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Robert PrietoChairman

Parsons Brinckerhoff

Robert PrietoChairman

Parsons Brinckerhoff

Vulnerability of Public Infrastructure

Vulnerability of Public Infrastructure

2002 Capital Projects Workshop 2002 Capital Projects Workshop Integrated Technology WorkshopIntegrated Technology Workshop

National Conference CenterLansdowne, Virginia

November 13, 2002

A Systems Perspective

Many Things Went Right on 911Many Things Went Right on 911

Emergency Services Responded Immediately55,000 People Safely Egressed Area of Attack

Trains Ordered to Bypass WTC LocationsNo Transit Workers or Passengers Injured or Killed

All Bridges and Tunnels in NYC Closed 16 Min. After the Second Plane Attack

Buses Removed People from Emergency Site300 Buses Mobilized to Transport Firefighters, Rescue Workers, Construction Workers

Emergency Services Responded Immediately55,000 People Safely Egressed Area of Attack

Trains Ordered to Bypass WTC LocationsNo Transit Workers or Passengers Injured or Killed

All Bridges and Tunnels in NYC Closed 16 Min. After the Second Plane Attack

Buses Removed People from Emergency Site300 Buses Mobilized to Transport Firefighters, Rescue Workers, Construction Workers


Engineering and Construction Industry Self Mobilized

Structural Inspection of BuildingsHeavy Construction Equipment

Emergency Operations Center Successfully RelocatedPrivate Ferry Operator Self Mobilized for Evacuation and Stepped-up Ferry Service to Lower ManhattanLower Manhattan EvacuatedAir Traffic Control System Safely Shut Down

Engineering and Construction Industry Self Mobilized

Structural Inspection of BuildingsHeavy Construction Equipment

Emergency Operations Center Successfully RelocatedPrivate Ferry Operator Self Mobilized for Evacuation and Stepped-up Ferry Service to Lower ManhattanLower Manhattan EvacuatedAir Traffic Control System Safely Shut Down


Emergency Generators Mobilized to Site

Infrastructure Systems Protected Against Further Damage

After Initial Impacts, Infrastructure Service Restored

Reconfiguration Continued Over Subsequent Period

Emergency Generators Mobilized to Site

Infrastructure Systems Protected Against Further Damage

After Initial Impacts, Infrastructure Service Restored

Reconfiguration Continued Over Subsequent Period

OverviewOverview

Critical Infrastructure Defined

The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned from 911

Be SMART: The New Vulnerabilities

Challenges Ahead

Critical Infrastructure Defined

The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned from 911

Be SMART: The New Vulnerabilities

Challenges Ahead

Critical Infrastructure

Defined


Defined

Critical InfrastructureCritical Infrastructure

Systems Whose RAPID Failure Would Lead to a Catastrophic Loss of Life. (Rapid is Relative to the Consequences Possible as Opposed to an Absolute Time Scale)

Systems Whose Failure or Significant Degradation Would Lead to Unacceptable Economic Consequences

Systems Whose RAPID Failure Would Lead to a Catastrophic Loss of Life. (Rapid is Relative to the Consequences Possible as Opposed to an Absolute Time Scale)

Systems Whose Failure or Significant Degradation Would Lead to Unacceptable Economic Consequences

Critical InfrastructureCritical Infrastructure

Systems Whose RAPID Failure Would Significantly Impact Rescue and Response Efforts (Should the Emergency Ops. Center Have Been Located in Proximity to High Profile Target?)

Systems Whose Significant Degradation Significantly Impact Recovery Efforts

Systems Whose RAPID Failure Would Significantly Impact Rescue and Response Efforts (Should the Emergency Ops. Center Have Been Located in Proximity to High Profile Target?)

Systems Whose Significant Degradation Significantly Impact Recovery Efforts

Remember . . .Remember . . .

