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i92*-ige3
■ MstcrtatiOB 8utettt«d to tb« yaeulfey of the
Cmduat« School of Qoomgvtoim Bblverslty in portlal ftilllllaoat of the requimasts tor the dugrM of
14 .£«8 Cf OfB
liciKjd Ctooargc Vogr«, B. 8«
Wudtilngtoo, 9. C.
no P'
-—! ^
JUN 2 11965
TteMi 8
iFi(J;2IS?[^ ifö"« ^SK^l m
Emmm mf
r
fhls th« Is 1«, Is Iftrge a^&eurtj th« peault of tho Insi&t
and kncwladfe of *r. «Ria«at ^etia «Nirio9ttl«t and lAspirlac te^dwr,
Fpef«fc&or ¥1111.« 1. Maoger. fhe thesis grsw frcn dlsetuslmc k«U la a
sMdaAr on totlo «trie«« pwr—Bfci and politics cooaueted by
9r« Haafsr. It 1. to hi. «xc«IXflat t.«iehln£, patient gul^loine, sod
out his aid, auggeJtlons, sa.i crltlclm.«, thi;^ p^per could aot har«
b#CQ IfTlitWB.
lh« author Is also gr«fly lnaäfat«d to Frofitsaor Utis I.
gullar-LAoa \toa häj r«aä the p«ptr JV nho, throat bin vt^st knavled^e
of the source naterl^l, directed mich of the research. Rla help jad
•drlee hare direct\y rootrltated to the aocoraogr of the final thesix.
■ further debt Is owed to Mlfik velln- K. j^eagaa «ho typed
aad edited the final cople of the thesis. To the Qhited Stetes Air Tore« Üastltute of Techoolocr a
opecial miawiAtdi—H is ätM» The Ueltei firteteo ilr Force aad the
In tltute provided the foodi. oad the even MOT« Ijepoartaat «lanenct, tlan»
so that the tcahor aic^it pureue hie graduate It idles«
Probably the Boat iaportaat statanut of «r Aitud« Is due the
author's wife, Beadra, «bo typed all drafts of the werk aad «ho read,
edited, aad re-read the paper thrrutfi the flaal edition.
fiaally, a viorc ooocminc the aecliaaies of the thesis is la
order. All traaelatioac free the fipaaiah are by the author. For these
Mbz'eaclatiaaa us for all oattera of factual coetect the author aust aocept,
taXX reapoBeibilityt aay errors are his.
-iU-
IT
fAJts or
PRIFCB lit
x. ICWBBPI of nraonw i
BM Folltlc I uad social Back^rooDd DM Military BMSkcramd fhe fhm >tvol-^ iaaary Uws.äaadi'l Ira
n. es KOZ or ss NZUTAST mm s»ns«B 192^ TO JftJW «T 192!: U*
m. m BD12 or SB xoKAfflf B m nmn or ?9S2t AB —WOP or jjjwgri w ■Brav or AUK jntii
US
151
v
r r n
CE^FiTÄ I
^CK-.;poünDs OF REVoumai
J
2
1 The Political ^o Social Bacicgronrid
eveotj; of 19 ^ and earlj 19-5 were a ssrles of conplex inter-
actloxu? vblch hftd their roots not only in the conteoporary political
.ltu:tion, but alao in the Chilean pact, In the civil war of 1391.
To understand the eituation in 19-^ roquircG an exanin.-.tico of tho
acc«coic, soci;-!, and political aitualari of the entire era. Ibe
B-uccesüive coupt d'etat were nod caused nerely hy a few yuung army 1
officer who rrttled their sabers in the Senate sod-lG^les; rathei,
they were the result of a long ^oriea of irritcclone ./ithin the
tot'd life of Chile.
Praa the jconoaic viejwpoint, lille's internal ccoacoy was
clocely tied to itr, errport;: of copper and nltratee. Proci 1350 to
Ld8Q Cliile mi tlie VAorld'« largest producer of copper, and the
duties laid upon thi« product accounted for iroßt of ito govcmeaastal
flaacce. With victory over Peru end Bolivls- in the War of the
I, The fir.Tt overt incident which finally culninnted In the coup d'et .t of CeptQri>er, 19'-^ i wis the ritt ling of sabers by young Amy offloeri» aeated in the visitors • gallery of the Senate, So« Ju^n fefolü] Bcimett A^rgandon^J, It* rgvolaci^n del ^ de setioBbre dc 19:?^ (SHntiago de aiile: Bulccll^ E Co. Kdltore;,, I)3^U F. 1^. fhT-partlcular incident was, of course, but ■ spAric wfiich Tgn^ted »in alreaöy e;^l^aive eituj>tion.
. George Wyth«, InAiatr^ in U^tin '»Cigrica (Hew York: Coluabia UolveiT.ity Preis, 1^5), p. 101,
L J
-#
*
r 3 n P Tlfic, Chile .cciiir-: .h -. c niv- -. fl : . ' ich
ihi |iiOi«0 BMAUA -: of nit. rti)ii;?r. in i'icultur«, md i t
rf nitr b« in the a aiufi-.cture of OMtelc S der, t
resource i-oon BO m Chile' ding opert* F. HI
to I 05, Chile.ox ritr vt ort I si C,000,000 er |
In 19X3 Chil • MgpU -. MsrM*« nitr .t . ol -jn
r i. sifl nc^i, in 191^i to ;iu.- or , of the cot
povemaeni receipt:; of Df3C . ? aog borllsg, £ ,. 6,1 «ua
terlin. 1 totirod fror: 1 port lusy on nitric •. 3
With the fcdnaL of World Mur I, -nu fch'.j enomou-> rar^ui
for nitr t-. in the produ^uioii cf osiokele-^a Ywiior, Chiloa« ;;ro- k
"ition res-, it bi^;. rlovcwr, BOM wo- whicr,
hnwy daiadi c« the nitr .t-. industry e .rried vith it the r
i i*r for the Cfcilt n ecopcry. In "om-Jiy, tbö hrselcinent of %
urocijo for the c^e&p coraat.rci 1 * c. :>;lon of Aitr^te fror, ilr
fbrcc. voro cutback in Ciiilam rrcauefcioti. In I Chil«
1. ifbi;. 1 »1 1 1
. Ibid., p. 193.
3. J. sott Keltic (ed.), Th: ^-^r^^' '^^ rbooteCLou iont MRO .ill .n md Cc., Limited, iniu), p. 750.
♦ , By 1 ;i6 Chile • 1 recor ,9^1,^ if.tric ton^ of nitr.it Ob. J. tcott Keltie (od.), Th .ia^'., '*■ rbooi-- (Lontcioni aucr.illJi .n'. Co.» Li itod, p. 735.
L J
I- 1, ">
1 exporteJ odly 303,961 actric tour of nitrate. A:, a rerult,
... depresslco had hit hwuly as early as 19^0, In the affceraath of
World War I. When the critic«-J. rplr^tiocshlp betw.ren sdneral
9:q>c^tE, or vorld detaand for these products, ;«c' Thlie's Internal
revenue, up to ÖTJJ of vtlch case free nJiier .1 dutlec, Is considered,
It li not difficult to understend the i^portanec of the induction in
üemeiiU c 4X20
r r 5 1
Within tho JS.WL of tho rice of f.Lliag •sn^loynent jtu ri ing
Li.-in« costs were CLUJ^tt nvjay of the lover c: . Of tlut er:.,
Bfailio Ro^rigaes ML lo , . "IXa-inc th-t i:rioi, th trx-
WäB heavy MB i ....c ..; ttd oa co inothcr, the crL*-:. eoanlattd.8
■Ml ihe CJiilc r. worker i- il .-.oci.il legislation mi rr/en ;cinc •iMMttty
for» of .oci..l security, or had the unrciiiiiiiiln Incc the civil n
dhowu Hf interest it ^11 in th f-ce at ch city-dwelling ucrhin.
CIUTB, it ic -ocßiblc th .t ev-en the ;.roblcai cf &h. „1 z.-aa..
nitrate lo&t . rising living co :t could hrvvp been solveü without
r-i ic J .oci.,1 upheaval. Such, how.-ver, I not th.. -J ..je.
Hitlwwillyj ;h'; vrcsüures of urt nl tlo« grarth i.hc
condition- of the city dmlltr .•ven cor:. unK r.tle, Vfhil: frocj
1370 to 1950 th, tot 1 -.c-jul.tior. of Chila mor« thna vioublea, th;
rur .i .-«c-Tulitlcsn ren-in.^ fi ; ..', to " incro-s^ ooouiTtta in the
cities,
ccording tc -jociologi >t Cuillenx Foliu Crui:, by the t .rt of
the twentieth century, '' . self-.—iscrti'vir. revoluticxiiiy w/.v? trlou to
find an oquilibrJUir. in the equ;iliz ^-ion of cl «MO« ' Moüt of the
1. v/vilio/ RcKlrljju^-r. Moniloa^., EL gol^- S '•'^^yi g 1/ ^ ( Mia^i de Chile: ftHclfl—■ frcllla, 1930;» p. 10%
. Pretiton E. Jtseeu, Latin rocric-: (3u td« rev.; Nc\; Yorks The Oiy.scy PrccsS, I999)i P«
3. Twillcnao Fcliu Cruz, "L* r/ui.uclon politic k, rconfariio.x, y social de Chile," Aal- -1: Vni-.•or.■ i--•: .o Ct.ilc., CXVUl, No. 119 (mercer trine;;tre de 1960), '. .
L J
r e "i
i'rportint political peurttM« howerer, toofe little notice of this new
•entla)*.nt. HH CoriaervativG Party In 1901,
. . . believed th.t It coul;l put Itself in the forefront vlth so sv-ny l^'rlc-il phr-eea» of souncL Insplr^tloo, ani truly Chrlücl JI—but ineffective to rectr-.lü the brutal reality of the cl mh of
ither did the Radical Porty tie an ^cti/o Lntcreat in the affaire
oi the lower tlasM . It vo.^ not until 1910 that thü Llbcr-1 Party
nade an unrucce&ifal ctter5>t to call for "Permanent Cocmlttees of
Workers" In fr4Ctoriec erf I'pO or rjore amployo«^,,^
There were, however,, ran.? jxjtles vhlch attflEptc . to appeal to
the working Slaw». The Partl^lo Be&oeratlco vris forme!" as ^ dis-
affected branch of thn Liber.O. P Jty In 188?. Itu specific role wae
to spo dt for th worklnr cl&sat
It fell to the Partido ggggcggtice to be the true organizer of the vorlcin* ißaßf.',s, the p^rty viliich, for th'v firet tiae, awcÄenci in tlKtu
i SlMfl conGcloutnetfc, one which wae the pre- cursor of social legi£l:tion. k
I. Ibid.
. Ibid». '. :5.
• fblf-» > P« -'l«
k, Ibl ., p, 60.
I J
r TH
^lao speaking for the workers v^s the p-jtido Foci-ligi ^ SSPSBl
fotsn^ed in 191 by Jjxi: Ecdllc Recubirren. Thia party becone uh 1
CcnrxKilEt Party In 19.1.' It «Ma in botn fozns, «trtlve aaioag the
nitrste warkcr^ of the north. I*y the end of World W^r I, those
parties which ootuitec any vcwrtter eupport were thr following:
Pi-^iöo Bocl:-.li2t -. ^rr^, nitrate workers', P xtido DepCTiXico,
coal ninsrs and «it>- artiüfuas; ^nd Partilo R&dicalt white eoUUtr
alddle claf.;.
