Exhibit6toStmt.pdf

7/27/2019 Exhibit6toStmt.pdf

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GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM

EMERGENCY SERVICES RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

ANALYSIS

PRELIMINARY REPORT

International Association of Fire Fighters

1750 New York Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20006

COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTSTOWN OF COVENTRY,RHODE ISLAND

OCTOBER 29,2013


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

________________________________________________________

IExecutive Summary.5

IIIntroduction9

IIIFire Department Operations11

IVStaffing and Deployment Analysis.31

VCentral Coventry Liquidation - Response Capability Analysis...49

VIConclusions63

VIISummary...65

VIIIMethodology Appendix...67


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Executive SummaryThis report summarizes the results of a station location, staffing, and emergency vehicle traveltime analysis for the Coventry Fire Districts including Central Coventry, Coventry-Anthony,

Hopkins Hill, and Western Coventry at the request of IAFF Local 3372. Furthermore, thiscomputer-based analytical study examines predicted travel times and geographic coverage areasfor emergency response units deployed from existing fire station locations in the Coventry FireDistrict response jurisdiction under existing and previous staffing and deployment configurationsand predicted travel times and geographic coverage areas for emergency response units pursuantto liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.

National Performance Standards

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) produced NFPA 1710 Organization andDeployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special

Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is the consensus standard forcareer firefighter deployment, including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffinglevels, and fireground responsibilities.1

Key Sections included in the 1710 Standard are:

5.2.3.1 & 5.2.3.1.1o Fire companies, whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and

perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed

with a minimum of four on-duty personnel.

5.2.3.2 and 5.2.3.2.1o Fire companies whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services

associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and

rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control,

illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall be staffed with a minimum of

four on-duty personnel.

5.2.4.1.1o The fire departments fire suppression resources shall be deployed to provide for

the arrival of an engine company within a 240-second travel time to 90 percent ofthe incidents.

5.2.4.2.1o The fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm

assignment within a 480-second travel time to 90 percent of the incidents.

1NFPA 1710, 2010


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5.2.4.2.2o The initial full alarm assignment to a structure fire in a typical 2000 ft2 two-

story single-family dwelling without basement and with no exposures shall

provide for the following.

Assignment Required Personnel

Incident command 1 Individual

Uninterrupted Water supply 1 Pump Operator

Water flow from two handlines 4 Individuals (2 for each line)

Support for hand lines 2 Individuals (1 for each line)

Victim search and rescue team 2 Individuals

Ventilation team 2 Individuals

Aerial operator 1 Individual

Initial Rapid Intervention Crew

(IRIC)

2 Individuals

Required minimum personnel for

full alarm

14 firefighters & 1 scene commander

Key Findings

The Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in

NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be worsened in the event of liquidation of

the Central Coventry Fire District. This lack of compliance with industry standard performance

objectives will increase risk for citizens and visitors of Coventry. These findings are based on the

following facts.

1) Based on this geographic information system assessment of the areas that are assumed tobe covered by CCFD a good measure of CCFD assigned area roads are not currently

serviced within safe and effective time frames as illustrated in this report. In fact, forroads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to protect, on only a few

roads can citizens expect the arrival of 12 or more firefighters pre-flashover, and on no

roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8 minutes,

considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small

residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and

immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases


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the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well as

significantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the

housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would

clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work

to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury.

2) Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters.3) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the

prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most

areas of the Town.

4) The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for theeffective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within

8-minutes in most areas of the Town.

5) Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled withinthe Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, if automatic mutual

aid responds. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that

fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring

in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to

initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy

building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely

the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response

time parameter, and only when automatic mutual aid responds . Without automaticaid response there will be nofirefighting or rescue capability in the Central Coventry Fire

District post-liquidation, at all.

6) Any further reduction in resources by any of the four fire districts significantlydeteriorates response and increases risk to firefighters and the citizens of Coventry.


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IntroductionThe International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) was contacted by the Central Coventry

Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 3372 to perform a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of

the response capability of the Coventry Fire Districts. Local 3372 requested that the GIS study

evaluate the current, previous and liquidation deployment models against both National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) industry standards and Federal Occupational Safety & Health

Administration (OSHA) regulations. The procedures involved in the evaluation included

generating GIS maps and explanations of the results. The steps included in the evaluation are

listed below.

1) GIS analysis of planned staffing and deployment configurations.2) Statistical analysis of fire department response capabilities pre and post personnel and

mobile resource deployment changes.

Scope and Objectives

This report provides the results of the emergency response system evaluation and the GIS

assessment of the Coventry Fire Districts response capabilies. The report refers both to the

current performance of the department and to their staffing and deployment practices. Items

specifically covered in this report include the following.

Fire District response capabilities and compliance with industry standards Staffing configurations and safe work practices Strengths and weaknesses of the Fire Districts


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Fire Department OperationsThe business of providing emergency services has always been labor intensive, and remains so

today. Although new technology has improved firefighting equipment and protective gear, and

has led to advances in modern medicine, it is the firefighters who still perform the time-critical

tasks necessary to contain and extinguish fires, rescue trapped occupants from a burning

structure, and provide emergency medical and rescue services.

In less than 30 seconds a small flame can burn out of control and become a major fire. During

fire growth, the temperature of a fire rises to between 1,000 and 1,200 F. It is generally

accepted in the fire service that for a medium growth rate fire 2, flashover- the very rapid

spreading of the fire due to super heating of room contents and other combustibles- occurs in less

than 10 minutes. Allowing time for discovery of the fire, a call to 911, and dispatch ofemergency responders, flashover is likely to occur within 8 minutes of firefighter dispatch. It

is also worth noting that flashover may occur more quickly depending on newer building

construction materials and room contents that act as fuel.

At the point of flashover, the odds of survival for unprotected individuals inside the structure are

virtually non-existent. The rapid response of an appropriate number of firefighters is therefore

essential to initiating effective fire suppression and rescue operations that seek to minimize fire

spread and maximize the odds of preserving both life and property.

F ir e Growth, F lashover, and the Importance of a Rapid Response to a Fir e in a Residential

Structure:

The Incipient Phase

The first stage of any fire is the incipient stage. When heat is applied to a combustible material,

the heat oxidizes the materials surface into combustible gases. The oxidation process is

exothermic, meaning that the oxidation process itself produces heat. The heat from oxidation

raises the temperature of surrounding materials, which increases the rate of oxidation and begins

a chemical chain reaction of heat release and burning. A fire can progress from the incipient

phase immediately or slowly, depending upon the fuel, nearby combustibles, and the availability

of oxygen in the surrounding air.

2As defined in theHandbook of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, a fast fire grows exponentially to 1.0MWin 150 seconds. A medium fire grows exponentially to 1 MWin 300 seconds. A slow fire grows exponentially to1 MWin 600 seconds. A 1 MWfire can be thought-of as a typical upholstered chair burning at its peak. A large sofamight be 2 to 3 MWs.