Not Everything is CriticalMust Have a Systems PerspectiveMust Apply Resources Where They Will Be Most Effective

Next Threat Will Be Different From The Last

Not Everything is CriticalMust Have a Systems PerspectiveMust Apply Resources Where They Will Be Most Effective

Next Threat Will Be Different From The Last

The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned

from 911

The 3 Rs: Lessons Learned

from 911

3 Rs of Critical Infrastructure3 Rs of Critical Infrastructure

Resist

Respond

Recover

Resist

Respond

Recover

The First “R” – ResistThe First “R” – Resist

Critical Infrastructure Must Be DefinedNot Everything is Critical

Critical Infrastructure Must Be Designed to Resist

AttackCatastrophic Failure

Open Role of Infrastructure Limits Ability to Resist Deliberate Attack

Critical Infrastructure Must Be DefinedNot Everything is Critical

Critical Infrastructure Must Be Designed to Resist

AttackCatastrophic Failure

Open Role of Infrastructure Limits Ability to Resist Deliberate Attack

The Second “R” – RespondThe Second “R” – Respond

5 Lessons LearnedLink Between Infrastructure and Development Highlighted“Core Capacity” of Infrastructure Systems EssentialDeferred Maintenance = Real Cost, Real RiskOperational/Emergency Response Training EssentialNeed to Reconfigure “First-Responder” Team

5 Lessons LearnedLink Between Infrastructure and Development Highlighted“Core Capacity” of Infrastructure Systems EssentialDeferred Maintenance = Real Cost, Real RiskOperational/Emergency Response Training EssentialNeed to Reconfigure “First-Responder” Team

Lesson #1:Lesson #1:

“Localized” Failure of “Development” Led to . . .“Localized” Destruction of Attendant Infrastructure

Transit, Power, Telecom

Led to . . .Remember That These Two “Systems” Are Tightly Coupled

“Localized” Failure of “Development” Led to . . .“Localized” Destruction of Attendant Infrastructure

Transit, Power, Telecom

Led to . . .Remember That These Two “Systems” Are Tightly Coupled

Recognize the Linkage Between Infrastructure and Development

September 11, 2001Underground Structures

September 11, 2001Underground Structures


Core CapacityDegree of Interconnectivity of Various Elements of a SystemNumber of Alternative Paths AvailableFlexibility and Redundancy

Traditional Project Evaluation Models Have Rewarded New Connections vs. Responsiveness and Reliability

Core CapacityDegree of Interconnectivity of Various Elements of a SystemNumber of Alternative Paths AvailableFlexibility and Redundancy

Traditional Project Evaluation Models Have Rewarded New Connections vs. Responsiveness and Reliability

“Core Capacity” of Infrastructure Systems is Essential


Complex Systems Require a New ModelDislocations Can Be ProfoundImproved Reliability, Availability and Performance Pay Hidden Dividends

“Quality” of the System Counts

Complex Systems Require a New ModelDislocations Can Be ProfoundImproved Reliability, Availability and Performance Pay Hidden Dividends

“Quality” of the System Counts

“Core Capacity” of Infrastructure Systems is Essential


Critical to Sustain Ability to RespondBacklog of Deferred Maintenance Should be Reviewed as Element of Systems’ RiskSystems in “State of Good Repair” Fared Better in Both Response and Recovery PhasesKey to Integrity of “New” Security and “Safety” Systems

Critical to Sustain Ability to RespondBacklog of Deferred Maintenance Should be Reviewed as Element of Systems’ RiskSystems in “State of Good Repair” Fared Better in Both Response and Recovery PhasesKey to Integrity of “New” Security and “Safety” Systems

Deferred Maintenance Represents A Real Cost and A Real Risk


Operational Training Integral to Engineering of Critical Infrastructure

Establish Evacuation Routes and Off-Property Staging Areas

Operational Training Integral to Engineering of Critical Infrastructure

Establish Evacuation Routes and Off-Property Staging Areas

Operational and Emergency Response Training is an Integral Element of Critical Infrastructure Response


Scenario Training Must be Evolutionary as New Threats Emerge

Review Existing Emergency Response PlanRevamp Unusual Incident ReportingConsider:

Weapons of Mass DestructionHigher Risk of Collateral Physical and Economic DamageExtended Time Frames Need to be Addressed

Scenario Training Must be Evolutionary as New Threats Emerge

Review Existing Emergency Response PlanRevamp Unusual Incident ReportingConsider:

Weapons of Mass DestructionHigher Risk of Collateral Physical and Economic DamageExtended Time Frames Need to be Addressed



Emergency Operation Centers Must be Safe, Redundant and Integrated with Other Relevant EOCs

Emergency Operation Centers Must be Safe, Redundant and Integrated with Other Relevant EOCs



Quick Response EssentialInteroperability of First RespondersFirst Responder Training Must Be Integrated with Infrastructure System Operational Training

ActionsInteractionsCommunicationsDecision Making

Quick Response EssentialInteroperability of First RespondersFirst Responder Training Must Be Integrated with Infrastructure System Operational Training

