AGASSI, Joseph - Kuhn's Way

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DOI: 10.1177/0048393102032003062002 32: 394Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Joseph AgassiKuhn's Way

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PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2002Agassi / KUHNS WAY

Kuhns Way

JOSEPH AGASSITel-Aviv University and York University, Toronto

Anything printed isipso factoout of date.Whittaker (1913, 26)

Thomas S. Kuhn,The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. Edited by James Conantand John Haugeland. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000.Pp. viii + 325. No bibliography; no index. $25.00 (hardcover),$18.00 (paperback).

PRELIMINARIES

This review of the posthumous collection of essays by Thomas S.Kuhnwill take the formof a personal obituary. I attempt to offer somebackground to his scholarly career, find a coherent story in it, andcome to a revised conclusion. I am not neutral, since I fancy myself arival. (He was my senior by a few years.) We wrote on the quantumrevolution(Agassi 1967; Kuhn 1978) and on the historiography of sci-ence(Kuhn1962;Agassi[1963]1967).Hissecondbookwasthefirstonthat topic; my first book came second. We reviewed each others book(Kuhn 1966; Agassi 1966). Gerd Buchdahl (1965, 69) reviewed bothbooks and noted a trend. The trend was mostly Kuhn. (Comparepages 28 and 168 of Kragh [1987].) His success was immense. Hisbook influenced . . . scientists, . . . economists, historians, sociologistsand philosophers, touching off considerable debate. It has sold aboutone million copies in 16 languages and remains required reading inmany basiccourses in the historyand philosophy of science (Gelder1996).

Hegood-humoredly indulgedmyunrulyhistoriesandcrudeman-ners. Our casual meetings were few but pleasant. He invited me tospeak to the departmental graduate seminar in Princeton. He thenreceived me at his home. We crossed swords in meetings. His book on

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Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32 No. 3, September 2002 394-430

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the quantum revolution (Kuhn 1978) had earned many reviews, andhe answered all of them (Kuhn 1984) save mine (Agassi1983). We met

last at the international history of science meeting at Berkeleyin 1985.I talked there about willful distortions of historical evidence. As anexample, I cited works of Henry Guerlac (Agassi 1987,102).Thereandthen, Kuhn broke off relations with me. Guerlac was a friend, hebriefly explained. It was nothing personal. He just wanted to be frank.I valued this frankness. This was our last meeting. He ignored all myefforts to appease him.

Traditionally, historians of science considered open criticism hos-tile. They thereforeconcealed their criticism. (I. Bernard Cohen [1954,164] is the first to have noticed this custom.) Guerlac told me that hisreviewof DonaldMcKie (Guerlac 1954) contained criticismandthat ithad aroused hostility. Oddly, I find no criticism in the review. Bothauthorandreviewer pouredscornon thephlogistontheorybecause itis false and praised Lavoisiers alternative as if it were true. Bothmasked the familiar refutations of Lavoisier, implying that only histerms needed updating (McKie [1952] 1962; Guerlac 1961; Agassi[1963] 1967, 17, 30, 41, 43, 46, notes 3, 22, 34, 36, 63, 91, 119). Kuhn(1962, 139-43, 173) noted rightly that some distortions are unavoid-able and thus excusable. He ignored the willful ones. My book offersmany examples of this kind. In his review of it, he dismissed them enbloc as dated (Kuhn 1966). Here he reports on his discovery of themand on his having learned from this discovery to avoid inflicting up-to-date readings on old texts (pp. 276-77, 291, cf. 276, 278). Obviousnow, it took courage to notice this when distortion was the rule. Hiscensure was of my criticizing a colleague by name and of my disre-

gard for the reputation of the field.His histories are above the ordinary cut, as he did not conceal con-troversy and error. Regrettably, he played them down. The centraltheme of the present summing up is this. Controversy is a vital andregular factor in the scientific tradition. Kuhn didnot do it justice. Hesaidthat most of thetime, leadingscientistsshieldtherulingscientificidea of the day from criticism,and rightly so.This attitude limited hisvision.Iamneveraphilosopherandahistorianatthesametime,heclaimed (p. 316). He was in error. We are all victimsof our philosophi-cal limitations, they being the chief source of distortion. The descrip-tion of Galileos significant errorsby Alexandre Koyr (1939, intro-duction to part 2; [1965] 1968, 2)is a major event in thehistoriography of science. (Still, many ignore it, e.g., Kragh 1987.)

Agassi / KUHNS WAY 395



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Kuhn openly denied that normally we all need criticism. To criticizescientific leaders is unseemly, he taught.

GLOSSING OVER CRITICISMCREATES CONFUSION

I first met Kuhn in 1962, at Guerlacs international history of sci-ence congress in Cornell.My paper for the occasion concerned simul-taneous discovery. Historians of science often blur differencesbetween distinct ideas by identifying them with their up-to-date vari-ants. (Agassi [1963] 1967, 7-8, notes 29, 34, 40, 80; Fuller 1989, 130).Genuine simultaneity is rare. It results from theuseof similar tools fortesting one theory. Kuhns 1959 essay (Kuhn 1977, 66-104) depicts thesimultaneity of a discovery as due to time being ripe for it. This isobscure and useless. I showed Kuhn my paper. He pleaded withGuerlac to ask me to scrap it. This puzzled me. I let it go, perhapsbecause my impromptu substitute paper won praise. (It appeared inGuerlacsProceedings.)

I once postponedcommenting ona lectureof Kuhns fromthe pub-lic discussion period to a private chat. He thanked meas a gentlehint, I suppose. Again, I was puzzled. After all, he was a skillful con-testant. Later I found out that he regularly implied that he had theconsensus on his side. He viewed dissent from him as merely verbalvariance. Inevitably, the term cross-purposes better catches thenature of our discourse than disagreement, was his response toKarl Poppers criticism. There is not a great deal to choose between

us (pp. 126, 136, 141). Poppers choice of words seemed to him tooharsh (p. 126). Popper called failed predictions refutations. Kuhnpreferred anomalies. (He borrowed it from Hans Reichenbach[1944]). This matters little (p. 142). By any name, refutations of suc-cessful theories are genuine discoveries. The value of a theory spillsover to its refutation.

Kuhnsviewofdissentasverbalvariancehadahighcost.Themorehe managed to defend it, the more he came to view all dissent as ver-bal. Had he rewritten his famous book, he confessed, he wouldemphasize language changemore andthenormal/revolutionary dis-tinction less (p. 57). This renders merely verbal the conformity thathe required of researchers. So far, so good. It also renders merely ver-bal all revolutions. Not so good. Rudolf Carnap had an idea that he

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called the principle of tolerance(see below).According to this idea,all disagreement is verbal (Wedberg 1975, 163). Carnapian tolerance

allowsforchoicebetween variants of a received theory, notfor dissentfrom it: Carnap deemed that obligatory. W. V. Quine suggested thatthis idea of Carnaps rests on two assumptions: that perfect transla-tion is possible and that evidence decides the choice of theoriesuniquely. He criticized these assumptions (pp. 46-47, 279, 306). Kuhnendorsed Quines critique. Hence, he could not endorse Carnapsprinciple of tolerance. He came as close to it as he could (p. 104). Hewas a positivistmalgr lui.

The stakes were high. Kuhn deemed general assent essential forbecoming the leader in a field. He wanted to be the leader in the fieldof philosophy of science. To that end, he voiced as much accord as hecould.HevoicedaccordwithHempel(pp.208,309).Hevoicedaccordwith Popper (pp. 133, 135). He voiced accord with MargaretMasterman,his nemesis (pp. 137, 169n,300). Hevoicedaccordwith meon thehistoriography of science, forgettingmy view of thegreatvalueof scientific controversy (Kuhn 1966).

Controversyaboutscientificmatters sometimes looked much likea cat fight, he said(p. 108). Hedeemed ita communication barrier (p.124). When I received the kind letter in which Carnap told me of hispleasure in my manuscript, I interpreted it as mere politeness, not asan indication that he and I might usefully talk. That reaction Irepeated to my loss on a later occasion (p. 227). The expression tomy loss here does not signify a change of view. It refers to his igno-rance at the time of deepparallelsbetweenhis views and those thatCarnap had allegedly formed late in life. He did not divulge the con-

tent of these deep parallelsbeyondmentioningan obscure paper bya fan of both. There is no such deep parallel. Carnaps pleasure inKuhns manuscript is simple. He could appreciate rival views.Regrettably, he also shared the common practice of flaunting areas ofagreement, as he had no room for controversy in his philosophy (seebelow).

