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Seminrio de Poltica Comparada e Relaes Internacionais (IPRI-

UNL e FCSH-UNL)

DRAFT: DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THEAUTHOR

Between the Atlantic and the Empire: NATO as a framework for

Portuguese-American relations in the early Cold War (1949-1957)

Daniel Marcos

IPRI-UNL

[email protected]

Introduction

After the difficult negotiations that led to the inclusion of Portugal as one of the

founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949

the American Ambassador at Lisbon, Lincoln MacVeagh, resumed this process to the

Department of State saying that it [was] sometimes difficult to make a horse drink,

though you have taken him to the water. And he added: the size of the horse has

nothing to do with the matter. Little horses may very well be more stubborn than big

ones.1 These considerations echoed the Portuguese resistance to accept the terms of

the Washington Treaty. Since the beginning, Portugal understood that the reason

behind its invitation was the geostrategic importance of the Azores, both for Western

interests in general, and to the United States, in particular. However, this new alliance

did not completely assure Lisbons foreign policy purposes, as the Portuguese

authoritarian regime was not able to guarantee that its colonial territories in Africa

and Asia stood within the area of action of the new defence treaty, which meant that

NATO could not be called upon to defend them.

This awareness is fundamental to understanding the framework that

constrained US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s. The Portuguese authoritarian

regime had a deeply rooted idea that the maintenance of its colonial empire in Africa

1

Letter from Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh to William Dunham, Department of State, April 29,1949. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland Record

Group (RG) 59, Lot File 59D108, Box 10.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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and Asia was essential to ensure the independence of Portugal as a nation state in

Western Europe. On the other hand, in Washington's perspective, the relationship

with Portugal was crucial to protect its interests in Europe, defined in terms of the

Cold War. The geostrategic position of the Portuguese Atlantic islands played a

decisive role in the deployment of US forces in Europe, North Africa and Middle East

while the Portuguese colonial territories were practically insignificant for US strategic

interests at this time.2

In light of these contradictory realities US-Portuguese relations were

constraint by the difficulty in integrating the strategic interests of both countries.

While in the Atlantic, ties of alliance bound Portugal and the United States, on the

colonial level the two countries had opposing views. Nevertheless, the

interdependence developed since the signing of the Treaty of Washington forced the

two countries to seek a modus vivendi that, in the end, guaranteed the broad interests

of each country and the maintenance of unity within NATO. In this article the

constraints of the US-Portuguese relations during the 1950s will be analyzed. It is

intended to demonstrate how the presence of both countries in NATO was crucial to

connect its interests in Europe, while Washington and Lisbon walked in opposite

directions in Asia and Africa without tearing this relationship apart.

Portugal, the Uni ted States and the Washington Treaty

The invitation to Portugal to be a founding member of the Atlantic Pact was

inextricably linked to the geostrategic importance of the Azores.3 Since 1944,

following the Anglo-Portuguese Atlantic bases agreement of October 1943, the US

had access to bases in the Azores (initially in the island of Santa Maria, and from

1946 onwards in Lajes, Terceira). In the early years of the Cold War US-Portuguese

relations reflected a constant tension between the government of the Portuguese

dictator, Oliveira Salazar, and the Truman Administration. Even allowing for the US

presence in the Azores, Salazars regime showed great reluctance regarding the

2For further information on the strategic importance of the Azores for the United Sates before the Cold

War see Jos M. Ferreira, Os Aores nas Duas Guerras Mundiais, Boletim do Instituto Histrico daIlha Terceira, XLV: 1987, 73-90; Antnio Telo, Os Aores e o Controlo do Atlntico (1898/1948)(Porto: Edies Asa, 1993) and Lus Rodrigues, No Corao do Atlntico. Os Estados Unidos e os

Aores (1939-1948) (Lisboa, Edies Prefcio, 2005).3

Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and theCold War(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 59 and Nuno Teixeira, From neutrality toalignment: Portugal in the foundation of the Atlantic Pact,Luso-Brazilian Review, 29:1992, 113-127.


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existence of an American base in its territory.4 At the centre of this issue were

different perceptions and interests. On the eve of Cold War, the United States

considered the Azores, along with Greenland and Iceland, as a primary base area.

The contribution of this archipelago to transatlantic security was therefore the most

vital single spot in the world in terms of bases for the staging of air transport and

combat aircraft. In this sense, it was essential to put an end to what the US considered

an undefined status in the Azores, since the presence of US forces was only assured

through a bilateral agreement signed with the Portuguese government, which

established a short term period for the presence of the North-American forces in the

Lajes; at the same time, the bilateral negotiations between the two governments were

traditionally very difficult.5 Thus, to the Truman administration, it was necessary to

promote the attainment of a stable and lasting agreement, clearly demonstrating the

importance of Portuguese-American relations and the question of the Azores in the

context of the Cold War.6

For Portugal, on the other hand, what was at stake was the readjustment of its

international status. In geopolitical terms, the country had lived since its foundation

on an unstable balance between Europe and the Atlantic. Peripheral regarding the core

Europe and with a larger and more powerful Spanish neighbour, Portugal had always

defined itself essentially as an Atlantic state, focused on the preservation of its

colonial empire. Seeing Spain as its main threat, Portugal considered the Atlantic as a

balancing factor for avoiding the countrys isolation on the westernmost part of

Europe. In fact, the regimes elite saw the African and Asian Portuguese territories as

the assurance of the countrys national independence, mostly because they allowed

overcoming the geographical, political and economic limitations of Portugal as a

European nation. Additionally, the traditional relationship with the United Kingdom,

an element of continuity between the different political regimes that ruled Portugal,

was essential for the international survival of Portugal, particularly in assuring the

4Lus Rodrigues,No Corao do Atlntico.

