Cameroon eConomiC Update
Revisiting the sources of growth Enhancing the efficiency of the Port of Douala
January 2015
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table of Contents iii
table of Contents
AbbReviAtions And AcRonyms ........................................................................................... v
Acknowledgement ..............................................................................................................viii
executive summARy ................................................................................................................. 1
Recent economic develoPments ..................................................................................... 3
Economic developments in 2014 remain positive ................................................................................. 3
…but fiscal performance is still preoccupying… .................................................................................... 4
…and the pace of debt and the external balances raise concerns ....................................................... 6
Medium term prospects are mitigated… ............................................................................................... 8
….and more efforts are needed to boost Cameroon’s growth... ........................................................ 10
Assessing tHe PeRFoRmAnce oF tHe PoRt oF douAlA ..............................................13
The Port of Douala is one of the least efficient of the region… ........................................................... 13
…mainly due to regulation and infrastructure limitations .................................................................. 19
Frontally addressing these infrastructure and regulation limitations will enhance
the efficiency of the Port of Douala ...............................................................................................24
abbreviations and aCronyms v
abbreviations and aCronyms
ASYCUDA AutomatedSystemforCustomsData
BL BillofLading
CEMAC Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale
(CentralAfricanEconomicandMonetaryCommunity)
CNSS CaissenationaledeSécuritésociale
DIT DoualaInternationalTerminal
GDP GrossDomesticProduct
IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
INS Institut National de la Statistique(NationalInstituteofStatistics)
PAD PortAuthorityofDouala
SNH Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures(NationalHydrocarbonsCorporation)
SONARA Société Nationale de Raffinage (NationalRefinery)
aCknowledgement vii
aCknowledgement
TheCameroonEconomicUpdatesareproducedbya
TeamledbySouleymaneCoulibaly,LeadEconomist
andProgramLeaderforCentralAfrica.OtherTeam
members include Rick Emery Tsouck Ibounde,
Senioreconomist(efficiencyofthePortofDouala)
and Chimene Diane Djapou Fouthe, Consultant
(recenteconomicdevelopments),SylvieMunchep,
Team Assistant. Peter Ngwa Taniform, Senior
TransportSpecialist,FaustinAngeKoyassé,Senior
Country Economist for Cameroon, Odilia Renata
Hebga,CommunicationsAssociate,andAbelBove,
GovernanceSpecialistprovidedguidanceatallstages
ofthework.TheTeamhasbuiltontwoconsultancy
reports prepared by Gaoussou Diarra, Ibrahim
Nguena,andTchapaTchouawou,consultants.The
photosinthisreport(includingonthecover)areto
thecreditofTchapaTchouawou.
Comments received from Birgit Hansl (Program
LeaderandLeadEconomist,ECCU1),GaelRaballand
(Sr. Public Sector Specialist, GGODR), Rachel
Sebudde(Sr.Economist,GMFDR)andErrolGeorge
Graham(SeniorEconomist,GMFDR)aregratefully
acknowledged.
Greg Binkert (Country Director for Cameroon),
Olivier Godron (Country Program Coordinator for
Cameroon)andMarkThomas(PracticeManager,
MFMAFR3),providedguidanceandadvice,andhave
beenaninvaluablesourceofencouragement.The
Teamhasalsogreatlybenefitedfromconsultations
with Cameroon’s key policy makers and analysts,
who provided useful insights, in particular the
following institutions: the BEAC (Bank of Central
AfricanStates),theTechnicalMonitoringCommittee
(CTS),MinistryofEconomyPlanningandRegional
Development, National Institute of Statistics, the
Directorate General of Custom, the National Port
AuthorityandtheSingleWindowforForeignTrade
Operations(GUCE).TheTeamisalsogratefultotheir
colleaguesatthe InternationalMonetaryFundfor
exchangesonthemacroeconomicframework.
exeCUtive sUmmary 1
exeCUtive sUmmary
WiththeseCameroonEconomicUpdates,theWorld
Bankispursuingaprogramofshortandfrequent
reports which analyze the trends and constraints
inCameroon’seconomicdevelopment.Eachissue,
producedbi-annually,providesanupdateofrecent
economicdevelopments,aswellasaspecialfocus
onatopicalissue.
The Cameroon Economic Updates aim at sharing
knowledge and stimulating debate among those
interestedinimprovingtheeconomicmanagement
ofCameroonandunleashingitsenormouspotential.
Thenotestherebyofferanothervoiceoneconomic
issuesinCameroon,andanadditionalplatformfor
engagement,learningandexchange.Pursuingthe
workstartedwiththeseventheditiononthetheme:
RevisitingthesourcesofgrowthinCameroon,this
eighteditionoftheCameroonEconomicUpdatelooks
attheefficiencyofthePortofDouala,themainentry
forimportstoCameroonandtwootherlandlocked
countries(CentralAfricanRepublic&Chad)ofthe
CEMACregion.
Growth is projected to remain strong in 2014 at
5.3percent,slightlylessthanthe5.6percentreached
in 2013, in spite of the gloomy global economic
environment,declininginternationaloilprices,and
insecuritycrisisintheFarNorthregionofthecountry.
Thisismainlyduetothestrongerperformanceofthe
oilsector,projectedtogrowat13.5percentagainst
8.5percentin2013.Withthenon-oilsectorexpected
tomaintainitscurrentperformanceoverthemedium
term,GDPgrowthisprojectedtoaverage5percent
over the next five years. Although commendable,
these rates still remain below the Government
objectivessetintheStrategicDocumentforGrowth
and Employment over the period 2010-2020.
AdditionaleffortsareneededtounleashCameroon’s
fullpotential.
Oneareathatrequiresanaccelerationofreformsis
tradefacilitation,especiallytheefficiencyofthePort
ofDoualawhichaccountsforatleast95percentof
thegoodsexportedfromandimportedtoCameroon.
As the natural hub for the Central African region
givenitsstrategiclocation,inefficienciesatthePort
ofDoualarepresentsamajorconstrainttogrowth.
ThePortofDoualaisconstrainedbyalongwaiting
timeattheentrygateaswellasalongdwelltime.
ImprovingthemanagementoftheportofDoualato
significantlyreducecargodwelltimeandensuring
its complementarity with the ports of Kribi and
Limbe will be essential for Cameroon’s external
competitiveness.
BuildingontworeportsoncargodelaysatthePort
of Douala by the economic and transport teams
of theWorldBankaswellasadditional interviews
ontheground,thiseightheditionoftheCameroon
EconomicUpdateprovidespolicyrecommendations
onhowtoimprovetheefficiencyofthePortofDouala.
ThereportshowsthatthePortofDoualaisoneofthe
leastefficientoftheregionandthatinspiteofefforts
deployedoverthelastyears,theobjectivetoreduce
theglobaldwelltimeto7daysattheendofthe1990
has not yet been achieved. The global dwell time
still representsmorethanthreetimesthattarget,
mainly due to: (a) weak coordination of frontline
stakeholders;(b)monopoliesoftheinspectionand
the terminal operators; (c) Ineffective legislation
(d)highshareofinformalandunprofessionalbrokers;
(c)complexityandlengthofimportproceduresand;
(d)physicalandequipmentlimitationsofthePort.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 reCent eConomiC developments2 3
Totackletheseconstraintsthataremainlystructural,
thereportrecommendsaboveall thepreparation
andadoptionbyallstakeholdersofacomprehensive
structural reform plan based on an independent
audit of the key choke points in any area of port
operations.Othersoptionstoimprovetheefficiency
ofthePortofDoualainclude:therevisionofthelegal
frameworkgoverningthePort,theimprovementof
the awareness of importers and brokers on trade
procedures,theaccelerationofthemodernization
ofthePortofDouala,andtheimprovementofdata
collectionandanalysisoftradefacilitationstatistics.
The report recognizes that implementing these
reforms will require building consensus among
various stakeholders and also overcoming the
statusquopracticesandbehaviorsprevailingwithin
thePort.
reCent eConomiC developments
Economic developments in 2014 remain positive…
Growth
GDPgrowthrateisprojectedtoreach5.3percentby
theendof2014inspiteofthegloomyglobaleconomic
environment, declining international oil prices,
insecuritycrisisintheFarNorthregionofthecountry
andthelowerthananticipatednationaloilproduction
for2014(figure1.1).Cameroon’seconomystillbenefits
from the positive dynamic observed in past years
withgrowthincreasingfrom3.2percentin2010to
5.6percentin2013.Thisperformanceaccountsfor
thestrongerperformanceintheservicesectoranda
notableprogressinthecommissioningofnewdams
andthermalplantsto improvethequantityofand
accesstoelectricpower.
The tertiary sector, which benefited from the
momentumoftheprimaryandsecondarysectors,
remainsthemaindriverofgrowthwitha2.4percent
contribution. This contribution would have been
higherintheabsenceofthesecuritycrisisinthefar
north.Indeed,thisyear,thetertiarysectorsuffered
fromtheclosingofbordersatAmchidéandFotokol
intheFar-NorthregionandatGaroua-Boulaiinthe
East region, which has negatively impacted trade
betweenCameroonanditsneighborsNigeria,Chad
andCentralAfricaRepublic.
The performance of the primary sector has been
mitigated.The2013-2014cocoacampaignrecorded
adeclineof9.9percentcomparedtotheprevious
campaign due to the declining yield of aging
plantationsandproducers,difficultaccesstohigh
qualitymaterialsandtheadverseeffectsofclimate
change. Agro-pastoral activities dropped due to
increasinginsecurityinthenorthandtheeast.On
the other hand, wood production increased by
13.7percentduringthefirsthalfof theyear2014.
Overall,commoditiesexportsslightlydeclinedduring
thefirstninemonthsof2014(year-on-year),except
forwood,aluminumandcoffee(figure1.2).
The secondary sector performed well during the
firsthalfoftheyear2014thankstothe increase in
energyproduction.ThenewKribiGasthermalPlant
figUre 1.2: export performance, 2014 (end-sept) (percentage Change in volume)
-40 -20
0 20 40 60 80
100 120 140
Coffee Logs andwood
products
Cocoa Bananas Aluminium Cotton Rubber
2014 (End-Sept)
Sources: CustomsandWBstaffcalculations.
figUre 1.1: sectoral Contributions to gdp growth, 2008-2014(est.) (in percent)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(Est.)
Oil Primary sector
Secondary sector (excl. oil) Tertiary sector
GDP growth
Sources: INS,MINFIandWBstaffcalculations.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 reCent eConomiC developments4 5
hasincreasedby25percentthenationalproduction
to 676, 4 Mwh in 2014. Construction is projected
togrowat7percent, ledbytheaccelerationofthe
governmentmajorinfrastructureprojectsparticularly
inroadconstructionandrehabilitation,andtheentry
intothemarketoftwonewcementproducers:CIMAF
and DANGOTE. However some construction sites
(especiallyroadsMaroua-Mora,Dabanga-Kousserie,
Batouri-Youkadouma-Ngoura…)havebeeninterrupted
duetoinsecurityintheFar-NorthandEastregions.