Kuhn linked assent with approval. He enjoyed a very consider-able rapprochement with Hempel (p. 247). He flaunted areas ofaccord with Hempel. They found that their views were perhaps notquite so different as we both then thought (p. 225). Hempel learnedto agree with Kuhn. Carnap had endorsed the dichotomy betweentwokinds of descriptive concepts: thepurely observationalandthepurely theoretical. Hempel agreed. Kuhn disagreed. A few years




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later, Hempel moved to Kuhns view. Referring to the traditionaldichotomy as if it were Carnaps distinction, Kuhn said that Hempel

had replaced it with a distinction between old and new concepts (p.226). This way he implicitly adopted a developmental or historicalstance (p. 226). Implicitly. He then put things in a sort of historicaldevelopmental perspective (p.309). Sort of.Kuhn tried hard, we see,to present a sort of agreement with Hempel.He was a friend (pp. 209-10, 224-26).

The story involves a misreading and a distortion. The distinctionbetween observational and theoretical concepts is innocuous. All dis-tinctionsare. Carnapserror liesin hisview that somedescriptive con-cepts are purely observational. Kuhn reported appreciatively thatCarnap too had given up this view (p. 227). This report is fantasy(Carnap 1963, 964-66; 1966).

Hempel backeda theory of Carnapsknown asthe theory of reduc-tion sentences. Kuhn backed Hempel on this (Kuhn 1977, 259). This ispuzzling. Let me explain. In 1935, Popper criticized the claim thatobservational terms can be pure. They are all dispositional. Theterm glass implies breakable. Observation reports it partakes inare thus testable and so not pure. In 1936, Carnap offered his theoryof reduction sentences that reduces dispositional terms to purelyobservational ones. It says something like this. Glass is breakable if itbreaks when the pressure on it is above a certain minimum. But isbreak a purely observational term? I do not know what Carnapsanswer was to this question. He didnot try to present purely obser-vational terms. Theliterature is still openon this. (See Hintikka [1975]fora conspicuous example.See, however, Murzi [2001].) Kuhn hadno

business endorsing any theory of Carnaps. He did so only because ofHempel. Carnap was an inductivist to the last (Carnap 1963, 998). Sowas Hempel. Kuhn was an anti-inductivist. He should haverespected inductivism without giving it his consent. Linking accordwith respect causes confusion.

Kuhn did not always conceal his dissent. His reluctance notwith-standing, he expressed dissent from Popper, from Carnap, and fromReichenbach (p. 127). More important, he dissented from the tworevered traditional views of science that positivism allows. (One isinductivism: inductive inferences are from observed data to uniquetheory-choice. The other is instrumentalism: theories are empty for-mulas used for housing observed data.) On this Kuhn was an unre-pentantPopperian (p.128).Assent toPopper imposessomedissent.




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among these the demand that they should respect rivals. Kuhndeclared that science recognizes no rivalry. As a historian of science,

he opposed concealing controversy; as a philosopher of science, headvocated suppressing controversy. This latter is neither possiblenornecessary. Rather, we should all learn to argue in dignity. All that isneeded are suitable procedures and sensible, skillful moderators.

Bacons view that criticism is divisive is self-reinforcing. It urgescritics to express disdain for their targets. Criticism and blame thusregularly mix. We should correct Bacon by separating them. This isimportant, mainly in history. Our rational heritage comprises a stockof noble and wise ideas and of noble and wise criticism of them,mostly valid.

Robert Boyle valued criticism but not its public display (Fulton1932, 101). Open, criticism makes its targets desert research, he said.Veiled criticism allows them to improve(Boyle 1661, Promial Essay).At the time, only a small band of amateurs conducted empiricalresearch.As their leader, Boyle respectedtheir feelings. He didnot tryto sustain theveilingof criticism.TheRoyal Societyof Londonunwit-tingly entrenched his demand to veil criticism by making it custom-ary. Newtontried to banishcriticism (Manuel 1968, 344-48). It becamenormal tocompare disputetofire. Itgives littlelight and muchheat. Ifso, then efficiency should rise as the cold light of reason replaces thefire. Scant effort went into attempts in this direction. Diverse meanscan serve that end. Honor to objects of criticism from pens of leadingthinkers may help. To some extent it does. Reconstruction of greatpast disputes may help too. To some extent, that does it too (Agassi[1963] 1967, 61).

Faraday presented his new theory in the usual wayavoiding aclash of opinions. He was ignored. He became increasingly explicitin vain. He tried to institute a new, critical style of scientific discourse(in the British Association). He had limited success. Traditiondemanded that old,respectedtheoriesshouldbe vaguely assimilatedinto new ones. The model is Newtons vague sketch of the level ofaccuracy of Keplers laws as both full and partial (Newton 1687, III,13; Cohen 1974, 325). Oddly, William Whewell was the first to notethis, and only apropos of some polemics. Keplers laws are not accu-rate, he said. Hence, they contradict Newtons laws. This wasignored, as he still tried to insist that the views of both Newton andKepler were true. John Herschel and Pierre Duhemnotedthese prob-lems too. Also to no avail.




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Einstein was the first to propose that older theories be treated asapproximationsto newer ones. He soughtcrucial tests betweenthem.

He respected all criticism (Einstein [1949] 1959, II, last words). New-tons theory, though superseded, is a great feat that still guides think-ing (Einstein [1949] 1959, I, 30). Popper (1963) developed this idea.Koyr ([1965] 1968, 54) said, Cartesian science, for us, belongsentirely to the past, whereas Newtonian science, though super-seded . . . is still alive. And very much so. I. Bernard Cohen (1974)then endorsed Poppers ideas and discussed Newtons vaguenessabout the status of Galileos and of Keplers laws in detail.

New theories meet the empirical criticisms that had hit the oldones. Science progresses by series of approximations. This idea isplain and powerful. Public notice of it lagged behind by a couple ofgenerations. Moritz Schlick, an eminent physicist-philosopher inVienna, belittled it.He charged Popperwith self-aggrandizement. Hethus managed to secure extra time for positivism. This allowed newcontenders to appear. Michael Polanyi offered a traditionalist viewthat wasfurther from postivism than that of Popper. He defended sci-ence and religion on a paras traditions. Kuhn offered an austereversionof Polanyisviews,offeringnotheoryof tradition andnothingat all on religion. The positivists could come to terms with this.

KUHN USED COMMON SENSETO FILL GAPS IN HIS PHILOSOPHY

Kuhn was a means for stoppingPopper. His choice tooverlooktra-

dition and religion was helpful and backed by common sense. Dis-cussing tradition raises controversy. Admittedly, any rounded viewon the rise of science takes notice of the great role that religion hasplayed in the process. Even Otto Neurath, the leading positivist,admitted that the rise of modern science owes much to religiousupheavals.He hated religion, andhe followed Duhem,in whose viewreligion and science are utterly detached. Even so, he would notignore history. Kuhn did. Paradigms are social entities. To discussthem with no sociology of science is odd, especially since so little isknown about them and since the little that is known does not sit wellwith Kuhns view of science as authoritarian (Finkelstein 1984, lastpages).

Kuhn witnessed in his lifetimea vast growthin the authority of sci-

ence. His image of it fits this. It is a rounded, convincing, insiders




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view. Seemingly, he omitted only technical stuff. One cannot grasp it,he said, without years of hard training. Normal scientists are compe-

tentprofessionalresearchers. Theysolvereasonablychallengingpuz-zles. They emulate the lead theory of the daythe paradigm. Thisway, they make puzzles manageable. A paradigm can become obso-lete, though. Leaders then spend sleepless nights trying to rectifymatters. They design a scientific revolution that is a paradigm shift.Observations only partly influence such shifts. They also resemblereligious conversions (pp. 108-9, 174-75) (Cohen 1987, 464, 468; Fuller1989, 67).Controversy may flairup inthe process. As a newparadigmsettles, consensus reemerges (pp. 108, 169n, 223, 288). Paradigmshadbeen traditionallymodels,particularlygrammatical [?]modelsofthe right way to do things (p. 298). They are what consensus wasabout (p. 299).

Kuhn insisted that nonetheless, science is empirical. He did notexplain. Rather, he appealed to commonsense. Notmuch of hisphilo-sophical output is devoted to exposition. Much of it is of ideas hesharedwith others.Most importantof these is that thereare no pureobservations and so no pure observational terms (pp. 107, 311).Most of his philosophical texts comprise examples from thehistoryofphysics. Nextcome corrections of misreadings of oldtexts. Nextcomedamaging misrepresentations of Kuhns own texts (p. 156). Hecomplained and showed surprise (pp. 53-54, 106, 123-24, 133-35, 156-57, 160, 228, 307-8, 311, 315, 322, and more). He was surprised to hear,Well, Tom, your biggest problem now is showing in what sense sci-ence can be empirical (p. 159n). He did not name his source, thoughhe mentioned that she had written a favorable review of his book,

thus targeting Mary B. Hesse (1963). The story reappears 30 pageslater, where he names her (p. 186). She repeated her message over alunch we three had one day. What troubled her, I understand, was hisview of the leaders as mediators between data and research.