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The Free Burning Phase

The second stage of fire growth is the freeor open burning stage. When the temperature of

a fire gets high enough, visible flames can be seen. The visible burning at this stage is still

limited to the immediate area of origin. The combustible process continues to release more heat,

which heats nearby objects to their ignition temperature, and they begin burning. In a wild-land

fire the surrounding growth will ignite and the flames will spread, quickly if wind and dry

growth are present. A structure fire is different, because the gaseous products of combustion,

most of which are flammable and lighter than air, rise and are contained in the upper levels of the

structure. When this occurs, the structure fire is at a critical point: either the fire has insufficient

oxygen available to burn and it progresses back to the incipient stage, or it has sufficient oxygen

available to move on to the next stage.

FIGURE 1:FIRE GROWTH IN A CONFINED SPACE3

When an object in a room starts to burn (such as the armchair in Figure 1), it burns in much the

same way as it would in an open area. After a short period of time, however, confinement begins

to influence fire development. The smoke produced by the burning object rises to form a hot gas

layer below the ceiling; this layer heats the ceiling and upper walls of the room. Thermal

radiation from the hot layer, ceiling, and upper walls begins to heat all objects in the lower part

of the room and may augment both the rate of burning of the original object and the rate of flamespread over its surface.

At this point, the fire may go out, for example, if the first object completely burns before another

begins, or if sufficient oxygen cannot get into the room to keep the object burning. Sometimes,

however, the heating of the other combustibles in the room continues to the point where they

3Image courtesy of University of California at Davis Fire Department


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reach their ignition temperatures more or less simultaneously. If this occurs, flames suddenly

sweep across the entire room, involving all combustibles. This transition from the burning of

one or two objects to full room involvement is referred to as flashover.4

Flashover

Flashover, when it occurs, is the most significant event during a structure fire. As combustible

gases are produced by the two previous stages they are not entirely consumed and are therefore

available fuels. These available fuels rise and form a superheated gas layer at the ceiling that

continues to increase, until it begins to bank down to the floor, heating all combustible objects

regardless of their proximity to the burning object. In a typical structure fire, the gas layer at the

ceiling can quickly reach temperatures of 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. With enough existing

oxygen at the floor level, flashover occurs, burning everything in the room at once. The

instantaneous eruption into flame generates a tremendous amount of heat, smoke, and pressure.

The pressure has enough force to push beyond the room of origin and through doors and

windows. Usually at the time of flashover, windows in the room will break, allowing for theentry of fresh air. The introduction of fresh air serves to further fuel the growth of the fire by

increasing the fires temperature and spreading the fire beyond the room of origin.

Unknown Unknown1 minute

elapsed

2 minutes

elapsed

7 minutes

elapsed

8 minutes

elapsed

Ignition of

Fire

Discovery Notification of

Emergency

Response

System

Dispatch of

Emergency

Units

Fire

Department

Turnout

Fire

Department

Arrival at the

Incident Scene

Access,

Rescue,

Ventil ate and

Suppress

FLASHOVER

Overhaul

Scene

TIMELINE OF A FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO A

STRUCTURE FIRE

8 minu tes

3 minutes

elapsed

Fire

Department

Departure

FIGURE 2:FIREDEPARTMENTRESPONSE TIMELINE

4J.R. Mehaffey, Ph.D., Flammability of Building Materials and Fire Growth, Institute for Research in Construction(1987)


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Based on the dynamics of fire behavior in an unprotected structure fire, any decrease in

emergency unit response capabilities will correlate directly with an increase in expected life,

property, and economic loss.

F ir e Growth and the Importance of a Rapid Response to Fir e in H igh-Rise/H igh H azard

Structures:

Fires in high-rise buildings pose unique and significant risks to firefighters operating on the

fireground and are some of the most difficult fires to control. The logistics of a high-rise

firefighting operation must not be underestimated. Even under ideal conditions, successfully

fighting a fire requires large numbers of personnel and supplies. Physical demands on

firefighters due the buildings sheer size requires regular rotation of personnel out of the fire area

for rest and rehabilitation.5

High-rise firefighting operations are considered high-hazard scenarios because of the potentialfor extremely large fires and the potentially large number of building occupants who may be

exposed to the resulting heat and smoke. Fires that are not contained by sprinklers or other fire

protection measures may grow to consume large portions of available floor area due to the

significant time that it takes for firefighters to reach and suppress the fire, as well as the large

quantities of fuel load typical of modern office spaces. Additionally, high-rise buildings may

have large floor areas and many floors at or above the fire that need to be searched for possible

victims or occupants requiring assistance. Searching the fire floor is typically conducted in high

heat and low visibility conditions due to the proximity of the fire. The remaining floors above the

fire can take substantial resources and time to fully search. Together, the tasks and hazards

typical of the high-rise fireground combine to form a substantial operational challenge typical of

the high-hazard class of response scenarios.6

The conclusions of the recently released NIST study on the high-rise fireground can be

summarized in three principal parts. First, when responding to a medium growth rate fire, 3-

person crews ascending to the fire floor confronted an environment where the fire had released

60% more heat energy than the fire encountered by the 6-person crews doing the same work.

Unfortunately, larger fires expose firefighters to greater risks and are more challenging to

suppress.

Second, larger fires produce more risk exposure for building occupants. In general, occupants

being rescued by smaller crew sizes and by crews that used the stairs rather than the elevators

were exposed to a significantly greater dose of toxins from the fire. While the exact risk

exposure for an occupant will depend on the fire growth rate, their proximity to the fire, and the

5National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18 th ed. (Quincy, MA:NFPA, 1997) 9-1146Averill, J., et. al., NIST Report on High-Rise Fireground Experiments, April 2013.


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floor on which the fire is located, it is clear that on-scene deployment decisions can have a

dramatic impact in determining the fate of building occupants.

Third, the study confirmed that a properly engineered and operational fire sprinkler system

drastically reduces the risk exposure for both the building occupants and the firefighters.

While this has been well understood for many years and most new high-rise buildings are

constructed with fire sprinkler protection, NFPA estimates that 41 percent of U.S. high-rise

office buildings, 45 percent of high-rise hotels, and 54 percent of high-rise apartment buildings

are not equipped with sprinklers. Moreover, sprinkler systems fail in about one in 14 fires. Thus,

fire departments should be prepared to manage the risks associated with unsprinklered high-rise

building fires.

Modern warehouses and storage occupancies are also subject to rapidly developing fires of great

intensity because complex configurations of storage are conducive to rapid fire spread,

presenting numerous obstacles to fire suppression efforts. Additionally, windows with iron

shutters- or buildings with no windows at all, hamper a fire departments efforts to gain access to

the building. If passageways are impassable, the fire can be reached only by streams operating

through windows, and the opening of shutters may be a time-consuming operation.7, 8

The Importance of Adequate Staffi ng to Conduct Safe and Eff ective F ir e Suppression and

Rescue Operations:

Staffing deficiencies on primary fire suppression apparatus also negatively affect the ability of

the fire department to safely and effectively mitigate emergencies and therefore correlate directly

with higher risks and increased losses. Continued fire growth, beyond the time of firefighter onscene arrival is directly linked to the time it takes to initiate fire suppression operations. As

indicated in Table 1, responding companies staffed with four firefighters are capable of initiating

critical fire ground operational tasks more efficiently than those with crew sizes below industry

standards.

