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Methodological IndividualismAuthor(s): Joseph AgassiReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1960), pp. 244-270Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/586749 .

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METHODOLOGICALINDIVIDUALISM

JosephAgassi

- t /[Y AIM in the presentessay is to argue that individualism

\/1 need not be psychologistic, nd to defend instituiionalistiej E g Sindividualism, whichI consider o be Popper'sgreatcontri-butionto the philosophy f the socialsciences.

Whentheindividualist ontends hat only ndividuals reresponsibleactorson thesocialand historicaltage,theholistretorts hatsociety smore than merelya collectionof individuals.To this retortthe indi-vidualistanswers hat thereis no mysterious dditionalentitywhich

turnsa collection f individualsnto a society;a collection f individualsis a society f there s strong nteraction etween hem; this interactionis due to thefact that whenany one individual cts (rationally) n thebasisof hisown aims and interests,he taleesnto account heexistenceof other individualswith aimsand interests.To this the holistretortsthat the individualistmisses he point;thatpeoples aimsdo not consti-tute a societybut ratherdependon society; othat members f diffierentsocietieshave diXerentaimsand interests.The individualistn turnanswers hat the holistmisses he point, by taking he socialsettingas

God-givenratherthan as explicable n termsof human action.Theholist in turn argues that human actiondoes not determinebut israther onstrainedy, or directedby, the social etting perhaps ecausesocial forcesare much stronger han any single ndividual).

This argumentmay be schematizedn the follossTinganner n anattempt o characterizehe t+vo raditional iews.

(a) Holism (b) IndividualzsmI. Society s the 'whole'svhich s Only ndividualsaveaimsand in-

more han ts parts holism). terestsindividualism).2. 'Society'affectsthe individual'sThe individualbehaves n a wayaims(collectivism). adequateo hisaim,givenhis cir-

cumstancesrationalityrinciple).3. The socialset-up nfluencesnd The social et-up s changeables a

constrains he individual'sbe- resultof individuals'ction insti-haviour(institutionalnalysis). tutionaleform).

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A{ETHODOLOGICAL NDIVIDUALISM

It is obviousthat here we have a characterizationf two differentpositions.Yet, so far the characterizations not sufficient o bring outthe fact that thesetwo positions re mutually ncompatible.Tradition-ally, many individualists ave refused o assume he existenceof anysocial entity becausehey assumed hat only individuals an have aimsand interests.They viewed 'the national nterest', publicpolicy',andsuch-like xpressionsitheras empty or as mereshorthand xpressionsfor sum-totals f many individuals' nterestsand policies.The holists,however,have traditionallynsisted hat nationalaims, class-interests,and destiniesf social roups o exist. Logically his amounts o alteringour schema n the followingway: we add to bothie\\rs, holismand ndi-vidualism, he followingproposition, nd reinterprethe otherproposi-

* * . r

tlons ln ltS g lt.

+. If 'wholes'existthenhey have distinctaims and interestsof theirOWll.

This additionalproposition renders (a) inconsistentwith I (b); italso enablesus to reinterpret (a) and 2 (b), as well as 3(a) and 3(b), ina mannerwhich renders hem inconsistent vitheach other. The indi-vidualistdoes not deny 2(a) (collectivism) nless t is reinterpretednaccordwith 4. He does not deny that one's aims can be affectedbyothers'aims,and he can explainrationally uchphenomena.He merelydenies hat one's aimscan be explainedby reference o the socialaim.Similarly, he holistdoes not deny 2(b) (rationality rinciple)unless tis reinterpretedn accordwith 4. He does not deny that the individualacts purposefullyrationally).He merelydeniesthat individuals' imsand physicalcircumstanceslone determine ction. He insists hat theaims of the social group constitutea major actor n determining heactions of its members.Again, the individualistdoes not deny 3(a)(institutional nalysis)unless t is reinterpretedccording o 4. He doesnot deny that the behaviour f an individual s constrained nd influ-enced by social factorsprovided hat we can explainsuch constraintsand influences s resultsof choicesof other ndividuals.Only when theholist attributes hesesocialconstraints nd nfluenceso the aim of thesocial group does the individualist isagreewith him. Similarlyas to3(b) (institutional eform): he holist denies it only when the set-upwhich the individual upposedly hanges s the 'society'or the socialgrouthat is to say society'saimsand destinies; e will not deny thatthe individual an alterhis material nvironment, r other ndividuals'tastes,and similar superficial'actors.

Thus, proposition renders he previouspropositionsmore definiteby interpreting olismas the view according o which the individual'sinterest s boundto the existing ocial nterest,and individualism s theview that only ndividuals xist and have interests.This form of indi-vidualism s knownas gbsychologisticndividualism, r as individualisticpsychologism.

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JOSEPH AGASSI

Proposition is not explicitly tated by writerson the presentcon-troversy, nd it is not theonlypropositionwhichrendershe twosidesof ourschemancompatiblewitheachother.However,n myview, t isoften mplicit n manyworkson thecontroversy,ld andnew.Indeedit is sometimes oobviouslymplicit n theseworks hat I find t a littlepuzzling hat so fewpeoplehavenoticed t andhavefound t worthyof a comment.Whetherproposition is acceptable r not, refrainingfromstating t explicitlymayeasily ead to confusion. t is one thing tostateexplicitlyhat allindividualismspsychologisticndquiteanotherthing to confusendividualismwithpsychologism.

Psychologisms the programme f explainingall socialphenomenasolelywiththe aid of psychologicalheory.If thepsychologicalheorywhichis to explainsocialphenomena s individualpsychology,henourpsychologisms of the individualist rand,while if it is collectivepsychology,henourpsychologisms of thecollectivist rholistbrand.Thus, svhileFreud'sattempt at a psychologicalxplanationof somesocialphenomena religion,eadership) s lndividualist,ung'ssimilarattempts collectivist rholist,sincehe assumesheexistence fgroup-subconsciousness.imilarly,Plato's heoryof thestate is an attempt oexplainclassstructure,not institutionally,ut psychologically-asre-flecting hementalstructure f thestate. Vethushavetsvodivisions-psychologismersus nstitutionalism,nd individualismersusholism

whichyield fourpossibleprogrammes:a) psycholot3ism-cum-indi-vidualism(the main streamof the individualistraditXon);b) insti-tutionalism-cum-holismthe main streamof holism or collectivism);(c)psychologism-cum-holismin rareexamplesikePlato'sandJung'stheories); and perhaps (d) institutionalism-cum-individualismsItshouldbe added,perhaps, hattheseareby no meansall thepossibili-ties;cybernetics,orinstance,alls ntononeof thefourcategoriesmen-tionedhere.)The fourthpossibility d) is preciselywhat is

deniedbyproposition*It is thecentral hesisofthepresent ssay hatproposition4 is false.

Individualism Holism

Psychologism a c

Institutionalism d b

Admittedly roposition isprimaacieveryconvincing.t entails hateitherall statementsaboutsocietiesand socialinstitutions houldbetakenat theirfacevalue or all of themshouldbe viewedasshorthandassertionsboutmanyindividuals. t soundsratheradhoc o claim,asinstitutionalist-;ndividualistsave toclaim, hatsomefthese tatements(sayaboutthestate of warbetweenBritainandGermany)have to be

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METtIODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISAI

takenat theirface value, and someof thesestatements aboutGer-many'sdesireto win the war or its EghtagainstBritain)havc to beviewed as shorthandassertionsabout individuals.This may partlyexplain hefactthattraditionallyocialphilosopherscceptedproposi-

* . * * .

tlon4 Wlt outc lscusslngt.Andyet,inspiteofthisprimafaciergumentnfavour fproposition,

Popper ejectst. Heassertshat'wholes'doexist(though,of course,notin the samesense n whichpeopleexist),but they have no (distinct)interests.These'wholes aresocialgroupsas well as social nstitutions

in the widestsenseof the word,and coveringa ^vide ariety, romcustoms o constitutions,ndfromneighbourhoodso states.An insti-tutionmayhaveaimsandinterests nlywhenpeoplegivetanaim, ract in accordwithwhattheyonsiderhoulde ts nterest;societyor aninstitution annothaveaimsandinterests f its own.