The pclitical rJfill-.c ioa rarely jatitfied the necU JIC de-
mands erf the vaxiou.; wort.ins groups, however. Frora the be£:iaatn; of
the tv.xsntieth -untury, many infom«! trade groups held open public
meeting: throughout the country. The city tftiMBi of S mtiago held
open 2SQ€t3ng£ ^nd put their protleas before the public. Other ribing
groups wore doing the seme thrca^out Chile:. BM nitrate workere, the
co>l niners, the longrhorenen, the r llvorkars, ^nd the factory
workers each btaided togeth'.-r tn iiifomcl or^oni? tions. By the tint
of tho poctvr.j nitrate crisis, "everel cf these -lüsociatiocij had been
formed: La A^ar^JlcH Obrere .e '-J-l^^nt iz.i'x: Xacloa?^ th^ Fedoracion
Obrera de vThilc ruid the Intemtlon-oJ Workerc of the World (IMW)
Hegion C^iilen.. These quasi-orgenised grewpe halped give body to UM
1. Robert J. Mexander, Conauaian in Lain ja ..ric . Brunj^fick, Hew Jcr...y: Rutgers University nres«, 1?57), • iT7.
. Robert J. le\sinder, Pro .rv'~- 01' .he H^x.'-olu.tion (Ncv LYor'a The Ifcuarll] n Canpjay, 1'/ ";, u. jf>. -J
-■
8 "1 I
otherviif hctorogeneous working groups.
M.v.i in the v-jaguard of thif. "ne-. social revolution" «ras the
Fe^or'^cioo >lg EPtudiantc.-, d: Chil: (FECj-). The FECK went into the work-
•re districts to educ,.tc the aftecey,
Cloaely allied witn toci JJ^t, ^ümrehist, and Syn.iic .Hat labor nov-oaents ac wtM aa the leftist v/intja of the I.iboral and Radlcol Partisr., rtudeatc plunged into i caE^aign of -rolonr - git'.tioc for aociiil sxid political refora.
While these org-mi^tlonE jnd party affiliation- ^ppear to be
rather ia^ortant, in reality they hüd little or no actual voice in the
nsfciocuil or local govertaaents md couli not obtain even dtai— e0*^3
foj* the workers. The one aetho-": throu^i ^diicfa the working man gained
the little he did «M the ctrlke. Befor-: World Wrjr I the orkers had
been -xor:u.ioGlly organized, and hundreds ware killed in strikes .-.gainst
eErploy^ • In 1903 in Valparaiso, the ^j^y shot and killed thirty
c-triker;. mA left taore than 200 woundcti. In October, 19C5, taore were
killed in Santiago. On Febni^ry 6, 1906, and again in 1907, acre were
killed .and woundoci in AnteIVigosta .nd Iquique, respectively. In Iquique
1. BXTC Coror., op. cit., pp. 51-^3.
. Prrgak Bonili-, "Tho Bbwlmtt Fe -r.;icai of Chil^: 50 Ye-rc of Politic .1 '.Cvlon," Joum 1. of Inter- ^eric.i Studier., II, No. 3 (July, 1'XO), p. 31-.
_. lit ndcr, Prcr-h'Tt- of thi' Revolution . . . , op, cit.,
L
r 9 -i the troops kiUeci -OOO strikers Jto had bean herded Into the bullring.
Bafcales in 1919 and Ifeifallanes in 19 0 aleo Buffered the reprc^icn of
strikes. In Hatixlec, WtKB of the strack workers were burned alive
^exunples."
In • single year, 1903, there were tventy-nine aiojor trtrikei:
throu^iout the exxmtry. In Santiago there were eleven; Antof ^gasta,
three; Coacepciow, three; the co^l ainlnf? rci^Lon, three; JUG there
were nine centers which suffered one strike each. SOCK* OutQOO people
were Involved in these ntrikec.^
Kith the ßuecess of the Rosai-a Revoluclon, the workers got yfc t
they taeri theretofore lacked: a successful ideolo^ which told than
they were Mrvwfe in their actions find which Justified their
ü-cri*lce: "The word 'soviet' IHM i raogical prestige." The
revolutionary oad rtdica.1 'Erkers' | , "«t»lch had increased to 100
newspapers und R«ga*ine6 since the beginning of the century, kept
Tllve the desire for radical change ^m the Bpirit of disgiisrt with
1. vlberto Eivi'.nii, Vivr Eduar-io Frol Hcmtalv-, Kistori de XQ.}. p.jti;o^ ;.'Ollticos ehll.ao (s^ntlitjo de Chile; E.litovl-] lei P^cifico ". ., l'^9), "P. ir'::-155.
. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p« 6?.
3. ^."^ti P» ^ •
h. Jorge Barrlu CerCTi, ''Chile. U-. cue^tion polftica. y -oci.l cm 19 0-19 6,' n-lo^ ^1. '. alv.-r.-ld ul cu C]iile, CXVII, No. Il6 (cuvirto triMtztrr j jjc./ de O^)» p. ?•
L J
I
r M n 1C the goverrtaent. It ir; pVsMhljf ütfli(?ult to over«ertl3»t« the
la^JortoaTce of the positiv? prograc of Crrauniaan. Acaj-cho-
syadlcalias, .lthou0i radical, offered essentially a negative
progrrar. foreign to all of the countty*^ poiiticOL eirperience,
Cocialidci or Pntiisn .'.ocitUac for a country in vhich hundreds of
vorkere were >.llle. ■■nlly t:e«Bi3d to offer little to the hungry
roto.
In spite of this fercierrt, the eovcrnDßnt chovad little sym*
pathy fear tht vorkfersj xs •, tKittor of f rt, it generally r?prc-roed
MB« Although In 191? the goverrHaent had be«n force- to dvjclaro
i state of siege rmd banish syn la lid; leaders to rgraotc part:, of
the coiaury, in hie laj?t presi.leotial nessage of 19-0 Precidant
Sanfucntea aaid not ningle vord about the social upher-Tal vlthln
Child The vhole situation setess well suaniarized by •Xiillcrtao feliu
Crus:
rhc peace intro&iced by the parlionentary reglnc iiüdained, %-ith ccEipl^te indifference, to worry e.bout social problenr which accvuaul «teu one upon another, each one with r»ro gravity, in the congrenaional rjrchlvei.
• Ibid.. . 5^»
.
r
i
*
n 1
For the wcrking class, then, the ecotiajitloo of i döcllnixie
external aorket for the Eoct inportnat product o' Cbil* -jncl a rising
cost of IlAdag crented on ^tsJO£|Äterc of discontent. The fl«nc;> of
thl* oiccontoBt, fjanod not only by I public .pnthy, but .vorre, by a
Tjublic aitipithy, had b«en gro**ing sluce 1000. The support given the
•vaarkin:' claseec by the virioun radlc.il netrsoaperr. idc i in Xeeping
olive their belief in their •altlnate trivasah. It vr»s, hovvever, the
victory of Coaraunian in Husaia -Aich «idöel ;n ideological base to
the growing dlocctxteot.
A strong, active, imgin-'-tive centra epYzraaatA. night h--ve been
able to cope tfith th; vroblaa." fteittl "hile, but I gcr/emDent such
the country h^d kno«n since 1 ItselJ' totally inc-p^blc or
unvlillrig to jncer into the cl'.sn ctru^le:
What ^dured Intact coring the period fror. L to 19-0 vu. DO•-..•. ii co Sncin ., "El im^blo chil^o h .1 illO y lo: raafrot OitfdiB ie au ex-olucioi jxslftic - / econdt-lc^ h r ' 0," n Ic te I.-. Unlver i l-v uv Cbilo, CXVIZX, 5o. llr> (t«rs«r tnn.s^rc
de 1 *-0), r. -3.
■—Si
r I ~
*ithin th ■ c;.i • •T-r-liv • -rclsed by the 1—. 1
tr P.C-U rich of aili^ing Jiü njiuf ccurlng. The neaob^r. of tb*»
^Cftfer houi.., zh ChMtbzr of P'»put!es, ser. : four yiMTg, r.
(or ■.'r/e: "tght y^ r .
Th Coogr^ , in . riitlon co boing con. rv-tiv. in n fi cf
change, baa two oth'-r failt .hieb lYui'.r t< iljnost »11
^ectcr of "rl a oeicty« Fir-.o, the Cooer««e «rfl rcr? .JI orpanl-
z rirxi for -b u-^ tbaa une for ' ., r. • legislation. For
le, ijf/rae;.ul ;.t:ly alter the defr-it of ExTmactcl - in 1391, ft lav
r ' bott«ia| i ui intro-uc,:' into the CngMSS« Th« nrop-oüed
legirl tic . bx. , for n< wr3y 1 t^.j^n yea-r;., until 1906, Oßly
-ft r UM . trike of 1905 in .c tafel ro - ih bill pM*
I'wib-r i333, on • i-y 0, 1> .
In^9.09 th.^re VM ta^roteocd into 6lM Congress bill regarding
cing jcci • ai . .ith the bill on housing, tM .ebuted
1. Willi JIB Lytlo 'churz, "Gov^mBient," in Iho Svolu^ion of L tin rh;ric-.ji Ckyytrnmc-nt, .. \Eher K. Ctei«ten?en 1 ■ YorK:
Corr, .r;y, lol), pp. 3-33. Se« al&o Charlef; A. Thanu,on, "Chlls :truggl.>. for Nutionii Beoovery," For*iga Policy Report , DC, No. 5 (February Ik, 193:»), p. '> ; ad u tin ?. McPonlJ, L.tin R'irie n Politic.:, uaa tkyvcrnracnt (Ntv York: ThonaB Y. Crowe 11 Caaip«iny,
1:"^), p. 9 .
. Luis Corre^i Pr-'eto, El ^rei'cnt. Tbin^zj I politico y !o.. polftlcofc (ß ntiiigo de Chii : '-ItcriGl Oibt, [jl ), p« 5?.
i.c 'chuxi, or.. cit.t p. 9.
3. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p. 63.
L
f r U"!
sporadically until it : Ln .lly p Mad in H?6, eight yo^ns after
it; intro-aictioc. In 1919, - ■! I «Hi • ioo %«a» fonawi by th-
Congres:' to -^uiy th'. need for JJC impast of legisl-ition throughout
the country. This cocifJ.tt':e Mt intertsittently until 19 1, «her it
w»« difctolvoc vlthout having ^ccanrt>li n^ anything.' One CRU^ for
sadb an unproiuctivc recor., rcorüng to the hijtori^n ancin?!,
that although tb Clsiie-Ji Congress v:.s a pArliiotent-ry be y, th
* .J* si cocplete l^k of x>arty diiciplln^ v.-ithln the sevej^xl r.-irci^ .
In a nulti-pi-rty purli^r^nt^ry leKi-i.ture such lack of 'Jii-ciplin:
»ide it nearly iEpoiiCibl^ to p-.s .nything of import J. ■ .
Proc that tlEJ/l8yi7 for. .r , vlutocr.cy con- nollrtitufl it fTontrol of yarli—>tj m while it revs Hoc in Itö pover, nev soeiaJ force- rtch-r ctrength in the sh^-do i .
The zocoai rujor f-ult of the Co; ■ it dao t eoiifltaiit
interference in the affaire of the executive branch. The- congretssionvl
victory in the civil Mr est^bliuhed th t th' Prefci tent'. c „bin-t rcvl"
1.Ibic«, p. 65.
3. By th^ tu*n oi' the century there *r»irp .1 Least eiy well- te fine'. n^iep. ?ee Schurs, loc. cit.
U. ESncin-^, op. cit., p. !vl; mi "Mberto Cabero, R?cu' r 3 ■ dort P'-iro 'g^lrr.: C;rda (Sarti ^o e (."hilrt: laprent t B&selaiMtO|
19^8), p. 5^
5. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p.75.
