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i92*-ige3

■ MstcrtatiOB 8utettt«d to tb« yaeulfey of the

Cmduat« School of Qoomgvtoim Bblverslty in portlal ftilllllaoat of the requimasts tor the dugrM of

14 .£«8 Cf OfB

liciKjd Ctooargc Vogr«, B. 8«

Wudtilngtoo, 9. C.

no P'

-—! ^

JUN 2 11965

TteMi 8

iFi(J;2IS?[^ ifö"« ^SK^l m

Emmm mf

r

fhls th« Is 1«, Is Iftrge a^&eurtj th« peault of tho Insi&t

and kncwladfe of *r. «Ria«at ^etia «Nirio9ttl«t and lAspirlac te^dwr,

Fpef«fc&or ¥1111.« 1. Maoger. fhe thesis grsw frcn dlsetuslmc k«U la a

sMdaAr on totlo «trie«« pwr—Bfci and politics cooaueted by

9r« Haafsr. It 1. to hi. «xc«IXflat t.«iehln£, patient gul^loine, sod

out his aid, auggeJtlons, sa.i crltlclm.«, thi;^ p^per could aot har«

b#CQ IfTlitWB.

lh« author Is also gr«fly lnaäfat«d to Frofitsaor Utis I.

gullar-LAoa \toa häj r«aä the p«ptr JV nho, throat bin vt^st knavled^e

of the source naterl^l, directed mich of the research. Rla help jad

•drlee hare direct\y rootrltated to the aocoraogr of the final thesix.

■ further debt Is owed to Mlfik velln- K. j^eagaa «ho typed

aad edited the final cople of the thesis. To the Qhited Stetes Air Tore« Üastltute of Techoolocr a

opecial miawiAtdi—H is ätM» The Ueltei firteteo ilr Force aad the

In tltute provided the foodi. oad the even MOT« Ijepoartaat «lanenct, tlan»

so that the tcahor aic^it pureue hie graduate It idles«

Probably the Boat iaportaat statanut of «r Aitud« Is due the

author's wife, Beadra, «bo typed all drafts of the werk aad «ho read,

edited, aad re-read the paper thrrutfi the flaal edition.

fiaally, a viorc ooocminc the aecliaaies of the thesis is la

order. All traaelatioac free the fipaaiah are by the author. For these

Mbz'eaclatiaaa us for all oattera of factual coetect the author aust aocept,

taXX reapoBeibilityt aay errors are his.

-iU-

IT

fAJts or

PRIFCB lit

x. ICWBBPI of nraonw i

BM Folltlc I uad social Back^rooDd DM Military BMSkcramd fhe fhm >tvol-^ iaaary Uws.äaadi'l Ira

n. es KOZ or ss NZUTAST mm s»ns«B 192^ TO JftJW «T 192!: U*

m. m BD12 or SB xoKAfflf B m nmn or ?9S2t AB —WOP or jjjwgri w ■Brav or AUK jntii

US

151

v

r r n

CE^FiTÄ I

^CK-.;poünDs OF REVoumai

J

2

1 The Political ^o Social Bacicgronrid

eveotj; of 19 ^ and earlj 19-5 were a ssrles of conplex inter-

actloxu? vblch hftd their roots not only in the conteoporary political

.ltu:tion, but alao in the Chilean pact, In the civil war of 1391.

To understand the eituation in 19-^ roquircG an exanin.-.tico of tho

acc«coic, soci;-!, and political aitualari of the entire era. Ibe

B-uccesüive coupt d'etat were nod caused nerely hy a few yuung army 1

officer who rrttled their sabers in the Senate sod-lG^les; rathei,

they were the result of a long ^oriea of irritcclone ./ithin the

tot'd life of Chile.

Praa the jconoaic viejwpoint, lille's internal ccoacoy was

clocely tied to itr, errport;: of copper and nltratee. Proci 1350 to

Ld8Q Cliile mi tlie VAorld'« largest producer of copper, and the

duties laid upon thi« product accounted for iroßt of ito govcmeaastal

flaacce. With victory over Peru end Bolivls- in the War of the

I, The fir.Tt overt incident which finally culninnted In the coup d'et .t of CeptQri>er, 19'-^ i wis the ritt ling of sabers by young Amy offloeri» aeated in the visitors • gallery of the Senate, So« Ju^n fefolü] Bcimett A^rgandon^J, It* rgvolaci^n del ^ de setioBbre dc 19:?^ (SHntiago de aiile: Bulccll^ E Co. Kdltore;,, I)3^U F. 1^. fhT-partlcular incident was, of course, but ■ spAric wfiich Tgn^ted »in alreaöy e;^l^aive eituj>tion.

. George Wyth«, InAiatr^ in U^tin '»Cigrica (Hew York: Coluabia UolveiT.ity Preis, 1^5), p. 101,

L J

-#

*

r 3 n P Tlfic, Chile .cciiir-: .h -. c niv- -. fl : . ' ich

ihi |iiOi«0 BMAUA -: of nit. rti)ii;?r. in i'icultur«, md i t

rf nitr b« in the a aiufi-.cture of OMtelc S der, t

resource i-oon BO m Chile' ding opert* F. HI

to I 05, Chile.ox ritr vt ort I si C,000,000 er |

In 19X3 Chil • MgpU -. MsrM*« nitr .t . ol -jn

r i. sifl nc^i, in 191^i to ;iu.- or , of the cot

povemaeni receipt:; of Df3C . ? aog borllsg, £ ,. 6,1 «ua

terlin. 1 totirod fror: 1 port lusy on nitric •. 3

With the fcdnaL of World Mur I, -nu fch'.j enomou-> rar^ui

for nitr t-. in the produ^uioii cf osiokele-^a Ywiior, Chiloa« ;;ro- k

"ition res-, it bi^;. rlovcwr, BOM wo- whicr,

hnwy daiadi c« the nitr .t-. industry e .rried vith it the r

i i*r for the Cfcilt n ecopcry. In "om-Jiy, tbö hrselcinent of %

urocijo for the c^e&p coraat.rci 1 * c. :>;lon of Aitr^te fror, ilr

fbrcc. voro cutback in Ciiilam rrcauefcioti. In I Chil«

1. ifbi;. 1 »1 1 1

. Ibid., p. 193.

3. J. sott Keltic (ed.), Th: ^-^r^^' '^^ rbooteCLou iont MRO .ill .n md Cc., Limited, iniu), p. 750.

♦ , By 1 ;i6 Chile • 1 recor ,9^1,^ if.tric ton^ of nitr.it Ob. J. tcott Keltie (od.), Th .ia^'., '*■ rbooi-- (Lontcioni aucr.illJi .n'. Co.» Li itod, p. 735.

L J

I- 1, ">

1 exporteJ odly 303,961 actric tour of nitrate. A:, a rerult,

... depresslco had hit hwuly as early as 19^0, In the affceraath of

World War I. When the critic«-J. rplr^tiocshlp betw.ren sdneral

9:q>c^tE, or vorld detaand for these products, ;«c' Thlie's Internal

revenue, up to ÖTJJ of vtlch case free nJiier .1 dutlec, Is considered,

It li not difficult to understend the i^portanec of the induction in

üemeiiU c 4X20

r r 5 1

Within tho JS.WL of tho rice of f.Lliag •sn^loynent jtu ri ing

Li.-in« costs were CLUJ^tt nvjay of the lover c: . Of tlut er:.,

Bfailio Ro^rigaes ML lo , . "IXa-inc th-t i:rioi, th trx-

WäB heavy MB i ....c ..; ttd oa co inothcr, the crL*-:. eoanlattd.8

■Ml ihe CJiilc r. worker i- il .-.oci.il legislation mi rr/en ;cinc •iMMttty

for» of .oci..l security, or had the unrciiiiiiiiln Incc the civil n

dhowu Hf interest it ^11 in th f-ce at ch city-dwelling ucrhin.

CIUTB, it ic -ocßiblc th .t ev-en the ;.roblcai cf &h. „1 z.-aa..

nitrate lo&t . rising living co :t could hrvvp been solveü without

r-i ic J .oci.,1 upheaval. Such, how.-ver, I not th.. -J ..je.

Hitlwwillyj ;h'; vrcsüures of urt nl tlo« grarth i.hc

condition- of the city dmlltr .•ven cor:. unK r.tle, Vfhil: frocj

1370 to 1950 th, tot 1 -.c-jul.tior. of Chila mor« thna vioublea, th;

rur .i .-«c-Tulitlcsn ren-in.^ fi ; ..', to " incro-s^ ooouiTtta in the

cities,

ccording tc -jociologi >t Cuillenx Foliu Crui:, by the t .rt of

the twentieth century, '' . self-.—iscrti'vir. revoluticxiiiy w/.v? trlou to

find an oquilibrJUir. in the equ;iliz ^-ion of cl «MO« ' Moüt of the

1. v/vilio/ RcKlrljju^-r. Moniloa^., EL gol^- S '•'^^yi g 1/ ^ ( Mia^i de Chile: ftHclfl—■ frcllla, 1930;» p. 10%

. Pretiton E. Jtseeu, Latin rocric-: (3u td« rev.; Nc\; Yorks The Oiy.scy PrccsS, I999)i P«

3. Twillcnao Fcliu Cruz, "L* r/ui.uclon politic k, rconfariio.x, y social de Chile," Aal- -1: Vni-.•or.■ i--•: .o Ct.ilc., CXVUl, No. 119 (mercer trine;;tre de 1960), '. .

L J

r e "i

i'rportint political peurttM« howerer, toofe little notice of this new

•entla)*.nt. HH CoriaervativG Party In 1901,

. . . believed th.t It coul;l put Itself in the forefront vlth so sv-ny l^'rlc-il phr-eea» of souncL Insplr^tloo, ani truly Chrlücl JI—but ineffective to rectr-.lü the brutal reality of the cl mh of

ither did the Radical Porty tie an ^cti/o Lntcreat in the affaire

oi the lower tlasM . It vo.^ not until 1910 that thü Llbcr-1 Party

nade an unrucce&ifal ctter5>t to call for "Permanent Cocmlttees of

Workers" In fr4Ctoriec erf I'pO or rjore amployo«^,,^

There were, however,, ran.? jxjtles vhlch attflEptc . to appeal to

the working Slaw». The Partl^lo Be&oeratlco vris forme!" as ^ dis-

affected branch of thn Liber.O. P Jty In 188?. Itu specific role wae

to spo dt for th worklnr cl&sat

It fell to the Partido ggggcggtice to be the true organizer of the vorlcin* ißaßf.',s, the p^rty viliich, for th'v firet tiae, awcÄenci in tlKtu

i SlMfl conGcloutnetfc, one which wae the pre- cursor of social legi£l:tion. k

I. Ibid.

. Ibid». '. :5.

• fblf-» > P« -'l«

k, Ibl ., p, 60.

I J

r TH

^lao speaking for the workers v^s the p-jtido Foci-ligi ^ SSPSBl

fotsn^ed in 191 by Jjxi: Ecdllc Recubirren. Thia party becone uh 1

CcnrxKilEt Party In 19.1.' It «Ma in botn fozns, «trtlve aaioag the

nitrste warkcr^ of the north. I*y the end of World W^r I, those

parties which ootuitec any vcwrtter eupport were thr following:

Pi-^iöo Bocl:-.li2t -. ^rr^, nitrate workers', P xtido DepCTiXico,

coal ninsrs and «it>- artiüfuas; ^nd Partilo R&dicalt white eoUUtr

alddle claf.;.

