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33Ideas and RealityIdeas and Reality

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TAs office h.TAs office h.

nonenone

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Bibliographical ResourcesBibliographical Resources (reminder):(reminder):

Descartes’ Descartes’ MeditationsMeditations (with (with Critics and Critics and RepliesReplies) + ) + Discourse Discourse free at:free at:

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_descarte.htmlf_descarte.html

Leibniz’s Leibniz’s New EssaysNew Essays free at:free at:http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_leibniz.hthttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_leibniz.htmlml

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By Now you should have read Descartes’ By Now you should have read Descartes’ Meditations. Meditations.

For the next 2 meetings you should For the next 2 meetings you should read the preface and ch. 1 of Leibniz’s read the preface and ch. 1 of Leibniz’s New EssaysNew Essays

It would also help if you can read It would also help if you can read Leibniz’sLeibniz’s Monadology Monadology (also on (also on Leibniz’s link)Leibniz’s link)

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Further bibliography on DescartesFurther bibliography on Descartes::

Cottingham J. (1986). Cottingham J. (1986). Descartes.Descartes. Blackwell, Blackwell, OxfordOxford

Further bibliography on/by ChomskyFurther bibliography on/by Chomsky::

Chomsky N. (2000). Chomsky N. (2000). New Horizons in the New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge UP: Cambridge UP: CambridgeCambridge

McGilvray J. (1999). McGilvray J. (1999). Chomsky: Language, Chomsky: Language, Mind, and Politics. Mind, and Politics. Polity Press: CambridgePolity Press: Cambridge

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The following can also be usefulThe following can also be useful

Antony L. M. & Hornstein N. (eds.) Antony L. M. & Hornstein N. (eds.) (2003). (2003). Chomsky and His Critics.Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell: OxfordBlackwell: Oxford

Smith, N. (1999) Smith, N. (1999) Chomsky: Ideas and Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals.Ideals. Cambridge UP: Cambridge Cambridge UP: Cambridge

Wilson C. (2003). Wilson C. (2003). Descartes’s Descartes’s Meditations: An Introduction.Meditations: An Introduction. Cambridge UP: CambridgeCambridge UP: Cambridge

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PerceptionPerception Sensory GraspSensory Grasp

Our perception of ordinary objects may be Our perception of ordinary objects may be obscure and confuse (e.g. change in obscure and confuse (e.g. change in phenomenological properties).phenomenological properties).

But objects possess all the properties which But objects possess all the properties which we clearly and distinctly understand, i.e. the we clearly and distinctly understand, i.e. the essential, eternal and immutable properties.essential, eternal and immutable properties.

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Essential Essential properties of material objectsproperties of material objects

Are true of matter under each manifestation Are true of matter under each manifestation and all conceivable conditions: they transcend and all conceivable conditions: they transcend the the qualia; qualia; they are senses-independent.they are senses-independent.

These properties can be cashed out These properties can be cashed out extensionally and, as such can be extensionally and, as such can be characterized in mere geometrical terms. (See characterized in mere geometrical terms. (See the mathematical model of knowledge).the mathematical model of knowledge).

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Res ExtensaRes Extensa

It is the nature or essence of corporeal It is the nature or essence of corporeal things (things (substantia corporealissubstantia corporealis). ).

It is a subject of predication, a bearer of It is a subject of predication, a bearer of attributes. Roughly it is something we can attributes. Roughly it is something we can say something about.say something about.

(see the subject/predicate distinction which (see the subject/predicate distinction which will be central in Leibniz’s metaphysics).will be central in Leibniz’s metaphysics).

It is independent and can stand on its own. It is independent and can stand on its own. It is independent of anything It is independent of anything exceptexcept God. God.

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Ideas Ideas Ideas: Ideas:

(i) Formal Nature(i) Formal Nature(ii) Material Nature (ii) Material Nature (iii) Reflexivity/Self-Referentiality(iii) Reflexivity/Self-Referentiality

Descartes distinguishes between the Descartes distinguishes between the material realitymaterial reality of an idea (this is the of an idea (this is the intellectual act/operation of the thinking) intellectual act/operation of the thinking) and the and the formalformal realityreality of an idea (this is of an idea (this is the representational power of the idea). the representational power of the idea).

These are two aspects of the very same These are two aspects of the very same thing, the idea.thing, the idea.