AccordingtotheNationalHydrocarbonsCorporation
(SNH), oil production in 2014 will slow down to
28.2millionbarrelscomparedtoapreviousestimation
of30.4(figure1.3),duetodelayinthedrillingofsome
new fields (Tiko, Bodjongo andYabassi) initially
plannedfor2014.Still,oilproductionisprojectedto
growby13.3percentin2014.
Inflation
TheinflationrateremainedbelowtheCEMAC3.0per
centconvergencecriteriainthefirstsemester(S1)of
2014(figure1.4).Itroseby1.1percentcomparedto
2.3percentinthesameperiodlastyear.
However,theriseinpriceunevenlyspreadsacross
the county’s territory (figure1.5). During the first
halfof2014comparedtothesameperiodlastyear,
inflationwaslowestinBamendaandEbolowawith
averageratesat-0.2and0.6percentrespectively.
PricepressureswerehighestinBertoua(Eastregion)
at 2.1 percent. This situation resulted partly from
therisingdemandofgoodsledbythepresenceof
refugeesfromCentralAfricanRepublic.
Recentchangesoffuelpricesatthebeginningofthe
secondsemesterhavestartedto impactthefood
andtransportinflationpace.InJuly,theinflationin
thetwomajorcitiesYaoundéandDoualaroseby2.4
and2.6percentrespectivelyowingtotransportprice
increasingby14.2and12.6percentrespectively.
…but fiscal performance is still preoccupying…
Thefiscalperformancedeterioratedduringthefirst
halfof2014,withhighcostofoilsubsidiescontinuing
toweighontheStatebudget.Indeed,asinthepast,
in order to balance the budget, the government
under-budgetedfuelsubsidiesatCFAF220billion
in2014,comparedtotheprojectedCFAF450billion
(about3percentofGDP).Toaddressthisproblem,
a presidential decree increasing fuel prices was
issuedonJuly1st2014.Thepriceofgasolineand
dieselincreasedby15percentwhilethatofdomestic
gasincreasedby8percent.Cameroondisplaysthe
highestfuelpricesamongoil-exportercountriesof
thesub-region(figure1.6).
Duringthefirstninemonthsof2014,therevenues
roseby12.7percentcomparedtothesameperiodin
2013,owingtoan18percentincreaseoftaxrevenues.
This performance should be contrasted with the
sharpdecreaseinoilpricepassingbelow$70/bbl
inDecember2014,anewcontextthatwillcertainly
affectoilrevenuescollected.
Throughoutthesameperiod,expendituresincreased
by 7 percent, leading to an overall deficit of 1.9
percentofGDP(table1.1).About47percentofthe
capitalspendingwasfundedbyexternalresources,
especiallygovernmentborrowingonprojects.
figUre 1.6: prices of fuel,selected Countries July 2014, Us$/liter
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Cameroon Congo Gabon Tchad Equatorial Guinea
Gasoline Diesel
Sources: CEMACmembercountries.
figUre 1.3: oil production 2009-14 (in mio barrels)
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
SNH projections
Sources: SNH.
figUre 1.5: inflation rate by major City 2014 (s1-o-s1 Change in percent)
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
Bam
enda
Ebol
owa
Buéa
Garo
ua
Mar
oua
Yaou
ndé
Natio
nal
Ngao
undé
ré
Bafo
ussa
m
Doua
la
Berto
ua
Sources: INSandWBstaffcalculations.
figUre 1.4: selected prices, 2013-2014(s1) (y-o-y Change in percent)
-1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Jan-
13
Feb-
13
Mar
-13
Apr-
13
May
-13
Jun-
13
Jul-1
3
Aug-
13
Sep-
13
Oct-
13
Nov-
13
Dec-
13
Jan-
14
Feb-
14
Mar
-14
Apr-
14
May
-14
Jun-
14
Total (Headline) CPI Food Price Index Fuel Price Index
Sources: INSandWBstaffcalculations.
table 1.1: fiscal performance, 2013-2014 (in percent of gdp)
2013 2014 2014 2014
Est. Budget End-Sept Proj.
Revenue and grants 18 17.1 13.4 17.6
OilRevenue 4.8 4.6 2.9 4.0
Non-oilRevenue 12.8 12.2 10.3 13.2
Directtaxes 3.5 — 3.1 3.6
Specialtaxonpetroleumproducts 0.8 — 0.6 0.8
Othertaxesongoodsandservices 5.8 — 4.4 5.9
Taxesoninternationaltrade 2.0 — 1.7 2.2
Non-taxrevenue 0.8 — 0.6 0.7
Grants 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4
total spending 21.9 19.6 15.3 22.7
CurrentSpending 14.6 13.2 10.4 15.1
Wagesandsalaries 5.4 5.4 4.0 5.4
Goodsandservices 4.6 4.1 3.1 4.8
Subsidiesandtransfers 4.2 3.4 3.0 4.5
Fuelsubsidies**** 1.7 1.4 — 2.1
Pensions 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.1
Other 1.4 1.0 — 1.3
Interest 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5
CapitalSpending 7.3 6.4 4.9 7.5
overall balance** –4.4 –2.5 –1.9 –5.1
Non-oilprimarybalance*** –9.0 –7.3 –2.1 –9.2
Sources: TableaudeBorddesFinancesPubliques,WBstaffcalculations.**doesnotincludepaymentofarrears.***inpercentofnon-oilGDP.**** Figuresfor2013isacashpaid;doesn’tincludetheresttopaytotheSONARA(1.3percentofGDP).projectionsfor2014takeintoaccounttheeffectsofreductioninfuelsubsidiesduetotherecentincreasingoffuelprices,sothefuelsubsidiesmovedfromabout3percentofGDPin2013to2.1percentofGDPin2014.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 reCent eConomiC developments6 7
The budget saving of about CFAF 165 billion
(1.1 percent of GDP) resulting from the reduction
ofoilsubsidiesisexpectedtobepartiallyabsorbed
by the reduction of the special tax on petroleum
products and global tax for transporters and a
CFAF30billionincreasesofpublicservantsalaries.
Overall,thegovernmentwillsaveabout0.9percent
ofGDPin2014,withtheoilsubsidiesprojectedto
decreasefromCFAF450billiontoCFAF330billion.
Furthermore,theinsecurityfacedintheFar-North
of the country due to regular attacks from Boko
Haramandthepreventivemeasurestofightagainst
Eboladiseasewillalsoincreasepublicexpenditure.
Accordingly, total expenditure will increase to
22.7percentofGDPfrom21.9percentofGDPin2013.
Totalrevenuewhichwillbeaffectedbythedownfallof
internationaloilpricesobservedsincethebeginning
ofsecondhalfoftheyear2014(figure1.7)isexpected
todeclineto17.2percentofGDPcomparedto17.6
percentin2013.Consequentlytheoverallfiscaldeficit
(commitmentbasis)isestimatedtowidenbytheend
of2014,reaching5.1percentofGDPcomparedto4.2
percentofGDPin2013.
…and the pace of debt and the external balances raise concerns
Debt
Thanks to the debt cancellation under the
HIPC-Initiative, the public debt of Cameroon is
currentlyatalowlevel.Thestockofpublicdebtis
estimatedat20percentofGDPinthefirsthalfof
2014,withanexternaldebtof14.6percentofGDP
and a domestic debt of 5.4 percent of GDP. The
government has been using this fiscal space to
externallyfinanceaseriesofinfrastructureprojects
toaddressthecountry’sinfrastructureneeds.The
externalfinanceneedof thegovernment for2014
wasestimatedat3.8percentofGDP.Ifthistrendis
maintained,Cameroonwillexceeditsself-imposed
debtlimitof35percentofGDPby2018,reaching40
percentby2020(figure1.8).Theshareofdomestic
debtisalsoprojectedtorise,from7percentin2013
to20percent in2019.Althoughtheexternaldebt
remainssustainable,theacceleratedpaceofdebt
accumulation in a context of relatively high fiscal
deficitsisworrisome.ItisexpectedthattheNational
Comity of Public Debt will closely monitor the
government’sdebtstrategyoverthecomingyears.
External Balance
Duringthefirstninemonthsoftheyear2014,thetotal
exports slightly increased compared to the same
periodin2013,thankstotheincreaseinoilexports.
However,non-oilexportsdecreasedby7percentin
value,wideningthenon-oiltradedeficitby10percent
(table 1.3). The overall trade deficit increased by
8percentcomparedtothesameperiodin2013.
Non-oilexportsareprojectedtomaintainthesame
paceovertheyear2014mainlyduetosomecurrent
bottlenecksattheportofDouala,andimportswill
declineby0.2percentcomparedto2013(table1.2).
Consequently, thetradebalancewilldeepenfrom
-0.7percentofGDPin2013to-1.4percentofGDPin
2014.Atthesametime,thecurrentaccountdeficit
(excludinggrants)willincreaseto4.7percentofGDP
from4.4percentin2013.
figUre 1.8: actual and projected stock of public debt, 2005-2019 (in percent of gdp)
0
10
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
(S1)
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
20
30
40
50
60
External public debt Domestic public debt
Sources: CAAandDebtSustainabilityAnalysis.
figUre 1.7: value of oil exports tied to international oil price, 2014 (Q1-Q4)
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
Quarter1 Quarter2 Quarter3 Quater4
Oil Exports in million of barrels International Oil price USD/Bbl Value of oil exports in billions of CFAF
Source: SNHandstaffcalculations.
box 1.1: economic impact of the Conflict in the far-north region
RecentdevelopmentsinNorthernCameroonhavepointedtoanalarmingdeteriorationinsecurityconditions
duetothepresenceofBokoHaram.Thenatureandreasonsofthisconflictaredifficulttocapture,butthe
economicimpactsarevisible.Duringtheyear2014,theinsecuritycrisisintheFar-Northhasnegatively
affectedagricultureactivitiesintheregionandtradewithneighbors.Thecrisisdisruptstheagricultural
schedulesandsomefamershaveabandonedtheirfields;thenetworkofdistributionofinputsandthe
supplyingofbordermarketshavealsobeendisturbed.Inaddition,theinaccessibilityofbordermarketsin
Nigeriahascausedanoversupplyandadeclineoffoodpricesandlivestockproductspricesinlocalmarkets
intheFarNorth.TheclosingofbordersatAmchidéandFotokolintheFar-Northregionhasleadto(i)the
scarcityofproductsfromNigeriaparticularlymotorcycles,spareparts,softdrinksand(ii)difficultiesto
sellsomeproductstoChad,CentralAfricanRepublicandNigeria.Finally,thebanningofmotorcyclesinthe
regionhasdisrupteddistributionservicestolargeconsumptioncenters.