Leaders impose paradigms, he said. They thus decide what pro-jects the rank and file should pursue. He did not say what or whomscience serves.He never mentioned grant donors.Presumably, he didnot favor gratifying them. Traditionally, research serves the curious,theseekersafterthetruth.Kuhndismissedthemasfossils(p.120).

Paradigms help solve puzzles. They undergo small revisions. Thissomehow makes them increasingly clumsy. Small revisions give wayto gigantic onesto revolutions. Leaders decide how much clumsi-ness to allowbefore going for a revolution.Einstein did not allow any

(Einstein [1949] 1959, I, 65). Kuhn reports that Einstein did (p. 154)




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on the assumption (Kuhns) that at any time, only one paradigm pre-vails. He (Kuhn) later withdrew this assumption, but he forgot to

withdraw thecorollaries to it.He finallyallowed formany paradigmsandforsmall revolutions (p.143). As these changesare gigantic, whathe was finally allowing for were small giants.

This is what Norwood Russell Hanson said (1964, 180-81). Kuhnhad good case histories, he said, but no idea for them to illustrate.After Kuhn had caught the public eye, he took back all that he hadever said, observed Hanson. Hanson wasquick to notice Kuhnsway,yet he exaggerated. Kuhn did have a theory. It is that leaders impose asharedbelief on all professional scientists.True, he alsotookthisbackonce, but we should overlook this as a mere slip. He said that sciencerequires dogma, as some dogmatic conduct is beneficial (Kuhn 1963).This justification will not do. When dogmatic conduct is useful, thenone can behave dogmatically without dogmatism (Bendix 1970, 68;Agassi 1977, 338). At one point, Kuhn said so too (p. 141). This musthave been a mistake, as it amounts to relinquishing the demand forshared belief. And then nothing of Kuhns philosophy remains.Abner Shimony (1993,309) hasascribed to Kuhn thesleight of handof a systematic abortion of a viable line of reasoning at exactly themoment that it became embarrassing to the author! This discussionpeters out unless someone presents a consistent canonic version ofKuhns philosophy. A sketch of its genesis may help them.

CONANT INFLUENCED KUHN SIGNIFICANTLY

Traditionally, empirical science was a loose network of amateurs.In the scientific revolution, the network became voluntary groups.(Boyle called his group an invisible college.) They became presti-gious clubs. They called themselves the republic of science, thecommonwealth of learning. Change followed the American andFrench Revolutions, the subsequent secularization of some universi-ties, and the industrial revolution. Technical universities appeared inthemid-19th century. Interest in science grew. Academies still ignoredresearch. Until World War I, the chemical industry employed only afewresearchers,andresearch institutesemployedfewer. Themilitarystepped in significantly only during World War II, and more so in thecoldwar.SaidDanhof(1968,1),forgoodorill,thecoldwarisinlargemeasure a war of the laboratories.Almost allof todays vast science-

based industry came during the cold war. Kuhns familiarity with the




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social history of science did not stop him from portraying research asa profession linkedto political power (pp. 149, 252) He even declared

this necessarily permanent (p. 252).To identify professionwith competence is to overlook incompetent

professionals and competent amateurs, not to mention outstandingamateurs (e.g., Michael Ventris). Kuhn collapsed quite a few distinc-tions. Here are some. Proficient versus dilettante. Professional versusamateur. Qualified versus unqualified. Polymath (e.g., vonNeumann) versus specialist. Reliable versus sham. Trade specialistversus academic specialist. Specialism versus subfield (Zuckerman1988, E 4b). Research activities versus research projects (Bunge 2001,170). Preference for an idea versus dogmatic adherence to it (Bendix1970, 68). His concernwas with prospective leaders. They must workhard and imitate top physics professors. These oozed authority andboasted top reputations (as well as security clearance). A lively pas-sage in Kuhns book on the quantum revolution (1978, 215) picturesyoung, hardly known Einstein visiting a famous university, the pro-fessorshowing himrespect, andthe students realizingthat hecounts.

All thisreflects thenew mentalityof thecoldwar. Harvard Univer-sity president Conant made new conditions for academic jobs. Hedemanded professional authority and political conformity(Hershberg 1993, 391-554; Danhof 1968, 281, 316, 320). Polanyi (1969)cautiously defended this authority. Authority grows out of mutualcontrol and criticism, he said. It enforces scientific standards andregulates thedistribution of professional opportunities. Above all, itis imperfect (pp. 44-46, 53-55, 94-95). For scientific opinion may, ofcourse,sometimes be mistaken(Polanyi 1962, 61). Kuhnsdefense of

authority is unqualified. Science is incertaincircumstances themostauthoritarian, he said (p. 308). The proviso in this sentence allowssome laxity. It gives license for controversy in interparadigm times.

ConantwasKuhnsmentor. He hadstanding in Washington, in thePentagon, and in the academy (Hershberg 1993, chap. 28; Lipset andRiesman 1975, 302, 305 ff). He wished to remain an academic but wasburnt out. So he opened a program for teaching popular science. Theideais worthybutweak. It canscarcely be improved without overalldirection and planning (Conant 1964, 51). Excuses for its weaknessabound. Were they serious, they and the obstacles that they depictwould beworthyof investigation(Conant 1964,chap.5).His programdid not suit his temper and his other activities. The rigorous scienceteaching programs of his battery of reputed top physicists (p. 266) left

popular teaching to the duds. He sought new ideas about education




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(Conant 1964, 4). He lacked a nationwide policy adequate to meetthe challenges ofthe new and awesomeage inwhich welive (Conant

1964, last sentence). Instead, he developed an innovative program forteaching the history of science. It had notable success (Hershberg1993, 409-11). When Kuhn joined it he was a rising star with a freshdoctorate in physics. History of science was barely a profession then.He had some difficulties settling down. Overall, however, accordingto his report, Conant had assured him of a career (p. 278).

Conants view of criticism is conservative. He said,

Atthe risk of incurringtheeverlastinghostility of theAmericanAssoci-ation of University Professors, I suggest that the time is more than ripefor lay boards to ask searching questions of the experts. These ques-tions, needless to say, should be addressed to the faculties through thepresidents and the deans. (Conant 1963, 110)

Controls, saidConant, flow from boardsthrough presidents, throughdeans. Kuhnagreedin part. Controls start at the top. The top isnot theboard but the scientific leadership. I assume that Kuhn was referringto leading intellectuals, not to presidents and deans. I am uncertain.He said nothing about presidents and deans and their part in wield-ing and molding intellectual prestige and power. He saidthat leadersare always right. In the absence of democratic controls, this holds foradministrators, not for researchers (Danhof 1968, 298). Kuhn ignoreddemocracy.

The success that physics then had was most unusual. Kuhnschoice of itasa paradigm is unhappy(Crane1972, 39; Reed 1987, 226).The same goes for his backing of rigid instruction. Scientific educa-

tion should be particularly careful to avoid this dangerous rigidity(Ziman 1968, 70-71). Kuhn ignored Robert Merton on egalitarianismin science (pp. 287-88; see also Zuckerman 1988). Derek J. de SollaPrice (1961, chap. 8) spoke of Diseases of Science. HarrietZuckerman (1988, V, C, D) discussed deviance in science. Popper(1945, chap. 10, n. 71) said that we have no guarantees for successandwe need training for criticism. Kuhn was unmoved by all of this.

The cold war initiated a social revolution (Weinberg 1963;Kowarski 1977; Agassi 1988). The academy began to offer to its mem-bers much in terms of worldly success. Academics increased theirefforts to gain worldly success (Zuckerman 1988, V, C, D). Competi-tionin theacademy increased(Burke1988, 114-32). Areversal is hope-fully now in store. Old wounds are healing. Interest in nuclear weap-




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ons is waning. The need for democratic control over the publicinstitutions of higher learning is gaining recognition. The republic of

science needs reconstruction. Giving up Kuhns authoritarianism is afirst healthy step.

HEMPEL FAILED TO RECONCILEKUHN WITH RATIONALISM

Kuhn was a frank authoritarian. So he invited the charge ofirrationalism.Thescientific leaders are rational, he replied, andso aretheir edicts. He offered no theory of rationality. He thus looked like aclandestine inductivist or a clandestine irrationalist.