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‘‘Idea’ can be taken Idea’ can be taken materiallymaterially, as an , as an operation of operation of the intellectthe intellect, in which case it cannot be said to be , in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than me. Alternatively it can be taken more perfect than me. Alternatively it can be taken objectivelyobjectively, as the , as the thing represented by that thing represented by that operationoperation; and this thing, even if it is not regarded ; and this thing, even if it is not regarded as existing outside the intellect, as existing outside the intellect, can still, in virtue can still, in virtue of its essence, be more perfect than myselfof its essence, be more perfect than myself. . ((Preface to Meditations; CSM IIPreface to Meditations; CSM II: 7): 7)

The idea of God, even if it exists only in my The idea of God, even if it exists only in my intellect is more perfect than myself because intellect is more perfect than myself because of its essence. of its essence.

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an idea is an idea is reflexivereflexive (self-referential) (self-referential)

The holder of the idea is aware/conscious The holder of the idea is aware/conscious of this very idea in so long as s/he of this very idea in so long as s/he entertains it. entertains it.

in nostro sentendi modo cogitatio includitur in nostro sentendi modo cogitatio includitur [thought is included in our mode of sensation] [thought is included in our mode of sensation] ((Letter to More, 5 Feb. 1649; CSMK IIILetter to More, 5 Feb. 1649; CSMK III: 365).: 365).

This allows to block an infinite regress (cf. This allows to block an infinite regress (cf. homunculus fallacy).homunculus fallacy).

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The awareness one has of the idea one The awareness one has of the idea one entertains is not another idea (or meta-entertains is not another idea (or meta-idea) that one entertains of the former.idea) that one entertains of the former.

The reflexive consciousness of the idea is The reflexive consciousness of the idea is contained into the idea itself.contained into the idea itself.

Hence, because of this direct awareness, Hence, because of this direct awareness, there isn’t a regress of ideas of ideasthere isn’t a regress of ideas of ideas..

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The Threefold Aspect of The Threefold Aspect of IdeasIdeas

(i) Formal Nature (semantic property)(i) Formal Nature (semantic property)

(ii) Material Nature (mental act)(ii) Material Nature (mental act)

(iii) Reflexivity/Self-Referentiality (direct (iii) Reflexivity/Self-Referentiality (direct awareness)awareness)

The The material naturematerial nature of an idea, i.e. its being a of an idea, i.e. its being a mentalmental actact, may help to explain their , may help to explain their causal causal powerpower. .

Since an idea is an act occurring in one’s mind, Since an idea is an act occurring in one’s mind, this act can trigger one to behave in a given way.this act can trigger one to behave in a given way.

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The The formal natureformal nature of an idea should of an idea should explain their explain their semanticssemantics and contribute in and contribute in determining the truth-value of a thought. determining the truth-value of a thought.

This explains the aboutness or This explains the aboutness or intentionality of ideas, i.e. what an idea intentionality of ideas, i.e. what an idea stands for / represents.stands for / represents.

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The The reflexivityreflexivity of ideas helps explaining their of ideas helps explaining their subjective charactersubjective character. .

In so long as one is entertaining an idea one is In so long as one is entertaining an idea one is aware of this very idea. And one canaware of this very idea. And one cannot not not be not be aware of itaware of it. .

And (because of the reflexivity) one is aware And (because of the reflexivity) one is aware of an idea without having to perceive it.of an idea without having to perceive it.

Immediate acquaintance of the idea.Immediate acquaintance of the idea.

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Meta-IdeaMeta-Idea

The reflexive character of an idea does not The reflexive character of an idea does not prevent one to have an idea about a given prevent one to have an idea about a given idea (a idea (a meta-ideameta-idea). ).

In that case one is aware of the meta-idea. In that case one is aware of the meta-idea.

This is similar to the difference between This is similar to the difference between thinking about red and thinking about “red”. thinking about red and thinking about “red”.

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Introspection and Introspection and NativismNativism

Methodology: IntrospectionMethodology: Introspection

The true understanding of reality requires The true understanding of reality requires the mind to turn on itself and make the mind to turn on itself and make abstraction of all information gained from the abstraction of all information gained from the senses. senses.

Innate IdeasInnate Ideas

The possession of an idea needs a cause. The possession of an idea needs a cause. Thus adventitious ideas are causes by the Thus adventitious ideas are causes by the senses, while an innate idea is causes by God. senses, while an innate idea is causes by God.