Source: MINEPAT,DAPE.
table 1.2: trade balancre 2013 (Jan-sept), 2014 (Jan-sept) volume in million of tonnes, value in billion of Cfaf
2013(End-Sept) 2014 (End-Sept) 2013(Sept)o 2014(Sept)
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
Exports 4079 1542.4 4816.6 1638.7 18% 6%
Oil 2153.5 711.8 2808.3 860.5 30% 21%
Non-oil 1925.5 830.6 2008.3 775.2 4% -7%
Imports 5520.8 2480 5884 2652.8 7% 7%
Oil 998.8 435.1 1315.3 544.8 32% 25%
Non-oil 4522 2044.9 4568.6 2107.9 1% 3%
TradeBalance –937.6 –1017.1 –8%
Non-oilTradeBalance –1214.3 –1332.7 –10%
Source: CameroonCustoms.
table 1.3: balance of payments, 2014 (in percent of gdp)
2013 2014 (Proj.)
current account balance –3.8 –4.2
Tradebalance –0.7 –1.4
Oilandoilproducts 10.5 10.1
Non-oilexports(goods) 10.1 9.9
Imports(goods) 21.2 21.4
Services(net) –2.1 –2.1
Income(net) –2.1 –1.9
Transfers(net) 1.0 1.2
Financial account balance 3.2 4.1
Officialcapital 3.1 2.9
Long-termborrowing 3.5 3.6
Amortization –0.5 –0.8
Non-officialcapital(net) 0.2 1.1
Oilsector 0.4 1.2
Non-oilsector -0.2 0.1
overall balance –0.3 –0.1
Source: IMF.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 reCent eConomiC developments8 9
Medium term prospects are mitigated…
Oilproductionisexpectedtocontinueitsupwardtrend
overthecomingyears.TheNationalHydrocarbon
Company(SNH)projectsa12.9percentincreasein
productionin2015,followingthestartofproduction
in the Dissoni oil field discovered last year, the
reactivationofproductioninLokéléoilfieldandtheuse
ofrecoverytechniquestooptimizetheproductionof
maturefields(RiodelRey).Additionallyfournewfields
(Eroko,Tiko,Bodjongo,andYabassi)areexpectedto
bedrilledbytheendof2015.However,SNHprojects
apeakinproductionfor2015andadeclineforthe
followingyearsunlessongoingexplorationsleadto
newproduction.Inthemediumtolongterm,natural
gascouldfillthisgap,providedinvestments,suchas
a liquefiedgasterminal,makes itsexportfeasible.
The positive prospect on the production side is
counterbalancedwiththesteadydeclineincrudeoil
price.Indeed,afterfluctuatingaroundUS$108per
barrelduringthefirstsevenmonthsof2014,theprice
ofcrudeoilhashitafour-year lowandiscurrently
belowUS$70perbarrel—approximatelya31percent
declinesinceJune.
The Kribi deep sea port is almost completed. In
July2014aChineseshipwithtwotugswasableto
accessthedock,indicatingthattheportcanreceive
heavyvesselsfromnowon.Whiletheconstruction
oftheportisestimatedat99percent,delayswith
connectinginfrastructure,especiallytheaccessroad,
theelectricitylineandtheopticfibercable,aswellas
thesetupforCustomsmightimpactthestartoffull
operations.TheproblemsattheportofDoualalast
yearhaveshownthatitrepresentsamajorbottleneck
forinternationaltrade.Onceoperational,thenewport
inKribicouldhelpinboostingCameroon’sexports.
Onpower,theLomPangarHydropowerdamisthe
centerpieceoftheGovernment’sstrategytoensurethe
mediumtolongtermelectricitysupplyinthecountry.
Besidestheplantthatwillsupply30MWtocoverthe
energyneedsfortheeasternregionofCameroon,Lom
PangarallowstheregulationoftheflowoftheSanaga
indryseasons.Itpavesthewayfortheconstructionof
newpowerplantsontheSanagaBasintotapthefull
potentialofthisbasin.TheLomPangarHydropower
projectwill thereforecomplementthemultitudeof
ongoingorcompletedenergyprojects,includingthe
KribipowerplantandtheMekinandMemve’ledams
andbringthetotalenergysupplytoaround1,560MW
by2017.Thechallengewillbetomakethiscapacity
availablewhereitcanbemoreproductive.Assuch
thetransportofenergytomatchsupplyanddemand
isessential,andasurveyoflargeenergydemands,
particularlyfromtheindustrialsectorshouldbedone,
andtheconstructionoftransport infrastructureto
theseareasshouldbeplanned.
Apart from these projects of dam constructions
which could increase the energy supply in the
country,Table1.4listsotherinfrastructureprojects
which could improve in the medium term the
country’s production backbone and boost its
domestic,regionalandinternationaltrade.
The third telecom operator, Nexttel, is on board
since September 2014. The fourth one, Camtel,
hasreceived its licenseand isabout to launch its
activities.Consequently,increasingcompetitioninthe
telecommunicationsectorcanbeexpected,raising
expectationsintermsofgoodqualityofservicesat
lowerprices.Theeffectiveimplementationofthe3G
licensewillboostthetertiarysectorwhichremains
oneofthemaindriversofgrowth.
table 1.4: Cameroon’s major infrastructure projects
Projects
Estimated Cost (Billion
of CFAF)Operational
Timeline
Kribideepseaport 244 2015
LomPangarHydropowerdam
220 2016
Mem'veledam 380 2017
Mekindam 26 2015
HighwayYaounde-Nsimalen 60 2015
HighwayDouala-Yaounde 241 2017
AsphaltingoftheroadKumba-Manfé
87.5 2016
SecondbridgeontheWouri 120 2017
EntryEastandWestofDouala
99.2 2016
Source: MINEPAT.
External risks
Theprospectsforworldmarketsaremitigated.The
growth forecast for the world economy has been
reviseddownwardto3.3percentfor2014,0.4percent
lower than in the April World Economic Outlook.
Theglobalgrowthprojectionfor2015waslowered
to3.8percentowingtoaworseningofgeopolitical
tensions,areversalofboththeriskspreadandthe
volatility compression in financial markets, the
stagnationandthelowpotentialgrowthinadvanced
economies, and a decline in potential growth in
emergingmarkets.
DespitetheeasingofinterestratesbytheEuropean
CentralbankinJuneandSeptember2014,growth
is expected to remain lackluster and fragile. GDP
rateisforecastedat0.9percentin2014,downfrom
1.1percentaspreviouslyprojected.TheEuroZone
Economic Sentiment Indicator was stable since
January2014,showingthatconfidenceintheEuro
Zone is also stable (figure 1.9). At the same time,
some of Cameroon’s major trading partners like
ChinaandPortugalareprojectedtoimportlessthan
the year before (figure 1.10). Moreover, the main
destination countries of Cameroon’s exports are
Europe and Asian countries (table1.4). Therefore,
thedownturnineconomicactivitiesintheEurozone
andAsiaisexpectedtonegativelyimpactCameroon’s
exports,especiallycommodities.
figUre 1.9: euro-zone – economic sentiment indicator, 2012-2014 (long-term average = 100)
80
85
90
95
100
105
Feb-
12
Apr-
12
Jun-
12
Aug-
12
Oct-
12
Dec-
12
Feb-
13
Apr-
13
Jun-
13
Aug-
13
Oct-
13
Dec-
13
Feb-
14
Apr-
14
Jun-
14
Aug-
14
Oct-
14
Source: EuropeanCommission.
Domestic challenges
Considering the fall in international oil prices
internationaloilpricewhichisexpectedtocontinue
over the coming months, and its impact on oil
revenues(whichcountforabout25percentoftotal
revenues),thegovernmentisencouragedtocontinue
thereductionoffuelsubsidiesandtheelimination
of fiscal expenditures as it continues to handle
strategicallythesecuritychallengeinthefarnorth
anditsimpactsontheeconomy.
Another issue that requires attention is the high
level of poverty. Despite a decade of economic
growth,povertyratesinCameroonremainalmost
unchangedwithapopulationgrowthat2.5percent.
Aftershowingalargedeclinebetween1996and2001,
povertytrendshaveremainedstatic.From1996to
2001,theincidenceofpovertyinCameroondropped
figUre 1.10: actual and projected import volume, main trading partners, 2013- 2015 (variation in percent)
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
France
Spain
Netherlands
Portugal
China
2013 2014 2015
Source: IMFWEOOctober2014.
table 1.5: Cameroon, main export destination countries
Exports goodsMain export
destination countries
Coffee Italy,Portugal,France
Logsandwoods Italy,China,France
Cocoa Germany,Malaisie,Netherland
Bananas France,Belgium,UnitedKingdom
Aluminium Netherlands,France,Italia
Cotton China,Malaisia,Turkey
Rubber Spain,China,Netherlands
Source: CameroonCustoms
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 reCent eConomiC developments10 11
from53.5percentto40.2percent,whilethe2007
datashowedapovertyincidenceof38.7percent.This
trendisinlinewiththetrendofpercapitaGDPover
2003-2013(figure1.11).Whilepercapita incomes
haveexpandedbyabout45percentinlowincome
countriesand inSub-SaharaAfrica(exceptSouth
Africa) and even by 65 percent in middle income
countries,percapitaincomehasalmoststagnated
in Cameroon, growing by a mere 9 percent over
theperiod.
Moreover,Cameroonstillfacesamajorinfrastructure
gap, partly because of its low investment over
thelast20years.This iswhythegovernmenthas
pushed an investment agenda over the recent
years.Takingadvantageofitslowdebtlevelsafter
thedebtcancellationundertheHIPC-initiative,the
government has invested in infrastructure, such
asroads,electricityproductionandtheKribiport.
The acceleration of investment, however, poses
the problem of decreasing quality of investment.
Asthenumberofexecutedprojects increases,so
does the risk of investing in projects that do not
maximizereturns,asinstitutionalcapacitytoassess
thereturnsoninvestmentarelimited.Therefore,an
overarchinginvestmentstrategywithclearpriorities
isindispensabletoavoid‘opportunistic’investments
inprojectsthatarenotthemostpertinentorwith
suboptimal financing conditions. Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs) might also be a source of
financingfornewinfrastructureprojects,butonly
if future costs are accounted for in a transparent
way and if it is more favorable than turning to
capitalmarkets.
….and more efforts are needed to boost Cameroon’s growth...
Inadditiontoinadequateinfrastructure,economic
per formance is also hur t by governance
shortcomings. The business climate is not yet
conduciveforgrowth.Intermsoftheeaseofdoing
business inCameroon,thecountryscoredlowon
internationalbusinessclimatecomparisons,such
as the Doing Business ranking. It lost ten points
figUre 1.11: per Capita gdp growth, 2003-2013 (index 2003=100)
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cameroon Low income
Middle income SSA (w/o South Africa)
Sources: WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsandWBstaffcalulations.
moving from 148th to 158th over 169 countries
accordingtoDoingBusiness2015.Besidesthetopic
of“ProtectingMinorityInvestors”whereCameroon
has gained thirteen (13) points, its rank on other
topicsstayunchangedorlow(Table1.6).“Dealing
withConstructionpermits”(lostof34points)isone
of the bottlenecks in the ease of doing business.
EvenifCameroonmadeiteasierbydecentralizing
the process for obtaining a building permit and
by introducing strict time limits for processing
theapplicationaswellas issuingthecertificateof
conformity,dealingwithconstructionpermitremains
morecomplexbytheintroductionofnotificationsand
inspectionrequirements.
Inanefforttoattract investment,thegovernment
offers fiscal incentives to businesses through its
newinvestmentlaw.However,asarecentstudyby
theMinistryofFinanceonthecompetitivenessof
secondarysectorcompanieshaspointedout,fighting
corruption, cutting red tape and reforming the
judiciarysystemareimportanttobusinessowners.
