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Richard C. Feiock and Jungah BaeAskew School of Public Administration and PolicyFlorida State University
Metropolitan areas in the U S are Metropolitan areas in the U.S. are characterized by governmental fragmentation
Makes local governments vulnerable to inefficiencies, diseconomies of scale, and
t liti th t ill h d b d externalities that spillover shared borders.
Also provides opportunities for local collaboration to overcome these institutional collective action (ICA) problems
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How do politically fragmented local How do politically fragmented local governments in a metropolitan region self‐organize to resolve shared problems and address negative externalities?
h h l f l l What are the roles of local government administrators in self‐organizing regionalism?
AutonomyHi h LHigh Low|________________|_____________|____________|______________|______________|______________|________________|informal “adaptive” inter- partnership council of voluntary imposed consolidated policy agreements governmental agreements governments districts districts general networks contracts government
Source: Feiock and Scholz 2010
Consolidation may be effective for resolving the most complex dilemmas, but it is also the most costly
Informal policy networks preserve autonomy and
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Informal policy networks preserve autonomy and exchange valuable information in the ways of less costly and more adaptable than formal relations
.
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Th f i i i l Three types of institutional mechanisms:
Centralized Authority
Mutually Binding Contracts or Agreements
Network Embeddedness
Collaboration studies focus on issues with little conflict and competitionlittle conflict and competition
Development is highly competitive Quasi Market for jobs and development
Competition can be zero (or negative) sum and undercuts regional interestsg
Transaction costs of collaboration are high Information/bargaining
Trust/credible commitment
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Actors (local governments) choose partners and embedded relationships to reduce the
b ll btransaction cost barriers to collaboration Coordination vs. Cooperation Games
Information is a barrier to coordination Actors seek to structure relationships to efficiently acquire information on the actions of other actors
Credible commitment is a barrier to cooperation Actors seek to monitor, constrain and build trust with other actors
Coordination Network Coordination Network
H1: Local administrators will connect with popular actors for information and advice on economic development projects
H2: Local government administrators will form H2: Local government administrators will form bridges to connect to new sets of actor for information and advice on economic development projects
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Coordination NetworkCoordination NetworkA) Popularity: in‐stars B) Bridging: 2‐path
Cooperation Network Cooperation Network
H3: Local government administrators will form reciprocal relationships for information and advice on economic development projects
H4: Local government administrators are more likely to forge network connection that creates clustered transitive relationships
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Collaboration NetworkCollaboration NetworkA) Reciprocity: reciprocal tie B) Bonding: transitivity
Coordination Cooperationp
Values Efficient information-
transmission
Trust, reciprocity,
reputation, credible
commitment
Risk Low Risk High Risks
Network
Structures
Star Network
Weak-tie
Reciprocal ties
Strong-tie
Network
Functions
Information bridging
Diffusion of ideas
Social bonding
Closure (Social Capital)
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���� ������ �� ��� 38 ����� ����������� �� ��� ������� ������� ������������ ���� ��� ������� ������� ������������ ���� Conducted 2007‐2007
Respondents were economic development directors
� ����� �� 31 ����/������ ����������� ��������� Response rate of 85%p 5
Total of 465 dyads
����������� ���� ����� ��� ���������� �� ��� ���� ���� ���� ��������� ���� �� ��� ����� ����������� �� ��� ������������ ���� �� �������� ����������� ������ (��������� ����������, ������, ����������� �������)
���� ����������� ��� ���������� ���� �� ���� ����������� ��� ���������� ���� �� ��������� ������ �� ����� ��� ���� �� ��� ������������� ������, ����� 1� ��������� �������� ������������ ��� 0� ��� ������� �� ���� ������������.
�� ����� ��������� �������� ���� ��� �� ����� ��������� ��������, ���� ��� ���������� � ��� ���������� ���������� � �� �� ����������� �������, ��� � �� ������ � ��� � ����� �� “1” �������� ��� ���������� ������.
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Dyadic counts 465
Mutual 42
Asymmetric 108
null 315
Network Density 0.2065
Average Degree 6. 1935g g
- Network for Economic Development Administrators (UCINET)
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Estimates the probability that the network structures included in the model appear at a greater frequency than would be explained by a random graph with the same number of local government actors (nodes) and development interactions (links).
The estimated parameters provide the likelihood of the structural effects observed in the network data.
Network Structure EstimateSt d d ENetwork Structure Standard Error
reciprocity 2.279*** (0.4188)
transitive triplets(bonding)
0.140*** (0.0234)
in-2-stars( l it )
0.049 (0 1519)(popularity) (0.1519)
2-path(bridging)
-0.120*** (0.0227)
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Appointed officials tend to create dense ppnetworks of relationships with other actors.
Reciprocity and bonding network structures have a positive relations for interlocalcollaboration.
There is little evidence the administrators choose collaboration partners based on coordination efficiency
Need to match structure to problems, actors and bvenues. No “one best way”
Salience of both actors and relationships.
Tightly‐clustered network structure reduces the transaction costs of enforcing and monitoring
t
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agreements
Even for competitive policy arenas like development, self‐organizing relationships may provide mechanisms to address regional ICA dilemmas
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Evolution of Self‐organizing solutions to ICA problems Co‐evolution of selection and behavior (SIENA models)Co evolution of selection and behavior (SIENA models) 2010 Orlando Survey Media based networks in three metro areas in Florida
Network Influences on Policy Instrument Choice Two mode networks Internal vs. external networks
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Bilateral vs. Collective Arrangements Contracting vs. Collective Action
Complimentary vs. Substitutive relationships among collaboration mechanisms Regional Planning councils
Who Governs? Can networks integrate multiple policy arenasarenas
Energy Sustainability Economic Development Land Use
How can studying self‐organizing inform policy design? Can we discover design principles to improve statutorily imposed
coordination mechanisms?
Are there policy principles in centralized mechanisms that can be used to increase the emergence and performance of self‐organizing
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to increase the emergence and performance of self‐organizing structures?
Impact of network solutions to ICAs on performance Economic development Service delivery
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http://[email protected]
Richard C. FeiockDirector, Center for Sustainable Energy Governance &Augustus B. Turnbull Professor of Public AdministrationAskew School of Public Administration and PolicyFlorida State UniversityTallahassee FL 32306‐2250
http://seg.fsu.eduhttp://askew.fsu.edu/faculty/feiockr.htmlhttp://localgov.fsu.edu/
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