In a symposium in honor of Hempel at the meeting of the EasternDivision of the American Philosophical Association heldin Boston in1983, Wesley Salmon and Kuhn paid homage to Hempel (chap. 9).Hempel was the commentator and Israel Schefflerwas in the chair. Inthe discussion period, I criticized the hostility to metaphysics thatpositivistsdisplay. Hempel repliedthat even if their hostility to meta-physics is excessive, their hostility to religious dogmatism is benefi-cial. This is no answer. So I may have misheard him. I also heard himsay that Kuhn was stuck in a dilemma between inductivism andirrationalism. Later, I casually reported this and elicited a hostiledenial from Adolf Grnbaum. Scheffler sided with me. I checked itwith Hempel. He said I had misheard him. At least Kuhn took someresponsibilityforthefact that so many take Hempel to have describedhim (Kuhn) as an irrationalist. He said,

some of the difficulties with my published accounts of theory choicewouldbe avoided if desiderata likeaccuracyandscope,invoked whenevaluating theories, were viewed not as means to an independentlyspecifiedend, likepuzzlesolving,but as themselves goals at which sci-entific inquiry aims. (Pp. 209-10).

This assertion is clear. It says, were Kuhn ready to admit that sci-ence aims at increased comprehensiveness, then the charge that hewas an irrationalist would die down. If he did not admit it, the chargestands. If he did, then he did so not consistently and without a clearindication (Sankey 1997,306-7; Toulmin2001,215-16). Eitherway, this




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undermines his complaint of damaging misrepresentations(p. 156).

Hempel (1979) attempted to help Kuhn out. To that end he had todiscussKuhnsdemand for conformity in science. Moreover, thecon-formity that Kuhn demanded isfull. Kuhn said this was necessary tomaximize efficiency (p. 209). Bohr regularly wanted crazy ideas.Popper wanted to boost respect for criticism. Kuhn wanted fullconformity.

Hempel (1983, 87-88) said that Kuhn demanded conformity onlywherereasonfails.Now, irrationalistsdo notdenythat reasonis valu-able. They only declare that it is limited and that authority shouldsupplement it. Did Kuhn agree? Hempels excuses for him make himagree. This is no help. If anything, it aggravates matters.

Kuhn wanted to escape both positivism and irrationalism. To thatend, he wished to replace individual rationality with group rational-ity. Classical rationalism is theview of science asa one-person game(p. 243). This is an important error. Most philosophers of the rational-ist school regrettably emulate Carnap, Hempel, and Grnbaum.Rationality, by their prejudice, comprises individual acts of delibera-tion that rest on extant evidence and lead to wise choices of hypothe-ses to believe in. Yet science is not faith.

Kuhntried to dowithout a criterion of rationality. Hesaid scienceisa language game, intrinsically a community activity (p. 215). Hesaid, suffice it to consider rational whatever is the observed norm(p. 209). What the observed norm is we do not know. Many say it isthe quest for comprehensiveness. Kuhn set aside these older, morecomprehensive modes of practice. He wrote them off as fossils

(p. 120). The most broadly recognized quality of a scientific theory isempirical verifiability (Piaget [1965] 1971, 11, 226). As Hume hasshown, this is an error. Hempel interpreted verifiability as con-firmability. Kuhn disagreed. Einstein interpreted it as falsifiability.Scientific theory should be verifiable (viz. falsifiable), he said (Ein-stein [1949] 1959, II, 676). Popper amplified this. He advocatedsteady criticism. Kuhn deemed this absurd (p. 136). With no con-sensus, all criticism is barren, he said, relying on the consensus(p. 141). Popper never discussed it, nor how it emerges. He stressedthat whatever it is, criticism provokes efforts to improve. Polanyi hadmore to say on this.




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KUHN BORROWEDTRADITIONALISM FROM POLANYI

Kuhn ignored his debt to Polanyi (pp. 296-97). Earlier he hadadmitted it, taking his term paradigm to be synonymous withPolanyistacitknowledge (Kuhn 1963, 392; cf.Kuhn1970, 44n, 191).It is not. For one thing, Newtons system is the paradigm of a para-digm (Kuhn 1963, 356). It is not tacit (Cohen 1956; Bunge 2001, 170).More generally, Kuhn admitted Margaret Mastermans observationthathis termis ambiguous. I seldom use this term these days,havingtotally lost control of it (p. 221). Paradigm was a perfectly goodword until I messed it up (p. 298).

What imposes unanimity? Inductivists say shared information.Full sharing of information is impossible, however. Duhem ([1914]1954) said that without scientific realism, unanimity is natural. If the-ories are mere tools, then unanimity about them can only be agree-ment about the degree of their utility. Duhem aimed at freedom ofchoice of theories limited only by freely chosen tasks (and by logic)(ibid., 206) He still allowed that realism is vital for science. So heviewed it as an ideal (ibid., 31-32, 217-18, 265-70, 285, 296). Polanyi(1958, 183-85) said that leaders are expert and largely trusted. Theirarbitration produces unanimity, he added. Rules that govern skills ofgreat artists are tacit. So are the rules that govern handing skills overto apprentices. The same holds for science, he said. This line ofthought deserves admiration, but also criticism. Admitting the use-fulness of tradition, Igor Stravinsky ([1936] 1962, 20) rightly advo-cated student autonomy too:

No matter what the subject may be, there is only one course for thebeginner: he must at first accept a discipline imposed fromwithout,butonly as themeansfor obtainingfreedomfor, andstrengthening himselfin, his own method of expression.

Polanyi (1969, 80, 93) left small room for dissent in science. Kuhn leftnone. As in art, he agreed, so in science, knowledge is tacit (Kuhn1977, 340-51). Unlike art, however, science aims at unique optimalsolutions (p. 209). To achieve this, we should maximize scientific dis-cipline, he said. This is crucial for him, and it is dead wrong. Notbefore the final truth is at hand will total authority be justifiable. Untilthen, all authority shouldbe under check.To echo Polanyi (1963,380),




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I can accept the . . . [conception of] Kuhn only as a fragment of anintended revision of a theory of scientific knowledge.

Polanyi is famous for the idea that some knowledge is tacit. It isprominent already in works of Pascal (esprit geometrique), Hume (jenesais quoi), Kant(Takt), Duhem(esprit de finesse, bon sens), and others.Polanyi (1969, 149, 222) combined it with ideas of Buber and ofHusserl. This led him to important new messages. In valuing tacitknowledge, we introduce large doses of tradition into all importantdiscourses. All tradition is imperfect, yet it deserves trust. The scien-tific tradition is but a special case, then, however important. Polanyi(1958, chap. 9: The Critique of Doubt) thought the scientific tradi-tion encouraged criticism as long as it is not comprehensive.

Kuhn (1963,392) expressed blanket agreement with Polanyi. Yet heactually agreed with him only on the authority of leaders, not on thefreedom to criticize them. Polanyi criticized leaders for their radical-ism. Kuhn had no right to join him, having granted them uncheckedpower. He dismissed their philosophies of science silentlyas out-side their narrow specialties. He never said so openly. This led to thedamaging misrepresentations.

We are all trapped within traditions. We are all frustrated by fail-ures to articulate. These are familiar limitations. Efforts to transcendthem are regularly afoot. Polanyi discouraged them. He judged themfutile.He taughtlearning tobear them ratherthan tryingto beat them.He was only halfway right. We cannot fully transcend them. We cando so to some extent, however. This is risky, said Polanyi. Risk is com-mon to all innovation, however. So applying new ideas is wise onlyafter they stand up to tests. Applying critical philosophy is hardly

risky. Just imagine: no more bullying, only free exchanges of ideas.Not too efficient, Kuhn might grumble. Perhaps. But it will be funagain (p. 130).

KUHN BORROWEDINCOMMENSURABILITY FROM DUHEM

Kuhn ignored his debt to Duhemthough he respected his lead-ing followers (pp. 286-87). Responding to a query of mine on hisneglect of Duhem, he said he had never read him. Commenting onthis, I. Bernard Cohen said, it is impossible. All members of Conantscircle were familiar with Duhem. Here Kuhn hardly mentions the

Conant circle, and he mentions Duhem as the inventor of a term




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(p. 235). The same goes for Whewell (p. 212). Giving credit for theinvention of a term is a common token tribute that is an inadvertent

insult (Agassi [1963] 1967, 10). More insulting is Kuhnsexpression ofgratitude to Popper for having advised him to read a book by aDuhem fan (p. 286). (When Popper was a visitor at Harvard, youngKuhn attended his seminar.)

Kuhnsimage ofpositivists doesnot jar withthe caseofDuhem.Hederided them for their lack of historical perspective. This is true ofSchlickand of Carnap. Duhem wasa great positivistanda greathisto-rian ofscience.Kuhndid not discuss the cause ofthe neglect ofthe his-torical perspective. It is that verification renders knowledgeahistorical. Bacon, the first of the modern positivists, explained this.Duhem disliked Bacon, but he was gracious enough to note his popu-larity (Duhem [1914] 1954, 86-93).