It is obviousthat Poppercan incorporateboth I(a) and I(b) intoa consistent iewwhich sincompatiblewithbothholismandpsycholo-gisticindividualism rovided hat thisview contains he negationofproposition . Andhe canincorporatento thisviewall the otherpro-positionsn the aboveschemaprovided hat they are interpreted otin accordancewithproposition but rather n oppositiono it. Thus,in e(a), nottheaimsof institutionsutrather heirexistence ffects heindividual's ehaviour:he existingnstitutionsonstitute partof theindividual's ircumstances hichtogetherwithhis aimsdeterminehisbehaviourn accordancewith 2(b).Whileaccordingo psychologisticindividualismnlymaterialconditionsmaybe considered s relevantcircumstances,ccordingo Popper heexistence f institutionsmaybeconsidered s relevantcircumstancesoo. This additionenriches2(b)and turnsit fromthe psychologisticationalityprinciple nto hatPoppercalls 'situationalogic'.Similarly,3(a) is admittedas institu-tionalanalysisnot by admitting hatthe aimsof institutionsonstrainthe individual'sbehaviour,but by admitting hat the existenceandcharacteristicsf institutions as svellas people'sadoptionof definiteattitudesowardshem)constrainheindividual's ehaviour, ccordingto thelogicofhissituation.3(b)is thetheoryof institutionaleform, fthe way peoplemayalteran institutionalituation o as to abolishorenforce ocialconstraints,ndalterotherpeople'sattitudes byresort-ingtoviolenceorbydemocraticmeans accordingo thelogicof theirsituation)

Both3 (a)and3 (b)relate o animportant spectofhumanbehaviourtheunintendedocialconsequencesf individual ctions.Theinstitu-

tionalanalysis 3(a))will showhosvpeopleact undercertaincircum-stancesn a way to forwardheirosvnaims,andin so doingaffectthesocialsystem. n particularhiswillbe sowhentheiraction s a reformofinstitutions3(b) It is theverycombination f 3 (a)and 3 (b)whichrendersheunintended onsequenceso important ndwhichamounts

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JOSEPH AGASSI

to a theoryof soeial ehange. It would be deserving f the title 'soeialdynamies'had not this title been used differently y some soeiologists.The holist soeial dynamies s but a historicist ssertion f the goal ordestinyof the socialwhole; t has no explanatory ower.The psyeholo-gistie ndividualistoeialdynamies s but an idea aboutthe interaetionof many ndividuals;t is far too eomplieated o be eapableof develop-ment in any detail.None of theseviewsof soeialdynamies eeordwiththe following ketehof a simpleexampleof socialehange.Gonsiderheinstitutional ircumstanees3(a))under which some workers ind itprofitable o organize trade union for collectivebargaining 3(b)).In these nesv nstitutional ircumstancesollowing he formationof atrade union (3(a)),other workerswill find it profitable o organizeas well (3(b)).This subsequent ituation n which most workersareorganized (3 a) makes it desirable for the employers o organize(3(b)).The existenceof both workers' nd employers' rganizations^villprofoulldlynfluence he relationsbetweenworkerand employer(3(a));and it may even bring about the government'sntervention,perhaps n the form of new legislation 3(b)).Thus, unintentionally,the first radeunionorganisers ave starteda socialavalanche.

I shouldadd, in parenthesis,hat manythinkers eemto havefelt theneed fora viamediaetsveen he two traditional Tiews,nd even for aeonsistent ynthesis etween he reasonable lements n them. I main-tain that Popperhas suceeededn carrying ut this intuitively eit pro-gramme, hus rendering xplicitthe approachhich in fact underliesthe fruitfuland reasonable art of existing ocialstudies,while retain-ing the eentral thesis of individualism,namely the thesis that onlyindividuals ave aimsand responsibilities.

In the restof thisessay shalltry to elaborate oints tated n the firstseetion.I shall entirely gnorepsychologistie olism,and diseuss, romthe methodological spect, nstitutionalist olism,psychologistiendi-vidualism, nd institutionalistndividualism. shalltheneoneludewitha eommenton the metaphysical iesvsbehindtheseapproaehes.

II

In this seetionI shall Iw to criticizeholism rom a methodologiealrather hanfroma Inetaphysicaliesvpoint. shallnot discuss he exist-enee or non-existence f group-interestsor of group-minds), ut stressthe metaphysieal haraeter2f any assumptiononcerning roup-inter-ests, and the danger involved in not recognizing his metaphysicaleharaeter, r in regarding olismas 'scientiSc'.

The majorquestion o sivhich olismgives rise eoncerns he relationbetsveen he distinct nterests f the groupand thoseof the individualsbelonging o it. Logically, hese svokindsof interestmay be in harmony

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METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALIShf

or in conflict.The diversity f individuals'nterests orcesoneto admitthat the group's nterestmay be in conflictwithsome ndividuals'nter-ests. One has to decidethen, in case of a conflictof individualand thegroup's nterest,whichof these s, or shouldbe, dominant.I ) One mayassert hat in caseof conflict he group'snterests houldbe dominant.In this case one merelyadvocates collectivistmorality.2) One mayassert hat the group's nterest s dominant, f not now, then at least'in the long run',evenwithoutbeing mposed n its individualmemberswho may all act against t. In this case,one expresses fatalistview ora prophecyaboutthings to come; Popperhas tried to show (in hisPovertyf Historictsm)he barrenness ndunscientific haracter f suchprophecies. 3) One may assert that in case of conflictthe group'sinterest s latent,and comes nto playonly when the group'smembers'interests ltersoas to coincidewith thegroup's nterest.This s the pat-tern of many widespread opularbeliefs.As a naive examplewe maytake the myth thatwhen all Jews keepthe Sabbath he Messiahwillcome. The newesttheorywhich follows his pattern s that the leaderdiscovers he destinyof his group;thisis but a variationon the bookof Exodus. 11 hevariantswhich ollow hispatternareobviouslymeta-physical; ts main nterest, think, iesin its relation o a specificmoralphilosophy f theindividual's esponsibilityo the collective. Thiskindof morality allsneitherunderthe headingof collectivistmoralitynorunder he headingof individualisticmorality-thetwokindsof moralitydiscussed n Popper'sOpenSociety.3)4) The only other alternativeseemsto be this:the group's nterestalwaysand necessarilymanifestsitself in, and acts through, ome individuals' ims and interests.Onemay state a scientificheorywhile following his pattern,by specifyingthe individuals thoseaims are identicalwith the group's nterests ndby specifying heseindividuals' imsand circumstances. ut then theassertion bout the identityof these ndividuals' nd the group'snter-ests hich that theory+rould ontain,will be redundantn the sensethat the testabilityof the explanatoryposserof that theorywill notdiminish ith the omission f this assertion.f this assertions omittedthe theorywill accord+srithhe patternof institutionalisticndividual-ism, but if this assertions not omittedone may be tempted o stick o ithen the scientificpart of the theory s refuted.For, beingunscientific,this assertion s irrefutableand can be safely upheld, though thisamounts o dogmatism. shallnow discusswo examples f this kindofholism,Marxism nd Functionalism.

V\rhatMarxsaidaboutclass nterests hardlyopen to rationalargu-ment and is thusmetaphysical, hilehis assertions oncerninghe wayclass nterestmanifeststself n the individual's ctionare opento criti-cismand arescientific. orexample,onecan criticizeMarxby pointingout that a uForker'snterestdoes not alssayscoincideurith hat of hisfellosvw-orlier,ndadduceempirical xamples o this effect.Of course,

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JOSEPH AGASSI

one maydismiss uchcriticism s irrelevant n the grounds hatonly theworkers' shert-run' rlterests arl conflict, but not their 'lorlg-run'interests.4 his is the attitudeof those who are determined o upholdthe metaphysical artof Marx'sview dogmatically, ven at the expenseof ignoring he scientificpart of Nfarx's iew. Yet, obviously, t is thescientificpart which s more nteresting nd more mportant.

Furthermorehis attitudemay easily ead to a collectivistmorality.For,by admitting hat the class nterestmayclashwith the ('short-run')interestupon which its membersact, one's views come very close tocollectivistmorality,and they becomecompletely o when priority sexplicitlygiven to the class interest tself. Thus, Marxistcollectivistmoralitybegins vithblamingworkers or not behaving n accordwithMaix's predictions.

My secondexample s from current ocial anthropology. mentionit diffidently, ecause am not suiciently familiarwithmodern nthro-pologicalstudies.I understand hat in some interpretationsunction-alism s viewedas the attempt o show hosvthe social-group'snterestof self-preservations manifest n the compatibility f diXerent ocialroles,when thesecoincideeither n any one personor in any one situa-tion. The scientific art of this approach onsists f a varietyof specificassumptionsf the compatibility etsseen pecific ocialrolesand of thecriticalexamination f these assumptions, nd is quite independent fany viewsconcerning he group's nterest. n particuIart is independ-ent of the metaphysical iew that a group's nterest s manifest n thecompatibility f socialroles.This metaphysical iew Ieads o the dogmathat compatibilitymustexist and to the corollary hat therecan neverbe any ('endogenous')ocialcausesof socialchange, o that only 'alien'bodiesor factors an causesocialchange.Gellner's xcellent riticism fthisdogmaiseems o me to be quiteunanswerable.My pointhere s thatthisdogma tems romholismand is quiteredundant:he partsof func-tionalismwhicharereasonable nd nteresting reentirely ndependentof it.

