ii

Acknowledgements

I am pleased to recognize the people who have been involved, in some way or

another, in the elaboration of this thesis. First, I would like to acknowledge that it was

thanks to a Fulbright LASPAU scholarship that I have been able to attend Tulane

University to obtain my master’s degree in History. At Tulane, I am especially

thankful for their guidance, encouragement, and for their exemplary scholarly

commitment, to my thesis committee comprised of Dr. Justin Wolfe, Dr. Jana

Lipman, and Dr. Kris Lane. I appreciate their honest feedback and generous

suggestions. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Wolfe, who prior my arrival to Tulane and

only through electronic communication, accepted me as advisee, and always

expressed interest in my thesis’ topic. In addition, the Tinker Foundation Summer

Field Research Grant, awarded by the Roger Thayer Stone Center for Latin American

Studies, allowed me to travel to Nicaragua to do archival research in 2016. My friends

and cohort at Tulane have offered valuable support. I especially appreciate Kyle

Lawton’s proofreading of the final draft.

In Nicaragua, my home country, I am thankful to the staff at the Instituto de

Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica for helping me to envision and develop this

project, and for providing unrestricted access to their extraordinary archival

collections. I am deeply grateful to have counted with Dora María Téllez’s permanent

encouragement and valuable comments throughout these years. She is an

extraordinary human being, and a remarkable historian; I am privileged to have her as

a mentor. My dear friend, Adriana Palacios, has been of tremendous support despite

the distance. Finally, my deepest thanks go to my mother, Marianela Doña, for her

unconditional love, patience, and for supporting all my endeavors.

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ ii

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

1.Best Friends and Brothers in Arms: Chamorristas and the Conservative Party ......... 7

2. Politics and Friendship: Chamorristas’ Correspondence ......................................... 25

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 42

Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 48

Biography ..................................................................................................................... 53

1

Introduction

“You already know that if you plant in this field, you will not sow in an infertile

plot– my soul is a ground in which the leafy and blossomy tree of gratitude germinates

and grows,” wrote Felipe Ibarra to General Emiliano Chamorro (1871-1966) in the early

1920s after the latter had been appointed as Nicaragua’s Minister Plenipotentiary in

Washington D.C.1 Taking advantage of a shared comradeship in the Conservative Party

and, of the fact that General Chamorro was not only a high-ranking official, but the

nephew of the President of Nicaragua, Ibarra evoked feelings of gratitude in order to

make two requests. He wanted General Chamorro to sign a document on his behalf, and

to intercede for him with Nicaraguan President Diego Manuel Chamorro (1860-1923).

Felipe Ibarra’s metaphor of his relationship with General Chamorro as a growing

tree nurtured through shared loyalty evokes the image of political relationships in

Nicaragua that were part of sustained, yet fragile, efforts to maintain clientelistic

partnerships for securing power in the government.2 These partnerships certainly were

not exclusive to Conservatives or even Nicaraguans, and they dated back to the early

1 “Ya sabe U. que en mí no sembrará en mal terreno- Mi alma es un campo donde nace y crece, frondoso y

florido, el árbol de la gratitud.”. Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica IHNCA-Universidad

Centroamericana (Hereafter IHNCA-UCA) Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Felipe Ibarra to Emiliano

Chamorro. N.d. (All translations from Spanish are mine). Despite the absence of a date for this letter, the

content indicates it was sent between January 1921 and October 1923, the years of Diego Manuel

Chamorro’s presidency in Nicaragua (1921-1923). 2 Here I refer to the system of caudillismo or caudillaje that is defined as a political system organized

around an authoritarian male leader or caudillo. My understanding of a caudillo comes from the definition

provided by John Charles Chasteen for whom, they are: “leaders who were capable of inspiring the most

intense devotion out of his followers and, who, moreover, were able to provoke the highest loyalties outside

any formal institutional framework”. John Charles Chasteen, Héroes a caballo: los hermanos Saravia y su

frontera insurgente, Biografías Aguilar (Montevideo: Aguilar, 2001). p. 21. (The English version was

originally published in 1995). I consider this definition useful because is ample enough to include a myriad

of organizational forms in which politics was understood and exercised under an authoritarian figure,

regardless of different interests and contexts. In this work, I use the phrase “clientelistic partnership” as

synonym to caudillismo to emphasize the unequal exchange between a leader and his followers for loyalty

which simultaneously sustained the group’s cohesion.

2

nineteenth century.3 But the U.S. intervention in those years (1910-1933) added new

complexities to those relationships. From 1910 on, Nicaragua became a U.S. protectorate

and local politicians navigated U.S. rules regarding Nicaragua’s internal stability;

therefore they framed their aspirations within its diplomacy.

This essay discusses the internal workings of the type of political system that

General Emiliano Chamorro participated in as a leading figure in one of the factions of

the Conservative Party, during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Instead of

focusing on his persona, my questions hinge upon the influence of followers like Ibarra in

shaping the clique’s inner functioning from 1912 to 1928. What type of connections did

this group of men have with their leader? How did they acknowledge General

Chamorro’s claim to legitimacy to politically represent them? How did their varied

identities inform the internal functioning of General Chamorro’s party faction, known as

Chamorristas?

There are few works on the Chamorristas as a group.4 Most writing instead treat

General Chamorro’s persona. We know little about the people who followed his orders,

3 Even when scholars have differed whether or not personalist leaders, or caudillos, existed in Nicaragua

during the first half of the nineteenth century, there is a consensus about the importance of clientelistic

partnerships between patriarch and folk as a form to exert political power in the process of nation-building

in Nicaragua. For two understandings of caudillos prior to 1858, see: E. Bradford Burns, Patriarch and

Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798-1858 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Frances

Kinloch Tijerino, Nicaragua: identidad y cultura política (1821-1858) (Managua: Edición Biblioteca "Dr.

Roberto Incer Barquero, 1999). For the case of El Salvador, see: Erik Ching, Authoritarian El Salvador:

Politics and the Origins of the Military Regimes, 1880-1940 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,

2014). 4 Personal accounts of contemporary witnesses and documentary collections are more frequent to find than

scholarly works about General Chamorro’s life. See: Gregorio Cedeño, Anécdotas del General Chamorro

(Managua: Tipografía Excelsior, 1953); Fermín Bravo, Revolución de 1903 (Managua: San Rafael, 1971);

Ramón Ignacio Matus, Tisma y el General Emiliano Chamorro (Managua: Tipografía Alemana de Carlos

Heuberger, n.d.). A recent documentary selection is: Clemente Guido, Emiliano Chamorro: Estadista y

Guerrero (Managua: Fondo Editorial CIRA, 2002). A scholarly work entirely devoted to Chamorro's

persona is: Gary L. Schilmoeller, "The role of Emiliano Chamorro in Nicaraguan Politics during the

Second Conservative Republic" (Master's Thesis, University of Kansas, 1967). The most comprehensive

works on Chamorristas are: Michael J. Schroeder, “Horse Thieves to Rebels to Dogs: Political Gang

Violence and the State in the Western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the Time of Sandino, 1926–1934”, Journal

3

supported his initiatives, negotiated local alliances or simply, organized his well-known

rallies. Those people were the ones on the ground in charge of securing the clique’s

cohesion and General Chamorro’s prominence. While focusing on Chamorristas’

interests and motivations, I find useful the term caudillo to place attention on General

Chamorro’s popular aura and authoritarian style. Not only scholarship on the topic but

primary sources from the period, constantly described him as such; regardless of the fact

that this term could be utilized with both pejorative and positive connotations.5 The

historiography on caudillos in Latin America informs my analysis and is useful because it

does not restrict the use of the term according to temporal classifications. It recognizes a

variety of contexts and strategies used by such political figures. 6

General Chamorro belonged to the landowning Nicaraguan elite. A common

feature in Latin America in this period, elites could claim militancy in either party, the

Conservador or the Liberal. Nicaraguan landowners were mostly involved in agriculture

of Latin American Studies 28, 2 (1996): 383–434; Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream :

Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 5 For Nicaraguan scholars, the term caudillo refers to an authoritarian politician with a charismatic

personality and exceptional abilities to cultivate alliances with different social groups. It holds a pejorative

connotation that has been used to qualify figures from a broad political spectrum; from conservatives like

General Chamorro, to dictator Anastasio Somoza García to the current President Daniel Ortega. See:

Emilio Álvarez Montalván, Cultura política nicaragüense: ensayos (Managua: PAVSA, 1999); Oscar-

René Vargas, La intervención norteamericana en Nicaragua y sus consecuencias, 1910-1925 (Managua,

Nicaragua: Centro de Investigaciones de la Realidad de América Latina, 1989); Andrés Pérez Baltodano,

Entre el estado conquistador y el estado nación: providencialismo, pensamiento político y estructuras de

poder en el desarrollo histórico de Nicaragua (Nicaragua: IHNCA-UCA, 2003); Frances Kinloch, Historia

de Nicaragua, 4ta Ed. (Managua, Nicaragua: IHNCA-UCA, 2014). 6 Here the historiography is vast. For a basic selection, see: Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in

Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); John Lynch, Caudillos En

Hispanoamérica, 1800-1850 (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1993); Robert M. Levine, Father of the Poor?:

Vargas and His Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Tulio Halperín Donghi and Jorge

Raúl Lafforgue, Historias de caudillos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Extra Alfaguara, 1999); Ariel De la

Fuente, Children of Facundo: Caudillo and Gaucho Insurgency during the Argentine State-Formation

Process La Rioja, 1853-1870 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); John Lynch, Argentine Caudillo:

Juan Manuel de Rosas (Wilmington: SR Books, 2001); Ralph Lee Woodward, Rafael Carrera y la

creación de la República de Guatemala, 1821-1871 (La Antigua, Guatemala: Centro de Investigaciones

Regionales de Mesoamérica ; South Woodstock, Vermont, 2002); Will Fowler, Santa Anna of Mexico

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).

4

and commerce, especially in coffee and sugar growing along with cattle ranching.7

General Chamorro’s position as a landowner, or patrón, indicates how he built his

leadership. He relied on patronage to weave clientelistic partnerships because of its

crucial role in defining labor in the rural world.8 This unequal personal relation

establishes two entities one subordinate and one dominant into a collaborative bond

whose internal tensions are flattened by feelings of friendship and loyalty.9 In this logic,

obedience is the most desirable result, and the ritual of conceding favors to each other

serves as the instrument of securing the bond. By heavily relying on a sense of personal

obligation through favors, the nature of General Chamorro’s patronage was highly

unstable. He was sometimes unable to fulfill his promises and had to be creative in the

resolution to political crises.

In this essay, I examine a set of political correspondence between General

Chamorro and the members of the Conservative faction he led. These letters constitute a

significant component in one of Chamorro’s private papers.10 More importantly, this

collection has not been examined before because it had remained as a familial patrimony

7. Although dominated by coffee production as the most profitable of all cash crops, both Liberals and

Conservatives were involved in Nicaragua’s agro export economy at the end of the nineteenth century. As

suggested by historian Michel Gobat, regardless of their partisan divisions, Nicaraguan elites became “an

agroexport elite… from all the nation’s leading regions”. Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream :

Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule. 57. 8 Patronage refers to a labor contract between a peon and a landowner associated with the hacienda or

estancia. In these two cases for example, a landowner at any given time could request from his workers

service at war, companionship in revolts, and support at the voting polls; while peons expected and

demanded from the patrón, permanent job, protection, room and board, and assistance from calamities.

Patronage also indicates the ability of a leader to fill government positions with his subordinates which can

include relatives, old time friends and business partners. For an expansion on the concept of patronage in

this sense, see: Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil. 2. 9 My understanding of patronage is influenced by the work of John Lynch. See: Lynch, Argentine Caudillo,

43. 10 The Chamorro Papers I consulted at the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA-

UCA) consist on 5,051 pages. There are two other known collections of Emiliano Chamorro papers. One is

located at Nicaragua’s National Bank’s library and the other is at Nicaragua’s National Archives both in

Managua. I have only been able to review some materials at the latter.

5

until it was temporarily sent to an archive. Besides describing political activities, these

vast and varied documents include materials related to personal businesses, diplomatic

initiatives, and family correspondence in the period between 1903 and 1936. 11 General

Chamorro’s papers complicate the idea that the internal structure of the faction heavily

depended of the leader’s personal will; thus, illustrating the importance of local decision-

making in securing the clique’s support. Who were these followers? What type of

connections allowed General Chamorro to become the faction’s leader? What did the

followers perceive were his main political assets? In what sense did the followers’ social

and economic conditions influence the clique’s internal cohesion? What role did they

have in the decision-making over political alliances and internal organization?

I argue that underneath the elaborate praises expressed in the political

correspondence, these letters demonstrate the fragile internal leadership of the caudillo.