Thispoorbusinessclimatecouldnegativelyaffect
capitalaccumulationorprecludethereallocationof
productionfactorstotheirmosteffectiveusesand
hencemaintaingrowthbelowthetargetsformulated
in the 2009 Strategy Document for Growth and
Employment(DSCE).Thissituationcallsforrenewed
attentiontothesourcesofgrowthinCameroon-to
identifypolicyareasthatcanhelpCameroonreach
the economic growth levels that are needed to
sustainablydevelopthecountryandreducepoverty.
table 1.6: ease in doing business in Cameroon
Topics DB 2015 Rank DB 2014 Rank change in Rank
StartingaBusiness 133 127 –6
DealingwithConstructionPermits 166 132 –34
GettingElectricity 52 52 Nochange
RegisteringProperty 172 172 Nochange
GettingCredit 116 111 –5
ProtectingMinorityInvestors 117 130 13
Payingtaxes 181 178 –3
TradingAcrossBorders 160 160 Nochange
EnforcingContracts 159 159 Nochange
ResolvingInsolvency 123 119 –4
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cameroon.
Oneareathatrequiresanaccelerationofreformsis
tradefacilitation,especiallytheefficiencyofthePort
ofDoualawhichaccountsforatleast95percentof
thegoodsexportedfromandimportedtoCameroon.
As the natural hub for the Central African region
givenitsstrategiclocation,inefficienciesatthePort
ofDoualarepresentsamajorconstrainttogrowth.
Therefore,anefficientPortofDoualaisakeysource
ofgrowth,asitwouldensurethatimports(including
intermediate goods for domestic production) are
cheaper in the domestic market and exports are
more competitive on foreign markets. The next
chaptersuggestssomeoptionsonhowtoimprove
theefficiencyofthePortofDoualaonthebasisof
theanalysisofimportedcargodwelltimesandthe
institutionalandregulatoryframeworkgoverningthe
managementofthePort.
assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala 13
assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala
TheportofDoualaisconstrainedbyalongwaiting
time at the entry gate as well as a long dwell
time. Improving the management of the port to
significantlyreducecargodwelltimeandensuring
its complementarity with the ports of Kribi and
Limbe will be essential for Cameroon’s external
competitiveness.Anabundanteconomicliterature
(Wilson et al, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Clark et al,
2004) has demonstrated that poorly-performing
portscanstronglyreducetradevolumesandmay
haveagreaterdampeningeffectontradeforsmall,
less-developed countries than many other trade
frictions and that port efficiency and services
infrastructure have a positive impact on African
trade(Djinkeetal,2008).Indeed,tradeandtransport
facilitation has become a vital tool in the process
of integrating markets and the performance and
efficiencyofaPorttohelplowertradetransaction
costshencereducingthemarginbetweendomestic
andinternationalpricestobenefitconsumersand
producers.
On average, the global importing time (from
departureinorigincountrytocargoexitattheport)
isestimatedat42days(39forcontainersand56for
non containers). 50 percent of this time is due to
maritimetransportandtheotherhalftotheglobal
cargodwelltime(fromvesselarrivaltocargoexit)
estimatedin2014at22days.Thisaveragevaluehas
beenquitestableinthelast10yearsdespitestrong
andconsistentgrowthintraffic.Someconsequences
oftheselongdelaysarethecrowdingeffectinterms
ofredirectionofsomevesselstoneighboringports,
notablytheportofPointeNoire intheRepublicof
Congo. In addition, long cargo dwell times largely
contributetothepoorrankofCameroon(133out
of166countries) inthe2014WorldBank logistics
performance indicators.Buildingontwomissions
that collected data on cargo delays at the Port of
Douala1andcomplementarydiscussionswithport
stakeholdersandafieldvisitofthePort,thischapter
assessestheefficiencyofthePortofDoualathrough
a disaggregated analysis of cargo dwell time, the
mainreasonsofcargodelaysattheportofDouala
andthenrecommendsmeasurestoimprovethePort
efficiencyandcompetitiveness.
The Port of Douala is one of the least efficient of the region…
Measuring the inefficiency of the Port of Douala
At least two indicators can beused to assess the
efficiencyofaport.Thetimespentbycargoswithin
the port or its extension and payments made by
shippingcompaniesortraderstoexitthecargos.In
thischapter,basedondataandinformationavailable,
theefficiencyorinefficiencyofthePortofDoualais
analyzedbasedonthecargodwelltime.Moreover,
1ThefirstmissionwasconductedbyGouassouDiarraandTchapaTchouawou,consultantsfortheWorldBank.Theobjectiveofthismissionwastoperformanin-depthdatacollectionandanalysistodeterminetheactualdriversoflongcargodelaysattheportofDoualainCameroon.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala14 15
since over 80 percent of the traffic at the Port of
Douala isrelatedto imports2,theefficiencyofthe
Portisanalyzedonthebasisofitsimportoperations
performance.Also,thestatisticalanalysisofcargo
dwelltimeindicatorshasbeendoneonlyforimport
cargoessinceonlythiscategoryofoperationswere
tradedfromthemanifesttothedeclarationtables
proposed by the Automated System of Customs
Data(ASYCUDA).Informationonexportdeclaration
was not filled during the period analyzed by the
presentanalysis.3Theanalysisisbasedonlyoncargo
282.4%ofthe141000cargoesrecordedbythecustomsauthorities in2013were importedand53.64%ofthemwerecontainerized.65%of totalcargoesregistered in2013forlocalimport,around15%fortransit,and20%forexport.ThetrafficinthePortofDoualahasincreasedupto9,84%from2012to2013.ThevesselsdischargedattheportofDoualacomeessentiallyfromAlgeciras(44%),Antwerp(21%),LasPalmas(9%)andSingapore(5%).EachvesselhavingmadeastopattheportofDoualaduring2013hasunloadedonaverage370containers.CargoesinthesevesselsaremainlyoriginatedfromFrance(23%),Belgium(16%),China(16%),ArabEmirates(10%),USA(7%)andGermany(4%)andthemaindestinationsofthesecargoesare:Cameroon(84%),Chad(13%),andRepublicofCentralAfrica(1%).
3According to Cameroonian customs, this issue wassolvedsinceMay2014throughareformwhichrequeststogenerateforeachexportdeclarationasingleBillofLading(BL)whichislinkedtoamanifest
discharged and assessed in 2013 which excludes
cargodischargedin2013butassessedin2014for
instanceorcargodischargein2012andassessedin
2013.Thereforetheresultsshouldbeinterpretedwith
thisrestrictioninmind.
Theglobaldwelltimemeasuresthetimebetweenthe
vesselarrivalordischargeandtheexitofcargoout
oftheport.Thisindicatoraimsatappraisingthejoint
performanceofallstakeholdersinimportoperations.
Itiscomposedof3components:theoperationaldwell
time,whichrefers to theperformanceofphysical
operations;thetransactionaldwelltime,whichrefers
totheperformanceofclearanceformalities;andthe
storage dwell time, which refers to the voluntary
storageofcargointhecontaineryardaspartofa
widerinventorymanagementstrategy.
Variousindicatorsofcargodwelltimecanbeused
toassesstheperformanceofdifferentstakeholders
ofimportatthePortofDouala.Thefigure2.1below
presentsthe listof individualoperationdatesthat
havebeenusedtocomputetheindicatorsofcargo
dwelltimeusedinthecontextofthepresentchapter.
Fromthesedifferentdates,severalcombinationsof
calculationarepossible.Wehaveanalyzedwhatwe
considerasthemostrelevantfortheanalysisofthe
box 2.1: the port of doula
Cameroonhasfourautonomousports:theportofDouala,themaritimeportofKribi,theseaportestuary
ofLaminaandtheriverportofGaroua.TheportofDoualaprovidesnear95percentofnationalporttraffic.
ItthuspositionsitselfasthemainportofCentralAfricaandservesneighboringlandlockedcountriessuch
asChad,theCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR)andtheNorthoftheRepublicofCongo.Theregulationsonthe
organizationoftheautonomousportofDoualaaredefinedbyDecreeNo.99/130of15June1999.Built
ontheestuaryoftheWouriRiver,thisportisconnectedtotheoceanbya50kmchanneldredgedtoan
averageratingof-7m.withanannualcapacityof7milliontonstraffic,itconsistsof:26berthson5.5kmlong,
7specializedterminals,15warehouses,65haofopenarea,25kmofrailwaysand20kmofpavedroads.The
containerterminalhasafrontofberthingof700mlongand45mTEUSwidefortrafficfrom1.2milliontons
to105000units.ASingleWindowforForeignTradeOperations(GUCE)wascreatedin2000tocoordinate
andhostinasingle-pointallthestakeholdersintheprocessofimportandexportofgoods.Itisoperational
since2002.SeveralindustrialandcommercialactivitiesoftheDoualaportwereprivatizedin2003and2004:
thecontainerterminalwasgrantedtoDoualaInternationalterminal(DIT),consortiumofleadingoperators
oftheportwhichincludesBolloré(Saga,SDV,SOCOPAO)andMaersk.
Source: http://www.logistiqueconseil.org/.
efficiencyofthePortofDouala.However,itshould
benotedthattherearesomeproblemsrelatedto
theaccuracyofsomedates,notablythevesseldate.
Forinstancewefoundthatforaround10percentof
declared items, the vessel was discharged before
itarrival.Thereforethesedatawereexcludedfrom
theanalysis4.
The global dwell time at the Port of Douala is
estimatedat22daysforthemeanvalueand16days
asamedian.Itishigherfornon-containerizedcargo
(30daysasmeanand21daysasmedian)thanfor
containerizedcargoes forwhichtheaveragetotal
dwell time is20dayswhilethemediandwell time
is15days.Asshown infigure2.2, it isamongthe
longestoftheportsofthecontinentforwhichdata
areavailable.TheaverageglobaltimeatthePortof
Doualais5timeshigherthantheoneofDurban,twice
ofthePortofMombasa,1.5timeofDarEsSalam
Port,exceedsby22percenttheglobaldwelltimeat
thePortofLomeandby10percentthePortofTema.
InmajorportsofAsiaandLatinAmerica,theglobal
cargodwelltimeisonaveragelessthanaweek.