Kuhn said of incommensurability, the notion still seems to me thecentral innovation introduced by his famous book (p. 228). This ispuzzling.Theword denotesan important ideathat Duhem explainedin some detail. It is that we do not forget old theories even after theyare dated.Scientific realismis the view thatthe aim ofscience isa com-prehensive image of the world (Duhem [1914] 1954, 81, 103, 171, 173,176). Duhem rejected it as nave (ibid., 31-32). It restricts truth to atmost one member of a set of alternative theories. Tradition overrulesthis restriction, as older theories continue to serve. If realism is over-ruled, theories cease to compete. They then become complementary(ibid.,101, 294). Kuhn endorsed everystepof this reasoning. Theerrorin it is the refuted hypothesis that usefulness goes with truth. Tradi-tion takes this idea as self understood. It permeates the writings of

Duhem as well as those of Kuhn. Its refutations are countless.Logic demands that we separate alternatives. We comply if weview them as languagessince perfect translation is impossible(Duhem[1914]1954, 133). (Duhem[1996, 78] limitedthisto thephysi-cal sciences, to exclude the life sciences.) Choice between differenttheories is then between languages. No amount of information suf-fices to settle matters with finality (Duhem [1914] 1954, 187-88). Cru-cial testsdo not, as they carry no assurance. Possibly a faulty workinghypothesis (say, about measuring instruments) is involved in thedeductionof thetestedpredictions. Itmaythen tipthe balance errone-ously (idid., 185, 187-90, 220). (Duhems wording is misleading. Hesaid that there are no crucial tests, meaning there are no decisive cru-cial tests. They are all fallible [Hempel 1966, 25-28; Adam 1992].)

In science, conclusive decidability is not possible. Here is why.




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1. Radical untranslatability: there is no perfect translation.2. Radical underdetermination: information never imposes a theory.

3. Empirical irrefutability: isolated hypotheses are irrefutable.

These theses are named after Duhem and/or Quine. Duhem pre-cluded and Quine included the possibility of false scientific theories(Jaki 1984, 370; Vuillemin 1986, 595-98). (Quine learned late aboutDuhem [Quine 1988, 118]. He was glad to learn that their views differ[Quine 1986, 619].) Each of these three theses has two different read-ings. They are demonstrable but with limited application. Satisfac-tory translation is obviously possible. Ordinary translations of scien-tific texts are so reliablethat in the present context, Duhem and Quinehave overlooked them. Nor can one preclude all perfect translationbetween perfectly formal systems. Likewise, information cannotdetermine the choice of a hypothesis only in the abstract. Within

received frameworks, this happens regularly. And hypotheses areirrefutable only in abstract isolation.

Kuhn elaborated. Paul FeyerabendandImre Lakatos agreed.Criti-cism cannot succeed, they all said, unless a better alternative to it isavailable. Hempel (1966, 40) agreed. Belief in a false theory is ratio-nally obligatory, then, even past its refutationuntil somethingbetter emerges. Sandra Harding (1976, Preface) considered this folly abreakthrough.

By its own light, this critique of the critical attitude (for that is whatit is) should be accompanied by a proposed criterion for choicebetween alternatives. Hempel appealed to experience. The othersappealed to authority. This way they succumbed to irrationalism(Russell 1917, I., end of 1).

Duhem needed no such criterion. He valued criticism highly. Heequated physics with applied mathematics, the aim of which isexpected utility. So he allowed for the errors that engineers commit.Kuhn too equated pure and applied science. He had to: most normalscientists today aretechnologists. They have no rulingparadigm, andthey usually apply refuted theories. Most of Kuhns historical exam-ples are from pure science, not from technology. Science and technol-ogy overlap, of course.They do so in basic research, which is theoreti-cal and for technical ends (Danhof 1968, 172; Agassi 1980). In rarecases, basic research serves pure science too. The most famousinstances of this are in nuclear technology, the nub of Kuhnsphilosophy.




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Researchers may ignore paradigms. Thus, Bohrs 1913 model ofthe atom is not relativistic. Sommerfelds variant of it is. Kuhn noted

that only Bohr was revolutionary. Sommerfeld merely retained Bohrsquantum jumps (p.141). Schrdinger didnot. Hisequation, too, is notrelativistic. The same holds for matrix mechanics. The concern of thedispute about them is not formal. (They are quasi-equivalent.) It isabout interpretation. This may evolve into a research program(Agassi 1957). Kuhn has noted that Schrdingers equation rests onsome relativistic findings, ignoring the fact that it is nonrelativistic(pp. 153-54). He also ignored the inconsistency between his demandforconformity andthefiercecontroversyover quanta. He said that onthis matter he was a trouble maker (p. 140). Poppers critical strat-egy seems to me the very best available, he also said (p. 137). Hence,conformity be damned and farewell to paradigms.

Popper encouraged troublemakers. Kuhn discourages them. Thisis where they differ. David Budworth (1981, 177) said that readingPoppermade himregretthat he hadmoved from research to adminis-tration, and reading Kuhn made him glad that he had.

THE CONSENSUS IS COMPLEX

If theories are viewed as languages, then alternatives may be heldconsistently. But then every theory change, however minute, mustcreate a new language. This precludes scientific revolutions (Duhem[1914] 1954, 32, 36, 39, 177, 220 ff). Kuhn was hesitant about this (p.143). His concern was with the scientific consensus. How does it sur-

vive scientific revolutions?Confusion on the consensus abounds. Inductivists see it as given:unanimity, proper belief, the belief widespread among scientists, orexpert opinion. Kuhn said that the consensus is made by decree. Thiscannot be so. The consensus is not unanimity, since dissenters recog-nize it. Opinion leaders have much to do with the way the consensussways. The public may test opinion leadersabilities to lead (Katz andLazarsfeld 1955, 281, 315-16, 322). They may influence public judg-ment on trivia and on important matters (Rogers 1962, 308-16). Theyadjudicate when controversy rages. When they suspend judgment,doubt lingers. Philosophers of science often wish to be right on ideasthat are beyond their skills (Laudan 1983, 118-19). They then needopinion leadersmost. Consensus may hold for parts of a controversy.

An exampleis the force of an experimental argument, to use an idiom




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of Faraday (1839, 1799, 1788, 2010; Agassi 1971, 64, 132, 137, 147,176, 295). Einstein discussed the value of a theory, not its credibility.

He found it unimportant whether a theory gains credence or not. Heliked intelligent disagreement. The superiority of one theory over itscompetitors, he suggested, is broadly recognized (Einstein [1949]1959, II, 680). In this, he was somewhat generous to his peers. If alter-natives lead to a crucial test, then itsevaluation will win consent. Cre-dence for a theory is not so important.

Unanimityis scarce. Newtoncame closestto winning it.He tried toimpose it and failed (Manuel 1968, 344-48). His criticism of Cartesianphysics did not stop terrific efforts to revive it. (Such revival effortswere finally crushed by Einstein and Bohr, their physics being soremote from commonsense physics.) During the cold war, the Penta-gon assigned to Edward Teller the project of developing thermonu-clear weapons. He needed the cooperation of J. Robert Oppenheimer.Hemetwitha blank refusal. Some Pentagonbigshots then decided tobully researchers and to teach them a lesson. They demanded cooper-ation and resorted to coercive, un-American means. Academicsfolded fast (Rovere 1959, 17, 24, 208). And then even the gods couldnot help America. Decline set in instantly. Academic officials forcedfaculty to seek research funds. The Pentagon demanded securityclearances and controlled much of the funds. For every grant, anadded bonus (of 50% or more of the grant) went to the successfulapplicants home institution. This turned researchers into academics,academies into research institutions, cultural institutions into acade-mies, and famous intellectuals into faculty. Grantmanship became atool for securing academic appointments. The initiation of peer

reviewgave power to windbags whohadno compunction about rais-ing the pressure to conform (Agassi 1990b).We can only admire Polanyis valiant struggle for scientific free-

dom (Polanyi 1958, 145, n., chap. 6, 5). He struggled consistentlyagainst officialattempts toplanscience.It is regrettable that he didnotthrow hisweightin favorof freedom ofopinionandhenceof scientificdissent. He warned against the dangers of some kinds of control overresearch but not against all kinds. Future historians will write aboutthe important influence exerted by his fight for freedom of scienceand culture. Had he fought against the American academic bureau-cracy too, he might have had success. We do not know. We do knowthat the American political bureaucracy managed to intimidate himwith trumped-upcharges (alleging that he hadsomeassociation with

communists, no less).




