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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by

her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for

domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code

(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry

laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's

natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;

furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and

unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public

welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

 

 

 

Separate Opinions

 

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment

granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and

standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

 

 

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna

and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the

Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the

second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

Republic of the Philippines       SUPREME COURT

Manila  

EN BANC  METROPOLITAN MANILA                 G.R. Nos. 171947-48DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES,            Present:DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1]                   PUNO, C.J.,DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,             QUISUMBING,DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC                CARPIO,WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,                  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND     CORONA,MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE            CARPIO MORALES,COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE             AZCUNA,NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME       TINGA,GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF        CHICO-NAZARIO,THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL             VELASCO, JR.,GOVERNMENT,                                      NACHURA,                             Petitioners,                   REYES,                                                                 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and             - versus -                                      BRION, JJ.                                                                                                                                   CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF         MANILA BAY, represented and           joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAHDELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNISQUINTERO, MA. VICTORIALLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICESEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,

SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and             Promulgated:JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,                                            Respondents.               December 18, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 D E C I S I O N

 VELASCO, JR., J.:

 

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change,

has of late gained the attention of the international community.  Media have finally

trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and

other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage.

And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale

few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. [2]  But amidst

hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of

cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

 

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature

of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and

preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted

by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the

pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if

their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not

mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on

bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

 

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past,

once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for

different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse

mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that

could have otherwise made a difference.

 

 

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned

Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners,

for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch

20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that

the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards

set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine

Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed

from:

            x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. [3]

  

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued

neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a

violation of, among others: 

(1)               Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2)               The  Environment Code (PD 1152);(3)               The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);(4)               The Water Code (PD 1067);(5)               The Sanitation Code (PD 856);(6)               The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);(7)               The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);(8)               Executive Order No. 192;(9)               The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);(10)           Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;(11)           The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and(12)           International Law

 

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered

to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action

for the purpose.

 

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club

followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of

the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau,

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for

petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the

Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000

to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative

Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact

recreational activities, or the “SB” level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]

 

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

(MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to

reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage

Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its

evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-

generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean)

project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.

 The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

 

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of

respondents. The dispositive portion reads:           WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.            In particular:             Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.             Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.             Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.             Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

             Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.             Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.             Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.             Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.             Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.             Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.             Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.             No pronouncement as to damages and costs.             SO ORDERED.

          The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed

before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were

eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

 

 On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine

Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five

other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition

for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent

the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of

MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

 

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent

provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of

specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from

raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes,

petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act

which can be compelled by mandamus.  

The CA Sustained the RTC

           

 By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal

and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s

decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions

under existing laws.[7]

 

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule

45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT

HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT,

I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

 ARGUMENTS

 I

[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

 II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

  

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152

under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,

envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific

pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to

clean up and rehabilitate the ManilaBay?

 

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral

arguments.

 

Our Ruling

 

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the

premises.  

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila BayCan be Compelled by Mandamus

 

          Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial

duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that “requires neither the exercise of official

discretion nor judgment.”[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the

discretion of the person executing it. It is a “simple, definite duty arising under

conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.”[10] Mandamus is

available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not

to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

 

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain

adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy

evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They

argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,

including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility

studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

 

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear

and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of

the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents,

petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose

which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to

contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of

discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste

disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such

services.

 

We agree with respondents.      

 

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties

as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the

other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s

mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law

or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and

may be compelled by mandamus.  We said so in Social Justice Society v.

Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City ofManila to enforce, as a matter of

ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to

cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called “Pandacan

Terminals” within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate

with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and

appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other

alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory

imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic

Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the

scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include: Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation

and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal.  It shall likewise include theestablishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

  

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid

Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the

establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum

operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a

sanitary landfill.  Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the

effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps

for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of

controlled dumps.

 

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is

set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its

charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be

characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the

power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to

their judgment or conscience.[13]  A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person

to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform.”[14] Any suggestion

that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-

related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

 

           A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes

and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are

enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating

directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of

the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

Consider:

 

          (1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary

agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper

use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine

Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as

the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and

implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality

management.  On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises

jurisdiction “over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location,

magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on

pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to

prevent and abate such pollution.”