The distribution of imported cargo dwell times
(figure 2.3) shows that 25 percent of all cargoes
have a dwell time higher than 26 days, while for
containerized cargo this value is estimated at
25 days against 34 days for non-containerized
cargoes.Figure2.3alsohighlightsthepresenceof
successive peaks that confirms the existence of
discretionarycargoesclearancebehaviors.Indeed
4Theanalysiswascompletedinfivemainphases:• Collectdetaileddisaggregateddataondwelltimeforthe
portofDouala,• Collectdatafromlogisticsservicesoperators(ofwhich
freightforwarders,customsbrokers,…),toassesstheircostsandservicesprices(aswellastimedata),
• Undertakefirmsurveystoassesstheextentoflogisticsconstraints on importers/exporters, large/small-scalecompanies,traders…,
• Quantitativeanalysisbasedoncollecteddata.
the peak around 11 days can be interpreted as a
psychologicalthresholdlinkedtotheexpirationofthe
legalfreetimeperiod.Theanalysisshowsthataround
1.6 percent of declared items of cargoes remains
withintheportmorethan90days.Forcontainerized
cargo this represents 1.1 percent and 4.6 percent
fornon-containerizedcargo.Thegoodswhichhave
stayedmorethan90daysarethoselikelytobesold
throughpublicauction.
figUre 2.1: Chronological dates Used for the Construction of indicators of Cargo dwell time
1. Date of departure of the vessel
Overall Importing time
MaritimeTransport time
Global Cargo Dwell time
2. Date of the registration of the manifest
3. Date of arrival of the vessel
4. Date of discharge of the vessel
5. Date of starting the process of declaration
6. Date of registration of the declaration
7. Date of assessment of the declaration
8. Date of payment of customs fees
10. Date of exit from the port gate
9. Date of issuing the permit of exit
Source: WorldBank,basedondatafromCamerooniancustoms.
figUre 2.2: average dwell time at selected ports of africa
0
5
10
15
20
25
Durban Douala Lome Tema Mombasa Dar es Salam
Source: WorldBank.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala16 17
figUre 2.3: distribution of imported Cargo dwell time (from discharging vessel to exiting Cargo) in 2013 at the port of douala (% of total items declared)
0 0.5
1 1.5
2 2.5
3 3.5
4 4.5
5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
% of total items declared
Dwell time (Number of days)
% o
f ite
ms
decl
ared
Source: WorldBankusingdatafromCameroonianCustoms.
Product, Destination and Broker Specific Assessments
Forvehicles,thedwelltimeisgreaterthan20days
andforrice,maizeandotherscerealsitisestimated
at an average of 56 days. By contrast, for fresh
products and products containing asbestos, it is
estimatedatlessthan6days.Thelegislationseems
to be one of the reasons for long delays for rice
and others cereals. In 2005, in order to facilitate
the country’s supply of rice, the Cameroonian
government allowed an exceptional 90 days free
time(thenormalfreetimeis11days)forriceasthis
commodity is the main imported food consumed
inCameroon(about700,000tonsperyear).This
decisionhasnotbeenreversedsincethen.
Discrepancies on the global time also exist when
we consider countries of destination of cargoes,
typeofbrokers, importersandcustomsregimes.5
Concerningdestinationsofcargos,whilecontainers
goingtoChadhave18daysasglobaldwelltime,it
isrecorded20.3daysforCameroon,27.1daysfor
theRepublicofCongoand44.7forCentralAfrican
Republic(CAR).6Thefactthatpartofcustomsfees
forcargosgoingtoCARarepaidattheportofDouala
largelyexplainsthislongdelay.Sincepartofcustoms
andimportfeesduetoCARarepaidatthePortof
Douala, the difficulties related to the mobilization
of resources to pay customs fees and deposit
necessarilycausedelays.Thisisconfirmedbythe
factthattheaveragetimetakenbythecontainers
goingtoChadislower(18days)thanthetimeofthose
5 three selectivity lanes are used by customs to clear cargo discharged at the port of douala.Theredlaneconsists in physical check using a scanner; the yellowlaneconsistsinadocumentcheckandthebluelaneforwhichthereisnoimmediatecheckasitseekstopromotefacilitationinimportoperations.Thegreenlaneissetforallcargoesafterclearance.In2013,61.2%oftotalcontainershavebeenclearedthroughtheredlane,28.9%throughtheyellowlaneand9.8%throughthebluelane.Fortransitcargothereisnobluelaneandtheredisessentiallytherule.Onlyasmallnumberofimportersarebenefitingthebluelaneundertheagreementofperformancecontract.Thisfacilitationlaneallowsreducingupto1weekthecargodwelltime.
6GaoussouDiarraetal.(2014),P.35.
goingtoCAR(about44.7).IfChadianimportershad
topayaportionoftheirdutiesinDouala,theirdwell
timewouldcertainlyincrease.
Substantial differences also exist between small,
medium and large customs brokers in terms of
average global dwell time. Medium brokers who
control half of the market seem to have lower
global dwell time (19 days) compared to the top
5 largest brokers owning a quarter of the market
(21.24 days) and small brokers (22.54 days). The
poorperformanceofsmallbrokersseemstobedue
totheirlowmasteryofproceduresanddifficultiesto
accessinformationontheitineraryofvesselsand
cargos.Consideringcustomsregimes,theaverage
timefortheredlaneis21days(16asamedian),20for
theyellow(14asamedian)and14daysfortheblue
lane(9asamedian).
Decomposition of the Global Dwell Time
The chronological date presented in figure 2.3
allowsdisaggregationoftheglobaldwelltime.The
figure2.4belowshowstheshareofeachcomponent
of theglobal dwell timeat thePortofDouala and
reveals its main sub-components that should be
targeted: (i) the customs declaration registration
time(fromdischargingvesseltoregisteringcustoms
declaration);(ii)thedeclarationpaymenttime(from
declaration assessment to paying customs dues)
and;(iii)thetimetogetexitpermit(fromdeclaration
paymenttoissuingexitpermit).
figUre 2.4: mean values of the share of each Component of Cargo dwell times within the global dwell time (from arrival to gate exit) in 2013 at douala port, all imported Cargo
0.71
58.34
4.8 1.83
18.54
19.87
7.98 From vessel arrival to vessel discharge
From vessel discharge to declaration registration
From starting declaration to registering declaration
From declaration registration to assessment
From declaration assessment to payment
From declaration payment to issuing exit permit
From issuing exit permit to gate exit
Source: WorldBankusingdatafromCameroonianCustoms.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala18 19
The customs declaration registration time (date
of declaration registration minus date of vessel
discharging) which assesses the performance of
customsbrokersandthequalityoftherelationship
betweenimportersandbrokersisbyfarthemost
importantcomponentoftheglobaldwelltime.Itis
estimatedonaveragearound58percentforoverall
cargoes (figure 2.4), 57 percent for containers
and 64 percent for non-containers. The average
value of this component of dwell time is 16 days
(14daysforcontainersand26fornon-containerized
cargoes)whilethemedianvalueis11days(11days
forcontainersand15fornon-containers).Thethird
quartilevalueis20days(19forcontainersand34
for non-containers). However, for containerized
cargoesclearedthroughthebluelaneandforrice
andmaize, thiscomponent isnotthehighestone
as it represents 38 percent in both cases. These
twocasessuggestadeliberatewillingnesstostore
cargowithintheportandallowstheconclusionthat
alargeproportionofthecustomsdeclarationtime
isnotduetoclearanceformalitiesbuttobehavioral
practices(willingnesstofraud,lackofanticipation,
absenceofrequireddocuments…).Thisdelaymay
be imputed to importers and customs brokers
becausetheregistrationofthedeclarationcannot
be completed if some required documents are
lacking. The responsibility of the pre-shipment
inspector (SGS) is also of concern since many
importersarecomplainingaboutitsbehaviorasa
monopolisticactor.
figUre 2.5: average Customs declaration registration time (in numbers of days)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Non -containerized Containerized Overall
Source: WorldBankusingdatafromCameroonianCustoms.
It is worth noting that the discharge of vessels is
delayedbythewaitingtimeattheentryofthePort
that was estimated in 2013 at 5 days on average
with a peak in September (around 10 days). This
delaywhichisanindicatoroftheinefficiencyofport
operatorsintermsofdredgingtheriverandhandling
equipmentsforunloadingandloadingvesselsatquay
isspecifictothegeographicalandlogisticfeaturesof
theportofDouala.Duetothisdelay,someshippers
areusingtheportofPointeNoire(theRepublicof
Congo)totransitanincreasingpartoftheirimport
cargoesgoingtoCameroon.Thepurchaseof4new
gantriesbythecontainerterminaloperator(DIT)in
May2014isexpectedtoreduceit.
The Declaration payment time (Date of payment
of customs duties minus date of declaration
assessment)isanindicatoroftheperformanceof
importers.Onaverage4days(figure2.6)separate
thedatesofassessmentandpaymentofdeclarations
bothforcontainerizedandnon-containerizedcargoes
(2daysformedianvalues).Thistimeisestimatedon
averageat2daysforbluelaneclearance,6daysfor
yellowlaneand4daysforredlane.Smallcustoms
brokersdisplayedonaverage1additionaldayforthis
componentofdwelltimecomparedtomediumand
largebrokers.Wecaninferthatdifficultiesofsome
importerstoaccessfinanceforpayingcustomsfees
isoneofthereasonsof longdeclarationpayment
dwelltime.
Thedeclarationassessmenttime(fromregistrationto
assessment),astepbeforethedeclarationpayment
timerepresentsonaveragelessthan2percentof
global cargo dwell time (figure 2.3) and less than
1percentfor90percentofcargoes.Itisworthnoting
that while the declaration time has been reduced
overthelastyearsasresultofcustomsreforms,this
transactiontimeisactuallymuchhighersincesome
brokersandcustomsagreeonalldetailswhenthey
wishtofraudbeforelodgingthedeclaration.
Thetimetogetexitpermit(Dateofissuingexitpermit
minusdateofpaymentofdeclarationfees)measures
theperformancesofimporters,terminaloperators
and brokers. It represents on average 20 percent
ofglobaldwelltime(18percentforcontainersand
28percentfornon-containers).Afterthepayment
ofcustomsfees,importersspendonaverage5days
(figure2.6)beforeobtainingtheissuingoftheexit
permit toremovecargoesoutof theport(3days
for containers and 13 days for non-containers).
75 percent of cargoes have encountered 5 days
asavalueofthiscomponentofdwelltime(4days
for containers and 14 days for non-containers).
Containerizedcargoesclearedthroughthebluelane
spendonaverage1additionaldayduringthistime
componentincomparisontothoseclearedthrough
theyellowlane(4daysagainst3)and2additional
dayscomparedtored lanecontainerizedcargoes
(2days).Itisalsothecasefortransit,riceandmaize
cargoes.Transitcargoestakesonaverage5daysto
getexitpermit(itreaches18daysforcargoesgoing
totheCentralAfricanRepublicwherethepolitical
instabilitymightexplainthislongdelay).Forriceand
maizecargoes,thetimetogetexitpermitisestimated
onaverageat40days,whichrepresentsonaverage
70percentoftheglobaldwelltime.Thelongtimeto
getexitpermitreinforcesthepresumptionthatsome
importers, especially large ones benefiting from
facilitiesthroughthebluelanecustomsclearance,
tendtousetheportasacheapwarehouse.Before
terminaloperatorsissueexitpermit,importersmust
payallcharges,includingwarehousingandtransport.
Thereforethereactivityofimportersinformulating
figUre 2.6: average Customs declaration registration time (in numbers of days)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Non -containerized Containerized Overall
Source: WorldBankusingdatafromCameroonianCustoms.
thisdemandofexitpermitislikelytobeaffectedby
financialconstraints.
After the issuing of the exit permit, 75 percent of
containerized cargoes exit within 1 day against 4
days for non-containerized cargoes. For rice and
maizecargoes,thiscomponentisestimatedat11.6
daysonaverage.Thislongdelaycanbeexplainedby
thefactthatimportersofthiscategoryofcommodity
havetoremovetheircargoesbyusingmanyrounds
oftrucksduetopoorroadinfrastructures,congestion
inportareascirculationinDoualaandweakhandling
ofterminalsequipmentsforloadingandunloading.
