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Seminrio de Poltica Comparada e Relaes Internacionais (IPRI-
UNL e FCSH-UNL)
DRAFT: DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THEAUTHOR
Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for
Portuguese-American relations in the early Cold War (1949-1957)
Daniel Marcos
IPRI-UNL
Introduction
After the difficult negotiations that led to the inclusion of Portugal as one of the
founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949
the American Ambassador at Lisbon, Lincoln MacVeagh, resumed this process to the
Department of State saying that it [was] sometimes difficult to make a horse drink,
though you have taken him to the water. And he added: the size of the horse has
nothing to do with the matter. Little horses may very well be more stubborn than big
ones.1 These considerations echoed the Portuguese resistance to accept the terms of
the Washington Treaty. Since the beginning, Portugal understood that the reason
behind its invitation was the geostrategic importance of the Azores, both for Western
interests in general, and to the United States, in particular. However, this new alliance
did not completely assure Lisbons foreign policy purposes, as the Portuguese
authoritarian regime was not able to guarantee that its colonial territories in Africa
and Asia stood within the area of action of the new defence treaty, which meant that
NATO could not be called upon to defend them.
This awareness is fundamental to understanding the framework that
constrained US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s. The Portuguese authoritarian
regime had a deeply rooted idea that the maintenance of its colonial empire in Africa
1
Letter from Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh to William Dunham, Department of State, April 29,1949. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland Record
Group (RG) 59, Lot File 59D108, Box 10.
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and Asia was essential to ensure the independence of Portugal as a nation state in
Western Europe. On the other hand, in Washington's perspective, the relationship
with Portugal was crucial to protect its interests in Europe, defined in terms of the
Cold War. The geostrategic position of the Portuguese Atlantic islands played a
decisive role in the deployment of US forces in Europe, North Africa and Middle East
while the Portuguese colonial territories were practically insignificant for US strategic
interests at this time.2
In light of these contradictory realities US-Portuguese relations were
constraint by the difficulty in integrating the strategic interests of both countries.
While in the Atlantic, ties of alliance bound Portugal and the United States, on the
colonial level the two countries had opposing views. Nevertheless, the
interdependence developed since the signing of the Treaty of Washington forced the
two countries to seek a modus vivendi that, in the end, guaranteed the broad interests
of each country and the maintenance of unity within NATO. In this article the
constraints of the US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s will be analyzed. It is
intended to demonstrate how the presence of both countries in NATO was crucial to
connect its interests in Europe, while Washington and Lisbon walked in opposite
directions in Asia and Africa without tearing this relationship apart.
Portugal, the Uni ted States and the Washington Treaty
The invitation to Portugal to be a founding member of the Atlantic Pact was
inextricably linked to the geostrategic importance of the Azores.3 Since 1944,
following the Anglo-Portuguese Atlantic bases agreement of October 1943, the US
had access to bases in the Azores (initially in the island of Santa Maria, and from
1946 onwards in Lajes, Terceira). In the early years of the Cold War US-Portuguese
relations reflected a constant tension between the government of the Portuguese
dictator, Oliveira Salazar, and the Truman Administration. Even allowing for the US
presence in the Azores, Salazars regime showed great reluctance regarding the
2For further information on the strategic importance of the Azores for the United Sates before the Cold
War see Jos M. Ferreira, Os Aores nas Duas Guerras Mundiais, Boletim do Instituto Histrico daIlha Terceira, XLV: 1987, 73-90; Antnio Telo, Os Aores e o Controlo do Atlntico (1898/1948)(Porto: Edies Asa, 1993) and Lus Rodrigues, No Corao do Atlntico. Os Estados Unidos e os
Aores (1939-1948) (Lisboa, Edies Prefcio, 2005).3
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and theCold War(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 59 and Nuno Teixeira, From neutrality toalignment: Portugal in the foundation of the Atlantic Pact,Luso-Brazilian Review, 29:1992, 113-127.
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existence of an American base in its territory.4 At the centre of this issue were
different perceptions and interests. On the eve of Cold War, the United States
considered the Azores, along with Greenland and Iceland, as a primary base area.
The contribution of this archipelago to transatlantic security was therefore the most
vital single spot in the world in terms of bases for the staging of air transport and
combat aircraft. In this sense, it was essential to put an end to what the US considered
an undefined status in the Azores, since the presence of US forces was only assured
through a bilateral agreement signed with the Portuguese government, which
established a short term period for the presence of the North-American forces in the
Lajes; at the same time, the bilateral negotiations between the two governments were
traditionally very difficult.5 Thus, to the Truman administration, it was necessary to
promote the attainment of a stable and lasting agreement, clearly demonstrating the
importance of Portuguese-American relations and the question of the Azores in the
context of the Cold War.6
For Portugal, on the other hand, what was at stake was the readjustment of its
international status. In geopolitical terms, the country had lived since its foundation
on an unstable balance between Europe and the Atlantic. Peripheral regarding the core
Europe and with a larger and more powerful Spanish neighbour, Portugal had always
defined itself essentially as an Atlantic state, focused on the preservation of its
colonial empire. Seeing Spain as its main threat, Portugal considered the Atlantic as a
balancing factor for avoiding the countrys isolation on the westernmost part of
Europe. In fact, the regimes elite saw the African and Asian Portuguese territories as
the assurance of the countrys national independence, mostly because they allowed
overcoming the geographical, political and economic limitations of Portugal as a
European nation. Additionally, the traditional relationship with the United Kingdom,
an element of continuity between the different political regimes that ruled Portugal,
was essential for the international survival of Portugal, particularly in assuring the
4Lus Rodrigues,No Corao do Atlntico.