The sources indicate that the internal cohesion of General Chamorro’s faction relied on

the varied socio-economic origins of its members and in their capacity to manage

tensions at different levels as a board of directors in the process of decision-making,

especially during electoral periods. One of Chamorristas’ most relevant concerns was to

maintain positive relations with the U.S. to secure their leverage against possible rivals;

especially because U.S. diplomats banned the Liberal Party’s political participation, thus,

11 In 2010, Xavier Zavala Cuadra, son of Joaquín Zavala Urtecho who was the founder editor of Revista

Conservadora, placed a collection of personal papers belonging to General Emiliano Chamorro in custody

at the IHNCA. According to Zavala Cuadra, before the 1972 earthquake, an unknown political relative of

General Chamorro saved these documents and had the intention to sell them. When Mr. Julio Chamorro

Benard heard about this offer, he sent the papers to the office of Revista Conservadora in Managua since

Carlos Chamorro Coronel, Julio’s son, worked at that journal. When the office was destroyed because of

the earthquake, Zavala Cuadra placed these documents at his mother’s house in Granada and they remained

unorganized there for decades. He verified the authenticity of these personal papers because Mr. Chamorro

Benard personally was acquainted with Chamorro’s political relative who safeguarded them after General

Chamorro’s demise in 1966. Mr. Xavier Zavala Cuadra. (Xavier Zavala Cuadra to Lissette Ruíz (email),

Director of Library and Archives at the IHNCA-UCA, «Consulta», 17 de junio de 2016.).

6

consolidating the Conservatives hegemony. Even when the ritual of favor was the most

important mechanism to secure loyalty and obedience, the case of General Chamorro’s

clique shows the limits of authoritarian figures.

This essay aims to contribute to centering the voices of supporters from different

strata in explaining how an authoritarian form of leadership, as represented in General

Emiliano Chamorro, maintained its influence for several decades. Indeed, this faction’s

open support for the U.S. intervention (1909-1933) and the repercussions of such

collaboration, negatively shaped Nicaraguan scholars’ assessment of Conservadores.12

They have been perceived as corrupt U.S. allies who shamelessly signed a treaty that

ceded the control of the interoceanic route to the United States in 1914, as well

accomplices with the Somocista dictatorship (1936-1979).13 In addition, there are other

motives for historians’ reluctance to explore conservatives’ stories concerning

Nicaragua’s political context and its sources’ dispersion.14 Many sources, as was

previously the case of the Chamorro’s papers, still remain unknown to historians. Despite

renewed efforts to study the period, however, the internal organization and social

composition of General Chamorro’s faction remained obscure.15

12 Conservatives in this period have been cataloged as vendepatrias or “homeland sellers” in Nicaragua’s

contemporary history for they aligned with the United States’ expansionist foreign policy in Central

America in the first decades of the twentieth century. 13 The Conservatives signed two treaties with Anastasio Somoza García that allowed the dictator’s political

stability. First, with Carlos Cuadra Pasos in 1948, and with General Chamorro in 1950. 14 First, it was not until the Sandinista Revolution that Nicaraguan researchers began to examine the period

of conservative administrations (1912-1928) in order to offer a historical background that could explain

General Sandino’s nationalist struggle in the late 1920s. The State funded a research agenda whose political

interest was to evidence the seeds of Nicaragua’s nationalism. 14 In the 1980s, with the creation of the

Institute for Sandinista Studies (Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo), a group of historians started to

investigate the period of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. One of those research teams named “Zeledón-

Sandino” was devoted to establishing a chronology of the period between the first landing of the U.S.

troops in 1912 and the beginning to the Sandino uprising in 1927. I thank Prof. Ligia Peña, a member of

this team, for this information. 15 Recent works on the Conservative Party include the aforementioned contributions of Michael Schroeder

and Michel Gobat, as well the study of Arturo Cruz. La república conservadora de Nicaragua, 1858-1893

7

This essay is divided in two sections. The first provides background to understand

General Emiliano Chamorro’s path to national politics and aims at describing the social

composition of the political clique he participated in. The second centers on political

correspondence concerning the followers’ perceptions of General Chamorro’s leadership

through an examination of language, content and writing structure from a variety of

followers.

1. Best Friends and Brothers in Arms: Chamorristas and the Conservative

Party

Since the nineteenth century, the Chamorro family has had a prominent role in

Nicaraguan politics. As part of the landowning elite, the Chamorros enjoyed the status

and influence that accompanied their considerable economic resources.16 Since the 1840s,

they dominated one political conglomerate, a tertulia, in the city of Granada.17 Around

1848, there were two distinct groups in open competition; one of them led by the family’s

patriarch, Fruto Chamorro Pérez (1804-1855). The Timbucos, as they were known, were

ideologically supporters of state centralization and a strong executive. With their support,

Fruto Chamorro was the first member of the family to ascend to the executive office in

(Managua: Fundación Vida, 2003). In his article, Schroeder notes that scarce sources impose interpretative

limitations to study Chamorristas. He emphasizes, for example, the absence of material that could

illuminate the connection between Chamorro’s group in Granada with local comrades in northern towns

such as Nueva Segovia. Schroeder, "Horse Thieves to Rebels to Dogs", 398. 16 The first relevant figure of the clan was Fruto Chamorro who became president of Nicaragua in 1852.

For more on his wealth, see: Burns, Patriarch and Folk. 82. The Chamorros might have started their capital

as coffee growers. According to Arturo Cruz, Fruto Chamorro owned a hacienda named “Quismapa” in the

fertile lowlands near Volcán Mombacho (Granada) in the 1850s. See: Arturo J. Cruz, La república

conservadora de Nicaragua, 1858-1893. 17Tertulias were informal but regular meetings in which elite families formed discussion clubs over

philosophical, literary, and political issues. Frances Kinloch refers to rivalries among tertulias and to the

existence of one tertulia known as “the moderates” in the 1840s, which was associated with the Chamorro

family. Frances Kinloch Tijerino, Nicaragua. 110.

8

1853.18 Later, his half-brother, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Alfaro, would also become

president of Nicaragua (1875-1879).

But General Chamorro did not enjoy the privileges of his last name until his teenage

years. Born in 1876, as Emiliano Vargas, he was the natural son of Gregoria Vargas Baez

and Salvador Chamorro Flores.19 During his childhood he lived modestly in the small

town of Comalapa, Chontales a cattle ranching region controlled by the granadino

elite. His stepfather, Evaristo Enríquez, was Chontales’ governmental delegate, or Jefe

Político, and the social connections derived from his political influence would serve his

stepson in the future. After being legally recognized at the age of 14, young Emiliano

Chamorro moved to live with his biological father and started attending the Colegio de

Granada, a distinguished elite high school reserved for boys. There, he mingled with

peers who, a couple of decades later, would become either his close comrades or his

political adversaries.20 But despite his father’s legal recognition, young Emiliano

18 According to the chronicler Francisco Ortega Arancibia, there were two granadino conservative family

groups around 1847-1848: the Timbucos and the Calandracas. The most famous timbucos were Fruto

Chamorro, Juan José Zavala, and Fulgencio Vega; they included the following families: the Barberenas,

Estradas and Guzmanes. In the opposition, the calandracas advocated for a new constitutional reform and a

restricted executive power; their most notable members were Benito Rosales, Buenaventura Selva and

Priest Agustín Vigil; the families backing them were the Lugos, Marencos, and Castrillos. Francisco Ortega

Arancibia as cited in Kinloch, Ibid. 117. 19 A natural son is a child born out of wedlock to unmarried parents; these relationships are legally referred

to as “natural unions” hence the term natural child. Little is known about General Chamorro’s mother

besides that she lived in Comalapa, Chontales. His father was a member of the fifth generation of

Chamorros raised in Nicaragua. He was born in Granada in 1843 and was also a “natural” son of Dionisio

Chamorro Alfaro. Thanks to his father’s social position, Salvador Chamorro became a prominent member

of the Conservative Party and was the owner of several coffee haciendas: La Luz, Corinto and Santo

Domingo. Adolfo Díaz Lacayo, Nicaragua: gobiernos, gobernantes y genealogías (Nicaragua: A. Díaz

Lacayo, 2010). 299. For an account of his first years in Chontales see: Emiliano Chamorro, El último

caudillo : autobiografía (Managua: Ediciones del Partido Conservador Demócrata, 1983). 20 At the Colegio de Granada he met Rafael, José Andrés Urtecho, Salvador Castrillo, Miguel Cuadra

Pasos, José María Moncada, and Bartolomé Martínez. For more details, see his autobiography. Emiliano

Chamorro, El último caudillo: autobiografía. 14-16.

9

Chamorro did not entirely fit into his new life; everyone knew he had been born out of

wedlock and that he could never claim Granada as his place of origin.

In order to cope with his fractured elite identity, young Chamorro decided to create a

path on his own. While he followed his father’s political affiliation (the Conservative

Party had long associated with the Chamorros), he decided to work to advance a military

career.21 His first incursion into politics was in April 1893 when he tried to join a revolt

against the government of conservative president Roberto Sacasa (1889-1893), but was

sent to jail.22 It was only after liberal General José Santos Zelaya seized power in the

midst of the Conservatives’ disunion in 1893 that young Chamorro participated in many

coup attempts against the new regime (1893-1909).23 He gained popularity for taking part

in three failed coup attempts in 1897, 1903, and 1906. These continuous conspiratorial

activities caused the Zelaya regime to send young Chamorro into exile from 1906 until

1909. During those years, he nurtured relations with other Central American politicians

opposed to Zelaya while developing a self-perception of leadership skills.24

Along with building military experience and political connections, young Chamorro

also became interested in cattle raising, one of the most important economic activities in

21Although Chamorro never received professional military training, he earned his ranks through

experience.. For a connection between landownership and politicians’ easy road to military career in

Central America, see: Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Zelaya, El patrón; estudio histórico sobre la personalidad

del general Justo Rufino Barrios. (Managua, Editorial La Prensa, 1966). 57. 22 Chamorro, El ultimo caudillo. 16-17. 23 The history of the Chamorros’ enmity with Zelaya’s liberal regime is mixed. It started with Zelaya’s

accusations of tax evasion, requests of forced loans, and property confiscations against the family.

However, after the failed coup of 1896 which resulted in the government’s expulsion of six members of the

family, Zelaya’s policies towards the elite changed. Probably to prevent new conspiracies against him and

to propel his economic program, Zelaya granted the Chamorros, and other elite families, subsidies for

agricultural production. Benjamin I. Teplitz, The Political and Economic Foundations of Modernization in

Nicaragua: The Administration of Jose Santos Zelaya, 1893-1909, 1973. 56, 60, 192. 24 Chamorro even requested economic resources to organize a coup supported by Guatemalan dictator

Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920). IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano Chamorro to

Manuel Estrada, July 11, 1907. Chamorro, Emiliano. Ibid. Pp. 137-140.

10

Nicaragua.25 Given his family upbringing, it is not surprising that he aspired to be a

landowner. Prior to any political involvement, his first job was to administer several

cattle ranches owned by his paternal aunt in Managua, and later he inherited his father’s

coffee plantation in the northern highlands of Matagalpa. 26 Having had access to these

economic resources thanks to his powerful family, he not only acquired managerial

knowledge in agriculture and cattle raising but these initial properties would provide him

the necessary financial support for a promising political career.

General Chamorro’s persistence in overthrowing Zelaya along with his familial

connection to granadino elite families, contributed to his prominent position within the

Conservative Party. The Conservatives have a long history of internal factionalism and,

indeed, their oligarchic nature reveals the relevance of family networks in the

configuration of political affiliations. Therefore, the party’s internal organization relied

on patriarchs’ abilities to reach consensus through alliances often sealed with

endogamous practices and economic conglomerates. In a certain sense, General

Chamorro’s rise represented the continuity of elites’ control over the Conservative

25 Chamorro was able to acquire several cattle ranches. Two of the most famous were Finca Santa Lastenia

(Malacatoya, Granada) and Río Grande (Managua). He also invested in lumber in the San Juan region, and

founded the society Chamorro-Ordóñez which conducted business with U.S. companies to export precious

woods in the late 1910s. For further information on Chamorro’s businesses and properties see: Castillo,

Eimeel. “Una mirada al fondo documental Emiliano Chamorro (Segunda parte)”, Revista de Historia 31,

Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica IHNCA-UCA, Managua. 26Chamorro’s aunt, Carlota Chamorro de Costigliolo, owned two cattle ranches surrounding the Lake

Xolotlán in the town of San Francisco “El Carnicero.” He administrated those properties between 1894 and

1896. Years later, he bought one of them known as “Río Grande” and renamed it “San Cristóbal.” The

coffee plantation in Matagalpa was “El Picacho” with which he formed a business with Pedro Chamorro, a

close relative. Emiliano, Chamorro. El ultimo caudillo. 25-28.