The same may be said about Gellner's riticismof the functionalistdoctrine f survival.According o this doctrine ocialrelicsdo not exist:no social nstitution urvives ts function: f it exists oday t musthavea function oday,and this functionwill explainand ustify ts existenceindependently f its history. In my own view there are two strongmethodological ointsbehind he functionalist octrine f survival.Thefirst s a methodologicalriticism f the approach vhichwaswidespreadbefore the rise of functionalism 'historism', bout which see below,p. 255): the assumptionhat an institution nceexisted s not an explan-ation of its existencenow, that is to say, of its survival.The second sthe methodologicalule of attempting o explaina seeming ocialrelicby assumingt to be something f contemporaryignificance.Ve do notknow which institution s a social relic and svhich s functioning, nd

250




sse should rlvestigateuchquestonswith open minds.Yet thesetwosoundrulesconcerningurvivals an easilybe exaggeratednd turnedinto the claimthat socialrelicsneverexistand that historydoesnotmatterat all.Thisis almost denticalwiththeviewthatall institutionsoperatewith perfectharmony,and withstandany externaldisturb-ancesby quickand efficientadaptationat the expenseof the quickelimination f institutionswhoseservicesareno longerrequired.

The metaphysical nd arch-conservativeharacterof this holisticviewarequiteobvious,and the exaggerationst containswell deserveGellner's riticism.This criticismed Gellner o posethe problemsoftheexplanation fsurvivals ndoftheplaceofhistoryn socialexplana-tion, problemswhich, I suggest,are capableof solution n termsofPopper'situationalogic.First, ituationalogicallows ortheexistenceof socialrelics,as well as for the explanationof theirsurvival.Forinstance,we mayexplainthe survivalof an obsolete aw as beingdueto the legislativebody'sbeingoverworked, r due to respect or theprintedetter.(Obsoleteawssometimes ecome ignificantustbecausetheywereneverformallyabolishedandbecause omepeoplediscoverthemandusethemaccordingo thelogicof theirsituations.) econdly,though t is clearlyunsatisfactoryo explain heexistence f an institu-tionmerelyby assumingts existencen the past,thisassumptionmaybe an ingredientn a satisfactoryxplanation.Situationalogicbringsinto the explanationof the existenceof an institutionts immediatehistory,whichconstituteshe circumstancesf individuals.Giventheinstitutional rrangementf any one period,svecan tryto explain tspreservation,r reformnr abolition, n the next period, n termsofrationalor purposeful ehaviour.Thus,by eliminating roup-interest,we haveall thatis reasonablen functionalism ithoutbeingconfinedto 'static'modelsonly.

To conclude,a holistictheoryeitherhas no explanatorypower,orelse it has explanatory owerwhichit wouldretainwhenthe holisticelement n it is eliminated.Yet if the holisticelementof the theory sretained,particularly fter ts scientific lement s empirically efuted,thenthe holisticelement eadsits adherentso obscurantismnd per-hapsto collectivistmorality.This (asI understandt) is Popper's rgu-mentagainstholism againstattributingdistinct)nterestso societiesor to social nstitutions quiteapartfromhis metaphysicalonvictionthatsocieties ndsocial nstitutions,hough heydo exist,haveno (dis-tinct)interests.

III

In thissectionI shallcriticizepsychologisticndividualismr indi-vidualisticpsychologism r simply psychologism since I shall notdiscussholisticpsychologismhis abbreviation an hardlycauseany

25t



JOSEPH AGASSI

confusion).As in the previous ection,my criticismwill be methodo-logicalrather hanmetaphysical.

The metaphysical ifferences etween nstitutionalismnd psycho-logismsomewhatresembleshe differencebetweena drawingand apointillistpaintingwhichcontainsonlycoloureddotsbut looksas if itcontainslines. Psychologism dmitsinstitutionsnto the pictureofsociety n thesamemannern whichthepointillist dmits ines ntohispainting-as mere llusions reatedby oversight f details.In thissec-tion I shalldiscussnot this metaphysical iew, but the methodologybasedon it.

Before oming othatI shouldpointout,infairnessosomeadherentsof psychologism,llatoriginallypsychologism asnot a programmeoexplainsocialphenomenabut an attempt o designthe idealrationalsociety.

The originof psychologismeems to me to be the applicationofBacon's heoryof T;novledgeo socialand politicalproblems.6Baconexplained he abilityto contributeo scientificprogress urelypsycho-logically:an individualpossesseshis abilityonly if his mind is in itsnaturalstate onlyif his mindis freefromsuperstition. ndsupersti-tion is the resultof impatienceand self-flattery:mpatienceeads toguessingandself-flatteryeadsto self-deception hichmakes t impos-sible to get rid of one'soriginalguesshoveverfalse t maybe andinspite of all refutations. hisbeingso, he said,sciencecan develop nly

ifweforgetallpastsuperstitionsndstartbyobservingactsastheyare.Bacon husexplainedocialphenomena sychologically:ncient ciencewas due to man'snaturalopen-mindedness;he lMediaeval arknesswasdueto man's elf-deception;ndmodern ciencesdue toforgettingMediaevalsuperstitions.Obviously he applicationof theseviewstosocial,political,andlegalproblemss highlyradicalistespeciallyincetheycontainthedemand hat+^tehouldstartafresh).Beingconsciousof this, and being a conservative,Bacon repeatedlydissuadedhisreadersromattempting o applyhisviess to socialandlegal-studies.Etetas soonas hisviesrs ere acceptedas theexplanation f Nesrton'sincredibleuccess,heyled to theradicalism f theeighteenth entury.All pastinstitutions ere dismissed s irrationalogether trith ll pastviewsonhich theyrested; ilesevievs ^vereeclaredo besheer uper-stitions.Theinstitutioninoxvnsmodern ciencevas vieved notasaninstitutionbut as tlle resultof the abolitionof the previous(institu-tionalized) earning(especially he teaching n Church nstitutions)andreversiono man'snaturalcapacity o learn.7SimilarlwT,he hopeforsocialreformwasthe hopenot thatinstitutions vouldbe replacedbybetteronesbutthattheybeabolished ndgiverisetoaninstitution-lesssocietyof (enlightened) aturalmensho areable to forsardtheirnatural nterestsn the bestmanner.

Practically ll theleadingthinkers f theeighteenth enturyagreed252



NIETHODOLOGICAL NDIVIDUALISM

thatthe existence f badinstitutions itallydependedon people's rra-tional and even superstitious cceptanceof them. 'Nothingappearsmoresurprising', ays Hume (in his Essay on The First PrinciplesfGovernment),to thosewhoconsider umanaffairswitha philosophicye,thanthe easinesswithwhichthe manyaregovernedby the few, andtheimplicitsubmissionwith which men resigntheirown sentiments ndpassions o thoseof theirrulers.Whenwe enquireby what meansthiswonders effected,we shallfindthat as force salwayson the sideofthegoverned, he governorshave nothing to support hem but opinion.'Humeemphasizedhat theopinionof thegoverned,by whichtyrannyis maintained, s quiteirrational.Althoughhe opposed he use of themythof the socialcontractas a justification f existing nstitutionsinhis essay on rTheOriginalContract),e himselfendorseda less rose-coloured ersionof it (in hisessayon TheOrigin f Government)n orderto explain he existenceof irrationalnstitutionsike tyranny.He attri-butedsome (military) ationality o the act ofinstituting government,and explained ts survival in peace time) after t had lost its originalfunctionby the subjects'rrationalorceof habit.Rousseau ad a similarview of tyranny. Thestrongests neverstrongenough o be always hemasterunlesshe transfers is strength nto right, and obedience ntoduty',he wrote n his SocialContractBk. I, ch. III). Yet he wasmoreconcerned to stress the irrationalityof accepting the right of thestrongest whose ole result s a massof inexplicable onsense', hantoexplainexistingsocialcircumstances. imilarly,Adam Smith had nointention to explain slaveryon rational ines;he considered t to be'absurd'and the most inefficient and expensive orm of labour;atmosthe was willing to explain t as rooted n people's gnoranceand

* a

preJuc .lce.

Thus, the originalviessbehind modernpsychologisms the eight-eenth-centuryheoryaccording o whichalmost all previous nstitu-tionsssere a massof inexplicable onsense'.The humanist hinkers ftheEnlightenment', ritesWatkins,8regarded istoryas a longrecordof unnecessaryuffering;but they repudiatedhe doctrineof originalsin and attributed he sufferingpartly to physicalcauseswhichmightbe revealedby science and controlledby technology,and partlytosuperstition nd ignorance, roducts f badeducaiionwhich,theysaid,had renderedman'snaturalgoodnessmpotent'.Existing nstitutionsarerooted n 'badeducation'; humannature' s at the root of the per-fectlyrational uturesociety.The idea that most existing nstitutionsare inexplicablewith the aid of the rationalityprinciple2(a)) led tothe condemnation f theseinstitutions, ot of the principle.Only theidealliberalUtopia can be fully explainedby therationality rinciple,for this society is perfectlyrational as in it human natureoperatesunimpeded y institutions,r by the 'massofinexplicable onsense' nwhich nstitutions rebased.