7Fire Chiefs Handbook, 4thed., Advanced Fire Fighting, (Saddle Brook, N.J., 1987) 498. 8National Fire Protection Association, Warehouse Operations, Fire Protection Handbook, 18 th ed. (Quincy, MA:NFPA, 1997) 9-110


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Engine Company Duties Ladder Company Duties

FiregroundTasks

Advanc

e Attack

Line

%

Change

Water

on Fire

%

Chang

e

Primar

y

Search

%

Chang

e

Ventin

g Time

%

Change

4

Firefighters

0:03:27 0:08:41 0:08:47 0:04:42

3

Firefighters

0:03:56 12%Less

Efficient

0:09:15 6% LessEfficient



2

Firefighters

0:04:53 29%Less

Efficient

0:10:16 15%Less

Efficient

0:12:16 28%Less

Efficient


TABLE 1:IMPACT OF CREW SIZE ON ALOW-HAZARDRESIDENTIALFIRE9

First-arriving companies staffed with four firefighters are more efficient in all aspects of initialfire suppression and search and rescue operations compared to two-or three-person companies.

There is a significant increase in time for all the tasks if a company arrives on scene staffed with

only three firefighters compared to four firefighters. According to the NIST Report on

Residential Fireground Field Experiments, four-person crews are able to complete time critical

fireground tasks 5.1 minutes (nearly 25%) faster than three-person crews. The increase in time

to task completion corresponds with an increase in risk to both firefighters and trapped

occupants.

With four-person crews, the effectiveness of first-arriving engine company interior attack

operations increases by 12% to 29% efficiency compared to three- and two-person crews

respectively. The efficacy of ladder company search and rescue operations also increasesby 4%

and 28% with four-person crews compared to three and two person crews. Moreover, with a

four-person company, because the first-in unit is staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to

accomplish its assigned duties, the second-in company does not need to support first-in company

operations and is therefore capable of performing critical second-in company duties.

Insufficient numbers of emergency response units or inadequate staffing levels on those units

exposes civilians and firefighters to increased risk, further drains already limited fire department

resources, and stresses the emergency response system by requiring additional apparatus torespond from further distances. Failing to assemble sufficient resources on the scene of a fire in

time to stop the spread and extinguish the fire, conduct a search, and rescue any trapped

occupants, puts responding firefighters and occupants in a dangerous environment with

exponential risk escalation such that it is difficult to catch up and mitigate the event to a positive

outcome.

9Derived from NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010.


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A prime objective of fire service agencies is to maintain enough strategically located personnel

and equipment so that the minimum acceptable response force can reach a reasonable number of

fire scenes before flashover is likely.10 Two of the most important elements in limiting fire

spread are the quick arrival of sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and

extinguish the fire as close to the point of origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped

occupants and care for the injured. Rapid and aggressive interior attack of structure fires, as

close as possible to the point of origin, can reduce human and property losses. Sub-optimal

staffing of arriving units may delay such an attack, thus allowing the fire to progress to more

dangerous conditions for firefighters and civilians. If the arriving units have adequate resources

to handle the situation, then they will fight the fire aggressively and offensively. They will

attack the problem head-on and, following department standards, will accomplish their

objectives efficiently, effectively, and safely. If they do not have adequate resources to

aggressively handle the situation, then they will have to fight the fire in a defensive mode of

attack. This mode will continue until enough resources can be massed to then change to anaggressive, offensive attack.

11

NFPA 1500 and 1710 both recommend that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level

should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder

company responding to any type of fire. Recall that at the scene of an emergency, the

driver/operator of the engine must remain with the apparatus to operate the pump. Likewise, the

driver/operator of the Ladder must remain with the apparatus to safely operate the aerial device.

Such activities, which help to ensure the safe and effective delivery of fire suppression and

rescue services, leave a crew of only two firefighters from an engine company and two

firefighters from a ladder company to support the attack or complete search and rescue activities.As noted previously, due to the demands of fireground activities which reduce the effective

firefighting force deploying from each company from four to three, a fire attack initiated by a

single fire company is not capable of effecting a safe and effective fire suppression and/or rescue

operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out policies until a second company arrives with

sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation, and to assist the first

company in the event of an unexpected emergency.12 Industry studies have confirmed that four

firefighters are capable of performing the rescue of potential victims 80% faster than a

crew of three firefighters.13

10University of California at Davis Fire Department website; site visited June 7, 2004.< http://fire.ucdavis.edu/ucdfire/UCDFDoperations.htm >11National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, High-Rise Apartment Fire Claims the Life of One CareerFire Fighter (Captain) and Injures Another Career Fire Fighter (Captain)Texas, 13 October 200112 A four-person fire company may initiate emergency search and rescue operations at the order of the incidentcommander if there is a reasonable and immediate threat to life. 13McManis Associates and John T. OHagan & Associates, Dallas Fire Department Staffing Level Study, (June1984); pp. 1-2 and II-1 through II-7; Richard C. Morrison, Manning Levels for Engine and Ladder Companies inSmall Fire Departments, (1990)


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The Importance of Crew Size to Overall Scene Time:

Studies have shown that the more personnel that arrive on Engine and Ladder companies to the

scene of a fire, the less time it takes to do all aspects of fire suppression and search and rescue.

As units arriving with more firefighters increases, the overall time on scene of the emergency

decreases. In other words, the more firefighters available to respond and arrive early to a

structure fire, the less time it takes to extinguish the fire and perform search and rescue activities,

thus reducing the risk of injury and death to both firefighters and trapped occupants and reducing

the economic loss to the property.

TABLE 2:THERELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREW SIZE AND SCENE TIME14

As Table 2 shows, units that arrive with only two firefighters on an engine or truck are on the

scene of a fire almost 7 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each crew.

Responding units arriving with only 3 firefighters on an apparatus are on the scene of a fire 5 to

6 minutes longer than units that arrive with four firefighters on each apparatus. In addition tocrew size, the time between the arriving crews matters to overall effectiveness and on scene time.

In the NIST study on low hazard residential fireground, close stagger was defined as a 1-minute

time difference in the arrival of each responding company. Far stagger was defined as a 2-

minute time difference in the arrival of each responding company.15 16 The results show a

consistent pattern of units arriving with four firefighters in a close stagger or far stagger will

decrease the overall time at the scene of the emergency compared to units that arrive with two or

three firefighters and are more efficient in fire suppression.

14NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,201015NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg. 24 16One minute and two minute arrival stagger times were determined from analysis of deployment data from morethan 300 U.S. fire departments responding to a survey from fire department operations conducted by theInternational Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Firefighters.