L J
W in
tt-I ir; office ooly *0 looc U it esvjüyed the confidence of tb*1
It wpe] rsear thct „fter the civil v.r, congreüsiooal
iioapproval of c -bincti; incr ^hrj-rly. ' coctpxrijotx of govem-
aenu JL crimes in pr^-civll v r end pc T.-civi] v j- ;«3Einiatratic»s
in.ü('.atec the inst djillty of the pott "HW cabinet :
Pre-Clvil W-j Cabiaats
ov.mnrni. Master of Cftblaots Kunbej- of Mtnittc
Priet. (131-' il) h I- ftOim (l^il-l .-51) 5 15 Jfc^f: (105^-13611 5 16 Per«^ (1361-1371)
.v rtu (1571-1B76) U Pinto (137^-1^1) 6 1
Maria (13 3) _5 1^ 3 109
S Po.Tt-Clvli tf..r Cibineta
-.L-n^edi (1S86-1B91) lb Jor|e Montt( 1391-1:: 10 Err zurin EchJAirren
(l8s/>-1901) 17 Riejco (i:)01-I906) 17 Pedro ^!0i^tt (l406-191C) U
T03 Luco (1Q10-I91t>) 15 f^nfuout'.:^ (1915-19 0) 15 •leüGondri (19 0-19 k) 0 71
1.1 Tfr
%
Br I
u. 1. uncjLn",' loc. eit./juad ^ Cxirtia Wllgur (^..)? ^-^eqtin^ jr ^il3 .tid Chile gin-x IIJ Ivyc-accnGo (W^diingtoc, D. C: The George " -iingbon ÜTii ari ity Rrw , 1 '35), pp. 357-36^;.
. Feliu Cruz, op. cifc»» ?. 76, It nhoulc be noteU that in their book dealing, with tlTa" Chilean pclltic-vl pjrtioa, Edwjpas snd Frei ütifce th^-t there were 1.1 ceünuts fuia 5j0 minicterü. The dif-
, ferenco U probibly ittribut;ü)le to the fiurt. that aooie rdnißtor/: served L«ore than one tiae, Se« Edwrird- Vljre;. JIA frei Mont^Lva, op. cit., _J pp, 1^135.
15 1
I
7h . of ptfty eoh^iiion ia Iso iUutcrfttevi In tho
-iltioo of cabinet« mä tdni • Ol to IT; .
"-1 of C fcbi. ■ ■ .
Llbor z: 70 £vli«?ÄCc.l:tas it6
Icnali^ U Rudlevies o Com^rviidoreB 1 0 l>aBocr:'.'. 0 6
During the jfman VUSme con^idGration, KhtM ui. group^ shifted
-lliauces ofton L . . ayu 1 yr. $ MMK« 5 <
. yr. U rxi^. 3 ^iy:- 1 :— . ?■ nor .
With Buch a rapid succession of govemnent- between 1591 ^
k ( Ji «sverige of more thtn three c vbinfitc per year), it was
dlfflnilt for the executive branch to naXe riny oroV". -ult on
social or ny other nroblapui. It haß been Mid th.-t there were
minister« who, h.iving trJcen their o-ithü of office in the morning,
lost their poat- in th or the Ch acsbcr of Deputie:. in th^
L 1. Feliu Cruz, or-., cit., p. 7?.
. Ibid. J
t
^ "I -
•»noon of ehe ■ fS
>re e i 1 la" . >; by ch' en; of th«
nfv . Loe» bb« I r ocrii ion, th-oust.ou!;
" of • < . of .;. i 1
liilc 1 b akn rtcy of th^' ; rliMMB ■■ cov-i-nasenc. Li-:U h
e /nrough the Con- I ft) -• UfBtlft] ■ItWiil, ri vh^- lie tie
; • l/e w ■ Uy rel -1 ely i:nJj:r
Ihc c^oev 1 i ffltetion, ra nife t in part by trikc , -o.'.l . only
o phec within Chile Äich infeciei ne rly All of ociety,
in Lu • o Eilliti.y.
1. Ibl ■. r. 76. Hater, on.r-r '-am'n. In hi book i ^cor I :lc- * oini • ?ion Ib»Äet (?sfltlt«o !« C%llet Ir.r'-in
T5" 1 ' T- . » *ere c bin b T'll bee e • .' ait&r of . wlni -'-y o "hool. te eter w i pie e- vl'h ic.
r r h ; i r :
L _J
- -— -* - ■■ ■ r,. ■" ■ '
r
i
17
The Klllviry oXcroimJ
' t-for« H v Chll«? V mc.1 fore li I - f .t;«i * r'-cor: of pc]i;i.il
nor-ln e'-'.^ntlon 'r. profe: ionl ooapeianc» of ahich ny eoun.r/ ccril •
b« prcuf?. Pb« Infu ton of thes»? ^nlrible qualltl» n i •. I«i i
ibo«it %8 It of ■ cooblaation of people ftiwS ■mbi vhicb Influence'
th- Oiilein raill: ry IVCB it ue.iniir,,- . Kv«» curing the • of
Indepeni'ence, the ^ilein experience •' ooewhat different than tr
of other L tin Jöeiictin !nlli*arit: . rh2 juoyt Inport^ut difr'^ronce w
the leading role of r. power, «hl
r 18 ~i
under Lc-• ' ocbr vn? * In ' •TiBenr.Hl In falnlcg: the f In a Tic o i .i
« i rer» 011 to belier* that none of the th ^e r.rJa -y IMAV
of ihc IndtpenJence movonent, neither £ n Martifi, C'Kiggin , nor
rochr^n-», w a of the c u-lillc rAnt-li y. of tb« «ilik.ajry5 'fin Martin
hia. .'If H m^l, "The presence of * fortuaate soldier iü daagerou. to
* newly con iiute.i scat»." eneral C'Hi^- || . fcer reBi.g?ii~ e
he-.d of täte in l8 3» retired to Perv «md sade no overt *ttcapt to
return to power. Finally, .ccor : '-.o Worcester, ". . .Cochraae :■«-
füneü to b«cCBÄ eiabroile.l in parti n polities," ?hu', of the three
esrly mllii-ry letder , none attejnpted to h ■a hi. forces to subvert ehe
;pvernraent. Bteia Lleuven ittributa» Latin 'jnerican caujilli.sBro
•o ^he Billt«nr*l ■:•■ 'vnp:ioa of powe- *i; the jjadftr .hip yicuu» left
Ly -.he e p.1 ion of :he Spaalsli« If tbl? naly i ifl coi-recc, then
n rticultrly ignificinc for :h- future politic l-nilitary
1. Donald E, Worce .vier, 0'«5 Po»«'r inrt Chilean Independence ( irr- .ill*-, 7Iorli.j rniver^ity of Flo Ida Pre^s, IOC ■. TiT •'omplete book gives ; det lileö Account of -lie role which uhe patriot nv/y pi ye > in the fin.l victo-y of ehe for independence fraB Op win. Ni vl o eorge PvnJel, The Laid md People of O.ile (ixsndon;
Chi le ".a ck, 1-960), p. sO.
. Michael 1 rd, r>olJ.i*rr &nd ovemment : Win-- "tu^itK in Civil-Milit:'r-y t>el cion Tlöndon: Eyre rpOT-t! wood, 1957), 0.1^57.
3. Wil^a , Ajgeotin:, n^.il> qd Thil» . . ., op. cit., p, 97«
k. Worcs^te-, op. cit., p. 77.
5. Sdvin Lleuwen, "The Ch ngin? Role of the Tülitary in Latin Sjrm la . Journal of Inter- riericji f>tt;c>i'.'., Ill, Ho. k (Oetobe-, W€i), p. 55c7 -J
relationship of Chile that tb«ee thre« potoctial caudilloc reaoyed
r«K«lTe- frca» power.
Vhlle ttw f'axxi- early le&dcrs vwtre not of the caudillo Bent&lity,
there were ncme lesser leader:: Ao were. During the peri&i of diaorder
l*^tinf fro» i9l8 to iSSO, Chile h d five coo titutloos, and was in
a con:*tint «tüte of conflict bettttn liberal: (pipiolos) and
ccm-ervitives (pclncooeg). It ir-s fin IXv the victory of the cooser-
rstive forces led by "enentl Joaquln Prieto over the libsr^l force«
^iich put the control of the Chlle-vn governaeot into the htnd^ of
Diego Portalen. The ejurly years of the Port aloe Ccrferoasent were
orlticil in Ibrther daveloplng the ailitar/'ü relationship to politics.
'ieneral Prieto'r victory» ^sils in^uriaf a eonservatire »rovemasfir., did
oca ineure nil« by ci-riiiaa autliorifcy. This Wts chiered by Portalesi
"the Ansy, n. hotted of lisa^asion. WU subjected to the Prosldeati-.!
»Uli officers of an taclependent mind were dsBaoted,, isiprl^oaeJ,
3 exiled or executed. By IffSSf the «iiitary, purped of insurgönt
el^taect" ^nd subordinated to th« cwstril goverasaent through Droaotioo
1. Robin 1. tiuetphreyf.; ^SwäSracy ana Diet at or ship," in Th«~* Evolutios of Lgtla ^trlcan v-overaa^it, ed, Asher H. ChriÄtensen' n(N«»v YoAl imry lloU and"CaBpaayf 195if, pp. 90* 9^.
'. Fredrick i. Pike, Chile and the United ftatgt, 1^0^196 (lotre Daee, I^i«nt: University o^ Hotre Dsae Presr, 1^35, p. 10.
3. Hubert Herrlnr, ^ History of L-tin fesg-.-'ics frcg) t-ba 3e^limlag to the Prfesent (H
■ 1 sad pt^r poiicicr« *ad th« tradition of tb« ailltary a««d«ayf v^<
fcrc^ to *br.t«ln froB politic-..
TW.k strong ilÄciiAlüißg of th« »lllt-ury by Portal*», follovlag
«loeely th« wlb« alllt ury l«fi(*«rehlp exercised by S&n Mtrtin,
O'Hlg^rlas, «ad Cochr&m, definitely lIM in vbordinating th«
allltary to civl. mthorlty. PortAle« ws successful bccins« of th»
«wli«r wort of tat tbre« w rrlors; •«d, in t-cm, their «irly
«politic I attitude« b*c?re tradition bec*Ui« of the positiv«
discipline ispocei by Port ales, kt Edwin Lieuwa sayr,
Where the Military was dißclplineJ «Ärly, as io th« unique c .« of Chil« under Diego Portales, the civilian oligarcy WM bl« to assuiK — «nd did as- -u»e—-control of the neticn'r nach in« ry.
Such r.incipline, oöcoKpliahed «o early la tb« «liltary's
hi.Lory, couia not .Ion« b« expected to account for th« traditiooal
ailitßj^^ Qttituoe of Oille. It hs b««n said by an intlaate observer
of »ore than one fllM fe estiidc la Lit in A»wir"i that
Th« long period of peaceful training easbellished only with tactical maneuvers nad occasional para4«s does aot s^tlefy th« urg« for Activity of ^bitious nä eaargetic ycung officers. 3
1. 8e« Pr 0101 sco *.. hacixn, Hi^torii. de Chile d«-vAe la pr«histori.i hasta lS9l (TOBO Xj R*ntla«o d« Chile: Bditorial I&sclnlentc, 19^),
. Kdvin Lieuwan, Arfea and Politic in Latin \»eric:i (Nev fork: Pr«dfcrlc* \. Pra«g«r, 1951), p. U.