5 A report to the president by the National Security Council, November 25, 1947. Harry Truman

Presidential Library (HTPL) Personal Secretary File, Subject File, Box 176. During the 1940s, US

presence in the Azores was regulated by three bilateral agreements signed in 1944, 1946 and 1948. See

Lus Rodrigues,No Corao do Atlntico.6Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2005), 31.


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Atlantic vector. Consequently, the Portuguese government saw in the ancient alliance

with Great Britain the main stronghold of its foreign policy.7

After World War II, the international position of Salazars regime was

weakened. The Allies victory and the emergence of the United States as the main

Atlantic power gradually, though not entirely, diminished the relevance of the long

lasting alliance with the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, the victory of the

democracies over the authoritarian regimes raised some political problems for the

Estado Novo (New State). On the one hand, Italy and Germanys total defeat allowed

the Soviet Union to enter in the centre of the European continent. On the other hand,

the expansion of liberalism and democracy throughout Western Europe seemed to

bring problems to the Iberian authoritarian regimes.8 And, as important as this, was

the fact that Portugal needed to become closer to the new Atlantic power, the United

Sates, in order to maintain its main foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, for

Salazar, Washington seemed unfamiliar with European values, especially regarding

the colonial interests of European powers. The traditional anti-colonial position of the

various administrations clearly influenced the Portuguese dictators negative

perception towards the United States.9

Having these constraints as background, the possibility of bringing a

vehemently anti-communist Portugal to the restricted club of NATOs founding

members was seen by the United States as a way of surpassing the bilateral

limitations of US-Portuguese relations. The US pressed the other Brussels Pact

partners in order to include a group of peripheral European countries in the future

transatlantic organization. Along with Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland, it was

decided in September 1948 that Portugal should be invited to join the new North

Atlantic defensive agreement, even if it did not fully accept its conditions.10 The

authoritarian characteristics of the Portuguese regime were criticised by some

countries, in particular Canada, which pointed out the contradiction of having

Portugal in an organization dedicated to the democratic spirit and the preservation of

7Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, in Contemporary Portugal.

Politics, Society and Culture (New York: SSM-Columbia University Press, 2011), 95-130.8

Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos,1996), 1.9Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD

diss., ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, 2011), 39-61.10Washington Paper, September 9, 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, III:

240-241.


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liberal institutions. Nonetheless, in the United States perspective, the fact that

Portugal, despite its neutrality, was close to the Allies during the final phase of World

War II and, mostly, the strong anti-communist character of the Estado Novo were

sufficient reasons for an invitation to Portugal. With British support, the United States

position prevailed and Portugal was for the first time approached on the possibility of

being part of the future Alliance in October 1948.11

Lisbon acknowledged this first inquiry with the same apparent suspicion it

received the news on the efforts for a greater European cooperation after the end of

World War II. Excluded by Soviet veto from the United Nations in 1946, the

Portuguese regime in 1947 sought to follow an autonomous position regarding the

Marshall Plan. This led to a contradictory strategy of the Portuguese Government,

which allowed Portugals participation at the Paris Conference of 1947 and the

foundation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

Nevertheless, Salazar initially refused to receive any financial support from the

European Recovery Program (ERP) forPortugals underdeveloped economy.12

In face of this, the Portuguese government understood the need to establish

some sort of transatlantic cooperation, particularly in the field of defence, which

could challenge the Soviet threat in Europe13. Although Salazar had a negative

perception of US power in Europe, it was already clear for the Portuguese political

elite that the European defensive area should include the United States as an

essential prerequisite to success. But it should also include Francos Spain, in order

to preserve the strategic and geographical unity of Europe and the Iberian Peninsula.14

Besides this condition Portugal also considered that the Pact should assure the

defence of the Portuguese colonies, namely through its extension into the European

colonial possessions. At the same time, the Pact should not be a way for the United

11Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948. The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (New York,

Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 172-177.12

Despite the rhetoric, Portugal eventually received financial support from the ERP from 1948 to 1950.

This change was justified by the degradation of the international financial system. For further

information see Nuno Teixeira, Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy and

Fernanda Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da rejeio solicitao da ajuda financeira norte-americana (1947-1952) (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1994).13

US official acknowledgement that the Portuguese peripheral position at the Western end of Europe

diminished the sense of threat of a military attack by the Soviet Union. This did not reflect a complete

absence of reality regarding the effective threat of Moscow to Europe, but it revealed the idea that

Portugal was thought to be in a position to bargain with the transatlantic partners. For further

information see Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial, 129-130.14Telegram Ambassador in Portugal to Secretary of State, September 8, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III: 1002-

1005.


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States to assure its long-term presence in the Azores, in more favourable conditions.

Finally, the Alliance should reinforce the intergovernmental cooperation, avoiding

any type of supranational integration.15

Despite Lisbons efforts, the Portuguese terms to sign the Atlantic Alliance

were not considered by the Treatys negotiators (United States, Canada and th e

members of the Brussels Pact) in particular what concerned the accession of Francos

Spain and the inclusion of the colonial territories in the Treatys area of action.16

Salazar and the Portuguese elite had their hands tied up and, as he himself

recognized during the National Assembly meeting where the Washington Treaty was

ratified, Portugals presence as a founding member of the Alliance was largely due to

the importance of the Atlantic islands to Europes geostrategic concerns. In short, to

the Portuguese government, it seemed difficult () to be absent.17 Being pressured

by its main allies, including the United States, the Portuguese government eventually

gave in, more out of a necessity than by conviction. Despite the reluctance

demonstrated by Lisbon, it is undeniable that Portuguese participation in the Atlantic