5 A report to the president by the National Security Council, November 25, 1947. Harry Truman
Presidential Library (HTPL) Personal Secretary File, Subject File, Box 176. During the 1940s, US
presence in the Azores was regulated by three bilateral agreements signed in 1944, 1946 and 1948. See
Lus Rodrigues,No Corao do Atlntico.6Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 31.
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Atlantic vector. Consequently, the Portuguese government saw in the ancient alliance
with Great Britain the main stronghold of its foreign policy.7
After World War II, the international position of Salazars regime was
weakened. The Allies victory and the emergence of the United States as the main
Atlantic power gradually, though not entirely, diminished the relevance of the long
lasting alliance with the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, the victory of the
democracies over the authoritarian regimes raised some political problems for the
Estado Novo (New State). On the one hand, Italy and Germanys total defeat allowed
the Soviet Union to enter in the centre of the European continent. On the other hand,
the expansion of liberalism and democracy throughout Western Europe seemed to
bring problems to the Iberian authoritarian regimes.8 And, as important as this, was
the fact that Portugal needed to become closer to the new Atlantic power, the United
Sates, in order to maintain its main foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, for
Salazar, Washington seemed unfamiliar with European values, especially regarding
the colonial interests of European powers. The traditional anti-colonial position of the
various administrations clearly influenced the Portuguese dictators negative
perception towards the United States.9
Having these constraints as background, the possibility of bringing a
vehemently anti-communist Portugal to the restricted club of NATOs founding
members was seen by the United States as a way of surpassing the bilateral
limitations of US-Portuguese relations. The US pressed the other Brussels Pact
partners in order to include a group of peripheral European countries in the future
transatlantic organization. Along with Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland, it was
decided in September 1948 that Portugal should be invited to join the new North
Atlantic defensive agreement, even if it did not fully accept its conditions.10 The
authoritarian characteristics of the Portuguese regime were criticised by some
countries, in particular Canada, which pointed out the contradiction of having
Portugal in an organization dedicated to the democratic spirit and the preservation of
7Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, in Contemporary Portugal.
Politics, Society and Culture (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2011), 95-130.8
Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos,1996), 1.9Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD
diss., ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, 2011), 39-61.10Washington Paper, September 9, 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, III:
240-241.
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liberal institutions. Nonetheless, in the United States perspective, the fact that
Portugal, despite its neutrality, was close to the Allies during the final phase of World
War II and, mostly, the strong anti-communist character of the Estado Novo were
sufficient reasons for an invitation to Portugal. With British support, the United States
position prevailed and Portugal was for the first time approached on the possibility of
being part of the future Alliance in October 1948.11
Lisbon acknowledged this first inquiry with the same apparent suspicion it
received the news on the efforts for a greater European cooperation after the end of
World War II. Excluded by Soviet veto from the United Nations in 1946, the
Portuguese regime in 1947 sought to follow an autonomous position regarding the
Marshall Plan. This led to a contradictory strategy of the Portuguese Government,
which allowed Portugals participation at the Paris Conference of 1947 and the
foundation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
Nevertheless, Salazar initially refused to receive any financial support from the
European Recovery Program (ERP) forPortugals underdeveloped economy.12
In face of this, the Portuguese government understood the need to establish
some sort of transatlantic cooperation, particularly in the field of defence, which
could challenge the Soviet threat in Europe13. Although Salazar had a negative
perception of US power in Europe, it was already clear for the Portuguese political
elite that the European defensive area should include the United States as an
essential prerequisite to success. But it should also include Francos Spain, in order
to preserve the strategic and geographical unity of Europe and the Iberian Peninsula.14
Besides this condition Portugal also considered that the Pact should assure the
defence of the Portuguese colonies, namely through its extension into the European
colonial possessions. At the same time, the Pact should not be a way for the United
11Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948. The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (New York,
Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 172-177.12
Despite the rhetoric, Portugal eventually received financial support from the ERP from 1948 to 1950.
This change was justified by the degradation of the international financial system. For further
information see Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy and
Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da rejeio solicitao da ajuda financeira norte-americana (1947-1952) (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1994).13
US official acknowledgement that the Portuguese peripheral position at the Western end of Europe
diminished the sense of threat of a military attack by the Soviet Union. This did not reflect a complete
absence of reality regarding the effective threat of Moscow to Europe, but it revealed the idea that
Portugal was thought to be in a position to bargain with the transatlantic partners. For further
information see Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial, 129-130.14Telegram Ambassador in Portugal to Secretary of State, September 8, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 1002-
1005.
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States to assure its long-term presence in the Azores, in more favourable conditions.