3* Kurt Conrad Amade, '"Th« TecbniQue of th« Coup d'gtat in Ltln Aaerlc-, rh.- Fvolutio« of Lttln Aacrican ovgrnwent, «d. Aäh«r a. ChriRten-1«! (1t«v ?örkt H«nry Holt and ConpanyV 1^51)» p.311^
;
f r I "1
Th« history of Chilean ax»» Is replete with honors von, not la the
hall* of eanereif, but en the fi?14c of battle. J«Mfte; fcryce decidec
thet "the beat of Chi lein psniuc. . .has bees, on the t^iole towards war
sad politics."1 Thxt thl^ 'bent" ha- borae fruit vaa attested by
Austin F. IfecBon Id, Jbo said of the Chileans, The-/ hare fought .
large nuwer of foreign wura, . . .with unifonaly successful result»."1
In 1836 Chile vent to wtr uitb a co lition of Peru and Bolivia,
finally defeating then in 1339. This w-r ''ertabliahed abroad the
reratation of Chile a« • fitting nation." 3 Pro« 1863 to 1366, Chile k
waa at ^mr *ith Spain. While thi- »AT Wf not one of great allitcry
lapor^incc, it did keep the aray ready and caused the Chilean navy to
enjoy a renewed lÄport/mce in the 'lltary hierarehy. *
Certainly one of the sott important of Chile'? fc»*eign vtirs was
the Wir of the Pacific, the "Hitrate Wir," in which Chile's military
defeated both Bolivia ani Peru. By the end of the w.r In 1833, the
Chilean araed forces had reached the height of th;lr military prestige,
*• J3»»» Bryee, South Aaericai Ob&enration^ mm l^gpro s'looa (Rew Yorkj Ihe Kacmillan Coag&ny, 191 }» p. ?1.
. MacDonald, op. ^•» P* 83.
3. Wllfus, Argrotin-i, Braail, wod Chile. . ., op^ clt., p. 311.
k, HATY Wilbelmine Williams, The People and i^olitica of L'tln «♦. Jury wimeisiine Williams, The yeopie and rt: Americi (Do-ton? Ciim and Coop .ay, 19V})» p. 6 1.
5. William Columbus Davis, Th* La^tCooqui:tadorer; The Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile. 1663-1366 ( eorglai Thi iTniverr,ity of •"".eorgis P'-ess, 1950), p. 3 9. This hoc* deals in its entirety with thin virtually bloodless wir between Sp*in *nd her two *• -colonle .
r a I
-n-i th«y ver« quite willing to r««t oc that pr«cti, hetweeo these aany foreign ware the Chilean anqr vas not
resting and plotting for lack of other occupation. To the sooth,
fron the diy. of the first cop^uistadoref-» the Araueanian Indians had
been eauäing constant ailittry probleBs.
'"zier -1 Teilet stetes flatly that the ccaqpest of the Araucctnian Indians in Chile cost Spain aore than all the rest of the discovery and conquest put together. 2
The Chilean military, while never oonquering these Indians, did subdue
them by 1383. That the Indisns did, indeed, cause the Chilean Military
to wage heavy Cisapaigna is indicated by the .^tateaant of a foreign visi-
tor In 1850J
Alfiost the whole of the regalar aray is quar- tered on the south frentier to keep check of the bold, savage Areucanians, but in the north frau Valparaiso to the desert a regular soldier is rarely seen, 3
1. Pike, op. cit.. p. !3- —— —
. Williaa S. Stakes, Latin Aaericaa Politics (lew Yorki Thcoas Y. Crc*ell Ccaarany, 1959)» p. 107.
3. Ooorge Byna, Wapderinga in Soae West era Rerpublics of Aaerica (London: John ^. feurker, West Strand, 1Ü$0), p. ^X), _l
r 23 ^
Tc subjugate the Indians require, the best the allltary could offer.
The Xhdion wars if»re a constent presence, both between ra^i cftirliig often
glorious foarvol war«, Ar euch, they were i eignlficaxt featur« of the
total ecviroBBteot t,-l:hin vhich the Chilean military »enured and developed
its philosophy.
Throughout these ye vrs of the develojeent of the militjjry, ttere
me a definite trend tovrvrd profeusicoalization. Tnis Development
probably took pl^ce because the Chilean military wes vucceseful end
free froci political intrigues: but conversely, it nu^t be noted that
tec 4i£e the solitary wus already a profecsiooal organization, it was
victorious and did not deal in politics. Certainly victory, proffecaioa-
aliaaa, and oon-interference In politics are closely inter-related.
Yet if, as Edwin Ideuven suggests, professionalism is the anti-
thesis of militariam or e'suclilliaao, then legardless of how or vhy
professionali^Bi developed in Chiln, it should be examined. Lieuwen*8
definition of perofeseicnalism enbodies these three aspectc 5
First, the officer corps turned its energies to the exereise and developusnt of its Edlitary function; second, the ..rard forces tend to become the servants rather than the »asters of the state; third, that their function lecaae increasingly limited to the "legitimste" military duties of maintaining internal security aid defending the country againct external aggression. I
Under these terns, it could be caid that even under Port ales the
Chilean;; were so developing.
1. tieuwsn, Arms and Politics. . .»"og. cit., p. 31»
r An
3b« Micceci- of Oalleaa ajma iodleal»« tb-t the officers «orljr
turned to tt* drrolopMOt of tim Killt «ry fuaetloß. Tb« sot loos a
£, -•.«■.eat; of ttH ejrly nlllt uv I«adere IMlcst« nubordiiMt Ico to
clrll 'jutborlty. Pln&IXy, tbe unlfbrily arcoecofwi fr>r?l^i «an -n&
the dOMtetlc pcciflcetioo of tbe Xtniiraxt. ebom that tb« nilit; ry «ad
able to aclstixia Inter» A! A«ourlty «ad to iefend tb« country sc&iaat
e^tamol ««resslo«.
Cbllc WM oo€ of tb« first Lotlo Aswrlcua antloae to r«qp««t a
nilxt .ry nl.-isloo froc PruMia» r«ceivlog its aliaistt, l«d by
G«u«ril Etail 3o«mei, io 2335* Tb« tr&lolag alt sloo «a« ao offsetive
that ooe author ocldsi th'.t "the Q^ll«a^ anQf wa.« »laort Pni»el»alstd.R
i *
It unoiijUl Tsgriin b« Dotoc tbnt Koeroor hotJ a Ecuocaaofbl ailitary iaa^ilnc
with vfclch to work. The Chlie&a trrsy had b^oone ar highly profe-sleo-
aliaoo that by 1905 it WTVB itcclf eendio^ ailltary aieslaDA to ■
Coloobla» ^«nafiuala, Ptyrr^uTy, -and tl Salvador.
Whilo It is difficult to aaaoso hov auch of C^ia*i t&zi££-
Ion iilr." v low «äe cau»« *&& bew naflb «m« affsert» tb« iwportnnt f^etor
1 that Cbilo's military USA b«ottae n. thoroughly nnjfasiloßaJ orgnai
• tlon. Ibraush this, it b«e«aM oaofftaiitly 1««« int«r«ct«d in politlae
-oc laorc Involved lo it« two prinury Bl&alooe erf protect in« lateroal
tr «jquililty nod providing for «xtamal defboM,
C jy4, — . Stotoa. op, Qjt.« p. 129,
3. Lleuvao, AnM j»d Polltlcfl, . ,, OB« gjt., p* Ji»
r v ^ Af the civil *ar of 1391 aajkrd a turning point in the political
and social levelojoeat cf Chile» eo also did thit eccfliet le&vt its
s&rk oa the aroed forces. The war was a sanguinary affair vhlch
Jjurtad nsarly a year and co«t the country 10,000 lives and over 100
miUlon peao«' daar^e. Yet, it vould be difficult to assign the cause
of this oonfliet to adllcaridB, a« in f^ct the red and basic csuse ley
aot in & clvll-ailitüry conflict, but in a conflict vlthin the civil
govertsaent itself. In speakiog of the civil dispute, Pedro Montt,
a Chilean representative in Uashlngtoc, cooMnted,
At this crislt, seeing the President -.r best :r. an arbitrary dictatorship. Congress reoolved to exercise the powers csnferred upon it by the Constitution. • . • Shis it proceeded to do, and solaonly ordained that Kr. Jos-- Manuel BaLoacedr. had ceased to be the Preeident of Chile.
After the crisis h&d been started, not by the ailitary, but by
the civil govemaoüt, the navy en toto supported the congrescional
position, '.diile n nunter of (tlsownts, if not the aajority, of the
rry supportec the Presidiait.^ Hot all of the ..ray renained loyal
1. WilliaBs, op. cit., p. 630. ~~~
•. Pedro Mmtt, E>gobition of the Xllegul Acts of gx-Presidetit balgaced^- Vhlda Caxuied the' Civil ^ur in ^lle (VaKh 10,3^)0, D. C.» Glbeon Bkx>s., Printers ; nd Bookbinders, 1S91), p. iM* This particular ^«üphlet oust be used with core, as Montt was the representative of the ccngreseioovd forces in Washington during the civil mr. The author has atteojptsd to use only «t&tetsenis vithln the competence of the congres- slanai representntlve: the work is definitely a proprt&aida device.
3. Wilgus, Argentina. Br&AJl, Jnd Chile. . ., op. cit., p. 357.
L J
t
1 «n
to BcJ»»ccdAf however, mi Matt, tlcasnts want to the coo^rtsclooal 'Id«.
3«D«nLl Koftrner, the head of the Pro*siM» MÜltary AIRSIODI wa« one of
the ley flgureet
La January, 1391» Koemer's elre&iy gre^ Influace over the Chilean eraed forcet increased still fur her vhen hit defection froe President Jose Balmeced«. helped turn the tide of revolution in favor of the constitutiaoedist forcec.1
Urine the ntvy and A cadre of loyal axny officers, the Coo^ress raised p
a new ray vhich defected Bcdsoceda within e^ght months.
In August, l391, shortly before the defect of Balaacede, the
coRgresslorud forces vrote, "At laßt the con&itutianal tray is mil-
equipped nnd they >rill soon continue alon^ their accuetoia&d pathe of
victory." - While only a portion of the iiray supported the congress,
within eigit sxxxuhs thlfc cadre had becone the core of -ncfther amy.
This new ?j«y, the Cco&res* declar«!, was really the aray Chile had
always had. This new annsr would be the one to "cootlaue a?oog their
(iceustoaeu pathf^ of victory.' Thuz, the Congress iaputed the whole
military history ^d tradition to that portion of the forces which !•-
stained loyal to it. By August 8, 1391, the Congress could say, "The
fleet a^ well aa the aost distijaflaiahed officers of the argpr placed
than-elTa- ■a the disposition of the Congress. Actually, of course,
1. Li euren, Armr and Pplitlcs. . ., loc. cit. . Wilgus, Araontimi, Brazil„ nod Chilet , ., loc. cit,
3* Nontt, op. cit., p. 19. fiaphasis eupplied« h. Ibid», p. 15. ifemhusiu supplied. 8uch an optlsiiatic j
evaluction T« belied by the 10,000 deaths suffered throughout the war. Obviously, the Presidential forcer, vere not e»Mrely incoapeteot.
■ ■ ■ ■■■ ■'
r --f -I
the wnqr vu IrrttBedlably isplit by the civil war. Afterwards, it wa-,
reorganit.