Pact was fundamental for the international legitimation of the Portuguese

authoritarian regime, highly diminishing the risk of its international isolation.18 Added

to this, the invitation to Portugal was a unique opportunity to strengthen the countrys

weight in the international system, bringing it closer to the Western powers and

clearly distinguishing it from Francos regime in Spain. In a period of intense

international adaptation, with the beginning of the Cold War, Portugal had to adapt its

own foreign policy, maintaining its links with the United Kingdom while becoming

closer to the United States.19

15Nuno Teixeira,From neutrality to alignment; Pedro Oliveira, Documentos: A Adeso de Portugal

NATO (1948-1949),Poltica Internacional, 19: 1999, 121-150.16

Portugal sought to ensure that its colonial territories were included within the treaty area.Nevertheless, the results were not the same as the ones achieved by Paris, which was successful in its

efforts. For more details see Carlos Gaspar Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, In Antnio

Barreto and Maria Filomena Mnica (ed.), Dicionrio deHistria de Portugal (Porto: LivrariaFigueirinhas, 2000), 678-684; Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948, 211-212.17

Carlos Gaspar, Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte, 678-684; Oliveira Salazars speech in

the Portuguese National Assembly, July 26, 1949. Quoted on Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque(1945-1958) (Porto: Livraria Civilizao Editora, 2000), 155.18

As the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris put it to Oliveira Salazar in a letter where he defended the

necessity of Portuguese participation in NATO, excluded from the United Nations Portugal could not

miss the opportunity of strengthen the international links with the Western powers. Letter from

Marcello Mathias to Oliveira Salazar, March 23, 1949. Verssimo Serro (ed.), CorrespondnciaMarcello Mathias/Salazar (1947/1968) (Lisboa: Difel, 1984), 127-129.19

Lus Rodrigues, Crossroads of the Atlantic: Portugal, the Azores and the Atlantic Community(1943-1957), In Valrie Aubourg, Grard Bssuat, Giles Scott-Smith (ed.), European Community,

Atlantic Community? (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 456-467; Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial:


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The Portuguese presence in NATO was perceived by the Truman

Administration as a crucial moment in the relationship between the two countries. It

became clear that the old, traditional bond between Portugal and the United Kingdom

was now hardly more than a sentimental alliance. The Atlantic Alliance emerged

now as an alternative substitute to this liaison and the United States was increasing its

diplomatic influence over the Portuguese government. The US was now the leading

power in the Western Alliance and had the right to act as such.20 In short, with the

signature of the Washington Treaty, the international situation was deeply changed

and Portugal was no longer merely a friend of our friends. In this sense, the US

wanted to take advantage of the Pacts multilateral spirit to renew the bilateral relation

with Portugal, clearly having in mind the need for the presence of North-American

forces in the Azores.21

Integrated in the transatlantic community, the Portuguese regime began a

cautious inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance, with a double result. On the one hand,

Salazars regime was forced to take a stand regarding the main international issues,

which definitely put an end to the neutrality policy followed by the regime since

World War II. If the international responsibility increased, so did the external prestige

of the regime.22 On the other hand, the Portuguese Armed Forces were arguably the

group on which NATO had a more profound impact.23 In return, on 6 September

1951, Portugal and the United States signed an agreement, by exchange of notes, to

define the facilities conceded by Portugal to the American forces in the Azores, until

the end of 1956. As the Portuguese press memorandum stated, having in mind

NATOs dispositions regarding the principle of common defence and the

preservation of peace and security, the United States and Portugal had signed an

agreement of defence which regulated these facilities, by integrating them in the

framework of the Alliances defensive procedures.24Thus, as a member of NATO,

the Portuguese government allowed the United States to immediately prepare and to

Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011),

39.20

Letter from the US Ambassador at Lisbon to the Department of State (William Dunham), April 29,

1949. NARARG 59, Lot 59D108, Box 10.21

Note from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government, December 7, 1949. Direco

Geral Arquivos (DGARQ), LisboaAOS/CO/NE-18-1.22

Daniel Marcos, Portugal e a Evoluo do Sistema Defensivo Europeu. A Cimeira de Lisboa de

1952,Relaes Internacionais, 27 (2010): 65-80.23

Antnio Telo, Portugal e a Nato: O reencontro da tradio Atlntica (Lisboa: Edies Cosmos,1996).24

Dirio de Notcias, September 7, 1951, 1.


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maintain the facilities considered necessary, in order to have them ready in case of

war.25

Portugal and the earl y days of NATO

The deterioration of international stability in the early 1950s forced Portugal to

deepen its relations with the new allies in a spirit of increasingly open cooperation.

From the end of 1949 to June 1950, several events compelled the United States and its

allies to reinforce their military position concerning the Soviet Union. First, the US

lost the nuclear monopoly, seen as the only balancing weapon against Soviet

supremacy in Europe.26 Secondly, following the victory of the Chinese Communist in

Mainland China, in June 1950 the world witnessed the beginning of the Korean

War.27These events had definitive consequences to NATO and to Europes evolution

during the Cold War. In Washington and the other European capitals, the need to

increase the investment in European defence became evident. This process meant an

increase in the military expenditure and, at the same time, a deep reform of the

Alliances political structures, which transformed the Pact into a true collective

defence organization.28

Yet, the way these objectives were to be achieved was not consensual among

the allies. To the US, the best way to develop the collective defence effort in Europe

was through NATO, with all member-states participating in it and with the inclusion

of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In fact, West Germany, despite belonging

to the geographical area of the Treaty, was not an original member of the Pact and did

not contribute to the Alliances military effort until after 1954. According to the

American plans, West Germany should contribute to the wider European defensive

effort, in the process of increasing the conventional capacity of the Alliance to

compensate for the loss of the Wests nuclear monopoly. This evolution would force

25Anexo I do Acordo Luso-Americano de 6 de Setembro de 1951. Arquivo da Defesa Nacional

(ADN), Pao de ArcosFundo do Secretariado-Geral de Defesa Nacional, Box 7089.2.26

Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of European Settlement (New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1999), 96-98.27

John Gaddis, TheCold War(London: Allen Lane, 2005), 40-60.28

Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2005), 63 ff.; Carlos Gaspar A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos, Nao e

Defesa, 102 (2002), 45-63.


