7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
1/72
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM
EMERGENCY SERVICES RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
ANALYSIS
PRELIMINARY REPORT
International Association of Fire Fighters
1750 New York Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20006
COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTSTOWN OF COVENTRY,RHODE ISLAND
OCTOBER 29,2013
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
2/72
2
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
3/72
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
________________________________________________________
IExecutive Summary.5
IIIntroduction9
IIIFire Department Operations11
IVStaffing and Deployment Analysis.31
VCentral Coventry Liquidation - Response Capability Analysis...49
VIConclusions63
VIISummary...65
VIIIMethodology Appendix...67
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
4/72
4
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
5/72
5
Executive SummaryThis report summarizes the results of a station location, staffing, and emergency vehicle traveltime analysis for the Coventry Fire Districts including Central Coventry, Coventry-Anthony,
Hopkins Hill, and Western Coventry at the request of IAFF Local 3372. Furthermore, thiscomputer-based analytical study examines predicted travel times and geographic coverage areasfor emergency response units deployed from existing fire station locations in the Coventry FireDistrict response jurisdiction under existing and previous staffing and deployment configurationsand predicted travel times and geographic coverage areas for emergency response units pursuantto liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
National Performance Standards
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) produced NFPA 1710 Organization andDeployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is the consensus standard forcareer firefighter deployment, including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffinglevels, and fireground responsibilities.1
Key Sections included in the 1710 Standard are:
5.2.3.1 & 5.2.3.1.1o Fire companies, whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and
perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed
with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.
5.2.3.2 and 5.2.3.2.1o Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services
associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and
rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control,
illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall be staffed with a minimum of
four on-duty personnel.
5.2.4.1.1o The fire departments fire suppression resources shall be deployed to provide for
the arrival of an engine company within a 240-second travel time to 90 percent ofthe incidents.
5.2.4.2.1o The fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm
assignment within a 480-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents.
1NFPA 1710, 2010
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
6/72
6
5.2.4.2.2o The initial full alarm assignment to a structure fire in a typical 2000 ft2 two-
story single-family dwelling without basement and with no exposures shall
provide for the following.
Assignment Required Personnel
Incident command 1 Individual
Uninterrupted Water supply 1 Pump Operator
Water flow from two handlines 4 Individuals (2 for each line)
Support for hand lines 2 Individuals (1 for each line)
Victim search and rescue team 2 Individuals
Ventilation team 2 Individuals
Aerial operator 1 Individual
Initial Rapid Intervention Crew
(IRIC)
2 Individuals
Required minimum personnel for
full alarm
14 firefighters & 1 scene commander
Key Findings
The Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in
NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be worsened in the event of liquidation of
the Central Coventry Fire District. This lack of compliance with industry standard performance
objectives will increase risk for citizens and visitors of Coventry. These findings are based on the
following facts.
1) Based on this geographic information system assessment of the areas that are assumed tobe covered by CCFD a good measure of CCFD assigned area roads are not currently
serviced within safe and effective time frames as illustrated in this report. In fact, forroads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to protect, on only a few
roads can citizens expect the arrival of 12 or more firefighters pre-flashover, and on no
roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8 minutes,
considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small
residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and
immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
7/72
7
the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well as
significantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the
housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would
clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work
to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury.
2) Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters.3) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the
prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most
areas of the Town.
4) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for theeffective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within
8-minutes in most areas of the Town.
5) Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled withinthe Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, if automatic mutual
aid responds. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that
fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring
in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to
initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy
building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely
the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response
time parameter, and only when automatic mutual aid responds . Without automaticaid response there will be nofirefighting or rescue capability in the Central Coventry Fire
District post-liquidation, at all.
6) Any further reduction in resources by any of the four fire districts significantlydeteriorates response and increases risk to firefighters and the citizens of Coventry.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
8/72
8
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
9/72
9
IntroductionThe International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) was contacted by the Central Coventry
Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 3372 to perform a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of
the response capability of the Coventry Fire Districts. Local 3372 requested that the GIS study
evaluate the current, previous and liquidation deployment models against both National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) industry standards and Federal Occupational Safety & Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations. The procedures involved in the evaluation included
generating GIS maps and explanations of the results. The steps included in the evaluation are
listed below.
1) GIS analysis of planned staffing and deployment configurations.2) Statistical analysis of fire department response capabilities pre and post personnel and
mobile resource deployment changes.
Scope and Objectives
This report provides the results of the emergency response system evaluation and the GIS
assessment of the Coventry Fire Districts response capabilies. The report refers both to the
current performance of the department and to their staffing and deployment practices. Items
specifically covered in this report include the following.
Fire District response capabilities and compliance with industry standards Staffing configurations and safe work practices Strengths and weaknesses of the Fire Districts
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
10/72
10
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
11/72
11
Fire Department OperationsThe business of providing emergency services has always been labor intensive, and remains so
today. Although new technology has improved firefighting equipment and protective gear, and
has led to advances in modern medicine, it is the firefighters who still perform the time-critical
tasks necessary to contain and extinguish fires, rescue trapped occupants from a burning
structure, and provide emergency medical and rescue services.
In less than 30 seconds a small flame can burn out of control and become a major fire. During
fire growth, the temperature of a fire rises to between 1,000 and 1,200 F. It is generally
accepted in the fire service that for a medium growth rate fire 2, flashover- the very rapid
spreading of the fire due to super heating of room contents and other combustibles- occurs in less
than 10 minutes. Allowing time for discovery of the fire, a call to 911, and dispatch ofemergency responders, flashover is likely to occur within 8 minutes of firefighter dispatch. It
is also worth noting that flashover may occur more quickly depending on newer building
construction materials and room contents that act as fuel.
At the point of flashover, the odds of survival for unprotected individuals inside the structure are
virtually non-existent. The rapid response of an appropriate number of firefighters is therefore
essential to initiating effective fire suppression and rescue operations that seek to minimize fire
spread and maximize the odds of preserving both life and property.
F ir e Growth, F lashover, and the Importance of a Rapid Response to a Fir e in a Residential
Structure:
The Incipient Phase
The first stage of any fire is the incipient stage. When heat is applied to a combustible material,
the heat oxidizes the materials surface into combustible gases. The oxidation process is
exothermic, meaning that the oxidation process itself produces heat. The heat from oxidation
raises the temperature of surrounding materials, which increases the rate of oxidation and begins
a chemical chain reaction of heat release and burning. A fire can progress from the incipient
phase immediately or slowly, depending upon the fuel, nearby combustibles, and the availability
of oxygen in the surrounding air.