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According o the humanist hinkers f the Enlightenment, ot onhtythe idealsocietybut also ts risecan be explained urelypsychologically

by referenceo humannaturealone:oncepeoplesee that the existingorder is superstitioushey will cease to accept it, by which very actthey will have created he ideal society.This naive view was attackedfromtwo sides, he traditionalist nd the extreme adicalist.The tradi-tionalistsdefendedsociety'sneed for some blind obedience ('super-stition' is the individualists' ame for the same). The extremeradi-calistsdemanded hat the state (or some other institution) houlduseradicalmeans o eradicatebad institutions nd the superstitiousduca-tion on ^shich hey rest. The traditionalists aturallymoved towardsholism as did those extremeradicalistswho noticed that what theydemandedwas no longer he abolitionof all institutions ut rather heestablishment f some new institutionsn orderto destroy ome olderones: heystarted o view the sceneas a battlefieldn whichold and newinstitutions or classes,or social forces) were struggling. L. PearceWilliams'very interestingpaper concerning he debate about the re-form of education mmediately fter the FrenchRevolution9 resentsa detailedhistorical xampleof such a development.)The eighteenth-centurypsychologistic rogramme f planninga future iberalUtopiaendedwith its failure o produce his Utopia afterthe FrenchRevolu-iion. It has two intellectualheirs, however: he anarchistmovement,and the nineteenth-century sychologistic rogrammeof explainingexisting ocialphenomena,whosechiefpromoters ereComteand Mill.

It is a most nterestingact that there s no otherdifference etweenthe eighteenth-centurysychologism nd the nineteenth-centurysy-cologismbut that the one was a programme o design the perfectlyrational ocietyand the otherwas a programmeo explain he existingsocieties.Bothhad at theirdisposalnothingbut physical ircumstancesand the psychologywhich is equally applicable o all individuals-namely,humannature.

The nineteenth-century sychologistic rogramme eflectsa com-promisebetweenthe desireto explain social entitieswhich could nolongerbe explained wayand the traditional mistaken)ndividualisticaversion rom the admission f social entities (or 'holisticentities'asGellnercalls them).l°But this in itselfdoes not explain he persistenceof the idea that only humannatureshouldbe used n the explanaiionof social phenomena. The persistence f this idea can be explainedby referenceto other opinions which were common to both theeighteenth- nd the nineteenth-centuryndividualists. ommon o bothgroups s the view that a satisfactoryheorymustbe an assertion boutthe essence f the phenomena xplainedby that theory;and the essenceof all human phenomena s human nature. Common o both groups(especiallywith regard o Alill) is also the idea that explaining socialset-uprationally 2 b) is tantamount ojustifying t. I shallnot discuss

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these two ideas, since there is a strongerargument or allowingonlyhumannature o enterour explanation f socialphenomena:ncludingthe psychologyof people as we know them would seem to make ourexplanation oo easy,adhoc, nd uninteresting.t would enable us toexplain monogamyby the monogamous endenciesof the individualmembers f a monogamousociety,and polygamyby the polygamoustendencies f the individualmembers f the polygamous ociety.Thisunsatisfactorymode of explanationwill be ruled out if we allow onlyhumannature o be used as the psychological lement n our explana-tion. For, by definition,human nature s common o all membersofmankind.For the sake of clarityI shall call the kind of psychologismwhich has only humannatureat its disposal traditional sychologism'and the oppositekind of psychologismvulgarpsychologism'.

Traditionalpsychologisms a daringprogramme.t is the suggestionthat we shouldnot be satisfiedwith any explanationof social phen-omenaunlessthis explanations an assertion bouthumannatureandmaterial circumstances.Hence, it is the suggestion hat we shouldexplain the variety of social phenomenaby assuminga variety ofmaterial ircumstancessincehumannature s unalterable).But manysocialphenomena nd theirvarieties ardlydependon material ircum-stances take language as an obvious example. Hence traditionalpsychologismeems o be untenable.The only way out of this difficultris the suggestionthat we should explain today's variety of socialphenomena ot by referenceo the varieties f today'smaterial ircum-stances,but by reference o the varietiesof materialcircumstances ftoday as well as of yesterday. This renders he psychologistic ro-gramme a version of historism,l1 amely of the programme o ex-plain phenomenaby relating heir history.)

But this would not help either. If we want to explain a child'sadaptation o an institutionwithout taking as given the fact that itsparentsare adapted o it, we have to explain he parents' eing adaptedto it by referenceo theirchildhood.This regresswill be an unsuccessfulattempt to eliminate statements about institutions rom our ownexplanation,unlesswe assume hat there was at least one moment nthe society'shistory n which only materialenvironment nd humannaturedetermined ationalaction. Hence traditionalpsychologismspushed o the unintended iew that everysocietyhad a defiXiiteistori-cal beginning.This view is dismissed y Popperas 'the methodologicalmyth of the socialcontract' Openociety,i, 93).

The methodologicalmyth of the social contractseems to be em-ployed n the creationof variouskindsof historicalmyths.Sometimesthese are storiesabout collectiveeventswhich eft their mpressions nthe furtherdevelopments f the societies n which they occurred.Afamousexampleof such a myth s Freud'sdescripiion f the beginningof societyand the creationof the Oedipuscomplexas the outcomeof a

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specific event of a collective father-killing. Other myths are stories

about strong individualswho left their impact on posterity. A famous

example of this is Carlyle'sHeroesndHero-Worshit.or my part, I view

Carlyle'seffort as an attempt to solve a problemwithin the frameworkof individualismbut in a manner designedto renderit as indistinguish-able from holism as possible; his solution was intended to be a bridge

along which one could easily pass from the individualists'to the holists'

camp. Strippedof its holistic hero-worship,however,Carlyle's mythol-

ogy would be a part of a more general discussionof the contributionof past events to the shaping of our present societies.And the unheroicimpression which Cleopatra's nose is alleged to have Inade on poor

Antony is as good an instance of such an event as the heroic entry of

Carlyle'sOdin onto the historical and social stage.I do not wish to challenge the prominenceof Cleopatra'snose in the

historiographic iterature, but rather to claim that it is too far-fetched

as a part of an explanationof today'ssocial set-up. If the psychologisticprogrammeis to be carriedout successfully,we have not only to trace

the historical origin of a specific social characterisiic, but also to

explain how the effect of a historical event has persistedthrough theages.l2 Hence, the explanation of today's social set-up must contain a

descriptionof yesterday'sset-up and an assumptionwhich explains theemergence of today's set-up from yesterday's set-up. But these twoassumptions are quite sufficient, and we should therefore start urith

them, although, of course, having provided an explanation of today's

set-up, we ma try to explain yesterday'sset-up (and its roots in that

of the day beforeesterday).And yet it should be noticed, perhaps,that unlilie holism, traditional

psychologism sometimes does lead to theories which are open to

criticismand even to empiricalcriticism.Thus, psychologisticattempts

to explain some social eventsby stressing he roles of certainindividuals(ratherthan of the institutionalset-up) in history,has provoled admir-

able criticismssuch as Tolstoy's (in War ndPeace).imilarly, Mill's

contention that economics is based only on the universal disposition

to get rich, though uninteresiingis at least criticizable. Indeed it svas

criticized by pointing out that the competitive system does not follovfrom the dispositionto get rich, and that economlc competition is not

universal. This criticismled to the psychologisticclaim that primitivepeople, who do not have competition (and are thereforeprimitive))donot compete becausenf climatic conditionswhich make people lazy or

conterlted etc. Yet co<npetiiion has been found even among someprimitive people, though not the competition Mill kneV.

Difficultiesof this kind are not due to some specific errorsbut due

to the poverty of the tools which the traditional psychologistic pro-gramme offiersto its adherent This can be seen more intuitively,perhaps, if we look at an imaginary future than if lsTeook at the past.