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NATO to commit to the defence of West German territory and to develop a new

relationship between the FRG and the Alliance.29

The resolution of this political process was two fold. Firstly, it consisted in the

creation of an integrated command in the Alliance, in the second half of 1950, as well

as the promotion of the idea that all the allies would accept the future integration of

West Germany into the organization.30 Later, during the Lisbon Summit of February

1952, the Allies agreed upon the creation ofthe office of NATOs Secretary General

and the constitution of a Permanent Council of Representatives. These actions

centralized and reinforced the Alliance, which reflected on the concentration of all

administrative dimensions of the Pact in a single International Secretariat.31

But most importantly, due to some allies resistance, especially France, between

1950 and 1952 several negotiations took place between the US, Great Britain, France

and, in a later moment, the Federal Republic of Germany itself, in order to find an

agreement regarding how and under which type of association Germany would

participate in European defence. Paris refused to accept West Germany in NATO and

proposed the creation of a supranational organization, similar to the model of the

European Coal and Steel Community, which should integrate the German military

assets in a future European Defence Community (EDC). The new organization that

was formalized in the Treaty of Paris, in May 1952, received its decisive boost at

NATOs meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952. During this Summit the Allies

Foreign Ministers gave their approval both to the negotiations on EDC and on the

political future of West Germany. Furthermore, they approved the terms of the future

relationship between NATO and the EDC.32 It was envisaged that this would be done

through an additional protocol to the Washington Treaty, approved by all member

states, which established the mutual commitment, in terms of security and defence,

between the members of both organizations. According to the final communiqu of

the Summit, the Atlantic Council acknowledged that NATO and EDC had the same

general objectives and considered that the obligations and relationships between the

29OTAN, Organization du Trait de l'Atlantique Nord. Structure, Faits et Chiffres (Brussels: OTAN,

1981), 28-29.30

James McAllister, No Exit. America and the German Problem (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,2002), 188.31

Report 1205 from the North Atlantic Pact Service, April 7, 1953. Arquivo Histrico Diplomtico-

MNE (AHD-MNE), LisboaRNP, A. 50, M. 102.32

William Hitchcock,France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe,1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 133-168; James McAllister,No Exit. America and the German Problem, 171-244.


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Communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one

working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and

reinforcing the other.33

According to the Portuguese government, these deep changes had to be

accompanied with guarantees that no ally would have its political voice diminished

within NATO, even though if, in the military field, it was clear that the US had an

eminence of their own.34 Although seeing it as globally positive, Portugal considered

that NATOs political restructuring could bring some problems in the future.

Decisions like the creation of the Permanent Council and the position of the Secretary

General, despite being considered as essential and allowing faster decisions, should

not be considered as definitive. The major concern of the Portuguese government was

the powers of the Secretary Generalin particular the ability to contact an individual

government without having to previously consult with the permanent representative

of that country. From the Portuguese perspective, this was a dangerous prerogative, as

it could transform the Secretary General into an absolute authority within the

Alliance, anticipating a future supranational character to NATO.35

Concerning the EDC, Portugal was sceptical regarding any political institutions

which were considered federalist and supranational. Thus, projects like the European

Defence Community seemed mere inaccurate ideas only to be implemented in the

long term.36 However, that did not mean that Portugal would block the French efforts

to build such a Community, in particular if these efforts were conducive to a solution

of German participation in European defence effort. Despite arguing that this solution

should be simply achieved through German accession to NATO, Portugal was proud

of being one of the first European countries to publicly sustain FRGs participation in

the European defensive system and, in that sense, it did not block the other allies

solutions.37

Finally, the Portuguese government was forced to accept and to endorse the first

enlargement of the Alliance. The accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 reaffirmed

33Final Communiqu of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, 20-25 February 1952. North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, Online Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm (accessedOctober 12, 2011).34

Franco Nogueira, Salazar. O Ataque (1945-1958) (Barcelos: Civilizao, 2000), 170-171.35

Informao de Servio, 17 de Maro de 1952. AHD-MNERQE, A. 51, M. 21.36

Evoluo da NATO durante os ltimos meses: de Otawa a Roma e ao TCC, July 8, 1951. AHD-MNERNP, A. 50, M. 102.37

Informao de Servio, March 17, 1952. AHD-MNERQE, A. 51, M. 21
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htmhttp://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htmhttp://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm


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NATOs engagement to the strategic space of the Mediterranean, initiated with the

invitation to Italy as one of NATOs founding members.38 However, the accession of

these two countries was not consensual. If, on the one hand, the US were clearly

interested in having Turkey contributing to the collective effort of Western defence,

most of the European partners had strong doubts about this.39 Nonetheless, the

strategic interest of the US and NATO prevailed and the accession of Turkey and

Greece was decided in Lisbon. Regarding this enlargement, Portugal considered that

these two countries membership would be seen by Moscow as a provocation.