The pclitical rJfill-.c ioa rarely jatitfied the necU JIC de-

mands erf the vaxiou.; wort.ins groups, however. Frora the be£:iaatn; of

the tv.xsntieth -untury, many infom«! trade groups held open public

meeting: throughout the country. The city tftiMBi of S mtiago held

open 2SQ€t3ng£ ^nd put their protleas before the public. Other ribing

groups wore doing the seme thrca^out Chile:. BM nitrate workere, the

co>l niners, the longrhorenen, the r llvorkars, ^nd the factory

workers each btaided togeth'.-r tn iiifomcl or^oni? tions. By the tint

of tho poctvr.j nitrate crisis, "everel cf these -lüsociatiocij had been

formed: La A^ar^JlcH Obrere .e '-J-l^^nt iz.i'x: Xacloa?^ th^ Fedoracion

Obrera de vThilc ruid the Intemtlon-oJ Workerc of the World (IMW)

Hegion C^iilen.. These quasi-orgenised grewpe halped give body to UM

1. Robert J. Mexander, Conauaian in Lain ja ..ric . Brunj^fick, Hew Jcr...y: Rutgers University nres«, 1?57), • iT7.

. Robert J. le\sinder, Pro .rv'~- 01' .he H^x.'-olu.tion (Ncv LYor'a The Ifcuarll] n Canpjay, 1'/ ";, u. jf>. -J

-■

8 "1 I

otherviif hctorogeneous working groups.

M.v.i in the v-jaguard of thif. "ne-. social revolution" «ras the

Fe^or'^cioo >lg EPtudiantc.-, d: Chil: (FECj-). The FECK went into the work-

•re districts to educ,.tc the aftecey,

Cloaely allied witn toci JJ^t, ^ümrehist, and Syn.iic .Hat labor nov-oaents ac wtM aa the leftist v/intja of the I.iboral and Radlcol Partisr., rtudeatc plunged into i caE^aign of -rolonr - git'.tioc for aociiil sxid political refora.

While these org-mi^tlonE jnd party affiliation- ^ppear to be

rather ia^ortant, in reality they hüd little or no actual voice in the

nsfciocuil or local govertaaents md couli not obtain even dtai— e0*^3

foj* the workers. The one aetho-": throu^i ^diicfa the working man gained

the little he did «M the ctrlke. Befor-: World Wrjr I the orkers had

been -xor:u.ioGlly organized, and hundreds ware killed in strikes .-.gainst

eErploy^ • In 1903 in Valparaiso, the ^j^y shot and killed thirty

c-triker;. mA left taore than 200 woundcti. In October, 19C5, taore were

killed in Santiago. On Febni^ry 6, 1906, and again in 1907, acre were

killed .and woundoci in AnteIVigosta .nd Iquique, respectively. In Iquique

1. BXTC Coror., op. cit., pp. 51-^3.

. Prrgak Bonili-, "Tho Bbwlmtt Fe -r.;icai of Chil^: 50 Ye-rc of Politic .1 '.Cvlon," Joum 1. of Inter- ^eric.i Studier., II, No. 3 (July, 1'XO), p. 31-.

_. lit ndcr, Prcr-h'Tt- of thi' Revolution . . . , op, cit.,

L

r 9 -i the troops kiUeci -OOO strikers Jto had bean herded Into the bullring.

Bafcales in 1919 and Ifeifallanes in 19 0 aleo Buffered the reprc^icn of

strikes. In Hatixlec, WtKB of the strack workers were burned alive

^exunples."

In • single year, 1903, there were tventy-nine aiojor trtrikei:

throu^iout the exxmtry. In Santiago there were eleven; Antof ^gasta,

three; Coacepciow, three; the co^l ainlnf? rci^Lon, three; JUG there

were nine centers which suffered one strike each. SOCK* OutQOO people

were Involved in these ntrikec.^

Kith the ßuecess of the Rosai-a Revoluclon, the workers got yfc t

they taeri theretofore lacked: a successful ideolo^ which told than

they were Mrvwfe in their actions find which Justified their

ü-cri*lce: "The word 'soviet' IHM i raogical prestige." The

revolutionary oad rtdica.1 'Erkers' | , "«t»lch had increased to 100

newspapers und R«ga*ine6 since the beginning of the century, kept

Tllve the desire for radical change ^m the Bpirit of disgiisrt with

1. vlberto Eivi'.nii, Vivr Eduar-io Frol Hcmtalv-, Kistori de XQ.}. p.jti;o^ ;.'Ollticos ehll.ao (s^ntlitjo de Chile; E.litovl-] lei P^cifico ". ., l'^9), "P. ir'::-155.

. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p« 6?.

3. ^."^ti P» ^ •

h. Jorge Barrlu CerCTi, ''Chile. U-. cue^tion polftica. y -oci.l cm 19 0-19 6,' n-lo^ ^1. '. alv.-r.-ld ul cu C]iile, CXVII, No. Il6 (cuvirto triMtztrr j jjc./ de O^)» p. ?•

L J

I

r M n 1C the goverrtaent. It ir; pVsMhljf ütfli(?ult to over«ertl3»t« the

la^JortoaTce of the positiv? prograc of Crrauniaan. Acaj-cho-

syadlcalias, .lthou0i radical, offered essentially a negative

progrrar. foreign to all of the countty*^ poiiticOL eirperience,

Cocialidci or Pntiisn .'.ocitUac for a country in vhich hundreds of

vorkere were >.llle. ■■nlly t:e«Bi3d to offer little to the hungry

roto.

In spite of this fercierrt, the eovcrnDßnt chovad little sym*

pathy fear tht vorkfersj xs •, tKittor of f rt, it generally r?prc-roed

MB« Although In 191? the goverrHaent had be«n force- to dvjclaro

i state of siege rmd banish syn la lid; leaders to rgraotc part:, of

the coiaury, in hie laj?t presi.leotial nessage of 19-0 Precidant

Sanfucntea aaid not ningle vord about the social upher-Tal vlthln

Child The vhole situation setess well suaniarized by •Xiillcrtao feliu

Crus:

rhc peace intro&iced by the parlionentary reglnc iiüdained, %-ith ccEipl^te indifference, to worry e.bout social problenr which accvuaul «teu one upon another, each one with r»ro gravity, in the congrenaional rjrchlvei.

• Ibid.. . 5^»

.

r

i

*

n 1

For the wcrking class, then, the ecotiajitloo of i döcllnixie

external aorket for the Eoct inportnat product o' Cbil* -jncl a rising

cost of IlAdag crented on ^tsJO£|Äterc of discontent. The fl«nc;> of

thl* oiccontoBt, fjanod not only by I public .pnthy, but .vorre, by a

Tjublic aitipithy, had b«en gro**ing sluce 1000. The support given the

•vaarkin:' claseec by the virioun radlc.il netrsoaperr. idc i in Xeeping

olive their belief in their •altlnate trivasah. It vr»s, hovvever, the

victory of Coaraunian in Husaia -Aich «idöel ;n ideological base to

the growing dlocctxteot.

A strong, active, imgin-'-tive centra epYzraaatA. night h--ve been

able to cope tfith th; vroblaa." fteittl "hile, but I gcr/emDent such

the country h^d kno«n since 1 ItselJ' totally inc-p^blc or

unvlillrig to jncer into the cl'.sn ctru^le:

What ^dured Intact coring the period fror. L to 19-0 vu. DO•-..•. ii co Sncin ., "El im^blo chil^o h .1 illO y lo: raafrot OitfdiB ie au ex-olucioi jxslftic - / econdt-lc^ h r ' 0," n Ic te I.-. Unlver i l-v uv Cbilo, CXVIZX, 5o. llr> (t«rs«r tnn.s^rc

de 1 *-0), r. -3.

■—Si

r I ~

*ithin th ■ c;.i • •T-r-liv • -rclsed by the 1—. 1

tr P.C-U rich of aili^ing Jiü njiuf ccurlng. The neaob^r. of tb*»

^Cftfer houi.., zh ChMtbzr of P'»put!es, ser. : four yiMTg, r.

(or ■.'r/e: "tght y^ r .

Th Coogr^ , in . riitlon co boing con. rv-tiv. in n fi cf

change, baa two oth'-r failt .hieb lYui'.r t< iljnost »11

^ectcr of "rl a oeicty« Fir-.o, the Cooer««e «rfl rcr? .JI orpanl-

z rirxi for -b u-^ tbaa une for ' ., r. • legislation. For

le, ijf/rae;.ul ;.t:ly alter the defr-it of ExTmactcl - in 1391, ft lav

r ' bott«ia| i ui intro-uc,:' into the CngMSS« Th« nrop-oüed

legirl tic . bx. , for n< wr3y 1 t^.j^n yea-r;., until 1906, Oßly

-ft r UM . trike of 1905 in .c tafel ro - ih bill pM*

I'wib-r i333, on • i-y 0, 1> .

In^9.09 th.^re VM ta^roteocd into 6lM Congress bill regarding

cing jcci • ai . .ith the bill on housing, tM .ebuted

1. Willi JIB Lytlo 'churz, "Gov^mBient," in Iho Svolu^ion of L tin rh;ric-.ji Ckyytrnmc-nt, .. \Eher K. Ctei«ten?en 1 ■ YorK:

Corr, .r;y, lol), pp. 3-33. Se« al&o Charlef; A. Thanu,on, "Chlls :truggl.>. for Nutionii Beoovery," For*iga Policy Report , DC, No. 5 (February Ik, 193:»), p. '> ; ad u tin ?. McPonlJ, L.tin R'irie n Politic.:, uaa tkyvcrnracnt (Ntv York: ThonaB Y. Crowe 11 Caaip«iny,

1:"^), p. 9 .

. Luis Corre^i Pr-'eto, El ^rei'cnt. Tbin^zj I politico y !o.. polftlcofc (ß ntiiigo de Chii : '-ItcriGl Oibt, [jl ), p« 5?.

i.c 'chuxi, or.. cit.t p. 9.

3. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p. 63.

L

f r U"!

sporadically until it : Ln .lly p Mad in H?6, eight yo^ns after

it; intro-aictioc. In 1919, - ■! I «Hi • ioo %«a» fonawi by th-

Congres:' to -^uiy th'. need for JJC impast of legisl-ition throughout

the country. This cocifJ.tt':e Mt intertsittently until 19 1, «her it

w»« difctolvoc vlthout having ^ccanrt>li n^ anything.' One CRU^ for

sadb an unproiuctivc recor., rcorüng to the hijtori^n ancin?!,

that although tb Clsiie-Ji Congress v:.s a pArliiotent-ry be y, th

* .J* si cocplete l^k of x>arty diiciplln^ v.-ithln the sevej^xl r.-irci^ .

In a nulti-pi-rty purli^r^nt^ry leKi-i.ture such lack of 'Jii-ciplin:

»ide it nearly iEpoiiCibl^ to p-.s .nything of import J. ■ .

Proc that tlEJ/l8yi7 for. .r , vlutocr.cy con- nollrtitufl it fTontrol of yarli—>tj m while it revs Hoc in Itö pover, nev soeiaJ force- rtch-r ctrength in the sh^-do i .

The zocoai rujor f-ult of the Co; ■ it dao t eoiifltaiit

interference in the affaire of the executive branch. The- congretssionvl

victory in the civil Mr est^bliuhed th t th' Prefci tent'. c „bin-t rcvl"

1.Ibic«, p. 65.

