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IsGlobalFRANDLitigationSpinningOutofControl?1

ThomasF.Cotter2

It has often been observed that, while patent rights are territorial inscope, commerce isglobaland, increasingly, interconnected. Indeed,with theadvent of 5G and the Internet of Things (IoT), technical standards soonwillenablenotonlydevicessuchassmartphonesandtablets,butalsoautomobiles,medicaldevices,andevenhomeappliancestoreceiveandtransmitdatawithinand across national borders. To achieve these ends, firms participate instandard-settingorganizations(SSOs)tohammeroutthetechnicalstandardsthat enable communication and interoperability among devices. Moreover,because the implementation of these standards requires the use of manydifferent, typically proprietary, technologies, SSOs generally encourage orrequiretheirmembersbothtodeclaretheirownershipofpatentsthatmaybeessential to thepracticeof the relevant standard, and to commit to licensingthese standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable andnondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. The FRAND commitments themselves, inturn,oftenareinterpretedasbindingcontractsforthebenefitofthirdparties(thatis,forthebenefitofimplementers).Inprinciple,theserequirementsworktoensureboththatimplementersareabletoaccessessentialtechnologies,andthatownersarefairlycompensatedfortheirinventivecontributions.

Twoproblemsnevertheless can impede the smoothworkingof suchasystem.ThefirstisthatSSOrulestypicallydonotdefinetheterm“FRAND,”fora variety of reasons. Disputes over the meaning of FRAND therefore areinevitable.Thesecondisthat,becausepatentsareterritorial,courtsoftenhavebeenreluctanttoadjudicateforeignpatentrights.Thisunderstandingofpatentrights, however, might appear, to some observers at least, to collide withcommercialrealities,whenpartiesareunabletoreachagreementandoptfor

1CiteasThomasF.Cotter,IsGlobalFRANDLitigationSpinningOutofControl?,2021PATENTLY-OPATENTLAWJOURNAL1(2021).2TaftStettinius&HollisterProfessorofLaw,UniversityofMinnesotaLawSchool;Innovators Network Foundation Intellectual Property Fellow. Many thanks toMadisonMurhammerColonforeditingthecitesandaddingpermalinks.Anyerrorsthatremainaremine.

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adjudicationbynationalcourts.Currentresponsestotheseproblemsarelikelyto prove unsatisfactory for both owners and implementers; a comprehensivesolutionnonethelessremains,fornow,elusive.

IntroductionIthasoftenbeenobservedthat,whilepatentrightsareterritorialin

scope—aU.S.patentbeingenforceableintheU.S.butnotintheU.K.,forexample,andviceversa—commerceisglobaland,increasingly,interconnected.Indeed,withtheadventof5GandtheInternetofThings(IoT),technicalstandardssoonwillenablenotonlydevicessuchassmartphonesandtablets,butalsoautomobiles,medicaldevices,andevenhomeappliancestoreceiveandtransmitdatawithinandacrossnationalborders.Toachievetheseends,firmsparticipateinstandard-settingorganizations(SSOs)tohammeroutthetechnicalstandardsthatenablecommunicationandinteroperabilityamongdevices.Moreover,becausetheimplementationofthesestandardsrequirestheuseofmanydifferent,typicallyproprietary,technologies,SSOsgenerallyencourageorrequiretheirmembersbothtodeclaretheirownershipofpatentsthatmaybeessentialtothepracticeoftherelevantstandard,andtocommittolicensingthesestandard-essentialpatents(SEPs)onfair,reasonableandnondiscriminatory(FRAND)terms.3TheFRANDcommitmentsthemselves,inturn,oftenareinterpretedasbindingcontractsforthebenefitofthirdparties(thatis,forthebenefitofimplementers).4Inprinciple,theserequirementsworktoensureboththatimplementersareabletoaccessessentialtechnologies,andthatownersarefairlycompensatedfortheirinventivecontributions.

3SeeNormanV.Siebrasse&ThomasF.Cotter,TheValueoftheStandard,101MINN.L.REV.1159,1160&n.1(2017).4Atleast,thisappearstobethedominantviewunderFrenchlaw(whichgovernstheinterpretation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)IntellectualPropertyRightsPolicy), seeUnwiredPlanet Int’lLtd.v.HuaweiTechs.(UK)Co.Ltd.[2020]UKSC37,[8](appealtakenfromEng.),https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0214-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD9W-K9JH],and under U.S. law, which governs several other SSO policies, see HerbertHovenkamp,FRANDandAntitrust,105CORNELLL.REV.1683,1695–96(2020)(citingsources).

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Twoproblemsneverthelesscanimpedethesmoothworkingofsuchasystem.ThefirstisthatSSOrulestypicallydonotdefinetheterm“FRAND,”foravarietyofreasons.5Tobesure,ownersandimplementersfrequentlyareable to reach agreement, oneway or another, for the licensing of FRAND-committed SEPs; and, given the global nature of commerce, these licensesoften are granted on a worldwide, rather than country-by-country, basis.DisputesoverthemeaningofFRANDneverthelessareinevitable.Thesecondis that, as noted above, patents themselves are territorial in scope. As aconsequence, courts oftenhavebeen reluctant to adjudicate foreignpatentrights,6partlyoutofconcernthatdoingsomightunderminetheprincipleof

5SeeSiebrasse&Cotter,supranote3,at1160n.2:

AfewSSOsrequirememberstolicenseSEPsonaroyalty-freebasis,butthisdoesnotappeartobethemajoritypractice.SeeJorgeL.Contreras,TechnicalStandardsandExAnteDisclosure:ResultsandAnalysisofanEmpiricalStudy,53 JURIMETRICS 163, 173–75 (2013) (stating that some SSOs encourage orrequiremembers todisclose themaximumroyaltyrates theywouldseek).SSOsgenerallyhaveavoidedsettingFRANDroyaltiesforavarietyofreasons.ButseeDougLichtman,UnderstandingtheRANDCommitment,47HOUS.L.REV.1023,1027–29,1046n.65 (2010) (suggesting that “firmsmightprefer theambiguous RAND commitment over a more conventional, explicit pricingterm” due to “the desirable absence of lawyers,” time constraints, lack ofinformationaboutthevalueofthetechnologyatthepointintimeatwhichastandardisadopted,andoutofconcernsoverantitrustliability).

In2015, the IEEEpublishedarevised IPRPolicy thatwent further thanmostSSOpoliciesinspecifyingsomeoftherequirementsforaFRAND-compliantlicense.SeeINST. OFELEC.&ELECS.ENG’RS, INC., IEEE-SASTANDARDSBOARDBYLAWS § 6.1 (2021),http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4JN-7FU8] (stating, inter alia, that a FRAND commitment signifies “thatreasonable terms and conditions, including without compensation or underReasonableRates, are sufficient compensation for a license to use thoseEssentialPatentClaimsandprecludesseeking,orseekingtoenforce,aProhibitiveOrderexceptasprovidedinthispolicy”).InaSeptember2020BusinessReviewLetter,however,the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) partially abrogated a 2015 Business ReviewLetterstating that theDOJdidnot intend tochallenge therevised IPRpolicy. Fordiscussion,andlinkstothe2015and2020BusinessReviewLetters,seeThomasF.Cotter, Antitrust Division Issues Supplement to 2015 IEEE Business Review Letter,COMPAR.PAT.REMEDIES(Sept.10,2020,4:30PM),http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2020/09/antitrust-division-issues-supplement-to.html[https://perma.cc/EM34-Q9Q8].6See,e.g.,UnwiredPlanet,[2020]UKSCat[63](“IfthejudgmentsoftheEnglishcourtshadpurportedtoruleonthevalidityorinfringementofaforeignpatent,thatwouldindeedbebeyondtheirjurisdiction.”);Vodav.Cordis,476F.3d887(Fed.Cir.2007)

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comity—that is, of the respect due to the courts and other institutions offoreignnations.7Thisunderstandingofpatentrights,however,mightappear,tosomeobserversatleast,tocollidewithcommercialrealities,whenpartiesareunabletoreachagreementandoptforadjudicationbynationalcourts.AsIshalldiscussinthefollowingpages,currentresponsestotheseproblemsarelikely to prove unsatisfactory for both owners and implementers; acomprehensivesolutionnonethelessremains,fornow,elusive.