The officers 4»c> belonged to ^Its äoeieoaa bau their futures H;>«ure
1 9 ,W —
Oencral Ib«oes himself iQUlcted th« prcaotlon ayston
ctuslly, the young -uray offlcert wer« dlsüit Isfled with the prcaotloo pattern, which w-s of «y asperating . lowne.-6. With great luck, ooe eight receive the grade of Btfrjojr when he v. u. acnething over fifty yeer^ of ^g«.1
The alow pronotloo dia not occur, however, becau&e of ^ny lack of
openings «Itbln th*f heirarchy of comand. according to Colontl Haul
Silva NuturanjL, there wer^ nineteen general officer^ »ad fifty-teven
colonels for the Chilean aray coa^oted of ■©»OOO »en. This is, on the
■vsrage, one general for every thousand sen aai ooe coloocl for every
three hundred. Ml far ^ack AS 1907 there wus gener .J disgust with
the law of prcnotioo aa- the open faroritlsa shown to on.«.-5
Other internal prohlenu« tended to damage dläcipUne .joong the
officers iad sen. ccoralng to Iherto Cabero, ^fter lS9i» military I
discipline started to decline. \ äumm^ry of the problem, facing th*
military w^t amply stated by Oener^l Bennett, nesber of the first
Junta de Goblemo of 19 41
The .rmy ludted everything! justice, barracks, food, Incenti.e; ana no longer coula public enchantnent «rlth the white mnet» of th« plumeo helmets of parading cadet a suffice i everything w-ia lacking and
1. Correa Frieto, op. clt., p. 60.
. Raul bllva Maturann, C mlno al ablaao. (8anti8go de Chiles editorial ünlv«r«ltftrla, I. .., 1955), pp. 5- 8.
3. 8ae» Morales, op.clt.» p. 37.
k, Cabero, Recuerdoa d« doo Pedro Aguirr« Cerda, op. clt., 37.
L
30 n everyihlng w&e badi t.h« qiurt2r»tt«t«rB 4id not ototain a ccßt unless th«y enjoyed Use »«rsaaal favor of i-oae adnl^tar,!
The gen«rf,l lack of facilities and coney affects! the officers,
especially thos.« of alddl« cl«>! baoiscrounä, who hid no family
fortune to finance thesi. äy 1^1 the officers gaoerally in the
grsules of li«iit"«^it through ii*ut«nant colonel began to be
concerned. One of the thingb which BOJt affected Ibenez Ȁien he
was a young officer WAS the condition of hie recruitBI
Who knpws—perhaps the awureneüsa of social back« wnrdness which I gained whet 1 wu,s in in tructor» officer fortified ny cooviction^ bout the necessity for a change which would better the condition, of the poor sectors of our populdtion, especially that of the country folk.'
Bec--.*ae the rich %'er« allowed to ' ouy" their way out of the servic«,
only the poor filled the rankc. They slept on straw.
MLiny of the officers -And men, thm, faced formidable military
and person~1 problam£ arlsip^ froa the poüti-o-economic situation.
In addition, by the very nature of the backgrounds from Mhlch these
men had cone, they felt a clo*c affinity for the problcns of the
eivllians.
1. Quoted in Roürigues itoido^a., op. clt., p. 173«
.:. Pike, op. clt., p. 130.
3. Correa Prieto, op. elt., n. k .
U. Silva M'iturana, op. clt., pp. 13-3^«
L J
t
- lUI.H.»«»! l i ..in mi— i, .„I ,„ . .
1 31 I understood tfec jtl «ri«?« of th« pt^plt vh^n the «oonaou» «.Kteei ©f illiiffirac^ aa tb«? p.%jf8lcül poverty of tbr r&e«, &o bard«?;«;-! neith i* fcsmit-v aoii coogenital lllaesfc., v«r* «sa'-le ^Iüö*« to s».
Tboce officer« «ho liveo closely nith civilian ^^ci«t/ MM to kaw
the hwdd&lp.s of the rl.lng, cost of lirisg *?fcich UM9^a their sen, aod
the civilian society were experiencJags ,tThroush dally ccatact «ith
the sen, they ccete to uaaerEtivod the general misery, a con lit ion ^hich
arouseB in them a longing for äocl&l tran^foz«at ion."
In ^adition to this dvareoesn bom of living in proximity to
the poor, the irme« foices h:«!, frao the beginning of th? century, been
given the auty of wUppreß&lng the vurious civil dicorders. As indicated
above, the suppression of the^e disorders had often been bloo^ and, in
aany ca^ae, -b^jlutely cruel. Considering the Chilean respect for aon-
vloleece, it woula Be«ua likely that uch iotivate contact with death
and civil disorder left its »ark on «any menteers of th« araea forces..
% the tijae of the Russian revolution, th^ militcry our^ly had cooe to
question its role?
The very ^Chilewo/ ragf, backbone of the structure of the State, ceeaed to have been ahsken by an effective vork of propaganda. The soldier_bad placed hiaself side by side *ith the Worker of the /"Russian^/ Revolution. 3
1. Ibid., p. 13.
. Sdwaxde Vive» an^i Frei i4ontalva, loc, cit.
3. larria Ceron, "Chile. . .,,, op. cit.« p. 57.
L J
-«.. *.
3-* 1 Be i^r; of poor proaot iao.i ( poor living cacdltica»» A growiag
soci&l &Viir«neB&t «ou a general revuleioo at heving killed MO Bony
count;ryaen with whoa they felt an ecoomlc and soci&l tie, tht- younier.
Junior officers lo t respect for the nilitaxy hierarchy ana, aa &
oaQ&eqiience, suffered fron poor discipline. "Hamy caae to doubt the
tense of juetice of their euoerlors, ind this ioaht I* alwuyg i had
in-ic aion. noth;r caamentcd .-dly, "The discipline of the naeü
Forces differed fras th^t of th^ Glorious ^jasy of 1879."^
This spirit of decadent discipline, ho himil^r to the geoeral
public indiscipline, broke into open revolt several tiaes during the
years after the civil war, and gave rise to several polots to overthrov
the govermrent, already held in general disrepute for U-ck of social
sensitivity .inci political stability. It vould appear that at early as
1909 the ul-cont it trith the government gave rise to secret societies
within the rrny/' By 191 , the Liga Militär had been identified as such
a society, but its n.«tict character hue remained in Joubt. These
1. §mä Morales, op. cit., p. 36,
. Ibid., p. 50.
3. Alberto Cabero, Chile y los diilenoa (jd ed,; Santiago de Chilet Editorial tyceu», 1^+3), p. c'67.
k. Bennett rgandona, op. cit,t p. 2.
5. Correa Prieto, og. cit., p. 60.
6. Saez Morales, pp. eit., p. 38.
L J
I III!
--
33
societies took 'io ctiv« Interest in the: affaire of the goverm^nt «d,
at leant maag t'e»e^lres, fomul^ted re?il prcir«»« of reform. • they
were illegal, ULttl« inforatHtion exists coaeeraing thes«.
KM far becx a» the Pre iidtocy of Srrasuris ichiOir^ü (IS96-I9OI),
the silitaxy had received a reprlssand for plotting ch-mges of goveroment.
Pedro Montt, daring his tenure of office (1906-1910), arrestea ««ver&l
officerfc for innuhordin^te actione -^ain^t hia.^ In l^ll, during a
parade for President Barroe Luco, the troops hroke ranks and thre^teoea
hi« life. They were only brought under control vith difficulty. Later
during his adatinistraticn, in 191 , «ereral leaser officers "alsmst
executed _ concrete plan a#iintt the govemaent."^ Finally, in 1913
ind 1919) high-rankiug officers bad a plan of takeover near realisation
wben the police discovered the«, Prctideat . «nfuenter retired General
Manuel Moore, Ge^^ral Quillemo Ara.aron^, Coei^ad&nte dc Canto, and
^lair&nte Cuevas for their ecBpLicity in ths plot. Many other Junior
officers were also forcetd to leave th: vrmy, creating '>n internal I«
dissension, is their felicw officers looked upo^i then as innocent.
1. Cabero, Chile y lo^ chilenoo, loc. cit.
. Ibid« Se« slao Feliu Cruz, oy. cit., p. S .
3. Feliu Cm«, loc. cit.
k, Cabero, Secuerdos de don Pedro xguirre Gerda, loc. cit.; Feliu Cruz, loc. cit; and Sae» Morales, ot». ^It., p. Uk,
L " J
r * Thui, by tb« «nd of the faAfueatte Govenweot, th« Chilean
«lllt&ry suffered froR IndidclpIiiM- 'me latem»! discaaoloD to the
extent thit Its loy»lty VBJ. In doubt by 19 0. * Of the lot^mal
uob- v 1 within the ooce-prcud Chilean nllltary. General Leo^lois
could s»y, "'Of euch conduct 1« mad«, nut a national ^rmjf, but .«n nnay _
for couyt. -i'et^t.
fuch was the econenic, social, political, and ailitary ;ituUloc
on the even of the elect iont of 19 0. There vas * general ecoocmic
r-'-r-ly-i. , «ociil upheaval, political j.p
35 "
I
The Prg-RoYolutioQiry le^sca^ri Ir^
i-
For a country in social turmoil, th« eaadidacy of Al«it«^cdri,
who preGsot^d hl&&«lf to the aaase. *J their savior, wa« the hope of
the people. RoBloatei In 19 0 ai. the Cjoilld&te of *he "LlherU \lll-oce
cc«pose
v xiou- factors. To clt« oce «x^aple. after »inning the Proficiency,
«l«864idri re Incorporated Into the Arcy ,CBe of the offlcero connected
vith the plot of 1919» *bo b*0 bemn bU3qn&rlIy JLaeharged by Prei-ideot
r »nfVieot«'. .x
During the election campaign itself, In *lch -leae^jHirl went
to the people, trarelline the length xad breadth of Chile, the military
played '_ plosive role, but acme cfflcere were, nevertheless, In contact
with .lea; JDdrl. ccordlng to General S&ez Hrsreles both the "Batlonal
Union vnd "Liberal «lliance" met with officer;» during tne caapj-ign.
Alessandri won the election with a total of 179 electoral votas
to IJk for Barrow Borgone. Hovevttr, the result wf.i. in doubt, ae the
conße;natively oriented Congreet had to ptas on the result«■. Fearing
that the Congress might rule in f»Tor of RATTO^ Borg>nc, which It
coulu have done,' letaindrl's forces usdt clear »" ^ubllc statenents
that rucn action would be looked u})ca with ^isfevor. In addition to
theae ct-teoents, Aleasandri contactsd SOB» unldeatified high officers
tc ask then to pl^n i military coup or Aeßonrtration, If necessary to
1. tuiei Morales, op. cit.t p. 50.
. Rodriguez Ncndoza, op. clt., p. 171.
3. Saez Morales, op. clt., pp. 51-5 «
k, Willl&ai;,, O^). clt.. D. 635.
b, Iwrlc K. Jua^t. op. clt., p. 77.
L J
r r * i f«t his lute office. During thl c«rlod f doubt, Ooeral U&«x Mnralea
r«c«lv«d H letter freo Oeneral An^bAlon :• ylng,
While. . .^leecsndrl/. . . has turned to the posalhillty of suc^e.? through - cherished nove- aent which v«uld call upon hla aa ths ' shosen one," another even sore aadfttSflM Jy^J^J •*■ Initiated ^y leosjidrl/ in 1919, which put it« h«Ao into the barrack* and prepared. If net a cou£, an advance In his candidacy, which t that tine w-* begi.tnlng to be noticea. Confi- dentially, he had ramy coBuxider:: und officers on his side. -
Wb^n th« Tribunal of Honor/ fonted by the Caigreas to decide
the election, mied In favor of Alestandri, the iznaediate threat of
military action ended. It i^ interesting to note that also during
this perlrxi of doubt, the .'anfüentesi Minister of War 4*n-t to renove the Anay from Santiago and to dig-
tract public attention frco ths proceedings of the "Tribunal of Honori"
failed almost laoediatily, and wus given up.