11

Party.27 Soon, he reached a leading role in one of the factions, the one linked to his

paternal family referred to as the Genuines, or Genuinos.28

This faction of the Conservative Party was composed of granadino elite families who

claimed a purity of blood through their connection to European ancestors, therefore, the

reference to their sense of genuineness. As revealed in the correspondence, some of the

leading families who stood beside General Chamorro were the Zavalas, the Benards, the

Arellanos, and the Urtechos. The linkages between General Chamorro and the Zavala

family seemed to have been due to his old friendship with don Joaquín Zavala Solís since

1903.29 The case of the Benard-Chamorro clan was especially strong because both

families had shared kindred for two generations by the time General Chamorro assumed a

position of leadership in the early twentieth century.30 Other powerful families from

different regions of Nicaragua also joined the genuinos; this was the case of the Paguagas

in Nueva Segovia.31

Building conspiratorial and military expertise was key to General Chamorro’s

growing fame. He succeeded in earning a good reputation as a commander-in-chief

27 Having as a backdrop the political development during the second half of the nineteenth century, Arturo

Cruz stated that General Chamorro’s followers represented a disgraceful exception within the history of the

Conservative Party. I consider that this interpretation overlooks the factionalism that has characterized the

Conservative Party since its inception as a set of Tertulias; thus, isolating this case as a novel phenomenon.

See: Arturo J. Cruz, La república conservadora de Nicaragua, 1858-1893. 28 In this sense, it is difficult to trace an exact path of the different family factions because they tend to

change names with ease. 29 Don Joaquín Zavala Solís was president of Nicaragua (1879-1883). In his memoir, General Chamorro

recalled don Joaquín as one of the conspirators in the coup attempt in 1903 known as “the Chontales

uprising”. 30 Dionisio Chamorro Alfaro, General Chamorro’s paternal grandfather, married Camila Benard Doudé but

they did not have offspring. In the next generation, Filadelfo Chamorro Bolaños, General Chamorro’s uncle

married Berta Benard Vivas. She was the sister of Carmela Benard Vivas who also married with another of

General Chamorro’s uncles. For more details of these relationships see the charts of both families in: Díaz

Lacayo, Nicaragua. Appendices, unpaged. 31 Gustavo Paguaga was jefe político (local governor) of the department of Nueva Segovia and his family

dominated the local landscape in the region bordering Honduras. He was accused of intimidating acts

against opponents in 1917. See: “El Caciquismo en La Segovia”, La Noticia, November 27, 1917. 4.

12

during the failed coup in 1903. In that occasion, he captured the barracks in the town of

Juigalpa an important city in his native Chontales and hijacked a boat in Lake

Cocibolca.32 By the end of 1909, his conspiratorial years in exile throughout Central

America paid off. His greatest opportunity came in October that year when he led one of

the conservative insurgent forces that attacked the eastern cost of Nicaragua, as part of a

bipartisan coalition against Zelaya’s army.33 The Battle of Tisma which took place near

Lake Cocibolca, served to cultivate his image as a courageous strategist.34 The United

States government sent a warship to block the port of Bluefields and thus secured the

coalition’s victory in 1910. General Chamorro’s military participation in the successful

coup afforded him the required political prominence to be included in the resulting

negotiations between the insurgent leaders and the government of the United States.

The U.S. involvement in these events was in tune with its imperial foreign policy in

the Caribbean and Central America at the end of the nineteenth century. The territorial

expansion after the Spanish-American War and the efforts to protect the Panama Canal

route placed Nicaragua in the sphere of influence of the United States. Despite their

overall good relations between the two countries, the last couple of years of the Zelaya’s

regime were marked by tensions. The United States began to oppose Zelaya due to

differences over his financial policy, issues related to concessions granted to U.S. owned

32 This episode is known as “the revolution of the steam boats” or “the revolution of the Lake.” It lasted

about three months and resulted in the Conservatives’ temporary control of the Ometepe Island and the port

of San Carlos in the San Juan River. Alejandro Chamorro, General Chamorro’s uncle, was proclaimed de-

facto president of Nicaragua. For details, see: Chamorro, Emiliano. El ultimo caudillo. 33 This coalition was formed by conservatives and dissenters of the liberal regime, and included high-rank

officials like the Costa Caribe’s governor, Juan José Estrada. 34 The battle of Tisma is controversial because it has been used as an apologetic event to mark General

Chamorro’s bravery and military command despite the fact it was a military defeat. Two contrasting

versions of this episode are: Ramón Ignacio Matus, Tisma y el General Emiliano Chamorro; José R.

Hernández, La confesión de Emiliano Chamorro: tragicomedia, con base en la verdad histórica (Managua:

s. ed., 1954).

13

companies and above all, disagreements on a proposed interoceanic canal in Nicaragua.

Zelaya’s secret negotiations with other countries, such as Japan, after the Panama route

was chosen over Nicaragua’s, alarmed the Department of State. When Zelaya ordered the

execution of two American citizens involved with the rebels’ cause in 1909, the tensions

reached their highest point, and the U.S. opposition to Zelaya was clearer than ever.35

In October 1910, General Chamorro along with de-facto President and Liberal

dissident Juan José Estrada and two other conservative figures, Adolfo Díaz and General

Luis Mena, signed an agreement with the U.S. special envoy Thomas Dawson. The

Dawson Pact was the foundation for Nicaragua’s transformation into a U.S. protectorate

and served as an exclusionary political instrument against Liberals associated with

Zelaya’s regime. As argued by Michel Gobat, the pact allowed the four signers to

concentrate Nicaragua’s political power.36

General Chamorro enjoyed a new fame in the following months after the bipartisan

government assumed power in 1910. Politicians recognized him as a war hero and

Chamorro gained political influence as a representative of the Conservative Party in the

Dawson Pact. In early 1911, he joined the new Constitutional Assembly whereby he

could create his own political network through granting favors to people who had been

involved in insurgent activities. Thus, former military fellows and subordinates composed

the first set of General Chamorro’s supporters, or Chamorristas.

The rebel movement in which General Chamorro participated allowed him to

configure new alliances rooted in his experiences at war. The successful coup against

35 Details on U.S. diplomatic stance in the last days of the Zelaya regime can be found in: Gobat,

Confronting the American Dream. 69-71. 36 Ibid. 75.

14

Zelaya provided relative newcomers like Chamorro, and others, the opportunity to

influence national politics. For instance, the other conservative politician who signed the

Dawson Pact, General Luis Mena, also hurried to gather military men around his figure

after President Estrada appointed him the new Minister of War in 1911.37 Early on, both

were competing for the same support base. In late 1910, a Chamorrista from Matagalpa,

Bartolomé Martínez, commented on his leader’s mistakes in carelessly providing letters

for recommendation:

people claim that anyone can fool you … anybody who wants something out of

you can just approach you and make you sign recommendations and orders … for

that reason nobody trusts in your signature anymore … you have put in public

office people who only recently pursued you, or your friends, and for that matter it

has been necessary to appeal to Mena’s iron fist to fix this mess.38

Surely, Chamorro’s strategy to give letters of recommendation favored the creation of

a personal clientele network in a moment of political reconfiguration. General Mena’s

growing popularity seemed to have harmed Chamorro’s own reputation in a key moment

of network building.

In 1912, General Mena revolted against the new president Adolfo Díaz (1877-1964)

and created a situation in which the two generals’ leadership was at stake. Mena’s revolt

using an antiimperialist rhetoric against loan treaties imposed by U.S. diplomats alarmed

both Nicaragua’s elite and the United States. They feared he would be able to create a

37 In the midst of intraparty struggles over the implantation of U.S. control over Nicaragua’s national

finances in 1911, General Luis Mena came forth as possibly the first nationalist mestizo leader against a

foreign power in contemporary Nicaragua; even though, General Sandino is most well-known. I thank

researcher Juan Pablo Gómez for suggesting this interpretation of Mena’s persona. 38 “(…) aseguran que cualquiera te engaña… que todo el que quiere se acerca donde vos y te hace firmar

recomendaciones ú órdenes… por cuyo motivo ya nadie le hace caso á tu firma;… has llegado a colocar en

puestos públicos a individuos que hace poco te perseguían á tí ó á tus amigos y que ha sido necesario apelar

a la mano de hierro de Mena para remediar tanto mal...” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers,

Bartolomé Martínez to Emiliano Chamorro. November 29, 1910.

15

bipartisan coalition with Liberals. Soon, the U.S. press reported that Mena’s political

ambitions were the main motive behind the revolt and never mentioned his nationalist

claims. On August 19, an article appeared in The Washington Post claiming that the

Department of State had qualified Mena’s actions as the most “barbarous undertaking in

Latin America in recent years.”39 A week later, it announced the approval of the U.S.

Congress for the deployment of 2,000 marines to restore “law and order” against the

“bloodthirsty and unscrupulous Mena.”40 The landing of U.S. troops secured the

surrender of General Mena while favoring General Chamorro. This episode allowed him

to enjoy a new exclusive position of power as President Adolfo Díaz appointed Chamorro

as the new Minister of War after Mena went into exile in Panamá.41

After the conflict ended, President Díaz appointed General Chamorro to Minister

Plenipotentiary in Washington D.C. in 1913. Playing with his military identity, he

reinvented himself as a diplomat. He learned to speak English and to mingle with staff at

the Department of State. In 1915, accompanied by his wife, Lastenia Enríquez, he toured

the U.S. from D.C. to San Diego.42 Moreover, he rapidly came to understand the rules of

lobbying in order to navigate the intricate paths of U.S. diplomacy. Convinced of the

privileged position of the Conservative Party, especially visible with the presence of U.S.

marines in Nicaragua preventing revolts, he committed to negotiating a new treaty with

the U. S. government for the construction of an interoceanic canal through Nicaraguan

territory. His efforts bore fruit on August 3, 1914, when he signed the Chamorro-Bryan

treaty with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan (1913-1915). General Chamorro

39 "War Due To U.S.", The Washington Post, August 19, 1912. 40 "Preparing to Crush Mena." The Washington Post, August 26, 1912. 41 For a detailed examination of the war of 1912 see: Gobat, Confronting the American Dream. Chapter 4. 42 For further details, see. Chamorro, El ultimo caudillo.

16

enjoyed popularity in Nicaragua during those months while he developed a friendly

relationship with Secretary Bryan. 43 In early 1916, he started to work on his presidential

candidacy for the term 1917-1920. For instance, he contacted other Central American

diplomats to help him by lobbying in his favor, as was the case of the Honduran chargé

d’affairs.44 In addition, he arranged for the publication of several articles detailing how

successful his campaign was within Nicaragua in Godoy's Diplomatic and Consular

Review.45

General Chamorro’s efforts to add to his war hero curriculum, a facet which led

credibility to his role as diplomat, illustrate that a key aspect of his success was his

capacity to portray himself as a man of arms, a popular caudillo and an astute negotiator

with the United States. Therefore, the varied Chamoristas’ socioeconomic composition

seemed to have followed such a pattern. Since 1910, Chamorro created alliances with

43 After U.S. Senate approved the treaty two years after it was signed, Bryan sent to Chamorro a friendly

note expressing his satisfaction: “(...) congratulations on the ratification of the treaty. It is a great victory for

you plus a benefit to both countries. I wish it had been done while I was secretary but the rules of the

Senate prevented (...)” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Bryan to Emiliano Chamorro. February

19, 1916. 44 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano Chamorro to José Jerónimo Reyna (Tegucigalpa).

February 28, 1916. 45 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano Chamorro to José Francisco Godoy, July 24 and

August, 27 1916. During his years as Nicaragua’s Minister, Chamorro became close to U.S. diplomats like

Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan (1913-1915), Boaz Walton Long, Franklin Gunther and George

T. Weitzel. He also relied in the support of military men such as Colonel J.H. Pendleton from the US

Marine Corps. See: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Boaz

Long (Cuba), June 16, 1921; Boaz Long (New York) to Emiliano Chamorro (Washington), June 22, 1922

Franklin Gunther (Rome) to Emiliano Chamorro, July 21, 1921; George Weitzel (Washington) to Emiliano

Chamorro, January 5, 1922; Emiliano Chamorro (Managua) to Manuel Zavala (Washington), November 5,

1923. IHNCA-UCA, Archivo Histórico, Adolfo Díaz Papers. Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Colonel

J.H. Pendleton, USMC, March 3, 1914. Boaz Long’s career in Central America and the Caribbean was

prolific. He was Minister Plenipotentiary in El Salvador (1914-1919), Cuba (1919-1921), Nicaragua (1936-

1938) and Guatemala (1943-1945). See. “Boaz Walton Long (1876-1962)” U.S. Department of State Office

of the Historian. Web. Checked May 19, 2015. <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/long-

boaz-walton?> See: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Boaz

Long (Cuba), June 16, 1921; Boaz Long (New York) to Emiliano Chamorro (Washington), June 22, 1922

Franklin Gunther (Rome) to Emiliano Chamorro, July 21, 1921. IHNCA-UCA, Archivo Histórico, Adolfo

Díaz Papers. Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Colonel J.H. Pendleton, USMC, March 3, 1914.