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KUHNS INCOMMENSURABILITYIS REDUNDANT AT BEST

Newtonianmechanics is the mostfamousKuhn-style paradigm. Ithad met opposition, mainly from Leibniz. Kuhn blamed Leibniz forinsubordination to the ruling paradigm (p. 290). He did not blameEinstein for siding with Leibniz (Einstein 1954). Einsteins is a differ-ent paradigm. Thus, much depends on how Kuhn demarcatedbetween paradigms. He could not say. He viewed this as a serious set-back (p. 187n) and as no setback at all (pp. 142-43).

Two ideas, of incommensurability and of the paradigm, expressthe primacy of the community over its members (p. 104). Fortu-nately, groups do not have minds (pp. 103, 242). So leaders mustadjudicate. These two ideas are at their disposal. One of them recon-ciles competing theories. The other views one as dominant. Oneallows free choice between theories. The other imposes one theory asdominant.Onedrainstheoriesofmeaning.Theothersoakstheminit.

Supposedly, leaders impose conformity to the paradigm. Howthen do they use incommensurability? They cannot. It is redundant.The view of theories as languages merely blocks conflicts betweenthem. This can be achieved with greater ease by other means. It suf-fices to give different senses to a term shared by competitors. To takeKuhns paradigm case (pp. 70-74), he assigned different senses to theterm mass in the systems of Newton and of Einstein. This alreadyreconciles them. Hence, we can amputate the idea of incommensur-ability from Kuhns system. More than that. Since the domain ofapplicability of the later theory is wider, relativistic mass (whatever

exactly it means) is variable to a higher extent than classical mass(whatever exactly it means) is constant. It is more accurate. Increasedaccuracy is progress.Callingit increasedverisimilitudeor notmatterslittle (Newton-Smith 1981, 176-77).

How do we compare two systems? Duhem said that we comparetheir domains of application. Kuhn promises us a few times thatincommensurability does not preclude comparison. So now we mayreintroduce comprehensiveness as the aim of physics. For Duhem,comprehensiveness means the condition of universal applicability,the qualitypossessed by the ideal theory. (This condition is necessarybut not quite sufficient. But let us not be finicky.) Duhems view of sys-tems as empty shells is thus redundant too. He has ascribed to theo-ries relative truthdepending on their domains of applicability. We

can then perfect his philosophy by making use of his admission that




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the relatively true is not absolutely true: it is false. His system andPoppers will then merge. Kuhn added the imposition of theoretical

conformity to all this. Thisaddition is undesirable. Theconsensus cando without it. There is no objectionto relative truth, then, as long as itdoes not oust the absolute truth. Kuhn, however, did oust it. To seewhy, we have to examine his theory of truth. It will transpire that hehad none.

Bacon demanded of scientific research that it should be free oferror. Whewell said that research is trial and error. Duhem said thatdomains of applicability are found by trial and error. Kuhn forgot todiscuss error. Obedience to paradigms is error-free, he said. Para-digmshad been traditionally models . . . of the right way to do things(p. 298). They are guarantees for success. So hisview explainssuccess(pp. 129, 132-33). Is it incommensurable with the view of science asinductive? Should contrasting them lead to crucial tests? Kuhnwanted incommensurability to be grammatical (p. 211): Paradigmshad been traditionally models, particularly grammatical models ofthe right way to do things (p. 298). Can grammar explain history? IsKuhns grammar incommensurable with its standard alternative orshould they undergo crucial tests (pp. 44, 77, 200)?

KUHNS CRITIQUE OF APPROXIMATIONISMIS DISAPPOINTING

Realism has variants. Of these, only approximationism is viable.Science approximates the truth. This is the demand that a theory

should outdo the explanatory success of its predecessors. Russell([1940] 1962, 280, 303) endorsed it. It is a corollary to Poppers views.The explanatory success of the predecessor refutes its competitorsthat do not share it. A new competitor that does share it challenges itspredecessor. It thus invites a retrial, a crucial test (Popper 1972, 200,358).

Kuhn denied that older theories approximate later ones (pp. 188-89). He adamantly rejected approximationism even while stressingthat in some sense science progresses: it does so because newer theo-ries are superior toolderones(p. 74).Theyare superior inmanyways.One of these is increased precision. That is to say, they are betterapproximations to the truth. Kuhn denied thiseven while comparingKeplers and Newtons theories (p. 150). As to the comparison

between Newton and Einstein, which is the heart of the matter, he




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saidthis already early in the day:Newtons lawsas a partofEinsteinssystem are not the same as the original, at least they are not unless

those laws are reinterpreted in a way that would have been impossi-ble until after Einsteins work (Kuhn 1970, 101). This is not contest-able. That it is no argument for incommensurability, Kuhn himselfsaid,moreor less at once. Hethen explained (after the wordBut in thefollowing quotation) why he opposed the alternative view (of theo-ries as competing alternatives).

Our argument has, of course, explained why Newtons Laws everseemed to work. . . . An argument of the same type is used to justifyteaching earth-centeredastronomyto surveyors.But the argument hasstill notdonewhat it purports to do.It hasnot, that is, shown NewtonsLaws tobe a limiting case of Einsteins. For in the passage to the limit itis notonly theformsof thelaws that have changed. Simultaneously wehave hadto alter thefundamentalstructural elements of whichtheuni-verse to which they apply is composed. (Kuhn 1970, 102).

This is a terrific passage, and it shows clearly, just as Kuhn wantedto show, that approximationism does not do its job without theassumption that the competing theories apply to the same universe(Scheibe 1997, 338-39).This iswhatDuhem saidallthe time: realismisat the basis of the view of alternative theories as competing. So Kuhnrejected realism. The trouble is, this rejection makes him a relativist.He tried to wriggle out of this consequence. He failed.

Kuhn invented a new argument against approximationism (pp.106, 161, 188-89, 243, 280). Anew theory may resemble less its imme-diate predecessor than an olderone. (Consider theoriesof light goingback and forth between waves and particles. If each approximates itssuccessor, then they progress towards the truth, yet they do not helpdecide whether light is comprised of waves or particles.) Now Kuhnwas satisfied with any progress in any respect. Yet he demanded ofapproximationism that it affirm progress on all questions (p. 189).This is not exactly fair. As long as new theories do better empiricallythan their predecessors, verisimilitude increases (Agassi 1981). Eachstage leaves open questions.

Though as an argument Kuhns new point is unfair, as an observa-tion it is true and significant. Atheory may serve many ends (Agassi1990a). Each of them can be used as a criterion for valuation. Progressproliferates.Kuhn andPopperare thus somewhatreconciled. Changeis generally a mixed blessing, and this should hold for scientific

change too. The old reluctance to give up Cartesian physics is an




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example. Nevertheless, Kuhn haserred. Approximationtothetruth iscentral to thelife of science. Hisobjectionto it issheer stubbornness.

Kuhn equated the quest for comprehensiveness with absolutism.This is not bad, although total comprehensiveness is necessary butinsufficient for realism. Relativism is not the acceptance of relativetruth; it is the rejection of absolute truth. Like young Carnap and likeArthur Pap, Kuhn introduced synthetic a priori knowledge. Unlikethem, he rejected the absolute truth, and thus he rejected knowledgeas justified true belief. Science explores the real world, but there is noKantian thing-in-itself, he said (pp. 7, 71, 207, 245, 264). Seemingly,this is absurd. He dodged it with the old, defunct logical positivists(pre-Tarski)exclusionof thequestion fromtheagendaassenseless.

I amnot suggesting. . . thatthere is a reality which science failsto get at.Mypoint is rather thatno sense can bemadeof the notionof reality asit

has ordinarily functioned in the philosophy of science. (P. 115)

He has painted himself as a positivistmalgr lui.

What replaces the mind-independent world about which scientistswere once said to discover the truth is a variety of niches in which thepractitioners of . . . various specialties practice their trade.Thosenichesare . . . real . . . (P. 120)

Perhaps this is what makes his view consistent. I do not pretend tounderstand what a niche is in this contextor what Kuhn meant by hisassertion that they are real. He praised Hempel as a man whointendsphilosophical distinctions to advance truth rather than to win

debates (p. 208). What niche did Hempel occupy? Does advancingtruth increase the size of a niche or reduce it or replace it altogetherwith an incommensurable one? It is a mystery to me.

I also do not see what (Ernst Cassirer [1910] 1953 and) Kuhn couldoffer as synthetic a priori knowledge flexible enough to suffer thewear andtear of scientific revolutions (p. 264). I go round explainingthatIamaKantianwithmoveablecategories,hesaid(p.264).Thingsdo not get better. Here is an especially puzzling passage that, as isclear from the context, is not a slip of Kuhns pen and not merely apassing aside:

...Igotsomeveryimportanttoolsoutofthat,andoneofthemwastogoback and think about the Copernican revolution . . . it turns out that

some people, to an extent that surprises me and others, simply say, in




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thePtolemaicsystemtheplanetsgoroundtheearthand intheCoperni-cansystemthey go roundthesun. But thatsan incoherent statement!