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The Importance of a Rapid Response in I ni tiati ng Safe and Ef fective F ir e Suppression and

Rescue Operations:

Any delay in the initiation of fire suppression and rescue operations translates directly into a

proportional increase in expected property, life, and economic losses (reference The

Relationship between Fire Extension and Fire Loss, Table 4, p. 24). It warrants emphasizing

that if a structure has no automatic suppression or detection system, a more advanced fire may

exist by the time the fire department is notified of the emergency and is able to respond. Fires of

an extended duration weaken structural members, compromising the structural integrity of a

building and forcing operations to shift from an offensive to defensive mode.17 As with

inadequate staffing this type of operation will continue until enough resources can be amassed to

then change to an aggressive, offensive attack.

Typical I ni tial Attack Response Capabil iti es Assuming I nterior Attack and Operations

Command Capabili ties for D if fering Fi re Hazard Envir onments:

High-Hazard Environments

Type of Occupancy

Schools Hospitals Nursing Homes Explosives Plants Refineries High-Rise Buildings Other high life hazard or large fire potential occupancies.

Response Capability

4 Engines / Staffed with 5 firefighters 2 Ladder Trucks/ staffed with 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus with equivalent

capabilities.)

2 Chief Officers Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed to cope with the combustible involved.

Personnel Resources

30 Firefighters 2 Chief Officers Extra staffing of units first due to high-hazard occupancies is advised.

17According to the NFPA, its important to realize that every 250 GPM stream applied to the building can add upto one ton per minute to the load the weakened structure is carrying.


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One or more safety officers Rapid intervention team(s) is also necessary.

Medium-Hazard Environments

Type of Occupancy

Apartments Offices Mercantile and Industrial not normally requiring extensive rescue or fire-fighting

forces.

Response Capability

3 Engines/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters

1 Ladder Truck/ Staffed with 4 or 5 firefighters (or combination apparatus withequivalent capabilities.)

1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available.

Personnel

1620 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team

Low-Hazard Environment

Type of Occupancy

One-, two-, or three-family dwellings Scattered Small Business Scattered Small Industrial Occupancies

Response Capability

3 Engines/ Staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters 1 Ladder Truck/ staffed with minimum of 4 firefighters (or combination apparatus with

equivalent capabilities.)

1 Chief Officer Other Specialized Apparatus as may be needed or available.


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Personnel

16 Firefighters 1 Chief Officer Safety Officer Rapid Intervention Team

The Importance of the 8-minute Engine Company Response dur ing Structural F ir e Fighting

Operations

One of the first priorities in a fire is to get water on the fire to extinguish it. When initiating fire

attack, a single engine company would not be capable of affecting a safe and effective fire attack

or rescue operation in compliance with 2 In/2 Out requirements unless staffed with at least

four firefighters. Engine crews with less than four must wait until a second fire suppression

company arrives with sufficient personnel to support the fire attack and/or rescue operation and

to assist the first crew in the event of an unexpected emergency during interior attack.

One firefighter must remain at the engine

pump to establish and maintain an

uninterrupted water supply to firefighters

working inside the burning structure

Two firefighters initiate interior

fire attack and rescue trappedoccupants

One firefighter remains to

check for exposures and

intervene in the event of a

firefighter emergency

FIGURE 3: ENGINE COMPANYFIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITHFOURFIREFIGHTERS


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The Importance of the 8-minute Ladder Company Response dur ing Structural F ir e Fighting

Operations

Ladder companies play a vital role on the scene of a structure fire. Ladder crew duties include

securing building access, conducting search and victim rescue and conducting ventilation during

suppression activities. The importance of being able to ventilate a building efficiently,effectively, and in coordination with interior attack operations is key to supporting fire

suppression and search and rescue operations. Once the superheated gases and smoke from the

building have been ventilated, firefighters conducting interior fire suppression and rescue

operations are able to more clearly locate the seat of the fire and more effectively perform victim

search and rescue. The rapid extrication of victims from inside a burning structure is critical to

saving lives: the quicker fire victims are removed from the structure, the quicker they can be

treated by fire department and medical personnel for smoke inhalation, burns, and other injuries

related to fire. Thus, the response of the Ladder in concert withother fire suppression companies

assigned to respond to a structure fire is critical to initiating safe and effectivefire suppression

and rescue operations. Any delay in response translates directly into a proportional increaseinrisk and the expected loss of life and property.

To facilitate the rapid extrication of trapped occupants, NFPA 1710 states that Fire companies

whose primary functions are to perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work,

such as forcible entry, ventilation, search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and

rescue, utility control, illumination, overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a

minimum of four on-duty personnel.18 A crew of four is required to make a safe initial attack

on a fire, with a crew of two working inside the burning structure and a backup crew of two

standing by to assist should the interior crew become trapped or injured. This is known as

OSHAs 2 In/ 2 Outpolicy19. Both the NFPA and OSHA 2 In/2 Out policy require an outside

crew to be assembled prior to anyone entering an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to

life or health (IDLH). This important safety requirement will have a large impact on availability

of firefighters to enter the building when small crews are deployed.

18NFPA 1710, Section 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.119The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR1910.134. This paragraph applies to private sector workers engaged in interior structural fire fighting and to Federalemployees covered under Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. States that have chosen to operate

OSHA-approved occupational safety and health state plans are required to extend their jurisdiction to includeemployees of their state and local governments. These states are required to adopt a standard at least as effective asthe Federal standard within six months. OSHAs interpretation on requirements for the number of workers requiredto be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH)covers the number of persons who must be on the scene before fire fighting personnel may initiate an attack on astructural fire. An interior structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the bui lding where hightemperatures, heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and therefore,

require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition to the minimum of two personsinside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire fighters may enter the building. Letter to Thomas N.Cooper, Purdue University, from Paula O. White, Director of Federal-State Operations, U.S. Department of Labor,Occupational Safety & Health Administration, November 1, 1995.


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No firefighter immediately

available to ventilate the

structure

When staffed with three fir efighters, only two

ladder company personnel ini tiate victimsearch and rescue. Venti lation activit ies are

delayed.

Staffing conditions and fireground capabilitieswhen a ladder company is staffed with only

three firefighters

Driver/Operator remains at the ladder truck to

maneuver the aerial device into position in

anticipation of second-in companies; inspection

of the premises for fire extension and exposures

not accomplished

Two remaining firefighters

initiate victim search and

rescue operations in

conjunction with the

suppression crew from an

engine.

FIGURE 4:LADDER COMPANY OPERATIONS WHENLADDER TRUCKSDEPLOY WITH ONLY THREEFIREFIGHTERS

The critical difference between staffing ladder companies with three firefighters instead of four

is that when staffed with four firefighters, ladder companies are capable of venting the structure

and initiating rescue operations more safelyand more effectivelythan ladder companies staffed

with less than four firefighters. In the low hazard environment, trucks staffed with four

firefighters, in compliance with industry standards, firefighters are 32% more efficient

than three-person crews in ventilating the structure and 4% more effective in

accomplishing victim search and rescue than three-person crews20

.