Finally, the Alliance should reinforce the intergovernmental cooperation, avoiding
any type of supranational integration.15
Despite Lisbons efforts, the Portuguese terms to sign the Atlantic Alliance
were not considered by the Treatys negotiators (United States, Canada and th e
members of the Brussels Pact) in particular what concerned the accession of Francos
Spain and the inclusion of the colonial territories in the Treatys area of action.16
Salazar and the Portuguese elite had their hands tied up and, as he himself
recognized during the National Assembly meeting where the Washington Treaty was
ratified, Portugals presence as a founding member of the Alliance was largely due to
the importance of the Atlantic islands to Europes geostrategic concerns. In short, to
the Portuguese government, it seemed difficult () to be absent.17 Being pressured
by its main allies, including the United States, the Portuguese government eventually
gave in, more out of a necessity than by conviction. Despite the reluctance
demonstrated by Lisbon, it is undeniable that Portuguese participation in the Atlantic
Pact was fundamental for the international legitimation of the Portuguese
authoritarian regime, highly diminishing the risk of its international isolation.18 Added
to this, the invitation to Portugal was a unique opportunity to strengthen the countrys
weight in the international system, bringing it closer to the Western powers and
clearly distinguishing it from Francos regime in Spain. In a period of intense
international adaptation, with the beginning of the Cold War, Portugal had to adapt its
own foreign policy, maintaining its links with the United Kingdom while becoming
closer to the United States.19
15Nuno Teixeira,From neutrality to alignment; Pedro Oliveira, Documentos: A Adeso de Portugal
NATO (1948-1949),Poltica Internacional, 19: 1999, 121-150.16
Portugal sought to ensure that its colonial territories were included within the treaty area.Nevertheless, the results were not the same as the ones achieved by Paris, which was successful in its
efforts. For more details see Carlos Gaspar Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, In Antnio
Barreto and Maria Filomena Mnica (ed.), Dicionrio deHistria de Portugal (Porto: LivrariaFigueirinhas, 2000), 678-684; Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948, 211-212.17
Carlos Gaspar, Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, 678-684; Oliveira Salazars speech in
the Portuguese National Assembly, July 26, 1949. Quoted on Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque(1945-1958) (Porto: Livraria Civilizao Editora, 2000), 155.18
As the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris put it to Oliveira Salazar in a letter where he defended the
necessity of Portuguese participation in NATO, excluded from the United Nations Portugal could not
miss the opportunity of strengthen the international links with the Western powers. Letter from
Marcello Mathias to Oliveira Salazar, March 23, 1949. Verssimo Serro (ed.), CorrespondnciaMarcello Mathias/Salazar (1947/1968) (Lisboa: Difel, 1984), 127-129.19
Lus Rodrigues, Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, the Azores and the Atlantic Community(1943-1957), In Valrie Aubourg, Grard Bssuat, Giles Scott-Smith (ed.), European Community,
Atlantic Community? (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 456-467; Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial:
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The Portuguese presence in NATO was perceived by the Truman
Administration as a crucial moment in the relationship between the two countries. It
became clear that the old, traditional bond between Portugal and the United Kingdom
was now hardly more than a sentimental alliance. The Atlantic Alliance emerged
now as an alternative substitute to this liaison and the United States was increasing its
diplomatic influence over the Portuguese government. The US was now the leading
power in the Western Alliance and had the right to act as such.20 In short, with the
signature of the Washington Treaty, the international situation was deeply changed
and Portugal was no longer merely a friend of our friends. In this sense, the US
wanted to take advantage of the Pacts multilateral spirit to renew the bilateral relation
with Portugal, clearly having in mind the need for the presence of North-American
forces in the Azores.21
Integrated in the transatlantic community, the Portuguese regime began a
cautious inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance, with a double result. On the one hand,
Salazars regime was forced to take a stand regarding the main international issues,
which definitely put an end to the neutrality policy followed by the regime since
World War II. If the international responsibility increased, so did the external prestige
of the regime.22 On the other hand, the Portuguese Armed Forces were arguably the
group on which NATO had a more profound impact.23 In return, on 6 September
1951, Portugal and the United States signed an agreement, by exchange of notes, to
define the facilities conceded by Portugal to the American forces in the Azores, until
the end of 1956. As the Portuguese press memorandum stated, having in mind
NATOs dispositions regarding the principle of common defence and the
preservation of peace and security, the United States and Portugal had signed an
agreement of defence which regulated these facilities, by integrating them in the
framework of the Alliances defensive procedures.24Thus, as a member of NATO,
the Portuguese government allowed the United States to immediately prepare and to
Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011),
39.20
Letter from the US Ambassador at Lisbon to the Department of State (William Dunham), April 29,
1949. NARARG 59, Lot 59D108, Box 10.21
Note from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government, December 7, 1949. Direco
Geral Arquivos (DGARQ), LisboaAOS/CO/NE-18-1.22
Daniel Marcos, Portugal e a Evoluo do Sistema Defensivo Europeu. A Cimeira de Lisboa de
1952,Relaes Internacionais, 27 (2010): 65-80.23
Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos,1996).24
Dirio de Notcias, September 7, 1951, 1.
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maintain the facilities considered necessary, in order to have them ready in case of
war.25
Portugal and the earl y days of NATO
The deterioration of international stability in the early 1950s forced Portugal to
deepen its relations with the new allies in a spirit of increasingly open cooperation.
From the end of 1949 to June 1950, several events compelled the United States and its
allies to reinforce their military position concerning the Soviet Union. First, the US
lost the nuclear monopoly, seen as the only balancing weapon against Soviet
supremacy in Europe.26 Secondly, following the victory of the Chinese Communist in
Mainland China, in June 1950 the world witnessed the beginning of the Korean
War.27These events had definitive consequences to NATO and to Europes evolution
during the Cold War. In Washington and the other European capitals, the need to
increase the investment in European defence became evident. This process meant an
increase in the military expenditure and, at the same time, a deep reform of the
Alliances political structures, which transformed the Pact into a true collective
defence organization.28
Yet, the way these objectives were to be achieved was not consensual among
the allies. To the US, the best way to develop the collective defence effort in Europe
was through NATO, with all member-states participating in it and with the inclusion
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In fact, West Germany, despite belonging
to the geographical area of the Treaty, was not an original member of the Pact and did
not contribute to the Alliances military effort until after 1954. According to the
American plans, West Germany should contribute to the wider European defensive
effort, in the process of increasing the conventional capacity of the Alliance to
compensate for the loss of the Wests nuclear monopoly. This evolution would force
25Anexo I do Acordo Luso-Americano de 6 de Setembro de 1951. Arquivo da Defesa Nacional
(ADN), Pao de ArcosFundo do Secretariado-Geral de Defesa Nacional, Box 7089.2.26
Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of European Settlement (New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1999), 96-98.27
John Gaddis, TheCold War(London: Allen Lane, 2005), 40-60.28
Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2005), 63 ff.; Carlos Gaspar A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos, Nao e
Defesa, 102 (2002), 45-63.