2As defined in theHandbook of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, a fast fire grows exponentially to 1.0MWin 150 seconds. A medium fire grows exponentially to 1 MWin 300 seconds. A slow fire grows exponentially to1 MWin 600 seconds. A 1 MWfire can be thought-of as a typical upholstered chair burning at its peak. A large sofamight be 2 to 3 MWs.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
12/72
12
The Free Burning Phase
The second stage of fire growth is the freeor open burning stage. When the temperature of
a fire gets high enough, visible flames can be seen. The visible burning at this stage is still
limited to the immediate area of origin. The combustible process continues to release more heat,
which heats nearby objects to their ignition temperature, and they begin burning. In a wild-land
fire the surrounding growth will ignite and the flames will spread, quickly if wind and dry
growth are present. A structure fire is different, because the gaseous products of combustion,
most of which are flammable and lighter than air, rise and are contained in the upper levels of the
structure. When this occurs, the structure fire is at a critical point: either the fire has insufficient
oxygen available to burn and it progresses back to the incipient stage, or it has sufficient oxygen
available to move on to the next stage.
FIGURE 1:FIRE GROWTH IN A CONFINED SPACE3
When an object in a room starts to burn (such as the armchair in Figure 1), it burns in much the
same way as it would in an open area. After a short period of time, however, confinement begins
to influence fire development. The smoke produced by the burning object rises to form a hot gas
layer below the ceiling; this layer heats the ceiling and upper walls of the room. Thermal
radiation from the hot layer, ceiling, and upper walls begins to heat all objects in the lower part
of the room and may augment both the rate of burning of the original object and the rate of flamespread over its surface.
At this point, the fire may go out, for example, if the first object completely burns before another
begins, or if sufficient oxygen cannot get into the room to keep the object burning. Sometimes,
however, the heating of the other combustibles in the room continues to the point where they
3Image courtesy of University of California at Davis Fire Department
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
13/72
13
reach their ignition temperatures more or less simultaneously. If this occurs, flames suddenly
sweep across the entire room, involving all combustibles. This transition from the burning of
one or two objects to full room involvement is referred to as flashover.4
Flashover
Flashover, when it occurs, is the most significant event during a structure fire. As combustible
gases are produced by the two previous stages they are not entirely consumed and are therefore
available fuels. These available fuels rise and form a superheated gas layer at the ceiling that
continues to increase, until it begins to bank down to the floor, heating all combustible objects
regardless of their proximity to the burning object. In a typical structure fire, the gas layer at the
ceiling can quickly reach temperatures of 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. With enough existing
oxygen at the floor level, flashover occurs, burning everything in the room at once. The
instantaneous eruption into flame generates a tremendous amount of heat, smoke, and pressure.
The pressure has enough force to push beyond the room of origin and through doors and
windows. Usually at the time of flashover, windows in the room will break, allowing for theentry of fresh air. The introduction of fresh air serves to further fuel the growth of the fire by
increasing the fires temperature and spreading the fire beyond the room of origin.
Unknown Unknown1 minute
elapsed
2 minutes
elapsed
7 minutes
elapsed
8 minutes
elapsed
Ignition of
Fire
Discovery Notification of
Emergency
Response
System
Dispatch of
Emergency
Units
Fire
Department
Turnout
Fire
Department
Arrival at the
Incident Scene
Access,
Rescue,
Ventil ate and
Suppress
FLASHOVER
Overhaul
Scene
TIMELINE OF A FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO A
STRUCTURE FIRE
8 minu tes
3 minutes
elapsed
Fire
Department
Departure
FIGURE 2:FIREDEPARTMENTRESPONSE TIMELINE
4J.R. Mehaffey, Ph.D., Flammability of Building Materials and Fire Growth, Institute for Research in Construction(1987)
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
14/72
14
Based on the dynamics of fire behavior in an unprotected structure fire, any decrease in
emergency unit response capabilities will correlate directly with an increase in expected life,
property, and economic loss.
F ir e Growth and the Importance of a Rapid Response to Fir e in H igh-Rise/H igh H azard
Structures:
Fires in high-rise buildings pose unique and significant risks to firefighters operating on the
fireground and are some of the most difficult fires to control. The logistics of a high-rise
firefighting operation must not be underestimated. Even under ideal conditions, successfully
fighting a fire requires large numbers of personnel and supplies. Physical demands on
firefighters due the buildings sheer size requires regular rotation of personnel out of the fire area
for rest and rehabilitation.5
High-rise firefighting operations are considered high-hazard scenarios because of the potentialfor extremely large fires and the potentially large number of building occupants who may be
exposed to the resulting heat and smoke. Fires that are not contained by sprinklers or other fire
protection measures may grow to consume large portions of available floor area due to the
significant time that it takes for firefighters to reach and suppress the fire, as well as the large
quantities of fuel load typical of modern office spaces. Additionally, high-rise buildings may
have large floor areas and many floors at or above the fire that need to be searched for possible
victims or occupants requiring assistance. Searching the fire floor is typically conducted in high
heat and low visibility conditions due to the proximity of the fire. The remaining floors above the
fire can take substantial resources and time to fully search. Together, the tasks and hazards
typical of the high-rise fireground combine to form a substantial operational challenge typical of
the high-hazard class of response scenarios.6
The conclusions of the recently released NIST study on the high-rise fireground can be
summarized in three principal parts. First, when responding to a medium growth rate fire, 3-
person crews ascending to the fire floor confronted an environment where the fire had released
60% more heat energy than the fire encountered by the 6-person crews doing the same work.
Unfortunately, larger fires expose firefighters to greater risks and are more challenging to
suppress.
Second, larger fires produce more risk exposure for building occupants. In general, occupants
being rescued by smaller crew sizes and by crews that used the stairs rather than the elevators
were exposed to a significantly greater dose of toxins from the fire. While the exact risk
exposure for an occupant will depend on the fire growth rate, their proximity to the fire, and the
5National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18 th ed. (Quincy, MA:NFPA, 1997) 9-1146Averill, J., et. al., NIST Report on High-Rise Fireground Experiments, April 2013.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
15/72
15
floor on which the fire is located, it is clear that on-scene deployment decisions can have a
dramatic impact in determining the fate of building occupants.
Third, the study confirmed that a properly engineered and operational fire sprinkler system
drastically reduces the risk exposure for both the building occupants and the firefighters.
While this has been well understood for many years and most new high-rise buildings are
constructed with fire sprinkler protection, NFPA estimates that 41 percent of U.S. high-rise
office buildings, 45 percent of high-rise hotels, and 54 percent of high-rise apartment buildings
are not equipped with sprinklers. Moreover, sprinkler systems fail in about one in 14 fires. Thus,
fire departments should be prepared to manage the risks associated with unsprinklered high-rise
building fires.