Althaigh AleiwJBdrl nay have been "the n^a of the people," be
had to face d recalcltra.:t, conservative Congrets which could block
his every atteapt to put the country an the road to political, economic,
and social recoveryi
1. Sie» Morales, loc, cj^t. ftaphasic eupplied. .. Edwards Vives «jia Frei Montalv^, op. cit.,
p« 187.
J
L - immm
' >3
The prograc of "Chile Ifucvo^,, vhlch jBuxtacfK In 1 < 0 ind which «axphasized great »ocial refors, atayej? rirtu&lly ^roctrcte in the tucc of pcliticftl resistance. 1
»« an illutration of tn Precicent'n problams, the Codi^o Je
TrjLba-Jo ^ich he presented in 19 1, .itill had not left Congresc at the
tljBe of the nllit try ia^erveniion of ^cptanoer, i y H. Ac a furthar
ccraplication, the Congress gave fifteen of his cahinets u vote of T'ao
ccmfid-ncc," wtich required, on the averige, the Rppointa«»t of * new
cabinet every three aonth; . Had his prograB.s passed through Coogreaa,
which they did not, none of the cabinet, was in office loo^ enough to
hrive irrrioaented then.
In addition to the political probl-ia& he faced (aad inde«d
because of then) ' lecB^adri could not iapleneot any of the ecotKnlc
ruid äoci.,j reformr necessary to ease the repercuteioBa of the craah
of the world nitrate narkct.
For four ycarc he battled ^gain.t further collapse, as synthetic nitrates ruined CSillt's najor inAistry und drove border into thz cities unemployed and starving.^
ie a teaqjorary measure to MM the burden nlaced vapaa the Chilean eco-
nooy, unbacked paper money re.3 issued. This, hovever, had only the ef-
fect of inflating cricta even higher, ae, the una«ploy^d iaw nooe of the ■ — mmmm***** MW *—m*»*c^mm*m*m*mim*mmm i mmm im. vmmm. . w m—i i «■■■ . m .m ■ i ■!■■ I-»I inni ■» ■ IP W—I^M——I^MMi—MMWM
t
39
Incrcvitd money supply in tb» fonc of actual iacoo*.
In the inaediate bacis^rcunn fo tbc ev«sts «hieb otwrteü In
S«pc€»ber of 19 bf upon th; d«^th of Senator Jo».»» P. Alesoandrl of
Ruble, clrcuautaoceb took ■. cour^.^ whlcb culÄlmtea in revolt,
öe&itor .M««£.änlrl died on Iktcmber 7, 19 3» leivlne the seat for
lublc y.x*nt. The Senate, In e-ccordunce vith le^al precedent, asked
Presicicait lei : >n4rl to announce publicly .. date for A special elect lot
to fill tbe seat. Preci.lent Alesecmdri, wishing to encouru^^ ^he
election of i liber:»!, delayed in fi-ing the date.
Hoping t. force an iewsdiate election, the Congrefij proBsptly
ceased all legislative action of even the aost routine nature, eno de-
sonded tbe resignation of AlesjkkOdri's SubercAse*ux ministry. By
Deccaber 311 19 3» the Congress b^d still not paused the Ct-xrison 3
La«e which allowed the Ssäntiego Ofirri.on to reou-in init^s bcrrocks.
On January 1, 19 *+, tbc Garrison left the city. On J-nuo-ry 7, in
"l. Barria Ceroo, "fevolucirai hi^rtdriea de Chile. . .," op. cit., P. 5^.
, Cabero, Recuerdoe de don Pedro ^guirre Cerda, op. cit., p.77.
3. Saez Morales, op. cit., p. o ; and Bennett \rginaona, op. cit., p. l6. Thes;e lawa, renevea annually, provided penalsäion to the national Congre. a. When these laws vere nofc paboed rinew each year, tbe military VU forced to withdraw frc« the slto of tbe congroasion^l meeting until thwir p4ef/-ge.
L
r * r«t illation, »lecviaiidrl declared th? sesf.icn of Con^reio closed. Thi
l^^arc w broken by ua agreoncat b€rtv»o«n I«tt»äßdri and the Ccasgr«»».
In e; ehang' for pacscig^ of the Garrlron X^sw jiod a etxtute fl>iiag
priaary Ixportancc to fiscal legislation, Me^Sc-ndrl pronlted free,
uninfluenced Congre&slooal electlona, to be held &t tbe noraul tlae,
Jfarch of that ycir. *•
It V.L. In the preparation *nd conflict of tbeue elections that
the »llltiry, and sspwclally the ray, was dr i-wn into political j^tlvity.
Coctru-y tc hi- -rruigejent" with the Congreue, Ale&£.>ndrl started In
Jixru-ixy to vlilt Al the unit a of the Santiago Garri^JOß to deliver
discourse!; -gainst the conservative Senate be the cau,ic of oath
alllttiry and public alscontent. These political "explanations"
cmlnf, frora the President influenced the younger llbercl officers.
The conservative forces, preparing for the election and reali-
sing the import of the^litary supervision of the«, also visited the
b-^mekö, but, in turn, dealt store with the senior officers and other
conservative elements. It would appear, however, that the actions :>f
these two factions vcre laying the groundwork within the Santiogo
Oarrlson for the future blows the counto was to feel.
1. Clarence H. Haring, "Chilean Polities, 19^0-1^8," Tbe Hispanic jaerican Historical Review, XI, Ho. 1 (February, 1931)»" pp. ^-5.
. Bdwards Vives and Frei Mootalva, o^)^ cit., p. 109» and Sae» »torülej, loc. cit.
3. Correa Frleto, op. cit., p. 75» and Cabero, Chile y los [Chllenoii, op. cit., p. J67. J
• r
«
kl
The t&Lt* of tu« Pre^id«nt had produced their effect a in the Anaed Forces ^ kji'l the Hatloo^l Union» for its ;>»rtf «Iso worked for their istervontion, hut in ü quite different lirection thAß the Preßid^it sl^ht vrl^hi they were untying a teapest which would svecp then '.iruy.
In scitccf hi promifce, Aless.>aari decided to oo »ore than
tttlX to the milit^jry, the body which was to auperviie the polls *t
the March election*. Aleseandri uaed the rsy Supervisors to force
the election of liberal Congreisacn. Of lessÄndrl, , Curtic Wilgua
vritea,
Directing his follower' to break up and disperte the gatherings of thAt opponents, he uade ready to use the .\nBy unc the national police force in hi;: own b^shalf«^
While there M>M to be little evidence to indicate that it w:l^ the
Äilitary intervrentloo which decided the election in favor of the
Liberal Alllaac«, the intervention war foreboding: "... in effect^
the mnea forces ippewid to be controlling the electoral act,
because the Arsiy had beucn laprudeotly silsed up with the oollticsl
fle^tt."3
The pre-el«c*lao speeches to the ailitary ot* Santiago ana the
actual use of the military to «Id the liberal cauue during the voting
1. tdwanls Vlves ind Frei Montnlva, oj^clt,, p. 19 .
.'. Vilguft, Argentina. B^qyil, gad Chile . . ., op. cit.. p. 383« ••• fl^so Correa ihri ;o, op. €^.7"?»'7 »
L 3. Sae» Moraloi, op. cit.» p. 63.
■
drew the kray Into (Olltic/.. Although the 'imy h&c been ap»rt froe
overt Intervention In politice for yeaxE, not*dtb«taniing the sever«*!
planned coup^ ciiocuß^ed above. It \r.tj now dra«miato direct iaterventitsi
by it^ own President; end by hii f.:>ee to it, thv nsgf w*s led to
believe that it held the political }X>ver bfilsaee or vai;, ut lea^t» •
very import»nt political factor. General Suez Morales Rtates,
The officer? were not soon going to forget that if the eimanstanceä dsaaanäed, they wotidu b« ible to go ß© far as to ia^oye -. ,Tii.iVingM sclutlon upon the powers of the State.^
The forcing of th-» silitary into political, aatterd cauüeä thi«
ladt dövository of Btate pewer to becaete a««axe of d political role
it therefore h^d not had. Thia political awareness of the sillteu^i
the »ijor coercive power of the state, unb»lanced the civil political
alignnhsnt of the oay. Given the several crises facing tb*? country in
19 U, this «iwakening, organized, powerful force in Chilean politics
provided the oeans for rapid political c&uige.
Ala the turmoil of the country, cmid the lack of authority, there re»*.ined in Chile only one organized and potent force, that of the jnned institutions.
Considering the background wl social awarenen« of the Azt^r, the new
political awu-reneaa gave it not only the desire, but the ability to
1. Gaez Jtoij-le.-?, op. oit., p. 63.
. C^bero, Chile y io; chileoob, loc. cit. L J
mm
: ^3"
iotervüöc, given th necae^sTjr sptirit. The »p&rk could hare been «ay
COS of sev ral Incidental ths isportant factor v*£ the b-^ckgrou^d,
♦;hr attituue» th- mtizace of Chllo In the ye&r 19 J*.
'
L
^ "I
CH'vPTS» n
THS ROLE OF THE MILIT^RT
FKOW --SPTBÖÄR, 19 ** TO JAÜU^J?!, lyjj
L J
fjWBWWWMWW 1-1-"" -"- I ^ . i iim ^mimnnmmj
'
r
i
I
ujl
In toth houses of the CongreEs elected in March, 19-U, the
Liberal Alliance held a majority; thus, theoretically, thct body vaa
farorable to the President. It must be resnejdsered, hovev.-r, that the
Liberal Mliance was only a quasi-formal grouping of left of center
7'rtlet united in little more thin their opposition to the national
Ohlon. There wae no central governing boo^' of the Allioice, and
little extra-party diacipltne wa^ demanded.
Although thi£ Ccmgresc war elected with the active support of
wlessandri, once in power, it? object of unity—the defeat of the
Rational Union—^e^ gone. Soon the nev Liber".] Congretc could agree
no more than aid its conservative predecessor. The conservative
Congress which held power until March of 19 ^ had purposely obstructed
the I'^T »1 President * 2 legislative program. The liberal Congress in
power after March, 19'^> ^^s composed of self-seeding parties, and
cud not atterjpt to unify to pass the Fre^ident's legislation. The finf.l
2 result of both Congresses was the same: a legislative paralysis.
Pike stetes flatly, "The newly elected Congress proved no more cooper-
3 ative thbn its predecessor.
From March until September, 19-^> Congress did little more than
debate. It wac ülow in passirig money bills, even those for the
Wiigus, ^ge'ntiaa, Brasil, SS Chile, . ., op. cit., p. 383-
. Raring, op. cit.,pp. 5-^.
?. Pike, op. cit., p. 176.