Duedothesechallenges,importersarguethatitis
impossibletomaketworoundsperdayswithtrucks.
In addition, the quality of trucks remains quite
questionable, which contributes also to increase
exitdelays.
Theanalysisofthedecompositionoftheglobaldwell
timeallowstheconclusionthatalargeproportionof
theglobaldwelltimeisneitherduetotransactional
processes nor operational processes but to
behavioralpractices.ItisactuallyduetowhatRefas
andCantens(2011)havedefinedasdiscretionary
dwelltimewhichcorrespondsto“thesumofallidle
timesbetweenvesselarrivalandexitfromcontainer
yardthatarestrictlystoragetimes’’.Thediscretionary
dwelltimeresultsmainlyfromabusinessmodelof
someimportersthatisbasedontheuseofthePort
aswarehouse.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala20 21
…mainly due to regulation and infrastructure limitations
Raballandetal(2012)haveidentifiedseveralreasons
forunusualcargodwelltimeinAfricanports.These
reasonsrangefromrent-seekingbehaviorsamong
shippers,intermediaries,andcontrollingagencies,
tolowlogisticsskillsandcashconstraintsformost
importersandprevailingmarketstructureonwhich
companiesuselongdwelltimesasastrategictool
topreventcompetition.ThesituationatthePortof
Douala is consistent with this observation. Based
onthe interviewscarriedoutduringthecollectof
cargodwelltimedataandthedisaggregationofthe
global dwell time above, specific reasons of long
dwelltimeatthePortofDoulacanbeclassifiedinto
six categories: (a) weak coordination of frontline
stakeholders;(b)monopoliesoftheinspectionand
the terminal operators; (c) Ineffective legislation
(d)highshareofinformalandunprofessionalbrokers;
(e)complexityandlengthofimportproceduresand;
(f)physicalandequipmentlimitationsofthePort.
Weak coordination of frontline stakeholders
RegulationofPortsinCameroonistheresponsibility
of the National Port Authority (APN), which
implementsthenationalportpolicyasdefinedby
the Government.7 The Port of Douala is managed
bythePortAuthorityofDouala(PAD). Itsmission
istocreate,maintain,improveandoperateallport
7Assuch,itisresponsibleforthenationalportdevelopmentplanning:developmentandcontroloftheimplementationofportsecurityandpolicestandards,ofthemonitoringof the implementation of legislation and regulationson environmental port protection; port performancemonitoring; compliance with competition rules in theexerciseofportactivities;monitoringoftheimplementationof the reducing port costs plan ; the participation, asappropriate, in the negotiations of the agreements tobe signed by the Government in the port field and thedefinitionoftheframeworkoftheexerciseandtransfersofportactivities.
facilities8toprovidecustomerswithaservicethat
meetstheirongoingneedsandexpectations.The
International Maritime Transportation Facilitation
Committee(FAL)wasestablishedin1997toensure
the facilitationofmaritimetraffic. Itsmaintask is
to monitor and coordinate the implementation of
measurestofacilitateandspeeduptraffic.
Since January 2005, the management of the
containerterminalwasgrantedbytheportauthority
toasinglecompany:DoualaInternationalTerminal
(DIT).MAERSKandSDVarethemainshareholders
with80percentofthesharesandcontrolmorethan
80percentoffreighttraffictoimportandexport.DIT
isresponsible forhandlingship(usingstandalone
gantry), handling land, and park management.
Handling operations are under the responsibility
of private operators grouped in unions. The most
importantistheGPAC(ProfessionalAssociationof
StevedoresofCameroon).TheCameroonNational
Shippers’Council(CNCC)whichisapublicagency
with legal personality and financial autonomy
providesassistanceandprotectinterestsofshippers.
A Single Window for Foreign Trade Operations
(GUCE) was created in 2000 to coordinate and
host inasingle-pointallthestakeholders involved
intheprocessof importandexportofgoods. It is
operationalsince2002.Itgroupsinthesameplace
entities representing customs, foreign exchange
service;theplantprotectionservice;theTreasury;
the PAD; the National Office of cocoa and coffee
Board(NCCB);theSociétéGénéraledeSurveillance
8Theportisorganizedinto11geographicareasofoperationincluding:(i)anareaforvariousgoods,(ii)amodernizedcontainersterminalwhichcoversanareaof23hectaresdividedintofourstorageareasandisintendedforcontainertrafficandimportedvehicles.Itreceivedin2013trafficof350,000TEUs.Therateofoccupationoftheterminalwasestimatedto90%in2013with65%ofboxesforimport,30%forexportand5%ofunloadboxesand(iii)aterminalforwoodtreatment;Afruitterminalformainlytrafficofbananas, pineapples and cereals; Mineral terminal fortrafficofaluminum;Oilterminal;Fishingarea;Shiprepairzone; Zone of logistical support to traffic of hinterlandcountries;Zoneoflogisticalsupportforoilexploration;Thelong-termstorageareasincludingwarehouses.
(SGS), banks and veterinary and phytosanitary
services. In 2007, the Government of Cameroon
launchedtheimplementationofthee-Guceaspart
of the automation on trade procedures with the
establishmentofanelectronicsinglewindowwhich
isacomputingplatformaimingtodematerialize36
trade procedures. Supported by the World Bank,
since2009,thisextensiveandambitiousprogramme
aimsatacceleratingtheautomationofinternational
trade procedures. The certificate of identification
ofsecond-hand importedvehicles(Civio)usedby
theSociétéGénéraledeSurveillance(SGS)andthe
automation of 16 procedures out the 36 planned
are among the achievements of the automation
programme.
The implementation of the GUCE has resulted in
productivitygains,areductioninthetimeoftransit
of goods, more security, a reliability of transport,
and an improvement of the quality of services of
the operators. However, the process of physical
layout at the one-stop shop of all stakeholders
remainsunfinished.Thisisthecaseofconsignees
and stevedores who are not physically within the
one-stopshop.Itseemsthattheavailablespaceof
theGUCEcannotaccommodatealloperatorsinthis
sector.TheSGShasonlyasmallteammakingthe
bulkoftheworktobedoneatitsheadquarters.On
theotherhand,althoughthebulkoftheservicesof
CustomsarepresentwiththeGUCE,theofficesof
transitandoneofhydrocarbonsarestilloutofthe
platform,whichisaburdenforsomeusers.
The weak coordination among key Port’s private
stakeholders also affects negatively cargo dwell
time.Theconsigneedoesnotofteninformimporters
orregistrantsofthearrivaloftheships.Importers
havetocallthecarriertofindoutiftheboatarrived
and have the manifest number and find out if
transshipmenthadhappenedduringtheride.Thus,
itmaytakeadaytohavethemanifest.Also,there
may be a difference between the manifest of the
vessel owner and the consignee manifest. Once
theconsigneehasvalidatedthemanifest,onlythe
customs can modify it. The modification of the
manifestmaytakeseveraldaysandaslongasitis
notdone,nodeclarationcanberegistered.
Itisalsotobenotedthatmultipleotheradministrative
services,presentinthePortandinvolvedinimport
procedures(marineservicesandMaritimeAffairs,
the gendarmerie, the police at the borders, the
fire department...) are still not present within the
GUCE. They are functioning following their own
rulesandthistendstogenerateunpredictabilityin
thelistofproductstobecontrolled.Thissituation
leadstoseveralharassmentsofimportersandthe
need for bargaining that induce additional cargo
dwelltimes.Inthesameperspective,thereisalack
ofarealsinglewindowfor thepaymentof feesto
thesevariousactorsandimpossibilitytopaythem
electronically.Theabsenceofanelectronicplatform
forsharinginformationofthesevariousstakeholders
islikelytomaintainacorruptionclimateatalllevels.
With the ongoing activities to reinforce and equip
theGUCE’splatform,financedbytheWorldBank
through its Regional CEMAC Trade and Transit
Facilitationproject,thereismuchhopetoupliftthese
bottlenecks.
Monopolies of the inspection and the terminal operators
Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI) complements
informationprovidedincustomsdeclarationsand
canbeusedtoevaluatecustomsduties.Asaresult
of inspection, the PSI firm issues a certificate of
conformityoracertificateofnon-conformity.The
customs administration intervenes after the PSI
firm.As inmanyotherscountries,onlyoneofPSI
firmhasbeenoperating inCameroonsince1988.
Someimporterspointedtothedifficultytohavea
promptanswerofthePSIfirmincaseoflitigation.
TheyarguedthatPSIfirmshaveatendencytosignal
errorsonlywhenthis increasesthepaymentthey
receivewhichresultsindelaystoobtaincertification
required to register a customs declaration. As a
result, importers perceive the behaviors of these
powerfuloperatorsasmonopolisticpractice.
Besides,tosomebrokersandimporters,conditions
setbyship-owners for theremovalofcontainers
tend to penalize Cameroonian SMEs and entail
long cargo dwell times. This is for instance the
casefortheobligationtodepositofCFAF1million
per container (about 2,000 USD) and delays in
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala22 23
repayment of the deposit. Dealing with such a
deposit becomes problematic when a customs
broker is facing 30 or 50 containers. He has to
find revenue to cover the operation and that can
generateadditionaldelays.Thispracticeofdeposit
of a large amount of money prior to removing
the container is perceived as being unfair and a
distortiontofreetradesincethedepositispaidby
someimportersandnotbyothers.Thereforethe
systemisperceivedbylocalimportersasastrategy
ofunfaircompetitionfromlargefirms.Inthesame
vein, some brokers argued that the containers
terminaloperator“Douala InternationalTerminal
(DIT)”seemstobelessneutralandtendstofavor
importersrelatedtoitsinternationalshareholdersto
thedetrimentoflocalSMEsregardingtheremovalof
containers.Asthereareinsufficientequipmentfor
terminaloperations(onlytwogantriesoftendown),
DITtendstohandleinprioritycontainersthatmust
beinspectedthroughscannertothedetrimentof
containerswithmanybillsofladingwhichmustbe
clearedatexternalwarehousing.Fournewgantries
havejustbeenboughtbyDITinMay2014,whichis
expectedtosubstantiallyresolvetheseconstraints.
Ineffective legislation
Oneofthemaincausesofcargodwelltimeatthe
portofDoualaislackofanadaptationoflegaltexts
tofacilitateprivatemanagementoftheport.Thelaw
on port operations which dates back to 1985 and
hasnotevolveddespitetheprivatizationoftheport
management since 1998, which set the free time
at11daysforimportand90daysfortransit.Italso
setthedailystoragefeesataverylowlevelofCFAF
600/day(around1USDperday).Theconsequence
is that it iseconomically interesting for importers
to keep cargo for long storage within the port as
the external storage will be more costly. This is
particularly true for the dwell time of refrigerated
containers for which the daily fees per container
isCFAF10,000(around15USD)whilethecostfor
theterminaloperatoristwicehigher(CFAF24,500)
duetothecostofelectricity.Theimportersuseport
installations to keep theirs commodities because
itischeaperthanoutsidewheretheyshouldrenta
warehouse,payforelectricityandsecurity.
Thereforesomelargeimportersdonothesitateto
privatizethesmallparkofrefrigeratedcontainersas
abusinessstrategytoexcludesmallercompetitor
from the market. The current occupancy rate
of the terminal is 130 percent because about
4,000containerswhichwereassessedbycustoms
arecurrentlyenjoyinglongdwelltimeattheterminal.