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True ideas are True ideas are innateinnate in us in us. .

The first, basic and more important, idea is The first, basic and more important, idea is the idea of God. the idea of God.

Having achieved knowledge of God we can Having achieved knowledge of God we can then proceed to the knowledge of external then proceed to the knowledge of external reality. reality.

The latter is gained by the grasping of The latter is gained by the grasping of (innate) mathematical concepts. (innate) mathematical concepts.

The essence of reality (its being extended) The essence of reality (its being extended) can be expressed in geometrical terms.can be expressed in geometrical terms.

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I apply the term I apply the term ‘innate’ to the ideas or ‘innate’ to the ideas or notions that are the form of those thoughts notions that are the form of those thoughts in order to distinguish them from others, in order to distinguish them from others, which I call ‘adventious’ or ‘made up’.which I call ‘adventious’ or ‘made up’. This is This is the same sense as that in which we say that the same sense as that in which we say that generosity is ‘innate’ in certain families, or that generosity is ‘innate’ in certain families, or that certain diseases such as gout or stones are certain diseases such as gout or stones are innate in others: innate in others: it is not so much that the it is not so much that the babies of such families suffer from these babies of such families suffer from these diseases in their mother’s womb, but simply diseases in their mother’s womb, but simply that they arethat they are born with a ‘faculty’ or born with a ‘faculty’ or tendency to contract themtendency to contract them. (. (Comments on a Comments on a Certain Broadsheet; CSM ICertain Broadsheet; CSM I: 303-4) : 303-4)

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Nothing reaches our mind from the external objects Nothing reaches our mind from the external objects through the sense organs except certain corporeal through the sense organs except certain corporeal motions … The idea of motions … The idea of pain, colours, sounds and the pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innatelike must be all the more innate if, on the occasion if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, of representing them to itself, for there is no for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motionsmotions. Is it possible to imagine anything more . Is it possible to imagine anything more absurd than that all the common notions within our absurd than that all the common notions within our mind arise from such motions and cannot exist without mind arise from such motions and cannot exist without them? I would like our author to tell me what the them? I would like our author to tell me what the corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some common notion to the effect that ‘things which are common notion to the effect that ‘things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other’, or any equal to a third thing are equal to each other’, or any other he cares to take.other he cares to take. ((Comments on a Certain Comments on a Certain Broadsheet; CSM IBroadsheet; CSM I: 304): 304)

In claiming that “there is no similarity” In claiming that “there is no similarity” Descartes seems to suggest that ideas are like Descartes seems to suggest that ideas are like images …images …

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Knowledge of ideasKnowledge of ideas Awareness of IdeasAwareness of Ideas

A child (untrained mind) faces difficulties to A child (untrained mind) faces difficulties to grasp the innate true ideas because her mind grasp the innate true ideas because her mind is flooded with bodily stimulus preventing the is flooded with bodily stimulus preventing the inward look which ultimately allows the inward look which ultimately allows the grasping of the true ideas. grasping of the true ideas.

In early childhood the mind is too closely tied In early childhood the mind is too closely tied to the body. to the body.

The body is seen as an obstruction to the The body is seen as an obstruction to the mind.mind.

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Ideas are Ideas are in the Mindin the Mind

What does it mean to say that ideas are in What does it mean to say that ideas are in the mind? the mind?

An idea is in the form of a thought and one An idea is in the form of a thought and one is aware of it by is aware of it by immediate perceptionimmediate perception. . (see reflexivity, self-referentiality of ideas)(see reflexivity, self-referentiality of ideas)

But at any given time one is only aware of But at any given time one is only aware of a tiny fraction of the idea that is in one’s a tiny fraction of the idea that is in one’s mind.mind.

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PossessionPossession of Ideas of Ideas

Should be understood in a dispositional, Should be understood in a dispositional, rather than actual, way.rather than actual, way.

To have an idea of X is to be To have an idea of X is to be disposeddisposed, by , by appropriate reflection, to recognize appropriate reflection, to recognize certain truths about X.certain truths about X.

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““idea”idea”

In using the word “idea” Descartes means In using the word “idea” Descartes means both the both the concept and the propositionsconcept and the propositions one has about the concept. one has about the concept.

