages may be recovered and it mentions &rticle !" as one of the instances. /t must be noted that &rticle !" states thatthe individualmust willfully cause loss or in5ury to another. There is a need that the act is willfuland hence done incomplete freedom. /n granting moral damages, therefore, the trialcourt and the Court of &ppeals could not but haveassumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant ofmoral damages would have no leg to stand on.;n the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on &rticle $0 of the 1amilyCode, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel -uenaventura. &rticle $0 of the 1amily Code states7&marriagecontracted byany party who,at thetime of thecelebration, was psychologicallyincapacitated tocomply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall li3ewise be void even if such incapacity becomesmanifest only after its solemni(ation.%sychological incapacity has been de.ned, thus7. . . no less than a mental 2not physical4 incapacity that causes a party to be 1+uly 2%,o3%21245 o6 1-5 7$82,9$+21$l ,o45%$%18 1-$1 ,o%,o921$%1ly 9u81 75 $88u95&$%&&28,-$+35&7y 1-5:$+1258 1o1-59$++2$35 which, assoeBpressedby&rticle0Dof the1amilyCode, includetheir mutual obligationstolivetogether, observelove, respectand.delityandrenderhelpandsupport. Thereishardlyanydoubtthattheintendment of the law has been to con.ne the meaning of @psychological incapacity@ to the most serious cases ofpersonality disorders clearly demonstrativeof an u115+ 2%85%8212421yo+ 2%$72l21y1o324595$%2%3$%&823%2;,$%,5 1o 1-5 9$++2$35. . . ."DTheCourt of &ppeals andthetrial court consideredtheacts of thepetitioner after themarriageasproof of hispsychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations ofmarriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. /tis contradictory to characteri(e acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the partybecauseof aninnateinability, whileat thesametimeconsideringthesameset of actsaswillful. -ydeclaringthepetitioneraspsychologicallyincapacitated, thepossibilityof awardingmoral damagesonthesamesetof factswasnegated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but onspeci.c evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had 3nowledge of his or her disability andyet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.1or the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants thatone must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitionerpurposely deceived the private respondent. /f the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on thepart of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.=ince the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of eBemplary damages cannot stand since theCivil Code provides that eBemplary damages are imposed 2% $&&212o% to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatorydamages.198ith respect to the grant of attorneyJs fees and eBpenses of litigation the trial court eBplained, thus7Regarding &ttorneyJs fees, &rt. !!*D of the CivilCode authori(es an award of attorneyJs fees and eBpenses oflitigation, other than 5udicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiCJs act or omission has compelled the defendantto litigate and to incur eBpenses of litigation to protect her interest 2par. !4, and where the Court deems it 5ust andequitable that attorneyJs fees and eBpenses of litigation should be recovered. 2par. ""420The Court of &ppeals reasoned as follows7;n &ssignment of :rror H, as the award of moral and eBemplary damages is fully 5usti.ed, the award of attorneyJsfees and costs of litigation by the trial court is li3ewise fully 5usti.ed.21The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in .lingthe complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent tolitigate, since both are grounded on petitionerJs psychological incapacity, which as eBplained above is a mental incapacitycausing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. 9ence, neither can be a ground for attorneyJs feesand litigation eBpenses. 1urthermore, since the award of moral and eBemplary damages is no longer 5usti.ed, the award ofattorneyJs fees and eBpenses of litigation is left without basis.&nent theretirement bene.tsreceivedfromthe1ar:ast -an3andTrust Co. andthesharesof stoc3inthe?anila?emorial %ar3 and the %rovident )roup of Companies, the trial court said7The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the con5ugal partnership in theevent of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The 9onorable =upreme Court has held that the declaration ofnullity of marriage carries ipso facto a 5udgment for the liquidation of property 2Homingo v. Court of &ppeals, etal., ).R. No. "*6D"D, =ept. ",, "$, !!0 =CR&, pp. #,! Q #,$, #D04. Thus, spea3ing through +ustice 1lerida Ruth %.Romero, it was ruled in this case78hen a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the .nal 5udgment therein shall provide forthe liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of thecommon children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had beenad5udicated in the previous proceedings.The parties here were legally married on +uly 6, ",, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage,whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses,is presumed to be con5ugal unless the contrary is proved 2&rt. ""0, New 1amily Code< &rt. "0*, Civil Code4. &rt."",of the1amilyCodeenumerateswhat arecon5ugal partnershipproperties. &mongothers theyarethefollowing7"4 Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the eBpense of the common fund, whether theacquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses:T:H.