3. By th^ tu*n oi' the century there *r»irp .1 Least eiy well- te fine'. n^iep. ?ee Schurs, loc. cit.

U. ESncin-^, op. cit., p. !vl; mi "Mberto Cabero, R?cu' r 3 ■ dort P'-iro 'g^lrr.: C;rda (Sarti ^o e (."hilrt: laprent t B&selaiMtO|

19^8), p. 5^

5. Feliu Cruz, op. cit., p.75.

L J

W in

tt-I ir; office ooly *0 looc U it esvjüyed the confidence of tb*1

It wpe] rsear thct „fter the civil v.r, congreüsiooal

iioapproval of c -bincti; incr ^hrj-rly. ' coctpxrijotx of govem-

aenu JL crimes in pr^-civll v r end pc T.-civi] v j- ;«3Einiatratic»s

in.ü('.atec the inst djillty of the pott "HW cabinet :

Pre-Clvil W-j Cabiaats

ov.mnrni. Master of Cftblaots Kunbej- of Mtnittc

Priet. (131-' il) h I- ftOim (l^il-l .-51) 5 15 Jfc^f: (105^-13611 5 16 Per«^ (1361-1371)

.v rtu (1571-1B76) U Pinto (137^-1^1) 6 1

Maria (13 3) _5 1^ 3 109

S Po.Tt-Clvli tf..r Cibineta

-.L-n^edi (1S86-1B91) lb Jor|e Montt( 1391-1:: 10 Err zurin EchJAirren

(l8s/>-1901) 17 Riejco (i:)01-I906) 17 Pedro ^!0i^tt (l406-191C) U

T03 Luco (1Q10-I91t>) 15 f^nfuout'.:^ (1915-19 0) 15 •leüGondri (19 0-19 k) 0 71

1.1 Tfr

%

Br I

u. 1. uncjLn",' loc. eit./juad ^ Cxirtia Wllgur (^..)? ^-^eqtin^ jr ^il3 .tid Chile gin-x IIJ Ivyc-accnGo (W^diingtoc, D. C: The George " -iingbon ÜTii ari ity Rrw , 1 '35), pp. 357-36^;.

. Feliu Cruz, op. cifc»» ?. 76, It nhoulc be noteU that in their book dealing, with tlTa" Chilean pclltic-vl pjrtioa, Edwjpas snd Frei ütifce th^-t there were 1.1 ceünuts fuia 5j0 minicterü. The dif-

, ferenco U probibly ittribut;ü)le to the fiurt. that aooie rdnißtor/: served L«ore than one tiae, Se« Edwrird- Vljre;. JIA frei Mont^Lva, op. cit., _J pp, 1^135.

15 1

I

7h . of ptfty eoh^iiion ia Iso iUutcrfttevi In tho

-iltioo of cabinet« mä tdni • Ol to IT; .

"-1 of C fcbi. ■ ■ .

Llbor z: 70 £vli«?ÄCc.l:tas it6

Icnali^ U Rudlevies o Com^rviidoreB 1 0 l>aBocr:'.'. 0 6

During the jfman VUSme con^idGration, KhtM ui. group^ shifted

-lliauces ofton L . . ayu 1 yr. $ MMK« 5 <

. yr. U rxi^. 3 ^iy:- 1 :— . ?■ nor .

With Buch a rapid succession of govemnent- between 1591 ^

k ( Ji «sverige of more thtn three c vbinfitc per year), it was

dlfflnilt for the executive branch to naXe riny oroV". -ult on

social or ny other nroblapui. It haß been Mid th.-t there were

minister« who, h.iving trJcen their o-ithü of office in the morning,

lost their poat- in th or the Ch acsbcr of Deputie:. in th^

L 1. Feliu Cruz, or-., cit., p. 7?.

. Ibid. J

t

^ "I -

•»noon of ehe ■ fS

>re e i 1 la" . >; by ch' en; of th«

nfv . Loe» bb« I r ocrii ion, th-oust.ou!;

" of • < . of .;. i 1

liilc 1 b akn rtcy of th^' ; rliMMB ■■ cov-i-nasenc. Li-:U h

e /nrough the Con- I ft) -• UfBtlft] ■ItWiil, ri vh^- lie tie

; • l/e w ■ Uy rel -1 ely i:nJj:r

Ihc c^oev 1 i ffltetion, ra nife t in part by trikc , -o.'.l . only

o phec within Chile Äich infeciei ne rly All of ociety,

in Lu • o Eilliti.y.

1. Ibl ■. r. 76. Hater, on.r-r '-am'n. In hi book i ^cor I :lc- * oini • ?ion Ib»Äet (?sfltlt«o !« C%llet Ir.r'-in

T5" 1 ' T- . » *ere c bin b T'll bee e • .' ait&r of . wlni -'-y o "hool. te eter w i pie e- vl'h ic.

r r h ; i r :

L _J

- -— -* - ■■ ■ r,. ■" ■ '

r

i

17

The Klllviry oXcroimJ

' t-for« H v Chll«? V mc.1 fore li I - f .t;«i * r'-cor: of pc]i;i.il

nor-ln e'-'.^ntlon 'r. profe: ionl ooapeianc» of ahich ny eoun.r/ ccril •

b« prcuf?. Pb« Infu ton of thes»? ^nlrible qualltl» n i •. I«i i

ibo«it %8 It of ■ cooblaation of people ftiwS ■mbi vhicb Influence'

th- Oiilein raill: ry IVCB it ue.iniir,,- . Kv«» curing the • of

Indepeni'ence, the ^ilein experience •' ooewhat different than tr

of other L tin Jöeiictin !nlli*arit: . rh2 juoyt Inport^ut difr'^ronce w

the leading role of r. power, «hl

r 18 ~i

under Lc-• ' ocbr vn? * In ' •TiBenr.Hl In falnlcg: the f In a Tic o i .i

« i rer» 011 to belier* that none of the th ^e r.rJa -y IMAV

of ihc IndtpenJence movonent, neither £ n Martifi, C'Kiggin , nor

rochr^n-», w a of the c u-lillc rAnt-li y. of tb« «ilik.ajry5 'fin Martin

hia. .'If H m^l, "The presence of * fortuaate soldier iü daagerou. to

* newly con iiute.i scat»." eneral C'Hi^- || . fcer reBi.g?ii~ e

he-.d of täte in l8 3» retired to Perv «md sade no overt *ttcapt to

return to power. Finally, .ccor : '-.o Worcester, ". . .Cochraae :■«-

füneü to b«cCBÄ eiabroile.l in parti n polities," ?hu', of the three

esrly mllii-ry letder , none attejnpted to h ■a hi. forces to subvert ehe

;pvernraent. Bteia Lleuven ittributa» Latin 'jnerican caujilli.sBro

•o ^he Billt«nr*l ■:•■ 'vnp:ioa of powe- *i; the jjadftr .hip yicuu» left

Ly -.he e p.1 ion of :he Spaalsli« If tbl? naly i ifl coi-recc, then

n rticultrly ignificinc for :h- future politic l-nilitary

1. Donald E, Worce .vier, 0'«5 Po»«'r inrt Chilean Independence ( irr- .ill*-, 7Iorli.j rniver^ity of Flo Ida Pre^s, IOC ■. TiT •'omplete book gives ; det lileö Account of -lie role which uhe patriot nv/y pi ye > in the fin.l victo-y of ehe for independence fraB Op win. Ni vl o eorge PvnJel, The Laid md People of O.ile (ixsndon;

Chi le ".a ck, 1-960), p. sO.

. Michael 1 rd, r>olJ.i*rr &nd ovemment : Win-- "tu^itK in Civil-Milit:'r-y t>el cion Tlöndon: Eyre rpOT-t! wood, 1957), 0.1^57.

3. Wil^a , Ajgeotin:, n^.il> qd Thil» . . ., op. cit., p, 97«

k. Worcs^te-, op. cit., p. 77.

5. Sdvin Lleuwen, "The Ch ngin? Role of the Tülitary in Latin Sjrm la . Journal of Inter- riericji f>tt;c>i'.'., Ill, Ho. k (Oetobe-, W€i), p. 55c7 -J

relationship of Chile that tb«ee thre« potoctial caudilloc reaoyed

r«K«lTe- frca» power.

Vhlle ttw f'axxi- early le&dcrs vwtre not of the caudillo Bent&lity,

there were ncme lesser leader:: Ao were. During the peri&i of diaorder

l*^tinf fro» i9l8 to iSSO, Chile h d five coo titutloos, and was in

a con:*tint «tüte of conflict bettttn liberal: (pipiolos) and

ccm-ervitives (pclncooeg). It ir-s fin IXv the victory of the cooser-

rstive forces led by "enentl Joaquln Prieto over the libsr^l force«

^iich put the control of the Chlle-vn governaeot into the htnd^ of

Diego Portalen. The ejurly years of the Port aloe Ccrferoasent were

orlticil in Ibrther daveloplng the ailitar/'ü relationship to politics.

'ieneral Prieto'r victory» ^sils in^uriaf a eonservatire »rovemasfir., did

oca ineure nil« by ci-riiiaa autliorifcy. This Wts chiered by Portalesi

"the Ansy, n. hotted of lisa^asion. WU subjected to the Prosldeati-.!

»Uli officers of an taclependent mind were dsBaoted,, isiprl^oaeJ,

3 exiled or executed. By IffSSf the «iiitary, purped of insurgönt

el^taect" ^nd subordinated to th« cwstril goverasaent through Droaotioo

1. Robin 1. tiuetphreyf.; ^SwäSracy ana Diet at or ship," in Th«~* Evolutios of Lgtla ^trlcan v-overaa^it, ed, Asher H. ChriÄtensen' n(N«»v YoAl imry lloU and"CaBpaayf 195if, pp. 90* 9^.

'. Fredrick i. Pike, Chile and the United ftatgt, 1^0^196 (lotre Daee, I^i«nt: University o^ Hotre Dsae Presr, 1^35, p. 10.

3. Hubert Herrlnr, ^ History of L-tin fesg-.-'ics frcg) t-ba 3e^limlag to the Prfesent (H

■ 1 sad pt^r poiicicr« *ad th« tradition of tb« ailltary a««d«ayf v^<

fcrc^ to *br.t«ln froB politic-..

TW.k strong ilÄciiAlüißg of th« »lllt-ury by Portal*», follovlag

«loeely th« wlb« alllt ury l«fi(*«rehlp exercised by S&n Mtrtin,

O'Hlg^rlas, «ad Cochr&m, definitely lIM in vbordinating th«

allltary to civl. mthorlty. PortAle« ws successful bccins« of th»

«wli«r wort of tat tbre« w rrlors; •«d, in t-cm, their «irly

«politic I attitude« b*c?re tradition bec*Ui« of the positiv«

discipline ispocei by Port ales, kt Edwin Lieuwa sayr,

Where the Military was dißclplineJ «Ärly, as io th« unique c .« of Chil« under Diego Portales, the civilian oligarcy WM bl« to assuiK — «nd did as- -u»e—-control of the neticn'r nach in« ry.

Such r.incipline, oöcoKpliahed «o early la tb« «liltary's

hi.Lory, couia not .Ion« b« expected to account for th« traditiooal

ailitßj^^ Qttituoe of Oille. It hs b««n said by an intlaate observer

of »ore than one fllM fe estiidc la Lit in A»wir"i that

Th« long period of peaceful training easbellished only with tactical maneuvers nad occasional para4«s does aot s^tlefy th« urg« for Activity of ^bitious nä eaargetic ycung officers. 3

1. 8e« Pr 0101 sco *.. hacixn, Hi^torii. de Chile d«-vAe la pr«histori.i hasta lS9l (TOBO Xj R*ntla«o d« Chile: Bditorial I&sclnlentc, 19^),

. Kdvin Lieuwan, Arfea and Politic in Latin \»eric:i (Nev fork: Pr«dfcrlc* \. Pra«g«r, 1951), p. U.