Thus one having an innate idea of a Thus one having an innate idea of a triangle is one having the concept of a triangle is one having the concept of a triangle and the proposition that the sum triangle and the proposition that the sum of its angles is 180 degrees.of its angles is 180 degrees.

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Having an idea entails Having an idea entails having propositional having propositional knowledgeknowledge (e.g.: I have the idea of God, so I (e.g.: I have the idea of God, so I know thatknow that he is all powerful …) he is all powerful …)

Cf: knowing that Cf: knowing that vsvs. knowing how, see also . knowing how, see also epistemic epistemic vsvs. non-epistemic seeing. (savoir . non-epistemic seeing. (savoir vs. vs. connaitre)connaitre)

E.g. “Knowing E.g. “Knowing howhow to swim” to swim” vs. vs. “Knowing “Knowing thatthat Ottawa is north of Toronto” Ottawa is north of Toronto”

““Seeing a chameleon” Seeing a chameleon” vsvs. “Seeing that the . “Seeing that the chameleon is on the branch”chameleon is on the branch”

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Tree Kind of IdeasTree Kind of Ideas 1. Innate1. Innate

2. Adventitious2. Adventitious

They come from an external source.They come from an external source.

3. Fictional3. Fictional

They are made up or invented.They are made up or invented.

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Since Since sense-perception is not a matter sense-perception is not a matter of a simple reception of the mindof a simple reception of the mind, all , all ideas must, in a sense, be innate. ideas must, in a sense, be innate.

The ideas of pain, colour, sounds, etc. The ideas of pain, colour, sounds, etc. must all be innate (sensations such as must all be innate (sensations such as pain, colour, etc. are not in the objects). pain, colour, etc. are not in the objects).

Sensory ideas should not be conceived as Sensory ideas should not be conceived as coming from the external world: they coming from the external world: they depends and should be explained in terms depends and should be explained in terms of of the innate structure of the mindthe innate structure of the mind..

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Ideas as RepresentationsIdeas as Representations

Descartes gives up the (scholastic) view Descartes gives up the (scholastic) view that the mind grasps images which are that the mind grasps images which are transmitted from the objects. transmitted from the objects.

When Descartes compared ideas to When Descartes compared ideas to images may be to stress that ideas, like images may be to stress that ideas, like images, are representatives, i.e. to images, are representatives, i.e. to underlie the intentionality of our underlie the intentionality of our thoughts.thoughts.

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Ideas may be conceived along symbols, Ideas may be conceived along symbols, for there are many way of for there are many way of representingrepresenting an an object. object.

Representation need not be by images Representation need not be by images or resemblancesor resemblances. .

““Cheese” stands for cheese. In French we Cheese” stands for cheese. In French we have “fromage” … Yet “cheese” and have “fromage” … Yet “cheese” and “fromage” don’t resemble cheese ….“fromage” don’t resemble cheese ….

Symbols are arbitrary.Symbols are arbitrary.

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Ideas as symbolsIdeas as symbols

WordsWords, as you well know, bear , as you well know, bear no resemblance to no resemblance to the things they signifythe things they signify, and yet they make us think , and yet they make us think of these things, frequently even without our paying of these things, frequently even without our paying attention to the sounds of the words or to their attention to the sounds of the words or to their syllables. Thus it may happen that we hear an syllables. Thus it may happen that we hear an utterance whose meaning we understand perfectly utterance whose meaning we understand perfectly well, but afterward we cannot say in what language it well, but afterward we cannot say in what language it was spoken. Now, if words, which signify nothing was spoken. Now, if words, which signify nothing except by human convention, suffice to make us think except by human convention, suffice to make us think of things to which they bear no resemblance, then of things to which they bear no resemblance, then why could nature not also have established some why could nature not also have established some sign which would make us have the sensation of sign which would make us have the sensation of light, even if the sign contained nothing in itself light, even if the sign contained nothing in itself which is similar to that sensation?which is similar to that sensation? ( (The World or The World or Treatise on Light; CSM ITreatise on Light; CSM I: 81) : 81)

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For Descartes clear and distinct ideas are For Descartes clear and distinct ideas are conform and similar to their objectconform and similar to their object. .

Yet the similarity must not be compared or Yet the similarity must not be compared or understood in terms of the similarity that may understood in terms of the similarity that may be involved in a representative picture. be involved in a representative picture.