=; ;RH:R:H.6>i3e the RTC earlier held, the C& ruled that ?etroban3 failed to overthrow the presumption established in &rt. ""0 of the1amily Code. &nd also decreed as going against ?etroban3 was 1lorenciaJs failure to comply with the prescriptions of thesucceeding &rt. "!6 of the Code on the disposition of con5ugal partnership property. &rt. "!6 states7&rt. "!6. The administration and en5oyment of the con5ugalpartnership property shall belong to both spouses5ointly. /n case of disagreement, the husbandJs decision shall prevail, sub5ect to recourse to the court by the wifefor proper remedy B B B./ntheeventthatonespouseisincapacitatedorotherwiseunabletoparticipateintheadministrationofthecon5ugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not includedisposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. /n the absenceof such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shallbe void. 9owever, the transaction shallbeconstrued as a continuing oCer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfectedas a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authori(ation by the court before the oCer iswithdrawn by either or both oCerors.&s to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneyJs fees, the C&, in gist, held that ?etroban3 did not enterinto the mortgage contract out of ill-will or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or li3e dishonest considerationsas to 5ustify damages.?etroban3 moved but was denied reconsideration by the C&.Thus, ?etroban3 .led this %etition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 6#, raising the following issues for consideration7a. 8hether or not the KC&L erred in declaring sub5ect property as con5ugal by applying &rticle ""0 of the 1amilyCode.b. 8hether or not the KC&L erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondentNicholson %ascual and 1lorencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.c. 8hether or not the KC&L erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.7Ou+ Rul2%3& modi.cation of the C&Js Hecision is in order.T-5 D28:u15& /+o:5+1y 28 Co%?u3$l/t is?etroban3Jsthresholdposturethat &rt. "0*of theCivil Codeprovidingthat @KaLll propertyof themarriageispresumed to belong to the con5ugal partnership, unless it be proveKnL that it pertains eBclusively to the husband or to thewife,@ applies. To ?etroban3, &rt. ""0 of the 1amily Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and1lorenciacontractedmarriagebeforetheeCectivityof the1amilyCodeon&ugust $, "DD. Citing 2anongsongv"3stimo,8 ?etroban3 asserts that the presumption of con5ugal ownership under &rt. "0* of the Civil Code applies whenthere is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. ?etroban3 adds, however, that for the presumption ofcon5ugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not only was the property acquired during themarriage but that con5ugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, ?etroban3 cites 4rancisco v" $ourt ofAppeals9 and 5ocson v" $ourt of Appeals,10 among other cases, where this Court held that a property registered in thenameof acertainpersonwithadescriptionofbeingmarriedisnoproof thatthepropertywasacquiredduringthespousesJ marriage.;n the other hand, Nicholson, ban3ing on 6e 7eon v" &ehabilitation 4inance $orporation11 and 8ong v" 9A$,12contendsthat ?etroban3 failedtoovercomethelegal presumptionthat thedisputedpropertyis con5ugal. 9easserts that?etroban3Js arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be shown for thepresumption in favor of con5ugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses,as inapplicable, 4rancisco and 5ocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no indication as to the eBact date ofacquisition of the property alleged to be con5ugal.&s a .nal point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that ?etroban3 had virtually recogni(ed the con5ugal nature of theproperty in at least three instances. The .rst was when the ban3 lumped him with 1lorencia in Civil Case No. **-,D as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as @spouses@ in the petition for eBtra5udicial foreclosure of mortgage. Thencame the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-mortgagor. &nd third, in itsdemand-letter13 to vacate the disputed lot, ?etroban3 addressed Nicholson and 1lorencia as @spouses,@ albeit the .nalityof the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.8e .nd for Nicholson.4irst, while ?etroban3 is correct in saying that &rt. "0* of the Civil Code, not &rt. ""0 of the 1amily Code, is the applicablelegal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the 1amily Code, it errs in its theory that, beforecon5ugal ownershipcouldbelegally presumed, theremust beashowingthat theproperty was acquiredduringmarriage u82%3,o%?u3$l 6u%&8. Contraryto?etroban3Jssubmission, theCourt didnot, in2anongsong,14 addthematteroftheuseofcon5ugal fundsasanessential requirementforthepresumptionofcon5ugal ownershiptoarise.Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumptionthat the property is con5ugal. /ndeed, if proof on the use of con5ugal is still required as a necessary condition before thepresumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superUuity. &s we stressedin $astro v" 2iat7%etitionersalsooverloo3&rticle"0*of theNewCivil Code. /t providesthat @all propertyof themarriageispresumed to be con5ugal partnership, unless it be proveKnL that it pertains eBclusively to the husband or to thewife.@ This article &o58 %o1 +5=u2+5 :+oo6 1-$1 1-5 :+o:5+1y >$8 $,=u2+5& >21- 6u%&8 o6 1-5:$+1%5+8-2:. Thepresumptionappliesevenwhenthemannerinwhichthepropertywasacquireddoesnotappear.15 2:mphasis supplied.4-econd, 4rancisco and 5ocson do not reinforce ?etroban3Js theory. ?etroban3 would thrust on the Court, invo3ing the twocases, the argument that the registration of the property in the name of @1lorencia Nevalga, married to Nelson %ascual@operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during theeBistence of the marriage.?etroban3 is wrong. &s Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the eBistenceof the marriage, then the presumption of con5ugalownership applies. The correct lesson of 4ranciscoand 5ocson is thatproof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favorof con5ugal ownership. 8hen there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a titleis in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs eBclusively to said spouse.16The Court, to be sure, has ta3en stoc3 of NicholsonJs arguments regarding ?etroban3 having implicitly ac3nowledged,thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the con5ugal ownership of the disputed lot, the ban3 having named the formerin the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of 1lorencia or her co-mortgagor. /t is felt, however, that there isno compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the .rst time in thispetition. -esides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the classi.cationof the lot in question.T5+92%$12o% o6 Co%?u3$l /+o:5+1y R53295 &o58%o1 ipso facto E%& 1-5 N$1u+5 o6 Co%?u3$l O>%5+8-2:?etroban3 neBt maintains that, contrary to the C&Js holding, &rt. "! of the 1amily Code is inapplicable. &rt. "! in partreads7&rt. "!. Fpon the dissolution of the con5ugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply7B B B B2,4 The net remainder of the con5ugal partnership properties shall constitute the pro.ts, which shall be dividedequally betweenhusband and wife, unless a diCerent proportion or division wasagreed upon in the marriagesettlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.&propos the aforequoted provision, ?etroban3 asserts that the waiver eBecuted by Nicholson, eCected as it werebefore the dissolution of the con5ugalproperty regime, vested on 1lorencia full ownership of allthe propertiesacquired during the marriage.Nicholson counters thatthemeredeclaration of nullityofmarriage,withoutmore,does not automaticallyresultin aregime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the con5ugal assets.8e again .nd for Nicholson.8hile the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and 1lorencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the con5ugalpartnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as con5ugal propertiesuntil and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply &rt. "! of the1amily Code on liquidation of the con5ugal partnershipJs assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application,or =ection ,, Chapter 6, Title /', -oo3 / 2&rts. ", to "D#4 of the Civil Code on the sub5ect, Con5ugal %artnership of )ains.1or, therelevant provisionsof bothCodes.rst requiretheliquidationof thecon5ugal propertiesbeforearegimeofseparation of property reigns./n 6ael v" 9ntermediateAppellate$ourt, weruledthat pendingits liquidationfollowingits dissolution, thecon5ugalpartnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs ofthe deceased.17/nthispre-liquidationscenario, &rt. 6$of theCivil Codeshall governthepropertyrelationshipbetweentheformerspouses, where7:ach co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and bene.ts pertaining thereto, and hemay therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its en5oyment, eBcept whenpersonal rights are involved. Bu1 1-5 5D5,1 o6 1-5 $l25%$12o% o+ 1-5 9o+13$35, >21- +58:5,1 1o 1-5 ,o(o>%5+8, 8-$ll 75l29215&1o1-5:o+12o%>-2,-9$y75$llo115&1o-292%1-5&24282o%u:o%1-515+92%$12o% o6 1-5 ,o(o>%5+8-2:. 2:mphasis supplied.4/n the case at bar, 1lorencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on &pril $*, ",, or a little less than two yearsafter the dissolution of the con5ugal partnership on +uly $", "#, but before the liquidation of the partnership. -e that asit may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted &rt.6$. Fnderit, 1lorenciahastherighttomortgageorevensell herone-half 2"M!4 undividedinterestinthedisputedproperty even without the consent of Nicholson. 