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Assume hatthe futureof mankinds goingto be better.Since,ultim-ately,all the toolsthe adherents f psychologisman use in ordertoexplain orpredict) hisfutureareagain heunalterable umannatureand physicalconditions, hey are almostbound to say that, if thefuture s goingto be better nany ense,t is goingto be betterbecauseof somesort of improvement f ourphysicalconditions the develop-mentofscienceandtechnology.Thisis whytheUtopianists f theAgeof Reason ay suchstresson the advancement f learning,as V9atkinsrightlyremarksseep. 253above).ThisiswhyRobertOwenexpressedhis optimismby claimingthat the improvement f man'smaterialconditionss goingto cause mprovement f man'sgeneralconditions:accordingto traditionalpsychologismultimately there is almostnothingelsewhichcan causeany improsYement.owadays he errorof thisview is, regrettably erhaps,only too obvious.We knowthatthe futureof mankinddepends esson technologicaluccessandmoreon our abilityor inabilityto createeffective nstitutionalmeansforpreventinghe misuseof ourtechnological chievements.

So muchabouttraditional sychologism. nliketraditional sycho-logism,whichoffers oo few toolsfor the explanationof socialphen-omena,vulgarpsychologism fferstoo many tools. It allowsone toattribute o individualsall the characteristicsf the societyto whichtheybelong. It is not only adhoc,but alsountenable,as it allowsoneto assumeconflictingcharacteristicsn orderto explainconflictinginstitutions, nstitutionalized onflicts, and other undesiredsocialphenomena.For example,adherentsof vulgarpsychologismwouldand did explainunemployment y claimingthat workersare lazy.This approach,when pushedfar enough,becomesplainlyridiculousand ceasesto be individualistic, s it would renderthe rationalityprinciple X(a)) napplicableo messy ituations.

Adherentsof vulgarpsychologisman hardlybe expectedto havediscussedhis criticismexplicitly.Nonetheless, ne may view certainideas as attempts o mitigate t, as, forinstance, he following ugges-tions. (I) Unemployment s desiredby somendividuals. X) Unem-ploymentis not yet understood or want of factual information.(3) Unemployments an unintendedonsequence f rationalbehaviour.

According o the firstsuggestiont is not the unemployedwhowantto have unemployment, ut someotherpeople.This is a versionofwhatPoppercalls'theconspiracyheoryof society':l3verysocialevilis desiredand broughtaboutby somewickedpeople.This theory isentirelymetaphysical.t allegedly xplains evil)socialphenomenabyattributingevil)intentionso somepeoplebut it doesnot tell us whythesesinisterpeopleratherthan well-wishersnforce heirintentionson others.The statementthat those who are engagedin wars arewicked s an unsatisfactoryxplanation f svars;hestatementhattheindustrialmagnatesove war (or moneyor power)is no explanation

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of warsunlessone addsto it assumptionsoncerninghe socialcircum-stanceswhichmakesthem capableof imposing heir wills on others.(This criticisms due to Marx.)Hence, any admissible xplanation fsocialevils by conspiracy ssumeshe existenceof someprevious ocialcircumstances,hichcontained omeothersocialevils.The suggestionthat those can be explainedby previous conspiracieswould leadto a ratherfunny versionof the methodologicalmyth of the socialcontract.

Accordingo the second uggestion, eforewecan attempt o explainany social phenomena,we simplyhave to collect indiscrtminatelyllfactual nformation bout all individualsnvolved n the socialsettingin which the phenomena ookplace, and whensufficient nformationabout them is known, heirsocialsettingsvillbe knosvn nd the phen-omena in questionexplained. n orderto understand nemployment,it is suggested,we must knowmuch more about the workers, heiremployers, heirorganizers, tc. etc. I shall call this view 'inductivistpsychologism'.

Inductivistpsychologismmay be the view that the multitudeoffacts will arraythemselves nto a picture ust like the points in thepointillistpaintingdo. This wouldonly raise the questionof whydothe facts fall into pattern; he increasingly etaileddescriptions notan explanation; n the contrary,he morefactswe describe, he morewe want explanations. Moreover,he more actswe describe, helesswill they fall into patternby themselves.Thosewho want to collectmore facts in orderto explaina given fact usuallyadmit all this,butthey claim thatwe can find a good explanation nly if ve have know-ledge of sufficientlymany facts to adduce his explanation rom-according o the Baconianmethodof induction.

According o the Baconianview the propermethodof inquiry s tocollectmanyfacts, o adduce rom hem theories,o adduce rom hesetheoriesmoregeneraltheories the axiomata edia), nd to go on in-creasingthe generalityof our theoriesuntil we arrive at the mostgeneral theory-to the essenceof things. The general theory willexplain the lessgeneraltheories n succession nd, ultimately, t willexplain the original act fromwhich it is adduced.Obviously, hen,since the essenceof human phenomenas humannature,advocatingthe applicationof the Baconianmethod to humanphenomena eemsto be advocating raditionalpsychologism.l4Moreover,according oBaconian nductivism aisingproblemss dangerous ince it preventsone from observing acts indiscriminately.Hence inductivists houldnot bother about how the generaltheory of human nature wouldexplain the less general theories(the axiomatamedia),nor need theybother abouthow it svouldexplainundesired ocialinstitutions.Thefaith in the possibilityof adducingmore and more general theoriesfrom observedfacts reassuresone that the most general theoryof

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humannaturewill ultimatelyappearand that then all will be quiteclear.The only troublewith this faith is that it is basedon logicalerrors.

The third suggestionis Max Weber's individualistic deal typeapproach. t is the suggestionhatwe shoulddescribe he averageortypicalmemberof a given societyor socialgroupby attributing ohimsomeypicalsocialcharacteristicsnd by tryingto explainorpre-dict) his having other typical social characteristicsespeciallytheundesired nes)astheunintendedonsequence3f hisrationalorpurposefulbehaviourn his typicalenvironment.

Weberand his followershave succeededn applyinghis approachfruitfully, roducing long ts lillesinterestingheorieswhichareopen

tocriticalargument.Weber's pproachmay e viewedas a devulgarizedversionof vulgarpsychologism.Hence,at leastone versionof psycho-logism s fruitful.HowesZer,wishto stresswopoints n thisconnexion.FirstnWeber'sown appraisal f his approach eemsto be that it is animprovedversionof traditionalpsychologism, ot of vulgarpsycho-logism.SecondlyWeber'sapproachs defectiven its beingapplicableonlyto a narrow angeof problems.

As to the firstpoint, it explains he fullctionof Weber'srepulsivetheoryof the chartsma.ccordingo thistheory he originof anyidealtype is a historicalindividualwho had strong magical hypnoticpowers('charisma's Weber'stermfor thesepowers)which he usedin orderto forcehis friendsand acquaintanceso imitatehim. Nowthis theoryseemsto be a historicalexplanationof the diversityofsocieties orof ideal types)by referenceo humannaturealone it isyet anotherversionof the methodologicalmythof the socialcontract.ButWeber's heoryof the charismas not individualistic:ccordingoit the rise of the ideal type is not a resultof individuals' ationalorpurposefulbehaviourbut of their being hypnotized.Moreover, hecharismaheory s criticizablen thesamewayasthe conspiracyheorv:althoughchartsmalike conspiracy)s a (small) part of social life,the charismaheory(like the conspiracy heory) s no explanationasyet.

IgnoringWeber'smythof the charzsma,e remainwith two otheralternativeways of interpretingWeber'sindividualisticdeal typeapproach.The one wayis to viewit as an improved ersionof vulgarpsychologismndtheother s toviewit asa versionof institutionalism.According o the institutionalistnterpretation f Weber'sapproachonlytheinstitutionalizedharacteristics aybe attributedo theidealtype,whileaccordingo the psychologisticpproach here s no basisforthedistinction etween heinstitutionalizedndtheuninstitutional-ized characteristicsf the membersof the societyin question.Sincethe wholepointaboutthe characteristicsf the idealtrpe is that theypersist,one can clearlysee that the applicationof Weber'sapproach

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will be moresuccessfulndinterestingf we attribute o the ideal typeonly institutionalcharacteristics.This is what Watkinsmakes ofWeber's heory.He emphasizesl5

that thepersonality f a man in societycomprises ispositions oth of a moreprivateand temperamentalkind, and of a more public and institutionalkind.Onlycertain ndividuals redisposed o weepduringthe death-scenein Othello, but all policemenaredisposed o blowtheirwhistles,undercer-tain circumstarlces,nd any Speaker n the Houseof Commons s disposedto disallowparliamentaryriticism fexercises f the Prerogative.Andthesemore public and institutionaldispositions,whichmay varyvery little whenone man undertakes nother's ole, can be abstracted rom the total,varie-gated flux of dispositions, nd so providethe social scientistwith a fairly

stablesubject-matter.