WhoDecides?Oftenthemostconsequentialdecisiontomake,inaddressingdifficult

legalorpolicyquestions,isthepreliminaryoneofselectingwhowillhavetheauthoritytoresolvethosequestions. Therangeofpossibledecisionmakersmay include, among others, markets, firms, legislatures, courts, andadministrativeagencies,thoughasIhavenotedelsewhereallsuchinstitutions“functionimperfectly,and...thepolicymaker'staskistodecidewhichofthese

(holdingthataU.S.districtcourtlackedsupplementaljurisdictiontoadjudicatetheinfringementofforeignpatents);seealsoLucasfilmLtd.v.Ainsworth[2011]UKSC39,[60]–[99] (appeal taken from Eng.), https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2010-0015-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR4Y-6MUB] (surveying variousauthoritiesfromtheU.K.,U.S.,andelsewhere);cf.ActavisGrouphfv.EliLilly&Co.[2013]EWCA(Civ)517,[51](Eng.)(“[T]heEnglishcourthasjurisdictiontoentertainclaimsforinfringementofforeignintellectualpropertyrightsprovidedvalidityisnotin issue and there is a basis for exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.”);PRINCIPLESOFTHELAW—INTELLECTUALPROPERTY§211(AM.L.INST.2008).7 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (defining comity as “therecognitionwhichonenationallowswithinitsterritorytothelegislative,executiveorjudicialactsofanothernation,havingdueregardbothtointernationaldutyandconvenience,andtotherightsofitsowncitizens,orofotherpersonswhoareundertheprotectionofitslaws”);THOMASRAPHAEL,THEANTI-SUITINJUNCTION8(2ded.2019)(stating that comity “refers to several different concepts that bear a familyrelationship,” and that “[t]he linking idea is the underlying notion that differentnations,andinparticulartheircourtsandlegalsystems,oweeachothermutualandreciprocalrespect,sympathy,anddeference,whereappropriate”).Forasummaryofdistinctions amongdifferent types of comity, and a game theoretic defense of thedoctrineasinducingcooperation,seeChristopherR.Drahozal,SomeObservationsontheEconomicsofComity,inECONOMICANALYSISOFINTERNATIONALLAW:CONTRIBUTIONSTOTHE13THTRAVEMUNDESYMPOSIUMONTHEECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW(MARCH29–31,2012)147 (ThomasEger, StefanOeter& StefanVoigt eds., 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101400[https://perma.cc/S92N-5ZMM].

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imperfect institutions will best advance the relevant social goals.”8Considerations that may be relevant to the allocation of decisionmakingresponsibilitymayincludenotonlytheobviousoneofidentifyingwhatthosesocial goals are or should be, but also such matters as the expertise thatdifferentinstitutionsmaybringtothetaskofeffectingthosegoals;relatedly,thereliabilityoftheinformationavailabletodecisionmakers;perceptionsoffairness and representativeness in the procedures chosen for renderingdecisions,andinthecompositionofthedecisionmakersthemselves;and,ofcourse,cost,both intheobvioussenseof financialcostsand inthebroadersenseoflonger-termorsystemicconsequencesofallocatingresponsibilitytothechoseninstitution.

Choosingtheappropriatedecisionmakertodeterminethetermsofa

FRANDlicensepresentsmanycomplexities.Thepartiesthemselves,ofcourse,can(andsometimesdo)engagethesecomplexitiesontheirownbyvoluntarilysubmittingtobindingarbitration,ortoanationalcourt’sdeterminationoftheterms of a global FRAND license9—though the latter option might raisequestionswhethercourts canadjudicate foreignpatent rights, if that is theright way to think about what they are doing, even with consent of theparties.10 When the parties are unable to reach a legally enforceable

8ThomasF.Cotter,LegalPragmatismandtheLawandEconomicsMovement,84GEO.L.J.2071,2107(1996) (citingNEILK.KOMESAR,IMPERFECTALTERNATIVES chs.1–2,9(1994)).9SeeMicrosoftCorp.v.Motorola,Inc.,795F.3d1024(9thCir.2015);TCLCommc’nTech.Holdings,Ltd.v.TelefonaktiebolagetLMEricsson,No.SACV14-341JVS(DFMx),2018 WL 4488286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018), vacated in part, rev’d in part, andremandedonothergrounds,943F.3d1360(FedCir.2019),cert.denied,141S.Ct.239(2020).10SeeVoda,476F.3dat890(holdingthataU.S.districtcourtlackedsupplementaljurisdictiontoadjudicatetheinfringementofforeignpatents);OptisWirelessTech.,LLCv.HuaweiTechs.Co.,No.2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP,2018WL3375192,at*7–9(E.D.Tex. July 11, 2018) (recommending granting amotion to dismiss a request for adeclaratoryjudgmentthatthepatentownerhadcompliedwithitsFRANDobligation,where adjudication would implicate foreign patent rights). It has been argued,however, that if thepropercharacterization is thatcourtsaremerelydecidingthetermsofathird-partybeneficiarycontract,thisproblemisavoidable.SeeTheodoreStevensonIII,NicholasMathews&PatrickPijls,USCourtsShouldAdjudicateFRANDRatesonaGlobalBasis,LAW360(Dec.3,2020,5:49PM),https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1332630/us-courts-should-adjudicate-frand-rates-on-a-global-basis?nl_pk=e6069cdd-aee4-4fa2-9719-0eb93573f1cf&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip [https://perma.cc/DPA2-H927] (arguing that, althoughVoda constrains the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to adjudicate disputes over the

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agreementonadecisionmaker,however,whatthen?Shouldnationalcourtssetthetermsofglobaloronlynational licenses? If theformer,pursuanttowhatauthority, andapplyingwhatbodyof law—patent, contract, antitrust,somethingelse—andwhichcountry’s(orregion’s)law?Alternatively,shoulddecisionmakerscreateaframeworkforprivatebargaining,whileavoiding(tothe extent possible) the task of affirmatively setting the terms of FRANDlicensesthemselves(aperspectivethat,arguably,ismoreconsistentwiththeGermancourts’approachtotheseissues)?11

Oneoptionissimplyfornationalcourtstotakeuponthemselvesthe

responsibilityforsettinggloballicenses,evenwhenoneofthepartiesdoesnotconsent.Asmanyreaderswillbeaware,thefirstnationtohavedonesoistheUnited Kingdom. In August 2020, the U.K. Supreme Court published its

infringementofforeignpatentrights,U.S.courtsshouldbeamenabletoadjudicatingbreach-of-contactclaimsthatwouldestablishthetermsofaglobalFRANDlicense).Sucha characterization,however,mightbe in some tensionwith theU.S.CourtofAppeals for the Federal Circuit’s holding in TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019), that thedeterminationofFRANDroyaltiesforpastusesissubjecttotheconstitutionalrightto trial by jury under U.S. law, precisely because it implicates the law of patentdamages.Cf.BriefofAmiciCuriaeTwentyLegalScholarsinSupportofPetitionersat8,TCLCommc’nTech.Holdings,Ltd.v.TelefonaktiebolagetLMEricsson,141S.Ct.239 (2020) (No. 19-1269), http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1269/144952/20200605105057025_19-1269%20Amici%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8P7-7DED](arguing,tothecontrary,thatFRANDdisputesarecontractual,andthat there is no constitutional right to trial by jury on matters of contractinterpretation).SeealsoTimothySyrett,USCourtsHaveLimitedAbilitytoSetFRANDRates Globally, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2021 4:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1347298/us-courts-have-limited-ability-to-set-frand-rates-globally?nl_pk=e6069cdd-aee4-4fa2-9719-0eb93573f1cf&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip(respondingtoStevenson,Mathews&Pijls,supra).11See,e.g., ‘CourtsCannotShyAwayfromTacklingFRANDIssues’,KLUWERPAT.BLOG(Nov. 27, 2020), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/27/courts-cannot-shy-away-from-tackling-frand-issues/ [https://perma.cc/FA5R-DSCE] (suggestingthatGerman courts to date have avoided someof thedifficult issues surroundingFRAND);seealsoJorgeL.Contrerasetal.,TheEffectofFRANDCommitmentsonPatentRemedies, in PATENTREMEDIESANDCOMPLEXPRODUCTS:TOWARDAGLOBALCONSENSUS160,176(C.BradfordBiddleetal.eds.,2019)[hereinafterCOMPLEXPRODUCTS](notingtwodifferentinterpretationsofFRAND,withoneviewingit“asa‘comitydevice’thatgeneratesbilateralfairplayobligationsonpatentholdersandprospectivelicensees,”andanotherthatseesit“asimposingsubstantivelimitsontheroyaltythatmaybecharged”).