          The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water

Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a

10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in

scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

             Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:

           a)      Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four

(24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

 b)      Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within

twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report; c)      Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan

within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

  

          The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is

in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality

Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit

a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA,

the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

         

          Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested

that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government

agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005,

the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time

frame, denominated asOperation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the

rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

 

            The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of

some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track

what are assigned them under existing laws.

 

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction,

supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory

comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the

provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:(g)        To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x  

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over

local water districts.  It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for

the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water

standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish

facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage,

waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached

agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,

inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage

disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19]  In relation to the instant

petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in

Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in

theManila Bay.

          (4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative

Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and

enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of

agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine

Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units

(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring,

control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in

Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.[21]  Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG

and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22]  More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)

under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and

control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of

the fisheries and aquatic resources.

 

          (5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national

government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and

construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource

development systems in accordance with national development objectives and

approved government plans and specifications.

 

          In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924

to perform metro-wide services relating to “flood control and sewerage

management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,

standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and

sewerage system.”

 

          On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the

DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible

for flood control in Metro Manila.  For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain

as the implementing agency for flood control services.  The mandate of the

MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the

removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,

waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other

pertinent laws.

 

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast

Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of

1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and

regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of

the Philippines.  It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance

with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control

Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and

enforcement of PD 979.  It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who: 

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines; b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and

 c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.  

(7)  When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government

(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime

Group was tasked to “perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial

waters and rivers.”  Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall

be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such

functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to

assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG

and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws,

rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of

the Philippines.  This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine

Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were

authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25]

 

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated “to establish,

develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in

support of trade and national development.”[26]  Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513

states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:x x x x b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]

  

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a

signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must

ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the

reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports.  Thus, the PPA is

tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and

dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into

the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it

is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

 

          (9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain

adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as

other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the

implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would

necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29]

 

          Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are

frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads,

canals oresteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and

landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials

in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA

9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental

compliance certificate.

 

          Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA

7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed “when persons or entities occupy

danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,

shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and

playgrounds.”  The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH,

LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,

constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other

pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila.  With

respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,

and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,

the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and

removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in

violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH

and concerned agencies.

 

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the

Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of

waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for

domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in

coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall

formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of

sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment

system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix

sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

 

In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of

the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the

DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal

of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the

requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection

treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental

sanitation permit. 

 

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine

Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental

education in its school curricula at all levels.[32]  Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the

DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and

Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational

campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use

of the environment.  Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA

9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of

environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste

management principles.[33]

         

          (12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under

Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and

sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the

country’s development objectives.[34]

 

          One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the

Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a

policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,

preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It

also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline

processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution

mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental

strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms

for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of

water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management

cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection,

water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive

management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

 

          Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain

the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development

objectives.   

 

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves

clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each

agency/petitioner under the law.  We need not belabor the issue that their tasks

include the cleanup of the Manila Bay. 

 

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment

Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific

pollution incidents?

 Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

 

The disputed sections are quoted as follows: Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.  

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the

subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the

Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be

operational.

 

 

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads: 

SEC. 16. Cleanup  Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

  

            As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is

more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case,

merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup

operations.

 

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment

Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution

incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions

would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines

the terms “cleanup operations” and “accidental spills,” as follows: g.         Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the        pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition. h.                   Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result

from accidents such as collisions and groundings.  

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely

direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and

cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water

concerned.  They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to

“water pollution incidents,” which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of

specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment,

removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the

aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires “cleanup operations” to restore the body of water

to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of

either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as

mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

 

          As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.

62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and

cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,

respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.

20.  Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed

covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses

around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in

the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a

delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by

including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in

Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

 

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues,

coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has

contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,

respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage

of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase “cleanup

operations” embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting

definition. As pointed out, the phrases “cleanup operations” and “accidental spills”

do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

 

Respondents are correct.  For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way

state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the

containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident

occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a

specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree

where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This section, to stress,

commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such

measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In

fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the

occurrence of any pollution incident.