Modern warehouses and storage occupancies are also subject to rapidly developing fires of great
intensity because complex configurations of storage are conducive to rapid fire spread,
presenting numerous obstacles to fire suppression efforts. Additionally, windows with iron
shutters- or buildings with no windows at all, hamper a fire departments efforts to gain access to
the building. If passageways are impassable, the fire can be reached only by streams operating
through windows, and the opening of shutters may be a time-consuming operation.7, 8
The Importance of Adequate Staffi ng to Conduct Safe and Eff ective F ir e Suppression and
Rescue Operations:
Staffing deficiencies on primary fire suppression apparatus also negatively affect the ability of
the fire department to safely and effectively mitigate emergencies and therefore correlate directly
with higher risks and increased losses. Continued fire growth, beyond the time of firefighter onscene arrival is directly linked to the time it takes to initiate fire suppression operations. As
indicated in Table 1, responding companies staffed with four firefighters are capable of initiating
critical fire ground operational tasks more efficiently than those with crew sizes below industry
standards.
7Fire Chiefs Handbook, 4thed., Advanced Fire Fighting, (Saddle Brook, N.J., 1987) 498. 8National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18 th ed. (Quincy, MA:NFPA, 1997) 9-110
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
16/72
16
Engine Company Duties Ladder Company Duties
FiregroundTasks
Advanc
e Attack
Line
%
Change
Water
on Fire
%
Chang
e
Primar
y
Search
%
Chang
e
Ventin
g Time
%
Change
4
Firefighters
0:03:27 0:08:41 0:08:47 0:04:42
3
Firefighters
0:03:56 12%Less
Efficient
0:09:15 6% LessEfficient
0:09:10 4% LessEfficient
0:07:01 32% LessEfficient
2
Firefighters
0:04:53 29%Less
Efficient
0:10:16 15%Less
Efficient
0:12:16 28%Less
Efficient
0:07:36 38% LessEfficient
TABLE 1:IMPACT OF CREW SIZE ON ALOW-HAZARDRESIDENTIALFIRE9
First-arriving companies staffed with four firefighters are more efficient in all aspects of initialfire suppression and search and rescue operations compared to two-or three-person companies.
There is a significant increase in time for all the tasks if a company arrives on scene staffed with
only three firefighters compared to four firefighters. According to the NIST Report on
Residential Fireground Field Experiments, four-person crews are able to complete time critical
fireground tasks 5.1 minutes (nearly 25%) faster than three-person crews. The increase in time
to task completion corresponds with an increase in risk to both firefighters and trapped
occupants.
With four-person crews, the effectiveness of first-arriving engine company interior attack
operations increases by 12% to 29% efficiency compared to three- and two-person crews
respectively. The efficacy of ladder company search and rescue operations also increasesby 4%
and 28% with four-person crews compared to three and two person crews. Moreover, with a
four-person company, because the first-in unit is staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to
accomplish its assigned duties, the second-in company does not need to support first-in company
operations and is therefore capable of performing critical second-in company duties.
Insufficient numbers of emergency response units or inadequate staffing levels on those units
exposes civilians and firefighters to increased risk, further drains already limited fire department
resources, and stresses the emergency response system by requiring additional apparatus torespond from further distances. Failing to assemble sufficient resources on the scene of a fire in
time to stop the spread and extinguish the fire, conduct a search, and rescue any trapped
occupants, puts responding firefighters and occupants in a dangerous environment with
exponential risk escalation such that it is difficult to catch up and mitigate the event to a positive
outcome.
9Derived from NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
17/72
17
A prime objective of fire service agencies is to maintain enough strategically located personnel
and equipment so that the minimum acceptable response force can reach a reasonable number of
fire scenes before flashover is likely.10 Two of the most important elements in limiting fire
spread are the quick arrival of sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and
extinguish the fire as close to the point of origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped
occupants and care for the injured. Rapid and aggressive interior attack of structure fires, as
close as possible to the point of origin, can reduce human and property losses. Sub-optimal
staffing of arriving units may delay such an attack, thus allowing the fire to progress to more
dangerous conditions for firefighters and civilians. If the arriving units have adequate resources
to handle the situation, then they will fight the fire aggressively and offensively. They will
attack the problem head-on and, following department standards, will accomplish their
objectives efficiently, effectively, and safely. If they do not have adequate resources to
aggressively handle the situation, then they will have to fight the fire in a defensive mode of
attack. This mode will continue until enough resources can be massed to then change to anaggressive, offensive attack.
11
NFPA 1500 and 1710 both recommend that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level
should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder
company responding to any type of fire. Recall that at the scene of an emergency, the
driver/operator of the engine must remain with the apparatus to operate the pump. Likewise, the
driver/operator of the Ladder must remain with the apparatus to safely operate the aerial device.
Such activities, which help to ensure the safe and effective delivery of fire suppression and
rescue services, leave a crew of only two firefighters from an engine company and two
firefighters from a ladder company to support the attack or complete search and rescue activities.As noted previously, due to the demands of fireground activities which reduce the effective
firefighting force deploying from each company from four to three, a fire attack initiated by a
single fire company is not capable of effecting a safe and effective fire suppression and/or rescue
operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out policies until a second company arrives with
sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation, and to assist the first
company in the event of an unexpected emergency.12 Industry studies have confirmed that four
firefighters are capable of performing the rescue of potential victims 80% faster than a
crew of three firefighters.13
10University of California at Davis Fire Department website; site visited June 7, 2004.< http://fire.ucdavis.edu/ucdfire/UCDFDoperations.htm >11National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, High-Rise Apartment Fire Claims the Life of One CareerFire Fighter (Captain) and Injures Another Career Fire Fighter (Captain)Texas, 13 October 200112 A four-person fire company may initiate emergency search and rescue operations at the order of the incidentcommander if there is a reasonable and immediate threat to life. 13McManis Associates and John T. OHagan & Associates, Dallas Fire Department Staffing Level Study, (June1984); pp. 1-2 and II-1 through II-7; Richard C. Morrison, Manning Levels for Engine and Ladder Companies inSmall Fire Departments, (1990)
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
18/72
18
The Importance of Crew Size to Overall Scene Time:
Studies have shown that the more personnel that arrive on Engine and Ladder companies to the
scene of a fire, the less time it takes to do all aspects of fire suppression and search and rescue.
As units arriving with more firefighters increases, the overall time on scene of the emergency
decreases. In other words, the more firefighters available to respond and arrive early to a
structure fire, the less time it takes to extinguish the fire and perform search and rescue activities,
thus reducing the risk of injury and death to both firefighters and trapped occupants and reducing
the economic loss to the property.
TABLE 2:THERELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREW SIZE AND SCENE TIME14
As Table 2 shows, units that arrive with only two firefighters on an engine or truck are on the
scene of a fire almost 7 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each crew.
Responding units arriving with only 3 firefighters on an apparatus are on the scene of a fire 5 to
6 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each apparatus. In addition tocrew size, the time between the arriving crews matters to overall effectiveness and on scene time.