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decision in the joined cases ofUnwired Planet International Ltd. v. HuaweiTechnologies(UK)Co.Ltd.;HuaweiTechnologiesCo.Ltd.v.ConversantWirelessLicensing SÀRL; and ZTE Corp. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing SÀRL,12affirmingthelowercourts’determinationthattheyhadauthoritytoestablishglobal FRAND terms, as an incident to resolving disputes over theinfringementofdomesticSEPrights.13 Although thedecisionsare factuallycomplex, the underlying logic for establishing global FRAND terms isstraightforward.First,intheU.K.courts’view,ifafreelynegotiatedFRANDlicensewouldbeglobal inscope,14 thenawilling licenseewouldagree toaglobalFRANDlicense.15Second,onceitisestablishedthatthedefendanthasinfringedoneormoreoftheplaintiff’svalid(domestic)SEPs,thecourtmayenjointhedefendantfrompracticingthepatentedtechnology,ifthedefendantisanunwillinglicensee.16Onthebasisoftheseprinciples,thecourtmaythenofferthedefendantachoice:eithersubmittothecourt’sdeterminationofthetermsofaglobalFRANDlicense(onethatawillinglicenseewouldaccept),or(asanunwillinglicensee)beenjoinedfromtheU.K.market.17

The result certainly offers advantages, in terms of efficiency, by

resolvingthetermsofagloballicenseinonesingleforum.ItalsoavoidstheriskofwhatthetrialjudgeinUnwiredPlanetcharacterizedasthe“madness”of litigating on a country-by-country basis, an alternative that he believedwould encourage implementers to “hold out”18 (that is, to seek strategicadvantage throughdelay). Moreover, by establishing the termsof a globalFRANDlicensetheU.K.courtsunderstandthemselvestobedeterminingan

12UnwiredPlanetInt’lLtd.v.HuaweiTechs.(UK)Co.Ltd.[2020]UKSC37(appealtakenfromEng.).13Seeid.at[95].14Seeid.at[29],[60].15Seeid.16Seeid.at[27]–[28],[165];seealsoCaseC-170/13,HuaweiTechs.Co.v.ZTECorp.,2015E.C.R.477(holdingthattheownerofaFRAND-committedSEPdoesnotabuseits dominant position by seeking injunctive relief when, inter alia, “the allegedinfringercontinuestousethepatentinquestion”and“hasnotdiligentlyrespondedto” the owner’s offer to license on FRAND terms, “in accordancewith recognisedcommercialpracticesinthefieldandingoodfaith”).WhethercourtswithintheU.K.will continue to follow E.U. competition law jurisprudence relating to SEPs, post-Brexit,remainstobeseen.17SeeUnwiredPlanet,[2020]UKSCat[20],[27]–[28].18Seeid.at[25],[168]–[169].

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issueofcontractlaw,ratherthanadjudicatingthevalidityorinfringementofforeign patents;19 and in crafting the terms of that license, the court willestimate the portion of foreign and domestic patents that are likely notessential, infringed, or valid.20 (Note, by theway, that this characterizationsuggests that courts following theU.K.’s leadmight be amenable to settingglobalFRANDratesevenwhenthereisnopatentinfringementaction,assuch,pending—forexample,inanactionbroughtbytheimplementerforbreachofthe contractualFRANDcommitment,or (whereavailable) foradeclaratoryjudgment.) In addition, the implementer retains the right to challenge theinfringementorvalidityofanyofthelicensedpatents,inaccordancewiththedomesticlawsoftheissuingcountry;andifsuccessful,thetermsofajudicially-determinedgloballicensemaybeadjustedaccordingly,onaperiodicbasis.21

Bethatasitmay,itneverthelesscanseemabitstrangeforanEnglish

court to be establishing global licensing terms, over the implementer’sobjection, in cases like Unwired Planet and Conversant in which theimplementerderivesmostofitssalesrevenuefromoutsidetheU.K.(inthesetwo cases, China).22 (In theory, the common-law doctrine of forum nonconveniensmightprovidesomehopethat, inanappropriatecase,thecourtwould dismiss or stay domestic adjudication in deference to a nationwithmore significant contacts with the dispute taking charge of the litigation.Application of the doctrine, however, requires, among other things, the

19Seeid.at[63],[95].20Seeid.at[60].21Seeid.at[64].22Seeid.at[37]:

Huawei and ZTE point out that only a very small proportion of theirworldwidesalesaremadeintheUK.HuaweimanufacturesinChinaanditsprincipalmarketisinChina.Itassertsthat64%ofitsrelevantsalesoccurinChina or in countries in which Unwired has no patent protection and isdependentonthevalidityandinfringementofChinesepatentsforitsclaimfor royalties. In relation to the Conversant claim, Huawei asserts that theChinesemarketaccounts for56%of its group’sworldwide salesonwhichConversantmakesclaims,andafurther19%ofsuchsalesoccurincountriesin which Conversant has no patents, so that Conversant’s claims in thosecountriesdependontheChinesepatents.TheUKmarketcomprisesonly1%ofHuawei’ssalesofthoseproducts.Similarly,ZTEmanufacturesinChinaandinthefirstsixmonthsof201760%ofthegroup’soperatingrevenuewasfromChina.Atthattimeonly0.07%ofitsturnoverwasgeneratedintheUK.

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existenceofanotherforumthatwouldbewillingtoadjudicatethematter,23amatter I shall return to below. Moreover, to the extent that civil-lawjurisdictions wind up following the lead of the U.K. in establishing globalrates,24itmayberelevanttonotethat,traditionally,thesejurisdictionshave

23 See id. at [96]–[97] (noting that, while “China is the only candidate which theappellantshaveputforward”asanalternativeforum,”thelowercourt“foundthatChinesecourtsdonot,atpresent,havejurisdictiontodeterminethetermsofaglobalFRANDlicence”absentconsentbytheparties).IntheU.S.aswell,theSupremeCourthasheld thatacourtmayapply thedoctrineonly “whenanalternative forumhasjurisdictiontohearthecase,andwhentrialinthechosenforumwould‘establish...oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion toplaintiff'sconvenience,’orwhenthe‘chosenforum[is]inappropriatebecauseofconsiderationsaffecting the court'sownadministrativeand legalproblems.’”PiperAircraftCo. v.Reyno,454U.S.235,241(1981)(quotingKosterv.LumbermensMut.Cas.Co.,330U.S.518,524(1947)). Toguide theanalysis, further,aU.S. court shouldconsidervariousprivateandpublicinterestfactors,seeid.at241n.6(statingthat“[t]hefactorspertainingtotheprivateinterestsofthelitigantsincludedthe‘relativeeaseofaccesstosourcesofproof;availabilityofcompulsoryprocessforattendanceofunwilling,and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view ofpremises,ifviewwouldbeappropriatetotheaction;andallotherpracticalproblemsthatmaketrialofacaseeasy,expeditiousandinexpensive,’”andthat“[t]hepublicfactorsbearingonthequestionincludedtheadministrativedifficultiesflowingfromcourt congestion; the ‘local interest in having localized controversies decided athome’;theinterestinhavingthetrialofadiversitycaseinaforumthatisathomewiththelawthatmustgoverntheaction;theavoidanceofunnecessaryproblemsinconflictoflaws,orintheapplicationofforeignlaw;andtheunfairnessofburdeningcitizensinanunrelatedforumwithjuryduty”(quotingGulfOilCo.v.Gilbert,330U.S.501,508–09(1947)));but “[t]hepossibilityofachange insubstantive lawshouldordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum nonconveniensinquiry,”id.at247.24CourtsinChinahavenowindicatedthattheyintendtodoso.Seeinfranotes67–70andaccompanyingtext.Thiswasnotanunexpectedresult.See,e.g.,DouglasClark,AfterUnwiredPlanetWhyItsNowOvertoChinasCourtstoSetGlobalFRANDRates,ROUSE(Nov.26,2020),https://rouse.com/insights/news/2020/after-unwired-planet-why-it-s-now-over-to-china-s-courts-to-set-global-frand-rates-1 [https://perma.cc/5SNV-ZYUR](“T]heUKSupremeCourt’sdecisionwaswidelyseenasavictoryforSEPowners,butitmightprovetobeaPyrrhicvictory.”).ButseeRichardVary,TheWuhanSubmarineSurfacesatChristmasinGlobalEricsson/SamsungSEPBattle,IPKAT(Jan.6,2021),https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/01/guest-post-wuhan-submarine-surfaces-at.html[https://perma.cc/KUF4-ER3P](statingthatthis“isanunfortunatemisunderstandingof theUKSupremeCourt’sdecision. It isone thing tocalculateglobal FRAND as part of a decision whether to grant a national injunction on anationalpatent,orinresolvingacontractualdisputeproperlybeforethatcourt,as

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rejected thedoctrineof forumnon conveniens.25) Onemight alsoquestionwhether the option, left open to implementers, of challenging validity orinfringementonacountry-by-countrybasis,andsubsequentlyrequestinganadjustmentoftheroyaltyrate,asappropriate,willprovepracticable.26 Andperhapstheperceived“madness”oflitigatingcountry-by-countryifcourtsdonot adjudicate global licenses is exaggerated, since onewould expectmostcaseseventuallytosettle,ifnotafterafirstdomesticjudgment,thenafterasecondorthird.27