 

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,

indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution

is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such

instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for

the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup

operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the

erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup

operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of

the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to

clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at

them.  Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD

1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on

the happening of a specific pollution incident.  In this regard, what the CA said

with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is

practical. The appellate court wrote: “PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive

program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by

making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific

pollution incidents.”[35]

 

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the

implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the

pollution of theManila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh

impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the

polluters are.  We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions “water pollution

incidents” which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself

or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into

the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to “any person

who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies,” which may refer to an individual

or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the

waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this

situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and

faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific

pollution incident level.

 

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies

concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the

numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the

apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.

Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a

given water pollution incident.  In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government

to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously

Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

 

          The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the

initial stage of the long-term solution.  The preservation of the water quality of the

bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is

imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays,

and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay.  Otherwise,

any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all,

the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum

standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the

Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and

offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their

mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the

quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes

as “continuing mandamus,”[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances,

issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set

to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of

continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the

length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]

 

          The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other

unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-

San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las

Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-

Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)

River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river

banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth,

dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay.  If there is

one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and

the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list.  And if

the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with

sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of

water would be for naught.  The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

 

          Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures

is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of

structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways.  Art. 51

reads: The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and

lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.  (Emphasis added.)  

          Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial

establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major

rivers, and connecting waterways.  But while they may not be treated as

unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute

to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways.  The DILG and the concerned

LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial

establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water

treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge,

including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major

rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying

establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

 

          At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for

petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian

Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila,

the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the

garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking.   Some

highlights of the report: 1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila -

the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

 2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a

large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

 3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous

contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems andManila Bay.[40]

 

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more

than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management

Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some

LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid

Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

  

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of

five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single

sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA

9003 has yet been set up.

 

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA

9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other

public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the

like.  Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply

discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in

the Manila Bay.  Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which

enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious

wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of

sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the

introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment

including “dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of

petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances

[and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances,

from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure.” 

 

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to

emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and

agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and

obligations.  Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables

for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them

by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

 

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a

historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to

restore theManila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life

that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be,

could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all

civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take

responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in

the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

 

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners

must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work

before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that

different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their

mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating

the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable

claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are

required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

 

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform

and improve waste management.  It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987

Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the

right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm

and harmony of nature.

 

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a

balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is

assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to

exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance

with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical

legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the

men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future

generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as

humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in

them.

 

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The September 28, 2005

Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the

September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99

are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent

developments or supervening events in the case.  The falloof the RTC Decision

shall now read:                     WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level

(Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. 

            In particular:

 

          (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of  EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary

agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper

use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,

designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its

enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement

its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy  for the rehabilitation,

restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time.  It is

ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government

departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid

plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

 

          (2) Pursuant to Title XII  (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of

1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in

exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate

guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the

Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila,

Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,

commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river

systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the

Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers,

the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-

Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the

Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge

water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether

they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by

existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs

shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said

facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,

sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,

waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of

fines and other sanctions.

 

          (3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide,

install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment

facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible

time.

 

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and

in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and

maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection,

treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,

Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

         

          (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered

to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay.  It is also directed to

assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and

Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic

resources in the Manila Bay.

 

          (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime

Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other,

shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and

regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

 

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to

immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid

and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from

vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

 

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and

projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in

coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,

Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other

agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other

encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable

laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las

Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting

waterways and esteros in Metro Manila.  The DPWH, as the principal implementor

of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more

particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination

with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other

concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,

constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other

applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the

Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other

rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the

Manila Bay.

 

          In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a

sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from

finality of this Decision.  On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in

connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills

and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the

appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of

RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on

pollution.

 

          (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA

9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed

septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and

disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give

the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set

up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation

clearance.

 

          (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of

RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste

management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of

all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their

parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining

a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine

archipelago.

 

          (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the

General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses

relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the

Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic

growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our

marine waters.

         

          (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,

DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA,

and PPA, in line with the principle of “continuing mandamus,” shall, from finality

of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the

activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

 

          No costs.

 

          SO ORDERED.