If that were the case ideas would merely be a If that were the case ideas would merely be a mental thing. (Ideas would have only their mental thing. (Ideas would have only their formal reality, i.e. their representational formal reality, i.e. their representational power).power).

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We would thus reject the materiality of ideas We would thus reject the materiality of ideas (the fact that they are an intellectual act/an (the fact that they are an intellectual act/an operation of our thinking activity) and the operation of our thinking activity) and the view that they are self-referential. view that they are self-referential.

A picture is neither an act, nor A picture is neither an act, nor reflexive/self-referentialreflexive/self-referential..

(cf. the (i) Formal Nature,(ii) Material (cf. the (i) Formal Nature,(ii) Material Nature, and (iii) Reflexivity/Self-Nature, and (iii) Reflexivity/Self-Referentiality aspect of ideas).Referentiality aspect of ideas).

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Port Royal Logic and Port Royal Logic and GrammarGrammar

The view that ideas are not images is also The view that ideas are not images is also defended by Arnauld & Nicole in their defended by Arnauld & Nicole in their Port Port Royal LogicRoyal Logic::

Whenever we speak of ideas, then, we are Whenever we speak of ideas, then, we are not not referring to images painted in the fantasyreferring to images painted in the fantasy, , but to anything in the mind when we can trustfully but to anything in the mind when we can trustfully say that we are conceiving something, however say that we are conceiving something, however we conceive it. (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 26)we conceive it. (Arnauld & Nicole 1662: 26)

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Similarity RelationSimilarity Relation

Similarity Relation: The Ontological Similarity Relation: The Ontological Thesis of the Double ExistenceThesis of the Double Existence

The (intentional) notion of similarity involved The (intentional) notion of similarity involved must be understood against the Scholastic must be understood against the Scholastic tradition. tradition.

Descartes explains the similarity relation of Descartes explains the similarity relation of ideas in terms of their objective reality and ideas in terms of their objective reality and this is tantamount of the medieval notion of this is tantamount of the medieval notion of esse objectivumesse objectivum. .

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Scholastic TraditionScholastic Tradition

Within the medieval/scholastic tradition Within the medieval/scholastic tradition “similarity”“similarity” is not understood along a is not understood along a pictorial resemblance, but as a pictorial resemblance, but as a kind of kind of identityidentity..

Within the scholastic tradition we find the Within the scholastic tradition we find the thesis of the thesis of the double existencedouble existence. .

A specific form can exist in two distinct ways A specific form can exist in two distinct ways (cf. St Thomas): either (cf. St Thomas): either materiallymaterially ( (de rede re) as a ) as a form of a material thing or form of a material thing or immateriallyimmaterially, as a , as a form informing the intellect. form informing the intellect.

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The The specis in mentisspecis in mentis is similar to the is similar to the external formexternal form. .

Every time one entertains a clear and Every time one entertains a clear and distinct idea there is an distinct idea there is an identity relationidentity relation between between the form informing the intellectthe form informing the intellect and and the form informing the external realitythe form informing the external reality..

I.e. the very same form informs both the I.e. the very same form informs both the mind and reality. mind and reality.

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The idea of a double existence (the The idea of a double existence (the esse esse objectivumobjectivum) goes hand in hand with the ) goes hand in hand with the Causal Adequacy PrincipleCausal Adequacy Principle. .

I.e. the self-evident principle that there I.e. the self-evident principle that there must be as much reality in the efficient must be as much reality in the efficient and total cause that there is in the effect and total cause that there is in the effect of that cause (of that cause (ex nihilo nihil fit).ex nihilo nihil fit).

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Reification of ideasReification of ideas

The Reification of Ideas: Ideas The Reification of Ideas: Ideas quaqua Mental ObjectsMental Objects

Ideas are objects of our knowledge and they Ideas are objects of our knowledge and they are known before the knowledge of external are known before the knowledge of external objects objects

Cf. We had ideas during the doubt, thus Cf. We had ideas during the doubt, thus before knowing that the external world before knowing that the external world exists.exists.

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The knowledge of ideas must precede the The knowledge of ideas must precede the knowledge of the external objects.knowledge of the external objects.

For it is only For it is only viavia that knowledge that we that knowledge that we can prove the existence of the external can prove the existence of the external world and, thus, defeat scepticism.world and, thus, defeat scepticism.