theUKSupremeCourtdid.Butintheabsenceofsuchajurisdictionalhook,itisnotclear why any one national court would have jurisdiction to set FRANDinternationally”).25 It isalsogenerally inapplicabletomattersfallingwithinthescopeofRegulation(EU)No1215/2012oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof12December2012onjurisdictionandtherecognitionandenforcementofjudgmentsincivilandcommercial matters, commonly known as the Brussels I Regulation. SeeCase C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 (holding that the “ConventionprecludesacourtofaContractingStatefromdecliningthejurisdictionconferredonitbyArticle2ofthatconventiononthegroundthatacourtofanon-ContractingStatewouldbeamoreappropriateforumforthetrialoftheactionevenifthejurisdictionofnootherContractingStateisinissueortheproceedingshavenoconnectingfactorstoanyotherContractingState”);UnwiredPlanet, [2020]UKSCat[98](notingthat,even if Chinawere an alternative forum, “a number of further issueswould havearisen, inparticular arising from theapplicationof theOwusu principle . . . to theEnglish defendants, set against the possibility that there might be a reflectiveapplicationofarticle24oftheBrusselsIRegulation...andtherecentdecisionofthiscourtinLungowevVedantaResourcesplc[2019]UKSC20;[2019]2WLR1051.Butwe consider that those issues, whichmaywell arise in future if and when othercountries decide to exercise jurisdiction to settle global licences, would best bedeterminedinacontextwhentheymightbedecisive.”).26 Onemight alsowonderwhether the procedure reverses the normal burden ofproof, by requiring affirmative action by the accused infringer to initiate suchproceedings.27SeeEliGreenbaum,NoForumtoRuleThemAll:ComityandConflictinTransnationalFRANDDisputes, 94WASH.L.REV. 1085, 1124 n.201 (2019) (stating that a “likelyconsequence of requiring territorial adjudication is that the partieswill litigate aFRANDdisputeinmajormarkets,andthenbysettlementextendanalogousroyaltyratestootherjurisdictionslesscentraltotheirbusiness”);seealsoMauricioA.Uribe,WhenItComestoSEPs,ActLocallybutEnforceGlobally,LAW360(Nov.25,2020,1:33PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1330378?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section [https://perma.cc/EAP2-Q9A4] (arguing, contra theefficiencyargument, that “[g]iventhe long-standing traditionofmultijurisdictionallicensing programs and the sophistication of the entities participating in SEP

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Atthispoint,nonetheless,therewouldseemtobelittlelikelihoodthat

theU.K.courtswillchangecourse.Whatseemsmoreprobableisthatcourtsinatleastsomeothercountrieswillfollowsuit,thuspresentingariskofforumshopping,asdiscussedbelow.

ForumShopping(orSelling?)

Oftenapersonplanningtofilealawsuitwillbeabletochooseamong

severaldifferentcourtsinwhichtoinitiatetheaction.Costandconveniencearelikelytofactorintothisdecisiontosomeextent,butoftenmoreimportant(dependingontheamountatstake)istheexpectationthatcertainforumsaremorelikelythanotherstofavortheplaintiff’sinterest,perhapsbyinterpretingthe law inadesired fashionorbyofferingproceduralorotheradvantages.Suchselectionofaforumbelievedtobefavorabletoone’sside—referredtoas“forumshopping”28—iscommontomanyjurisdictions,andmanybodiesoflaw.29 Whether forum shopping is consistent with the public interest isanothermatter, however, the answer towhichmay vary from one case toanotherandfromoneobservertoanother—andislikelytobeentwinedwiththe observer’s views of the merits of the competing legal standards.Nevertheless, when one forum appears to be attracting litigation over aparticular type of subjectmatter in numbers disproportionate towhat onewouldexpectbasedonfactorssuchaspopulationorresidenceoftheparties,andwhen the evidence further shows thatparties choosing that forumareconsistently more successful than when similar matters are litigatedelsewhere, thehypothesis that litigantshave“captured” the forumfor their

standardsorganizations,” itwouldbe “sheermadness tobelieve that conveniencewouldbetheactualdrivingfactorinrequiringasingle,globalroyaltyratedeterminedbyasinglejurisdiction”).28 See Francesco Parisi & Erin A. O’Hara,Conflict of Laws, in1THENEWPALGRAVEDICTIONARYOFECONOMICSANDTHELAW387,389(PeterNewmaned.,1998).ParisiandO’Hara distinguish between bilateral, ex ante forum selection bymeans of forumselectionclauses,andexpostforumshoppingasdescribedabove,onthegroundthattheformer,butnotthelatter,islikelytobeefficient.Seeid.29Libelplaintiffs,forexample,preferwhenpossibletolitigateincountriesliketheU.K.,wherethesubstantivelawismuchmorefavorabletotheirclaims,thanintheUnitedStates,whereFirstAmendmentconsiderationsimposesubstantialobstaclestorelief.Thetablesareturnedforothertypesofpersonalinjuryclaims,wheremoregenerousdiscoveryandtheavailabilityofpunitivedamagessometimesmaketheU.S.theplaintiff’scountryofchoice.

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ownprivatebenefit seemshighlyplausible—thoughperhaps “capture” is amisleadingterm,sinceitmaybethecourtsthemselvesthatcompetetoattractcertainlitigants(aphenomenonsometimesdecriedas“forumselling”).30Theresultmaybebotha“racetothecourthouse,”aslitigantsseekadvantagesbybeing the first to file (in their favored forum,of course), anda “race to thebottom,”totheextentcourtsadoptpoliciesthatsystematicallyfavoronesideor the other (or their nation’s owndomestic firms)without regard for thegreatergood.31

Formally,forforumshoppingtoexisttheremustbe,first,amultitude

ofpotentialforumsfromwhichlitigantsmaychoose,andsecondanabilityonthe forums’ part to differentiate themselves from one another in terms ofpotentialbenefitstheycanoffer.32Asforthefirstcondition,sinceSEPownerstypicallyownportfoliosofpatents issuedbynationsaroundtheworld,andimplementers likewise sell devices throughout theworld, there clearly is abroad rangeof countries inwhichactions for the infringementofdomesticSEPscouldbelitigated.Totheextent,however,thateitheraSEPowneroranimplementer seeks, over the other’s objection, a judicial determination ofglobalFRANDterms,untilrecentlythatrangewasconsiderablynarrower.Inthe Conversant matter itself, for example, the Patents Court rejected thedefendants’forumnonconveniensmotion,inpartbecausetheevidencewaslackingthatChinawouldofferanalternativeforumforadjudicatingaglobalFRAND license.33 More recently, however, Chinese courts have acceptedjurisdiction to determine the terms of global FRAND licenses—with theWuhan Intermediate People’s Court apparently willing to establish globalFRAND licenses in disputes between Xiaomi and InterDigital and between

30SeeStefanBechtoldetal.,ForumSellingAbroad,92S.CAL.L.REV.487(2019);DanielKlerman&GregReilly,ForumSelling,89S.CAL.L.REV.421(2016).31 See Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-SuitInjunctions and the Global Race to the Bottom inDisputes over Standards-EssentialPatents,25B.U.J.SCI.&TECH.L.251,280–86(2019).32Or,inMatthewSag’spithyformulation,“Advantage+Choice=ForumShopping.”MatthewSag,IPLitigationinU.S.DistrictCourts:1994-2014,101IOWAL.REV.1065,1104(2016).33SeeConversantWirelessLicensingS.A.R.L.v.HuaweiTechs.Co.Ltd.[2018]EWHC(Pat)808, [64](Eng.);ConversantWirelessLicensingS.A.R.L.v.HuaweiTechs.Co.Ltd. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 38, [104], [121]–[126] (Eng.). The U.K. Supreme Courtagreed.SeeUnwiredPlanetInt’lLtd.v.HuaweiTechs.(UK)Co.Ltd.[2020]UKSC37,[96]–[97](appealtakenfromEng.).

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SamsungandEricsson,34andtheShenzhenIntermediatePeople’sCourtinadispute between Sharp and Oppo.35 It remains to be seen whether othercountrieswill followsuit, thoughonecommentatorrecentlyhasspeculatedthat Francemight do so,36 and others have urged U.S. courts to adopt thepractice.37

The second condition for the existence of forum shopping,

differentiation, also is clearly present. Aside from procedural and costdifferences of litigating in, say, the U.K. versus China, major substantivedifferencesalsomayexistamongcourtsandjurisdictions,andmayinfluencethe terms of any decision ultimately rendered. Among these substantivedifferencesare:

DifferencesregardingFRANDmethodology. AsmycoauthorsandI

have discussed in detail elsewhere,38 some courts rely primarily oncomparablelicensestoevaluatewhetheranofferorcounterofferisFRAND,ortodeterminethatrateforthemselves(theso-called“bottom-up”approach).Othershaveestimatedtheimplementer’saggregateroyaltyburdenandthentried to determine the portion of this burden properly attributable to theplaintiff’s valid and essential SEPs (the so-called “top-down” approach), orhaveusedonemethodasacheckontheother.39Othermethodologicalissues

34Idiscussthesetwocasesinfraatnotes68–70andaccompanyingtext,inthecontextofantisuitinjunctions.35Tomyknowledge, thedecisionhasnotbeenpublishedyet. Fordiscussionandcitationtofurthersources,seeThomasF.Cotter,ShenzhenCourttoSetGlobalFRANDRate, COMPAR. PAT. REMEDIES (Dec. 9, 2020, 9:16 AM), https://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2020/12/shenzhen-court-to-set-global-frand-rate.html?showComment=1608026401509[https://perma.cc/D8PT-9YZR].36SeeMatthieuDhenne,UnwiredPlanetJudgmentandtheFrenchRiviera: jet’aimemoi non plus, KLUWER PAT. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2020), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/12/08/unwired-planet-judgment-and-the-french-riviera-je-taime-moi-non-plus/[https://perma.cc/D5DS-J4TV].37SeeStevensonetal.,supranote10.38See,e.g.,Contrerasetal.,supranote11,at165–68;NormanV.Siebrasse&ThomasF. Cotter, Judicially-Determined FRAND Royalties, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OFTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW 365 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) [hereinafterCAMBRIDGEHANDBOOK].39SeeContrerasetal.,supranote11,at168–70.InUnwiredPlanet,forexample,thetrialjudgereliedprimarilyoncomparablesbutusedtop-downasacross-check.See