In the NIST study on low hazard residential fireground, close stagger was defined as a 1-minute
time difference in the arrival of each responding company. Far stagger was defined as a 2-
minute time difference in the arrival of each responding company.15 16 The results show a
consistent pattern of units arriving with four firefighters in a close stagger or far stagger will
decrease the overall time at the scene of the emergency compared to units that arrive with two or
three firefighters and are more efficient in fire suppression.
14NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,201015NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg. 24 16One minute and two minute arrival stagger times were determined from analysis of deployment data from morethan 300 U.S. fire departments responding to a survey from fire department operations conducted by theInternational Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Firefighters.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
19/72
19
The Importance of a Rapid Response in I ni tiati ng Safe and Ef fective F ir e Suppression and
Rescue Operations:
Any delay in the initiation of fire suppression and rescue operations translates directly into a
proportional increase in expected property, life, and economic losses (reference The
Relationship between Fire Extension and Fire Loss, Table 4, p. 24). It warrants emphasizing
that if a structure has no automatic suppression or detection system, a more advanced fire may
exist by the time the fire department is notified of the emergency and is able to respond. Fires of
an extended duration weaken structural members, compromising the structural integrity of a
building and forcing operations to shift from an offensive to defensive mode.17 As with
inadequate staffing this type of operation will continue until enough resources can be amassed to
then change to an aggressive, offensive attack.
Typical I ni tial Attack Response Capabil iti es Assuming I nterior Attack and Operations
Command Capabili ties for D if fering Fi re Hazard Envir onments:
High-Hazard Environments
Type of Occupancy
Schools Hospitals Nursing Homes Explosives Plants Refineries High-Rise Buildings Other high life hazard or large fire potential occupancies.
Response Capability
4 Engines / Staffed with 5 firefighters 2 Ladder Trucks/ staffed with 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus with equivalent
capabilities.)
2 Chief Officers Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed to cope with the combustible involved.
Personnel Resources
30 Firefighters 2 Chief Officers Extra staffing of units first due to high-hazard occupancies is advised.
17According to the NFPA, its important to realize that every 250 GPM stream applied to the building can add upto one ton per minute to the load the weakened structure is carrying.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
20/72
20
One or more safety officers Rapid intervention team(s) is also necessary.
Medium-Hazard Environments
Type of Occupancy
Apartments Offices Mercantile and Industrial not normally requiring extensive rescue or fire-fighting
forces.
Response Capability
3 Engines/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters
1 Ladder Truck/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus withequivalent capabilities.)
1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available.
Personnel
1620 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team
Low-Hazard Environment
Type of Occupancy
One-, two-, or three-family dwellings Scattered Small Business Scattered Small Industrial Occupancies
Response Capability
3 Engines/ Staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters 1 Ladder Truck/ staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters (or combination apparatus with
equivalent capabilities.)
1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
21/72
21
Personnel
16 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team
The Importance of the 8-minute Engine Company Response dur ing Structural F ir e Fighting
Operations
One of the first priorities in a fire is to get water on the fire to extinguish it. When initiating fire
attack, a single engine company would not be capable of affecting a safe and effective fire attack
or rescue operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out requirements unless staffed with at least
four firefighters. Engine crews with less than four must wait until a second fire suppression
company arrives with sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation and
to assist the first crew in the event of an unexpected emergency during interior attack.
One firefighter must remain at the engine
pump to establish and maintain an
uninterrupted water supply to firefighters
working inside the burning structure
Two firefighters initiate interior
fire attack and rescue trappedoccupants
One firefighter remains to
check for exposures and
intervene in the event of a
firefighter emergency
FIGURE 3: ENGINE COMPANYFIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITHFOURFIREFIGHTERS
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
22/72
22
The Importance of the 8-minute Ladder Company Response dur ing Structural F ir e Fighting
Operations
Ladder companies play a vital role on the scene of a structure fire. Ladder crew duties include
securing building access, conducting search and victim rescue and conducting ventilation during
suppression activities. The importance of being able to ventilate a building efficiently,effectively, and in coordination with interior attack operations is key to supporting fire
suppression and search and rescue operations. Once the superheated gases and smoke from the
building have been ventilated, firefighters conducting interior fire suppression and rescue
operations are able to more clearly locate the seat of the fire and more effectively perform victim
search and rescue. The rapid extrication of victims from inside a burning structure is critical to
saving lives: the quicker fire victims are removed from the structure, the quicker they can be
treated by fire department and medical personnel for smoke inhalation, burns, and other injuries
related to fire. Thus, the response of the Ladder in concert withother fire suppression companies
assigned to respond to a structure fire is critical to initiating safe and effectivefire suppression
and rescue operations. Any delay in response translates directly into a proportional increaseinrisk and the expected loss of life and property.
To facilitate the rapid extrication of trapped occupants, NFPA 1710 states that Fire companies
whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work,
such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and
rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a
minimum of four on-duty personnel.18 A crew of four is required to make a safe initial attack
on a fire, with a crew of two working inside the burning structure and a backup crew of two
standing by to assist should the interior crew become trapped or injured. This is known as
OSHAs 2 In/ 2 Outpolicy19. Both the NFPA and OSHA 2 In/2 Out policy require an outside
crew to be assembled prior to anyone entering an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to
life or health (IDLH). This important safety requirement will have a large impact on availability
of firefighters to enter the building when small crews are deployed.
18NFPA 1710, Section 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.119The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR1910.134. This paragraph applies to private sector workers engaged in interior structural fire fighting and to Federalemployees covered under Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. States that have chosen to operate
OSHA-approved occupational safety and health state plans are required to extend their jurisdiction to includeemployees of their state and local governments. These states are required to adopt a standard at least as effective asthe Federal standard within six months. OSHAs interpretation on requirements for the number of workers requiredto be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)covers the number of persons who must be on the scene before fire fighting personnel may initiate an attack on astructural fire. An interior structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the bui lding where hightemperatures, heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and therefore,
require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition to the minimum of two personsinside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire fighters may enter the building. Letter to Thomas N.Cooper, Purdue University, from Paula O. White, Director of Federal-State Operations, U.S. Department of Labor,Occupational Safety & Health Administration, November 1, 1995.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
23/72
23
No firefighter immediately
available to ventilate the
structure
When staffed with three fir efighters, only two
ladder company personnel ini tiate victimsearch and rescue. Venti lation activit ies are
delayed.
Staffing conditions and fireground capabilitieswhen a ladder company is staffed with only
three firefighters
Driver/Operator remains at the ladder truck to
maneuver the aerial device into position in
anticipation of second-in companies; inspection
of the premises for fire extension and exposures
not accomplished
Two remaining firefighters
initiate victim search and
rescue operations in
conjunction with the
suppression crew from an
engine.