9owever, the rights of ?etroban3, as mortgagee, are limited only to the"M! undivided portion that 1lorencia owned. &ccordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining "M!undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.The conclusion would have, however, been diCerent if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the con5ugal partnership.-ut, as found by the courts a quo, the &pril , "# deed of waiver allegedly eBecuted by Nicholson three months prior tothe dissolution of the marriage and the con5ugal partnership of gains on +uly $", "# bore his forged signature, not tomention that of the notari(ing oAcer. & spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may becomethe root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.Fpon the foregoing perspective, ?etroban3Js right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, iscon.ned only to the "M! undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to 1lorencia. The other undividedhalf belongs to Nicholson. &s owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, ?etroban3 may as3 for the partition ofthe lot and its property rights @shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to Kthe ban3L in the division upon thetermination of the co-ownership.@18 This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of acontract must be recogni(ed as far as it is legally possible to do soQQquando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valerepotest.19/n view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of ?etroban3, there is hardly a need to discuss atlengthwhether or not ?etroban3wasamortgageeingoodfaith. =uAceit tostatefor thenoncethat wherethemortgagee is a ban3ing institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not loo3 beyond thefour corners of the title is inapplicable.20 Fnli3e private individuals, it behooves ban3s to eBercise greater care and duediligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property oCered assecurity and the validity of the mortgagorJs title must be standard and indispensable part of the ban3Js operation. 21 &ban3 that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona :de mortgagee,22 as here.-ut as found by the C&, however, ?etroban3Js failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the result of adishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a 3nown duty for some interest or ill-will that parta3es of fraud thatwould 5ustify damages.as %iSas City, -ranch !#6 2trial court4 in Civil Case No. >%-*"-*"6.T-5 A%15,5&5%1 .$,18&lain ?. HiSo 2petitioner4 and ?a. Caridad >. HiSo 2respondent4 were childhood friends and sweethearts. They startedliving together in "D6 until they decided to separate in "6. /n "0, petitioner and respondent decided to live togetheragain. ;n "6 +anuary "D, they were married before ?ayor 'ergel &guilar of >as %iSas City.;n $* ?ay !**", petitioner .led an action for Heclaration of Nullity of ?arriage against respondent, citing psychologicalincapacity under &rticle $0 of the 1amily Code. %etitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to givelove and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping spreesandgallivantingwithherfriendsthat depletedthefamilyassets. %etitionerfurtherallegedthat respondent wasnotfaithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.:Btra5udicial service of summons was eCected upon respondent who, at the time of the .ling of the petition, was alreadyliving in the Fnited =tates of &merica. Hespite receipt of the summons, respondent did not .le an answer to the petitionwithinthereglementaryperiod. %etitionerlaterlearnedthat respondent .ledapetitionfordivorceMdissolutionof hermarriage with petitioner, which was granted by the =uperior Court of California on !# ?ay !**". %etitioner also learnedthat on # ;ctober !**", respondent married a certain ?anuel '. &lcantara.;n $* &pril !**!, the ;Ace of the >as %iSas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between theparties and the case was set for trial on the merits.Hr. Nedy >. Tayag 2Hr. Tayag4, a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent wassuCering from Narcissistic %ersonality Hisorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.Hr. Tayag found that respondentJs disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable./n its "D ;ctober !**0 Hecision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologicallyincapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.T-5 D5,282o% o6 1-5 T+2$l Cou+1The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondentJs psychologicalincapacity. Thetrial court ruledthat evenwithout Hr. TayagJspsychological report, theallegationsinthecomplaint,substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial courtfoundthat respondent committedactswhichhurt andembarrassedpetitioner andtherest of thefamily, andthatrespondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and .delity required of her under &rticle 0D of the 1amily Code. The trialcourt also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.The dispositive portion of the trial courtJs decision reads789:R:1;R:, in view of the foregoing, 5udgment is hereby rendered7". Heclaring the marriage between plaintiC &>&/N ?. H/W; and defendant ?