3* Kurt Conrad Amade, '"Th« TecbniQue of th« Coup d'gtat in Ltln Aaerlc-, rh.- Fvolutio« of Lttln Aacrican ovgrnwent, «d. Aäh«r a. ChriRten-1«! (1t«v ?örkt H«nry Holt and ConpanyV 1^51)» p.311^

;

f r I "1

Th« history of Chilean ax»» Is replete with honors von, not la the

hall* of eanereif, but en the fi?14c of battle. J«Mfte; fcryce decidec

thet "the beat of Chi lein psniuc. . .has bees, on the t^iole towards war

sad politics."1 Thxt thl^ 'bent" ha- borae fruit vaa attested by

Austin F. IfecBon Id, Jbo said of the Chileans, The-/ hare fought .

large nuwer of foreign wura, . . .with unifonaly successful result»."1

In 1836 Chile vent to wtr uitb a co lition of Peru and Bolivia,

finally defeating then in 1339. This w-r ''ertabliahed abroad the

reratation of Chile a« • fitting nation." 3 Pro« 1863 to 1366, Chile k

waa at ^mr *ith Spain. While thi- »AT Wf not one of great allitcry

lapor^incc, it did keep the aray ready and caused the Chilean navy to

enjoy a renewed lÄport/mce in the 'lltary hierarehy. *

Certainly one of the sott important of Chile'? fc»*eign vtirs was

the Wir of the Pacific, the "Hitrate Wir," in which Chile's military

defeated both Bolivia ani Peru. By the end of the w.r In 1833, the

Chilean araed forces had reached the height of th;lr military prestige,

*• J3»»» Bryee, South Aaericai Ob&enration^ mm l^gpro s'looa (Rew Yorkj Ihe Kacmillan Coag&ny, 191 }» p. ?1.

. MacDonald, op. ^•» P* 83.

3. Wllfus, Argrotin-i, Braail, wod Chile. . ., op^ clt., p. 311.

k, HATY Wilbelmine Williams, The People and i^olitica of L'tln «♦. Jury wimeisiine Williams, The yeopie and rt: Americi (Do-ton? Ciim and Coop .ay, 19V})» p. 6 1.

5. William Columbus Davis, Th* La^tCooqui:tadorer; The Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile. 1663-1366 ( eorglai Thi iTniverr,ity of •"".eorgis P'-ess, 1950), p. 3 9. This hoc* deals in its entirety with thin virtually bloodless wir between Sp*in *nd her two *• -colonle .

r a I

-n-i th«y ver« quite willing to r««t oc that pr«cti, hetweeo these aany foreign ware the Chilean anqr vas not

resting and plotting for lack of other occupation. To the sooth,

fron the diy. of the first cop^uistadoref-» the Araueanian Indians had

been eauäing constant ailittry probleBs.

'"zier -1 Teilet stetes flatly that the ccaqpest of the Araucctnian Indians in Chile cost Spain aore than all the rest of the discovery and conquest put together. 2

The Chilean military, while never oonquering these Indians, did subdue

them by 1383. That the Indisns did, indeed, cause the Chilean Military

to wage heavy Cisapaigna is indicated by the .^tateaant of a foreign visi-

tor In 1850J

Alfiost the whole of the regalar aray is quar- tered on the south frentier to keep check of the bold, savage Areucanians, but in the north frau Valparaiso to the desert a regular soldier is rarely seen, 3

1. Pike, op. cit.. p. !3- —— —

. Williaa S. Stakes, Latin Aaericaa Politics (lew Yorki Thcoas Y. Crc*ell Ccaarany, 1959)» p. 107.

3. Ooorge Byna, Wapderinga in Soae West era Rerpublics of Aaerica (London: John ^. feurker, West Strand, 1Ü$0), p. ^X), _l

r 23 ^

Tc subjugate the Indians require, the best the allltary could offer.

The Xhdion wars if»re a constent presence, both between ra^i cftirliig often

glorious foarvol war«, Ar euch, they were i eignlficaxt featur« of the

total ecviroBBteot t,-l:hin vhich the Chilean military »enured and developed

its philosophy.

Throughout these ye vrs of the develojeent of the militjjry, ttere

me a definite trend tovrvrd profeusicoalization. Tnis Development

probably took pl^ce because the Chilean military wes vucceseful end

free froci political intrigues: but conversely, it nu^t be noted that

tec 4i£e the solitary wus already a profecsiooal organization, it was

victorious and did not deal in politics. Certainly victory, proffecaioa-

aliaaa, and oon-interference In politics are closely inter-related.

Yet if, as Edwin Ideuven suggests, professionalism is the anti-

thesis of militariam or e'suclilliaao, then legardless of how or vhy

professionali^Bi developed in Chiln, it should be examined. Lieuwen*8

definition of perofeseicnalism enbodies these three aspectc 5

First, the officer corps turned its energies to the exereise and developusnt of its Edlitary function; second, the ..rard forces tend to become the servants rather than the »asters of the state; third, that their function lecaae increasingly limited to the "legitimste" military duties of maintaining internal security aid defending the country againct external aggression. I

Under these terns, it could be caid that even under Port ales the

Chilean;; were so developing.

1. tieuwsn, Arms and Politics. . .»"og. cit., p. 31»

r An

3b« Micceci- of Oalleaa ajma iodleal»« tb-t the officers «orljr

turned to tt* drrolopMOt of tim Killt «ry fuaetloß. Tb« sot loos a

£, -•.«■.eat; of ttH ejrly nlllt uv I«adere IMlcst« nubordiiMt Ico to

clrll 'jutborlty. Pln&IXy, tbe unlfbrily arcoecofwi fr>r?l^i «an -n&

the dOMtetlc pcciflcetioo of tbe Xtniiraxt. ebom that tb« nilit; ry «ad

able to aclstixia Inter» A! A«ourlty «ad to iefend tb« country sc&iaat

e^tamol ««resslo«.

Cbllc WM oo€ of tb« first Lotlo Aswrlcua antloae to r«qp««t a

nilxt .ry nl.-isloo froc PruMia» r«ceivlog its aliaistt, l«d by

G«u«ril Etail 3o«mei, io 2335* Tb« tr&lolag alt sloo «a« ao offsetive

that ooe author ocldsi th'.t "the Q^ll«a^ anQf wa.« »laort Pni»el»alstd.R

i *

It unoiijUl Tsgriin b« Dotoc tbnt Koeroor hotJ a Ecuocaaofbl ailitary iaa^ilnc

with vfclch to work. The Chlie&a trrsy had b^oone ar highly profe-sleo-

aliaoo that by 1905 it WTVB itcclf eendio^ ailltary aieslaDA to ■

Coloobla» ^«nafiuala, Ptyrr^uTy, -and tl Salvador.

Whilo It is difficult to aaaoso hov auch of C^ia*i t&zi££-

Ion iilr." v low «äe cau»« *&& bew naflb «m« affsert» tb« iwportnnt f^etor

1 that Cbilo's military USA b«ottae n. thoroughly nnjfasiloßaJ orgnai

• tlon. Ibraush this, it b«e«aM oaofftaiitly 1««« int«r«ct«d in politlae

-oc laorc Involved lo it« two prinury Bl&alooe erf protect in« lateroal

tr «jquililty nod providing for «xtamal defboM,

C jy4, — . Stotoa. op, Qjt.« p. 129,

3. Lleuvao, AnM j»d Polltlcfl, . ,, OB« gjt., p* Ji»

r v ^ Af the civil *ar of 1391 aajkrd a turning point in the political

and social levelojoeat cf Chile» eo also did thit eccfliet le&vt its

s&rk oa the aroed forces. The war was a sanguinary affair vhlch

Jjurtad nsarly a year and co«t the country 10,000 lives and over 100

miUlon peao«' daar^e. Yet, it vould be difficult to assign the cause

of this oonfliet to adllcaridB, a« in f^ct the red and basic csuse ley

aot in & clvll-ailitüry conflict, but in a conflict vlthin the civil

govertsaent itself. In speakiog of the civil dispute, Pedro Montt,

a Chilean representative in Uashlngtoc, cooMnted,

At this crislt, seeing the President -.r best :r. an arbitrary dictatorship. Congress reoolved to exercise the powers csnferred upon it by the Constitution. • . • Shis it proceeded to do, and solaonly ordained that Kr. Jos-- Manuel BaLoacedr. had ceased to be the Preeident of Chile.

After the crisis h&d been started, not by the ailitary, but by

the civil govemaoüt, the navy en toto supported the congrescional

position, '.diile n nunter of (tlsownts, if not the aajority, of the

rry supportec the Presidiait.^ Hot all of the ..ray renained loyal

1. WilliaBs, op. cit., p. 630. ~~~

•. Pedro Mmtt, E>gobition of the Xllegul Acts of gx-Presidetit balgaced^- Vhlda Caxuied the' Civil ^ur in ^lle (VaKh 10,3^)0, D. C.» Glbeon Bkx>s., Printers ; nd Bookbinders, 1S91), p. iM* This particular ^«üphlet oust be used with core, as Montt was the representative of the ccngreseioovd forces in Washington during the civil mr. The author has atteojptsd to use only «t&tetsenis vithln the competence of the congres- slanai representntlve: the work is definitely a proprt&aida device.

3. Wilgus, Argentina. Br&AJl, Jnd Chile. . ., op. cit., p. 357.

L J

t

1 «n

to BcJ»»ccdAf however, mi Matt, tlcasnts want to the coo^rtsclooal 'Id«.

3«D«nLl Koftrner, the head of the Pro*siM» MÜltary AIRSIODI wa« one of

the ley flgureet

La January, 1391» Koemer's elre&iy gre^ Influace over the Chilean eraed forcet increased still fur her vhen hit defection froe President Jose Balmeced«. helped turn the tide of revolution in favor of the constitutiaoedist forcec.1

Urine the ntvy and A cadre of loyal axny officers, the Coo^ress raised p

a new ray vhich defected Bcdsoceda within e^ght months.

In August, l391, shortly before the defect of Balaacede, the

coRgresslorud forces vrote, "At laßt the con&itutianal tray is mil-

equipped nnd they >rill soon continue alon^ their accuetoia&d pathe of

victory." - While only a portion of the iiray supported the congress,

within eigit sxxxuhs thlfc cadre had becone the core of -ncfther amy.

This new ?j«y, the Cco&res* declar«!, was really the aray Chile had

always had. This new annsr would be the one to "cootlaue a?oog their

(iceustoaeu pathf^ of victory.' Thuz, the Congress iaputed the whole

military history ^d tradition to that portion of the forces which !•-

stained loyal to it. By August 8, 1391, the Congress could say, "The

fleet a^ well aa the aost distijaflaiahed officers of the argpr placed

than-elTa- ■a the disposition of the Congress. Actually, of course,

1. Li euren, Armr and Pplitlcs. . ., loc. cit. . Wilgus, Araontimi, Brazil„ nod Chilet , ., loc. cit,

3* Nontt, op. cit., p. 19. fiaphasis eupplied« h. Ibid», p. 15. ifemhusiu supplied. 8uch an optlsiiatic j

evaluction T« belied by the 10,000 deaths suffered throughout the war. Obviously, the Presidential forcer, vere not e»Mrely incoapeteot.

■ ■ ■ ■■■ ■'

r --f -I

the wnqr vu IrrttBedlably isplit by the civil war. Afterwards, it wa-,

reorganit.