20NIST Report on Residential Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,2010, Pg 40-41.


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Company Officer and

Firefighter #1 initiate victim

search and rescue operations

Firefighter #2 left to perform

the task of ventilating the

structure

When staffed with four f ir efighters, the crew

is able to initiate search and rescue andbegin venti lation as necessary.

Staffing conditions and fireground capabilitieswhen ladder companies are staffed with fourfirefighters, in compliance with NFPA 1710

company staffing objectives

Driver/Operator remains available to check

for exposures and fire extension, and to

maneuver the aerial device into position in

anticipation of second-in companies

FIGURE 5:LADDER COMPANYFIREGROUND OPERATIONS WHEN STAFFED WITHFOUR

FIREFIGHTERS

When staffed with three firefighters, crews assigned to ventilate a low hazard structure are 32%

less effective than 4-person crews. Likewise, 2- person crews are 38% less effective compared

to crews with four firefighters. For search and rescue tasks, crews staffed with three firefightersare 4% less efficient at search and rescue compared to four firefighters.21

NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS ROOF

VENTILATION

SEARCH &

RESCUE

4 Firefighters

3 Firefighters 32% less efficient 4% less efficient

2 Firefighters 38% less efficient 28% less efficient

TABLE 3:LADDER COMPANYEFFICIENCY:2FIREFIGHTERS VS.4FIREFIGHTERS22

21NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al., 2010, pg 40 -41.22NIST Report of Residential Fireground Field Experiments, Jason D. Averill, et. al.,2010, pg 40-41.


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I nitial F ull Alarm Assignment

Initial Full Alarm Assignment Capability, as outlined in NFPA Standard 1710, recommends that

the fire department shall have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within an

8-minute response time to 90 percent of the incidents [and that the] initial full alarm shall

provide for the following: a minimum of one individual dedicated to establishing incident

command outside of the hazard area, assisted by an aide; establishment of an uninterrupted water

supply, which shall be maintained by an operator who shall ensure uninterrupted water flow

application; establishment of attack and backup lines, operated by a minimum of two personnel

each to effectively and safely maintain the line; provision of one support person for each attack

and backup line to provide hydrant hookup, assist in line lays, utility control, and forcible entry;

a minimum of one search and rescue team, consisting of two personnel; a minimum of one

ventilation team, consisting of two personnel; and establishment of an Initial Rapid Intervention

Crew (IRIC), consisting of a minimum of two properly equipped and trainedpersonnel.23 This

breakdown of the expected capabilities of a full alarm assignment, in compliance with NFPAStandard 1710, requires a minimum contingent of fifteen fire suppression personnel, including

the Incident Commander (IC) and the ICs aide24, to arrive at the scene of a structure fire within

8 minutes of receiving the alarm.25

TOTAL ON SCENE: 17

Incident Command Vehicle: 1 Chief Officer

Ladder Truck: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters

Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters

Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire Fighters

Engine: 1 Officer/3 Fire FightersVentilation

Team

Aerial

Operator

Victim Search &

Rescue Team

Supply Pump

Operator

IRIC Team

Attack Hose

Crew

Incident Commander (IC) and

IC Aide

Attack Pump

Operator

Backup

Hose Crew

FD

FD

FD

15 PERSONNEL REQUIRED

17 if Aerial Device and

Supply Pump are in Operation

FIGURE 6: NFPA1710INITIALFULLALARMASSIGNMENTDEPLOYED WITHIN 8MINUTES

23NFPA 1710, 5.2.3.2.1 and 5.2.3.2.2, (a)(h)24NFPA 1710, 5.2.1.2.525 It should be noted that a minimum on-scene contingent of fifteen to seventeen fire suppression personnel arerequired by NFPA Standard 1710 when a second pump and an aerial device are in operation at the incident scene.


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The ability of adequate fire suppression forces to greatly influence the outcome of a structural

fire is undeniable and predictable. Data generated by the NFPA provides empirical proof that a

rapid and aggressive interior attack can substantially reduce loss of life and the loss of property

associated with structural fires. Each stage of fire extension beyond the room of origin directly

increases the rate of civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage.

Rate Per 1,000 Fires

Fire Extension in Residential Structures:Civilian

DeathsCivilian

Injuries

Average Property

Damage

Confined to Room of Origin 2.07 24.30 $1,505.00

Confined to Floor of Origin 18.60 80.44 $12,134.00

Beyond Floor of Origin 27.23 55.37 $21,343.00

TABLE 4:THERELATIONSHIP BETWEENFIREEXTENSION ANDFIRELOSS26

OSHAs 2 In/2 Out Regulation:

The 2 In/2 Out policy is part of paragraph (g)(4) of OSHAs revised respiratory protection

standard, 29 CFR 1910.134. The focus of this important section is the safety of fire fighters

engaged in interior structural firefighting. OSHAs requirements for the number of workers

required to be present when conducting operations in atmospheres that are immediately

dangerous to life and health (IDLH) also covers the number of persons who must be on the scene

before firefighting personnel may initiate an interior attack on a structural fire. An interior

structural fire (an advanced fire that has spread inside of the building where high temperatures,

heat and dense smoke are normally occurring) would present an IDLH atmosphere and,

therefore, require the use of respirators. In those cases, at least two standby persons, in addition

to the minimum of two persons inside needed to fight the fire, must be present before fire

fighters may enter the building.27, 28 This requirement is mirrored in NFPA 1500, which states

that a rapid intervention team shall consist of at least two members and shall be available for

rescue of a member or a team if the need arises. Once a second team is assigned or operating in

the hazardous area, the incident shall no longer be considered in the initial stage, and at least

one rapid intervention crew shall be required.

26Source: National Fire Protection Association27 According to NFPA standards relating to fire fighter safety and health, the incident commander may makeexceptions to these rules if necessary to save lives. The Standard does not prohibit fire fighters from entering aburning structure to perform rescue operations when there is a reasonable belief that victims may be inside. 28Paula O. White, letter to Thomas N. Cooper, 1 November 1995 (OSHA)


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FIGURE 7:OSHA2IN/2OUTILLUSTRATEDTwo of the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of sufficient

numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish the fire as close to the point of

origin as possible, as well as rescue any trapped occupants and care for the injured. Several

existing National Fire Protection Association standards address this time-critical issue. NFPA

1500 states, while members can be assigned and arrive at the scene of an incident in many

different ways, it is strongly recommended that interior firefighting operations not be conducted

without an adequate number of qualified firefighters operating in companies under the

supervision of company officers. It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire

company staffing level should be four members responding on or arriving with each engine

and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. NFPA Standard 1710 further

recommends that fire companies whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and

perform basic firefighting at fires, including search and rescue shall be staffed with a

minimum of four on-duty personnel,29while fire companies whose primary functions are to

perform the variety of services associated with Ladder work, such as forcible entry, ventilation,search and rescue, aerial operations for water delivery and rescue, utility control, illumination,

overhaul and salvage work shall [also] be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty

personnel.30 For either fire suppression company, NFPA 1710 states that in jurisdictions with

tactical hazards, high hazard occupancies, high incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or

29NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.1.130NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2.1


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other pertinent factors as identified by the authority having jurisdiction, these companies shall be

staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members.31

There exist a number of incidents in which the failure to follow 2 In/2 Out procedures have

contributed to fire fighter casualties. For example, in Lexington, Kentucky, one firefighter died

and a second was severely injured following a fire where Kentucky OSHA later cited the

firefighters employer for failing to utilize 2 In/2 Out procedures. In a second case, two

firefighters died from smoke inhalation after being overcome by toxic fumes while fighting an

accidental fire in Philadelphia, PA. Although two additional firefighters were outside the home,

both were engaged in support activities (hydrant hook-up and pump operation), and neither was

fully accountable for monitoring the interior personnel32.