17

different social groups who amplified his political influence granted, largely, by his elite

last name. Chamorristas included military men, non-elite regional caudillos, members of

the Clergy and indigenous communities from Central and Northern Nicaragua.

The long years of conspiracy and military actions General Chamorro carried out to

oust Zelaya from power generated a strong sense of companionship between him and

some military men.46 The correspondence highlights his special closeness with four

people who had fought under his command: Tomás Masís, Bartolomé Víquez, Fernando

Elizondo, and Arsenio Cruz Báez. Masís had joined the insurgents in the city of

Bluefields in 1910 and, when Chamorro became president of Nicaragua (1917-1920), he

was appointed Minister of War. For long time, he was a loyal Chamorrista in his native

department of Rivas. Bartolomé Víquez not only backed General Chamorro during the

Mena War in 1912 but also commanded troops against liberal General José María

Moncada in El Rama in 1926. Likewise, Víquez obtained a governmental post during

those years; first as governor of the vast Caribbean coast, and then as Minister of the

Interior during the short presidency of Bartolomé Martínez (1923-1924). 47 Fernando

Elizondo led insurgents in El Bluff in 1910 and also waged war against General Mena in

1912. During the presidency of Diego Manuel Chamorro (1921-1923), he served as

consul in New York but then was assigned to Hamburg.48 Arsenio Cruz Báez fought

along General Chamorro in 1903 and 1910. With another conservative, Salvador

46 John Charles Chasteen, Heroes on Horseback : A Life and Times of the Last Gaucho Caudillos.

(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995). 47 Presidente de la República, "Declaración del Presidente de la República", The American, August 4, 1912,

Vol. 8, Issue 376, page 1; El Comercio, January 12, 1923, year 28, Issue 7521, page 1. 48 Tijerino, Toribio, "Autorretrato", Revista Conservadora, July, 1962, Issue 22. 25.

18

Castrillo, he organized a coup in 1922. Cruz’s loyalty was mixed with familial ties for he

had a daughter with Hermisenda Enríquez Vargas, Chamorro’s step-sister.49

The Conservative Party, controlled by granadino elite families, was divided. One

faction was dominated by the Cuadra family with the brothers Carlos, Pedro Rafael, and

Eulogio at its head, sometimes in alliance with Adolfo Díaz. The Cuadra clan was

opposite to General Chamorro and the issue of the “unification” of the party for electoral

purposes was always a concern. The most prominent granadino elite Chamorristas were

Martín Benard Vivas,50 José Andrés Urtecho,51 Juan José Zavala52 and Juan José

Martínez.53 They stood by Chamorro and helped in these intraparty negotiations as

emissaries of good will. They also reinforced the party’s elite identity.

49 Díaz Lacayo, Nicaragua. 303. 50 Martín Benard Vivas was a wealthy landlord and merchant involved in the sugar industry. The

Chamorros and the Benards were connected through marriage. General Chamorro’s paternal grandfather

married Martín’s aunt. Later, Filadelfo Chamorro Bolaños, General Chamorro’s paternal uncle, married

Berta Benard Vivas, Martin’s sister. Díaz, Nicaragua, Gobiernos, Gobernantes y Genealogías. Anexos,

nonpaged. For details on Benard’s origins and his experience during the Mena War in 1912, see: Gobat,

107.

In the first days after the triumph of the bipartisan coalition in 1910, Martín Benard Vivas was appointed

Minister of Finance; he then served in the same post in 1917 during General Chamorro’s presidency.

Howard Tilton Library, Tulane University, Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs

of Nicaragua 1910-1929, Section Political Affairs – Record Group 59. Microfilm Collection, MIC 771,

Reel 57, 817.0375 Olivares to Secretary of State, Undated. 817.00/0058, First Presidential Address to

National Assembly, 1 January 1917. 51 José Andrés Urtecho was General Chamorro’s classmate at El Colegio de Granada. He graduated in

Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania and also was a West Point graduate. He was Adolfo

Díaz’s Minister of War (1912-1916). In both of their presidencies, General Chamorro and Bartolomé

Martínez named him Minister of Foreign Affairs and Education. USNA, RG 59, MIC 771, Reel 57,

817.00/0404, Jefferson to the Secretary of State, 13 January 1920. 52 Juan José Zavala was the son of former President Joaquín Zavala Solís (1879-1883). While President,

General Chamorro appointed him Minister of Development (Fomento) in early 1920. From 1910 to 1912,

he was Nicaragua’s consul in New Orleans. USNA, RG 59, MIC 771, Reel 57, 817.00/0408, Jefferson to

the Secretary of State, 10 April 1920. 53 Juan José Martínez was a surgeon born in Granada. He studied medicine at South Penge Park College

(London) and New York University. In 1911, he helped found the Conservative Social Club in his native

Granada, and in 1917 was appointed Jefe Político in the same department. He served as deputy for the

department of Jinotega in the Constituent Assembly of 1913 and was Senator for Granada in 1922. He was

famous for having done the first radiograph in Nicaragua and for having examined poet Rubén Darío’s

brain after his death. Martínez, Juan José, “Consideraciones sobre el cerebro y personalidad de Rubén

Darío” Revista Conservadora, June 1965, Issue 57, 60-61.

19

Chamorro legally belonged to the granadino elite when his father helped to change

his last name, however, he could have been perceived otherwise because of his origins as

a natural-born son. In an interview published in La Tribuna, a local newspaper, Martín

Benard told a story that when someone had asked Rosendo Chamorro Alfaro, General

Chamorro’s grand-uncle, about his nephew’s presidential candidacy in 1916, he

exclaimed: “How are you guys going to let Salvador’s bastard son to be President!” to

which Benard responded that, “Emiliano’s appeal was, precisely, due to his bastardy.”54

This passage shows the negative perceptions about General Chamorro’s elite identity and

belonging. It also illustrates the way in which his followers conceived him as an

alternative leader from the traditional granadino oligarch from calle La Atravesada, the

exclusive street in the city of Granada where the most important conservative families

resided.

In a political milieu that assigned significance to a politician’s place of birth, the fact

that General Chamorro was not born in Granada but in the small town of Comalapa

(Chontales) had a positive impact on his popular appeal. A crucial component of his

followers was medium to large landowners and merchants from different regions. These

non-elite Chamorristas could identify themselves with someone who, despite his last

name, was somewhat of an outsider. In the next section, I will describe the details behind

the intraparty crisis of 1922, when some bitter Chamorristas carried out a coup against

President Diego Manuel Chamorro (1921-1923). They understood their struggle in

geographical terms; it was a revenge against granadino conservatives.

54 “¡Cómo van a hacer presidente a un hijo bastardo de Salvador!” Sin comprender que las bondades de

Emiliano son debidas, precisamente, a su bastardía.” Norori, Eusebio, Los cretinos del conservatismo:

desfile ante las puertas de la historia (Managua: Tipografía de «El Diario Moderno», 1924). 104.

20

Followers from outside Granada composed the most important conglomerate of

Chamorristas because they served as regional liaisons with local caudillos in different

regions across Nicaragua. Their economic activities varied. Some, like Bartolomé

Martínez (Matagalpa) or Leonidas Guerra (Rivas), could have competed in wealth with

granadino elite families since they were important coffee and cacao growers,

respectively. 55 For instance, Venancio Montalván (León) and José Dolores Mondragón

(Granada) were ranchers.56 In their hometowns, they would have been regarded as

wealthy people, but, they could never have claimed elite membership in Granada. As we

have seen, elite identity did not rely entirely on levels of income, but included factors

such as family kinship and birthplace. Others were businessmen, large entrepreneurs such

as Gustavo and José María Paguaga (Nueva Segovia) to medium-sized store owners like

Deogracias Rivas and Domingo Calero (both from Managua). The clique even included

cantina proprietors such as Cayetano Lugo (Managua).57 In addition, there were

55 Bartolomé Martínez, don Bartolo as he was called by General Chamorro, was a coffee planter from the

Northern región of Matagalpa and owned a property called “El Bosque”. He and Chamorro went to the

same high school in Granada and besides being Chamorro’s liaison in the Northern departments of

Matagalpa and Jinotega, served as Sub Secretary of State in 1919. Toribio Tijerino, “Reminiscencias

Históricas” en Revista Conservadora, enero 1964, Issue 40, 46. Díaz Lacayo, Nicaragua. 324. Leonidas

Guerra was a prominent merchant and cacao grower in the department of Rivas. By 1909, his importation

business was among the top ones in Managua. In 1912, he owned three cacao fincas which encompassed a

total of 88 manzanas (153 acres). República de Nicaragua, Boletín de Estadística de la República de

Nicaragua, Year II, 8 (Managua, Nicaragua: Compañía Tipográfica Internacional, 1909), 414; República

de Nicaragua, Boletín de Estadística de la República de Nicaragua, Year VI, 22–23 (Managua, Nicaragua:

Tipografía Nacional, 1913), 1335. 56 Venancio Montalván was a doctor and had interests in agriculture and cattle raising. He served in three

posts: Minister of Interior (1917-1918), Minister of Police (1918, 1920), Minister of Finance (1921). As

most Chamorristas, he was pro-United States. Howard Tilton Library, Tulane University, USNA, RG 59,

MIC 771, Reel 57, 817.00/0404, Jefferson to the Secretary of State, 13 January 1920. 817.0419, Jefferson

to the Secretary of State 6 January 1921. 817.426-427, Jefferson to the Secretary of State, 22 February

1921. Mondragón owned a store wherein he sold cow milk from his finca Santa Bárbara in Granada.

Archivo de la Municipalidad y Prefectura de Granada (Hereafter AMPG), 1903, caja 296, Correspondencia

y documentos varios. AMPG, libro 58 del Tesorero Municipal, folio 104, Libro del Tesorero Municipal,

Lista de Almacenes y Alumbrado Público de la ciudad de Granada, 1905. 57 República de Nicaragua, Boletín de Estadísitica de la República de Nicaragua, 1909. 390-392 and

passim. Although Cayetano Lugo appeared as a modest cantina owner in Managua, he was also a large

coffee grower in Nandaime (Granada) around 1880s. He owned Finca San Cayetano which had 3000 coffee

21

industrialists, as was the case of Felipe Ibarra (Managua), owner of a large soap fabric.58

Despite their diversity, they gathered around General Chamorro’s figure and claimed a

space within the Conservative party. By 1921, while serving as diplomat, he benefited

from a social network that kept him informed of everything that occurred in national

politics in his absence.59

General Chamorro leveraged the already established alliance between Conservatives

and the indigenous communities. In Northern Nicaragua, this was created after the Indian

revolt in 1881.60 He also enjoyed the support of communities in Chontales and Boaco

during his military incursions in 1910. Chamorro assumed the political representation of

these communities as early as 1911.61 Bartolomé Martínez, himself of Indian origins, was

key in securing this alliance. In his letters, he advocated for Chamorro’s protection

against intimidating acts, such as arrests, of indigenous people and their authorities.

Especially relevant was Martínez’s bond with Ceferino and Macedonio Aguilar, both

capitanes generales of the Comunidades Indígenas in Matagalpa and Jinotega,

respectively.62

trees and annually produced 36 quintales. His name appeared as a producer in a second category by number

of planted coffee trees. AMPG, 1880, leg. 441, caja 158, Estadística rural de fincas, ganado. 58 Gobat, Confronting the American Dream. 129. 59 Other Chamorristas with no governmental positions in the national government but who might have

acted as local caudillos in other key regions are: Constantino Tapia (Masaya), M.J. Morales (Chontales),

Lizandro Moreira (Jinotega). 60 Jeffrey L. Gould, To Die in This Way : Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965,

(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 27-68. 61 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Statement from the comunidad Valle Santo Domingo (La

Libertad, Chontales) to National Assembly, March 20, 1911. 62 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Bartolomé Martínez (Matagalpa) to Emiliano Chamorro,

September 14, 1910; November 8, 1910, July 5, 1916; July 10, 1916; July 15, 1916; August 22, 1916;

September 10, 1916. For further details on the relationship between Martínez and Aguilar, see: Gould, To

Die in This Way. 47. Another Chamorrista contributing to patronage with Indians in Matagalpa was J.

Bárcenas Meneses. See: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. J. Bárcenas Meneses (Matagalpa) to

Emiliano Chamorro, May 8, 1912.