Thisrepresentsaround40percentof thestorage
capacityoftheterminal.Thesecontainersareowned
bylargeimporterswithhighinfluentialpower.This
behavior is detrimental to local SMEs in terms of
competitiveness.
High share of informal and unprofessional brokering market
TheroleofacustombrokeriscentralwithinaPort.
Aselsewhere,inCameroon,importersmustusea
customsbrokerwhoactsonbehalfoftheclientand
isresponsibleforallcustomsclearanceoperations.
Specific skills, knowledge, and experience are
needed for effectively managing the clearance
process,properlyassessingtherisks,andensuring
profitability.It isnotalwaysthecaseinthePortof
Douala.Accordingtoarecentstudycompletedby
Cantensetal(2014),threebrokercategoriesexists
at the Port of Douala: (i) formal brokers (working
withinformalimporters),(ii)“Professional”informal
brokers with training, education, and experience
in the transit sector and a sound knowledge of
customs practices, procedures, and documents,
(iii)Nonprofessionalbrokers,otherwiseknownas
bala-balasbytheirmoreprofessionalcounterparts.
Somehaveanintuitiveknowledgeoftheprofession,
whileothersarequiteexperiencedand,ingeneral,
aremoreeagertotakeonriskswithfewercontainers.
Overall,ThomasCantensetalhaveidentifiedmore
than200informalbrokersoperatinginandaround
the port of Douala (versus 220 official brokers9,
includingofficialrepresentativesofembassies).
Theissueofcargodwelltimeisespeciallyproblematic
forthebala-balasbecauseoftheirnonprofessional
practicesandlackofskills.Brokersestimatedthat
9 Approximately 200 official certified customs brokers(commissionnaires agréés en douane, CAD) operate inCameroon.
between 50 and 80 percent of informal brokers
arebala-balas(accountingforlessthan30percent
of declarations) who have no license and no
identification (ID) login to access the IT customs
system,whichismandatoryforlodgingadeclaration.
They thus “hire” (against payment) an ID from a
licensed broker and lodge declarations through
the broker’s login. Most of them ignore clearance
proceduresandthefull listofdocumentsrequired
whichentailsoverheads,stress,leadtolowerquality
ofservicesandthereforecontributestotheincrease
ofdwelltime.
As shown by Refas and Cantens (2011) this high
informalityistheconsequenceoftheveryconcentrated
brokering market in Douala, with an aggregate
marketshareofthe20biggestagentsthatexceeds
55 percent for container imports destined to local
consumption.Despitetheincreaseinthenumberof
brokers inoperation(+4percentannually)thefirst
playersgainmarketshareeveryyear.Theconcentration
leadsto lownegotiatingpowerofclients,especially
small and occasional ones who turn to low cost
unprofessionalbrokers.
Length of import procedures.
Asatisfactionsurveyofusersofthecarpark,and
among brokers and importing firms conducted
in 2012 by the regional Institute for Statistics
and Applied Economics (ISSEA) identified slow
administrative procedures as one of the main
obstacles to the reduction of delays at the Port
of Douala. As shown in figure 2.7 below, brokers
and importerscriticize theclearanceprocedures,
especially at the PAD, SGS, DIT, stevedores and
Treasury.Thesegrievancesrelatetothenumberof
documents, travelanddeadlines.Usersmuststill
move with a lot of photocopies to adjust certain
operations,evenifstakeholders,apartfromthoseof
thecarparkandstevedores,arefoundinthesame
building.Most importersofsecond-handvehicles
havesuggestedgroupingthroughtheautomation
programallthestakeholdersinvolvedinthecustoms
clearance procedure. The ongoing automation
programshouldsignificantlyreducetheslownessof
procedures.
Physical and equipment limitations of the Port
TheinfrastructureofthePortofDoualaisinsufficient
and of low quality. According to a report of the
nationalportauthority(APN)madepubliconJuly
2014, the port of Douala that was designed to
accommodate traffic of 10 million tons is running
todaybeyonditscapacity.Thecurrenttraffic,which
increasedby9.8percentbetween2012and2013
exceeds by 600,000 tons its real capacity. This
situationresultfromseveralfactors,amongwhich:
thefluvialnatureofthePort,insufficientquaysand
handlingequipments.
figUre 2.7: port stakeholders where Users are more affected by slow administrative procedures
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
PAD
SGS
DIT
Stev
edor
es
CNSS
Trea
sury
GUCE
Polic
e
Bank
s
Source: ISSEA.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala24 25
Thefirstphysicallimitationisthefluvialnatureofthe
Port.LocatedintheestuaryoftheWouririver50km
fromtheseaintheheartoftheGulfofGuinea,the
PortofDoualaextendsoveranareaof1,000haof
which60percentareexploited.Thetotalwharflength
is600metersandthedepthhastobemaintained
ataminimumof7mtoallowaccesstoships.The
Wouririverdoesnotbenefitfromregulardredging
toremovesandwhichentailswastingtimeatlanding
(saturatedquays,12intotal)andattheentrygate
of the port.10 In addition, the docks of the Port of
Doualahavebeenbuilttoaccommodatevesselsof
150meterswhilethetendencytodayistousevessels
measuring200metersforscaleeconomy.Thearrival
of longer vessels lengthens the time needed for
unloadingoperations.Thesedelaysaffectbothcargo
dwell time incontainerizedandnoncontainerized
terminals. These delays have been estimated at
5 days on average during 2013 according to port
operators.Thesituationhasworsened in thefirst
semesterof2014whentheaveragenumberofwaiting
daysincreasedto9.7days.Accordingtolocalpress
articles, in May 2014, more than 20 vessels were
waitingfor1monthattheentrypointoftheportdue
tocongestiononquaysoftheportwheremorethan
10vesselswerestilloffloading.
Insufficientnumberofquaysandweaknessesofthe
Doualacontainerterminal(DIT)alsocontributetothe
weakoperationalcapacityofthePort.Twoofthe15
existingquaysaredefectiveandonrehabilitationand
amongtheother13,someareclutteredbyshipsand
wrecksorservedforactivitiesthathavenothingtodo
withtheirpurpose.
10ThePorthastwoentrances,thenorththatisreservedforentryoftrucksandtractorsandthesouthernforexit.Howeverhandlingequipmentcanusebothaccess.Thesouthoneisregularlycongestedduetothepoorqualityofroadsleadingtotheportwhichalsoentailsomedifficultiesorimpossibilitytomakemorethanonerotationsperdaybytrucks.Asconsequence,thehandlingofcontainersisdoneonlybyoldtrucks.Thetrucksownersconsiderthatitisalosstoassignnewtrucksfortheseoperationsinsuchconditions.
Concerningthecontainerterminal,untilthemiddle
of the year 2014, DIT had only two Wharf cranes
andthuscouldnotusethe3postsatitsdisposalto
handletheunloadingofshipsandassuchwasunable
tomeetdailyrequestsforremovalfromimporters.
Overall,thebrokeringprofessionestimatesthatasa
resultoftheinsufficientnumberandfailuresofWharf
gantry, container terminal performance declined
from23containersperhourto20containersper
hourfrom2012to2013.Thissituationhasledtothe
redirection of some vessels to neighboring ports.
Thebrokeringprofessionestimatesthatanoptimal
handlingsituationrequires fourwharfcranesand
eight gantries. At the time of writing, work was
underway for the installation of four additional
gantriespurchasedinMay2014.
Furthermore, few trucks in good condition are
availabletodelivercargoestoconsigneesduetothe
badqualityandtrafficcongestionoftheaccessroad
totheport.Importersarguedthatitisimpossibleto
make2tripsperdaypertruck.Onepotentialsolution
couldbetodefinenighthoursforthetrucktrafficof
largeimporters.Itisthesamedevicesthatareused
bothtounloadanddelivercontainers.
Frontally addressing these infrastructure and regulation limitations will enhance the efficiency of the Port of Douala
Theimprovementoftheefficiencyofthemanagement
of the ports has been a key component of the
governmentactiontopromotetheattractivenessof
thecountryduringthepast15years.Theseefforts
are today reflected in significant improvement of
transportinfrastructure,modernizationofcustoms
administration, intensification of the fight against
corruption and informal practices and border
controls. The Government is supported by the
donorcommunitythroughamulti-donortransitand
transport facilitation program co-financed by the
WorldBank,theAfricanDevelopmentBankandthe
EuropeanCommissiontohelpCameroon,Central
African Republic and Chad address their trade
facilitationchallenges.
Despiteoftheseeffortsdeployedoverthepastyears,
theobjectivetoreducetheglobaltimeto7daysatthe
endofthe1990hasnotyetbeenabletobeachieved.
Theglobaldwelltimestillrepresentsmorethanthree
timesthattarget.Thedecompositionoftheglobal
dwell timeandtheanalysisof thereasonsofhigh
dwelltimeabovehaveshownthatthehighimpacts
problemsofhighdwelltimeareaboveallstructural
(weak coordination of stakeholders, monopolies
of the Port and the PSI operators, informal trade
practice,useofthePortascheaperwarehouse…)
thananyother.Thatcallsfirst forthepreparation
andadoptionbyallstakeholdersofacomprehensive
structuralreformplan.Othersoptionsrecommended
bythepresentreport to improvetheefficiencyof
thePortofDoualainclude:therevisionofthelegal
frameworkgoverningthePort,theimprovementof
the awareness of importers and brokers on trade
procedures,theaccelerationofthemodernization
ofthePortofDouala,andtheimprovementofdata
collectionandanalysisoftradefacilitationstatistics.
The need for a comprehensive structural reform plan
Thedeterminantstepforsettingupacomprehensive
structural reform plan aimed at achieving a
sustainablereductioninthedwelltimeshouldbeto
buildconsensusamongvariousstakeholdersinorder
toovercomestatusquopracticesandbehaviors.This
impliestotake intoaccountthepoliticaleconomy
surroundingimportandexportactivities.Basedon
theexperienceoftwoPorts,arecentstudyledby
Raballandetal.(2012)hasidentifiedkeycomponents
ofareformpolicythatcould leadtoasustainable
reductionindwelltime:(a)political impetusofthe
State, (b) regular meetings of stakeholders at a
decision-makinglevel,(c)auditteamstoreengineer
processes, and (d) a comprehensive approach
to changing the behavior of stakeholders. The
Boxbelow, showsthemain features onhow such
approach was successfully applied in Durban
andDaresSalaamPorts.Thesetwocasestudies
demonstratethataddressingstructuralconstraints
can lead to a sustainable reduction of the dwell
timeandsignificantly improvethecapacityof the
containerterminalwithoutanyinvestmentinphysical
extensions.
Astartingpointofthepreparationofsuchstructural
reformplanshouldbeanindependentauditonchoke
pointsinanyareaofportoperations.Itshouldinclude
auditsofthemonopoliesofthecontainerterminal
concession and the PSI operator performances
due to their strategic role within the Port. These
auditscouldserveasbasisfortheimplementationof
performancebasedmanagementcontractforthese
twooperators.