There also exist a number of success stories following the adoption of 2 In/2 Out procedures.

In Pittsburgh, PA, the Fire Department implemented an accountability and rescue system

following a fatal fire. In one instance, four firefighters who were performing an interior attackon an apartment building fire became disoriented and were trapped in the building. The standby

personnel were able to initiate rescue operations promptly and, although the four interior

firefighters and two of the rescuers were injured, all survived.33

One firefighter expected to

maintain an uninterrupted

water supply to f irefighters

working inside the burningstructure and also remain

available for rapid intervention

if firefighters inside become

trapped.

Only 4 firefighters

are capable of

initiating effective

emergency rescue

operations

Two firefighters enter structure

and initiate fire suppression and/

or emergency rescue of trapped

occupants

Two firefighters remain immediately

availableto monitor operations and rescue

trapped firefighters, if necessary

Figure 8: Emergency 2 In/2 Out Operations When Fire Companies are Staffed with 4

Firefighters

31NFPA 1710, 5.2.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.2.232FACE 98-03: Two Fire Fighters Die of Smoke and Soot Inhalation in Residential FirePennsylvania, retrievedfrom CDC website: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9803.html, site visited 3/5/201333John B. Miles, Jr., letter to J. Curtis Varone, Esq., 29 April 1998 (OSHA)


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When confronted with occupants trapped in a burning structure and a single fire company is on

scene, only a company staffed with four firefighters is able to initiate emergency search and

rescue operations in compliance with 2 In/2 Outpolicies. As indicated in the previous graphic,

this requires the complete engagement of every firefighter from the first-in fire company, staffed

with four, to participate in the effort, and means that the driver-operator of the apparatus must

tend to the pump to ensure the delivery of water to the firefighters performing the initial attack

and search and rescue operations and be prepared to make entry with the remaining firefighter

should the crew operating inside become trapped.

Regardless, when there exists an immediate threat to life, only a company of four firefighters can

initiate fire suppression and rescue operations in compliance with the 2 In/2 Out policies, and

in a manner that minimizes the threat of personal injury. In crews with fewer than 4 firefighters,

the first-in company must wait until the arrival of the second-in unit to initiate safe and effective

fire suppression and rescue operations. This condition underlines the importance and desirability

of fire companies to be staffed with four firefighters, and stresses the benefit of four-personcompanies and their ability to save lives without having to wait for the second-in company to

arrive.


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Staffing and Deployment AnalysisStaffing and Deployment

The following table specifies the Coventry Fire Districts existing Station locations, apparatus

and minimum on-duty staffing:

Station Address Apparatus Min. Staffing

Centr al Coventr y - 1 954 Hill Farm Road closed

Centr al Coventr y - 3 2 Station Street closed

Central Coventry - 4 243 Arnold Rd EngineAmbulance

2

2

Centr al Coventr y - 5 701 Main Street closed

Central Coventry - 7 2847 Flat River Road EngineAmbulance

2

2

Coventry-Anthony Station 571 Washington Street EngineLadder

Ambulance

4

Hopkins Hill Station 1 Bestwick Trail EngineLadder

Ambulance

1 career, 1

volunteer

Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,RI

EngineAmbulance

2 career (M-F,

8-4), 2

volunteer

The following table specifies the previous staffing and deployment configuration:


Central Coventry - 1 954 Hill Farm Road Ambulance 2

Central Coventry - 3 2 Station Street LadderAmbulance

2

Central Coventry - 4 243 Arnold Rd Engine 2

Central Coventry - 5 701 Main Street Engine 2Central Coventry - 7 2847 Flat River Road Engine 2


Ambulance

4


Ambulance

1 career, 1

volunteer


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Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,RI

EngineAmbulance

2 career (M-F,

8-4), 2

volunteer

Fire District and Station Location Overview Map


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The following series of maps indicate estimates of existing response capabilities of the Coventry

Fire Districts based on a travel time model. The indicated response capabilities for individual

units, and the units designated to respond as part of an alarm assignment, assume that all units

and the personnel assigned to staff these units are available to respond immediately upon

dispatch.34

Understanding the several components of an emergency response is an important part ofunderstanding how to interpret the following series of maps. To follow are some key terms thatthe reader should understand.

Alarm Answering Timeis The time interval that begins when the alarm isreceived at the communication center and ends when the alarm isacknowledged at the communication center.35

Alarm Handling Timeis The time interval from the receipt of the alarmat the primary PSAP until the beginning of transmittal of the response

information via voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities(ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs) in the field.

36

Alarm Processing Time, also known as Di spatch Time or Call Processing

Time, is The time interval from when the alarm is acknowledged at thecommunication center until response information begins to be transmittedvia voice or electronic means to emergency response facilities (ERFs) andemergency response units (ERUs).37

Alarm Transfer Time is The time interval from the receipt of theemergency alarm at the PSAP until the alarm is first received at the

communication center.38

I niti ating Action/I ntervention Timeis The time interval from when a unitarrives on the scene to the initiation of emergency mitigation.

39

Total Response Timeis The time interval from the receipt of the alarm atthe primary PSAP to when the first emergency response unit is initiatingaction or intervening to control the incident.40

34As previously indicated, dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as

much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower, and the associated traveltimes greater, with any traffic congestion or any other unpredictable impedances. If any unit is unavailable for anyreason, travel times will be greater as more distant apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays.Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and implementation of an actual fireattack, and to the delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of emergencymedical care.35NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.136NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.237NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.338NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.439NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.5


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Travel Timeis The time interval that begins when a unit is en route to theemergency incident and ends when the unit arrives at the scene.41

Turnout Time is The time interval that begins when the emergency

response facilities (ERFs) and emergency response units (ERUs)notification process begins by either an audible alarm or visualannunciation or both and ends at the beginning point of travel time

42PerNFPA 1710, turnout time should not exceed 80 or 60 seconds.43

It is critical to understand that the response capabilities indicated in the following series of mapsreflect travel time only. That is to say, the following series of maps indicate how far anemergency vehicle traveling on the existing road network can travel within 4 and 8 minutes.

Dispatch time and turnout time are not considered as part of this analysis, and may add as

much as two minutes to overall call-to-arrival time. Actual response speeds may be slower,

and the associated travel times greater, with any traffic congestion or any other

unpredictable impedances including those impedances listed above.