Furthermore, the accession of a country such as Turkey menaced the spirit of the

Alliance, which was based on the association of states with a common heritage,

culture and objectives.40 Moreover, this process did not serve Portuguese interests,

since Lisbon was mainly concerned with the integration of Spain into the European

defensive system and not towards an area that had little strategic importance to

Portugal. As Foreign MinisterPaulo Cunha declared, if Portugal effusively greeted

this decision, it could only avoid regretting that it had not yet been decided to close

the Alliance in the West, and remove the absurd situation which is the absence of

Spain in the Western defence system.41

Therefore, the first years of the Alliance allowed Salazar to enhance

international recognition of his regime, while simultaneously consolidating the

Portuguese position with regard to transatlantic cooperation. While any sort of

supranational project seemed unattractive to the Portuguese objectives, Portugal

decided not to oppose these ideas, as to do so would risk the repeal of transatlantic

compromises assumed by Western allies after World War II. According to the

Portuguese government, the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed its role as a fundamental

organization for the maintenance of an independent Europe facing the Soviet threat.

Despite the Portuguese governments traditionally sceptical rhetoric regarding the

United States, the fact is that Portugal became one of the most cooperative allies.42

38Carlos Gaspar, A Aliana Atlntica e o mtodo dos alargamentos,Nao e Defesa, 102 (2002), 50.

39James Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece (Chapel Hill: The University of

North Carolina Press, 2009), 29-30.40

Memorandum of Conversation, July 13, 1951. NARARG59, Lot File 59D108, Box 1.41

Dirio de Notcias, February 20, 1952, 1 and 6.42Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD

diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 103-118.


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From the Atlantic to the Empir e: NATO and the emergence of the colonial issues in

US-Portuguese Relati ons

The developments that occurred in NATO in the early 1950s jeopardized the

established guidelines of Portuguese foreign policy. Traditionally with its back turned

to Europe, Portugal was forced to deepen its relations with the United States, whether

at a multilateral or at a bilateral level.43 With an impact on various aspects of

Portuguese political life, the traditionally tense bilateral relationship between Portugal

and the United States had been maturing since the Second World War, particularly

due to the multilateral framework assured by common participation in NATO.

In early 1954 the Portuguese government reassessed Portuguese-American

relations in face of the new alliance system in which both countries participated.According to a memorandum prepared by Alberto Franco Nogueira, a promising

diplomat from the Bureau of Political Affairs who would become Minister of Foreign

Affairs in 1961, the most important issues in the relationship between the United

States and Portugal would always be, from the American perspective, the Azores and,

from the Portuguese point of view, the maintenance of its colonial empire. Therefore,

in order to achieve this objective Portugal had to follow an integrated, firm and

comprehensive policy to avoid being ignored or overlooked in all the issues that

mattered to the Western powers. In light of this, it was fundamental to follow a set of

principles that had been the basis of Portuguese foreign policy throughout history,

especially when reassessing relations with the United States. Firstly, Portugal could

not risk losing its independence by getting involved and losing a war. In this sense,

it was essential that she should not take part in any coalition of forces that did not

offer a "guarantee of victory in a future conflict. Independence and victory were

assured with Portugal's accession to NATO in 1949 since it appeared unlikely that

this Alliance would be defeated in war against the Soviet Union.44

However, the participation in NATO had made Portugals foreign policy more

vulnerable regarding what the Portuguese government considered to be one of the

main aspects of its external autonomy: the maintenance of the colonial empire. Since

the first moment, the Portuguese government understood that its participation in the

Alliance increased the risks to any Portuguese territory, without assuring its

43

Nuno Teixeira, Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1989,Anlise Social, 30-133 (1995), 803-818.44 Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros,

January, 1954. AHD-MNERNP, A. 59, M. 232.


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defence. Therefore, it was clear that one of the main concerns of Portuguese foreign

policy was not protected. In this sense, the country was in a position in which it could

not count on an Alliance or political support that would protect its vital interests

outside the coalition area in which we are included.45

Having this in mind, there were two possible solutions: either a full alliance,

in which case the obvious partner would be the United States, or outside of the

coalition and regarding the issues which are not abridged by it, the development of a

policy of independence, which would look for partial political support elsewhere.

This had been the strategy adopted by Portugal when dealing with the Far East

powers, where the survival of Macau and Portuguese territories in India was

accounted for, among other reasons, by the fact that Portugal had always followed a

different policy to that adopted by the West.46 What suggested itself was a policy

of independence in Africa and in the Far East, which would not consider the

framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but which would unfold in different directions

according to the Portuguese interests. These, in certain moments, could even be

contradictory to those of the Pact. In conclusion, Nogueira stated: having in mind

the need for cooperation in Europe, forWestern defence; considering that it was not

clearly legitimate nor convenient, to review the terms of that cooperation; being

imperative for Portugal correspondingly, to help to defend the Western

Civilization values and to protect the territorial integrity of the Nation it seemed

that the only option would be to follow the independent policy as base for a possible

global orientation of the Portuguese foreign policy towards the United States47.

Thus, any possibility of a deepening of the bilateral relations with the United

States was inhibited by the Portuguese need in assuring support for the maintenance

of its colonial empire. As the US seemed unable to assure this, there was no

alternative to Portugal but to adopt a flexible and pragmatic position: showing

45Before World War II this foreign policy guideline was assured by the Alliance between Portugal and

Great Britain. However, in the 1950s, it was already clear to Portugal that Britain was not in a position

of affording support to Portuguese colonial interests. For further information see Pedro Oliveira, OsDespojos da Aliana. A Gr-Bretanha e a questo colonial portuguesa, 1945-1975 (Lisboa: Tinta-da-China Edies, 2007).46

Historically, Portuguese Foreign policy in the Far East was based on the effort to follow an

autonomous position regarding the Western Powers. This meant that the Portuguese government

should analyze every particular situation independently, which could mean adopting a course that serve

the interests of the regional powers, China, for example, instead of those of the European powers.

Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana Circunstancial: Portugal e os Estados Unidos nos Anos 1950 (PhD

diss., ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, 2011), 145-146.47 Memorando da Repartio de Negcios Polticos para o Ministro dos Negcios Estrangeiros,

January, 1954. AHD-MNERNP, A. 59, M. 232.


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of national urge for unity was impossible to sustain. The Portuguese territories were

incompatible with the status of India as an independent country. Thus, those

pockets of foreign territories, however small in area and however friendly the powers

occupying them, should simply not exist on Indian soil.52 The argumentation used

by the Indian government reflected a fundamental point of its foreign policy: the idea

that India had the right and the obligation to promote the liberation of subject

peoples as well as the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual. In other

words, India had a duty to fight all forms of colonialism. However, even though India

felt the moral duty to help the Third World free itself from European colonialism,

Nehrus policy had a dilemma: morally and intellectually committed with the

settlement of dispute through peaceful means, any attempt to force a reluctant colonial

power to leave Indian soil could be charged with hypocrisy53.

For this reason, the initial position of India, regarding Goa, was to establish

political and diplomatic relations with Portugal, hoping that it could lead to future

negotiations regarding its territories in India. Originally, Nehru and other Indian

leaders did not attach much importance to Goas problem since for them Portuguese

rule would wither away, the moment British rule come to an end in India. Nehru

assumed that the Portuguese would quit Goa without any hesitation as it wou ld be

impossible for them to survive without the goodwill of Britain.54 However, facing the

reluctance of the Portuguese to discuss their exit, India developed a more aggressive

policy. Between 1953 and 1955, Delhi closed its Embassy in Lisbon and strengthened

the support to the Goan nationalist movements.55

Since the beginning of this quarrel, the United States had adopted a neutral

position to avoid any involvement in the effort developed by the Indian government

to bring about through negotiation the remaining foreign enclaves in India.56 The

US wished to have as little to do as possible regarding this issue so as to avoid

damaging their relations both with Portugal and India.57

52Note from the Legation of India in Lisbon, January, 14, 1953. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da

ndia, (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 281-283. This idea of geographicalcontiguity as an argument to take control over Goa was contested by Portugal on the basis that from

British India two countries have become independent: Pakistan and Indian Union.53

Arthur Rubinoff,Indias use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971), 15-29.54

P.P Shirodkar, Goas Struggle for Freedom (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1988), 40-41.55

Maria Stocker, Xeque-Mate a Goa (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2005), 95 and P. D. Gaitonde, The

Liberation of Goa: A Participants view of History (London: Hurst&Co, 1987), 71-80.56Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 1950. FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, 1480.

57Memorandum of Conversation, February 14, 1951. FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, p.1663.


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Rhetorically, for the Portuguese government, the Goan dispute seemed one

more case of Communist penetration in Asia. Consistent with the cooperation showed

by Portugal in the early years of NATO, Portuguese diplomacy followed a strategy of

creating an overall awareness of the future dangers that were at stake for the Alliance

in case of an aggression against the Portuguese territories in Asia. Following the

heroic efforts being made by the French in confronting revolutionary anti-colonial

forces in Indochina, the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, Paulo Cunha, stated in the

North Atlantic Council in April 1954 the need for NATO to increase vigilance

throughout the world. It was time to follow a policy of firmness without

provocation in order to prevent the development of Communism in Asia.

Accordingly, Cunha argued that NATO should prevent any new aggression in this

area such as the one which might arise in face of the efforts developed by the Indian

Government towards Goa, which affected the national integrity of Portugal.58

But, behind the Portuguese rhetoric expressed in the plenary session of the

NATO Council, the Goan dispute was the occasion where the Lisbon government

wished that the Alliance could somehow protect its colonial interests. Assuming its

loyalty towards the overall importance of the Alliance for the Western world,

Portugal still tried to conciliate its interests within the Atlantic Treaty dispositions.

Understanding that it not would be possible to invoke article 559 of the Atlantic

Alliance, all that was left for Portugal was to call upon article 4, which stated that

there might be a collective position from the Allies in the case where one of its

members considered that its territorial integrity and security might be endangered. In

order to achieve this objective, Portugal approached both the United Kingdom and the

United States.60 In only one month, the Portuguese government tried to raise the

matter to the highest level of the Department of State, calling the attention of the

Deputy Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Deputy Under

Secretary, Robert Murphy. On both occasions, Washington argued that such

consultation would result in any action by the Council or if the Council should take

any action, it was doubtful that it would be effective in producing a solution and

would allow Communist propaganda to arouse Indian and South Asian sensitivities

58Department of State Telegram, April 24, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, p. 516.

59

According to this article, any attack to a NATO ally is considered to be an act of violence against allmember states of this organization.60

Portuguese approach to the United Kingdon in Pedro Oliveira, Os Despojos da Aliana, pp. 95-103.


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17

regarding a Western Bloc and the preservation of colonialism.61 In face of this

reply, Portugal dropped its intention.