The officers 4»c> belonged to ^Its äoeieoaa bau their futures H;>«ure

1 9 ,W —

Oencral Ib«oes himself iQUlcted th« prcaotlon ayston

ctuslly, the young -uray offlcert wer« dlsüit Isfled with the prcaotloo pattern, which w-s of «y asperating . lowne.-6. With great luck, ooe eight receive the grade of Btfrjojr when he v. u. acnething over fifty yeer^ of ^g«.1

The alow pronotloo dia not occur, however, becau&e of ^ny lack of

openings «Itbln th*f heirarchy of comand. according to Colontl Haul

Silva NuturanjL, there wer^ nineteen general officer^ »ad fifty-teven

colonels for the Chilean aray coa^oted of ■©»OOO »en. This is, on the

■vsrage, one general for every thousand sen aai ooe coloocl for every

three hundred. Ml far ^ack AS 1907 there wus gener .J disgust with

the law of prcnotioo aa- the open faroritlsa shown to on.«.-5

Other internal prohlenu« tended to damage dläcipUne .joong the

officers iad sen. ccoralng to Iherto Cabero, ^fter lS9i» military I

discipline started to decline. \ äumm^ry of the problem, facing th*

military w^t amply stated by Oener^l Bennett, nesber of the first

Junta de Goblemo of 19 41

The .rmy ludted everything! justice, barracks, food, Incenti.e; ana no longer coula public enchantnent «rlth the white mnet» of th« plumeo helmets of parading cadet a suffice i everything w-ia lacking and

1. Correa Frieto, op. clt., p. 60.

. Raul bllva Maturann, C mlno al ablaao. (8anti8go de Chiles editorial ünlv«r«ltftrla, I. .., 1955), pp. 5- 8.

3. 8ae» Morales, op.clt.» p. 37.

k, Cabero, Recuerdoa d« doo Pedro Aguirr« Cerda, op. clt., 37.

L

30 n everyihlng w&e badi t.h« qiurt2r»tt«t«rB 4id not ototain a ccßt unless th«y enjoyed Use »«rsaaal favor of i-oae adnl^tar,!

The gen«rf,l lack of facilities and coney affects! the officers,

especially thos.« of alddl« cl«>! baoiscrounä, who hid no family

fortune to finance thesi. äy 1^1 the officers gaoerally in the

grsules of li«iit"«^it through ii*ut«nant colonel began to be

concerned. One of the thingb which BOJt affected Ibenez Ȁien he

was a young officer WAS the condition of hie recruitBI

Who knpws—perhaps the awureneüsa of social back« wnrdness which I gained whet 1 wu,s in in tructor» officer fortified ny cooviction^ bout the necessity for a change which would better the condition, of the poor sectors of our populdtion, especially that of the country folk.'

Bec--.*ae the rich %'er« allowed to ' ouy" their way out of the servic«,

only the poor filled the rankc. They slept on straw.

MLiny of the officers -And men, thm, faced formidable military

and person~1 problam£ arlsip^ froa the poüti-o-economic situation.

In addition, by the very nature of the backgrounds from Mhlch these

men had cone, they felt a clo*c affinity for the problcns of the

eivllians.

1. Quoted in Roürigues itoido^a., op. clt., p. 173«

.:. Pike, op. clt., p. 130.

3. Correa Prieto, op. elt., n. k .

U. Silva M'iturana, op. clt., pp. 13-3^«

L J

t

- lUI.H.»«»! l i ..in mi— i, .„I ,„ . .

1 31 I understood tfec jtl «ri«?« of th« pt^plt vh^n the «oonaou» «.Kteei ©f illiiffirac^ aa tb«? p.%jf8lcül poverty of tbr r&e«, &o bard«?;«;-! neith i* fcsmit-v aoii coogenital lllaesfc., v«r* «sa'-le ^Iüö*« to s».

Tboce officer« «ho liveo closely nith civilian ^^ci«t/ MM to kaw

the hwdd&lp.s of the rl.lng, cost of lirisg *?fcich UM9^a their sen, aod

the civilian society were experiencJags ,tThroush dally ccatact «ith

the sen, they ccete to uaaerEtivod the general misery, a con lit ion ^hich

arouseB in them a longing for äocl&l tran^foz«at ion."

In ^adition to this dvareoesn bom of living in proximity to

the poor, the irme« foices h:«!, frao the beginning of th? century, been

given the auty of wUppreß&lng the vurious civil dicorders. As indicated

above, the suppression of the^e disorders had often been bloo^ and, in

aany ca^ae, -b^jlutely cruel. Considering the Chilean respect for aon-

vloleece, it woula Be«ua likely that uch iotivate contact with death

and civil disorder left its »ark on «any menteers of th« araea forces..

% the tijae of the Russian revolution, th^ militcry our^ly had cooe to

question its role?

The very ^Chilewo/ ragf, backbone of the structure of the State, ceeaed to have been ahsken by an effective vork of propaganda. The soldier_bad placed hiaself side by side *ith the Worker of the /"Russian^/ Revolution. 3

1. Ibid., p. 13.

. Sdwaxde Vive» an^i Frei i4ontalva, loc, cit.

3. larria Ceron, "Chile. . .,,, op. cit.« p. 57.

L J

-«.. *.

3-* 1 Be i^r; of poor proaot iao.i ( poor living cacdltica»» A growiag

soci&l &Viir«neB&t «ou a general revuleioo at heving killed MO Bony

count;ryaen with whoa they felt an ecoomlc and soci&l tie, tht- younier.

Junior officers lo t respect for the nilitaxy hierarchy ana, aa &

oaQ&eqiience, suffered fron poor discipline. "Hamy caae to doubt the

tense of juetice of their euoerlors, ind this ioaht I* alwuyg i had

in-ic aion. noth;r caamentcd .-dly, "The discipline of the naeü

Forces differed fras th^t of th^ Glorious ^jasy of 1879."^

This spirit of decadent discipline, ho himil^r to the geoeral

public indiscipline, broke into open revolt several tiaes during the

years after the civil war, and gave rise to several polots to overthrov

the govermrent, already held in general disrepute for U-ck of social

sensitivity .inci political stability. It vould appear that at early as

1909 the ul-cont it trith the government gave rise to secret societies

within the rrny/' By 191 , the Liga Militär had been identified as such

a society, but its n.«tict character hue remained in Joubt. These

1. §mä Morales, op. cit., p. 36,

. Ibid., p. 50.

3. Alberto Cabero, Chile y los diilenoa (jd ed,; Santiago de Chilet Editorial tyceu», 1^+3), p. c'67.

k. Bennett rgandona, op. cit,t p. 2.

5. Correa Prieto, og. cit., p. 60.

6. Saez Morales, pp. eit., p. 38.

L J

I III!

--

33

societies took 'io ctiv« Interest in the: affaire of the goverm^nt «d,

at leant maag t'e»e^lres, fomul^ted re?il prcir«»« of reform. • they

were illegal, ULttl« inforatHtion exists coaeeraing thes«.

KM far becx a» the Pre iidtocy of Srrasuris ichiOir^ü (IS96-I9OI),

the silitaxy had received a reprlssand for plotting ch-mges of goveroment.

Pedro Montt, daring his tenure of office (1906-1910), arrestea ««ver&l

officerfc for innuhordin^te actione -^ain^t hia.^ In l^ll, during a

parade for President Barroe Luco, the troops hroke ranks and thre^teoea

hi« life. They were only brought under control vith difficulty. Later

during his adatinistraticn, in 191 , «ereral leaser officers "alsmst

executed _ concrete plan a#iintt the govemaent."^ Finally, in 1913

ind 1919) high-rankiug officers bad a plan of takeover near realisation

wben the police discovered the«, Prctideat . «nfuenter retired General

Manuel Moore, Ge^^ral Quillemo Ara.aron^, Coei^ad&nte dc Canto, and

^lair&nte Cuevas for their ecBpLicity in ths plot. Many other Junior

officers were also forcetd to leave th: vrmy, creating '>n internal I«

dissension, is their felicw officers looked upo^i then as innocent.

1. Cabero, Chile y lo^ chilenoo, loc. cit.

. Ibid« Se« slao Feliu Cruz, oy. cit., p. S .

3. Feliu Cm«, loc. cit.

k, Cabero, Secuerdos de don Pedro xguirre Gerda, loc. cit.; Feliu Cruz, loc. cit; and Sae» Morales, ot». ^It., p. Uk,

L " J

r * Thui, by tb« «nd of the faAfueatte Govenweot, th« Chilean

«lllt&ry suffered froR IndidclpIiiM- 'me latem»! discaaoloD to the

extent thit Its loy»lty VBJ. In doubt by 19 0. * Of the lot^mal

uob- v 1 within the ooce-prcud Chilean nllltary. General Leo^lois

could s»y, "'Of euch conduct 1« mad«, nut a national ^rmjf, but .«n nnay _

for couyt. -i'et^t.

fuch was the econenic, social, political, and ailitary ;ituUloc

on the even of the elect iont of 19 0. There vas * general ecoocmic

r-'-r-ly-i. , «ociil upheaval, political j.p

35 "

I

The Prg-RoYolutioQiry le^sca^ri Ir^

i-

For a country in social turmoil, th« eaadidacy of Al«it«^cdri,

who preGsot^d hl&&«lf to the aaase. *J their savior, wa« the hope of

the people. RoBloatei In 19 0 ai. the Cjoilld&te of *he "LlherU \lll-oce

cc«pose

v xiou- factors. To clt« oce «x^aple. after »inning the Proficiency,

«l«864idri re Incorporated Into the Arcy ,CBe of the offlcero connected

vith the plot of 1919» *bo b*0 bemn bU3qn&rlIy JLaeharged by Prei-ideot

r »nfVieot«'. .x

During the election campaign itself, In *lch -leae^jHirl went

to the people, trarelline the length xad breadth of Chile, the military

played '_ plosive role, but acme cfflcere were, nevertheless, In contact

with .lea; JDdrl. ccordlng to General S&ez Hrsreles both the "Batlonal

Union vnd "Liberal «lliance" met with officer;» during tne caapj-ign.

Alessandri won the election with a total of 179 electoral votas

to IJk for Barrow Borgone. Hovevttr, the result wf.i. in doubt, ae the

conße;natively oriented Congreet had to ptas on the result«■. Fearing

that the Congress might rule in f»Tor of RATTO^ Borg>nc, which It

coulu have done,' letaindrl's forces usdt clear »" ^ubllc statenents

that rucn action would be looked u})ca with ^isfevor. In addition to

theae ct-teoents, Aleasandri contactsd SOB» unldeatified high officers

tc ask then to pl^n i military coup or Aeßonrtration, If necessary to

1. tuiei Morales, op. cit.t p. 50.

. Rodriguez Ncndoza, op. clt., p. 171.

3. Saez Morales, op. clt., pp. 51-5 «

k, Willl&ai;,, O^). clt.. D. 635.

b, Iwrlc K. Jua^t. op. clt., p. 77.

L J

r r * i f«t his lute office. During thl c«rlod f doubt, Ooeral U&«x Mnralea

r«c«lv«d H letter freo Oeneral An^bAlon :• ylng,

While. . .^leecsndrl/. . . has turned to the posalhillty of suc^e.? through - cherished nove- aent which v«uld call upon hla aa ths ' shosen one," another even sore aadfttSflM Jy^J^J •*■ Initiated ^y leosjidrl/ in 1919, which put it« h«Ao into the barrack* and prepared. If net a cou£, an advance In his candidacy, which t that tine w-* begi.tnlng to be noticea. Confi- dentially, he had ramy coBuxider:: und officers on his side. -

Wb^n th« Tribunal of Honor/ fonted by the Caigreas to decide

the election, mied In favor of Alestandri, the iznaediate threat of

military action ended. It i^ interesting to note that also during

this perlrxi of doubt, the .'anfüentesi Minister of War 4*n-t to renove the Anay from Santiago and to dig-

tract public attention frco ths proceedings of the "Tribunal of Honori"

failed almost laoediatily, and wus given up.

