Armenia: Post-Election AssessmentRichard Giragosian

Director

Regional Studies Center Yerevan, Armenia

26 February 2013

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Political Assessment

1. Pre-Election Context & Campaign

2. The Election

3. Election Reaction

4. Opposition: Momentum & Initiative

5. Role Play & Scenario Analysis Exercise

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General Observations• Competition of election: limited choice, little

voice, even less debate

• Conduct of the vote: widespread local & regional level violations; protest vote swings to opposition; acceptable voter turnout

• Competence and capacity: CEC handling of challenges and complaints as a test

• Confidence: legitimacy of results questioned; need to gain/earn public trust

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Lack of Real Competition• Generally, the presidential election was the

country’s least competitive election, with an absence of any one viable challenger to incumbent President Sarkisian

• But the lack of real competition was an accurate reflection of the current political reality

• Opposition was fairly weak due to three factors: open division between prominent opposition figures & inability to unite; lack of true grassroots-based political parties; pronounced lack of democracy within the parties themselves

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Personality over Policy

• As with past political campaigns (both presidential and parliamentary), the campaign was dominated by a contest of personality, rather than any real competition of ideology or a competing choice of policies

• The campaign was also marked by a primitive and low level of political discourse, with little debate and even less of a choice between competing visions or strategic alternatives

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Amateur Politics• A related criticism of the campaign was the

affirmation that politics in Armenia is still more of a hobby, and not a profession, with little in terms of campaign tactics and even less political strategy; no clear message or theme, and no campaign planning of events or issues

• In this way, it was not a political campaign as commonly accepted; the use of “boycotts & hunger strikes” are not political tactics, usually used in politics only as last resort, not first resort

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Specific Trends

• Un-level playing field; advantage of incumbency; use, misuse and abuse of administrative resources

• Inflated and inaccurate voter list• Media coverage more open and balanced;

but much less to cover• Widespread voting irregularities• Another “missed opportunity” for Armenian

democracy

Lack of Real Competition

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This was the campaign highlight?

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The Election: 18 February

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“Harry Potter’s Disappearing Ink”

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The Party Machine

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The Election Outcome• Sarkisian’s re-election was largely

expected (58.6 %)

• Turnout was greater than expected (60%)

• Votes for Raffi Hovhannisian (36.75%) more than expected; votes for Hrant Bagratian (2.15%) less than expected

• Voting violations & irregularities

• “Prosperous Armenia” campaigns for Sarkisian; passive Kocharian

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The Broader SignificanceUnresolved March 2008 Lingers

The Post-Election SituationCan the opposition sustain the momentum?

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Reaction: 19 February Yerevan

• Thousands turn out to protest election results

• Hovhannisian emerges as undisputed leader of the opposition

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Yerevan 20 February

• Hovhannisian declares launch of “prolonged struggle”

• Nikol Pashinian unofficially endorses & anoints Hovhannisian, but warns of need for clarity and strategy

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21 February: Meeting

• Hovhannisian walks to meet President Sarkisian

• Risky move, legitimizes Sarkisian

• But also elevates the civility of political culture & challenges Sarkisian

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21 February: Meeting

• Hovhannisian as new type of challenger

• Sarkisian disarmed and confused by Hovhannisian’s smile

• First-ever opposition maturity puzzles Sarkisian- has never faced such a non-confrontational rival

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21 February: Meeting

• Risky move by not reporting on meeting, triggers concern over secret deal

• Hovhannisian promises details in next day rally

• But Hovhannisian gains upper hand, demonstrates willingness to engage

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Yerevan 22 February

• Pressure and opposition momentum only builds

• Over 8000 protestors• Forges new tactical

alliances as ARF and Nikol Pashinian lend support

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Yerevan 22 FebruaryAlliances

• Most important tactic is in securing Pashinian, as endorsement

• But Pashinian may also emerge later to rescue and carry on the broader stuggle

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Gyumri: 23 February

• Smart tactics by Hovhannisian to leverage his base of support and broaden his momentum

• Exploits his divisive win (+70%) in Gyumri & Vanadzor, second- and third-largest cities

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23 February“Agents of Change”

• Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (LTP) rejects election results, declares Hovhannisian winner

• Hovhannisian recognized as LTP-style “agent of change”

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25 February: Student ProtestsHelp to Sustain the Momentum

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Political Ghosts & Corpses• Situation affirms the

decline of Prosperous Armenia Party and confirms demise of former President Kocharian

• Even subsequent Prosperous Armenia party statement is to little, too late, failed attempt to show political relevance

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Context of Confrontation:Less apathy, even less fear

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Opposition Tactics & Strategy

26-28 February: • “road show” to 21

cities & towns• Return for Yerevan

rally & March 1st rallyMost significant as first-

ever opposition strategy to engage regions beyond the capital Yerevan

The Government’s Response• To date, the government

has neither understood nor addressed the deep level of discontent

• Government’s response has largely been passive and inactive, but no over-reaction either

• Momentum & initiative remains firmly with opposition (so far)

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Trends & Forecast

• Lingering discontent

• Can the opposition strategize?

• Do the authorities understand?

• The government’s response?

• Start of a political transition

• Emerging leaders & new contenders

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Role Play & Scenario Analysis

• Role play exercise: the characters:– Main players: Sarkisian & Hovhannisian– Others: Pashinian & Ter-Petrosyan– Parties: ANC, ARF and Prosperous Armenia– Other? Kocharian? More??

• Scenario analysis: Strategic goals? Tactics: what next? How?