&. C&R/H&H >. H/W; on +anuary "6,"D, and all its eCects under the law, as NF>> and ';/H from the beginning< and!. Hissolving the regime of absolute community of property.& H:CR:: ;1 &-=;>FT: NF>>/TO ;1 ?&RR/&): shall only be issued upon compliance with &rticleKsL #* and #" of the1amily Code.>et copies of this Hecision be furnished the parties, the ;Ace of the =olicitor )eneral, ;Ace of the City %rosecutor, >as%iSas City and the ;Ace of the >ocal Civil Registrar of >as %iSas City, for their information and guidance.=; ;RH:R:H.4%etitioner .led a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property andthe ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with &rticles #* and #" of the 1amily Code./n its "! ?arch !**, ;rder, the trial court partially granted the motion and modi.ed its "D ;ctober !**0 Hecision asfollows789:R:1;R:, in view of the foregoing, 5udgment is hereby rendered7"4 Heclaring the marriage between plaintiC &>&/N ?. H/W; and defendant ?&. C&R/H&H >. H/W; on +anuary "6,"D, and all its eCects under the law, as NF>> and ';/H from the beginning< and!4 Hissolving the regime of absolute community of property.& H:CR:: ;1 &-=;>FT: NF>>/TO ;1 ?&RR/&): shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the partiesJproperties under &rticle "6, of the 1amily Code.>et copies of this ;rder be furnished the parties, the ;Ace of the =olicitor )eneral, the ;Ace of the City %rosecutor of >as%iSas City and the >ocal Civil Registrar of >as %iSas City, for their information and guidance.59ence, the petition before this Court.T-5 I88u5The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriageshall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the partiesJ properties under &rticle "6, of the 1amilyCode.T-5 Rul2%3 o6 1-28 Cou+1The petition has merit.%etitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issuedafterliquidation, partition, anddistributionof thepartiesJ propertiesunder&rticle"6,of the1amilyCode. %etitionerargues that =ection "2"4 of the Rule on Heclaration of &bsolute Nullity of Null?arriages and &nnulment of 'oidable?arriages6 2the Rule4 does not apply to &rticle "6, of the 1amily Code.8e agree with petitioner.TheCourt hasruledin %aldesv" &'$, (ranch102, )uezon$it! that inavoidmarriage, regardlessof itscause, theproperty relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by &rticle "6, or &rticle "6D of the1amily Code.7 &rticle "6, of the 1amily Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by anyimpediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the casebefore the Court.&rticle "6, of the 1amily Code provides7&rticle "6,. 8hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live eBclusively with each other ashusband and wife without the bene.t of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned bythem in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their wor3 or industry shall be governed by therules on co-ownership./n the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have beenobtained by their 5oint eCorts, wor3 or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. 1or purposes of this &rticle, aparty who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed5ointly in the acquisition thereof if the formerJs eCorts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of thehousehold.Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitationand owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.8hen only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownershipshall be forfeited in favor of their common children. /n case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children ortheir descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. /n the absence ofdescendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. /n all cases, the forfeiture shall ta3e place upon termination ofthe cohabitation.1or &rticle "6, of the 1amily Code to apply, the following elements must be present7". The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each otheranding=ubdivision, &langilan, -atangasCity< No. ",0-rias=treet, Nasugbu, -atangas< %. =amaniego=treet,=ilangan, Nasugbu, -atangas< and -atangas City, .nanced by 1ilinvest< 2!4 cash amounting to %!**,***.**< and 2$4 motorvehicles, speci.cally 9onda City and Toyota Tamaraw 1N2collectively, @8aived %roperties@4. Thus, =alas contended that thecon5ugal properties were deemed partitioned.The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court/n its !0 =eptember !**D ;rder, the RTC ruled in favor of &guila. The dispositive portion of the ;rder reads789:R:1;R:, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to partitionbetween themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without pre5udice to the legitime oftheir legitimate child, +oan +isselle &guila =alas72"4 & parcel of land registered in the name of +uan =. =alas married to Rubina C. =alas located in =an -artolome,Que(on City and covered by TCT No. N-!#!-& mar3ed as :Bhibit @&@ and its improvements