ActionsInteractionsCommunicationsDecision Making



Role of the Engineer and ConstructorThe New Fourth Responder

Role of the Engineer and ConstructorThe New Fourth Responder

Today’s Highly Engineered Environment Requires a First Responder Team that Goes Beyond the Traditional Triad of Fire, Police and Emergency Services

The Third “R” – RecoverThe Third “R” – RecoverEngineer for Recovery

Providing for Accessibility to the Sites of “Critical Infrastructure”Ensuring Availability of Specialized Construction Equipment, Contracts and MaterialsDeveloping a Well-Documented System with Clear Interface PointsPre-Planning and Rehearsing Response and Recovery Scenarios for High Probability Events (Earthquake, Hurricane, Flood in Prone Areas)

Engineer for RecoveryProviding for Accessibility to the Sites of “Critical Infrastructure”Ensuring Availability of Specialized Construction Equipment, Contracts and MaterialsDeveloping a Well-Documented System with Clear Interface PointsPre-Planning and Rehearsing Response and Recovery Scenarios for High Probability Events (Earthquake, Hurricane, Flood in Prone Areas)

But Also . . .But Also . . .

Understand our Engineered Environment

Not Only Past and PresentMore Importantly – Future

Understand How It Will Evolve

Understand How 3 “Rs” Will be Built in As System Expands

Have a Vision

Understand our Engineered Environment

Not Only Past and PresentMore Importantly – Future

Understand How It Will Evolve

Understand How 3 “Rs” Will be Built in As System Expands

Have a Vision

Be Smart:The New

Vulnerabilities

Be Smart:The New

Vulnerabilities

MM

Be Smart: The New VulnerabilitiesBe Smart: The New Vulnerabilities

Build on “Lessons Learned” From WTCAlso Consider Other Large Scale Events

Fall Into 5 SMART Categories S ystems

aintenance & Operation

A ttitude

R isk Taking

T ransitional

Build on “Lessons Learned” From WTCAlso Consider Other Large Scale Events

Fall Into 5 SMART Categories S ystems

aintenance & Operation

A ttitude

R isk Taking

T ransitional

System VulnerabilitiesSystem Vulnerabilities

Focus: Ensuring the Right Systems Put in Place

Failure to Recognize the “Built Environment” As A Growing And Ever More Complex System

Inadequate “System” UnderstandingWhat May Go Wrong, How To Detect and Remedy

Positive Feedback Loop Risks“Progressive” Failures

Focus: Ensuring the Right Systems Put in Place

Failure to Recognize the “Built Environment” As A Growing And Ever More Complex System

Inadequate “System” UnderstandingWhat May Go Wrong, How To Detect and Remedy

Positive Feedback Loop Risks“Progressive” Failures


Centralized Control Weaknesses in Complex Systems

Need For “Interoperability”Need to “See” the SituationPartial Decentralization of Systems Required

“Tight Coupling” of SystemsAn Event in One System Leads to an Event in Another in Short Order (Lesson #1)

Centralized Control Weaknesses in Complex Systems

Need For “Interoperability”Need to “See” the SituationPartial Decentralization of Systems Required

“Tight Coupling” of SystemsAn Event in One System Leads to an Event in Another in Short Order (Lesson #1)


Failing to KISSKISS – Keep It Simple StupidSome Classes of Systems/Technology Are Inherently Open to Chains of Failure

Adding Safety Systems Only Raises Level of Complexity

Inadequate “Core Capacity”“Reach” Emphasized Over “Responsiveness” (Lesson #2)Keys to System Responsiveness to Unplanned Events

InterconnectivityFlexibilityRedundancy

Failing to KISSKISS – Keep It Simple StupidSome Classes of Systems/Technology Are Inherently Open to Chains of Failure

Adding Safety Systems Only Raises Level of Complexity

Inadequate “Core Capacity”“Reach” Emphasized Over “Responsiveness” (Lesson #2)Keys to System Responsiveness to Unplanned Events

InterconnectivityFlexibilityRedundancy

Maintenance & Operation VulnerabilitiesMaintenance & Operation Vulnerabilities

Focus: Keeping the “Right” System That WayFailing to Recognize Importance of “State of Good Repair” (Lesson #3)

Tendency Will Be to “Add” On Top Of Existing Base “System”