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mayariseinregardtowhethertheappropriateroyaltybaseistheendproductoracomponent(the“smallestsalablepatent-practicingunit”)40andwhethertheFRANDrateshouldreflectanyofthevaluederivedfromstandardizationitself.41

License-to-all versus access to all. Another issue that currently is

generating intense debate is whether SEP owners are obligated, undercontractorcompetitionlaw,tolicensetheirpatentsonFRANDtermstoanyentityinasupplychain(e.g.,componentmanufacturers),orarefreetoofferlicensesonly toendusers(e.g.,automobilemanufacturers).42 AlthoughthecontractissuehingesonthecorrectinterpretationoftherelevantSSOpolicies,the competition law issue does not. The CJEUmay be resolving the lattersometimeinthenextyearorso.43

Injunctions. Yet another issue relates to the circumstances under

whichSEPownerscanobtaininjunctions.Incivillawcountries,thegeneralview is that theprevailingpatentowner is entitled to injunctive relief as amatter of course, whereas in common law countries injunctive relief is, to

UnwiredPlanetInt’lLtd.v.HuaweiTechs.Co.Ltd.[2017]EWHC(Pat)711,[806](10)(Eng.).40SeeSiebrasse&Cotter,supranote38,at375–77.41Siebrasse&Cotter,supranote3.CompareEricsson,Inc.v.D-LinkSys.,Inc.,773F.3d1201,1232(Fed.Cir.2014)(statingthatitshouldn’t),withUnwiredPlanet, [2017]EWHC(Pat)at[97](statingthat,intheory,itshould).42Foranoverviewofthevariouspositionsandcitationtotherelevantliterature,seeThomasF.Cotter,LicensetoAllShouldPrevailinFRANDPatentWars,LAW360(June4,2020,2:14PM),https://www.law360.com/articles/1277844/license-to-all-should-prevail-in-frand-patent-wars[https://perma.cc/6T53-Z4EZ].43SeeMathieuKlos,BREAKING:RegionalCourtDüsseldorfRefersNokiavs.DaimlerQuestions toCJEU, JUVEPAT. (Nov.26,2020),https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/cases/breaking-regional-court-dusseldorf-refers-nokia-vs-daimler-questions-to-cjeu/ [https://perma.cc/YT63-ZGKC] (linking to the Düsseldorf court’spress release); FlorianMueller,Dusseldorf Regional Court Refers Component-LevelLicensingofStandard-EssentialPatentstoCourtofJusticeoftheEU,FOSSPATS.(Nov.26,2020,9:40AM),http://www.fosspatents.com/2020/11/developing-story-dusseldorf-regional.html [https://perma.cc/D8PX-G8EU] (providing an unofficialtranslationintoEnglish).Asofthiswriting,NokiahaslodgedanappealofthereferralwiththeDüsseldorfOberlandesgericht.

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somedegree,discretionary.44Evenso,commonlawjudgesawardprevailingpatentownerspermanentinjunctionsmostofthetime—thoughlesssointheUnitedStates,followingtheU.S.SupremeCourt’s2006decisionineBayInc.v.MercExchange,L.L.C.,45thaninothercommonlawjurisdictionssuchastheU.K.With regard to FRAND-committed SEPs inparticular, however,while thereappears to be a rough consensus among the major patent litigationjurisdictions that courts should not award injunctions against “willing”licensees,thedoctrinalbasisforthisresult—andthusthepreciseconditionsthatmust be in place before a courtmay deny injunctive relief—can varyconsiderablyfromonenationtoanother.46TheCJEU’sdecisioninHuaweiv.ZTE, forexample, imposeslimitsbasedoncompetitionlaw,butevenwithintheE.U.thedecisionhasgivenrisetovaryinginterpretations47(someofwhich,

44Forgeneraldiscussion,see,forexample,NormanV.Siebrasseetal.,InjunctiveRelief,inCOMPLEXPRODUCTS,supranote11,at115,125–43.45eBayInc.v.MercExchange,LLC,547U.S.388,391(2006)(statingthatthepatentowner “must demonstrate (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) thatremediesavailableatlaw,suchasmonetarydamages,areinadequatetocompensateforthat injury;(3)that,consideringthebalanceofhardshipsbetweentheplaintiffanddefendant,aremedyinequityiswarranted;and(4)thatthepublicinterestwouldnotbedisservedbyapermanentinjunction”).In2019,theAntitrustDivisionoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentof Justice, theU.S.PatentandTrademarkOffice,andtheNational Institute of Standards and Technology issued a policy statement urgingcourts to bemore receptive to granting injunctions in SEP cases. SeeU.S.PAT.&TRADEMARKOFF.,DEP’TOFJUST.&NIST,POLICYSTATEMENTONREMEDIESFORSTANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS (2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1228016/download [https://perma.cc/PY4Z-3HXW].For critiques, see, for example, Michael A. Carrier, New Statement on Standard-EssentialPatentsReliesonOmissions,Strawmen,Generalities,BLOOMBERGL.(Jan.13,2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-new-statement-on-standard-essential-patents-relies-on-omissions-strawmen-generalities [https://perma.cc/5S73-V9JH]; and Thomas F. Cotter, Gov't Policy Statement on SEPRemedies Should Be Cabined, LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2020, 12:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1231304 [https://perma.cc/EY36-4VRF] (noting, inter alia,thatthepolicystatementlackstheforceoflaw).46SeeContrerasetal.,supranote11,at171–90.47See,e.g.,HettiHilge,AnotherGermanFRANDRuling–OLGKarlsruhe,Judgmentof30October 2019, 6 U 183/16 (Philips v Wiko), KLUWER PAT. BLOG (Dec. 4, 2019),http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/12/04/another-german-frand-ruling-olg-karlsruhe-judgment-of-30-october-2019-6-u-183-16-philips-v-wiko/ [https://perma.cc/H2PL-6HY5] (noting differences, as of December 2019, among courts withinGermany and among German, Dutch, and U.K. courts regarding the requisitespecificityoftheSEPowner’sofferandthemeaningofnondiscrimination).Someof

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however, theCJEUmayresolve inresponseto theNokiav.Daimler referralnotedabove).48

Otherdifferences.Althoughthedifferencesnotedaboveareperhaps

themostprominent,theyarebynomeanstheonlymattersonwhichopinionsamongcourtsmaydiverge.Differencesofopinionmayremainonanumberof other issues, including themeaningof the “nondiscriminatory” aspectofFRAND;49 therelativesignificanceof“holdup”onthepartofSEPowners incomparisonwith “holdout”on thepartof implementers;whetheraFRANDlicenseis,necessarily,global,suchthatanimplementer’srefusaltoacceptsuchalicenserendersitanunwillingprospectivelicensee;relatedly,whethertherefusaltoacceptaportfoliolicenseisconsistentwiththelicensee’sobligationtonegotiateingoodfaith;andtheappropriateroleofcompetitionlaw,bothinmitigatingholdupandinpolicingSSObehavior.50Moreover,evenifadomesticcourt were to apply foreign law to some aspects of a FRAND dispute (forexample, by applying foreign law to the calculation of FRAND royaltiesattributabletotheuseofforeignpatents),theremaybecertainmattersthatsimplycannotbereplicated.TheU.S.,forexample,uniquelyamongthenations

thedifferencestheauthornotedbetweentheKarlsruheandDutchcourtsmaybelessprominentfollowingtheBundesgerichtshof’sMay5,2020judgmentinSisvelv.Haier,KZR36/17,which is largelyregardedasdecisivelypro-SEPowner. See,e.g.,PeterGeorgPicht&ErikHabich,Sisvelv.Haier:TheGermanFRANDApproachRevisited,IPKAT (July7,2020),https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/guest-post-return-of-orange-book-german.html[https://perma.cc/6AHC-7UHY].48Seesupranote43.49 On this issue, see the Court of Appeal’s decision in Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v.HuaweiTechs.Co.Ltd.[2018]EWCA(Civ)2344, [148]–[207](Eng.)(stating,interalia, that while “it is desirable that an internationally accepted approach shouldultimately emerge,” “there is as yet only a handful of decisionswhich attempt tograpplewiththeseissues.Itwouldbewrong,inourjudgment,toharmoniseonafirst-to-decidebasis”).50Asnotedabove,intheE.U.(andinmanynon-Europeancountries)competitionlawimposeslimitsonSEPowners’abilitytodemandinjunctiverelief.Bycontrast,intheU.S.ithasgenerallyplacedalesserroleinSEPmatters,thoughitsprecisecontoursremain awork in progress. For a general overview of the various positions, seeThomasF.Cotter,Antitrust,IntellectualProperty,andDynamicEfficiency:AnEssayinHonorofHerbertHovenkamp,CONCURRENCES,Sept.2020,https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-3-2020/articles/antitrust-intellectual-property-and-dynamic-efficiency-an-essay-in-honor-of-95413-en [https://perma.cc/4F8D-4R95]. Cf.FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (adopting a narrow view ofantitrustoversightofSEPownerconduct).