The invasion of two Portuguese enclaves, Nagar Aveli e Dadr, by Goan

nationalists supported by Indian police officers in July 1954 and the consequent

Portuguese complaint, both in NATO and in Washington, failed to persuade

Portugals allies, in particular the United States, to take action. Confronted with a

formal request for help by the Portuguese government, namely a public declaration of

solidarity by the United States, the State Department responded that it was not in a

strong position to take any action condemning India. Washington considered that

any public position was impracticable regarding the international atmosphere in

Asia, since the United States had the strongest desire to become sympathetic in the

eyes of Nehrus government.62 In other words, Portugal should not expect from the

United States anything more thanprivate general advice to the government of India

against the use of violence.63

The Eisenhower administrations position caused great dissatisfaction in

Lisbon. Aware that the United States would not allow NATOs involvement in this

dispute, the Portuguese regime tried to make Goa a Cold War issue. Consequently,

Lisbon put in motion a contradictory strategy of bilateral pressure that, in the end,

could jeopardize the Alliances overall interests. Salazar and the Portuguese Foreign

Minister, Paulo Cunha quickly understood that the American interest and

commitment in the Azores could play an important role in this affair. In reaction to

the US neutral position, Cunha called the American Ambassador to his office and

strongly criticized his government attitude. According to Cunha, Portugal had

always collaborated with US and had never asked for economic aid or otherquid pro

quo both in US-Portuguese multilateral and bilateral relations. However, some

political collaboration in return was obviously expected. As Robert Guggenheim,

the US Ambassador at Lisbon, put it, it was not possible to predict how this matter

could not fail in gravely affecting such things as NATO and Azores. The tone used

by Paulo Cunha, who was not aperson to imply double-dealing lightly, proved that

61Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and to the Deputy

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), May 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, pp.

1742-1744.62

Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry to the Overseas Ministry, Julho 31, 1954. Vinte anos deDefesa do Estado da ndia, Vol. II. (Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1967), 35-36.63

Office Memo to the Secretary of State, July 30, 1954. NARARG 59, Lot File 59D 108, Box 3.


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the Portuguese government was sincerely aroused at what they consider to be a very

shabby treatmentby the United States.64

It did not take much time for the US administration to start believing that its

position regarding Goa might have endangered NATO and US objectives in the

Azores. Even within the Department of State, especially in the Bureau that took care

of US-Portuguese relations, it became clear that the Portuguese super-sensitivity

over Goa was caused by Lisbons clear perception that the United Sates were more

concerned in protecting their interests in India than in supporting a NATO ally.65

However, the mood was about to change. At the same time as the Goan issue

intensified, the US Department of Defence was studying the possibility of expanding

the facilities granted to the United States in the Azores in 1951. These plans implied a

considerable increase in US military personnel as well as a request for the extension

of the US presence in the Azores. For the Department of Defence, it was obvious that

US diplomacy had to have in mind, when setting an attitude toward Portugal

regarding Goa, the facilities we already enjoy in the Azores, but also the steady

pressure for their expansion (), to say nothing of the renewal of the Azores

agreement itself in 1956.66 Basically, the Department of Defence not only wanted

additional facilities. They also wanted a new agreement, with an extension of the

deadline. However, the Department of Defence was not the only part of the

administration to support this point of view. To the US Embassy in Lisbon, the Goan

issue should be seen as an opportunity to create a better atmosphere for the

attainment of future US-Portuguese relations. As James Bonbright, the newly

appointed US Ambassador at Lisbon insisted, helping Portugal was a refreshing

position by the United States since it was normally this country that requested

assistance from Portugal. Therefore, any kind of helpful motion or some moral

support to Portugal would pay big dividends in US-Portuguese relations especially

regarding the bases in the Azores.67

64Telegram from the Ambassador in Portugal to the Department of State, August 9, 1954. FRUS,

1952-1954, Vol. VI, 1744-1745.65

Letter from the US Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, August 30, 1954. NARA- RG59,

Lot File 59D108, Box 3.66

Dispatch from the Embassy in Lisbon to the Department of State, November 2, 1954. FRUS, 1952-

1954, Vol. VI, pp. 1749-1750.67Letter from the American Embassy in Lisbon, April 23, 1954. NARA RG 59, Lot File 59D 108,

Box 3.


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With the deterioration of US relations with Portugal and in view of American

interests in the Azores, the State Department was forced to produce a policy to do

what it could to renew the Azores agreement .68 This position was completely

connected to the Goan issue since Portugal had, according to the State Department, a

strong emotional position regarding Goa that nobody seemed to control.

Therefore, the least they were expecting was that the USA should stop playing a

losing game with Nehru and start to give full attention to the virile small nations of

the West.69

Trying to bring together the Portuguese and United States points of view, at the

end of 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invited his Portuguese counterpart

to make an official visit to the USA, where they could discuss the situation of US-

Portuguese relations, with particular focus on the Goan dispute, NATO evolution and

the renewal of the Azores agreement. In a private meeting with Foster Dulles, Paulo

Cunha emphasized the position which Goa holds in the heart of all Portuguese since

it was constitutionally inseparable from the homeland and a part of the life -blood

of the Portuguese people. There were no negotiations that could be held with the

objective of transferring power in Goa to India; not even a plebiscite, as Dulles

suggested, since for Cunha that would be like the United States holding a plebiscite

in Alaska, Massachusetts or Florida to decide whether American citizens there want

to remain Americans. Besides the Goa question, Foster Dulles and Cunha also had

the opportunity to discuss the renegotiation of the Azores Agreement. For Cunha, the

American request, that included the increase of US troops, raised serious political

questions. To the Portuguese minister, the United States should be aware that the

Portuguese people were very sensitive about their sovereignty and did not favour the

presence of foreigners on their soil. Despite understanding the Portuguese position,

Foster Dulles mentioned the importance of NATO maintaining a strong defensive

posture as a deterrent of war.70

The Portuguese foreign minister made it clear that the evolution of US-

Portuguese relations in the Azores was deeply connected to the support the US might

give to Portugal in its colonial policies. Portugal was not in a position to accept a long

term US presence in the Azores during peacetime, especially if the US showed itself

68Memorandum of Conversation, January 13, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 439.

69

Letter from the US Embassy in Portugal to the Portuguese Desk, September 24, 1954. NARARG84, US Legation in Lisbon, Box 47.70

Memorandum of Conversation, November 30, 1955. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, pp. 445-451.