__^ «_™ _, ; „ . ■ -..-yjMUb^W ■ ■■■""-■-■■ >■■■ ■■.IIIHMM
L
paynent of .>uLäu-le.' due. The Jtilitary UJS msll .s th* civil service
»ad pollc*; suffered, •.. their pxy v*t coo-t^otly In arreare. Ibaaex
hiöäelf, coitawkxider of the Cavalry i-cdiool is ^oatii^o, often h^d to borrow
per .oDally fron bunk la order to pay the men of hie ccoMoad. The
governbeot eventually would reueeso hi. notes, but »omtiaes xs mich &e
«ix atoath^ later. tflMfil Bennett, s-eober of the first JuotjL de
CK^biemo^ L »id of the financial situation of the officer*, *. . , they
were owed 'gritificitioRi' fro« y?f*rs before. . .,"
Thin lack of üCtion by the new Ccngress, upon **ich so aaay hopes
had been fixed, further dii»gustea the die effect e
f
f
c
r U7
ID prll of 19 ^1 *ooa after it appeared that the new Coogresa
offered the country no acre than ths eld, Ceoer*! Bennett vae upproacbed
hy in unidentified retired officer who ^ked Bennett if be «"auld help
eh-jige the government. Tht General ;..1J that while be would take no
action uhile 00 active a\zt/, be would certainly consider the request
after retirement. .ecoraing to Bennett, thitt »tame person contacted
other ienlor officer.., al-o unidentified, and received ^n iffirmatlv*
reply from th«a. The general could not otato if there were any
definite relationship between the B»tional Union *nü th retired officer,
though he did admit to thit possibility. vlberto Eow^urd« Vive*, while
not aentioning Bennett or other by najae, loo. t^t»,
Meanwhile, the leaoers of the old Unionist opposition also got in contact with oca« hi^h-raakiag officer- of th« rwdf and H vy, in the hope of putting an end to the existing situation by means of an armed pronunciaiEieoto. 3
Future leaders of several revolts; ^no. former cla^aatitee hela stcetiQ£S
1. Bennett rganddha, op. eit> pp. l£Ul7. ^e roithor Su not been able to detvraine the identitieu of the other officers, although It is not unlikely that General \ltaairano nay have been one of those contacted.
* Jbld., p. &d. 3. lctv.-rdc ?ive«, Lu frooua aritocretica. . ., op. cit,, p. 35. U, Chile, Acttdeaia de Querra, Re»en^ hi^torica de 1^ Ac&deali
defluerra, 1886-1936 (Saatiago de Chilei Institute Geogr'iflcc Militär, I936)♦ According to this publication, the careers of Blanche, Ibanez, «d Orove started similarly. In 191 , ^H three entered the asae class,
«hici; WAB grevduated in 191**• These three were the only aenbers of thf.t das,., to have been sent abroad, Blanche vent to Oermi^ny; Ibanez, to
L3an Salvador; and Grove, filso to Oermany. Set pp. 11^-1 3.
'■ " •' ■»•"—
U6
within the very offlc»^ of the Qeoeril Staff. In theiy B$«tlG^£ the
two officer? ecimautea fftrorably upon the 9CtloQ& of the liber«! juntKj
of Spain of that j-erlod. Kot only were the&e officers not censured for
these aeetlngii, their iCtioo^ were coouooed. There can be little
doubt es to the exletence of iCtive, nearly orert plotting a^^lnet the
Alee-.aÄdri rcglae.
In thi^ ^.tiaoTshere of plots *nä counterplots, legislative
paralyelc, aid overdue public sj-laries, caae the spark, which ist off
the explosion which was to rock Chile for eight ye^rs. The Congress,
which hAö been conpot-ed of the landed and wealthy since the ^aya of
Diego Portules, served without rewuncraticstt. With the election of the
new Coogrest, leas wealthy people entered the two chaasbersi
Perhups in JI «ideavor to win its good will, ":
r
}
r H9
MT«*r.;, ilooi yi^fe » PilU"irisnio (J^a>ao -oEr'B un' f^ncc^no ^olltT- oosocial lbeytv»«ierlc«no)(!»cxicöt MbllöteFa de Kn^Äyon:;"rociolO£lcoa,'
Li^»), ynBr—'— , Bennett .rgaßdoß&, op« cit.» p, 14,
tmMm^^~r~~~r-~^.''''^m**^:-~~~~~-~^J «P|i>l,!J
50 1
ver« to coeci
. . , th» S-pteaber »ovemeot was the work of the yoimc offlccra, pootaneous, iaeallätle, rtpld, aod effecrtlvc, ü it, vs.- the fruit of ycuat aindc -ad yirlle spirita.i
On Septonber 3, 19 i*, th« Coogrtsi» paised th« Dl«t Blli.
according to nua>erou£ sources, sever&l young officera went to th«
Seoate th t very day in tüjticlnatlon of the puse&g« of the bill. '
It */ould appear that '*tiile the appcwrance of allitary officers in
uaifoi-a La the Sen«.te »^ unusual, it w ^ not unprece.ented. The
MM type of vi..it had be«B jfe.de during the adiaini.tr a ion of
Pedro Montt, snd "it ia very possible that thi exoaple stiaulatsd
the officerü to their action in the Senate. Other active Lobbying
had tljw taken place in Chile after the Ncott adainistration. In
ugust, 19 U, a nev waaen'i, oarganisi.tlon, the "Patriotic Unlao of the
Wauen of Chile,' vent to the Chamber of Deputies. In the C&dRbcr
b&lcooii.: they ctaged a protest againat the IAWE of divorce, »«par&tioo
of Church am. State, ud cectariun projects. Alberto Cubero feels that
this suceesifful aeaoabtratioo was the in^^ir^tioo for the officers'
— lt xbid., n. 18. '
. tee, for exvinple, Rippy. Hist ricbl Evolutiar. of Hispanic ^mcrica, loc. f~it.; Bennett rggadoin&i op. cit., pp. 19- 0; Pike, loc. cit.; -vrturo .lessondrt, Rectificuciopeü xj tqjaox(Santiago de Chile» Ireprent^ Univcrflitirin, 19^1), p. ^3; Sdvu"
»
I
r 51 i *,cticÄi em Seyt.-jutär third.1'
Kecor .ÜQf, üC -Y«^*! ; ^ici -Jat .. t ^« d«cl len to fc to the
"»cent's on taptMfewr ^ ». ."a _:»', ;• o- y, Th;re i r-, oa to
b«lieve thi ti> fewer th^a tw« nty offl.'eu^ w*»-..t to t^« Jftn ce on
'.he thixl. \fteT -h« young off 1--;r orgjiai^en however a ijy »3r :
'-ook ; at, U - klagt l tb^ crifln.. off. ■ r. . rr-.it, b»-J no
orpuiiBed b. kinf. \ -ho^eh th fl l«lt to Ih« ea >e * rd I
■ i siv« -o t f i m. -n- irifth th D!*r Bl'l Jhi tdt' fca ■•« in
geaer , rf.. ao»-. .caev,; Ib-;n - ifcor daiaed .t the fir t o » j;\2-i
-.Iseontcnt. tartes: b.foir kiptoÄer thin .n that off 1 • r of th
l:-.cui Mi 11-- n iojtlt^cic^a re hiy ftalo oil; oo the COOK n f, .
*t-jff hoc", of th« Uaittr'i tx e fore« . h rli« - puhli
t.ttBent- vgiin ,. r-h Di>t Bi 1. fkirtber i:iho.-s-h th. utbor '
foun ■ no other proof Ib^Ver. itat it ivc con.; :r ic,. • o 1 ; i JI
RiO" ■.■■ O n P^ jj-.'i. C H.ri-. ur la. !. oftM t tiU -rcol l t
re the inci r. .n th« . "Bit . The roerml lnälc -orii - c tl .p. . . ., o: . -1 .. i - 191.
I
" 52
ti - o ?, 'or- .,cB».-i ■• , uf BilHärv .ncer-.--n-ioa.^
"v oh nc o;Gn onf . ■:. - I .en "n off.'c / a th^
c. c _ C-. .b B ' BlH c^t .£-5. o t .h ;• *lto Rij.py. Hl.torlcv.I gvoiuticn of Hiaputic; An^rlc. i p, cit., p. 37c«
L
, Bennett Artandonr. op. cit.. p. 19; and Rljpj , Hirtcric ü on of Hi^piinic A»crlc^ ioc^ cit.
3. Äinn-.!tt. AygMuSMfti oy. cit., p. 0. J
HMWW"111"" n. mg^nj 'W> '
r 53
had b©«o lovolved at the rei&te iwd gath«reü t iaxge group cf th*.
yconger officert, and th«r« was loud converEatloa. At th t time, the
officers hud little »ottvntlco other thaa to eonqplaln about the Insultt
aufferod at the baad* c£ the ionator«. The Klßi^ter of War vac re-
ceived vlth little courtesy by the group, which aow totalled several
hundred. Ifora Inforoed them thnt the President of the Eenate hfid
a«ked that they be r>«ilähea for t^elr acts. The meeting 1-sted until
nearly «Idalght of Fept^aber 3-'*. Ihe Minister, insulted, bullied, -jad
often i^nor««!, finally stated that he vould not punish any officer
involved.
There were, hmrever, other reasons for the renoval of the
I threat of puai^haent. The of fiel .1 opinion of the high officers, by
the aoming of Septessber U, vaa, if anything, in f-,vor of the -,ct of
the thirc. At th« dally cabinet meeting held on the aoming of
Scpteciber U, General Altaalrano, Inspector Gencrril of the Anay (its
higheat po<lc»), told the cabinet that he WUä frankly in ayBcg>athy 3
with the protest by the officers. General Sacg Mbrale* loo
indicates th..,, a-, e^r*^ as the aoming of the fourth; Prer.ldent
Alcaaandri looked upon the action In the Kencte and the jjubMcqueot
meeting in the Cjab Killtar with favor, sathough «t that time he h^d
I. Correu frieto, OpT^T.', p. ^ .
c. Ibid.
3. Bennett rg^nuon«., op. cit., p.
91 r i n
given it no cfflcl&l support. Sur«Iy hivlag this backlag, both ovwrv
and |«ett| frc» t«o such ixtportsat people, the otficcm ver« in %
flwwblt i?oeitlon vi-.--^-yl:. scy ^ttea^t to dlsclplix« the»,
La^er, duriag the oay of the fourth, I group of sixty officer»
Again went to th« Deatte gallery. This visit to ths Sen&te bad be«c
decided upon the night before by those f thcred at the Club Milit&r.
Thli r.ecoiia vltlt heid tittle objective other than to rtsgia^er the
officers' orotest st their trc.itccnt on the day before and to anpfcaalte
their solicL*rity, Ibc vielt of tht foujrt* f-aded in an uglier aanner
than biid the prtr&SBi dixy's, Ae both the officer:. ;jad the senators
were cencitiv? to each other1.' action, It w-ia not loag befor« insults
were traded: "Sever--! pWMD&l disputes bet%raen Scaatori and offlcerä 3
alco took place in the Senate,"" This tiaje the officers »ere ordereo
by the Pre.:ileat of the Eeonte to leave the gallery, «hich they did
with no little noise.
That aitemooo, after notice of the eaefront-.tioo had be«n given
to all uniti of tha Santiago Otxrison, two aeetiags were l»ld in the
Club Militär. Th« first was a tea offered by the lleutoaants to the
l." »53 BSaraSa] op. clt.., pp. 7^-7%"° j. Dennett Argaaco&a, op. cit«. p. ijö. Mother icconmt ütates
th&t naariy 100 officers went heck to the Senate on the fourtia. lit Kdwamr Vives and frei Montalva, Hiatori.i Je los parti dos. , .. op, clt., p. i;3.
3. tippy, Historical tvolutiqn of Hispanic ^ggrlo^i loc^il.
H, Bennett Argtindona, oy. cit,, pp. ;i- 3.
L J
.I[."I,-««W»JIIIII.IL
#"
f
55 '
CAj^dißs. fhe purpos« of IttU tea v«^ to ^«th«r together ^11 the
y&s&g «a^syay grrid« officf:r;i in oraer to diccuftt the exchange of
insultr of thui »o:mlag. frofc this ffieettng, held at 1300 on dt&m&Hl
kt eftms a ple%e of unity in facing tnt Confiress. While thi^ parti-
dujur ae«tiag produced no perskinaat pl'jn» it was laportsnt, for it was
the first unified public declaration try nay »ilit ry fspoup of a
yositioa vls-a-vl.': the problem of the day.