Can Create New Risks in Complex SystemsThe “Foundation” Must Be Strong

Focus: Keeping the “Right” System That WayFailing to Recognize Importance of “State of Good Repair” (Lesson #3)

Tendency Will Be to “Add” On Top Of Existing Base “System”

Can Create New Risks in Complex SystemsThe “Foundation” Must Be Strong

Maintenance & Operation VulnerabilitiesMaintenance & Operation Vulnerabilities

Inadequate Renewal of Emergency Training (Lesson #4)

“Built Environment” Exists in Dynamic Environment“Built Environment” Has Its Own Inherently Dynamic Nature

Inadequate Operating Provisions to Limit Disturbances

Avoid “Tight Coupling” EffectsGood Example – Power-Grid Inter-ties

Inadequate Renewal of Emergency Training (Lesson #4)

“Built Environment” Exists in Dynamic Environment“Built Environment” Has Its Own Inherently Dynamic Nature

Inadequate Operating Provisions to Limit Disturbances

Avoid “Tight Coupling” EffectsGood Example – Power-Grid Inter-ties

Attitude VulnerabilitiesAttitude Vulnerabilities

Focus: Willingness to Accept Unexpected or Undesired “Truths”“Cognitive Lock”

Holding On to a Course of Action Against All Contradictory Evidence

Disastrous When Combined With a Complex SystemFermi Breeder Reactor AccidentRequires a Fresh Pair Of Eyes

HasteRisks Incurred, Unknowingly While Blindly Charging Ahead

Poor Quality Control on Slag Inclusions Did More To Sink The Titanic Than The Iceberg

Focus: Willingness to Accept Unexpected or Undesired “Truths”“Cognitive Lock”

Holding On to a Course of Action Against All Contradictory Evidence

Disastrous When Combined With a Complex SystemFermi Breeder Reactor AccidentRequires a Fresh Pair Of Eyes

HasteRisks Incurred, Unknowingly While Blindly Charging Ahead

Poor Quality Control on Slag Inclusions Did More To Sink The Titanic Than The Iceberg


Over Commitment to Bureaucratic Goals

Growing Problems Ignored for Sake of Meeting Goals

NASA and Morton ThiokolCongress and TSA on Aviation Security

Over Commitment to Bureaucratic Goals

Growing Problems Ignored for Sake of Meeting Goals

NASA and Morton ThiokolCongress and TSA on Aviation Security


Prisoner to HeuristicsBroader Look Constrained by…

Past Experience (Never Happened So Not Credible)What We Heard (Often Narrow and Limited)

Failure to Consider Lessons Learned in Analogous Settings or System

DenialFailure to Consider the Unlikely

“Core Capacity” Provides the Tools to AddressAbsence of Contingency Plans for Future

Failure to Learn “Lessons Learned”

Prisoner to HeuristicsBroader Look Constrained by…

Past Experience (Never Happened So Not Credible)What We Heard (Often Narrow and Limited)

Failure to Consider Lessons Learned in Analogous Settings or System

DenialFailure to Consider the Unlikely

“Core Capacity” Provides the Tools to AddressAbsence of Contingency Plans for Future

Failure to Learn “Lessons Learned”

Risk Taking VulnerabilitiesRisk Taking Vulnerabilities

Focus: How We Perceive Risks and Handle Mistakes

Litigation Constrains Risk-Taking in “Respond” and “Recover” Phases

Inadequate Good Samaritan Legislation for Engineers and Constructors (Lesson #5)

Fear of “Satisficing”Satisficing – A Workable and Fast-Acting Solution Without Complete InformationDriven By How We “Handle Mistakes”

Focus: How We Perceive Risks and Handle Mistakes

Litigation Constrains Risk-Taking in “Respond” and “Recover” Phases

Inadequate Good Samaritan Legislation for Engineers and Constructors (Lesson #5)

Fear of “Satisficing”Satisficing – A Workable and Fast-Acting Solution Without Complete InformationDriven By How We “Handle Mistakes”

Transitional VulnerabilitiesTransitional Vulnerabilities

Focus: Vulnerability During “Change” ProcessInadequate Use of Currently Deployed Resources

“Silver Bullet” Syndrome

Change Processes Will Further Stress Existing Systems

Air TravelJust-in-Time Commerce

Seaport SecurityBorder Crossings

First Responders“Narrow” Approach May Increase Overall Risks

More Holistic Approach Required

Focus: Vulnerability During “Change” ProcessInadequate Use of Currently Deployed Resources