NowI fullyagreewith thiskeenobservationf Watkins', ut I haveto stress that thoughit is a fair and commonsensicalommentonWeber'sapproach, t is not a part of it. The commentexplainswhythisapproachwassuccessful; ut thosewhoapply thisapproachneednot know why it is successfuland therefore hey have no need tomention institutionseven though the characteristicswhich theyattribute o their dealtypeshappen o beinstitutional. headvantageof speaking f (institutional)haracteristicsf the idealtype,

insteadofspeakingof institutions and of institutional oles) proper is ratherplain:this modeofspeaking vades heproblemofwhethernstitutionsexist (I(a)), and, if they exist,whetherthey have disnct aims andinterestsof their own (4). In otherwords, the whole advantageofWeber'sapproach s that it cen be viewed as psychologistic nd t can

be viewed as institutionalistic.or thosewhoha?edefided upontheseissues,this advantageof Weber?s pproachdisap?ears,while its dis-advantages,the great limitationsupon its range of applicability,remain.Briefly, hey arethese.

AsWatkins aspointedout,Weber's pproach llowsone toattributeto the typicalindividualonly publicand institutional haracteristics,so thatit doesnot enableus to explainsatisfactorilyffiects f detailedcharacteristicsf one prominentndividualand otherdetailedeventsof (social)history:Weber'sapproach ies us too muchto the typical.This, it seemsquiteobvious, eads to furtherand muchmoreseriouslimitations.Weber's approach leaves no room for sociologicallysignificantyet untypicalcharacteristicssuch as the more abstractinstitutionswhich leave no markon any typicalindividual)and theuntypicalcasesof specificand unique nstitutionaleforms.lsAt mostit allowsone to assume withoutdebate)changeswhichconstitute heemergenceof a new society(i.e. of ness ideal types). It allosssus toexplain ocialevilsasunintendedonsequencesfpurposefulehaviour,but it does not allons oomforpurposefulnstitutionaleform.Conse-quently t is inapplicable ven to the case of the typicalreformer f

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may act as a constrainton some persons n some instances, heyare always-proneo inducethese persons o attemptto reform hem.In cases n which t is obvious hat reform souldbe costlyand lead tolittle benefit,one would hardlyraise the questionof reform;and yet,obviousas the answer o it may be, as long as the questionof reformis not a prtori ruled out, ourdiscussions not quite on the traditionallines.

Let us take an exampleof how an obviouscase of the absenceofreform eadsto mystificationecauseholism eavesno roomto discusseven the absenceof reform.Let us considerDurkheim'sdeathat law-breakers ervesociety by reminding ts membersof the existenceofthe laws whichthey break.This functionalistdea seemsto be highlyunsatisfactory,ecause t seemsto be the resultof a determinationoexplain any event as one which contributesowards ocialcohesionin the faceof schismsand disintegration. nd yet somehowone tendsto admit that there s moreto Durkheim'sdea thanjust this. To mysurprise found that some studentsof sociologyare still unable tostatesimply he reasonablelement n Durkheim'sdea. It is, of course,the truism hatpunishmentmaybe used as a deterrent; ndthat whenit is a successful eterrentt strengthenshelaw. But this sby no means

universallyhe case. Therefore, full explanation f a specific ase of acrime followedby a punishmentwhich strengthenshe law has to bean explanation f the following acts:that the law was broken ratherthan universallyobserved); hat the criminalwas punished(ratherthan ignored or resvarded); nd that the punishm nt acted as adeterrent andwas neither gnorednor opposedby the public).Partsof the explanation reoften o obvious hat theyarenotstatedexplicitly;but while theexplanationsrestated n a holistic ashion hesepartsaresilentlyomitted.

To takeanotherexample,sve know that there exist no public tele-phonedirectoriesn Moscow.The following impleexplanation f thisfact may be trueor falsebutit is quite opento rationalargument:heauthoritiesear that telephonedirectorieswill be used by prospectivereformers 'counter^revolutionaries')n order to communicateandorganizea reform movement.The unintendedconsequences f theauthorities'behaviourare very interesting,especially or those whowish to knowundersvhatconditions uch highly centralized ontrolwill lead to a complete ollapseof the socialsystem.Thus,our explana-

iion of thissocietyand its ability or inability o remainunaltered orlong necessarilyontainsa discussion f possible hangesand prospec-*

tlve retormers.The sameexamples villshowthe inadequacy f psychologismin all

its versions).Take punishment gain. Whatdistinguishest (at leastin democratic ocieties) rompersonalrevenge s, according o someadherents f psychologism,he consentwhichthe udge'snorms eceive

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from many individuals.This explanation s refutedby any case ofpunishmentwhichcomesafterpublicdemandfor reformof the lawuponwhichthatpunishments basedbut before he reforms imple

mented.The adherentof psychologismmay now try to modifyhistheory,buthe willhaveto modify t whiletakingaccountof thesitua-tion in svhichthe refutinginstancehas occurred,thus riskinghispsychologism ltogether.This point will be moreobviouswhen wetake our second exampleof stringentcentralcontrolover all thecitizens'aciivities.

Theexistence fsucha centralcontrols themosteloquent vidence,if evidence s wanted,forthe viewthatpersonallyhe citizens ubjectto it are highly disposed o reform,and yet it is the (institutional)controlwhichmakesreformesspracticable.Thus,although ersonally

Hungarians owadaysareby andlargemoredisposed o reform hanBritons,nstitutionally Britains moredisposedo reformhanHungary.Adttedly the increaseof individualpeople'sdiscontentwill temptaprospective ebel in Hungaryto act, but his action,his attempttoinstitutionalizethis discontent,is psychologisticallynexplicable.Psychologismlocks hewayto theexplanation f thefactthatsuccessin creating nstitutions xpressing nd co-ordinatinghe existingdis-contentconstitutes successfulevolution r a major teptowardst.

Admitting uchcriticisms,omeadherents f psychologismiew in-siitutional eforms ot as the spreadof newattitudesbut as thesimul-taneousoccurrencesf manyindividuals'decisionswhichare causedby the spreadof the new attitudes. This view is nothingbut theadmissionhatpsychologismeavesno roomfortheexplanation f thefactthatindividuals hoose o act in a co-ordinatedashion.

The adherentof psychologismwill claim,perhaps, hat the boot ison the otherfoot.He will admitthatco-ordinationxists,but he willwantto exp]ain hisco-ordinationpsychologically)ndnot take t forgrantedas the institutionalistwould.This retortis not void of sub-stance,forinstitutionalismoesallowone to takethe existing nstitu-tionalco-ordinationsorgranted.Yet ultimately heretort s basedonan error.The institutionalist rogrammes neitherto assumetheexistenceof all co-ordinationsorto explainall of them,butrather oassumeheexistence fsome co-ordinationnorder o explain theexistenceof some otherco-ordinations.t is anerror o assume hattheonlysatis-factoryexplanation f institutionss by assumptions hichsaynothingabout nstitutions.Admittedlyuchan explanation,f it werepossible,wouldbe highlydesirable asit wouldbe simplerandthusmoreopento criiicalargument).But thereexistsa very obviousreasonwhichmakest impossibleoproduce uchexplanation.t iswhatI wouldcall'Popper'sationalprinciple f institutionaleform', ndit is this.How-ever bad the existinginstitutionalco-ordinations re a prospectivereformerwill tryhisbestto makeuseof them n hisattempt o reform

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them or to abolish hem. Therefore, he existing ocial co-ordinaiionswill constitutean importantfactor in determining he rational orpurposeful ehaviourof the prospective eformer,n determining helikelihoodof success, he cost of the reform,and the expectedbenefitfrom t.

In my previous wo sections have triedto argue hat all reasonableexplanationswithin the holisticand psychologisticrameworksan beformulatedwithin Popper's nstitutionalist-individualistethodology-situational logic.In the present ection havegonefurther nd statedthat almost all reasonable xplanationsof social phenomena,whenfullystated,cannot be fitted into the previous rameworks ut can befitted into situational ogic. In brief, almostall serious ocial thinkershave employed ituational ogic even though Popperwas the first toformulate t. This last assertion f mine may be true or false, but it iscertainlyno more nconsistenthan the widely acceptedasseriion hatEuclidused rulesof mathematicalogic (like reductiod absurdum)ongbeforemathematical ogicians ormulated hem. I should even stressthat adherentsof psychologismwere often ardentreformers f socialinstitutions,ust as Aristotleoften used inferenceswhich cannot form

part of his logic. Although he employment f situational ogic is notnew, its formulations. And it formsa great advancerelativeto theuntenable olistic chemeandthe untenablepsychologisticcheme,andeven relative to WeberXscceptable hough narrowscheme of indi-vidualistic deal type.

V

This sectionconcerns he natureof societyand social and political

instituiions as such, and is thereforemetaphysical.According toholismociety s a super-individual;ccording o psychologisticndividualismsociety s the sum-totalf individuals'nteractions;ccording o institution-alistic-individualismociety s the conventionaleansf co-ordinationetweenindividualactions.This last vies is knownas contractualismr con-

* v

ventlonallsm.