(P. 312)

The statement that Kuhn declared incoherent is quite consistent.Because of the importance that he laid on it, let me elaborate. Com-parethe sum of angles of any triangle and the sum oftwo rightangles.They are exactly equal in Euclids geometry, and not in its alterna-tives. This was proved by Felix Klein. (One geometry can embedanother.) The two statements, Kleins and Kuhns, are strictly analo-gous. Hence, he is in error.

Of the extant alternatives to absolutism and relativism, the moredetailed their presentation, the more apparent their troubles become,unless they collapse into relativism or approximationism. IlkkaNiiniluoto (1999) has recently discussed this in detail.He found these

the only possible options. Thosewho disagree would be wise to try torebut him. The editors of this bookwrite as if Kuhnhad developedhisalternative to absolutism and relativism and as if he had criticized indetaildiversealternativesto it (pp. 6-8).Theyexaggerate.Letme pres-enthisfragmentsontruthandonmeaningtodepicttheirsketchiness.

KUHN HAD NO THEORY OF TRUTH

One philosophical problem fascinated Kuhn: what is truth? (pp.278,312). Hecould bea physicist (p. 273); he was a top historian of sci-ence(p. 276); hecould bea historian of philosophy(p. 316); but hewasa born philosopher. I like doing history . . . [but] philosophy was

always more important [to me] (p. 314). He sought a newepistemology.

Mygoal isdouble. OntheonehandI aim tojustifyclaimsthatscienceiscognitive, that itsproductis knowledgeof nature, andthatthe criteria itusesinevaluatingbeliefsareinasenseepistemic.Butontheother,Iaimto deny all meaning to claims that successive scientific beliefs becomemore and more probable or better and better approximations to thetruthandsimultaneouslyto suggest that thesubjectof truthclaimscan-not be a relationbetween beliefsand a putatively mind-independent orexternal world. (P. 243)

Cognition is of an object out there, in the mind-independent orexternal world. The view that science is cognitive clashes with the




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disclaimer of all relations between statements and a putatively mind-independent or external world. Hence, the second part of this

account repudiates the first.Kuhn suggested that semantics should be limited to intra-

theoretic applications (p. 162). One begins with declaring a theorytrue and proceeds to seek more truths. Its logical consequences arelikewise true. Other statements are independent of the theory. Kuhnignored them. He wanted competing theories to be separate butequal. To that end, hecalled themlanguages. This will not do. (Hence,theories are languages is buta restricted metaphor.) Themathemat-ical theory of embedding allows full embedding of some older theo-ries in newer ones. This permits perfect translations (Vuillemin 1986,note 28 [regarding Euclid] and note 34 [regarding Newton]; Scheibe1997, 341). Though Kuhns idea is so very sketchy, it already failsrepeatedly.

Duhem suggested not ascribing truth-values to theoriesto avoidmaking them probably false. (Popper suggested the opposite for thesame reason.) This is intriguing. First, wevoid a theory of content andthus of truth-value. Consequently, it is mathematical, and thus vacu-ously true. We may then give it any meaning that renders it true.Henri Poincar took up this idea. He viewed axiom systems asimplicit definitions of their descriptive words. David Hilbertendorsed this and made it a part of the study of the foundations ofmathematics (Jaki 1984, 315, 335). Duhem ([1914] 1954, 184, 206, 208)also sketched a new theory of partial truth, to reflect empiricaltestability. A hypothesis is true for the domain to which it is success-fully applicable. Tests are of the precise meanings of hypotheses,

namely, of their precise domains of applicability. This way Duhemcombined (mathematical) certitude with (scientific) doubt (ibid., 174,181). It is a splendid achievement. Admittedly, consent to allow forfalsescientific theories supersedes it.It stillis active in the study of thefoundations of mathematics. Kuhn hasascribed it to a criticof himselfand dismissed it casually (p. 249). This is an amazing feat.

Frege identified meaning with possessing truth-value.Wittgenstein agreed and further identified it with decidability. Thewish to allow for meaning with only partial decidability, in defianceof Wittgenstein, invited deviations from Frege. Carnap (1963, 963-66;1966) allowed partial verification and so partial meaning.Reichenbach(1944) suggested intermediatevaluesbetween truthandfalsehood. Both ideas are worthless as they ignore error and so the

incompatibility between scientific theories. Kuhn, too, ignored error.




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Buthe addressedincompatibility (p.161). He strongly dissented fromCarnap and ignored Reichenbach. He dissented from Duhem, want-

ingincompatible theoriesto be informative andtrue (pp. 73n). He dis-sented from Tarski and Popper. He offered no alternative. Hisendorsement of thedemandforconstructivecriticismannulshiscriti-cism of all theories of truth.

KUHN HAD NO THEORY OF MEANING

Kuhn claimed that he had linked incommensurability, meaning,and translation. He did not. He understood Quines view on transla-tionas limited to nouns anddescriptive phrases. Quines analysis oftranslation suffers badly . . . from its inability to distinguish, he said(p. 48). His references display no need for distinctions or analysis(pp. 37-40, 47-49, 61, 189). Quine (1988) had a mere sketch of a theoryof meaning and translation. He viewed dictionaries as sets of loose,circular definitions. This is hardly contestable, least of all by Kuhn.Dictionaries employ theories, Kuhn rightly added, implying thatQuine would disagree. Trying to raise difficulties for Quine, hepointed at famous difficulties that compilers of dictionaries face. Hederided Quines conception of a translation manual without argu-ment (pp. 47, 74, 165). Whether Quine is right or wrong, Kuhns com-ments on language are disappointing.

Ian Hacking (1993, 1999) ascribes to Kuhn a view thathe (Hacking)names revolut ionary transcendental nominalism. OnWittgensteins authority, Hacking identifies it with the classifications

implicit in common discourse (p. 72). It resembles Saul Kripkesessentialism-of-sorts. Kuhn responded by rightly expressing dis-agreement with Wittgenstein: common views are useless for science(pp. 78, 229).

Aristotle viewed science as classification. He deemed one classifi-cation natural and right. This is essentialism (Platonism). The tradi-tional alternative to it is nominalism.Both equate meaning and deno-tation. They differ about class names. Essentialists say that theydenote classes. Nominalists say that they denote their members. Thismakes language overflow with homonyms and with synonyms.Frege refuted both views by refuting the view of meaning as denota-tion. It makes the identity of the evening star and the morning starpurely verbal. Kuhn observed that the discovery of this identity rests

onthe discoveryof planetaryorbits (p. 220). Didhe suggestthat this is




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an argument foror againstFrege?Russells theoryof definite descrip-tions is an alternative to Freges, but it is incomplete. Kuhn rejected it

(p. 198) to exclude strict synonymy. So did Quine. Kuhn rejectedQuines theorytoo(pp.47-48). He offered no alternative. This matterslittle, as he accepted (Poppers) methodological nominalism (p. 232),not noticing that this idea moves the search for a theory of meaningfrom philosophy to science.

Though all classifications are legitimate, theymay smuggle in the-ories, and these may be false. They may also be hardto detect, as theyoften appeal to intuition. Kripke has suggested that this makes usendorse them. He was in error. They appeal to our intuition becausethey approximate to some scientific theory (Agassi 1995, 255). ErnstMayer told me proudly that he managed to convince Popper that thedispute among biologists about classification is significant. Later,David Hull (1999, 496-99) expounded on this significance. The litera-ture that he refers to ignores common intuition. It thus also ignoresKripke, Putnam, and Hackingnot to mention Wittgenstein.

THE BOOK

Foreword, by Jehane R. Kuhn. She says touchingly that her late hus-band would have altered some of the text here, not so much from dis-cretion, whichwas not high among his virtues,but from courtesy (p.viii). Here is a clear example. His putdowns of Quine and of Putnamdiffer in toneonly. Abookby Quine isgoing off the rails;thereisntmuch of an argument in it (pp. 279-80). Not so Putnam: nobody

could reasonably show anything but respect for him. His book is notexactly Kuhn, but it is a big step (pp. 312-13). Putnam is a friend.

EditorsIntroduction opens with Shifts happen,a pun on a sopho-moric flyer. The flyer also includes, Why does this shift happen tome?