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NATO to commit to the defence of West German territory and to develop a new
relationship between the FRG and the Alliance.29
The resolution of this political process was two fold. Firstly, it consisted in the
creation of an integrated command in the Alliance, in the second half of 1950, as well
as the promotion of the idea that all the allies would accept the future integration of
West Germany into the organization.30 Later, during the Lisbon Summit of February
1952, the Allies agreed upon the creation ofthe office of NATOs Secretary General
and the constitution of a Permanent Council of Representatives. These actions
centralized and reinforced the Alliance, which reflected on the concentration of all
administrative dimensions of the Pact in a single International Secretariat.31
But most importantly, due to some allies resistance, especially France, between
1950 and 1952 several negotiations took place between the US, Great Britain, France
and, in a later moment, the Federal Republic of Germany itself, in order to find an
agreement regarding how and under which type of association Germany would
participate in European defence. Paris refused to accept West Germany in NATO and
proposed the creation of a supranational organization, similar to the model of the
European Coal and Steel Community, which should integrate the German military
assets in a future European Defence Community (EDC). The new organization that
was formalized in the Treaty of Paris, in May 1952, received its decisive boost at
NATOs meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952. During this Summit the Allies
Foreign Ministers gave their approval both to the negotiations on EDC and on the
political future of West Germany. Furthermore, they approved the terms of the future
relationship between NATO and the EDC.32 It was envisaged that this would be done
through an additional protocol to the Washington Treaty, approved by all member
states, which established the mutual commitment, in terms of security and defence,
between the members of both organizations. According to the final communiqu of
the Summit, the Atlantic Council acknowledged that NATO and EDC had the same
general objectives and considered that the obligations and relationships between the
29OTAN, Organization du Trait de l'Atlantique Nord. Structure, Faits et Chiffres (Brussels: OTAN,
1981), 28-29.30
James McAllister, No Exit. America and the German Problem (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2002), 188.31
Report 1205 from the North Atlantic Pact Service, April 7, 1953. Arquivo Histrico Diplomtico-
MNE (AHD-MNE), LisboaRNP, A. 50, M. 102.32
William Hitchcock,France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe,1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 133-168; James McAllister,No Exit. America and the German Problem, 171-244.
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Communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one
working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and
reinforcing the other.33
According to the Portuguese government, these deep changes had to be
accompanied with guarantees that no ally would have its political voice diminished
within NATO, even though if, in the military field, it was clear that the US had an
eminence of their own.34 Although seeing it as globally positive, Portugal considered
that NATOs political restructuring could bring some problems in the future.
Decisions like the creation of the Permanent Council and the position of the Secretary
General, despite being considered as essential and allowing faster decisions, should
not be considered as definitive. The major concern of the Portuguese government was
the powers of the Secretary Generalin particular the ability to contact an individual
government without having to previously consult with the permanent representative
of that country. From the Portuguese perspective, this was a dangerous prerogative, as
it could transform the Secretary General into an absolute authority within the
Alliance, anticipating a future supranational character to NATO.35
Concerning the EDC, Portugal was sceptical regarding any political institutions
which were considered federalist and supranational. Thus, projects like the European
Defence Community seemed mere inaccurate ideas only to be implemented in the
long term.36 However, that did not mean that Portugal would block the French efforts
to build such a Community, in particular if these efforts were conducive to a solution
of German participation in European defence effort. Despite arguing that this solution
should be simply achieved through German accession to NATO, Portugal was proud
of being one of the first European countries to publicly sustain FRGs participation in
the European defensive system and, in that sense, it did not block the other allies
solutions.37
Finally, the Portuguese government was forced to accept and to endorse the first
enlargement of the Alliance. The accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 reaffirmed
33Final Communiqu of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, 20-25 February 1952. North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, Online Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm (accessedOctober 12, 2011).34
Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958) (Barcelos: Civilizao, 2000), 170-171.35
Informao de Servio, 17 de Maro de 1952. AHD-MNERQE, A. 51, M. 21.36
Evoluo da NATO durante os ltimos meses: de Otawa a Roma e ao TCC, July 8, 1951. AHD-MNERNP, A. 50, M. 102.37
Informao de Servio, March 17, 1952. AHD-MNERQE, A. 51, M. 21
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NATOs engagement to the strategic space of the Mediterranean, initiated with the
invitation to Italy as one of NATOs founding members.38 However, the accession of
these two countries was not consensual. If, on the one hand, the US were clearly
interested in having Turkey contributing to the collective effort of Western defence,
most of the European partners had strong doubts about this.39 Nonetheless, the
strategic interest of the US and NATO prevailed and the accession of Turkey and
Greece was decided in Lisbon. Regarding this enlargement, Portugal considered that
these two countries membership would be seen by Moscow as a provocation.