A defence of any view must constitute n answering he criticismlaunchedagainst his viess and in showing hat it is preferable o allthe existing alternatives o it. More one cannot do, for it is alwayspossible hat futurecriticismwill showthe unacceptabilityf that viewand futurethinkingmight bring about better alternatives. n accord-ance sviththis attitude,I shall noss try to discuss he criticism f con-ventionalism r contractualismnd then argue that it is preferable oholismand to psychologism.

Thereexist tsvoobjections o conventionalismr contractualism:heone is that the conventionor contractwas never signed;the other is

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that while one may contractout of a conventionor a contractonecannot contractout of society. The first objection s slight:conven-tionalismor contractualismeed not entail the view that a contractwas ever signed;an individualgives his implicitconsent o an existingcontractevery time that he acts in accordancewith it, even whileattempting o abolish t. No one everstops any individual rom con-tractingout of anyconvention.Hereproposers f the secondobjection(like Adam Smith)will point out that such people as policemenandmagistrates ee to it that no individualcontractsout of the existinginstitutions, nd that therefore nstitutions re not contracts.But thisis an error. %lhatn individual annotdo is to forceother ndividuals,policemenor no policemen, o contractout of a convention.The law-breaker s the personwho, by the actof breaking law, contracts ut;if the other ndividualsn his societydo not contractout theywill tryto catch and punishhim in accordancewith the laws (namelytheconventions) llich they adopt; if they contractout as well, he willnot be punished,and that is all there s to it.

Undoubtedly,any individual'sdecisionas to whetheror not tocontractout of any given conventionmay dependon the questionofshetheror not he thinksother ndividuals re tempted o contractoutas well. This is howindividual ctionsare co-ordinated, otonly whenthey conform o a given conventionbut also when (as the unintendedconseqllence f existingconventionor as the result of the develop-ment of new ideas) they are highly disposed towardsaccepting anew conventionor towards abolishing or reformingan existingconvention.

What the criticsof conventionalismeem to have missedis thatalthough one person'scontractingout of an institutiondependsonother people's choice, it is, ultimately,his own choice. Moreover,they seem to havemissed he point thatwhen one chooses o act onedoes not necessarilyike the conditions nderwhichone acts.Choice soften betweenevils,and the aim is to choose he lesserevil.Why aniiconventionalistsiew he abidanceby tyrannyas stronger n objectionto conventionalismhan the willingnesso die on the barricades donot know. Bothof these kindsof behaviourare- to me at any rate-profoundly uzzling.And yet only conventionalism,think,allows orboth of them; the holisticview and he psychologistic iewamounttogiving up hope everto understandhem.

Totalitarians ave often claimedthat conventionswhichthey con-tractedout of srere merepiecesof paper'or merecustoms,while thosewhich suited themwere 'real'. The plain fact is that all conventionsare 'merepiecesof paper'-that withoutagreement o abideby it anyinstitution s void. (Otherwise hese tyrants' propagandamachineswouldhave beenquite unnecessary.) his was knownalready o Humeand Rousseau seeabove,p. 953), andwas merelysmoke-screenedy

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holistic propaganda.And yet this holistic propagandacontains astrongpoint which s this.

Althoughany conventionmay in principlebe discarded,people dowant to have someconventions;t is better o have almostany law andorder (i.e. conventional o-ordination)han to have none. This anti-anarchisticcontention can be used in order to explain rationallypeople'sabidanceby tyrannywithoutthereby ustifying yranny.Forit is a poor ustification f a system hat it is preferable nly to completedisorder.Realizing his,mostof those who are subject o tyrannywilltry to reform t. Admittedlyome peopleaccepttyrannybecause heirillusion hat it is government y forcerather han by convention eadsthem to expect from it moresecurityor more efficiency.Admittedly,some people accept tyrannybecause hey beneSt from it, or hope tobenefit from it, and some people accept tyranny ust because theyadmiretyrants.But mostpeople,I contend,abide by tyrannymerelybecause hey see no otherway of keepingalive and may wait for thefirstopportunity o organizeand overthrowt. And a significant artof this attitude is people'srealizationof the bitter truth that eventyranny may be preferable o total disorder.This realizationmaysometimesbe the productof revolutionswhich lead to disorder.Thuswe can explain the strangehistoryof battles againsttyrannywhichended by establishingmuchworsetyrannies, uch as the FrenchandRussian errors: yranny s sometimes oleratedbecausepeople realizethat they have no idea of how to overthross uccessfullyhe tyrannyrather han the tyrant.Herepeople'sopinionsenteras a major actorin the socialsituation;but they enternot so much as personal pinionbut ratheras institutional r public opinion (be it scientificor not).Of course, tyranny is not always better than total disorder.Therealization hat an existing yranny s worse than disorder,however,

may even lead to suicidalrevolts ike the WarsawGhetto Uprising.And in any casesuchrare yranniesead to statesof affairsn whichtherelationbetweenmasters ndoppresseds that of government y bruteforce. Such relations,not being institutional t all, do not enter the

. * .

presentdlscusslon.The holisticview explains he existenceof institutionswhich no one

desires,by the suggestionhatthese nstitutionserve ocietyas a whole.But holismmisses he problem o be solved,which is not what is thefunctionof these institutions,but ratherwhy do people accept themagainst heirsvill?lsEven f an institutions useful o society, ven f it isusefulto everybody, he puzzle remains:hy do people abide by itsvhiledesiring o overthrowt? The holisticview cannot be disproved,but one can show that it explainsnothingat all, that it may lead tohistoricism nd dogmatism, nd that it may lead to an unacceptablemoraloutlook.

The psychologistic iewexplains he changesof socialorganizations266



METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM

by changes n people's ituationsand attitudes.There is truth n thisexplanation,but there are two arguments gainstthe view that thisis thewhole explanation.First, ndividuals' ttitudes oncernnot onlyindividuals ut alsotheir ocialorganization. Society s not apointillistpicturejust becausepeople's aims happen to be co-ordinatedbynature;society s a picturebecausepeople wantit to be one,becausepeopleare ready to changetheir attitudes, n a give-and-takeashionor by a civil war, but in order o createor to alterthis or that picture.The second argument s this. Institutionsare not just the reflectionof the psychology f the majority f theirparticipants. Twoidenticalgroupsof individuals n identical surroundings, ut with somewhatdifferent onventions rrulesof behaviour,willdevelopverydifferentlyfromeach othernot onlysociallybut alsopsychologically.) s Russellsaid,l9 institutionsmouldcharacter nd character ransformsnstitu-tions.Reform n both mustmarchhand in hand'.

Beforeconcluding hissectionI wish to drawattention o an inter-estingscientific heorywhich incorporateshe conventionalist r con-tractualist ssumptionwhichI have described bove.It is NI.Banton'sviewconcerning he problemof racialprejudicesn Britain White ndColoured,959) Thetraditional sychologicalpproach o racerelationsis inapplicablehere wherethe rapid emergence f a coloured ectionin British ocietyhascreated he problembeforewidespread rejudicesandemotionalattitudescould emerge.(Theuselessness f holismhereneed hardly be mentioned.)An important ngredient n Banton'sexplanation s the assumptionhat this rapidemergence f a colouredsection n British ocietyhascauseda seriousgap in the body of socialconventionswhich had somehow o be closedratherquickly,particu-larlybecausethe Britishsociety s highlyconventionalized. cannotdiscussBanton's nterestingheoryhere; I mention t as an exampleofthe application f conventionalismn proposing specific ociologicalexplanation.

To conclude his sectionI shall repeat that institutions an be ex-plainedas inter-personal eansof co-ordination,s attitudeswhichareacceptedconventionally r by agreement.Not that an agreementwassignedby thosewho havethe attitude,but the attitude s maintainedby one largelybecause t is maintainedby many, and yet everyonesalwaysat liberty to reconsiderhis attitude and change it. This idealeaves room for the rational principle of institutionalreform(seeabove,p. 263). It accordswith the classical ndividualisticdea thatsocialphenomena re but the interactions etween ndividuals.Yet itdoes not accord with the classical ndividualistic-psychologisticdeathatthis nteraction epends n individuals' imsand material ircum-stancesalone;rather t adds to thesefactorsof interaction he existinginter-personalmeansof co-ordination s well as individuals' bilitytouse,reform,or abolish hem, on theirowndecisionandresponsibility.

267



268JOSEPHGASSI

AthispointwehavetogoovertoPopper's rogrammefmoralizing

politicsatherthan politicizingmorals,and to his idea that the task

ofocialand politicalphilosophy s the planningnot of the ideal

societyut of the reformof the existingones.Butat thispointI shall

closey discussion.