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so uncooperative with regard to Portuguese colonial interests. At the end of this visit,

the Eisenhower administration was forced to assume, for the first and only time, its

support for the maintenance of Portuguese colonial possessions. In a declaration that

became known has the Cunha-Dulles Statement, both the US administration and the

Portuguese government concluded that the two countries embrace many peoples of

many races and for that reason they deplored all efforts to foment hatred between

East and West and to divide people who need to feel a sense of unity and fellowship

for peace and mutual welfare, in a direct reference to the Portuguese territories in

India that were in dispute between Portugal and Nehrus government. Finally, both

governments reinforced the idea that all these topics had in common the problems of

defence within the framework of NATO, reinforcing the importance that the Azores

and the harmony of US-Portuguese relations had for US interests, in particular, and

the Western World in general.71

In the next year and a half Portugal and the United States carefully prepared a

new Azores agreement. US clear support for Portugal in late 1955 regarding the Goan

dispute obviously contributed to this process. However, it cannot be said that the

relations between the two countries recovered definitely. In fact, the negotiations for

the renewal of this agreement were intentionally delayed by the Portuguese

government, owing to its anxiety and annoyance over American foreign policy,

particularly during the Suez crisis in late 1956. In a meeting with Ambassador James

Bonbright at the end of 1956, Salazar was very explicit: a series of events caused the

Portuguese government to reflect on the desirability of postponing the conclusion of

the new agreement. Since Portugal had interests scattered in Africa and Asia, they

had to make sure that American policies were not prejudicial to those interests. For

the Portuguese dictator, the hostile position adopted by the United States towards

France and the UK during the Suez Crisis had completely undermined NATO,

which had forced Portugal to wait to see where the US is heading before accepting

the extension of US facilities in the Azores under NATO provisions.72

71Cunha-Dulles Statement, December 2, 1955. Vinte anos de Defesa do Estado da ndia, Vol. III

(Lisboa: Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1968), 51. The Cunha-Dulles Statement was a

milestone on US-Portuguese relations. For the United States, it reflected the North-American position

regarding the Bandung Conference of 1955. For the Portuguese Government, the Cunha-Dulles

Statement was made at a time when the recent Portuguese accession to the United Nations anticipated a

period of strong criticism to Portugals colonial policy in that institution. Daniel Marcos, Uma Aliana

Circunstancial.72Despatch from the US Embassy in Lisbon, January 4, 1957. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XXVII, 466-

471.


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In private, Salazar understood that the compromise of defending the Portuguese

colonies was something beyond any American Administration. Accordingly, the

only solution was to limit the duration of the agreements, forcing the United States

to a constant renegotiation to maintain the facilities in the Azores.73 The agreement

was finally signed in September 1957, valid for five years, until December 1962,

when, once again, the colonial issue arose, at that point due to the developing colonial

war in Angola.

Conclusion

Behind the invitation for Portugal to become a member of NATO was the

United States strategic interest in the North Atlantic area, particularly the utilization

of the Lajes airfield in the Azores. As has been seen, for the Portuguese authoritarian

regime the invitation to participate as a founding member of this restrictive group

raised problems for Portugals foreign policy. It quickly became clear that the

Alliance would not assure its colonial interests. However, the acceptance of the

North-American invitation, more by necessity than by conviction, represented several

gains for Salazar: the international recognition of the authoritarian Estado Novo

regime and its insertion in the Western bloc. During the Alliances first years,Salazars strongly anti-communist government was a committed ally, supporting a

solution for the European Defence Community, accepting the Alliances first

enlargement in the Mediterranean area and the institutional reform of NATO. In all

these issues, Portugal had to adjust itself in order to strengthen the Atlantic Alliances

cohesion.

Simultaneously, Portugals participation in the Atlantic Alliance served as a

broader framework for the bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, this

multilateral framework constrained the two countries to become allies. If, in the first

place, the Azores were the reason behind Portugals admission into NATO, after 1949

it was the Alliance that brought together the two countries and forced them to

strengthen their relationship. The United States, because it was in its interest to

maintain and further develop the facilities in the Lajes airfield; Portugal, because it

was aware of this interest and played the Azorean trump card to push Washington and

73Handwritten note by Oliveira Salazar on US-Portuguese relations, November, 1955. DGARQ

AOS/CO/NE-17.


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thereby, obtain leverage in the colonial issue. This strategy led to the creation of a

modus vivendi in US-Portuguese relations that was based on a thin balance between

the interests of both governments.

The Goan dispute in the mid-1950s is a clear example of this situation. After

one last effort to raise the problem in NATO, which was firmly denied by the United

States, the Portuguese government felt it was essential to put the Eisenhower

Administration under pressure. By delaying the renegotiation of the Azores

Agreement, Salazar and his government clearly demonstrated that Lisbon expected

some kind of solidarity regarding Portugals colonial problems, in exchange for her

loyalty in the Atlantic Alliance. However, Portugal never went as far as jeopardizing

the interests of the Alliance or even the defence of Western Europe. The

interdependence of the Portuguese-US interests forced the creation of a modus vivendi

between the two countries, having always NATO as the broader framework of the

bilateral US-Portuguese relations. In other words, in exchange for the only public

demonstration of solidarity by the United States on Portuguese colonial policy,

Portugal agreed to extend the Azores facilities for five more years. As a result, until

the end of the Eisenhower administration, US-Portuguese relations developed in a

constrained way, though they did not break apart.

In conclusion, this modus vivendi allowed Portugal to be perfectly inserted into

the western bloc and in the Cold War international system, at the same time it assured

the maintenance of the Azores base for the US forces. Consequently, US-Portuguese

relations evolved but were always constrained between the Atlantic and the Empire.

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