FIGURE 4:LADDER COMPANY OPERATIONS WHENLADDER TRUCKSDEPLOY WITH ONLY THREEFIREFIGHTERS
The critical difference between staffing ladder companies with three firefighters instead of four
is that when staffed with four firefighters, ladder companies are capable of venting the structure
and initiating rescue operations more safelyand more effectivelythan ladder companies staffed
with less than four firefighters. In the low hazard environment, trucks staffed with four
firefighters, in compliance with industry standards, firefighters are 32% more efficient
than three-person crews in ventilating the structure and 4% more effective in
accomplishing victim search and rescue than three-person crews20
.
20NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,2010, Pg 40-41.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
24/72
24
Company Officer and
Firefighter #1 initiate victim
search and rescue operations
Firefighter #2 left to perform
the task of ventilating the
structure
When staffed with four f ir efighters, the crew
is able to initiate search and rescue andbegin venti lation as necessary.
Staffing conditions and fireground capabilitieswhen ladder companies are staffed with fourfirefighters, in compliance with NFPA 1710
company staffing objectives
Driver/Operator remains available to check
for exposures and fire extension, and to
maneuver the aerial device into position in
anticipation of second-in companies
FIGURE 5:LADDER COMPANYFIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITHFOUR
FIREFIGHTERS
When staffed with three firefighters, crews assigned to ventilate a low hazard structure are 32%
less effective than 4-person crews. Likewise, 2- person crews are 38% less effective compared
to crews with four firefighters. For search and rescue tasks, crews staffed with three firefightersare 4% less efficient at search and rescue compared to four firefighters.21
NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS ROOF
VENTILATION
SEARCH &
RESCUE
4 Firefighters
3 Firefighters 32% less efficient 4% less efficient
2 Firefighters 38% less efficient 28% less efficient
TABLE 3:LADDER COMPANYEFFICIENCY:2FIREFIGHTERS VS.4FIREFIGHTERS22
21NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg 40 -41.22NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,2010, pg 40-41.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
25/72
25
I nitial F ull Alarm Assignment
Initial Full Alarm Assignment Capability, as outlined in NFPA Standard 1710, recommends that
the fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within an
8-minute response time to 90 percent of the incidents [and that the] initial full alarm shall
provide for the following: a minimum of one individual dedicated to establishing incident
command outside of the hazard area, assisted by an aide; establishment of an uninterrupted water
supply, which shall be maintained by an operator who shall ensure uninterrupted water flow
application; establishment of attack and backup lines, operated by a minimum of two personnel
each to effectively and safely maintain the line; provision of one support person for each attack
and backup line to provide hydrant hookup, assist in line lays, utility control, and forcible entry;
a minimum of one search and rescue team, consisting of two personnel; a minimum of one
ventilation team, consisting of two personnel; and establishment of an Initial Rapid Intervention
Crew (IRIC), consisting of a minimum of two properly equipped and trainedpersonnel.23 This
breakdown of the expected capabilities of a full alarm assignment, in compliance with NFPAStandard 1710, requires a minimum contingent of fifteen fire suppression personnel, including
the Incident Commander (IC) and the ICs aide24, to arrive at the scene of a structure fire within
8 minutes of receiving the alarm.25
TOTAL ON SCENE: 17
Incident Command Vehicle: 1 Chief Officer
Ladder Truck: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters
Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters
Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters
Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire FightersVentilation
Team
Aerial
Operator
Victim Search &
Rescue Team
Supply Pump
Operator
IRIC Team
Attack Hose
Crew
Incident Commander (IC) and
IC Aide
Attack Pump
Operator
Backup
Hose Crew
FD
FD
FD
15 PERSONNEL REQUIRED
17 if Aerial Device and
Supply Pump are in Operation
FIGURE 6: NFPA1710INITIALFULLALARMASSIGNMENTDEPLOYED WITHIN 8MINUTES
23NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.2.1 and 5.2.3.2.2, (a)(h)24NFPA 1710, 5.2.1.2.525 It should be noted that a minimum on-scene contingent of fifteen to seventeen fire suppression personnel arerequired by NFPA Standard 1710 when a second pump and an aerial device are in operation at the incident scene.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
26/72
26
The ability of adequate fire suppression forces to greatly influence the outcome of a structural
fire is undeniable and predictable. Data generated by the NFPA provides empirical proof that a
rapid and aggressive interior attack can substantially reduce loss of life and the loss of property
associated with structural fires. Each stage of fire extension beyond the room of origin directly
increases the rate of civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage.
Rate Per 1,000 Fires
Fire Extension in Residential Structures:Civilian
DeathsCivilian
Injuries
Average Property
Damage
Confined to Room of Origin 2.07 24.30 $1,505.00
Confined to Floor of Origin 18.60 80.44 $12,134.00
Beyond Floor of Origin 27.23 55.37 $21,343.00
TABLE 4:THERELATIONSHIP BETWEENFIREEXTENSION ANDFIRELOSS26
OSHAs 2 In/2 Out Regulation:
The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection
standard, 29 CFR 1910.134. The focus of this important section is the safety of fire fighters
engaged in interior structural firefighting. OSHAs requirements for the number of workers
required to be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately
dangerous to life and health (IDLH) also covers the number of persons who must be on the scene
before firefighting personnel may initiate an interior attack on a structural fire. An interior
structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the building where high temperatures,
heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and,
therefore, require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition
to the minimum of two persons inside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire
fighters may enter the building.27, 28 This requirement is mirrored in NFPA 1500, which states
that a rapid intervention team shall consist of at least two members and shall be available for
rescue of a member or a team if the need arises. Once a second team is assigned or operating in
the hazardous area, the incident shall no longer be considered in the initial stage, and at least
one rapid intervention crew shall be required.
26Source: National Fire Protection Association27 According to NFPA standards relating to fire fighter safety and health, the incident commander may makeexceptions to these rules if necessary to save lives. The Standard does not prohibit fire fighters from entering aburning structure to perform rescue operations when there is a reasonable belief that victims may be inside. 28Paula O. White, letter to Thomas N. Cooper, 1 November 1995 (OSHA)
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
27/72
27
FIGURE 7:OSHA2IN/2OUTILLUSTRATEDTwo of the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of sufficient
numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire as close to the point of
origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped occupants and care for the injured. Several
existing National Fire Protection Association standards address this time-critical issue. NFPA
1500 states, while members can be assigned and arrive at the scene of an incident in many
different ways, it is strongly recommended that interior firefighting operations not be conducted
without an adequate number of qualified firefighters operating in companies under the
supervision of company officers. It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire
company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine
and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. NFPA Standard 1710 further
recommends that fire companies whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and
perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed with a
minimum of four on-duty personnel,29while fire companies whose primary functions are to
perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation,search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination,
overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty
personnel.30 For either fire suppression company, NFPA 1710 states that in jurisdictions with
tactical hazards, high hazard occupancies, high incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or
29NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.1.130NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.1
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
28/72
28
other pertinent factors as identified by the authority having jurisdiction, these companies shall be
staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members.31
There exist a number of incidents in which the failure to follow 2 In/2 Out procedures have
contributed to fire fighter casualties. For example, in Lexington, Kentucky, one firefighter died
and a second was severely injured following a fire where Kentucky OSHA later cited the
firefighters employer for failing to utilize 2 In/2 Out procedures. In a second case, two
firefighters died from smoke inhalation after being overcome by toxic fumes while fighting an
accidental fire in Philadelphia, PA. Although two additional firefighters were outside the home,
both were engaged in support activities (hydrant hook-up and pump operation), and neither was
fully accountable for monitoring the interior personnel32.
