Richard C. Feiock and Jungah Bae - UVic

7/21/2011

1

Richard C. Feiock and Jungah BaeAskew School of Public Administration and PolicyFlorida State University

Metropolitan areas in the U S are Metropolitan areas in the U.S. are characterized by governmental fragmentation

Makes local governments vulnerable to inefficiencies, diseconomies of scale, and

t liti th t ill h d b d externalities that spillover shared borders.

Also provides opportunities for local collaboration to overcome these institutional collective action (ICA) problems

7/21/2011

2

How do politically fragmented local How do politically fragmented local governments in a metropolitan region self‐organize to resolve shared problems and address negative externalities?

h h l f l l What are the roles of local government administrators in self‐organizing regionalism?

AutonomyHi h LHigh Low|________________|_____________|____________|______________|______________|______________|________________|informal “adaptive” inter- partnership council of voluntary imposed consolidated policy agreements governmental agreements governments districts districts general networks contracts government

Source: Feiock and Scholz 2010

Consolidation may be effective for resolving the most complex dilemmas, but it is also the most costly

Informal policy networks preserve autonomy and

4

Informal policy networks preserve autonomy and exchange valuable information in the ways of less costly and more adaptable than formal relations

.

7/21/2011

3

Th f i i i l Three types of institutional mechanisms:

Centralized Authority

Mutually Binding Contracts or Agreements

Network Embeddedness

Collaboration studies focus on issues with little conflict and competitionlittle conflict and competition

Development is highly competitive Quasi Market for jobs and development

Competition can be zero (or negative) sum and undercuts regional interestsg

Transaction costs of collaboration are high Information/bargaining

Trust/credible commitment

7/21/2011

4

Actors (local governments) choose partners and embedded relationships to reduce the

b ll btransaction cost barriers to collaboration Coordination vs. Cooperation Games

Information is a barrier to coordination Actors seek to structure relationships to efficiently acquire information on the actions of other actors

Credible commitment is a barrier to cooperation Actors seek to monitor, constrain and build trust with other actors

Coordination Network Coordination Network

H1: Local administrators will connect with popular actors for information and advice on economic development projects

H2: Local government administrators will form H2: Local government administrators will form bridges to connect to new sets of actor for information and advice on economic development projects

7/21/2011

5

Coordination NetworkCoordination NetworkA) Popularity: in‐stars B) Bridging: 2‐path

Cooperation Network Cooperation Network

H3: Local government administrators will form reciprocal relationships for information and advice on economic development projects

H4: Local government administrators are more likely to forge network connection that creates clustered transitive relationships

7/21/2011

6

Collaboration NetworkCollaboration NetworkA) Reciprocity: reciprocal tie B) Bonding: transitivity

Coordination Cooperationp

Values Efficient information-

transmission

Trust, reciprocity,

reputation, credible

commitment

Risk Low Risk High Risks

Network

Structures

Star Network

Weak-tie

Reciprocal ties

Strong-tie

Network

Functions

Information bridging

Diffusion of ideas

Social bonding

Closure (Social Capital)

7/21/2011

7

�� 38 �� Conducted 2007‐2007

Respondents were economic development directors

� �� 31 ��/�� Response rate of 85%p 5

Total of 465 dyads

�� (�� , ��, �� )

�� , �� 1� �� 0� �� .

�� , �� , �� “1” �� .

7/21/2011

8

Dyadic counts 465

Mutual 42

Asymmetric 108

null 315

Network Density 0.2065

Average Degree 6. 1935g g

- Network for Economic Development Administrators (UCINET)

7/21/2011

9

Estimates the probability that the network structures included in the model appear at a greater frequency than would be explained by a random graph with the same number of local government actors (nodes) and development interactions (links).

The estimated parameters provide the likelihood of the structural effects observed in the network data.

Network Structure EstimateSt d d ENetwork Structure Standard Error

reciprocity 2.279*** (0.4188)

transitive triplets(bonding)

0.140*** (0.0234)

in-2-stars( l it )

0.049 (0 1519)(popularity) (0.1519)

2-path(bridging)

-0.120*** (0.0227)

7/21/2011

10

Appointed officials tend to create dense ppnetworks of relationships with other actors.

Reciprocity and bonding network structures have a positive relations for interlocalcollaboration.

There is little evidence the administrators choose collaboration partners based on coordination efficiency

Need to match structure to problems, actors and bvenues. No “one best way”

Salience of both actors and relationships.

Tightly‐clustered network structure reduces the transaction costs of enforcing and monitoring

t

20

agreements

Even for competitive policy arenas like development, self‐organizing relationships may provide mechanisms to address regional ICA dilemmas

7/21/2011

11

Evolution of Self‐organizing solutions to ICA problems Co‐evolution of selection and behavior (SIENA models)Co evolution of selection and behavior (SIENA models) 2010 Orlando Survey Media based networks in three metro areas in Florida

Network Influences on Policy Instrument Choice Two mode networks Internal vs. external networks

21

Bilateral vs. Collective Arrangements Contracting vs. Collective Action

Complimentary vs. Substitutive relationships among collaboration mechanisms Regional Planning councils

Who Governs? Can networks integrate multiple policy arenasarenas

Energy Sustainability Economic Development Land Use

How can studying self‐organizing inform policy design? Can we discover design principles to improve statutorily imposed

coordination mechanisms?

Are there policy principles in centralized mechanisms that can be used to increase the emergence and performance of self‐organizing

22

to increase the emergence and performance of self‐organizing structures?

Impact of network solutions to ICAs on performance Economic development Service delivery

7/21/2011

12

23

http://[email protected]

Richard C. FeiockDirector, Center for Sustainable Energy Governance &Augustus B. Turnbull Professor of Public AdministrationAskew School of Public Administration and PolicyFlorida State UniversityTallahassee FL 32306‐2250

http://seg.fsu.eduhttp://askew.fsu.edu/faculty/feiockr.htmlhttp://localgov.fsu.edu/

24

7/21/2011

13

25

Richard C. Feiock and Jungah Bae - UVic

Documents

Transcript of Richard C. Feiock and Jungah Bae - UVic