Althaigh AleiwJBdrl nay have been "the n^a of the people," be

had to face d recalcltra.:t, conservative Congrets which could block

his every atteapt to put the country an the road to political, economic,

and social recoveryi

1. Sie» Morales, loc, cj^t. ftaphasic eupplied. .. Edwards Vives «jia Frei Montalv^, op. cit.,

p« 187.

J

L - immm

' >3

The prograc of "Chile Ifucvo^,, vhlch jBuxtacfK In 1 < 0 ind which «axphasized great »ocial refors, atayej? rirtu&lly ^roctrcte in the tucc of pcliticftl resistance. 1

»« an illutration of tn Precicent'n problams, the Codi^o Je

TrjLba-Jo ^ich he presented in 19 1, .itill had not left Congresc at the

tljBe of the nllit try ia^erveniion of ^cptanoer, i y H. Ac a furthar

ccraplication, the Congress gave fifteen of his cahinets u vote of T'ao

ccmfid-ncc," wtich required, on the averige, the Rppointa«»t of * new

cabinet every three aonth; . Had his prograB.s passed through Coogreaa,

which they did not, none of the cabinet, was in office loo^ enough to

hrive irrrioaented then.

In addition to the political probl-ia& he faced (aad inde«d

because of then) ' lecB^adri could not iapleneot any of the ecotKnlc

ruid äoci.,j reformr necessary to ease the repercuteioBa of the craah

of the world nitrate narkct.

For four ycarc he battled ^gain.t further collapse, as synthetic nitrates ruined CSillt's najor inAistry und drove border into thz cities unemployed and starving.^

ie a teaqjorary measure to MM the burden nlaced vapaa the Chilean eco-

nooy, unbacked paper money re.3 issued. This, hovever, had only the ef-

fect of inflating cricta even higher, ae, the una«ploy^d iaw nooe of the ■ — mmmm***** MW *—m*»*c^mm*m*m*mim*mmm i mmm im. vmmm. . w m—i i «■■■ . m .m ■ i ■!■■ I-»I inni ■» ■ IP W—I^M——I^MMi—MMWM

t

39

Incrcvitd money supply in tb» fonc of actual iacoo*.

In the inaediate bacis^rcunn fo tbc ev«sts «hieb otwrteü In

S«pc€»ber of 19 bf upon th; d«^th of Senator Jo».»» P. Alesoandrl of

Ruble, clrcuautaoceb took ■. cour^.^ whlcb culÄlmtea in revolt,

öe&itor .M««£.änlrl died on Iktcmber 7, 19 3» leivlne the seat for

lublc y.x*nt. The Senate, In e-ccordunce vith le^al precedent, asked

Presicicait lei : >n4rl to announce publicly .. date for A special elect lot

to fill tbe seat. Preci.lent Alesecmdri, wishing to encouru^^ ^he

election of i liber:»!, delayed in fi-ing the date.

Hoping t. force an iewsdiate election, the Congrefij proBsptly

ceased all legislative action of even the aost routine nature, eno de-

sonded tbe resignation of AlesjkkOdri's SubercAse*ux ministry. By

Deccaber 311 19 3» the Congress b^d still not paused the Ct-xrison 3

La«e which allowed the Ssäntiego Ofirri.on to reou-in init^s bcrrocks.

On January 1, 19 *+, tbc Garrison left the city. On J-nuo-ry 7, in

"l. Barria Ceroo, "fevolucirai hi^rtdriea de Chile. . .," op. cit., P. 5^.

, Cabero, Recuerdoe de don Pedro ^guirre Cerda, op. cit., p.77.

3. Saez Morales, op. cit., p. o ; and Bennett \rginaona, op. cit., p. l6. Thes;e lawa, renevea annually, provided penalsäion to the national Congre. a. When these laws vere nofc paboed rinew each year, tbe military VU forced to withdraw frc« the slto of tbe congroasion^l meeting until thwir p4ef/-ge.

L

r * r«t illation, »lecviaiidrl declared th? sesf.icn of Con^reio closed. Thi

l^^arc w broken by ua agreoncat b€rtv»o«n I«tt»äßdri and the Ccasgr«»».

In e; ehang' for pacscig^ of the Garrlron X^sw jiod a etxtute fl>iiag

priaary Ixportancc to fiscal legislation, Me^Sc-ndrl pronlted free,

uninfluenced Congre&slooal electlona, to be held &t tbe noraul tlae,

Jfarch of that ycir. *•

It V.L. In the preparation *nd conflict of tbeue elections that

the »llltiry, and sspwclally the ray, was dr i-wn into political j^tlvity.

Coctru-y tc hi- -rruigejent" with the Congreue, Ale&£.>ndrl started In

Jixru-ixy to vlilt Al the unit a of the Santiago Garri^JOß to deliver

discourse!; -gainst the conservative Senate be the cau,ic of oath

alllttiry and public alscontent. These political "explanations"

cmlnf, frora the President influenced the younger llbercl officers.

The conservative forces, preparing for the election and reali-

sing the import of the^litary supervision of the«, also visited the

b-^mekö, but, in turn, dealt store with the senior officers and other

conservative elements. It would appear, however, that the actions :>f

these two factions vcre laying the groundwork within the Santiogo

Oarrlson for the future blows the counto was to feel.

1. Clarence H. Haring, "Chilean Polities, 19^0-1^8," Tbe Hispanic jaerican Historical Review, XI, Ho. 1 (February, 1931)»" pp. ^-5.

. Bdwards Vives and Frei Mootalva, o^)^ cit., p. 109» and Sae» »torülej, loc. cit.

3. Correa Frleto, op. cit., p. 75» and Cabero, Chile y los [Chllenoii, op. cit., p. J67. J

• r

«

kl

The t&Lt* of tu« Pre^id«nt had produced their effect a in the Anaed Forces ^ kji'l the Hatloo^l Union» for its ;>»rtf «Iso worked for their istervontion, hut in ü quite different lirection thAß the Preßid^it sl^ht vrl^hi they were untying a teapest which would svecp then '.iruy.

In scitccf hi promifce, Aless.>aari decided to oo »ore than

tttlX to the milit^jry, the body which was to auperviie the polls *t

the March election*. Aleseandri uaed the rsy Supervisors to force

the election of liberal Congreisacn. Of lessÄndrl, , Curtic Wilgua

vritea,

Directing his follower' to break up and disperte the gatherings of thAt opponents, he uade ready to use the .\nBy unc the national police force in hi;: own b^shalf«^

While there M>M to be little evidence to indicate that it w:l^ the

Äilitary intervrentloo which decided the election in favor of the

Liberal Alllaac«, the intervention war foreboding: "... in effect^

the mnea forces ippewid to be controlling the electoral act,

because the Arsiy had beucn laprudeotly silsed up with the oollticsl

fle^tt."3

The pre-el«c*lao speeches to the ailitary ot* Santiago ana the

actual use of the military to «Id the liberal cauue during the voting

1. tdwanls Vlves ind Frei Montnlva, oj^clt,, p. 19 .

.'. Vilguft, Argentina. B^qyil, gad Chile . . ., op. cit.. p. 383« ••• fl^so Correa ihri ;o, op. €^.7"?»'7 »

L 3. Sae» Moraloi, op. cit.» p. 63.

■

drew the kray Into (Olltic/.. Although the 'imy h&c been ap»rt froe

overt Intervention In politice for yeaxE, not*dtb«taniing the sever«*!

planned coup^ ciiocuß^ed above. It \r.tj now dra«miato direct iaterventitsi

by it^ own President; end by hii f.:>ee to it, thv nsgf w*s led to

believe that it held the political }X>ver bfilsaee or vai;, ut lea^t» •

very import»nt political factor. General Suez Morales Rtates,

The officer? were not soon going to forget that if the eimanstanceä dsaaanäed, they wotidu b« ible to go ß© far as to ia^oye -. ,Tii.iVingM sclutlon upon the powers of the State.^

The forcing of th-» silitary into political, aatterd cauüeä thi«

ladt dövository of Btate pewer to becaete a««axe of d political role

it therefore h^d not had. Thia political awareness of the sillteu^i

the »ijor coercive power of the state, unb»lanced the civil political

alignnhsnt of the oay. Given the several crises facing tb*? country in

19 U, this «iwakening, organized, powerful force in Chilean politics

provided the oeans for rapid political c&uige.

Ala the turmoil of the country, cmid the lack of authority, there re»*.ined in Chile only one organized and potent force, that of the jnned institutions.

Considering the background wl social awarenen« of the Azt^r, the new

political awu-reneaa gave it not only the desire, but the ability to

1. Gaez Jtoij-le.-?, op. oit., p. 63.

. C^bero, Chile y io; chileoob, loc. cit. L J

mm

: ^3"

iotervüöc, given th necae^sTjr sptirit. The »p&rk could hare been «ay

COS of sev ral Incidental ths isportant factor v*£ the b-^ckgrou^d,

♦;hr attituue» th- mtizace of Chllo In the ye&r 19 J*.

'

L

^ "I

CH'vPTS» n

THS ROLE OF THE MILIT^RT

FKOW --SPTBÖÄR, 19 ** TO JAÜU^J?!, lyjj

L J

fjWBWWWMWW 1-1-"" -"- I ^ . i iim ^mimnnmmj

'

r

i

I

ujl

In toth houses of the CongreEs elected in March, 19-U, the

Liberal Alliance held a majority; thus, theoretically, thct body vaa

farorable to the President. It must be resnejdsered, hovev.-r, that the

Liberal Mliance was only a quasi-formal grouping of left of center

7'rtlet united in little more thin their opposition to the national

Ohlon. There wae no central governing boo^' of the Allioice, and

little extra-party diacipltne wa^ demanded.

Although thi£ Ccmgresc war elected with the active support of

wlessandri, once in power, it? object of unity—the defeat of the

Rational Union—^e^ gone. Soon the nev Liber".] Congretc could agree

no more than aid its conservative predecessor. The conservative

Congress which held power until March of 19 ^ had purposely obstructed

the I'^T »1 President * 2 legislative program. The liberal Congress in

power after March, 19'^> ^^s composed of self-seeding parties, and

cud not atterjpt to unify to pass the Fre^ident's legislation. The finf.l

2 result of both Congresses was the same: a legislative paralysis.

Pike stetes flatly, "The newly elected Congress proved no more cooper-

3 ative thbn its predecessor.

From March until September, 19-^> Congress did little more than

debate. It wac ülow in passirig money bills, even those for the

Wiigus, ^ge'ntiaa, Brasil, SS Chile, . ., op. cit., p. 383-

. Raring, op. cit.,pp. 5-^.

?. Pike, op. cit., p. 176.