Chapter 1is on scientific revolutions. They are rare. Small ones arecommon (p. 143). This raises the serious problem of discriminationof normal and revolutionary episodes (p. 146). On this,Kuhnhad nomorethanamere aperu (p. 187n).We must first ask,he added, forwhom is an episode revolutionary (p. 146)? To ask this is to render thedistinction relative. This is funny, as the rationale for the distinction

was to maintain conformity to a consensus.




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The best suggestion is by Mario Bunge (1968, 342). Start with aproblem.Trytosolveitbyasmallchange.Failureraisesthestakesand

invites a more drastic change and a greater talent.

Chapter 2concerns verbal changes. Revolutions are far-reachingverbal changes. Small ones comprise mini-revolutions or belong tonormal science. He could not say. This is odd, as he forgot that scien-tific change partly depends on decisions (of leaders) (p. 32). More-over, mini-revolutions are not too revolutionary. New intellectualframeworksmake forreal revolutions. Kuhn consideredthese verbal.He made them paper tigers.

Chapter 3is on possible-worlds semantics. Kuhn asserts that itsworlds are not theories. This is puzzling. Though they are not theo-ries, as descriptions of possible worlds they may well include theo-ries. By definition, a possible world is an alternative, comprehen-sive description of a conceivable world. Each description shouldinclude the theories that hold in the conceivable world that itdescribes. The literature on possible words confuses two senses ofpossible,possible given thelaws of nature andpossible in a broadersense (Popper 1959, appendix *10). This confusion causes no prob-lems for modal logic. It is disastrous for possible-worlds semantics.

Chapter 4describes Kuhns progress since Structure. He concen-trated on incommensurability and focused on its linguistic aspects.The ways of being-in-the-world which a lexicon provides are notcandidates for true/false (1962, last sentence). This is below Kuhns

standard.It soundsdeepbut is trite:whatever a being-in-the-worldis (it is a human being), quite obviously, ways . . . are not candidatesfor true/false. Only assertions/statements are.

Chapter5. Thehistorical philosophy of science . . . has underminedthe pillars on which the authority of scientific knowledge was for-merly thought to rest. Observations of facts are prior to and inde-pendent of the beliefs for whichthey are said to supply the evidenceand what emerges from the practice of science are truths, probabletruthsor approximations to thetruth(p.118). True. The authorityofscientific knowledge is thus gone. What emerges is freedom ofthought. Kuhns effort to limit it is pointless.




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Chapter 6 comprises Kuhns replies to critics. He dismissed (p. 139)oddparadigms,suchas mediaeval theology (Watkins) andsafe crack-

ing (Feyerabend). They are unproblematic, he said. They would beproblematic, were he interested in the demarcation between scienceand nonscience.

Popperscomments on hisclaims,he said, areonly seemingly criti-cal. They display verbal diversity. Seen otherwise, as by me, they arecounterclaims. The latter option invites crucial tests. Kuhn preferredthe former. He invokes Carnaps principle of tolerance (p. 164). Kuhnwas a positivistmalgr lui.

Chapter 7is a valid critique of a stray, once-famous, mock formal-ization of Duhems theory. Kuhn never cared for it (pp. 318-19).

Chapter 8connects with Max Blacks famous paper on metaphors.Wittgensteins view of ordinary theological terms as metaphoricalchallenged Black to develop a theory of metaphors. Their suitabilitydepends on some loose (tacit) networks of associations, he said.This is most interesting. It is problematic, however, as it makes alle-gory the best metaphor. And it does not serve his purpose, as it doesnothelp Wittgenstein. Arguably, it mayhelp with OurFather,andthenalso withWhich art in Heaven, but not withHallowed be thy Name.Wittgenstein suggested that we replace religion with religious atti-tudes. This is unacceptable. Nor is any theory of metaphors relevantto it.

Chapter 9 concerns the choice of theories. Why does it matter?

Bacon said that belief influences observation. Kuhn presents this as amodern invention (pp. 107, 311). Bacon demanded that observersshould shed all preconceived notions (= unproven theories). Kuhndisagreed. He nonetheless lauded control over the beliefs and con-duct of normal scientists.

Alvin Weinberg (1963, 159-60) did better. He spoke not of individ-ualchoice of theories butof scientificor institutional choice betweenscience and industry and between different branches of basic sci-enceas matters of allocation of resources. He also considered theoption of postponing such decisions indefinitely. The neglect of theseinsights is sad.




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Chapter 10 concerns the humanities and social studies. Kuhnvoiced broad agreement with arch-conservative Charles Taylor. He

charmingly confessed ignorance. Interest in social affairs had curedhimof positivism(pp. 216-17). Hiswork intriguedsome leadersin thesocial sciences, as they wished to impose unanimity. They were igno-rant of his view of their fields as too arid for growing paradigms (pp.57,223).Thisway he assented to thecriticismof Feyerabend, Watkins,and Hesse. Unanimity is insufficient. What more is needed, then?

The Greek heavens were different from ours . . . the transition betweenthem wasrelatively sudden. . . resulted from research done in thepriorversion of the heavens . . . the heavens remained the same while thesearch was under way. Without that stability, the search . . . could nothave occurred. But stability of that sort cannot be expected when theunitunderstudyisasocialorapoliticalsystem.Nolastingbasefornor-mal, puzzle-solving science need be available to those who investigate

them. (P. 223)

Thisis a movingspeculation.DespiteesteemforKoyr,Kuhnignoredthe neo-Platonism of early modern science. He wasa positivist malgrlui.

Chapter 11is from a conference in Kuhns honor at the Massachu-setts Instituteof Technology. It comprises responses to paperson him.It includes his acceptance of Hempels support and his refusal ofHackings.

A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn is a long interview (69 pages) thatis a pleasure toread. Hespokethere ina marvelouslyuninhibitedand

cooperative manner. Apropos of his life story, he talked of manythingseducation, psychoanalysis, social and political affairs,including the bomb, metaphysics, religion, history, and art. The con-tent is slight, conveying typical middle-of-the-road contemporaryAmerican intellectual attitudes, expressing very mild sympathieswith the American Left. Its scattered highlights on the academyof theday are of some use.

Publication List. Kuhns publications (pp. 325-35) helped link phi-losophy with history. Early in his career, the philosophy departmentat Berkeley insulted him by trying to move him to the department ofhistory(p.300). These were then separate fields.They mergedtoolate




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for him (pp. 309, 311, 315-17)partly due to his great success. Thiswas a real and significant contribution.

His influence is not profound but marked. His publicationsamplify important ideas for which he rapidly won public endorse-ment: science has no justification; it involves repeated revolutions;scientists may have political ambitions; and their authority restsorshould reston competence. The social background of science mat-ters too, since competence requires nurturing.

His publications contain valuable historical material, includingreviews and surveys of difficult literatures. He argued with some ofthesharpest intellectsaround. He wasadmirablycandid,as he admit-ted that he refused to play guru, as it scared the shit out of me(p.321). Hecould have rightlysaid, Itis beneathmy dignity. Andheshould have. His fame allowed him to be a powerbroker like Conant.Laudably, he did not care for it.

Hewas not as innovative asDuhem,Popper, orPolanyi. Hedid notwrite as innocently as Hempel or as gracefully as Koyr and Cohen.Yet he wrote engagingly, workedwith tremendous verve,andmade adifference. He chose theright predecessors andbrought someof theirbetter ideas to large audiences. Trying to convince, he also appealed tothe ability to exercise judgment.

He was far too decent to drive his ambition toward success. Hewanted recognition as serious, not as merely popular. I confess I didhim systematic injustice by repeatedly considering his views a merevulgarization of Polanyis while ignoring his ambition. Though aleader in the field of the history of science, he wished to be a leader in

philosophy. He failed in this. He was much more subtle than heappears, but also much less systematic. He triedhard not to fool him-self. He did not need me to remind him of his shortcomings. I musthave been a thorn in his side, I now realize. I regret this.

He crusaded for the idea that the authoritarian turn in physics her-alds a new era. Had he been successful, much of the inadequacy of hiswritings would be exempt, merely blemishes for time to heal. Fortu-nately, the democratic view of science has not lost this round. Kuhndeserves the accolades that we, his chivalrous democratic challeng-ers, can bring ourselves to award him as we bury him with fullhonors.

May he rest in peace.




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. [1963]1967.Towards an historiography of science, history and theory, Beiheft 2 . [TheHague: Mouton]; Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

. 1966. Review of T. S. Kuhn,The structure of scientific revolutions.J. Hist. Philos.4:351-54. (Reprinted in Joseph Agassi,The gentle art of philosophical polemics: Selectedreviews and comments, Peru, IL: Open Court, 1988)

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by Thomas Birch. Reprint, Hildesheim: George Olnsverlagsbucher.Buchdahl,Gerd. 1965. A revolutionin historiographyof science.History of Science 4:55-

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