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of the world, sometimes affords litigants a constitutional right to a jurydeterminationofFRANDroyaltiesandrelatedmatters.51Allofthissuggeststhatthetemptationtoforum-shopwillbestrongindeed.

AntisuitInjunctionsandComityProblemsOne way to try to preserve one’s own ability to forum-shop, while

preventingtheotherpartyfromdoingso,istoobtainan“antisuit”injunctionprohibitingtheotherpartyfromlitigatingorenforcingajudgmentinanotherjurisdiction.52 According to the leading British commentator, in Englandantisuitinjunctionsare

predominantly granted in two main situations: first,‘contractual’ injunctions, where foreign proceedings are inbreachofacontractual forumclause;andsecond, ‘alternativeforum’cases,whereforeignproceedingsoverlapwithmattersthat are being or can be litigated in England, and should beinjuncted,inparticularwheretheyareconsideredvexatiousoroppressive.53

Courts inothercommon-lawcountriesapplysimilarprinciples;54andwhilecivil-lawjurisdictionstraditionallyhaverejectedtheremedy,55inrecentyearssomecivilcourtsandcommentatorshaveexpressedadegreeofopennessto

51See,e.g.,GodoKaisha IPBridge1v.TCLCommc’nTech.HoldingsLtd.,967F.3d1380,1385(FedCir.2020)(jurytrialonessentiality);TCLCommc’nTech.HoldingsLtd.v.TelefonaktiebolagetLMEricsson,943F.3d1360,1373(Fed.Cir.2019)(righttojurytrialonpastroyaltiesdue);Ericsson,Inc.v.D-LinkSys.,Inc.,773F.3d1201,1229(Fed.Cir.2014).52See,e.g.,RAPHAEL,supranote7,at2(“Ananti-suitinjunctionisanorderofthecourtrequiringtheinjunctiondefendantnottocommence,ortoceasetopursue,ornottoadvanceparticularclaimswithin,ortotakestepstoterminateorsuspend,courtorarbitrationproceedingsinaforeigncountry....Theorderisaddressedto,andbinds,theactualorpotentiallitigantintheotherproceedings,andisnotaddressedto,andhasnoeffecton,theothercourt.”).53Id.at3.54Seeid.at3–5.55Seeid.at5,8.ThisperspectiveisreflectedintheBrusselsIRegulation,whichisgenerally understood as forbidding courts within the E.U. from entering antisuitinjunctionsdirectedagainstlitigationinanotherE.U.member. Fordiscussion,see,forexample,id.at260–68.

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theconcept,atleastincertainlimitedcircumstances56—atrendthatappearsnowtobeontheriseinconnectionwithFRANDmatters,asdiscussedbelow.In the United States, the conditions for granting antisuit injunctions varysomewhat from one federal circuit to another, with some commentatorsdistinguishing among “liberal,” “conservative,” and “middle” approaches.57TheNinthCircuit, forexample,whichapplies the liberalapproach,usesthefollowingframework:

First,wedetermine“whetherornotthepartiesandtheissuesare the same” in both the domestic and foreign actions, “andwhetherornotthefirstactionisdispositiveoftheactiontobeenjoined.”Second,wedeterminewhetheratleastoneoftheso-called“Unterweserfactors”applies.Finally,weassesswhethertheinjunction's“impactoncomityistolerable.”58

Like the liberal approach, the conservative andmiddle approaches requireidentityofpartiesand issues.59 The former,however,cautions thatcourtsshouldissueantisuitinjunctionsonlyiftheforeignlitigationwouldfrustrateapolicy of the forum or threaten its jurisdiction, while the latter applies arebuttable presumption against issuance, which can be overcome if theUnterweserfactorsoutweighthenegativeeffectoncomity.60

56Seeid.at5–8.57 See Jorge L. Contreras & Michael A. Eixenberger, The Anti-Suit Injunction - ATransnationalRemedyforMulti-JurisdictionalSEPLitigation,inCAMBRIDGEHANDBOOK,supranote38,at451,454–55.58 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 2012) (citationsomitted).TheUnterweserfactorsinclude“[whetherthe]foreignlitigation...would(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious oroppressive;(3)threatentheissuingcourt'sinremorquasiinremjurisdiction;or(4)where the proceedings prejudice other equitable considerations. Id. (citationsomitted); see also Contreras & Eixenberger, supranote 57, at 454 (stating a fifthfactor,namely“whetheradjudicationof thesameissues inseparateactionswouldresult in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment”(quotingVEDP.NANDAETAL.,LITIGATIONOFINTERNATIONALDISPUTES INU.S.COURTS §16:15(2017))).59SeeContreras&Eixenberger,supranote57,at454.60Seeid.

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Inrecentyears,courtsintheU.S.andelsewherehavegrantedantisuitinjunctionsinafewFRANDdisputes.InMicrosoftCorp.v.Motorola,Inc.,61forexample,MicrosoftfiledanactioninU.S.districtcourtaccusingMotorolaofbreachingitsFRANDcommitment.62 Whilethatsuitwaspending,MotorolasoughtandobtainedaninjunctioninGermanyforMicrosoft’sinfringementofthe German SEPs.63 The U.S. court thereafter enjoined Motorola fromenforcing the injunction in Germany, on the grounds that (1) “the pendingcontractactionbefore itwouldbedispositiveoftheGermanpatentaction”;(2)“theGermanactionraised‘concernsagainstinconsistentjudgments,’”andof“forumshoppingandduplicativeandvexatiouslitigation,”thuspotentiallyfrustratingthecourt’s“abilitytoadjudicateissuesproperlybeforeit”;and(3)“theinjunction’s‘impactoncomitywouldbetolerable’”becausetheU.S.actionwasfiledfirst,theinjunctionwaslimitedinscope,andthecourthada“stronginterest”inadjudicatingclaimsbetweentwoU.S.corporations.64TheCourtofAppealsaffirmed.65 Similarly,thePatentsCourtinbothUnwiredPlanetand

61MicrosoftCorp.v.Motorola,Inc.,871F.Supp.2d1089(W.D.Wash.),aff’d,696F.3d872(9thCir.2012).62SeeMicrosoft,696F.3dat878.63Seeid.at879.64 Id. at 880–81 (quotingMicrosoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1100–01). Compare SteinAssocs., Inc. v.Heat& Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirmingdenialofantisuit injunctiondirectedagainstU.K.patentinfringementlitigation,onthe ground that “the issues are not the same, one action involving United StatespatentsandtheotherinvolvingBritishpatents”).TheMicrosoftcourtdistinguishedStein on the ground that Microsoft’s “domestic contract action could resolve theissues in the German patent action ‘because the European Patents at issue in theGermanActionwereincludedinMotorola'sOctober29Letterofferingaworldwidelicense for Motorola's H.264 Standard-essential patents, and because Motorolacontracted with the ITU to license the European Patents on RAND terms to allapplicantsonaworldwidebasis.’”Microsoft,696F.3dat883(quotingMicrosoft,871F.Supp.2dat1099).65See id.at889. Similarly, inHuaweiTechs.Co.v.SamsungElecs.Co.,No.3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 WL 1784065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018), the district courttemporarily enjoined Huawei from enforcing a judgment entered in a parallelproceeding in China, on the grounds, among others, that enforcement wouldundermine the court’s ability to determine if injunctive reliefwas an appropriateremedyintheU.S.action.Thematterthereaftersettledpendingappeal.SeeFlorianMueller, BREAKING NEWS: Huawei and Samsung Settle Their Patent InfringementDispute, FOSS PATS. (Feb. 26, 2019, 8:20 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/02/breaking-news-huawei-and-samsung-settle.html [https://perma.cc/X9PR-PET8].