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Tension between the view of ideas as Tension between the view of ideas as (mental) objects and the view of ideas as (mental) objects and the view of ideas as mental actsmental acts

I.e. a tension between their I.e. a tension between their material material nature nature and their and their formalformal nature. nature.

Ideas conceived as acts do not enter as Ideas conceived as acts do not enter as intermediary between the mental activity and intermediary between the mental activity and the objects they stand for, while ideas the objects they stand for, while ideas conceived as objects are intermediary between conceived as objects are intermediary between the mind and the world: one “grasp” and object the mind and the world: one “grasp” and object by “grasping” the idea that stands for that by “grasping” the idea that stands for that object. object.

In that case an idea is an epistemic In that case an idea is an epistemic tertium tertium quidquid between the mind and the external reality. between the mind and the external reality.

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Innate Innate vs.vs. Adventitious Adventitious IdeasIdeas

Even if all ideas are somewhat innate the Even if all ideas are somewhat innate the distinction between innate and adventitious distinction between innate and adventitious ideas subsists insofar as we must distinguish ideas subsists insofar as we must distinguish between those (innate) abstract ideas which between those (innate) abstract ideas which the mind grasp independently of the stimuli the mind grasp independently of the stimuli and the ideas arising because triggered by and the ideas arising because triggered by external stimuli (e.g. perception).external stimuli (e.g. perception).

Cf. the idea of God Cf. the idea of God vsvs. the idea one has of . the idea one has of the pen one is perceiving.the pen one is perceiving.

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Mind/World relationMind/World relation In giving up the naïve (scholastic) view that In giving up the naïve (scholastic) view that

the mind (the mind (viavia the ideas) relates to the external the ideas) relates to the external world because our ideas copy the objects they world because our ideas copy the objects they stand for—i.e. that the intentional relationship stand for—i.e. that the intentional relationship is one of similarity—Descartes creates a gap is one of similarity—Descartes creates a gap between the mind and the world. between the mind and the world.

How does one’s idea of X stand for X if the How does one’s idea of X stand for X if the former is not an image of the latter?former is not an image of the latter?

God, the creator, guarantees that our mind God, the creator, guarantees that our mind reflects accurately the structure of reality. reflects accurately the structure of reality. The aboutness/intentionality is guaranteed by The aboutness/intentionality is guaranteed by Good.Good.

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[A]n idea is the thing which is thought of in so far as it [A]n idea is the thing which is thought of in so far as it has has objective beingobjective being in the intellectin the intellect … which is … which is never outside the intellect, and in this sense ‘objective never outside the intellect, and in this sense ‘objective being’ simply means being in the intellect in the way in being’ simply means being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there … But if the question which objects are normally there … But if the question is what the is what the ideaidea of the sun is, and we answer that it is of the sun is, and we answer that it is the thing which is thought of, insofar as it has the thing which is thought of, insofar as it has objective being in the intellect, no one will take this to objective being in the intellect, no one will take this to be the sun itself … ‘objective being in the intellect’ will be the sun itself … ‘objective being in the intellect’ will not here mean ‘the determination of an act of the not here mean ‘the determination of an act of the intellect by means of an object’, but will signify the intellect by means of an object’, but will signify the object’s being in the intellect in the way in which its object’s being in the intellect in the way in which its objects are normally there. By this I mean that objects are normally there. By this I mean that the the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect—not of course formally existing, as it intellect—not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existingdoes in the heavens, but objectively existing , i.e. , i.e. in the way in which objects normally are in the in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect. Now this mode of being is of course much intellect. Now this mode of being is of course much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect; but, as I did explain, it has not outside the intellect; but, as I did explain, it has not therefore simply nothing. (therefore simply nothing. (First Set of Replies; CSM IIFirst Set of Replies; CSM II: : 74-5)74-5)

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AboutnessAboutness

Ideas are about object because they are Ideas are about object because they are “similar” to them. But “similarity” is not “similar” to them. But “similarity” is not understood along a pictorial resemblance. It understood along a pictorial resemblance. It is a kind of identity.is a kind of identity.

This comes from the scholastic thesis of the This comes from the scholastic thesis of the double existence. double existence.

The aboutness/intentionality of our ideas is The aboutness/intentionality of our ideas is granted by God via the objective reality, i.e. granted by God via the objective reality, i.e. double existence.double existence.