22

Chamorristas acknowledged Chamorro as not only a worthy hero and a skilled

diplomat but as a proper manly figure who could exercise his charismatic persona to

achieve their goals. In their letters, they stressed Chamorro’s outstanding personal traits

when comparing him to other leading figures in the clique; this was especially

emphasized during electoral periods. For instance, in the midst of the decision process

over the party’s possible presidential candidates in 1923, G. Ramírez recognized Martin

Benard’s impressive personal qualities but remarked his lack of command to assume the

presidency. In his words, Benard was “an authentic honorable person with all the

beautiful qualities of a perfect gentleman and the civic virtues of a true patriot, but to be

President of Nicaragua, he lacks courage, energy, commanding talent, and popular

sympathy; indispensable qualities to govern this dear ship (Nicaragua).” Ramírez’

analysis reveals some of the Chamorristas’ perspectives on what a proper politician

should be. While they acknowledged Benard’s bourgeois values, they preferred

Chamorro’s tough and popular personality. However, this is not to suggest that there

were not competitors for leadership among Chamorristas. After President Diego Manuel

Chamorro sudden death on October 12, 1923, seven presidential candidates emerged in

the following months; including two close of Chamorro’s allies, Bartolomé Martínez and

Tomás Masís. 63

General Chamorro’s popular appeal was a highly valued asset. It may have been the

most important of his political weapons and Chamorristas were aware of these qualities.

63 “un honorable auténtico con todas las bellas cualidades de un perfecto caballero y las virtudes cívicas de

un verdadero patriota; pero para Presidente de Nicaragua le faltan valor, energía, dón [sic] de mando y aura

popular; cualidades que son indispensables para gobernar esta querida nave (Nicaragua)” IHNCA-UCA,

Emiliano Chamorro Papers. G. Ramírez (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, March 12, 1923. See also:

Carlos Huete (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, January 3, 1923.

23

We know little from these letters about the exact reasons why he was a people person but

some anecdotes pointed to his efforts to connect with folks using his rural origin and

rancher’s identity. For instance, there are stories about Chamorro’s sharing working class

meals and celebrating with peasants and Indians in small towns like Nandaime and

Ometepe, or that as President he devoted long hours to listen to anyone who walked into

his office, including lower-class people.64 However, his political adversaries, such as

Liberal José María Moncada, always criticized Chamorro’s oligarchic origins and corrupt

practices.65

In the early 1920s, Nicaragua suffered from the strict fiscal plans supervised by the

United States. 66 In that context, Chamorristas –and Conservatives in general- hoped that

new diplomatic compromises with the U.S. government would improve the country’s

situation. The Chamorro-Bryan treaty from 1914 had proved not to be enough for

creating the necessary governmental solvency.67 In response, Chamorristas pressured

their caudillo to demand a revision of a loan agreement signed in 1920 that would allow

for the construction of a railroad branch line to the Caribbean coast. They estimated that

Chamorro’s manly character, derived from his experience in the battlefields, would allow

him to obtain better conditions for Nicaraguans. Thus, they translated their own

64 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. José Dolores Mondragón (Granada) to Emiliano Chamorro,

November 9, 1910; Miguel Libby (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, Mayo 30, 1922. See also: Cedeño,

Gregorio, Anécdotas del General Chamorro. 65 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. José María Moncada, “Ya se acerca la hora”, 1924. (This is a

newspaper clipping with no reference of the publishing source). 66 For a detailed explanation on the application of dollar diplomacy in Nicaragua, see: Gobat, Confronting

the American Dream. 125-132. 67 Chamorristas widely complained about the acute economic crises of the years of U.S. intervention in

Nicaragua. Some representative examples are: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Juan José

Martínez (Granada) to Emiliano Chamorro, September 11, 1913; M. A. Gallegos (Rivas) to Emiliano

Chamorro, January 23, 1914; Silvestre Vargas (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, May 31, 1914;

Bartolomé Víquez (Bluefields) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 14, 1921.

24

calamities in gendered terms when they previously labeled U.S. diplomats as “machos”.68

Despise his image as vendepatria, General Chamorro enjoyed an ephemeral fame as a

nationalistic politician when he made public a series of letters demanding Secretary of

State Charles Hughes (1921-1926) a necessary revision of what he called were “a set of

arbitrariness.”69 It is most likely that Chamorro’s strategy to improve his image through

this nationalist stance was anything but genuine, since it was during his presidency that

this treaty was arranged.70 It responded more to a widespread anti-Wall Street sentiment

among elite Nicaraguans as well the Chamorristas’ interests to control the cattle ranching

areas in Chontales, where the railroad branch was going to pass and where they enjoyed

support from indigenous communities.71

General Chamorro’s military curriculum, diplomatic skills, manly character, and

popular appeal made him a profitable caudillo for Chamorristas. In addition, he was a

Catholic mixed-race man with close ties with both the Church and the Indigenous

communities in Northern and Central Nicaragua. General Chamorro also developed a

sense of profound affection for this group of politicians. His identification could have

68 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Leonidas Guerra (Puntarenas) to Emiliano Chamorro, August

8, 1913. 69 For example, in his way to the U.S. as Nicaragua’s Minister in May 1921, General Chamorro made a

short trip to Guatemala wherein he was received by a group of Nicaraguan political exiles who demanded

his immediate departure. Soon, the group turned into a manifestation in front of the hotel he was staying at,

and starting shouting against his negative posture regarding the reinstatement of the Central American

Federation, and especially, for having signed the “ignominious” Chamorro-Bryan treaty in 1914. IHNCA-

UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to President Diego Manuel Chamorro

(Managua), June 16, 1921; Sebastián Núñez (Masaya) to Emiliano Chamorro (Washington), September 10,

1921. 70 In January 1922, local newspapers La Tribuna, El Heraldo, El Censor y El Comercio published these

letters and they labeled Chamorro’s attitude as “nationalist”. According to comments from Chamorristas,

his popularity increases during these months. IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano

Chamorro (Washington) to Secretary of State Hughes, August 18, 1921; Emiliano Chamorro (Washington)

to President Diego Mnauel Chamorro, August 22, 1921, December 19, 1921; May 15, 1922, June 5, 1922,

July 8, 1922. 71 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Colonel Ernesto Solórzano Díaz (Nicaragua’s consulate in

New York) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 2, 1927.

25

been greater than familial ties. In a unique letter to his father, Salvador, General

Chamorro discussed his thoughts and feelings toward his uncle, Diego Manuel, after the

coup attempt in 1922. He expressed that he disagreed with don Diego’s policy towards

the Chamorristas and, although, he disapproved of such actions, he understood the

bitterness of the organizers. Chamorro finally remarked: “In a word, this [the faction

known to have been behind the coup] was don Diego Manuel’s deed and it was prepared

to politically destroy me by disorganizing the entire party in all provinces and fighting

against my best friends, politically and personally speaking: my brothers in arms.”72

Certainly, friendship was at the core of the group’s cohesion and played a significant role

as a shared value in their political relations.

2. Politics and Friendship: Chamorristas’ Correspondence

The Chamorro papers consist mostly of political correspondence that covers three

decades of General Chamorro’s public service and party militancy. They were produced

between 1903 and the mid-thirties in a context of political dominance of the Conservative

Party from 1910 to 1928. It was in those years that Nicaragua became a U.S. protectorate

and also the time of General Chamorro’s greatest popularity. Under the U.S. influence

over Nicaragua, politicians were in a constant struggle for U.S. approval of their personal

72 “En una palabra que es hechura de Don Diego Manuel y que fué creado para políticamente destruirme

desorganizando en todos los Departamentos al partido y combatiendo á mis mejores amigos políticos y

personales: á mis hermanos de lucha.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Emiliano Chamorro

(Washington) to Salvador Chamorro, October 18, 1922. Examples of Chamorristas’ suggestions on uncle

and nephew rivalries are: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. H. Bejarano (Puntarenas) to Emiliano

Chamorro, December 12, 1921.

26

aspirations to power. In this sense, the set of letters Chamorristas wrote reflected those

expectations.73

Because this political correspondence was intended to be read only by General

Chamorro it is an exceptional source to study the intimacy of politics within the party’s

faction. In this period, writing letters was the most common means to secure

communication among Nicaraguan politicians since the telephone was not accessible and

the use of telegraphs would have hindered the intended level of secrecy. Writing letters or

notes was a highly efficient way of informing General Chamorro, especially in those

years he spent in the United States (1913-1916, 1921-1923). More importantly, they

provided the personal connection with followers that sustained Chamorro’s popular aura.

There are two main categories of this political correspondence according to its

specific purpose; notwithstanding, in both forms the centrality of performing favors as

the primary mechanism for sustaining the clique’s inner cohesion is evinced. First, there

was the “request letter” soliciting a favor and second, the “informative-advising” letter

commenting on party politics. In many cases, the content in one letter encompassed two

categories. In both cases, however, followers from different social classes and

geographical origins used a colloquial language to remark on their closeness and

comradeship. But, since these politicians had specific purposes directed toward the public

sphere, the realm of party politics, these letters could be considered a type of source in

73

In his analysis of political correspondence in nineteenth-century Brazil, Richard Graham observed the

predominance of feelings of anxiety in the requests for letters of recommendation that job seekers wrote to

politicians to be granted public positions, as part of patronage politics at the institutional level. In the case

of Chamorro, I found some similarities to Graham’s case. Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-

Century Brazil. Chapters 8-9.

27

the middle of the private and the political.74 Therefore, the florid and apologetic language

that inundates the tone of this correspondence can also be deceitful and hide other

meanings that could help to understand the relationship between General Chamorro and

his followers.

Furthermore, the issue of silence in the correspondence illuminates not only on

the nature of the archive itself but the Chamorristas’ own political strategies. For

instance, during the U.S. supervised elections in 1928, this conservative faction filed

several complaints to the U.S. electoral commission decrying what they referred to as

“abuses” that favored Liberals in the campaign. The reading of other sources complicates

this self-representation as victims since the Chamorristas were well-known to practice

acts of intimidation and bribing to get votes. The lack of references to such strategies to

counterbalance what they perceived as harmful to their campaign had clear political

intentions to erase any evidence of illegal behavior that might later be used against

them.75

Certainly, there are some interpretative limits in the correspondence. First, it is

crucial to acknowledge that this collection is just one out of three known Chamorro

Papers. It is, however, the first time this set of documents has been examined for research

74 My understanding of letters as primary sources in-between is based on the Cécile Dauphin definition of

letters as “a meeting place between the social and the inner being, between conventions and their use in

practice, between the private and the political”. See: Cécile Dauphin as cited by Dobson, Miriam “Letters”

In: Miriam Dobson y Benjamin Ziemann, Reading Primary Sources : The Interpretation of Texts from

Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (London: Routledge, 2009). 57. 75 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Sebastián Amador (Matagalpa) to General Emiliano

Chamorro (Managua), October 30, 1928; Manuel Espinosa to Director of the Police, August 16, 1928;

Telegram from Bartolomé Rojas and J. Arturo Matuz to Emiliano Chamorro, October 22, 1928; Letter to

President of the Departmental Council, Coronel C.C Smidt on elections, n.d; Ismael Solórzano to Pedro

Joaquín Chamorro, November 4, 1928; Telegrams to Secretary of the Conservative Party’s National

Directory on elections, November 5, 1928; J.D. Mondragón (Granada) to General Chamorro, November

1928; F. Molina to David Stadthagen on election day, November, 10 1928; Alberto Avilés to Adolfo

Fernández, November 11, 1928.

28

purposes. Second, there is a significant imbalance in the quantities of Chamorristas’

letters and the intended recipient’s responses. As was the case of many caudillos, writing

did not come easily for General Chamorro.76 Indeed, since the early 1910s one of the

most repeated advices Chamorristas gave him was that he needed to be diligent in his

replies, otherwise risking popular support.77 Not surprisingly when comparing Carlos

Cuadra Pasos (1879-1964), a conservative lawyer, and General Chamorro, conservatives

sharply emphasized that Cuadra was “the thinker” and Chamorro was “the caudillo” of

the party.78

The letters’ structure reflected the channels or inner workings of the patronage

bond among Chamorristas. The first section was the most prevailing in the entire set of

letters and consisted in the sender’s presentation to the recipient. This could include the

name of mutual acquaintances, geographical references, or historical events. This first

part was essential for aspiring members of Chamorro’s clique, and especially during

electoral periods; in any case, mentioning one’s connection to the caudillo was useful for

requesting favors.