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Conversant indicated that it would have enjoined the defendants fromproceedingwithparallel litigation inChina, had theparties themselvesnotreachedacompromiseonthematter.66

More recently, courts in China have entered antisuit injunctions in

threedecisions. First, inHuaweiv.Conversant, theSupremePeople’sCourtenteredanexparteorderforbiddingConversantfromenforcinganinjunctionagainstHuawei inGermany, on the basis of factors substantially similar tothose employed by the U.S. court in Microsoft v. Motorola, pending theresolutionofclaimsinvolvingConversant’sChineseSEPs.67Second,inXiaomiv.InterDigital,68theWuhanIntermediatePeople’sCourtenteredanexparteorderforbiddingInterDigitalfromassertingclaimsagainstXiaomirelatingtoInterDigital SEPs anywhere in the world, pending the Wuhan’s courtdeterminationofaglobalFRANDrate. AsYuandContrerasnote, thereliefenteredbytheWuhancourtisnotableinthat

its geographic scope is not limited to the country in whichInterDigital sought injunctive relief (India), but extends to alljurisdictionsintheworld.Asananti-suitmeasure,thisismoresweeping than any ASI [antisuit injunction] issued in U.S. or

66SeeConversantWirelessLicensingS.A.R.LvHuaweiTechs.Co.Ltd.[2018]EWHC(Pat)2549,[24](Eng.);UnwiredPlanetInt’lLtd.v.HuaweiTechs.Co.[2017]EWHC(Pat)2831,[1],[9](Eng.).67SeeEnricoBonadioetal.,ChinaEnterstheRealmofAnti-SuitInjunctionsinStandardEssential Patent (SEP) Cases, SPICYIP (Oct. 21, 2020), https://spicyip.com/2020/10/china-enters-the-realm-of-anti-suit-injunctions-in-standard-essential-patent-sep-cases.html [https://perma.cc/K8FD-BGQA]; Zheng (Sophia) Tang, Anti-SuitInjunctionIssuedinChina:Comity,PragmatismandRuleofLaw,CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET(Sept. 27, 2020), https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/anti-suit-injunction-issued-in-china-comity-pragmatism-and-rule-of-law/[https://perma.cc/PLY8-8VPC];YangYu&JorgeL.Contreras,GuestPostbyProfs.ContrerasandYu:WillChina’sNewAnti-SuitInjunctionsShifttheBalanceofGlobalFRANDLitigation?,PATENTLY-O(Oct.22,2020),https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/10/contreras-injunctions-litigation.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter [https://perma.cc/8NBM-6HUQ] (discussing,andproviding translationsof, thedecisions inHuawei v. ConversantandXiaomi v.InterDigital).UponbeingnotifiedoftheordersinHuaweiv.ConversantandXiaomiv.InterDigital,thedefendantsmovedforreconsideration,asauthorizedunderChineselaw,buttheirrequestsweredenied.SeeYu&Contreras,supra.68SeeBonadioetal.,supranote67;Tang,supranote67;Yu&Contreras,supranote67.InterDigitalhasrespondedbymovingforananti-antisuitinjunctioninIndia,asdiscussedbelow.

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othercourts inFRANDcases. UnderU.S.andUK law,acourtconsideringarequestforanASImustcomparetheactioninthedomesticcourtwiththeparallelactionintheforeigncourtanddeterminewhethertheyaddressthesamematterandwhetherthe resolution of the domestic action would dispose of theforeignaction.ThistypeofanalysisisnotpossiblewithanASIthat is not directed to a particular foreign action, butprospectively prohibits any attempt to seek an injunctionanywhereintheworld.69

Third, and most recently, in Samsung v. Ericsson the Wuhan IntermediatePeople’sCourtenteredanexparteorderforbiddingEricssonfromassertingclaimsrelatingtoEricsson’sSEPsanywhereintheworldpendingtheWuhan’scourt’sdeterminationofaglobalrate.70

Not surprisingly, requests for antisuit injunctions have provoked

opposing parties to seek anti-antisuit injunctions prohibiting theircounterparties from obtaining or enforcing antisuit injunctions issued by

69Yu&Contreras,supranote67.70ThedecisionisdiscussedinMarkCohen,WuhanandAnti-InjunctionSuits,CHINAIPR (Dec. 28, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/12/28/wuhan-and-anti-suit-injunctions/ [https://perma.cc/MRL6-83DH]; and Vary, supra note 24. Ericssonrespondedbymovingforananti-antisuitinjunction,asdiscussedbelow.

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anothercourt. Morespecifically,courts inFrance,71Germany,72 India,73 theU.K.,74and(mostrecently)theUnitedStates75havenowissuedanti-antisuitinjunctionsinSEP/FRANDcases.Ingeneral,thesedecisionshaveexpressedconcernovertheuseofantisuit injunctionstodeny litigantstheirabilityto

71SeeCourd’appel[CA][regionalcourtofappeal]Paris,Mar.3,2020,19/21426(Fr.),http://patentmyfrench.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-03-Lenovo.pdf[https://perma.cc/48YG-ZR8A](affirminganorderrequiringLenovotowithdrawitsmotionforanantisuitinjunctionintheU.S.).Fordiscussion,see,forexample,JorgeL.Contreras,It’sAnti-SuitInjunctionsAlltheWayDown—TheStrangeNewRealitiesofInternational Litigation over Standards-Essential Patents, IP LITIGATOR, July/Aug.2020,at1–7;andLéonDijkman,ProportionalityandFRANDinFrance-ParisAppealCourtUpholdsAnti-Anti-SuitInjunctionbutFirstInstanceCourtRefusesPIinIPComv.Lenovo, IPKAT (Mar. 10, 2020), https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/03/proportionality-and-frand-in-france.html[https://perma.cc/9SB9-FSU8].72LandgerichtMünchenI[LG][regionalcourtMunichI]July11,2019,21O9333/19(Nokiav.Continental)(enteringanexparteorderrequiringdefendantstowithdrawtheir motion for an antisuit injunction in the U.S.), https://www.katheraugenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EN-21-O-9333-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/V257-7WJ8];LandgerichtMünchenI[LG][regionalcourtMunichI]Aug.30,2019,21 O 9512/19 (Nokia v. Continental) (subsequent decision reaching the sameconclusion),aff’d,OberlandesgerichtMünchen[OLG][HigherRegionalCourtMunich]Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19, GRUR 2020, 379. For discussion, see, for example,Contreras,supranote71;andMathieuKlos,AnotherWinforNokiaandArnoldRuessAgainstContinental, JUVEPAT. (Sept.3,2019),https://www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/cases/another-win-for-nokia-and-arnold-ruess-against-continental/[https://perma.cc/YX28-QQRW].73See InterDigitalTech.Corp.v.XiaomiCorp., (2020) IA8772/2020 inCS(COMM)295/2020 (Del. HC), https://techlawblog.in/rails/active_storage/blobs/eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBVdz09IiwiZXhwIjpudWxsLCJwdXIiOiJibG9iX2lkIn19--2a867b99bffc73265adbf78f15e873b3d03f9b1e/InterDigitalvXiaomi.Judg.09102020.pdf?disposition=preview[https://perma.cc/N9TB-B434];seealsoBonadioetal.,supranote 67;Rajiv Choudhry,DelhiHigh Court IssuesAnti Anti-Suit Injunction inInterDigital v. Xiaomi Patent Infringement Dispute, SPICYIP (Oct. 12, 2020),https://spicyip.com/2020/10/delhi-high-court-issues-anti-anti-suit-injunction-in-interdigital-v-xiaomi.html[https://perma.cc/5CLQ-KC3W].74See IPComv. Lenovo [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 (Eng.) (granting an anti-antisuitinjunctionagainstLenovo’spursuitofanantisuitinjunctionintheU.S.);Contreras,supranote71.75SeeEricsson,Inc.v.SamsungElecs.Co.,No.2:20-CV-00380-JRG,2021WL89980(E.D.Tex.Jan.11,2021).Thepreliminaryinjunctionrequires,interalia,SamsungtoreimburseEricssonforanyfinesitincursinChinaasaresultofviolatingtheChineseorderbylitigatingintheTexasaction.Seeid.at*8.

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litigate in theirchosen forum.76 Onemightalso imagine that,even thoughantisuitinjunctionsoperateinpersonam—andthusdonotdirectlyunderminethejurisdictionofthetargetedcourt—judgesinthetargetforumgenerallydoresent them as an interference with their authority to manage their owndockets.

It’snotclearwhereallofthiswilleventually lead,but itwouldn’tbe

surprisingif2021witnessesarisingtideofanti-andanti-antisuitinjunctions(andperhapsfurtherpermutations).Whatthelong-termconsequenceswillbe are anyone’s guess, though it seems reasonable to fear that suchmachinations couldwind up undermining respect for the law, cooperationamongnations,andperhapsevenglobaltraderelationships.77

Wheretogofromhere?Toreturntothe“whodecides”questionposedatthebeginningofthis

essay,itisprobablyfairtoassumethat,fromthestandpointofpublicpolicy,the relevant goals of any system for resolving SEP/FRANDdisputeswouldinclude enhancing innovation, ensuring fairness and predictability, andkeepingcostsincheck.Unfortunately,theremaybelittleconsensusrightnowabout how best to achieve these goals. Notwithstanding the considerableeffortandexpertisethatmanyjudgesandotherdecisionmakersthroughouttheworld arewilling todedicate to thesematters, there remains, asnotedabove, substantial disagreement on many foundational issues. Thesedifferences will continue tomake forum shopping an attractive option forlitigants,andwillinturnprovokeresponses(suchasantisuitandanti-antisuitinjunctions)thatseemdestinedtoincreasecostandtogenerateperceptions

76Seeid.at*4;seealsoInterDigitalTech.Corp.v.XiaomiCorp.,(2020)IA8772/2020inCS(COMM)295/2020(Del.HC);Courd’appel[CA][regionalcourtofappeal]Paris,Mar.3,2020,19/21426(Fr.);LandgerichtMünchenI[LG][regionalcourtMunichI]July11,2019,21O9333/19.77Asnotedabove,whileintheorythedoctrineofforumnonconveniens,underwhichacourtcouldvoluntarilyrelinquishitsjurisdictionindeferencetoaforumwithmoresignificantcontacts,couldprovideacheckon theunwarranteduseofantisuitandanti-antisuitinjunctions,thedoctrinemaynotbeavailableatallinsomejurisdictions,ormaybeofonlylimitedapplicability.Seesupranotes23–25andaccompanyingtext.Asatheoreticalaside,isitanaffronttocomitytoissueananti-antisuitinjunction,orisdoingsoconsistentwithcomitybecausetheissuanceofanantisuitinjunctionitselfundermines comity? Cf.Drahozal, supra note7 (suggesting that comitypromotescooperationbypermittingnationstodepartfromitsnormstopunishdefectionfromcooperativebehavior).