There also exist a number of success stories following the adoption of 2 In/2 Out procedures.
In Pittsburgh, PA, the Fire Department implemented an accountability and rescue system
following a fatal fire. In one instance, four firefighters who were performing an interior attackon an apartment building fire became disoriented and were trapped in the building. The standby
personnel were able to initiate rescue operations promptly and, although the four interior
firefighters and two of the rescuers were injured, all survived.33
One firefighter expected to
maintain an uninterrupted
water supply to f irefighters
working inside the burningstructure and also remain
available for rapid intervention
if firefighters inside become
trapped.
Only 4 firefighters
are capable of
initiating effective
emergency rescue
operations
Two firefighters enter structure
and initiate fire suppression and/
or emergency rescue of trapped
occupants
Two firefighters remain immediately
availableto monitor operations and rescue
trapped firefighters, if necessary
Figure 8: Emergency 2 In/2 Out Operations When Fire Companies are Staffed with 4
Firefighters
31NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.2.232FACE 98-03: Two Fire Fighters Die of Smoke and Soot Inhalation in Residential FirePennsylvania, retrievedfrom CDC website: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9803.html, site visited 3/5/201333John B. Miles, Jr., letter to J. Curtis Varone, Esq., 29 April 1998 (OSHA)
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
29/72
29
When confronted with occupants trapped in a burning structure and a single fire company is on
scene, only a company staffed with four firefighters is able to initiate emergency search and
rescue operations in compliance with 2 In/2 Outpolicies. As indicated in the previous graphic,
this requires the complete engagement of every firefighter from the first-in fire company, staffed
with four, to participate in the effort, and means that the driver-operator of the apparatus must
tend to the pump to ensure the delivery of water to the firefighters performing the initial attack
and search and rescue operations and be prepared to make entry with the remaining firefighter
should the crew operating inside become trapped.
Regardless, when there exists an immediate threat to life, only a company of four firefighters can
initiate fire suppression and rescue operations in compliance with the 2 In/2 Out policies, and
in a manner that minimizes the threat of personal injury. In crews with fewer than 4 firefighters,
the first-in company must wait until the arrival of the second-in unit to initiate safe and effective
fire suppression and rescue operations. This condition underlines the importance and desirability
of fire companies to be staffed with four firefighters, and stresses the benefit of four-personcompanies and their ability to save lives without having to wait for the second-in company to
arrive.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
30/72
30
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
31/72
31
Staffing and Deployment AnalysisStaffing and Deployment
The following table specifies the Coventry Fire Districts existing Station locations, apparatus
and minimum on-duty staffing:
Station Address Apparatus Min. Staffing
Centr al Coventr y - 1 954 Hill Farm Road closed
Centr al Coventr y - 3 2 Station Street closed
Central Coventry - 4 243 Arnold Rd EngineAmbulance
2
2
Centr al Coventr y - 5 701 Main Street closed
Central Coventry - 7 2847 Flat River Road EngineAmbulance
2
2
Coventry-Anthony Station 571 Washington Street EngineLadder
Ambulance
4
Hopkins Hill Station 1 Bestwick Trail EngineLadder
Ambulance
1 career, 1
volunteer
Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,RI
EngineAmbulance
2 career (M-F,
8-4), 2
volunteer
The following table specifies the previous staffing and deployment configuration:
Station Address Apparatus Min. Staffing
Central Coventry - 1 954 Hill Farm Road Ambulance 2
Central Coventry - 3 2 Station Street LadderAmbulance
2
Central Coventry - 4 243 Arnold Rd Engine 2
Central Coventry - 5 701 Main Street Engine 2Central Coventry - 7 2847 Flat River Road Engine 2
Coventry-Anthony Station 571 Washington Street EngineLadder
Ambulance
4
Hopkins Hill Station 1 Bestwick Trail EngineLadder
Ambulance
1 career, 1
volunteer
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
32/72
32
Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,RI
EngineAmbulance
2 career (M-F,
8-4), 2
volunteer
Fire District and Station Location Overview Map
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
33/72
33
The following series of maps indicate estimates of existing response capabilities of the Coventry
Fire Districts based on a travel time model. The indicated response capabilities for individual
units, and the units designated to respond as part of an alarm assignment, assume that all units
and the personnel assigned to staff these units are available to respond immediately upon
dispatch.34
Understanding the several components of an emergency response is an important part ofunderstanding how to interpret the following series of maps. To follow are some key terms thatthe reader should understand.
Alarm Answering Timeis The time interval that begins when the alarm isreceived at the communication center and ends when the alarm isacknowledged at the communication center.35
Alarm Handling Timeis The time interval from the receipt of the alarmat the primary PSAP until the beginning of transmittal of the response
information via voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities(ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs) in the field.
36
Alarm Processing Time, also known as Di spatch Time or Call Processing
Time, is The time interval from when the alarm is acknowledged at thecommunication center until response information begins to be transmittedvia voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities (ERFs) andemergency response units (ERUs).37
Alarm Transfer Time is The time interval from the receipt of theemergency alarm at the PSAP until the alarm is first received at the
communication center.38
I niti ating Action/I ntervention Timeis The time interval from when a unitarrives on the scene to the initiation of emergency mitigation.
39
Total Response Timeis The time interval from the receipt of the alarm atthe primary PSAP to when the first emergency response unit is initiatingaction or intervening to control the incident.40
34As previously indicated, dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as
much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower, and the associated traveltimes greater, with any traffic congestion or any other unpredictable impedances. If any unit is unavailable for anyreason, travel times will be greater as more distant apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays.Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and implementation of an actual fireattack, and to the delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of emergencymedical care.35NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.136NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.237NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.338NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.439NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.5
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
34/72
34
Travel Timeis The time interval that begins when a unit is en route to theemergency incident and ends when the unit arrives at the scene.41
Turnout Time is The time interval that begins when the emergency
response facilities (ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs)notification process begins by either an audible alarm or visualannunciation or both and ends at the beginning point of travel time
42PerNFPA 1710, turnout time should not exceed 80 or 60 seconds.43
It is critical to understand that the response capabilities indicated in the following series of mapsreflect travel time only. That is to say, the following series of maps indicate how far anemergency vehicle traveling on the existing road network can travel within 4 and 8 minutes.
Dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as
much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower,
and the associated travel times greater, with any traffic congestion or any other
unpredictable impedances including those impedances listed above.
If any unit is unavailable for any reason, travel times will be greater as more distant
apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays. Unavailability of any units
critical to a particular emergency response will result in increased risk to firefighter safety.
Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and
implementation of an actual fire attack (possibly resulting in increasedfire growth), and tothe delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of
emergency medical care (possibly resulting in decreasedpatient survivability).
Additionally, when and where use of callback or mutual aid personnel may be applicable, the computer model is unable to accurately portray the response of callback fire fightersresponding in private vehicles from their residence or other location to an incident scene.Inasmuch as callback or mutual aidpersonnel are not available on a regular basis to respondemergency units immediately upon dispatch- and it is impossible to quantify the amount of timeit takes for those individuals to respond from their different locations to the station, staff anapparatus, and respond that unit to a given location- the GIS software is also unable to accuratelydisplay the predicted response capabilities of apparatus deploying from a fire station whenstaffed with callback, or mutual aid personnel. As such, the unpredictable responsecapabilities of units staffed by off-duty personnel responding as callback fire fighters, or thoseunits staffed personnel from neighboring communities as mutual aid personnel, are omitted fromthis analysis.
40NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.641NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.742NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.843NFPA 1710, 4.1.2.1(2)80 seconds for turnout time for fire and special operations response and 60 secondsturnout time for EMS response.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
35/72
35
Existing Emergency Response CapabilitiesCoventry Fire Districts
Map 1
Map 1 indicates existing Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. Currently, the
Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 39.20% of all
roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units are available to
respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
36/72
36
Map 2
Map 2 indicates existing Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. Currently, the
Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 32.31% of all
roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units, excluding
volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
37/72
37
Map 3
Map 3 indicates existing Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. Currently, the
Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 83.44% of all
roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to
respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
38/72
38
Map 4
Map 4 indicates existing Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. Currently, the
Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 70.11% of all
roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes , assuming units, excluding
volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
39/72
39
MAP 5
Map 5 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts are currently capable of initiatingsafe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Outregulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when District units are responding fromassigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of initiating firesuppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulations on
69.14% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry in 8 minutes, assuming the unitsare available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
40/72
40
Map 6
Map 6 indicates the existing ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel
within 8-minutes. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with at least
12 personnel to 1.7% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,
assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Map 6 also indicates 7.09%
of roads (indicated in red) lost coverage from previous capabilities (see Map 13, page 44).
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
41/72
41
Previous Emergency Response Capabilities (5 operating Central Coventry
stations)Coventry Fire Districts
Map 7
Map 7 indicates previous Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating
Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine
company to 47.94% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes,
assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8AM to 4 PM.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
42/72
42
Map 8
Map 8 indicates previous Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating
Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine
company to 41.05% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes,
assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
43/72
43
Map 9
Map 9 indicates previous Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating
Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine
company to 86.06% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,
assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8
AM to 4 PM.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
44/72
44
Map 10
Map 10 indicates previous Engine Company 8-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating
Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine
company to 72.72% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,
assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
45/72
45
MAP 11
Map 11 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of
initiatingsafeand effectivefire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2
Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are
responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable
of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out
regulations on 66.59% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,
assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8
AM to 4 PM.
.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
46/72
46
MAP 12
Map 12 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of
initiatingsafeand effectivefire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2
Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are
responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable
of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out
regulations on 61.56% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,
assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
47/72
47
Map 13
Map 13 indicates the previous ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel
within 8-minutes. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are
capable of responding with at least 12 personnel to 8.79% of all roads located within the Town
of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon
dispatch.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
48/72
48
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
49/72
49
Central Coventry Liquidation Response
Capability AnalysisStaffing and Deployment
The following table specifies the potential effective liquidation staffing and deployment
configuration:
Station Address Apparatus Min. Staffing
Centr al Coventr y - 1 954 Hill Farm Road closed
Centr al Coventr y - 3 2 Station Street closed
Centr al Coventr y - 4 243 Arnold Rd closed
Centr al Coventr y - 5 701 Main Street closed
Centr al Coventr y - 7 2847 Flat River Road closed
Coventry-Anthony Station 571 Washington Street EngineLadder
Ambulance
4
Hopkins Hill Station 1 Bestwick Trail EngineLadder
Ambulance
1 career, 1
volunteer
Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,
RI
Engine
Ambulance
2 career (M-F,
8-4), 2volunteer
The following Geographic Information System (GIS) maps present the results of a response
capabilities analysis of the emergency response capabilities of the Coventry Fire Districts
pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. Please refer to pages 32 and 33
regarding modeling assumptions made in the following analysis.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
50/72
50
Post-Liquidation Response CapabilitiesCoventry Fire Districts
Map 14
Map 14 indicates the anticipated 4-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have response capability on 30.08% of all roads within 4 minutes. The ability of
the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 30.08% of all roads within the Town of Coventry
within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12%decrease
in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon
dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.
Table 5 details the comparison of the engine company 4-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and engine company 4-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
51/72
51
TABLE 5:
COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(M-F,8AM-4PM)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 1, page 34)
39.20% of all roads covered within 4 minutes
Previous Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 7, page 40)
47.94% of all roads covered within 4 minutes
Post-Liquidation Engine Company 4-
minute Response Capabilities
30.08% of all roads covered within 4
minutes
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
52/72
52
Map 15
Map 15 indicates the anticipated 4-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have response capability on 23.19% of all roads within 4 minutes. The ability of
the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 23.19% of all roads within the Town of Coventry
within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available torespond immediately upon dispatch.
Table 6 details the comparison of the engine company 4-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and engine company 4-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
53/72
53
TABLE 6:
COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 2, page 35)
32.31% of all roads covered within 4 minutes
Previous Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 8, page 41)
41.05% of all roads covered within 4 minutes
Post-Liquidation Engine Company 4-
minute Response Capabilities
23.19% of all roads covered within 4
minutes
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
54/72
54
Map 16
Map 16 indicates the anticipated 8-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have response capability on 69.32% of all roads within 8 minutes. The ability of
the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 69.32% of all roads within the Town of Coventry
within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 14.13% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 16.75% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upondispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.
Table 7 details the comparison of the engine company 8-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and engine company 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
55/72
55
TABLE 7:
COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(M-F,8AM-4PM)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing Engine Company 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 3, page 36)
83.44% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Previous Engine Company 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 9, page 42)
86.06% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Post-Liquidation Engine Company 8-
minute Response Capabilities
69.32% of all roads covered within 8
minutes
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
56/72
56
Map 17
Map 17 indicates the anticipated 8-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have response capability on 51.86% of all roads within 8 minutes. The ability of
the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 51.86% of all roads within the Town of Coventry
within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to an 18.25% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 20.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available torespond immediately upon dispatch.