Furthermore, the accession of a country such as Turkey menaced the spirit of the
Alliance, which was based on the association of states with a common heritage,
culture and objectives.40 Moreover, this process did not serve Portuguese interests,
since Lisbon was mainly concerned with the integration of Spain into the European
defensive system and not towards an area that had little strategic importance to
Portugal. As Foreign MinisterPaulo Cunha declared, if Portugal effusively greeted
this decision, it could only avoid regretting that it had not yet been decided to close
the Alliance in the West, and remove the absurd situation which is the absence of
Spain in the Western defence system.41
Therefore, the first years of the Alliance allowed Salazar to enhance
international recognition of his regime, while simultaneously consolidating the
Portuguese position with regard to transatlantic cooperation. While any sort of
supranational project seemed unattractive to the Portuguese objectives, Portugal
decided not to oppose these ideas, as to do so would risk the repeal of transatlantic
compromises assumed by Western allies after World War II. According to the
Portuguese government, the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed its role as a fundamental
organization for the maintenance of an independent Europe facing the Soviet threat.
Despite the Portuguese governments traditionally sceptical rhetoric regarding the
United States, the fact is that Portugal became one of the most cooperative allies.42
38Carlos Gaspar, A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos,Nao e Defesa, 102 (2002), 50.
39James Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2009), 29-30.40
Memorandum of Conversation, July 13, 1951. NARARG59, Lot File 59D108, Box 1.41
Dirio de Notcias, February 20, 1952, 1 and 6.42Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD
diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 103-118.
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From the Atlantic to the Empir e: NATO and the emergence of the colonial issues in
US-Portuguese Relati ons
The developments that occurred in NATO in the early 1950s jeopardized the
established guidelines of Portuguese foreign policy. Traditionally with its back turned
to Europe, Portugal was forced to deepen its relations with the United States, whether
at a multilateral or at a bilateral level.43 With an impact on various aspects of
Portuguese political life, the traditionally tense bilateral relationship between Portugal
and the United States had been maturing since the Second World War, particularly
due to the multilateral framework assured by common participation in NATO.
In early 1954 the Portuguese government reassessed Portuguese-American
relations in face of the new alliance system in which both countries participated.According to a memorandum prepared by Alberto Franco Nogueira, a promising
diplomat from the Bureau of Political Affairs who would become Minister of Foreign
Affairs in 1961, the most important issues in the relationship between the United
States and Portugal would always be, from the American perspective, the Azores and,
from the Portuguese point of view, the maintenance of its colonial empire. Therefore,
in order to achieve this objective Portugal had to follow an integrated, firm and
comprehensive policy to avoid being ignored or overlooked in all the issues that
mattered to the Western powers. In light of this, it was fundamental to follow a set of
principles that had been the basis of Portuguese foreign policy throughout history,
especially when reassessing relations with the United States. Firstly, Portugal could
not risk losing its independence by getting involved and losing a war. In this sense,
it was essential that she should not take part in any coalition of forces that did not
offer a "guarantee of victory in a future conflict. Independence and victory were
assured with Portugal's accession to NATO in 1949 since it appeared unlikely that
this Alliance would be defeated in war against the Soviet Union.44
However, the participation in NATO had made Portugals foreign policy more
vulnerable regarding what the Portuguese government considered to be one of the
main aspects of its external autonomy: the maintenance of the colonial empire. Since
the first moment, the Portuguese government understood that its participation in the
Alliance increased the risks to any Portuguese territory, without assuring its
43
Nuno Teixeira, Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1989,Anlise Social, 30-133 (1995), 803-818.44 Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros,
January, 1954. AHD-MNERNP, A. 59, M. 232.
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defence. Therefore, it was clear that one of the main concerns of Portuguese foreign
policy was not protected. In this sense, the country was in a position in which it could
not count on an Alliance or political support that would protect its vital interests
outside the coalition area in which we are included.45
Having this in mind, there were two possible solutions: either a full alliance,
in which case the obvious partner would be the United States, or outside of the
coalition and regarding the issues which are not abridged by it, the development of a
policy of independence, which would look for partial political support elsewhere.
This had been the strategy adopted by Portugal when dealing with the Far East
powers, where the survival of Macau and Portuguese territories in India was
accounted for, among other reasons, by the fact that Portugal had always followed a
different policy to that adopted by the West.46 What suggested itself was a policy
of independence in Africa and in the Far East, which would not consider the
framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but which would unfold in different directions
according to the Portuguese interests. These, in certain moments, could even be
contradictory to those of the Pact. In conclusion, Nogueira stated: having in mind
the need for cooperation in Europe, forWestern defence; considering that it was not
clearly legitimate nor convenient, to review the terms of that cooperation; being
imperative for Portugal correspondingly, to help to defend the Western
Civilization values and to protect the territorial integrity of the Nation it seemed
that the only option would be to follow the independent policy as base for a possible
global orientation of the Portuguese foreign policy towards the United States47.
Thus, any possibility of a deepening of the bilateral relations with the United
States was inhibited by the Portuguese need in assuring support for the maintenance
of its colonial empire. As the US seemed unable to assure this, there was no
alternative to Portugal but to adopt a flexible and pragmatic position: showing
45Before World War II this foreign policy guideline was assured by the Alliance between Portugal and
Great Britain. However, in the 1950s, it was already clear to Portugal that Britain was not in a position
of affording support to Portuguese colonial interests. For further information see Pedro Oliveira, OsDespojos da Aliana. A Gr-Bretanha e a questo colonial portuguesa, 1945-1975 (Lisboa: Tinta-da-China Edies, 2007).46
Historically, Portuguese Foreign policy in the Far East was based on the effort to follow an
autonomous position regarding the Western Powers. This meant that the Portuguese government
should analyze every particular situation independently, which could mean adopting a course that serve
the interests of the regional powers, China, for example, instead of those of the European powers.
Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD
diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 145-146.47 Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros,
January, 1954. AHD-MNERNP, A. 59, M. 232.
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of national urge for unity was impossible to sustain. The Portuguese territories were
incompatible with the status of India as an independent country. Thus, those
pockets of foreign territories, however small in area and however friendly the powers
occupying them, should simply not exist on Indian soil.52 The argumentation used
by the Indian government reflected a fundamental point of its foreign policy: the idea
that India had the right and the obligation to promote the liberation of subject
peoples as well as the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual. In other
words, India had a duty to fight all forms of colonialism. However, even though India
felt the moral duty to help the Third World free itself from European colonialism,
Nehrus policy had a dilemma: morally and intellectually committed with the
settlement of dispute through peaceful means, any attempt to force a reluctant colonial
power to leave Indian soil could be charged with hypocrisy53.
For this reason, the initial position of India, regarding Goa, was to establish
political and diplomatic relations with Portugal, hoping that it could lead to future
negotiations regarding its territories in India. Originally, Nehru and other Indian
leaders did not attach much importance to Goas problem since for them Portuguese
rule would wither away, the moment British rule come to an end in India. Nehru
assumed that the Portuguese would quit Goa without any hesitation as it wou ld be
impossible for them to survive without the goodwill of Britain.54 However, facing the
reluctance of the Portuguese to discuss their exit, India developed a more aggressive
policy. Between 1953 and 1955, Delhi closed its Embassy in Lisbon and strengthened
the support to the Goan nationalist movements.55
Since the beginning of this quarrel, the United States had adopted a neutral
position to avoid any involvement in the effort developed by the Indian government
to bring about through negotiation the remaining foreign enclaves in India.56 The
US wished to have as little to do as possible regarding this issue so as to avoid
damaging their relations both with Portugal and India.57
52Note from the Legation of India in Lisbon, January, 14, 1953. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da
ndia, (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 281-283. This idea of geographicalcontiguity as an argument to take control over Goa was contested by Portugal on the basis that from
British India two countries have become independent: Pakistan and Indian Union.53
Arthur Rubinoff,Indias use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971), 15-29.54
P.P Shirodkar, Goas Struggle for Freedom (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988), 40-41.55
Maria Stocker, Xeque-Mate a Goa (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2005), 95 and P. D. Gaitonde, The
Liberation of Goa: A Participants view of History (London: Hurst&Co, 1987), 71-80.56Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 1950. FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, 1480.
57Memorandum of Conversation, February 14, 1951. FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, p.1663.
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Rhetorically, for the Portuguese government, the Goan dispute seemed one
more case of Communist penetration in Asia. Consistent with the cooperation showed
by Portugal in the early years of NATO, Portuguese diplomacy followed a strategy of
creating an overall awareness of the future dangers that were at stake for the Alliance
in case of an aggression against the Portuguese territories in Asia. Following the
heroic efforts being made by the French in confronting revolutionary anti-colonial
forces in Indochina, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Paulo Cunha, stated in the
North Atlantic Council in April 1954 the need for NATO to increase vigilance
throughout the world. It was time to follow a policy of firmness without
provocation in order to prevent the development of Communism in Asia.
Accordingly, Cunha argued that NATO should prevent any new aggression in this
area such as the one which might arise in face of the efforts developed by the Indian
Government towards Goa, which affected the national integrity of Portugal.58
But, behind the Portuguese rhetoric expressed in the plenary session of the
NATO Council, the Goan dispute was the occasion where the Lisbon government
wished that the Alliance could somehow protect its colonial interests. Assuming its
loyalty towards the overall importance of the Alliance for the Western world,
Portugal still tried to conciliate its interests within the Atlantic Treaty dispositions.
Understanding that it not would be possible to invoke article 559 of the Atlantic
Alliance, all that was left for Portugal was to call upon article 4, which stated that
there might be a collective position from the Allies in the case where one of its
members considered that its territorial integrity and security might be endangered. In
order to achieve this objective, Portugal approached both the United Kingdom and the
United States.60 In only one month, the Portuguese government tried to raise the
matter to the highest level of the Department of State, calling the attention of the
Deputy Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Deputy Under
Secretary, Robert Murphy. On both occasions, Washington argued that such
consultation would result in any action by the Council or if the Council should take
any action, it was doubtful that it would be effective in producing a solution and
would allow Communist propaganda to arouse Indian and South Asian sensitivities
58Department of State Telegram, April 24, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, p. 516.
59
According to this article, any attack to a NATO ally is considered to be an act of violence against allmember states of this organization.60
Portuguese approach to the United Kingdon in Pedro Oliveira, Os Despojos da Aliana, pp. 95-103.
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regarding a Western Bloc and the preservation of colonialism.61 In face of this
reply, Portugal dropped its intention.