NOTES

ings is, of course,an irrationalpart of

1An earlierversionofsections II and

Vf he presentessaywas read to the

seminarf E. GellnerandT. Bottomore

atheLondonSchoolofEconomicsarly

in958. An earlierversionof sectionI

ofhe presentessay was read to theLondonchoolof Economics' ociology

Clubn a debate with E. Gellner,on

December, I958; and a subsequent

versionasalsoreadto the Theoretical

andomparativeociologyStudyGroup

ofheBritishSociologicalAssociationn

December6, I958. I amgrateful o my

wife,Mr. P. Cohen, Mr. E. Gellner,

hIr.. Goodman,WIr.K. Klappholz,

NIr.. G. MacRaeand Mr.J. W. N.

\Vatkinsor reading the MS. in its

varioustagesand for valuablesugges-tions.

2 The term'metaphysicalharacter's

heresed in Popper's ense,namelyto

denoterrefutabilityand lack of ex-

planatorypower. The proposal to

attributeimsto societies s labelledby

Poppermethodologicalollectivism'.n

thispaper, hosZesrer, prefer to use

Gellner'serminology: is term'holism'

isynonyrnous ithPopper's(methodo-

logical)ollectivism'.

3 FortheJesrish radition findisZidualresponsibilityossrardshe collectisesee

my JacobKatz on Jewish SocialHis-

tory' 7Le 3ewish ournal of Sociology,

Elol. , No. 2, December, 959, especi-

ally p. 264. The existenceof such a

traditionrefutes the viesZsthat there

existonly tz o kinds of moralityand

thata collectivistsocial philosophy n-

variablyeads to a collectivistmorality.

4 If 'long-run'here means >hat is

usuallymeantby this termin economic

literature,one can obviouslyfind con-flictsbetweenthe 'long-run'nterestsof

differentworkers.B'hen the 'long-run'

interest,however,s simplythe (distinct)

interest f theclassasa srhole hetheory

of the identityof workers'nterestsbe-

comes metaphysicalas well as trite.

The vacillationbetssreenhe two mean-

contemporaryarxism.5E. Gellner, 'Time and Theory in

Socialnthropology',Mind, LXVII,

ApriJ,958, I82-202. I shouldmakeit

quitelear thatmy sketchof function-

alismsgreatlyover-simplified. slightlymoredequate formulationallows for

conflictshich can be resolved by

institutionaleans(by ceremony, esig-

nation,tc. Yet this forrnulationn

turnaises many problems which I

cannotnterinto. I shouldonly like to

mentionhat it rendersfunctionalism

yetmore metaphysical,for we can

alwaysope to find the method of

resolutionf a conflict-even if it does

notxist.Moreover,n a sense t renders

functionalismntirely trivial. For itsclaimshat any institutionaland re-

peatedonflict (otherswill be hardly

noticedy themembers f thesocietv n

question,uch essbytheanthropologist)

willooneror later lead to the institu-

tionalizationf someremedies or it, at

leastn the samesensethat peoplewill

getsedto livingwithit (orelseperish).

Gellnerhas made the same criticism

someurhatifferently: to assert that

somemethodof co-ordinationxists n a

societys trivial,and even folloss fromthemeaningof the srord society';while

toassert that full co-ordinationexists

leads o the untenableview which ex-

cludesny ('endogenous')hange.Thus,

functionalisms either trivial or dog-

matic.Thereexistconflicts vhichareinstitu-

tionalized, .g. feuds, or relationsbe-

t+veenn-lasvs.Functionalismorcesits

adherentso view institutionalizedon-

flicts asmeans of social co-ordination

andas meansof resolving onflicts.Thisled EsZans-Pritchardo his ingenious

viewof feudsas meansof co-ordination

or cohesionbetveen the different ine-

ages or clans or tribes. \ et this vies

sounds dangerouslyapologetic, and,

indeed, for some philosopherst seems



METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 269

to have become a mysticaldogma. It isby far preferable, think, to view feudsmerelyas means of protection,and to

view the rest of what anthropologistsmay call their function as their unin-tended consequences.For such conse-quencesmay be undesirablend lead toreform.Alternatively, he feud systemmay become unnecessarywhen somereform leads to a better method ofprotection, and the undesired conse-quences of that reform may be thevanishingof the desirableconsequencesof thefeudsystemwhichEvans-Pritchardand Gluckmanhave discovered.

ffThe origin of Bacon's theory ofknowledge eems o be rooted n politicaltheory. See Popper'sOpen ociety,h. 9,on 'canvascleaning'.

7 Psychologisms still taken orgrantedby most writers on the problem ofknowledge. Popper's institutionalismstemsfromhis theoryof knowledge n astrange parallel to psychologism.Seehis Logicof Scientific iscovery,ections8and 27.

8 'The Strange Face of Evil', The

Lsstener, eptember30, I954, Vol. 52,Pp 522-3.

9 L. Pearce Williams, 'The Politicsof Science in the French Revolution',PaperTen, Critical roblemsn theHistoryof Sc?ence,d. MarshallClagett,Univer-sity of WisconsinPress,Madison, 959.

10 Explanations n History',Proceed-ings of the Aristotelian ociety, Supp.vol. 30, I956. Reprinted in Eheories fHastory, d. Patrick Gardiner, I 959.

See also his Reply to Mr. Watkins,

printedat the very end of thatvolume.11Historismshould not be confusedwith its near relative historicism:his-torism explains a phenomenonas aresult of a chain of events in the pastand historicism s a link between pastand future events, as taking its placein the present according to History'stimetable. Historism should not beviewed as wholly or mainly a part ofpsychologistic ndividualism: ts mainexponents elong o the Platonic holistic)

tradition.12 It should be noted that Freud's

famoustheory of mass-psyche end ofTotemndTaboo)s an attempt oexplainthe persistenceof the (Oedipus)guilt-feelingwhich he explainshistorically yassuming n event of a collective ather-killing.It is remarkable hat Freud wasfully conscious of the methodological

probIemspresent at each stage of thedevelopment f his views, but had neverfullyetorked ut his methodology s such.

Thus one can see in his Totem ndEaboohow his psychologism riveshim to themethodologicalmyth of the social con-tract which he consciouslyaccepts-and how, as soon as he related hemyth,he becomesmoreand moreawareof theemergentproblemof the persistcnce fthe contract.And yet, on the whole,ashis individualism rove him to psycho-logismandashis psychologism rovehimto collectivism,ultimately he was leftwith an inconsistentmethodology.As to

his mass-psycheheory, ts metaphysicalcharacter was made manifest by thedevelopment,through his own teach-ings, of social (educational) reformswhich led to the rise of societiesmuchlessguilt-ridden han his own.

13 The conspiracy theory of societyhas holisticversions; t is, historically, f

. . . .

a lo lStlC Orlgln.

14 Durkheim,who was an inductivist,escaped hisconclusionby claiming hatsocial *sholesare observable.This was

pointed out by F. A. Hayek in his TheCotxnter-Revolutionf Science.l6'Ideal Types in HistoricalExplana-

tion', TheBritish ournalforhePhilosophyof Science, , 9, I952, p. 40, reprintedin Readingsn the Philosophyf Science,edited by H. Feige and M. Brodbeck,N.Y., I953, p. 74Ie

lff Mr. Watkinshas drawn my atten-tion to the followingremarkof TalcottParsons, n his edition of Max Weber'sTheTheoryfSocial ndEconom*rganiza-

tion I947), which is appended o a noteby Weber referring to an intendedchapter on revolutions p. 354 n.): 'nosystematic account of revolutions isavailable . . . in Weber's publishedworks'.It seerns hat ParsonsnotedthatalthoughWeber was very interested nsocialchanges,he rarelydiscussedhem,being methodologically handicapped;cp. ibid., p. 24. Parsons s in favourofusing more boldly holistic ideas whereWeber's individualistic ideas are in-

applicable.17 This point was first made by

Watkins n his 'HistoricalExplanationin the Social Sciences', The BritishJournalor thePhilosophyf Science,, 30,I957, p. II2 n., reprinted n TheoriesfHistory, d. PatrickGardiner, 959, pp.

509-IO n18 rn order to explain why people



JOSEPH AGASSI70

accept an institutionagainsttheir willone may endorseone of the followingterosuggestions.First,experience rans-

mittedby tradition howsthe dangerofabolishinghem. This is an indisridualistsolutionwhichmakesholismredundant(see Popper's 'Towards a RationalTheor> of Tradition', The RationalistiInnual,949). Secondly,one maypostu-late theexistenceofsocialsub-conscious-ness or mass-psycheor group-spirit.

Gellner claims that nowadaysnobodytakesthis view seriously. , on the con-trary,maintainthat most holistssooneror later assume mplicitlythe existenceof a group-spiritwhich embracesboththe social itlterest and the vehielewhich carries the wisdomof abidingby the (undesired) nstitutionswhichserve t.

19PortraitsFromMemory,Reflectionson my EightiethBirthday.

London choolof EconomicsandPoliticalScience

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