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ofunfairness. Subject to thesepessimisticconclusions, Ineverthelessclosewithafewmodestproposalsformovingforward.

First, governments and other actors could devote more effort to

developing,ifnotconsensus,atleastsomemeasureofbestpracticesrelatingtoFRANDmethodologyandrelatedissues.Althoughsomeissuesmaysimplybe intractable fornow,perhapsagreement couldbe reachedona few—forexample, onwhetherbottom-upand top-downareboth acceptableFRANDmethodologies,andwhethercourtsshouldresorttoantisuitinjunctionsonlyintherarestofcircumstances.AndperhapsadegreeofconsensusonotherissueswillbemorereadilyachievableaftertheCJEUdecidesNokiav.Daimler,which(itistobehoped)willunifythepositionoftheE.U.memberstatesonissuesrelatingtocomponent-levellicensingandinjunctiverelief.78

Second,governmentsandotheractorsalsocoulddevotemoreeffortto

developing the sort of empirical evidence that would enhance rationaldecisionmakingwithregardtoSEPsandFRAND.Atpresent,suchevidenceisoften sorely lacking. It is commonly believed, for example, that a largepercentage(perhapsamajority)ofdeclaredSEPsarenotactuallyessential—though the European Commission is considering measures to improvetransparencyinthisregard.79 Similarly,asIhavenotedelsewhere,thedatathatwould be necessary to carry out a top-down analysis—including suchmatters as aggregate royaltyburdens and the relativedistributionof valueamong SEPs—could be improved.80 Two other evidentiary gaps, however,mayproveevenmoredifficult toovercome. The first is thatnoone reallyknows how important, if at all, the patent incentive is to innovation intelecommunicationsandrelatedmarkets.81Havingananswertothisquestion

78Seesupranote43andaccompanyingtext.79 See RUDIBEKKERS ET AL., PILOT STUDY FOR ESSENTIALITYASSESSMENT OF STANDARDESSENTIALPATENTS (2020),https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC119894/jrc119894_online.pdf(lastvisitedJan.24,2021).80SeeThomasF.Cotter,PatentDamagesHeuristics,25TEX.INTELL.PROP.L.J.159,207–10 (2016) (noting that, to apply a top-down approach, courtsmust employ somebaselineassumptionsregarding“theportionofthebasethattypicallyis(orshouldbe) payable as royalties,” “the number of valid and essential SEPs reading on thebase,”and(perhaps)therelativeimportanceoftheplaintiff’sSEPscomparedtotheaverage).81AsIhavenotedelsewhere,“[s]urveyevidence...indicatesthatthepatentincentiveis most important in industries such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices andchemicals, and that in other fields patents play a lesser role in enabling firms to

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would be very helpful in assessing howmuch effort should be devoted todetermining themost “accurate” royalty in relation to somebenchmark, asopposedtosomelessaccurate,butalsolesscostlytodetermine,measureofcompensation.82 The second is that, while licensing agreements may bedisclosedamongpartiestolitigation,pursuanttoconfidentialityrequirementsthatmaydifferinsomerespectsamongnationalcourts,theygenerallyarenotmattersofpublicrecord.Althoughthebusinessrationalesforkeepingsuchinformationprivatearenothard to fathom, it isnotatall clearhow, in theabsence of such information outside the litigation context, anyone cansubstantiatewhetherSEPownersarecomplyingwiththeirobligationtooffernondiscriminatory royalties (whatever the correct definition of“nondiscriminatory” happens to be)—or how decisionmakers can beconfidentthatthecomparablesdisclosedinlitigationarerepresentativeofthewhole.83Thatsaid,Idon’tseeanypracticalwayforSSOsor,forthatmatter,evengovernments,torequiresuchdisclosureasamatterofcourse.84

Third, itmight seem that, in view of the problems noted above, the

obvioussolutionwouldbeforthenationsoftheworld—or, failingthat, theSSOsthemselves—totakethematteroutofthehandsofnationalcourtsand

appropriateareturnonresearchanddevelopment(R&D).”ThomasF.Cotter,OntheEconomicsofInjunctionsinPatentCases,11ZEITSCHRIFTFÜRGEISTIGESEIGENTUM293,302 (2019) (citations omitted); see also Luke Froeb et al.,Technology Economics:Innovation,Licensing,andAntitrust,inTHEGLOBALANTITRUSTINSTITUTEREPORTONTHEDIGITALECONOMY192,196,199n.28(2020)(asserting,ontheonehand,that“themainreason” that there is “too little investment in research and development” is “thatinventorsappropriatefarlessthantheentiresocialvalueoftheirinventions,”whilealsostatingthatthe“[e]mpiricalevidencecitedinSectionIVofthischaptertypicallydoesnotfindthatpatentspromoteinnovation”).82 See generally Cotter, supra note 80 (arguing that standards relating to patentdamagesnecessarilytradeoffsomedegreeofaccuracyforefficiency).83Seeid.at193–94.84Cf.CurtisDodd&ChrisDubuc,CellularWirelessStandardEssentialPatents:ASurveyof FRAND-Related Statements, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/10/28/cellular-wireless-standard-essential-patents-survey-frand-related-statements/id=126781/ [https://perma.cc/HN4C-CSVB] (expressingdisagreement with the view, attributed to the Fair Standards Alliance, that thereshould be “not only be transparency between the SEP owner and a prospectivelicensee, but also with respect to all other prospective licensees” (citing FAIRSTANDARDS ALLIANCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2015), https://fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FSA-POSITION-PAPER-June2016.pdf[https://perma.cc/W6Y4-4MWR])).

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establishsomesortofglobal tribunal to resolvedisputesover the termsofglobalFRANDlicenses.85Proposalsalongtheselinesareworthconsidering,even though, in the near term, there doesn’t seem to be much chance ofadoption86 (not leastbecause there isn’t any consensusyetonmanyof thetoughmethodologicalissues,asdiscussedabove).87Thus,whileIdoubtthatthepresentsystem,withits incentivesforforumshoppingandjurisdiction-grabbing—andthefrictionsthatmayresultfromaproliferationofanti-andanti-antisuit injunctions—issustainable in the longrun, thingsmaysimplyhavetodeteriorateforawhilebeforeanyworkablecompromiseisattainable.Ifnothingelse,thenextfewyearspromisetoprovideawildride.

85Forproposals,seeJorgeL.Contreras,GlobalRate-Setting:ASolutionforStandards-Essential Patents?, 94WASH.L.REV. 701 (2019); and Roya Ghafele,Global FRANDLicensing in Light of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2020,https://uclajolt.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Ghafele-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SU8-9LRM]. See also Dani Kass, FRAND Rate ‘Nightmare’ Raises Call forInternational Tribunal, LAW360 (Jan. 14, 2021, 7:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1343824/frand-rate-nightmare-raises-call-for-international-tribunal?nl_pk=e6069cdd-aee4-4fa2-9719-0eb93573f1cf&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip [https://perma.cc/B75G-F8NJ]. But seeGreenbaum,supranote27,at1089,1120(arguingthat “courtsshouldresist the temptationtostreamlineworldwideFRANDlitigationthroughconsolidationofthedisputeinonejurisdiction,”inpartbecause“territorialadjudicationwouldallowjurisdictionstosetindependent FRAND policies appropriate to their specific social, economic, andpoliticalcircumstances”).86SeeClark,supranote24(“[E]stablishingsuchabodywouldbethebestsolution.However,giventhenumerousdisparateinterests,thisisunlikelytoeveroccur.”).87As farasU.S.antitrust liability isconcerned,SSOsmayhaveabitmoreroomtoexperiment under the incoming Biden administration than they did under theoutgoingadministration;buttheheterogeneityofSSOmembershipmakesagreementonrequiringthesubmissionofdisputestoaglobalFRANDtribunal, inaccordancewith some agreed-upon methodological principles, unlikely for the foreseeablefuture.Cf.A.DouglasMelamed&CarlShapiro,HowAntitrustLawCanMakeFRANDCommitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2130–31 (2018) (arguing that,becauseSSOscollectivelyconfermarketpoweronSEPowners,theyhaveanantitrustduty to take “effectivesteps tominimize theharm fromthemonopolies that theircollaborationconfersuponSEPholders”).