The invasion of two Portuguese enclaves, Nagar Aveli e Dadr, by Goan
nationalists supported by Indian police officers in July 1954 and the consequent
Portuguese complaint, both in NATO and in Washington, failed to persuade
Portugals allies, in particular the United States, to take action. Confronted with a
formal request for help by the Portuguese government, namely a public declaration of
solidarity by the United States, the State Department responded that it was not in a
strong position to take any action condemning India. Washington considered that
any public position was impracticable regarding the international atmosphere in
Asia, since the United States had the strongest desire to become sympathetic in the
eyes of Nehrus government.62 In other words, Portugal should not expect from the
United States anything more thanprivate general advice to the government of India
against the use of violence.63
The Eisenhower administrations position caused great dissatisfaction in
Lisbon. Aware that the United States would not allow NATOs involvement in this
dispute, the Portuguese regime tried to make Goa a Cold War issue. Consequently,
Lisbon put in motion a contradictory strategy of bilateral pressure that, in the end,
could jeopardize the Alliances overall interests. Salazar and the Portuguese Foreign
Minister, Paulo Cunha quickly understood that the American interest and
commitment in the Azores could play an important role in this affair. In reaction to
the US neutral position, Cunha called the American Ambassador to his office and
strongly criticized his government attitude. According to Cunha, Portugal had
always collaborated with US and had never asked for economic aid or otherquid pro
quo both in US-Portuguese multilateral and bilateral relations. However, some
political collaboration in return was obviously expected. As Robert Guggenheim,
the US Ambassador at Lisbon, put it, it was not possible to predict how this matter
could not fail in gravely affecting such things as NATO and Azores. The tone used
by Paulo Cunha, who was not aperson to imply double-dealing lightly, proved that
61Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and to the Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), May 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, pp.
1742-1744.62
Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry to the Overseas Ministry, Julho 31, 1954. Vinte anos deDefesa do Estado da ndia, Vol. II. (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 35-36.63
Office Memo to the Secretary of State, July 30, 1954. NARARG 59, Lot File 59D 108, Box 3.
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the Portuguese government was sincerely aroused at what they consider to be a very
shabby treatmentby the United States.64
It did not take much time for the US administration to start believing that its
position regarding Goa might have endangered NATO and US objectives in the
Azores. Even within the Department of State, especially in the Bureau that took care
of US-Portuguese relations, it became clear that the Portuguese super-sensitivity
over Goa was caused by Lisbons clear perception that the United Sates were more
concerned in protecting their interests in India than in supporting a NATO ally.65
However, the mood was about to change. At the same time as the Goan issue
intensified, the US Department of Defence was studying the possibility of expanding
the facilities granted to the United States in the Azores in 1951. These plans implied a
considerable increase in US military personnel as well as a request for the extension
of the US presence in the Azores. For the Department of Defence, it was obvious that
US diplomacy had to have in mind, when setting an attitude toward Portugal
regarding Goa, the facilities we already enjoy in the Azores, but also the steady
pressure for their expansion (), to say nothing of the renewal of the Azores
agreement itself in 1956.66 Basically, the Department of Defence not only wanted
additional facilities. They also wanted a new agreement, with an extension of the
deadline. However, the Department of Defence was not the only part of the
administration to support this point of view. To the US Embassy in Lisbon, the Goan
issue should be seen as an opportunity to create a better atmosphere for the
attainment of future US-Portuguese relations. As James Bonbright, the newly
appointed US Ambassador at Lisbon insisted, helping Portugal was a refreshing
position by the United States since it was normally this country that requested
assistance from Portugal. Therefore, any kind of helpful motion or some moral
support to Portugal would pay big dividends in US-Portuguese relations especially
regarding the bases in the Azores.67
64Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal to the Department of State, August 9, 1954. FRUS,
1952-1954, Vol. VI, 1744-1745.65
Letter from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, August 30, 1954. NARA- RG59,
Lot File 59D108, Box 3.66
Dispatch from the Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, November 2, 1954. FRUS, 1952-
1954, Vol. VI, pp. 1749-1750.67Letter from the American Embassy in Lisbon, April 23, 1954. NARA RG 59, Lot File 59D 108,
Box 3.
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With the deterioration of US relations with Portugal and in view of American
interests in the Azores, the State Department was forced to produce a policy to do
what it could to renew the Azores agreement .68 This position was completely
connected to the Goan issue since Portugal had, according to the State Department, a
strong emotional position regarding Goa that nobody seemed to control.
Therefore, the least they were expecting was that the USA should stop playing a
losing game with Nehru and start to give full attention to the virile small nations of
the West.69
Trying to bring together the Portuguese and United States points of view, at the
end of 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invited his Portuguese counterpart
to make an official visit to the USA, where they could discuss the situation of US-
Portuguese relations, with particular focus on the Goan dispute, NATO evolution and
the renewal of the Azores agreement. In a private meeting with Foster Dulles, Paulo
Cunha emphasized the position which Goa holds in the heart of all Portuguese since
it was constitutionally inseparable from the homeland and a part of the life -blood
of the Portuguese people. There were no negotiations that could be held with the
objective of transferring power in Goa to India; not even a plebiscite, as Dulles
suggested, since for Cunha that would be like the United States holding a plebiscite
in Alaska, Massachusetts or Florida to decide whether American citizens there want
to remain Americans. Besides the Goa question, Foster Dulles and Cunha also had
the opportunity to discuss the renegotiation of the Azores Agreement. For Cunha, the
American request, that included the increase of US troops, raised serious political
questions. To the Portuguese minister, the United States should be aware that the
Portuguese people were very sensitive about their sovereignty and did not favour the
presence of foreigners on their soil. Despite understanding the Portuguese position,
Foster Dulles mentioned the importance of NATO maintaining a strong defensive
posture as a deterrent of war.70
The Portuguese foreign minister made it clear that the evolution of US-
Portuguese relations in the Azores was deeply connected to the support the US might
give to Portugal in its colonial policies. Portugal was not in a position to accept a long
term US presence in the Azores during peacetime, especially if the US showed itself
68Memorandum of Conversation, January 13, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 439.
69
Letter from the US Embassy in Portugal to the Portuguese Desk, September 24, 1954. NARARG84, US Legation in Lisbon, Box 47.70
Memorandum of Conversation, November 30, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, pp. 445-451.