In late 1910, General Chamorro was briefly appointed Minister of War. He had

signed the Dawson Pact which demanded the creation of a new Constituent Assembly in

November that year, in exchange for U.S. recognition of the new government. In the

76 The limited written sources produced by these political and military chiefs is an obstacle that has been

recognized by scholars. The biography of Álvaro Obregón, for example, is based upon thousands of

interviews carried out under the oral history Project of the Mexican Revolution. For two cases that

underline this lack of sources, see: Chasteen, Heroes on Horseback; Jürgen Buchenau, The Last Caudillo:

Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican Revolution (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 77 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Alfredo Gallegos to Emiliano Chamorro, October 31, 1910;

José Dolores Mondragón (Granada) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 9, 1910; Bartolomé Martínez

(Matagalpa) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 29, 1910; Deogracias Rivas (Managua) to Emiliano

Chamorro (Washington), October 22, 1913; Luis E. Rivas to Emiliano Chamorro, circa 1914. 78 “Cabos Sueltos en mi memoria” Revista Conservadora, March-December 1962, 21, p. 1.

29

resulting electoral context, Chamorro’s newly gained national prominence was a key

asset in attracting more followers under his influence. Most of the time, these were

people acquainted with him in some way, anywhere from former high school classmates

to sympathizers in remote areas who had recently served in the campaign against Zelaya.

This elemental part in sustaining Chamorro’s networking had as a main purpose to

specify the sender’s political situation as well as his degree of personal loyalty by listing

previous deeds. Letter writers deliberately mentioned a variety of actions and

qualifications to claim a certain personal connection to Chamorro. For instance, they

could remark that, during the Zelaya regime, they had suffered political persecution for

identifying themselves as conservatives, that they had laboriously collaborated with the

bipartisan military campaign, or that they had published articles in newspapers supporting

Chamorro. These senders did not show any reluctance when recalling Chamorro of their

political commitment or the risks taken towards what they called “the revolutionary

cause.”79Abraham Gutiérrez Lobo, who by the mid-1920s was one of the most important

conservative patriarchs from the frontier town of Ocotal (Nueva Segovia), reminded

Chamorro that they both met when they attended the same school and that he had

suffered incarceration in the times of Zelaya.80

The sender’s presentation contributed to the development of the rest of the letters.

In letters requesting favors, the resource of recalling past actions to prove one’s loyalty

was especially useful. In a similar vein, in letters of advice, senders tried to draw on their

79 For examples illustrating this variety of qualifications, see: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. J.

Jarquín (Masaya) to Emiliano Chamorro, October 11, 1910; Fernando Martínez (León) to Emiliano

Chamorro, October 22, 1910. The quote is from Jarquín’s letter. 80 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Abraham Gutiérrrez Lobo to Emiliano Chamorro, November

11, 1910. My description of Abraham Gutiérrez Lobo relies on Schroeder, "Horse Thieves to Rebels to

Dogs", 395-396.

30

local political expertise and hence demonstrated their authoritative voice to support their

credibility as appropriate advisors to General Chamorro. Then, in both cases found in this

correspondence, the sender’s mandatory introduction played a key role in creating the

bond between a leader and his followers. It also had a practical usage in clarifying the

terms in which the exchange of favors, or advices, was going to be carried out as it

provided an initial specification of the sender’s identity (class, geographic location,

family ties). This was the case of Gutiérrez Lobo when he intentionally suggested they

had similar class origins by pointing to a common education and a shared experience of

youth. In this sense, it stressed the reciprocal nature of the linkage that united the clique.

On the one hand, it was a reminder to General Chamorro of the sender’s potential appeal

as future collaborator or of his already established local influence. On the other, while it

helped to position the sender’s as a subordinate, it was indicative of Chamorro’s moral to

with the sender’s due to the former’s evidences of past adherence or loyalty.

The content in the second part of these letters varied depending on the motive

behind them, however, they point to the mechanism of conceding favors of various kinds

in exchange for local representation and confidential information about politics. The

majority of these letters aimed at requesting personal favors, whether to obtain material

benefits or to advance the sender’s own political career. The time span of these petitions

is ample and can be traced back to 1908 when Emiliano Chamorro, not yet known as

General, was in exile and spent short periods of time in El Salvador, Guatemala, and

Costa Rica. Francisco Cáceres, his business partner in Comayagua (Honduras), for

31

instance, solicited Chamorro to get him two sewing machines, one for his daughter and

another female relative residing in the city of Granada.81

After signing loan treaties with U.S. private bankers, Nicaragua’s government

reduced its public expenditures and U.S. officials began administering the country’s

revenues, which created a compromised economic situation. It is not surprising that in

those years General Chamorro became a source of income for his followers, especially

after the approval of a financial plan in 1917.82 There are many records of Chamorristas

requesting petty loans in the name of personal friendship throughout the 1910s and

1920s.83 During the period in which General Chamorro served as diplomatic official in

Washington (1913-1916, 1921-1923), he continued receiving similar letters that involved

purchasing imported goods not available in Nicaragua. Juan Ruíz, Minister of Education

in 1922, sent an official letter whose apparent main purpose was to comment on an

internal division in the Conservative Party but quickly moved to make the case for a

personal request. Ruíz confessed that his son was suffering from tuberculosis and that he

needed an injection that was only available from the British Red Cross because he heard

81 A similar case was local Matagalpino caudillo, Bartolomé Martínez who solicited a typewriter to

contribute to the conservatives’ propaganda against Liberals. IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers,

Francisco Cáceres to Emiliano Chamorro, July 6, 1908; Bartolomé Martínez (Matagalpa) to Emiliano

Chamorro, October 24, 1910. 82 The 1917 financial plan, also known as the Lansing Plan after U.S. secretary of state Robert Lansing

(1915-1920), restricted the capacity of Nicaragua’s government to make use of its national budget. In

addition, it established the National Bank as the office in charge of collecting all government revenues

which were used in their entirety to pay loans with U.S. private bankers. This plan also specified the role of

the binational High Commission and the Customs General Collector as long the country’s external debt was

being paid. Bases del Plan Financiero y de los contratos para el arreglo de la deuda externa e interna.

Law Decree No. 3, August 31, 1917. 83 For an illustrative case see: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Juan Francisco Espinosa

(Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, December 20, 1922. For a reference on Chamorro’s habit of providing

cash as gifts for “friends” in need, see: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Reyes Lobo (Managua)

to Emiliano Chamorro, April 28, 1921.

32

it had been newly produced by a Swiss scientist. Ruíz promised to pay back all the

expenses in order to get the medicine shipped to Nicaragua.84

Ruíz’s type of request suggests that General Chamorro’s purchasing capabilities

and diplomatic influence stimulated politicians to perceive him as a reliable provider.

These letters also indicate the reduced market for manufactured goods and the limited

capacity of the national government to purchase medicines under U.S. occupation. Thus,

they indicate a belief in personal power over bureaucratic reach of the government. In

this sense, the mechanism of favor allowed General Chamorro to assume a paternal figure

as a provider who took care of his fellow politicians. Ruíz’s letter, in particular, illustrates

the level of intimacy that could be reached between politicians since detailing familiar

issues as delicate as a relative’s contagious disease was almost a taboo, an information

only shared among family members.

Thus, General Chamorro constantly dealt with his followers’ familiar issues.

Through their letters Chamorristas saw him as a temporal paternal figure for their

families. Many sent their sons to study in the United States and when Chamorro lived in

Washington, they often asked him to look after their sons. Although he never had

children with his wife Lastenia Enríquez, followers trusted in his influence to resolve

problems when they arose.85 These letters neatly showed the integration of political and

84 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Juan Ruíz from the Ministry of Public Instruction (Managua)

to Emiliano Chamorro, December 8, 1922. 85 While it is true that General Chamorro never had children on his own, he seemed to have raised a

nephew and a niece both of which are repeatedly mentioned in his autobiography. Also, he was known to

have many godchildren. The content of some letters makes references to compadres and comadres. A more

detailed examination of Chamorro’s compadrazgo relationships and their political implications is beyond

the scope of this essay and needs further attention. I was able to find a letter from one of Chamorro’s

compadres from Bluefields in late 1922. Felipe LeFranc solicited Chamorro to take care of Lefranc’s son,

Alejandro, who wanted to be admitted in a medical school in the United States. LeFranc stated “Take the

matter into your hands, and as though Alejandrito were your own son, and to the best to get him into a nice

university.” Felipe LeFranc (Bluefields) to Emiliano Chamorro, December 12, 1922. A political satire on

33

familial concerns among the members of this conservative clique. For instance, José

María Paguaga, a senator and member of the Paguaga clan, thanked Chamorro for

helping him paying the tuition of his son, José María Jr., who was attending Allentown

College in Pennsylvania. Paguaga finally added that when he traveled to Managua to join

the Senate sessions, he would wait for Chamorro’s “correct indications and pleasant

orders.”86

Nicaragua’s diplomats were involved in this networking and were intermediaries

for their acquaintances’ issues. In one of his letters, A. Bolaños, Nicaragua’s consul in

New Orleans, first briefly advised General Chamorro to advocate for a needed loan

negotiation to build a railroad that would connect both of Nicaragua’s coasts and then,

started making several requests; one of them being to use his influence to get a young

Nicaraguan boy admitted into the U.S. air force. Next, he demanded the repatriation of

another young boy, Ramón Enríquez, an acquaintance who had suffered poverty in the

United States.87

Other letters required more direct intervention by General Chamorro. For

example, the widow Pastora de Lacayo had lost communication with her son Daniel and

exhorted Chamorro to “make efforts to see or call him to his home and convince him to

write me or at least respond my phone calls.” Pastora’s demand went even further when

Chamorro’s reasons for not having children can be found in: José R. Hernández, La confesión de Emiliano

Chamorro: tragicomedia, con base en la verdad histórica. s.ed., 1954. 86 “El diez del mes entrante estaré en Managua, en mi carácter de senador, allá espero sus acertadas

indicaciones lo mismo que sus gratas órdenes.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, J.M. Paguagua

(Ocotal) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 21, 1921. See also: Irvin M. Shalter (Allentown College, PA) to

Minister of Nicaragua Emiliano Chamorro (Washington D.C.), September 3, 1921; Bill issued by

Allentown College to José María Paguaga, September 3, 1921. 87 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, A. Bolaños (New Orleans) to Emiliano Chamorro, December

7, 1921. For a similar case in which a father requested Chamorro’s financial support to repatriate an ill

young boy residing in the United States, see: Aníbal Collado (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorrro,

November 10, 1922.

34

she pleaded that Chamorro obtain a notarized certificate from Daniel and send it to

Nicaragua so she could resolve a legal problem involving her dead husband’s will.88

Most of the favors in these letters required General Chamorro’s use of his political

influence to recommend a third person into a public post or political nomination. As was

common in other parts of Latin America, Chamorro’s followers were intermediaries

whose political strength relied on their advocacy power to facilitate the incorporation of

novice politicians or bureaucrats into the governmental structure. 89 Letters in this

category are from Chamorristas who controlled localities and used this type of

mechanism to extend their own political reach; thus, while they competed to strengthen

their connections with other local leaders, they tested Chamorro’s leadership and capacity

to secure favorable appointments; both in Nicaragua and abroad.90 As a result, Chamorro

wrote letters of recommendation but he could also verbally persuade an official in a

variety of issues: to introduce candidates in local elections, hire a public servant, admit an

aspirant to the priesthood, shelter a political refugee, rehire a diplomat, or even expedite

someone’s personal identity card.91 In 1929, Felipe Rojas, a Chamorrista from Estelí,

88 “se interesara por verlo o llamarlo a su casa, para exhortármelo a que me escriba o por lo menos a que me

conteste.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Pastora B. V de Lacayo (Granada) to Emiliano

Chamorro, November 21, 1922. 89 There are some similarities with Chamorristas and politicians in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth

century. Richard Graham emphasizes the role of recommendations as means through which a politician

asserted his own strength. He adds that bacharéis (job seekers) “bound together the national and local

spheres of government with powerful ties of friendship, family connection, and personal loyalty. (…) He

who received an office, received it as a gift.”, Graham, Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century

Brazil. 210. 90 Juan José Zavala, son of former president Joaquín Zavala who had been Chamorro’s close friend,

commented his financial hardships as consul in New Orleans, and demanded, “Look what you can do for

me, in this occasion I am sure you will provide valuable service which I will know how to repay”. “Vé qué

puedes tu hacer por mí, en esta ocasión seguro de que me prestaras valioso servicio que yo sabré

agradecer”. IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Juan J. Zavala (New Orleans) to Emiliano

Chamorro, September 11, 1914. For another request to favor a Nicaraguan diplomat, see: Mathilde R. de

Lacayo (Diriamba) to General Emiliano Chamorro, September 22, 1926, 91 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Salvador Castrillo (París) to Emiliano Chamorro, January 31,

1912; José María (Bishop of Comayagua) to Emiliano Chamorro, May 9, 1912; Emiliano Chamorro to

doña Graciela de Bermúdez (Matagalpa), September 25, 1930; Emiliano Chamorro to Hernaldo Zuñiga

35

requested a recommendation for the relocation of pro-conservative priest Eusebio R.