“Silver Bullet” Syndrome

Change Processes Will Further Stress Existing Systems

Air TravelJust-in-Time Commerce

Seaport SecurityBorder Crossings

First Responders“Narrow” Approach May Increase Overall Risks

More Holistic Approach Required

Transitional VulnerabilitiesTransitional Vulnerabilities

New System Failure Rates Not Planned Don’t Know What You Don’t KnowSystems Must Be Learned Under Good Conditions and Bad

Technology Put Ahead Of PeopleTechnology Needs to Fit People – Not the Other Way Around

New System Failure Rates Not Planned Don’t Know What You Don’t KnowSystems Must Be Learned Under Good Conditions and Bad

Technology Put Ahead Of PeopleTechnology Needs to Fit People – Not the Other Way Around

Challenges Ahead

Challenges Ahead

Challenges Ahead--Best Viewed From Critical Infrastructure/3Rs PerspectiveChallenges Ahead--Best Viewed From Critical Infrastructure/3Rs Perspective

Systems Whose Rapid Failure Would Lead to Catastrophic Loss of Life

Type 1 – Resistance (Life)

Systems Whose Failure Would Lead to Unacceptable Economic Consequences

Type 2 – Resistance (Economic)

Systems Whose Failure Would Significantly Impact Rescue and Response Efforts

Type 3 – Response

Systems Whose Degradation Would Significantly Impact Recovery Efforts

Type 4 – Recovery

Systems Whose Rapid Failure Would Lead to Catastrophic Loss of Life

Type 1 – Resistance (Life)

Systems Whose Failure Would Lead to Unacceptable Economic Consequences

Type 2 – Resistance (Economic)

Systems Whose Failure Would Significantly Impact Rescue and Response Efforts

Type 3 – Response

Systems Whose Degradation Would Significantly Impact Recovery Efforts

Type 4 – Recovery

Resistance ChallengesType 1 (Life)Resistance ChallengesType 1 (Life)

Internally IntroducedAirportsNuclear/Chemical PlantsMajor Public Spaces – Transport Terminals/Hubs/ Large Public Gathering SpacesWater SupplyIssues

Airports/Nuclear & Chemical Plants As Sources of Threat (Plane, Radiation, Toxin)Open Nature of Infrastructure Terminals• Looking Past Fire to Biological/Chemical

ThreatsSlow to Detect Biological Contamination of Major Water Supply

Internally IntroducedAirportsNuclear/Chemical PlantsMajor Public Spaces – Transport Terminals/Hubs/ Large Public Gathering SpacesWater SupplyIssues

Airports/Nuclear & Chemical Plants As Sources of Threat (Plane, Radiation, Toxin)Open Nature of Infrastructure Terminals• Looking Past Fire to Biological/Chemical

ThreatsSlow to Detect Biological Contamination of Major Water Supply

Resistance ChallengesType 1 (Life)Resistance ChallengesType 1 (Life)

Recommendation National Test Bed Focused On Port Security

Recommendation National Test Bed Focused On Port Security

Resistance ChallengesType 2 (Economic)Resistance ChallengesType 2 (Economic)

Single Point Failure Threats(Conventional or Unconventional Weapons)

Major Infrastructure Links WithExtended Repair Times or CostsLimited or No Alternate “System” ConnectionsBroad “System” Degradation Potential

Particularly At Risk AreMajor Bridges & Subaqueous TunnelsTransit & Road Tunnels in Major CitiesElectric Power Transmission Lines, Inter-ties and Critical SwitchyardsTranscontinental Gas PipelinesMajor Aqueducts, Dams, Wastewater Treatment FacilitiesCable Landing Stations and Trans-oceanic Cables

Single Point Failure Threats(Conventional or Unconventional Weapons)

Major Infrastructure Links WithExtended Repair Times or CostsLimited or No Alternate “System” ConnectionsBroad “System” Degradation Potential

Particularly At Risk AreMajor Bridges & Subaqueous TunnelsTransit & Road Tunnels in Major CitiesElectric Power Transmission Lines, Inter-ties and Critical SwitchyardsTranscontinental Gas PipelinesMajor Aqueducts, Dams, Wastewater Treatment FacilitiesCable Landing Stations and Trans-oceanic Cables


Degraded Ubiquitous Infrastructure System Control/Capability (Conventional or Unconventional Weapons, Cyber or Insider Threat)