The second Eieeting, also scheduled for 1300 of the fourth, had
be«n planned hastily after the sixty officers had be«n ordered to leaTfe
tho SoiÄte, This meeting «as planned on the initiative of a
Lieutenant Leio, an officer under the tben Major Ibcnez. Lato uent
telcgr«a&a to each unit calling for the officere, regardless of ieojk,
to meet at the Club Militär that evening. While no copy of the tele-
grata tos been found, It doe^ not se«n unreasonable to -^sunvc that
nigjber authority than Lifutcsr-int Lazo would have been nece^aary for
the other officers--«me oo^ore and Lieutenant colonelj--to have accepted
the invltaticm. There is, however, abeolutely no proof, to the author's
knowleuge, to connect Ibonex with the telegraa. Victor Contrcras Ouzratn
3 beliares, aev^rtheleat, that Ibanes wa.' in the plot fron the beginning.
If thia is so, it »by account for the telegraa'is authority.
l< ifcid.t pt ,3. — ---------
2, Cornea Prieto, op. clt., pp. 33-34. /
[ 3« Contreras 3uaiBan, op, cit«, p. 27,
r ä"1 Thece officers, ace» four hundred strong, oloö aset ftt tbe club.
Inost irandi'iteli', they wer» told h> sorae-one that General Altaair&ao
hid Jcf«nde-J thoa that noralng before the cabinet. Before 1900, th^ l
had decided to send the General an invitctioc to t.ttenti tbe aeeting.
Tiis be Oli, but he tscld little »ore tha« that no one would be iAa&iehed,
and tlvxt he was in ^ympathy with the offlctrs. Soou h/ter he left, the
four hundred, «aong th««uelves, decided that they should request th&t
President ' ic. .-jadri veto the Diet Mil, as it was the lmedl«te cause
of ili.cootent j but they did not «t this tin*» offer any definite profra«
beyonu thiö. But with the insults, a change had come over the groups
2 . . .now it did not .ipeak of '^las' it spoke of 'deaanding'.
There zem to htve been at lea«t thro« aajor reasons for the
ucceas of thiL reeting inü for the officers' having be«! left alone
to plot. First, Piooog the plotting officers thesselves there «as
general ogreenent upon the n««ä for action, although the type of act,loo
was in dispute. Second, there vtre sooe cenior office,; ? «bo, while
taJtins no part in the plot, looked upon any actior
r 57 i
gev« ao loaiCE.tlan, at thtJt, tine, of disapproval, fia.a.I.v, other
EQDlor officers, anoog th.-m Gcüorai öiuiinell, coss&.iMLttr of the
biortlfego Gcariüon, iookeo u;>on the r.4«tjuj£ with iaclfferen^ej "la
r««.llty, ao high officer of the Arny g&ve the »otter the laiportsnce
v;hiGi::it h&d,"' Tneac several attitudes Kay aid in explainiag th«» lack
of ^say force having he«« uued to '&fp lha officert» froo the aeeting
oi the fourth«
&oan after Generul Altanslrujao left the Chxb killtd.rt the news
had be«n. a^de public that '-cc^-thln^ uiiu-u-l V^J> taking place,
hortly hei'orv XX) that i>£jat nl^it, ■ repräsentativ*} fn» Ic^ßanori
went to the ciu.b and oeked that a aelege.tion of officers be eent to
speaJi «ith the Pretid«it.J "The U00" rqpidly selected Ibane« and two
k other officert- to represent then. The neeting, held £.t the
Preiideot's official resilüncc, th? "Hcoea.', took pli-.ee If-te in the
ai^it of k-5 Septeedjcr, To the three officer« .VIeaÄMidri maai- hia
position clear: "If the Arny la with me, I am with the AiT»y. , ,j"
but he left no doubt that he felt Mnaelf in conB^nd as he continued,
"... but do not forgt't th t I already h ve the support of a great
1. gdvards Yivca mm frei fSStSbn] loc. cit.
2, Correa Prieto, loc. cit.
3* Bennett Argasdono, op. cit.» p. £9«
U, Corres. Prieto, op. cit., p, 3$. While the author hut fouud no proof, it 1.-. possible that ooe of th^ other officers w.y have ocen Colonel Blanche.
L. J
I
■
r Mn
L
part of public crplalcw."
It woulc also appear that during this, saeetlog, the President
hiai elf forrailfttfeG the r«fome aad i gearal fftpWi of d«Kicdß for
"the i^OO" of the Club Militär. After the aeeting, Ibnnez wtaie'd that
he (Itsaes) took operatiooal contrcl of the progrsa for the officers. -
Genersl Z*AZ Mor&lCw also states thct It was only after this eaetlng
tha^t Ibanez started r>o talk ibout the nilit ,ry - supporting the ohanges
^.Ich Alcuc^ncrl wanted. Alessandrl al«o atieltB to the aiadlarlty of
his progrsaa -Ma the allltary'a conands:
The petitions or aspirations of the military, aa I have said before end repent aov, itaply correcpond to that fear vhlch the Precideat
*-
e
r a Lc
Talcatei'-ßo for suprort, but wau told thit he Mi alck, Th* jfevy
60
fT^ve no ieajpOi'^c- j«^«fer to either tnquir:'.
Thece rather uncoordlaited att«£^ptc to doairuit« the Situation
indicate naich of the probloE facing the govertBKrtr.. At the very tiue
the FresiOent of the ftepublic wru, telling c. group fron the Club Militär
that he wa- "with thosa," the Head of Cabia«^, Aguirrc Cerde, waa «t»
teesping to ralli' force? to reüirt. It wouli oeaa obviouy that thie
lf^:k of eccBair.ic tion between the two moit Inportant g^vsmacnt flguuree
%RS intentional. Thf. PresMert aew in the njovoaeot an cq?porcunity
to force JJ. of his prrgraa», /Qt he olao felt he couli keep the acr/asesit
under control if then? were no outci^ interference.
Second, ;«d peAapa »ore grave, we.- Aguirre Cerd&'e »tteKpt
to call forces ^gsicat the offlcera. The locus of ccmand authority
wa& apparently e^reoely difficult to e^certain. Jhe two hi^h oanb&t
coBäFaßndere, Altaxalriao an- Dvjrtnell, woula do nothing* The unit COD-
asoders wetre then cootocced, but would not connit th«Melve&f especially
alnce they Isnew their general') backed "the sOO". While the troopc were
in the hftrrack!;, Aguirre Cerd? could find no aethod hy «hich to deploy
the». Further, the amed fbrces appeared to present no united front
at that tlae. Although Aguirre Cerda knew he had little, if any, Anv
rupport, he attempted to contnet the Hflvy to ascertain ita po<laa.
. Caberot Recuerdos dc don Podro Agutrrg CerUtt. OP. cit..90«
L,
Kt it vas, ev«itn raoved too ru^idl^ for hiia to receive ca answer.
this &rotelea of th« indefinite authority IOCUü appears to Iwve e>ieted
duiing the whole period of tureoil.
On the noiTiing of ßeptentoer 5» Ibanez held a sa«eting of selected
offirare, each of w»ior represented a specific unit, in the Cavalry
1 ^ School of which he va^ the ccomaader* At that iseeting Ibanez outlinea
the prograa 'Aic* the President haa Mxggeste^d. The prograa wua stated
unofficially as being!
1. refoana the Ccoatitution of 1 33 to eliminate the Parlia-
mentary cyatjai;
t« veto the cougreasionul ualcry bill, or Diet Li.v;"
f 3« ineredce the pay of the Aray, S^vy, end police;
4, pay theae bodies the back sal&riee due thexa;
3* proniae Congreualocal p^üsa^e of oth.-r outstanding
legialatioo.
Iban^z ordered Lieutenant L*&o to notify key units throughout the ■a
country revest log their pledge to uupport tht* progroa.J T* ^ec from
this meeting that sn «nbryonie organization »^aerged. This; group was
the first tc notify the units outnide of Sarrti4*$o of the occurrences
in the c&vitsl, and it was the ./icleua of the later powerful JUnta
1. Corr^fi Prleto, loc, cit»
, Haring loc. cit.
3, S&ez Mort&les, loc, cit*
t
r 62"1
Militär. The group also c&lled for naathur meeting at tt* Clufc
.Mllllar later in th*? dvy. The several rspreatntatlves notiflecl their
•nit aaö each unit aent üJO. t of it.-, officers to the Gluh Mlllty.
Thli i^cood meeting of Se^teaher 5 vac probably one of the aosrt
ijEportaot one: of the crldls. Use first order of buaiaee« vaztxt the
four hundred offlcer3 of the QXTTIUOQ to appoint a ^jufita to represent
then In «11 official rolatlorrhipc vrith the govenuBsat, The aeabers
elected to the Junti wer« the following}
Coraasnding Generfil of Fa. ces I,! Sentla^oi (Jener*! fedro D?jrtaell Sf.Ty: Coennnder DIt born and CaBBKOde- Ocevedo Ocncr-I Stafft CoBMsnder Uraculio Military S>chool: Colonel Ahuoed^ and Lieut «»suit Bravo Cftrafcincros 1 Coraaancler Swing «ii- Captain Fenner davalry School I Major Ibanez and Lieutene^act I^so War Acciatfnyt Lieut edaxxt Calvo RegiB>ent of Bain: M;:.,or Canales ^Sinvcr.t, of Pudetot Mbjoor Mujipa anl Crptiin A^uirre Reglatent; of Vcddivlai Vt^or Dl^z Regliaect of Teleg3npk«;r ; Ccntumdcr Sallnae Li^ht Infantry iV^linsat. > Camander Blanche and Capte.in Cabreru B , iT-.nt. of Tacnn,! Majctr Pugt / Mcuote . Groupt Major Viou , Captain Va.quer. Lieutenant Urlzar Mountain Group 1 Major (Sraaset Andeac Botallicni Major del Fozo .
«cretory of the Juntat C&pt&in Moreno.
It U important to note the ranks of thoce elected to the junta.
With the exception of General Dartnell and Colonel AhumadD.nor of the
officer \mu hl^er than Copg43'^ Mb^ii Ait«dr^> '-waa neror 11 uted »s a BMrnb«? 0? the ^unta Mjlltar.
r
•
63 ^ .dditlouftlly, cv«ry a^jor unit of the ß-ntltgo Oarriüon, locludint th«
l^iry, MM repreitsatea. 3t»« junta gave jeveral ladlcetions of being o
poiiticU. grouping of Bllitary afn, Ihe distribution *,;:? rsaik was
clo»ei^ pre iortiooftl to the iBsportonce of the participation of U»
variouc ranJw in the evaftt« leading t') the crisis. The unit reproren-
tstion, on the other hroiu, eaj^iajiseü the several repocitoricü of
ejoftd strength, not the officers in thaa per tc. Tin. , it wouici appefjr,
the Junta reprcßentcü the intereete of the v*x-otu rank groupings bnd
thekttereüts of the cenpooente of the Garrison, acnteVh&t in toe taanner
of a bicaoeral dccirion-ia&king organ is at ion. Bvid.
L ' J
6k i
the stability of the Ixecutlrc.
It wowl. appear that the ttassbership of the Clftj) ^ilitar» politically,
was not dlielnlLar to the nation?! Coogreae, except thet the UOOT
agreed upon desiring ""..ctlco" of one type of another.
The second major hueinces o
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