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so uncooperative with regard to Portuguese colonial interests. At the end of this visit,
the Eisenhower administration was forced to assume, for the first and only time, its
support for the maintenance of Portuguese colonial possessions. In a declaration that
became known has the Cunha-Dulles Statement, both the US administration and the
Portuguese government concluded that the two countries embrace many peoples of
many races and for that reason they deplored all efforts to foment hatred between
East and West and to divide people who need to feel a sense of unity and fellowship
for peace and mutual welfare, in a direct reference to the Portuguese territories in
India that were in dispute between Portugal and Nehrus government. Finally, both
governments reinforced the idea that all these topics had in common the problems of
defence within the framework of NATO, reinforcing the importance that the Azores
and the harmony of US-Portuguese relations had for US interests, in particular, and
the Western World in general.71
In the next year and a half Portugal and the United States carefully prepared a
new Azores agreement. US clear support for Portugal in late 1955 regarding the Goan
dispute obviously contributed to this process. However, it cannot be said that the
relations between the two countries recovered definitely. In fact, the negotiations for
the renewal of this agreement were intentionally delayed by the Portuguese
government, owing to its anxiety and annoyance over American foreign policy,
particularly during the Suez crisis in late 1956. In a meeting with Ambassador James
Bonbright at the end of 1956, Salazar was very explicit: a series of events caused the
Portuguese government to reflect on the desirability of postponing the conclusion of
the new agreement. Since Portugal had interests scattered in Africa and Asia, they
had to make sure that American policies were not prejudicial to those interests. For
the Portuguese dictator, the hostile position adopted by the United States towards
France and the UK during the Suez Crisis had completely undermined NATO,
which had forced Portugal to wait to see where the US is heading before accepting
the extension of US facilities in the Azores under NATO provisions.72
71Cunha-Dulles Statement, December 2, 1955. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da ndia, Vol. III
(Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1968), 51. The Cunha-Dulles Statement was a
milestone on US-Portuguese relations. For the United States, it reflected the North-American position
regarding the Bandung Conference of 1955. For the Portuguese Government, the Cunha-Dulles
Statement was made at a time when the recent Portuguese accession to the United Nations anticipated a
period of strong criticism to Portugals colonial policy in that institution. Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana
Circunstancial.72Despatch from the US Embassy in Lisbon, January 4, 1957. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 466-
471.
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In private, Salazar understood that the compromise of defending the Portuguese
colonies was something beyond any American Administration. Accordingly, the
only solution was to limit the duration of the agreements, forcing the United States
to a constant renegotiation to maintain the facilities in the Azores.73 The agreement
was finally signed in September 1957, valid for five years, until December 1962,
when, once again, the colonial issue arose, at that point due to the developing colonial
war in Angola.
Conclusion
Behind the invitation for Portugal to become a member of NATO was the
United States strategic interest in the North Atlantic area, particularly the utilization
of the Lajes airfield in the Azores. As has been seen, for the Portuguese authoritarian
regime the invitation to participate as a founding member of this restrictive group
raised problems for Portugals foreign policy. It quickly became clear that the
Alliance would not assure its colonial interests. However, the acceptance of the
North-American invitation, more by necessity than by conviction, represented several
gains for Salazar: the international recognition of the authoritarian Estado Novo
regime and its insertion in the Western bloc. During the Alliances first years,Salazars strongly anti-communist government was a committed ally, supporting a
solution for the European Defence Community, accepting the Alliances first
enlargement in the Mediterranean area and the institutional reform of NATO. In all
these issues, Portugal had to adjust itself in order to strengthen the Atlantic Alliances
cohesion.
Simultaneously, Portugals participation in the Atlantic Alliance served as a
broader framework for the bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, this
multilateral framework constrained the two countries to become allies. If, in the first
place, the Azores were the reason behind Portugals admission into NATO, after 1949
it was the Alliance that brought together the two countries and forced them to
strengthen their relationship. The United States, because it was in its interest to
maintain and further develop the facilities in the Lajes airfield; Portugal, because it
was aware of this interest and played the Azorean trump card to push Washington and
73Handwritten note by Oliveira Salazar on US-Portuguese relations, November, 1955. DGARQ
AOS/CO/NE-17.
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thereby, obtain leverage in the colonial issue. This strategy led to the creation of a
modus vivendi in US-Portuguese relations that was based on a thin balance between
the interests of both governments.
The Goan dispute in the mid-1950s is a clear example of this situation. After
one last effort to raise the problem in NATO, which was firmly denied by the United
States, the Portuguese government felt it was essential to put the Eisenhower
Administration under pressure. By delaying the renegotiation of the Azores
Agreement, Salazar and his government clearly demonstrated that Lisbon expected
some kind of solidarity regarding Portugals colonial problems, in exchange for her
loyalty in the Atlantic Alliance. However, Portugal never went as far as jeopardizing
the interests of the Alliance or even the defence of Western Europe. The
interdependence of the Portuguese-US interests forced the creation of a modus vivendi
between the two countries, having always NATO as the broader framework of the
bilateral US-Portuguese relations. In other words, in exchange for the only public
demonstration of solidarity by the United States on Portuguese colonial policy,
Portugal agreed to extend the Azores facilities for five more years. As a result, until
the end of the Eisenhower administration, US-Portuguese relations developed in a
constrained way, though they did not break apart.
In conclusion, this modus vivendi allowed Portugal to be perfectly inserted into
the western bloc and in the Cold War international system, at the same time it assured
the maintenance of the Azores base for the US forces. Consequently, US-Portuguese
relations evolved but were always constrained between the Atlantic and the Empire.
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