Zelaya to Ciudad Darío (Matagalpa) because Liberals harded him. Rojas, who was

originally from Darío, stressed the priest Zelaya’s staunch collaboration and made sure to

comment that in his new community “he will be politically useful to us [Chamorristas]

since he is an apostle of our conservative cause.”92 Even high level officials, as was the

case of Honduras’ president Manuel Bonilla (1903-1907, 1912-1913), agreed to help one

of Chamorro’s protégés, Colonel Manuel Pinto.93

In other cases, job seekers directly asked Chamorro for a recommendation while

promising their future loyalty in return. Most likely this can be explained given the

popular aura that Chamorro held and the reduced size of Nicaragua’s political arena.

Thus, many followers felt close enough to their leader to explicitly address their demands

in a casual tone, for example, without using his military title of General. Following the

style of introduction discussed pages above, Chamorristas with desires to enter political

life requested recommendations for nominations or explicit appointments as deputies,

senators, local judges, and even railroad managers.94 Macario Díaz, a landowner and

Chamorro’s business partner in the timber industry, recalled a promise he had made to

him and expressed,

General, I always believe that you are my Providence because you care for me,

and with a confidence inspired in your good heart, I hope you do not forget what

Padilla (Masaya), August 28, 1930; Emiliano Chamorro to General Alberto Tiffer (Masaya), October 6,

1930; Emiliano Chamorro (Managua) to President Adolfo Díaz (Managua), November 9, 1928. 92 “(...) y en donde políticamente nos sería muy útil por ser un Apóstol decidido de nuestra Causa

conservadora.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Felipe F. Rojas (Estelí) to Emiliano Chamorro,

June 18, 1929. 93 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Manuel Bonilla (Tegucigalpa, Honduras) to Emiliano

Chamorro, March, 6, 1912. 94 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Fernando Martínez (León) to Emiliano Chamorro, October

22, 1910; César Cuadra (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, September 21, 1921; Adolfo Cruz (Juigalpa) to

Emiliano Chamorro, September 3, 1929; Felipe F. Rojas (Estelí) to Emiliano Chamorro, September 6,

1929.

36

you promised; in other words, that you would speak to the Supreme Court

magistrates so that I may be named Boaco’s judge once Incer has left the post.95

It is important to comment on the tone of job seekers’ in these letters because it

reflects their attitude towards Chamorro. The emphasis on their proven political

adherence and on Chamorro’s promises demonstrate that they rarely seen themselves as

beggars and, instead, saw the relationship as mutual, even if unequal. These Chamorristas

were aware that a job position was advantageous to them as much as it was for their

leader.

Despite the strong oligarchic character of the Conservative Party and General

Chamorro’s highly centralized way to exercise power, nepotism did not seem to have

been central for his leadership. This is not to say that he did not made use of his political

influence to get some relatives into governmental posts, as this was the case during his’

and his uncle’s presidencies.96 Likewise, General Chamorro frequently utilized official

channels of communication to deal with his personal businesses; many of which were

controlled by his father, Salvador Chamorro.97 But, most of the governmental positions in

both of his administrations (1917-20, 1925-26) were filled with politicians not associated

with the traditional families connected to the Chamorros in Granada. Nepotism was

95 “General, siempre creo que es Ud. mi Providencia por que se interesa por mí, y con la confianza que me

inspira su buen corazón desearía no se olvide de lo que me prometió, esto es, de hablar con los Magistrados

de la Suprema, para el efecto de que me nombraran juez de Boaco una vez de que Incer renunciara.”

IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Macario Díaz (finca La Esperanza) to Emiliano Chamorro

(Casa Presidencial), May 22, 1918. 96 For example, two of General Chamorro’s half-brothers, Fernando and Salvador, held diplomatic posts in

San Francisco (California) and Paris, respectively. When Salvador was fired, he demanded Chamorro to

use his influence to get his job back as consul in France. IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers,

Salvador Chamorro (París) to Emiliano Chamorro, February 10, 1911; F. Chamorro (San Francisco, CA) to

Emiliano Chamorro, August 4, 1921. 97 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Commercial Bank of Spanish America Ltd (New York),

December 6, 1921.

37

certainly a trait in Nicaragua’s political practice in these years but General Chamorro

prioritized his military comrades and local followers over elite members. In fact, the

political crisis that emerged among conservatives in 1921-1922 was ignited because of

Diego Manuel Chamorro’s policy regarding cabinet appointments.

The language in these letters stressed the value of friendship and camaraderie

among Chamorro’s clique, and even with other factions of the Conservative party. One of

the most salient characteristics of their communication was the use of the term “friend.”

Intermediaries, job seekers, and Chamorro himself, all used this type of casual and

familiar address to advance their objectives.98 Even though, the title of “friend” might be

deceitful since it surely was a rhetoric tool to reduce differentiated power positions

among politicians, we should not take it lightly. Its recurrent use signals its importance in

sustaining bonds of loyalty, political identity, and group cohesion. Therefore, it helped

assuage internal struggles and contributed to the Chamorristas’ own sense of collectivity

vis-a-vis other conservative groups like the Partido Conservador Progresista.99 The term

“friend” seemed to have had two meanings. First, it was a reference to the idea of “friend

of the political cause,” this is, a political sympathizer of the values that General

Chamorro represented.100 Second, it alluded to a close type of relationship in which

affection, loyalty and obedience were some of the elements mediating their political

98 In a letter to President Adolfo Díaz (1912-1916), General Chamorro tried to persuade him to hold his

support for a presidential candidate, Pedro Rafael Cuadra. He added in a handwritten note: “This [letter] is

not written by the Minister to the President but from a friend to another friend. Okay?”. “Esta no está

escrita por el Ministro al Sr Presidente, sino por un amigo a otro amigo. Vale.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano

Chamorro Papers, Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Adolfo Díaz (Managua), March 15, 1916. 99 The Partido Conservador Progresista was founded in 1912 and it was led by Adolfo Díaz. Although it

was a faction within the Conservative party, they referred to themselves as a separate party. 100 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Abraham Narvaez (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro,

August 30, 1910.

38

connection. In other words, General Chamorro and his followers understood their

political affinity, and therefore developed a political language, as one of friendship.101

To be a Chamorrista then, politicians should not only demonstrate they were on

the Conservatives’ side in their struggle for power against Liberals, they also needed to

be considered true allies of General Chamorro. From the times of his early conspiracies,

he surrounded himself with men who enjoyed his complete confidence. In September

1909, at the organization of the revolt against Zelaya, his close comrades envisioned a

future revolutionary army composed exclusively by loyal military men whom they named

“our friends.”102 This idea was congruent with the Chamorristas’ self-perception in

relation to other factions within the Conservative Party. According to these letters, an

aspiring “friend” whose loyalty had not been tested, first stated the terms of his political

involvement as a servant. They often stressed that they were putting themselves at

Chamorro’s service in any situation in the future.103 Such statement rendered

Chamorristas as perpetual subordinates; nonetheless, this was a mutual bonding

relationship in which favors represented its most crucial component. It also allowed

General Chamorro to think high of himself as a leader surrounded by devoted men.

But what did it mean to be Chamorro’s friend? In exchange of support for local

political representation, firstly, it implied a compromise to provide first hand relevant

information so General Chamorro obtained an upper hand over other politicians. For

instance, while Chamorro was in Washington (1921-1923), he was informed, months in

101 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Emiliano Chamorro (Washington) to Juan José Ruíz, March

12, 1914. 102 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Fernando Elizondo (Puntarenas, Costa Rica) to Emiliano

Chamorro, September 9, 1909; J. Jarquín (Masaya) to Emiliano Chamorro, October 11, 1910. For

Elizondo’s short biography, see note 44. 103 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, Leopoldo Lacayo (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro,

February 20, 1922; J. Alberto Gámez (Masaya) to Emiliano Chamorro, August 14, 1926.

39

advance, of a possible armed revolt in the Northern provinces, which indeed occurred in

late August 1921. He also knew in advance of a coup attempt against the government of

his uncle in May 1922.104 Secondly, their local knowledge permitted them to advise

regarding any of his political moves, and sometimes even to reprimand him when they

considered he had committed a mistake. While their letters are full of flattering and

affectionate connotations, Chamorristas did not hesitate to communicate their opinions

and frequently, pushed back against Chamorro’s decisions.

Within this clique, there were tensions and rivalries which sometimes threatened

the leader’s dominant position. Chamorristas defiant attitudes were especially evident

during electoral periods. To balance these internal tensions, gratitude was the most highly

regarded value among Chamorristas. It was congruent to their understanding of their

political relationship as one based on personal friendship. The centrality of conceding

favors reinforced the importance of gratitude as a shared value for sustaining

Chamorristas’ endeavors and sense of collectivity. When informing about the armed

revolt in 1921, and in line with Felipe Ibarra’s letter, R. Cabezas expressed

acknowledgment of Chamorro’s favors and stated that his report wished to “pay,

although in small proportion, all the favors I received from you while in Nicaragua; you

104 Due to Chamorristas frequent reports on the preparations of these two events, some government

officials accused General Chamorro of having been behind them. Although his personal papers do not

provide concrete evidence to sustain this claim, an overall assess of these communications suggests that, in

case, he had not been directly involved, General Chamorro certainly could have warned his uncle in

advance but he refused to. On the armed revolt in 1921, see: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, R.

Cabezas (San Francisco, CA) to Emiliano Chamorro, July 12, 1921; Venancio Montalván (León) to

Emiliano Chamorro, September 7, 1921; Bartolomé Viquez (Bluefields) to Emiliano Chamorro, September

7, 1921; Gustavo Paguaga (Ocotal) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 12, 1921; Bartolomé Viquez

(Bluefields) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 14, 1921. On the coup attempt in 1922, see: Cable from

Associated Press, May 22, 1922; Domingo Calero (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, August 29, 1922.

40

were good to me, and I will never forget that.”105On the contrary, to forget one’s received

past favors was transgressive; it was to neglect a code of honor. The crisis faced by

President Diego Manuel Chamorro, and propelled by Chamorristas, is illustrative of the

weight this clique assigned to political actions based upon appreciation for comrades. The

problem emerged when the new President did not follow his nephew’s suggestion for a

new cabinet and started to remove Chamorristas and to appoint members of the granadino

elite instead. Most importantly, they had supported don Diego’s candidacy in the

electoral campaign in 1920 following General Chamorro’s initiative.106 They felt

betrayed, blamed his leader for the elected President, and declared that don Diego was

“such a fatuous and aristocratic man whose only determination is to enrich his family to

whom he had given nearly all of the public posts as you already know.”107

In addition to gratitude, the content of these letters is abundant in affectionate

language towards Chamorro. For instance, Chamorristas often declared they were “in

love with” or “always and only cared about” Chamorro. One of his compadres stated that

he was “yours in body and soul.” Similar to Ibarra’s comments, they also used metaphors

from rural life to channel their feelings. In 1922, José C. Espinosa, from Granada,

105 “pagar aunque sea en muy pequeña proporción, los favores que de Ud. recibí en Nicaragua; Ud. fue

bueno conmigo, y yo no lo olvidaré jamás.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, R. Cabezas (San

Francisco, CA) to Emiliano Chamorro, July 12, 1921. On a similar tone, see: IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano

Chamorro Papers, Leopoldo Lacayo (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, February 20, 1922. For a

contradictory reflection on General Chamorro’s high regard for friendship and disinterested favors while

recalled past collaboration see: Emiliano Chamorro (Managua) to José Antonio Artiles (Boaco), August 8,

1930. 106 Along with Chamorristas, there was another conservative clique based in Managua, “The Ismayles”

whose leader was Ismael Zepeda, and who also joined the opposition to don Diego’s administration due to

his new governmental appointees. For details on the granadino conservatives’ arbitrary actions, Eusebio

Norori published a series of articles in the newspaper La Tribuna (circa 1921). Cfr. Norori, Eusebio. Ibid.

Prologue, n.p. 107 “Ud. tiene mucha culpa con haber impuesto al país un hombre tan fatuo y aristocrático, que su unico

[sic] empeño es enriquecer a su familia a la que ha dado casi todos los puestos públicos como Ud. bien

sabe.” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, A. Espinosa (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro,

November 15, 1922. See also: H. Bejarano to Emiliano Chamorro, December 12, 1921.