__^ «_™ _, ; „ . ■ -..-yjMUb^W ■ ■■■""-■-■■ >■■■ ■■.IIIHMM

L

paynent of .>uLäu-le.' due. The Jtilitary UJS msll .s th* civil service

»ad pollc*; suffered, •.. their pxy v*t coo-t^otly In arreare. Ibaaex

hiöäelf, coitawkxider of the Cavalry i-cdiool is ^oatii^o, often h^d to borrow

per .oDally fron bunk la order to pay the men of hie ccoMoad. The

governbeot eventually would reueeso hi. notes, but »omtiaes xs mich &e

«ix atoath^ later. tflMfil Bennett, s-eober of the first JuotjL de

CK^biemo^ L »id of the financial situation of the officer*, *. . , they

were owed 'gritificitioRi' fro« y?f*rs before. . .,"

Thin lack of üCtion by the new Ccngress, upon **ich so aaay hopes

had been fixed, further dii»gustea the die effect e

f

f

c

r U7

ID prll of 19 ^1 *ooa after it appeared that the new Coogresa

offered the country no acre than ths eld, Ceoer*! Bennett vae upproacbed

hy in unidentified retired officer who ^ked Bennett if be «"auld help

eh-jige the government. Tht General ;..1J that while be would take no

action uhile 00 active a\zt/, be would certainly consider the request

after retirement. .ecoraing to Bennett, thitt »tame person contacted

other ienlor officer.., al-o unidentified, and received ^n iffirmatlv*

reply from th«a. The general could not otato if there were any

definite relationship between the B»tional Union *nü th retired officer,

though he did admit to thit possibility. vlberto Eow^urd« Vive*, while

not aentioning Bennett or other by najae, loo. t^t»,

Meanwhile, the leaoers of the old Unionist opposition also got in contact with oca« hi^h-raakiag officer- of th« rwdf and H vy, in the hope of putting an end to the existing situation by means of an armed pronunciaiEieoto. 3

Future leaders of several revolts; ^no. former cla^aatitee hela stcetiQ£S

1. Bennett rganddha, op. eit> pp. l£Ul7. ^e roithor Su not been able to detvraine the identitieu of the other officers, although It is not unlikely that General \ltaairano nay have been one of those contacted.

* Jbld., p. &d. 3. lctv.-rdc ?ive«, Lu frooua aritocretica. . ., op. cit,, p. 35. U, Chile, Acttdeaia de Querra, Re»en^ hi^torica de 1^ Ac&deali

defluerra, 1886-1936 (Saatiago de Chilei Institute Geogr'iflcc Militär, I936)♦ According to this publication, the careers of Blanche, Ibanez, «d Orove started similarly. In 191 , ^H three entered the asae class,

«hici; WAB grevduated in 191**• These three were the only aenbers of thf.t das,., to have been sent abroad, Blanche vent to Oermi^ny; Ibanez, to

L3an Salvador; and Grove, filso to Oermany. Set pp. 11^-1 3.

'■ " •' ■»•"—

U6

within the very offlc»^ of the Qeoeril Staff. In theiy B$«tlG^£ the

two officer? ecimautea fftrorably upon the 9CtloQ& of the liber«! juntKj

of Spain of that j-erlod. Kot only were the&e officers not censured for

these aeetlngii, their iCtioo^ were coouooed. There can be little

doubt es to the exletence of iCtive, nearly orert plotting a^^lnet the

Alee-.aÄdri rcglae.

In thi^ ^.tiaoTshere of plots *nä counterplots, legislative

paralyelc, aid overdue public sj-laries, caae the spark, which ist off

the explosion which was to rock Chile for eight ye^rs. The Congress,

which hAö been conpot-ed of the landed and wealthy since the ^aya of

Diego Portules, served without rewuncraticstt. With the election of the

new Coogrest, leas wealthy people entered the two chaasbersi

Perhups in JI «ideavor to win its good will, ":

r

}

r H9

MT«*r.;, ilooi yi^fe » PilU"irisnio (J^a>ao -oEr'B un' f^ncc^no ^olltT- oosocial lbeytv»«ierlc«no)(!»cxicöt MbllöteFa de Kn^Äyon:;"rociolO£lcoa,'

Li^»), ynBr—'— , Bennett .rgaßdoß&, op« cit.» p, 14,

tmMm^^~r~~~r-~^.''''^m**^:-~~~~~-~^J «P|i>l,!J

50 1

ver« to coeci

. . , th» S-pteaber »ovemeot was the work of the yoimc offlccra, pootaneous, iaeallätle, rtpld, aod effecrtlvc, ü it, vs.- the fruit of ycuat aindc -ad yirlle spirita.i

On Septonber 3, 19 i*, th« Coogrtsi» paised th« Dl«t Blli.

according to nua>erou£ sources, sever&l young officera went to th«

Seoate th t very day in tüjticlnatlon of the puse&g« of the bill. '

It */ould appear that '*tiile the appcwrance of allitary officers in

uaifoi-a La the Sen«.te »^ unusual, it w ^ not unprece.ented. The

MM type of vi..it had be«B jfe.de during the adiaini.tr a ion of

Pedro Montt, snd "it ia very possible that thi exoaple stiaulatsd

the officerü to their action in the Senate. Other active Lobbying

had tljw taken place in Chile after the Ncott adainistration. In

ugust, 19 U, a nev waaen'i, oarganisi.tlon, the "Patriotic Unlao of the

Wauen of Chile,' vent to the Chamber of Deputies. In the C&dRbcr

b&lcooii.: they ctaged a protest againat the IAWE of divorce, »«par&tioo

of Church am. State, ud cectariun projects. Alberto Cubero feels that

this suceesifful aeaoabtratioo was the in^^ir^tioo for the officers'

— lt xbid., n. 18. '

. tee, for exvinple, Rippy. Hist ricbl Evolutiar. of Hispanic ^mcrica, loc. f~it.; Bennett rggadoin&i op. cit., pp. 19- 0; Pike, loc. cit.; -vrturo .lessondrt, Rectificuciopeü xj tqjaox(Santiago de Chile» Ireprent^ Univcrflitirin, 19^1), p. ^3; Sdvu"

»

I

r 51 i *,cticÄi em Seyt.-jutär third.1'

Kecor .ÜQf, üC -Y«^*! ; ^ici -Jat .. t ^« d«cl len to fc to the

"»cent's on taptMfewr ^ ». ."a _:»', ;• o- y, Th;re i r-, oa to

b«lieve thi ti> fewer th^a tw« nty offl.'eu^ w*»-..t to t^« Jftn ce on

'.he thixl. \fteT -h« young off 1--;r orgjiai^en however a ijy »3r :

'-ook ; at, U - klagt l tb^ crifln.. off. ■ r. . rr-.it, b»-J no

orpuiiBed b. kinf. \ -ho^eh th fl l«lt to Ih« ea >e * rd I

■ i siv« -o t f i m. -n- irifth th D!*r Bl'l Jhi tdt' fca ■•« in

geaer , rf.. ao»-. .caev,; Ib-;n - ifcor daiaed .t the fir t o » j;\2-i

-.Iseontcnt. tartes: b.foir kiptoÄer thin .n that off 1 • r of th

l:-.cui Mi 11-- n iojtlt^cic^a re hiy ftalo oil; oo the COOK n f, .

*t-jff hoc", of th« Uaittr'i tx e fore« . h rli« - puhli

t.ttBent- vgiin ,. r-h Di>t Bi 1. fkirtber i:iho.-s-h th. utbor '

foun ■ no other proof Ib^Ver. itat it ivc con.; :r ic,. • o 1 ; i JI

RiO" ■.■■ O n P^ jj-.'i. C H.ri-. ur la. !. oftM t tiU -rcol l t

re the inci r. .n th« . "Bit . The roerml lnälc -orii - c tl .p. . . ., o: . -1 .. i - 191.

I

" 52

ti - o ?, 'or- .,cB».-i ■• , uf BilHärv .ncer-.--n-ioa.^

"v oh nc o;Gn onf . ■:. - I .en "n off.'c / a th^

c. c _ C-. .b B ' BlH c^t .£-5. o t .h ;• *lto Rij.py. Hl.torlcv.I gvoiuticn of Hiaputic; An^rlc. i p, cit., p. 37c«

L

, Bennett Artandonr. op. cit.. p. 19; and Rljpj , Hirtcric ü on of Hi^piinic A»crlc^ ioc^ cit.

3. Äinn-.!tt. AygMuSMfti oy. cit., p. 0. J

HMWW"111"" n. mg^nj 'W> '

r 53

had b©«o lovolved at the rei&te iwd gath«reü t iaxge group cf th*.

yconger officert, and th«r« was loud converEatloa. At th t time, the

officers hud little »ottvntlco other thaa to eonqplaln about the Insultt

aufferod at the baad* c£ the ionator«. The Klßi^ter of War vac re-

ceived vlth little courtesy by the group, which aow totalled several

hundred. Ifora Inforoed them thnt the President of the Eenate hfid

a«ked that they be r>«ilähea for t^elr acts. The meeting 1-sted until

nearly «Idalght of Fept^aber 3-'*. Ihe Minister, insulted, bullied, -jad

often i^nor««!, finally stated that he vould not punish any officer

involved.

There were, hmrever, other reasons for the renoval of the

I threat of puai^haent. The of fiel .1 opinion of the high officers, by

the aoming of Septessber U, vaa, if anything, in f-,vor of the -,ct of

the thirc. At th« dally cabinet meeting held on the aoming of

Scpteciber U, General Altaalrano, Inspector Gencrril of the Anay (its

higheat po&ltlc»), told the cabinet that he WUä frankly in ayBcg>athy 3

with the protest by the officers. General Sacg Mbrale* loo

indicates th..,, a-, e^r*^ as the aoming of the fourth; Prer.ldent

Alcaaandri looked upon the action In the Kencte and the jjubMcqueot

meeting in the Cjab Killtar with favor, sathough «t that time he h^d

I. Correu frieto, OpT^T.', p. ^ .

c. Ibid.

3. Bennett rg^nuon«., op. cit., p.

91 r i n

given it no cfflcl&l support. Sur«Iy hivlag this backlag, both ovwrv

and |«ett| frc» t«o such ixtportsat people, the otficcm ver« in %

flwwblt i?oeitlon vi-.--^-yl:. scy ^ttea^t to dlsclplix« the»,

La^er, duriag the oay of the fourth, I group of sixty officer»

Again went to th« Deatte gallery. This visit to ths Sen&te bad be«c

decided upon the night before by those f thcred at the Club Milit&r.

Thli r.ecoiia vltlt heid tittle objective other than to rtsgia^er the

officers' orotest st their trc.itccnt on the day before and to anpfcaalte

their solicL*rity, Ibc vielt of tht foujrt* f-aded in an uglier aanner

than biid the prtr&SBi dixy's, Ae both the officer:. ;jad the senators

were cencitiv? to each other1.' action, It w-ia not loag befor« insults

were traded: "Sever--! pWMD&l disputes bet%raen Scaatori and offlcerä 3

alco took place in the Senate,"" This tiaje the officers »ere ordereo

by the Pre.:ileat of the Eeonte to leave the gallery, «hich they did

with no little noise.

That aitemooo, after notice of the eaefront-.tioo had be«n given

to all uniti of tha Santiago Otxrison, two aeetiags were l»ld in the

Club Militär. Th« first was a tea offered by the lleutoaants to the

l." »53 BSaraSa] op. clt.., pp. 7^-7%"° j. Dennett Argaaco&a, op. cit«. p. ijö. Mother icconmt ütates

th&t naariy 100 officers went heck to the Senate on the fourtia. lit Kdwamr Vives and frei Montalva, Hiatori.i Je los parti dos. , .. op, clt., p. i;3.

3. tippy, Historical tvolutiqn of Hispanic ^ggrlo^i loc^il.

H, Bennett Argtindona, oy. cit,, pp. ;i- 3.

L J

.I[."I,-««W»JIIIII.IL

#"

f

55 '

CAj^dißs. fhe purpos« of IttU tea v«^ to ^«th«r together ^11 the

y&s&g «a^syay grrid« officf:r;i in oraer to diccuftt the exchange of

insultr of thui »o:mlag. frofc this ffieettng, held at 1300 on dt&m&Hl

kt eftms a ple%e of unity in facing tnt Confiress. While thi^ parti-

dujur ae«tiag produced no perskinaat pl'jn» it was laportsnt, for it was

the first unified public declaration try nay »ilit ry fspoup of a

yositioa vls-a-vl.': the problem of the day.