If any unit is unavailable for any reason, travel times will be greater as more distant

apparatus will be required to respond, with potential delays. Unavailability of any units

critical to a particular emergency response will result in increased risk to firefighter safety.

Impediments to access may add to the delay between the discovery of a fire and

implementation of an actual fire attack (possibly resulting in increasedfire growth), and tothe delay between the discovery of an individual in medical distress and the initiation of

emergency medical care (possibly resulting in decreasedpatient survivability).

Additionally, when and where use of callback or mutual aid personnel may be applicable, the computer model is unable to accurately portray the response of callback fire fightersresponding in private vehicles from their residence or other location to an incident scene.Inasmuch as callback or mutual aidpersonnel are not available on a regular basis to respondemergency units immediately upon dispatch- and it is impossible to quantify the amount of timeit takes for those individuals to respond from their different locations to the station, staff anapparatus, and respond that unit to a given location- the GIS software is also unable to accuratelydisplay the predicted response capabilities of apparatus deploying from a fire station whenstaffed with callback, or mutual aid personnel. As such, the unpredictable responsecapabilities of units staffed by off-duty personnel responding as callback fire fighters, or thoseunits staffed personnel from neighboring communities as mutual aid personnel, are omitted fromthis analysis.

40NFPA 1710, 3.3.53.641NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.742NFPA 1710, 3.3.42.843NFPA 1710, 4.1.2.1(2)80 seconds for turnout time for fire and special operations response and 60 secondsturnout time for EMS response.


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Existing Emergency Response CapabilitiesCoventry Fire Districts

Map 1

Map 1 indicates existing Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. Currently, the

Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine company to 39.20% of all

roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units are available to

respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.


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Map 2



roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes, assuming units, excluding

volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.


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Map 3



roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to

respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.


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Map 4



roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes , assuming units, excluding

volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.


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MAP 5

Map 5 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts are currently capable of initiatingsafe and effective fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Outregulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when District units are responding fromassigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of initiating firesuppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out regulations on

69.14% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry in 8 minutes, assuming the unitsare available to respond immediately upon dispatch.


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Map 6

Map 6 indicates the existing ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel

within 8-minutes. Currently, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with at least

12 personnel to 1.7% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,

assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch. Map 6 also indicates 7.09%

of roads (indicated in red) lost coverage from previous capabilities (see Map 13, page 44).


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Previous Emergency Response Capabilities (5 operating Central Coventry

stations)Coventry Fire Districts

Map 7

Map 7 indicates previous Engine Company 4-minute response capabilities. With 5 operating

Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are capable of responding with an engine

company to 47.94% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 4 minutes,

assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8AM to 4 PM.


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Map 8




assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.


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Map 9




assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8

AM to 4 PM.


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Map 10






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MAP 11

Map 11 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of

initiatingsafeand effectivefire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2

Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are

responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable

of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out

regulations on 66.59% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,

assuming units are available to respond immediately upon dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8

AM to 4 PM.

.


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MAP 12

Map 12 indicates those areas where the Coventry Fire Districts were previously capable of

initiatingsafeand effectivefire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2

Out regulation within 8-minutes. Under these conditions, when Fire District units are

responding from assigned stations, it is predicted that the Coventry Fire Districts are capable

of initiating fire suppression and rescue operations in accordance with the 2 In/2 Out

regulations on 61.56% of all roads located within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,



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Map 13

Map 13 indicates the previous ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to assemble 12 personnel

within 8-minutes. With 5 operating Central Coventry Stations, the Coventry Fire Districts are

capable of responding with at least 12 personnel to 8.79% of all roads located within the Town

of Coventry within 8 minutes, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon

dispatch.


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Central Coventry Liquidation Response

Capability AnalysisStaffing and Deployment

The following table specifies the potential effective liquidation staffing and deployment

configuration:


Centr al Coventr y - 1 954 Hill Farm Road closed

Centr al Coventr y - 3 2 Station Street closed

Centr al Coventr y - 4 243 Arnold Rd closed

Centr al Coventr y - 5 701 Main Street closed

Centr al Coventr y - 7 2847 Flat River Road closed


Ambulance

4


Ambulance

1 career, 1

volunteer

Western Coventry Station 1110 Victory Hwy, Greene,

RI

Engine

Ambulance

2 career (M-F,

8-4), 2volunteer

The following Geographic Information System (GIS) maps present the results of a response

capabilities analysis of the emergency response capabilities of the Coventry Fire Districts

pursuant to the liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. Please refer to pages 32 and 33

regarding modeling assumptions made in the following analysis.


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Post-Liquidation Response CapabilitiesCoventry Fire Districts

Map 14

Map 14 indicates the anticipated 4-minute Engine Company response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have response capability on 30.08% of all roads within 4 minutes. The ability of

the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 30.08% of all roads within the Town of Coventry

within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12%decrease

in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upon

dispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.

Table 5 details the comparison of the engine company 4-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and engine company 4-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.


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TABLE 5:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(M-F,8AM-4PM)

SCENARIO RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Existing Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 1, page 34)

39.20% of all roads covered within 4 minutes

Previous Engine Company 4-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 7, page 40)


Post-Liquidation Engine Company 4-

minute Response Capabilities

30.08% of all roads covered within 4

minutes


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Map 15



within 4 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 9.12% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 17.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available torespond immediately upon dispatch.



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TABLE 6:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 4-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)









minutes


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Map 16



within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 14.13% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 16.75% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units are available to respond immediately upondispatch, Monday through Friday, 8 AM to 4 PM.



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TABLE 7:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(M-F,8AM-4PM)









minutes


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Map 17



within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to an 18.25% decrease in responsecapabilities from the existing conditions and a 20.86% decrease in response capabilitiesfrom the previous conditions, assuming units, excluding volunteer units, are available torespond immediately upon dispatch.



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TABLE 8:

COMPARISON OF ENGINE COMPANY 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)









minutes


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MAP 18

Map 18 indicates the anticipated 8-minute 2 In/2 Out response capabilities pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry FireDistricts would have response capability on 41.24% of all roads within 8 minutes. TheCoventry Fire Districts will likely have the capability to respond with at least four

firefighters to 41.24% of all roads within the Town of Coventry within 8 minutes,pursuantto liquidation, translates to a 27.90% decrease in response capabilities from the existingconditions and a 25.35% decrease in response capabilities from the previous conditions,assuming all are available to respond immediately upon dispatch.

Table 9 details the comparison of 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities under existing andprevious conditions and anticipated 2 In/2 Out 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.


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TABLE 9:

COMPARISON OF 2IN/2OUT,8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)


Existing 2 In/2 Out 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 5, page 38)


Previous 2 In/2 Out 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 11, page 44)


Post-Liquidation 2 In/2 Out, 8-minute

Response Capabilities


minutes


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Map 19

Map 19 indicates the anticipated 8-minute ability to assemble 12 personnel pursuant to theliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District. The GIS software calculates the Coventry fireDistricts would have 12 personnel response capability on 0.0% of all roads within 8 minutes.