Table 8 details the comparison of the engine company 8-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and engine company 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
57/72
57
TABLE 8:
COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing Engine Company 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 4, page 37)
70.11% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Previous Engine Company 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 10, page 43)
72.72% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Post-Liquidation Engine Company 8-
minute Response Capabilities
51.86% of all roads covered within 8
minutes
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
58/72
58
MAP 18
Map 18 indicates the anticipated 8-minute 2 In/2 Out response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry FireDistricts would have response capability on 41.24% of all roads within 8 minutes. TheCoventry Fire Districts will likely have the capability to respond with at least four
firefighters to 41.24% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,pursuantto liquidation, translates to a 27.90% decrease in response capabilities from the existingconditions and a 25.35% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions,assuming all are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.
Table 9 details the comparison of 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities under existing andprevious conditions and anticipated 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
59/72
59
TABLE 9:
COMPARISON OF 2IN/2OUT,8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing 2 In/2 Out 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 5, page 38)
69.14% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Previous 2 In/2 Out 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 11, page 44)
66.59% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Post-Liquidation 2 In/2 Out, 8-minute
Response Capabilities
41.24% of all roads covered within 8
minutes
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
60/72
60
Map 19
Map 19 indicates the anticipated 8-minute ability to assemble 12 personnel pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have 12 personnel response capability on 0.0% of all roads within 8 minutes.
The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 0.0% of all roads within the Town
of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 1.70% decrease inresponse capabilities from the existing conditions and an 8.79% decrease in responsecapabilities from the previous conditions,assuming units are available to respond immediatelyupon dispatch.
Table 10 details the comparison of the 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
61/72
61
TABLE 10:
COMPARISON OF 12PERSONNEL 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)
SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Existing 12 personnel 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 6, page 39)
1.70% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Previous 12 personnel 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 13, page 46)
8.79% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
Post-Liquidation 12 personnel 8-minuteResponse Capabilities
0.0% of all roads covered within 8 minutes
TABLE 11:
SUMMARY OF THE COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTSRESPONSE CAPABILITIES AS MODELED
CURRENT PREVIOUS LIQUIDATION
4MIN ENGINE 39.20% 47.94% 30.08%4MIN ENGINE
24HOUR
32.31% 41.05% 23.19%
8MIN ENGINE 83.44% 86.06% 69.32%
8MIN ENGINE
24HOUR
70.11% 72.72% 51.86%
8MIN
2IN2OUT
69.14% 66.59% 41.24%
8- MIN 12FF 1.70% 8.79% 0.0%
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
62/72
62
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
63/72
63
ConclusionsThe Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in
NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be increased in the event of liquidation of
the Central Coventry Fire District.
CCFD assigned area roads are not currently serviced within safe and effective timeframes. Citizens on roads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to
protect are unlikely to receive 12 or more firefighters on scene before flashover occurs,
and on no roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8
minutes, considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small
residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and
immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases
the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well assignificantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the
housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would
clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work
to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury.
Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters. The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the
prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most
areas of the Town.
The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for theeffective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within
8-minutes in most areas of the Town.
Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled withinthe Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, using automatic
mutual aid. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that
fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring
in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to
initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy
building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely the
maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response time
parameter, and only if automatic mutual aid continues. Otherwise no firefighting force
will be available in the Central Coventry Fire District post-liquidation at all.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
64/72
64
Any fur ther reduction i n resources by any of the four fi re distr icts sign if icantl y deter iorates
response and increases r isk to f ir efighters and the citi zens of Coventry.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
65/72
65
SummaryWhile it is impossible to predict where most of ajurisdictions fire and medical emergencies will
occur, the Coventry Fire Districts should examine where emergencies have typically occurred in
the past and make efforts to ensure these areas continue to enjoy the same level of coverage,
while adjusting resources and deployment in an effort to achieve complete compliance with
NFPA Standard 1710. Areas with accelerated development and population growth will require
additional coverage in the future. Any projected increase in emergency response demands
should also be considered before changes are implemented, focusing on associated hazard types
and planned response assignments.
It is generally accepted that a municipality has the right to determine the overall level of fire
protection it wants. However, regardless of the level of fire protection chosen by the citizens,
neither they nor their elected representatives have the right to jeopardize the safety of theemployees providing those services. Citizens pay for protection of life and property through
their tax dollars, and they assume that their elected and appointed officials will make informed
decisions regarding that protection. Too often, however, that decision-making process has been
based solely on budgetary expedience. Irrespective of the resources provided, citizens continue
to believe that firefighters are prepared to provide an aggressive interior assault on fires,
successfully accomplishing victim rescue, fire control, and property conservation. They do not
expect firefighters to take defensive actions- to simply surround and drown a fire- because to do
so would be to concede preventable loss of both life and property
The ramifications of station closures and staffing reductions, as they pertain to the loss of life
and property within a community, are essential when considering modifications to a fire
departments deployment configuration. A fire department should be designed to adequately
respond to a number of emergencies occurring simultaneously in a manner that aims to minimize
the loss of life and the loss of property that the fire department is charged to protect. Any
proposed changes in staffing, deployment and station location should be made only after
considering the historical location of calls, response times to specific target hazards, compliance
with departmental Standard Operating Procedures, existing industry standards, including NFPA
1500 and NFPA Standard 1710, and the citizens expectation of receiving an adequate number of
qualified personnel on appropriate apparatus within acceptable time frames to make a differencein their emergency.
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
66/72
66
7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf
67/72
67
Methodology AppendixOverview
Once the domain of cartographers, computer-assisted drawing technicians, mainframes, and
workstations, geographic information systems (GIS) mapping has migrated to the desktop. With
ArcMap, a user can create intelligent, dynamic maps, using data from virtually any source and
across most popular computing platforms to display information that has a geographic aspect.
The ArcMap GIS software, a product of ESRI, Inc., allows desktop users to work simultaneously
with maps, database tables, charts, and graphics, and is an effective tool for conducting
computerized system analysis and management.
GIS is used by government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and businesses to describe andanalyze the physical world. Simply put, a GIS combines layers of information about a
geographic region to give you a better understanding of that region. Layers of information can
be combined depending on the purpose of the study, forming a computer model of a jurisdiction
on which many types of analysis can be made. In the public safety sector, and for the purposes
of this analysis, GIS software uses geography and computer-generated maps as an interface for
integrating and accessing location-based information. For example, the location of fire stations
can be layered on a jurisdictions geography including the road network, water features, building
footprints, or any other feature that has been digitized and assigned a location. In this manner,
GIS allows public safety personnel to effectively plan for emergency response, determine
mitigation priorities, analyze historical events, and predict future events. GIS can also be used to
provide critical information to emergency responders upon dispatch or while en route to an
incident to assist in tactical planning.
NFPA 1710 and GIS Analysis
While modern science has been well integrated into