The second Eieeting, also scheduled for 1300 of the fourth, had

be«n planned hastily after the sixty officers had be«n ordered to leaTfe

tho SoiÄte, This meeting «as planned on the initiative of a

Lieutenant Leio, an officer under the tben Major Ibcnez. Lato uent

telcgr«a&a to each unit calling for the officere, regardless of ieojk,

to meet at the Club Militär that evening. While no copy of the tele-

grata tos been found, It doe^ not se«n unreasonable to -^sunvc that

nigjber authority than Lifutcsr-int Lazo would have been nece^aary for

the other officers--«me oo^ore and Lieutenant colonelj--to have accepted

the invltaticm. There is, however, abeolutely no proof, to the author's

knowleuge, to connect Ibonex with the telegraa. Victor Contrcras Ouzratn

3 beliares, aev^rtheleat, that Ibanes wa.' in the plot fron the beginning.

If thia is so, it »by account for the telegraa'is authority.

l< ifcid.t pt ,3. — ---------

2, Cornea Prieto, op. clt., pp. 33-34. /

[ 3« Contreras 3uaiBan, op, cit«, p. 27,

r ä"1 Thece officers, ace» four hundred strong, oloö aset ftt tbe club.

Inost irandi'iteli', they wer» told h> sorae-one that General Altaair&ao

hid Jcf«nde-J thoa that noralng before the cabinet. Before 1900, th^ l

had decided to send the General an invitctioc to t.ttenti tbe aeeting.

Tiis be Oli, but he tscld little »ore tha« that no one would be iAa&iehed,

and tlvxt he was in ^ympathy with the offlctrs. Soou h/ter he left, the

four hundred, «aong th««uelves, decided that they should request th&t

President ' ic. .-jadri veto the Diet Mil, as it was the lmedl«te cause

of ili.cootent j but they did not «t this tin*» offer any definite profra«

beyonu thiö. But with the insults, a change had come over the groups

2 . . .now it did not .ipeak of '^las' it spoke of 'deaanding'.

There zem to htve been at lea«t thro« aajor reasons for the

ucceas of thiL reeting inü for the officers' having be«! left alone

to plot. First, Piooog the plotting officers thesselves there «as

general ogreenent upon the n««ä for action, although the type of act,loo

was in dispute. Second, there vtre sooe cenior office,; ? «bo, while

taJtins no part in the plot, looked upon any actior

r 57 i

gev« ao loaiCE.tlan, at thtJt, tine, of disapproval, fia.a.I.v, other

EQDlor officers, anoog th.-m Gcüorai öiuiinell, coss&.iMLttr of the

biortlfego Gcariüon, iookeo u;>on the r.4«tjuj£ with iaclfferen^ej "la

r««.llty, ao high officer of the Arny g&ve the »otter the laiportsnce

v;hiGi::it h&d,"' Tneac several attitudes Kay aid in explainiag th«» lack

of ^say force having he«« uued to '&fp lha officert» froo the aeeting

oi the fourth«

&oan after Generul Altanslrujao left the Chxb killtd.rt the news

had be«n. a^de public that '-cc^-thln^ uiiu-u-l V^J> taking place,

hortly hei'orv XX) that i>£jat nl^it, ■ repräsentativ*} fn» Ic^ßanori

went to the ciu.b and oeked that a aelege.tion of officers be eent to

speaJi «ith the Pretid«it.J "The U00" rqpidly selected Ibane« and two

k other officert- to represent then. The neeting, held £.t the

Preiideot's official resilüncc, th? "Hcoea.', took pli-.ee If-te in the

ai^it of k-5 Septeedjcr, To the three officer« .VIeaÄMidri maai- hia

position clear: "If the Arny la with me, I am with the AiT»y. , ,j"

but he left no doubt that he felt Mnaelf in conB^nd as he continued,

"... but do not forgt't th t I already h ve the support of a great

1. gdvards Yivca mm frei fSStSbn] loc. cit.

2, Correa Prieto, loc. cit.

3* Bennett Argasdono, op. cit.» p. £9«

U, Corres. Prieto, op. cit., p, 3$. While the author hut fouud no proof, it 1.-. possible that ooe of th^ other officers w.y have ocen Colonel Blanche.

L. J

I

■

r Mn

L

part of public crplalcw."

It woulc also appear that during this, saeetlog, the President

hiai elf forrailfttfeG the r«fome aad i gearal fftpWi of d«Kicdß for

"the i^OO" of the Club Militär. After the aeeting, Ibnnez wtaie'd that

he (Itsaes) took operatiooal contrcl of the progrsa for the officers. -

Genersl Z*AZ Mor&lCw also states thct It was only after this eaetlng

tha^t Ibanez started r>o talk ibout the nilit ,ry - supporting the ohanges

^.Ich Alcuc^ncrl wanted. Alessandrl al«o atieltB to the aiadlarlty of

his progrsaa -Ma the allltary'a conands:

The petitions or aspirations of the military, aa I have said before end repent aov, itaply correcpond to that fear vhlch the Precideat

*-

e

r a Lc

Talcatei'-ßo for suprort, but wau told thit he Mi alck, Th* jfevy

60

fT^ve no ieajpOi'^c- j«^«fer to either tnquir:'.

Thece rather uncoordlaited att«£^ptc to doairuit« the Situation

indicate naich of the probloE facing the govertBKrtr.. At the very tiue

the FresiOent of the ftepublic wru, telling c. group fron the Club Militär

that he wa- "with thosa," the Head of Cabia«^, Aguirrc Cerde, waa «t»

teesping to ralli' force? to reüirt. It wouli oeaa obviouy that thie

lf^:k of eccBair.ic tion between the two moit Inportant g^vsmacnt flguuree

%RS intentional. Thf. PresMert aew in the njovoaeot an cq?porcunity

to force JJ. of his prrgraa», /Qt he olao felt he couli keep the acr/asesit

under control if then? were no outci^ interference.

Second, ;«d peAapa »ore grave, we.- Aguirre Cerd&'e »tteKpt

to call forces ^gsicat the offlcera. The locus of ccmand authority

wa& apparently e^reoely difficult to e^certain. Jhe two hi^h oanb&t

coBäFaßndere, Altaxalriao an- Dvjrtnell, woula do nothing* The unit COD-

asoders wetre then cootocced, but would not connit th«Melve&f especially

alnce they Isnew their general') backed "the sOO". While the troopc were

in the hftrrack!;, Aguirre Cerd? could find no aethod hy «hich to deploy

the». Further, the amed fbrces appeared to present no united front

at that tlae. Although Aguirre Cerda knew he had little, if any, Anv

rupport, he attempted to contnet the Hflvy to ascertain ita po&ltlaa.

. Caberot Recuerdos dc don Podro Agutrrg CerUtt. OP. cit..90«

L,

Kt it vas, ev«itn raoved too ru^idl^ for hiia to receive ca answer.

this &rotelea of th« indefinite authority IOCUü appears to Iwve e>ieted

duiing the whole period of tureoil.

On the noiTiing of ßeptentoer 5» Ibanez held a sa«eting of selected

offirare, each of w»ior represented a specific unit, in the Cavalry

1 ^ School of which he va^ the ccomaader* At that iseeting Ibanez outlinea

the prograa 'Aic* the President haa Mxggeste^d. The prograa wua stated

unofficially as being!

1. refoana the Ccoatitution of 1 33 to eliminate the Parlia-

mentary cyatjai;

t« veto the cougreasionul ualcry bill, or Diet Li.v;"

f 3« ineredce the pay of the Aray, S^vy, end police;

4, pay theae bodies the back sal&riee due thexa;

3* proniae Congreualocal p^üsa^e of oth.-r outstanding

legialatioo.

Iban^z ordered Lieutenant L*&o to notify key units throughout the ■a

country revest log their pledge to uupport tht* progroa.J T* ^ec from

this meeting that sn «nbryonie organization »^aerged. This; group was

the first tc notify the units outnide of Sarrti4*$o of the occurrences

in the c&vitsl, and it was the ./icleua of the later powerful JUnta

1. Corr^fi Prleto, loc, cit»

, Haring loc. cit.

3, S&ez Mort&les, loc, cit*

t

r 62"1

Militär. The group also c&lled for naathur meeting at tt* Clufc

.Mllllar later in th*? dvy. The several rspreatntatlves notiflecl their

•nit aaö each unit aent üJO. t of it.-, officers to the Gluh Mlllty.

Thli i^cood meeting of Se^teaher 5 vac probably one of the aosrt

ijEportaot one: of the crldls. Use first order of buaiaee« vaztxt the

four hundred offlcer3 of the QXTTIUOQ to appoint a ^jufita to represent

then In «11 official rolatlorrhipc vrith the govenuBsat, The aeabers

elected to the Junti wer« the following}

Coraasnding Generfil of Fa. ces I,! Sentla^oi (Jener*! fedro D?jrtaell Sf.Ty: Coennnder DIt born and CaBBKOde- Ocevedo Ocncr-I Stafft CoBMsnder Uraculio Military S>chool: Colonel Ahuoed^ and Lieut «»suit Bravo Cftrafcincros 1 Coraaancler Swing «ii- Captain Fenner davalry School I Major Ibanez and Lieutene^act I^so War Acciatfnyt Lieut edaxxt Calvo RegiB>ent of Bain: M;:.,or Canales ^Sinvcr.t, of Pudetot Mbjoor Mujipa anl Crptiin A^uirre Reglatent; of Vcddivlai Vt^or Dl^z Regliaect of Teleg3npk«;r ; Ccntumdcr Sallnae Li^ht Infantry iV^linsat. > Camander Blanche and Capte.in Cabreru B , iT-.nt. of Tacnn,! Majctr Pugt / Mcuote . Groupt Major Viou , Captain Va.quer. Lieutenant Urlzar Mountain Group 1 Major (Sraaset Andeac Botallicni Major del Fozo .

«cretory of the Juntat C&pt&in Moreno.

It U important to note the ranks of thoce elected to the junta.

With the exception of General Dartnell and Colonel AhumadD.nor of the

officer \mu hl^er than Copg43'^ Mb^ii Ait«dr^> '-waa neror 11 uted »s a BMrnb«? 0? the ^unta Mjlltar.

r

•

63 ^ .dditlouftlly, cv«ry a^jor unit of the ß-ntltgo Oarriüon, locludint th«

l^iry, MM repreitsatea. 3t»« junta gave jeveral ladlcetions of being o

poiiticU. grouping of Bllitary afn, Ihe distribution *,;:? rsaik was

clo»ei^ pre iortiooftl to the iBsportonce of the participation of U»

variouc ranJw in the evaftt« leading t') the crisis. The unit reproren-

tstion, on the other hroiu, eaj^iajiseü the several repocitoricü of

ejoftd strength, not the officers in thaa per tc. Tin. , it wouici appefjr,

the Junta reprcßentcü the intereete of the v*x-otu rank groupings bnd

thekttereüts of the cenpooente of the Garrison, acnteVh&t in toe taanner

of a bicaoeral dccirion-ia&king organ is at ion. Bvid.

L ' J

6k i

the stability of the Ixecutlrc.

It wowl. appear that the ttassbership of the Clftj) ^ilitar» politically,

was not dlielnlLar to the nation?! Coogreae, except thet the UOOT

agreed upon desiring ""..ctlco" of one type of another.

The second major hueinces o