Major Control Centers and FunctionalityGateway to Other Systems

Particularly At Risk Are:Telecommunication Switching FacilitiesInternet Switching and Data CentersPower Dispatch Facilities

Degraded Ubiquitous Infrastructure System Control/Capability (Conventional or Unconventional Weapons, Cyber or Insider Threat)

Major Control Centers and FunctionalityGateway to Other Systems

Particularly At Risk Are:Telecommunication Switching FacilitiesInternet Switching and Data CentersPower Dispatch Facilities


Trade Interruption or Degraded Trade SystemMajor Port Facilities

Cargo (NY, Seattle, LA) and Energy (SPR, LOOP)

Select Border Crossings with Canada and MexicoIncreased Supply-Chain Transit Times Due To Increased Security RequirementsExamples

Bridge/Tunnel Links to DetroitKey Shipping Channels

Including Those Outside U.S.

Trade Interruption or Degraded Trade SystemMajor Port Facilities

Cargo (NY, Seattle, LA) and Energy (SPR, LOOP)

Select Border Crossings with Canada and MexicoIncreased Supply-Chain Transit Times Due To Increased Security RequirementsExamples

Bridge/Tunnel Links to DetroitKey Shipping Channels

Including Those Outside U.S.


RecommendationRisk Weighted Design Standards For Critical Infrastructure

RecommendationRisk Weighted Design Standards For Critical Infrastructure

Response ChallengesType 3Response ChallengesType 3

First Responder Protection & InteroperabilityEquipment & Training for Fuller Range of Threats Process for Assessing/Handling Unplanned ScenariosMission Reliable Communications Enhanced Communication At Responder Level Between First Responder Elements (CAPWIN)Enhanced Rapid Toxin IdentificationIssue

Sufficiency of Specialized First Responder ElementsFirst Responder Elements Are Not Universally Capable of Communicating Directly with Each Other At The Field Level

First Responder Protection & InteroperabilityEquipment & Training for Fuller Range of Threats Process for Assessing/Handling Unplanned ScenariosMission Reliable Communications Enhanced Communication At Responder Level Between First Responder Elements (CAPWIN)Enhanced Rapid Toxin IdentificationIssue

Sufficiency of Specialized First Responder ElementsFirst Responder Elements Are Not Universally Capable of Communicating Directly with Each Other At The Field Level


Emergency Operation Center Survivability

Enhanced Site Selection & ScreeningHardening and Protection for EOC Sites and FacilitiesIssue

Lessons Learned in National Defense Sector Need to Be Considered in EOC

Emergency Operation Center Survivability

Enhanced Site Selection & ScreeningHardening and Protection for EOC Sites and FacilitiesIssue

Lessons Learned in National Defense Sector Need to Be Considered in EOC


RecommendationsNational First Responder Training Facility For WMD EventsDeploy National First Responder Interoperability System

Build on CAPWIN

Develop Disaster Response Network of Engineers and Constructors as Part of First Responder Team

RecommendationsNational First Responder Training Facility For WMD EventsDeploy National First Responder Interoperability System

Build on CAPWIN

Develop Disaster Response Network of Engineers and Constructors as Part of First Responder Team

Recovery ChallengesType 4Recovery ChallengesType 4

Inadequate Specialized Personnel, Facilities and Equipment

Needs Not Well Defined in Homeland Security ContextExamples Include:

Decontamination Teams and EquipmentLaboratory and Specialized Manufacturing and Process FacilitiesHeavy Construction Equipment and EngineersNetwork of Disaster Recovery Specialists

Inadequate Specialized Personnel, Facilities and Equipment

Needs Not Well Defined in Homeland Security ContextExamples Include:

Decontamination Teams and EquipmentLaboratory and Specialized Manufacturing and Process FacilitiesHeavy Construction Equipment and EngineersNetwork of Disaster Recovery Specialists


Inadequate Legislative, Financial, Contracting and Risk Management Framework

Inadequate Legislative, Financial, Contracting and Risk Management Framework


RecommendationNational “Good Samaritan” Legislation for Engineers and Constructors Involved in Disaster Response and Recovery

RecommendationNational “Good Samaritan” Legislation for Engineers and Constructors Involved in Disaster Response and Recovery

SummarySummary


3 Rs – Resist, Respond, Recover

“SMART” Vulnerabilities

Challenges Ahead


3 Rs – Resist, Respond, Recover

“SMART” Vulnerabilities

Challenges Ahead