The ability of the Coventry Fire Districts to respond to 0.0% of all roads within the Town

of Coventry within 8 minutes, pursuant to liquidation, translates to a 1.70% decrease inresponse capabilities from the existing conditions and an 8.79% decrease in responsecapabilities from the previous conditions,assuming units are available to respond immediatelyupon dispatch.

Table 10 details the comparison of the 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities underexisting and previous conditions and 12 personnel 8-minute response capabilities pursuant toliquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District.


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TABLE 10:

COMPARISON OF 12PERSONNEL 8-MINUTE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES(24-HOUR)


Existing 12 personnel 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 6, page 39)


Previous 12 personnel 8-minute ResponseCapabilities (reference Map 13, page 46)


Post-Liquidation 12 personnel 8-minuteResponse Capabilities


TABLE 11:

SUMMARY OF THE COVENTRY FIRE DISTRICTSRESPONSE CAPABILITIES AS MODELED

CURRENT PREVIOUS LIQUIDATION

4MIN ENGINE 39.20% 47.94% 30.08%4MIN ENGINE

24HOUR

32.31% 41.05% 23.19%

8MIN ENGINE 83.44% 86.06% 69.32%

8MIN ENGINE

24HOUR

70.11% 72.72% 51.86%

8MIN

2IN2OUT

69.14% 66.59% 41.24%

8- MIN 12FF 1.70% 8.79% 0.0%


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ConclusionsThe Coventry Fire Districts are not currently in compliance with performance objectives in

NFPA Standard 1710. Current non-compliance will be increased in the event of liquidation of

the Central Coventry Fire District.

CCFD assigned area roads are not currently serviced within safe and effective timeframes. Citizens on roads that can be identified as the sole responsibility of CCFD to

protect are unlikely to receive 12 or more firefighters on scene before flashover occurs,

and on no roads can citizens expect the arrival of 15 or more firefighters within 8

minutes, considered to be the standard for safe, effective, and efficient operations at small

residential structure fires. Any reduction of CCFD resources, especially on-duty and

immediately available firefighters, will dramatically worsen performance. This increases

the risk of death or injury due to fire for nearly 50% of all citizens in Coventry as well assignificantly increases the risk of significant property loss for approximately half of the

housing units across the entire town of Coventry. Liquidation of CCFD resources would

clearly open the population, the housing they live in, and the businesses where they work

to unprecedented risk of property loss and injury.

Fire companies are not uniformly staffed in companies of 4 firefighters. The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for the

prompt arrival of any apparatus or personnel within 4-minutes of travel time in most

areas of the Town.

The existing response resources provided by the four fire districts do not provide for theeffective assembly of apparatus and personnel at the scene of a small structure fire within

8-minutes in most areas of the Town.

Currently twelve is likely the maximum firefighting force that can be assembled withinthe Town of Coventry within the 8-minute response time parameter, using automatic

mutual aid. This falls short of NFPA 1710 performance objectives that indicate that

fifteen firefighters are needed to initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring

in a typical 2,000 sq. ft. single family dwelling and twenty-six firefighters are needed to

initiate safe and effective operations at a fire occurring in a high hazard occupancy

building. In the event of liquidation of the Central Coventry Fire District six is likely the

maximum firefighting force that can be assembled within the 8-minute response time

parameter, and only if automatic mutual aid continues. Otherwise no firefighting force

will be available in the Central Coventry Fire District post-liquidation at all.


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Any fur ther reduction i n resources by any of the four fi re distr icts sign if icantl y deter iorates

response and increases r isk to f ir efighters and the citi zens of Coventry.


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SummaryWhile it is impossible to predict where most of ajurisdictions fire and medical emergencies will

occur, the Coventry Fire Districts should examine where emergencies have typically occurred in

the past and make efforts to ensure these areas continue to enjoy the same level of coverage,

while adjusting resources and deployment in an effort to achieve complete compliance with

NFPA Standard 1710. Areas with accelerated development and population growth will require

additional coverage in the future. Any projected increase in emergency response demands

should also be considered before changes are implemented, focusing on associated hazard types

and planned response assignments.

It is generally accepted that a municipality has the right to determine the overall level of fire

protection it wants. However, regardless of the level of fire protection chosen by the citizens,

neither they nor their elected representatives have the right to jeopardize the safety of theemployees providing those services. Citizens pay for protection of life and property through

their tax dollars, and they assume that their elected and appointed officials will make informed

decisions regarding that protection. Too often, however, that decision-making process has been

based solely on budgetary expedience. Irrespective of the resources provided, citizens continue

to believe that firefighters are prepared to provide an aggressive interior assault on fires,

successfully accomplishing victim rescue, fire control, and property conservation. They do not

expect firefighters to take defensive actions- to simply surround and drown a fire- because to do

so would be to concede preventable loss of both life and property

The ramifications of station closures and staffing reductions, as they pertain to the loss of life

and property within a community, are essential when considering modifications to a fire

departments deployment configuration. A fire department should be designed to adequately

respond to a number of emergencies occurring simultaneously in a manner that aims to minimize

the loss of life and the loss of property that the fire department is charged to protect. Any

proposed changes in staffing, deployment and station location should be made only after

considering the historical location of calls, response times to specific target hazards, compliance

with departmental Standard Operating Procedures, existing industry standards, including NFPA

1500 and NFPA Standard 1710, and the citizens expectation of receiving an adequate number of

qualified personnel on appropriate apparatus within acceptable time frames to make a differencein their emergency.


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Methodology AppendixOverview

Once the domain of cartographers, computer-assisted drawing technicians, mainframes, and

workstations, geographic information systems (GIS) mapping has migrated to the desktop. With

ArcMap, a user can create intelligent, dynamic maps, using data from virtually any source and

across most popular computing platforms to display information that has a geographic aspect.

The ArcMap GIS software, a product of ESRI, Inc., allows desktop users to work simultaneously

with maps, database tables, charts, and graphics, and is an effective tool for conducting

computerized system analysis and management.

GIS is used by government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and businesses to describe andanalyze the physical world. Simply put, a GIS combines layers of information about a

geographic region to give you a better understanding of that region. Layers of information can

be combined depending on the purpose of the study, forming a computer model of a jurisdiction

on which many types of analysis can be made. In the public safety sector, and for the purposes

of this analysis, GIS software uses geography and computer-generated maps as an interface for

integrating and accessing location-based information. For example, the location of fire stations

can be layered on a jurisdictions geography including the road network, water features, building

footprints, or any other feature that has been digitized and assigned a location. In this manner,

GIS allows public safety personnel to effectively plan for emergency response, determine

mitigation priorities, analyze historical events, and predict future events. GIS can also be used to

provide critical information to emergency responders upon dispatch or while en route to an

incident to assist in tactical planning.

NFPA 1710 and GIS Analysis

While modern science has been well integrated into

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Documents

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