41

reassured Chamorro in Washington that they were going to obey whatever presidential

candidate he would propose and that, “Distance cannot erase the affection nor can it cool

down feelings, no, or at least I think it does not because when the plant of affection has

been cultivated by hands which have grown the seed of goodness everywhere, this seed

grows and its fruits are then known by all.”108

As condensed in these expressions, private correspondence was a mostly

homosocial space in which Chamorristas could express their admiration for their leader in

a somewhat romantic language.109 These images evoke a youth infatuation, as if these

men were engaged in a courtship. If, from their sickly-sweet words, it seemed clear they

highly regarded their leader, Chamorristas manifested their appreciation into direct action

through personal devotion. For example, as we have observed, this translated into local

networking and representation on his behalf, sharing sensitive information and organizing

rallies. Thus, personal devotion meant political allegiance. According to a hierarchy of

political identities, they were first General Chamorro’s friends and followers; only then

they recognized themselves as members of the Conservative Party. Bartolomé Martínez’s

words rightly summarize this devotion when he exclaimed, “As for me, there is no doubt,

I will follow you whenever you go and I can assure you likewise about the men who are

here [Matagalpa].”110

108 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers, F. Ocón Brenes (Jinotepe) to Emiliano Chamorro, May 6,

1912; Cayetano Lugo (Managua) to Emiliano Chamorro, November 5, 1922; Felipe LeFranc (Bluefields) to

Emiliano Chamorro, December 12, 1922; José C. Espinosa (Granada) to Emiliano Chamorro, March 12,

1922. Espinosa’s words were: “No es la distancia la que borra el cariño, y entivia [sic] afectos, no, o por lo

menos creo que no, porque cuando la planta del afecto ha sido cultivada por manos que han sembrado por

doquiera la semilla del bien, ésta fructifica, y sus FrutoFruto entonces son de todos conocidos…”. 109 I would like to note that while I found few letters from Chamorrista women, there is a heavy gendered

component in the composition and language of the clique that is mostly presented as masculine. Further

discussion on Chamorrista women participation is needed. 110 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Bartolomé Martínez (Matagalpa) to Emiliano Chamorro,

September 14, 1910.

42

In summary, the content, structure, and language of these letters reflect the

importance of friendship as the principal bond of Chamorristas’ political connections.

Contrary to prevalent tendencies of nepotism in Nicaragua’s history, Chamorristas at both

upper and subordinate positions based their association with General Chamorro in shared

formative experiences such as school and warfare, as introductions showed. This was the

case despite General Chamorro’s evident influence in his paternal uncle’s ascendance to

the presidency following his own term (1917-1920). As his presidential policy showed,

most of General Chamorro’s cabinet were his close comrades, what he called “his

friends,” and not other members of the Chamorro family –with exceptions in the Foreign

Service.

Conclusion

The intraparty crisis between General Chamorro and his uncle was the first of

many events that would contribute to larger problems for the longtime caudillo.

Bartolomé Martínez, one of his closest allies and vice-president of Nicaragua (1921-

1923), assumed the executive office a few days after President Diego Manuel Chamorro

died of diabetes in his home.111 Martínez’s personal ambition to run for the presidency in

the coming elections in late 1924 marked the beginning of their enmity. Forced to dismiss

his intentions, Martínez signed a pact with Toribio Tijerino and General Tomás Masís to

organize a new bipartisan group.112 Conservatives were divided themselves and General

111 USNA, RG 59, 817.00/0153, Carlos Cuadra Pasos to John E. Ramer, 13 October 1923. 112 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Venancio Montalván (León) to Emiliano Chamorro, May 26,

1923.

43

Chamorro achieved his presidential nomination only after he convinced Martín Benard,

Carlos Cuadra Pasos, and Bartolomé Víquez to withdraw theirs. However, the Partido de

Transacción, the coalition that included Liberals and was backed by Martínez, won the

elections in October 1924. Chamorristas were perplexed, and in their disarray, carried out

a coup d’état in October 1925 just months after the last detachment of marines, installed

in 1912, had left. General Chamorro was named President of Nicaragua but he did not

obtain U.S. support.113 The resulting civil war was the beginning of the Sandino uprising

in May 1927.

Thanks to U.S. diplomatic pressure, Conservatives agreed to exile General

Chamorro and they sent him to Europe as Minister Plenipotentiary in late 1926.114 In his

period abroad, Chamorristas pleaded to their long time strongman to make explicit and

public his decision not to run as a presidential candidate in the upcoming elections to be

held in 1928. The moral debacle Chamorristas faced after the U.S. rejection of their coup,

not only damaged their image within the Conservative Party but greatly affected their

political influence.115 Therefore, they started to question General Chamorro’s leadership

in the new political panorama. In a collective letter written by prominent Chamorristas,

including Martín Benard, Juan José Martínez, G. Argüello, Bartolomé Víquez, and Juan

J. Zavala, they justified their request in the following terms: “the struggle, due to the

current circumstances of this U.S. cooperation, so efficient, has to be very strong, and the

113 Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (1925-1929) sent a note to General Chamorro in mid-1926 in which

he specified that the U.S. government was not going to recognize his administration. This document was

known as “The Kellogg note”. For a copy, see: Antonio Esgueva Gómez, Las leyes electorales en la

historia de Nicaragua, vol. II (Managua: Editorial El Amanecer, 1995). 904-905. 114 Chamorro, El ultimo caudillo. 331. 115 For further details on tensions between the faction led by former President Díaz and Chamorristas, see:

IHNCA AD D5G2 0383 “Conflicto que origina la candidatura de Emiliano Chamorro para elecciones

presidenciales de 1928”.

44

Conservative Party in order to face it needs to strengthen its rank and file around an

acceptable candidate and, if possible, desirable to the Department of State.”116 What this

group of Chamorristas referred to was the upcoming U.S. supervised elections that

imposed new and strict rules to all participant parties.117 In addition, comrades in the

departments of Chontales and Boaco threated to boycott the conservative ticket and

violence arose in the Segovias.118 Finally, General Alejandro Cárdenas summarized the

party’s feelings towards Chamorro when he labeled him as an “anachronic caudillo,” and

stressed they needed to start an internal transformation.119

Throughout this essay, I have paid attention to the voices, demands, and interests

of Chamorristas in order to explore the nature of the relationships they developed with

their leader, General Emiliano Chamorro in the first three decades of the twentieth

century in Nicaragua. By using a collection of private letters, this work suggests that

Chamorro’s authoritarian and centralized leadership was more unstable and fragile than

most of the historiography has argued. Indeed, Chamorro created a diverse clientele

network with local liaisons in almost all of Nicaragua’s provinces, however, his power

116 “La lucha, dadas las circunstancias de esa cooperación americana, tan eficiente, tiene que ser muy

fuerte, y el partido conservador para poderse enfrentar necesita compactar sus filas alrededor de un

candidato aceptable y, si es posible, deseable para el Departamento de Estado” IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano

Chamorro Papers. Conservatives to Emiliano Chamorro (París), August 26, 1927. See also: Fernando

Medina (San Carlos) to Emiliano Chamorro (París), May 27, 1927; Ramón Enríquez (Managua) to General

Emiliano Chamorro (París), July 30, 1927; Alfonso Estrada to General Emiliano Chamorro (Washington),

August 30, 1927; César to General Chamorro, July 14, 1928. 117 For further details on the electoral process in 1928, see: Pérez Baltodano, Entre el estado conquistador y

el estado nación. 432-439. 118 The gravity of the situation for Chamorristas can be exemplified by Gustavo Paguaga’s letter. He wrote

to General Chamorro in an alarmed tone and solicited money to fund the Conservative campaign in Nueva

Segovia. He also commented on high levels of violence that resulted in the assassination of the party’s

secretary in the town of San Lucas. He remarked: “It is said then, this time, we are risking it all.” “Dicho

esta (sic), pues, que jugamos el todo por el todo”. IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Gustavo

Paguaga (Ocotal) to Emiliano Chamorro, October 9, 1928. 119 IHNCA-UCA, Emiliano Chamorro Papers. Alejandro Cárdenas (Managua) to Adán Molina (Estelí),

November 10, 1928.

45

and influence were constantly supervised, and sometimes even questioned, by his own

followers. Based on these letters, Chamorristas acted as a consultancy directory to

Chamorro and challenged his personal aspirations, as was the case of his failed efforts for

becoming, again, a presidential candidate in 1928. As long as Chamorro was capable of

providing benefits and a credible representation in the Conservative party, he could

remain in a hegemonic position within the clique. He successfully framed his leadership

within patronage by offering material goods, money and public positions to his followers.

But changes in national politics and U.S. foreign policy towards Nicaragua by the end of

the 1920s illustrated, especially after the 1925 coup, that Chamorro was unable to act

according to the new context in order to legitimize his power.

Despite the innumerable reiterations of personal devotion and loyalty in their

letters, Chamorristas’ support was not unconditional. In some sense, these letters showed

the rhetorical strategies used for politicians in subordinate positions not only to achieve

their goals, whether to get a loan or a job, but to mislead the caudillo about his greatness.

They knew how and when to pressure their leader to make a political move, such as the

decision to abdicate his candidacy, and in circumstances when the interests of the clique

were put at risk. They also cleverly stated their demands as strictly necessary and whose

reasons were out of their reach, placing ultimate accountability to other political actors.

In addition, Chamorristas also had presidential ambitions, as was the case of Bartolomé

Martínez and Tomás Masís, and often threated Chamorro’s own objectives.

Finally, General Chamorro faced tensions at various levels. First, competition for

material benefits, governmental posts and candidacies among Chamorristas compelled

Chamorro to make concessions to favor whoever he considered was better fitted to

46

represent him at the regional or local level. Second, he had to compete with other figures

in the Conservative party; for instance, when they had to decide over their candidates for

elections or new governmental appointees. It is no secret that he was General Luis Mena,

Adolfo Díaz, and Carlos Cuadra Pasos’ adversary. Competition among factions was

constant and it led to serious crises, such as the one produced during Diego Manuel

Chamorro’s presidency. It was often so bitter that Chamorristas recognized themselves as

a separate party, Partido Conservador Genuino. Third, there was the U.S. influence in

Nicaragua’s politics. Although Chamorro had training in diplomacy and usually

succeeded in his goals with the Department of State as the Chamorro-Bryan treaty in

1914 showed, he challenged the transformations in U.S. foreign policy concerning

caudilllismo in the late 1920s.120 Chamorro disregarded the emergence of a new political

coalition between Conservatives and Liberals in 1924, and probably also misunderstood

the importance of the Sandino war for U.S. future plans in Nicaragua. After the

astonishing electoral victory of Liberals in 1928, Chamorro and his prestige never

recovered. Thus, Chamorristas suffered a moral defeat after almost twenty years in which

Liberals had been excluded from politics.

Although Nicaragua was not an exceptional case of caudillismo in Latin

America’s history, examining these letters might help us understand the existence of

followers’ concrete interests and the necessities that these leaders fulfilled for them to

become relevant political figures. Had General Chamorro not been able to provide favors

out of a lack of economic resources or elite status, for example, it is unlikely he could

have extended the political reach of the Conservative Party through the inclusion of a

120 See, Gobat, Confronting the American Dream. Chapter 8.

47

variety of people. Chamorristas were from different social strata and ethnic backgrounds,

and most of them were not associated with elite families from Granada. It could even be

suggested, although paradoxically, that Chamorristas democratized the party in some

way; or at least, they provided it with a renewed popular aura.

Scholars in Nicaragua have relied on an understanding of political culture as

irrational, blind, and even with tinted with magic.121 This essay aims at contributing to an

understanding of caudillismo as a phenomenon with concrete causes and manifestations.

Chamorristas, for instance, did not follow Chamorro because he possessed remarkable

leadership qualities; most of the time, they saw him as the means by which they could

resolve their everyday issues like a relative’s health problem, enhance their opportunities

for upward mobility through a public post, and perform a political identity for their own

sense of fulfillment. Personal devotion was more a political tool for securing those

benefits than a real conviction. Caudillismo was, and is still prevalent in Nicaragua, but it

has its limits, it is permeable and, as the case of General Chamorro illustrates, is also

ephemeral.

121 For two of the most representatives examples, see: Emilio Álvarez Montalván, Cultura política

nicaragüense: ensayos; Pérez Baltodano, Entre el estado conquistador y el estado nación.

48

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53

Biography

A native of Managua, Nicaragua, Eimeel Castillo Doña graduated magna cum

laude from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua (UNAN-Managua) in 2011

with a Bachelor’s degree in History. Thanks to a scholarship from the Global

Undergraduate Exchange Program (Global UGRAD), she attended Nazareth College of

Rochester (New York) as an exchange student in the spring of 2009. Upon graduation,

Eimeel began teaching history at both UNAN-Managua and Universidad

Centroamericana (UCA). In 2013, she joined the research team at the Instituto de Historia

de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA-UCA) where she also worked organizing

archival collections and editing the journal Revista de Historia. She has done research on

history textbooks and caudillo politics in Nicaragua. In 2014, Eimeel was awarded a

Fulbright LASPAU scholarship, through the Department of State, and began an M.A.

program at Tulane University in 2015. Eimeel will attend the Ph.D. joint program in

Women’s studies and History at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) in the fall of

2017.