Theobjectiveoftheauditofthecontainerterminal
concession would be to assess its performance
comparedtothemissionsthathavebeenassigned
toit.Theresultsoftheauditcouldalsohelptobring
clarityon(i)theconcessionalagreements,onthe
distributionofrolesbetweentheconcessionaireand
thePortauthorities,(ii)thealignmentofincentives
of the concessionaire and the country’s, and
(iii) performance targets in concession contract.
Such audit would temper the perception that the
performanceofDIThasincreasedatthemarginwhile
tariffshavetremendouslyincreased.
Concerning the audit of the PSI operator which
is in place since 1988, in principle, PSI programs
arereputedtobetransitorytoavoidcollusionwith
others stakeholders (V. Dequiedt et al., 2009).
An operational audit would help to assess the
performanceoftheoperatorandadvisewhetheror
notitscontractshouldbemaintained.
Similarly, the recent study of Cantens and al
(2014)haspointedouttheneedforShapingbrokers’
marketstructureandpracticestochanginginformal
tradepracticesinanincentive-compatibleapproach
andrecommendsthatforpoliticaleconomyreasons,
acoalitionbetweencustomsandsomebrokersand
importersshouldbeencouraged.Howeveritnotes
thatthiswouldnotbeaneasytaskbecausebrokers
aresometimespoliticallypowerfulandsomepast
initiativeshavenotledtotheexpectedimpacts.For
example,theTradeFacilitationCommittee,GUCE,
and customs wanted to establish a certification
programforbrokersandfreightforwarders,butcould
notachievetheirplansbecausesome“professionals”
didnotmeettherequiredcriteriaandsabotagedthe
wholeinitiative.Adifferentiatedapproach(through
contractualincentives)couldalsobeenvisionedto
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala26 27
addressthatmatter.Thesamestudyalsomentions
that it is essential that customs officials disrupt
information asymmetries and better disseminate
information to informal importers on customs
processes and official costs and should sanction
more strongly some informal brokers in order to
reducecollusionwithsomecustomsofficers.
Finally,theNationalPortAuthorityofDoualashould
prepare and implement an ethics code for the
importersandconsigneesaswellasperformance
contractsforconsignees.Thecodeofethicsshould
bepartoftheapprovalofconsignee’scontractsand
subjecttoanamendmentofformercontract
It is worth noting that long term commitments
frompolicymakersandprivatestakeholderswillbe
essential. Indeed, reducing cargo dwell time may
notbeintheinterestofsomeprivatestakeholders
(terminal operator, customs broker, importers)
becausethestatusquoissupposedtocontributein
optimizingtheirsprofits(theportisacheapandsafe
storagesolutionforsomeimportersanditgenerates
somegainsforportwarehousingoperators).
Revise the legal framework governing the Port of Douala.
Theobjectivesofthisrevisionwouldbetodiscourage
the use of the Port as storage. The reform would
consistintherevisionofthelawonportoperations
whichdatesbackto1985tointroduceasubstantial
increaseinwarehousingfeesandanapplicationof
financial penalties such as those proposed in the
financelaw2003/07for2004fiscalyearstatingthat
cargoescarriedinCustomsofficesshallberemoved
upontheissuanceoftheauthorizationgrantedby
thecustoms(afterthepaymentofduties),except
timespeciallygrantedbyit.Failuretocomplywith
this legal obligation should be sanctioned by the
paymentofafixedpenaltyaccordingtothefollowing
scale: 1 to 30 days: CFAF 100 000 (around 200
USD);31to60daysCFAF200000;61to90days:
CFAF300000;beyond91days:CFAF400000per
month.Thescaleofthesefinancialpenaltiesshould
beincreasedinordertohaveaneffectiveimpacton
behaviors.Thisfinancialsanction,althoughmodest,
isnotcurrentlyapplied.Wesuggestthatinaddition
tothestrictapplicationofthelaw,theauthoritiesalso
considertosignificantly increasedemurrageafter
22days,exceptspecialdispensationofthetypesof
commodities.
Besides,itshouldbenotedthatcustomsdonothave
aspecificareawithintheport forstoringcargoes
havingpassedthedeadlineof11daysoffreetime.
Thus,thesecargoescoexistwithcargoesunderfree
time.Article108oftheCEMACcustomscodedefines
90 days as a maximum clearance delay beyond
whichcargoisconfiscatedandputundercustoms
bondedstoragetobeauctioned.Inpractice,public
auctionsareorganizedeach6monthsattheport
ofDouala. Inaddition,beforepublicauctionsome
importers seize the judge to oppose the sale and
oncetheorderisobtained,noformalitiesofremoval
shall be taken until the next sale where the cycle
begins again. Therefore, a change in the CEMAC
stockpilingregulationsshouldbedone. Insteadof
prescribingaformaldepositionattheendofthefree
time,which isaltogether fictitious in fact, itcould
be like insomecountrieswhere incustomsareas
cargoesareorganizedinthefollowingmanner:free
timeperiod;timeout;stockpilingafter90daysbut
themerchandiseisconsideredabandonedandcan
neitherbedeclared(ifnotyet)norremovedbythe
importer as it becomes the property of customs
administrations.Thisorganizationwouldhavethe
advantageofavoidingsuccessivedelaysincargosale
afteracourtdecision.TheGovernmentofCameroon
shouldalsoconsidertheprivatizationofwarehousing
anddryportcustomclearancespacesoutsidethe
Doualaport.
However,thesereformsshouldensurethatimporters
willnottranslateallfinancialsanctionsduetolong
dwelltimeintothefinalpriceofgoodsforconsumers.
This requires a political support and the general
public must be well-informed about challenges
underlyingreformsaimingatreducingcargodwell
timesothatitbecomesadriverofchange.Highlevel
publicdecision-makersshouldbeinvolvedthrough
aneffectivecommitmenttoovercometheproblem
because it impedes the welfare (increase in final
prices)andtheattractivenessofthecountryinterms
oftrade,investmentsandcompetitiveness.
Finally, there isalsoaneedtorevisethestatusof
thecustomsstaffandthoseofothersstakeholders
involvedinthefunctioningofthePort.Legalworking
hoursthatarecurrentlyfrom7:30amto3:30pm
need to be adapted to the current situation of
congestionofthePort.Itwouldbehelpfultomake
working hours more flexible through allowing
customs and others Port operators to maintain a
workingpresence24hoursaday,sevendaysaweek.
Thisrevisionofworkingtimecouldbeaccompanied
byaperformance-basedpaysystemforcustoms.
box 2.2: examples of successful reforms in reducing Cargo dwell time in africa
the case of the Port of durban. FollowingrecurrentmutualcomplaintsbetweenTransnetPortTerminals
andprivatestakeholdersondwelltimeanditscauses,aninterimadvisoryboardwascreated,co-chairedbya
managerfromTransnetandachiefexecutiveofficerfromtheprivatesector,withthemandatetoidentifythe
keymeasuresthatshouldbeimplementedtoreducedwelltime.Overaperiodofthreeyears,thiscommittee
metfortnightly.ThecommitteeincludedthePortoperator(TransnetPort),therailoperator(TransetFreight
Rail),cargoowners(containerLineroperatorsforum);landlordandmarineservices,theNationalPorts
authorityandfreightforwarders.Anauditteamwasaddedtothegrouptoprovideanindependentview
onwhatshouldbedone.Thisteamwascommissionedonanadhocbasistogivetechnicaladviceonthe
measurestobetaken.Itwascomposedofarepresentativeofashippingline,arepresentativeoftheroad
freightassociation,arepresentativeofPortnet,andarepresentativeofanengineeringfirm.
ThelessonsfromDurbanshowthattheterminaloperatorfirstneedstoreengineeritsinternalprocessesand
proceduresandthentoagreeonmeasurestochangethebehaviorofprivatestakeholders,suchasshipping
lines,transporters,customsbrokers,andsoon.Itisalsocriticaltoresolvehigh-impactproblemsfirstand
thentoagreewithportusersontheproblemtoberesolved.Inthisregard,itisimportanttodemonstratethat
dwelltimecanbereduced.Durbanstakeholdersusedacomprehensive“enablingblock”approachwhich
changedtheincentivesforcraneoperators,changedporttariffs,alteredtheopeninghoursofcontaineryard
operators,establishedaqueuingsystemfortrucks,andinvestedinsoftwareandequipment.Averagedwell
timethatstoodatsevendaysin2002wasreducedtothreedaysin2004.
the case of the Port of dar es salaam.InDaresSalaam,amultistakeholderworkshopondwelltime
identified205issuesinJune2008andproposedactionstoimprovetheperformanceofdwelltime.The
processwaschampionedbyahigh-levelinterventionledbythepresidentandprimeminister,whichresulted
intheformationofamultistakeholderPortDecongestionCommittee,whichmetfortnightly.Moreover,
stakeholderscommissionedacommitteeofspecialiststoidentifykeymeasurestoreducedwelltime.
ThesetupandfunctioningofthePortImprovementCommittee(PIC)issimilartotheapproachtakenin
Durban.Forexample,participationisatthechiefexecutivelevel,bothprivateandpublicsectoragencies
arerepresented,meetingsareheldfortnightly,andtwosubcommittees—oneondwelltimeandanotheron
standardoperatingprocedures—convenetotacklespecifictechnicalassignmentsonbehalfofthePIC.The
subcommitteeonproceduresundertakesauditsonchokepointsinanyareaofportoperations.Ittookabout
oneyeartodevelopthestrategyforincreasingstoragethroughputandalteringthebehaviorofthevarious
participants.Outof205issuesidentifiedthroughstakeholderconsultations,thePICsummarized10priority
actionstoreducedwelltimeandimproveproductivityintheport.ReportsbythePICindicatethatdwelltime
wasreducedfrom25daysto15in2009andthento13in2010.
Source: Raballandetal.in Why does cargo spend weeks in Sub-Saharan African Ports, lessons from six countries, chapter 6, pp88-92.
Cameroon eConomiC Update n8 assessing tHe performanCe of tHe port of doUala28 29
Improve the awareness of importers on trade procedures
Thisrecommendationhastwoobjectives:todecrease
thefinancialunpreparednessoftheimportersand
reducerentseekingbehaviorofportstakeholders.
Asseeninaprevioussection,thelackofknowledge
of procedures leads to financial unpreparedness
of the importer. Two main measures could help
address the misinformation of the importers on
theproceduresoftheircase:(i)theorganizationof
trainingandworkshopsand(ii)theimplementation
ofanalertsystemonthetraceabilityofvesselsand
cargoescomingtothePortthatwillhelpimportersto
anticipatethemobilizationofvariouscostspayable
ontheportarea.
Concerning the training on procedures, at the
requestoftheFAL,theCameroonNationalShippers’
Council projects to organize series of workshops
on procedures for trade operators. To be more
productive,theseworkshopsshouldbedoneonthe
basisofa“guidetotheimporter,”editedorpublished
byCustomsorGUCEandshouldleadtothedelivery
of a certificate of importation preparedness to
importersthathaveparticipatedtotheworkshop.The
expectedresultsofthismeasureshouldhoweverbe
temperedduetothefactthatmanyofimportershave
abusinessmodelbasedoncollusionwithcustoms.
Extensivetrainingsweredoneinthe90s/2000sand
didnotleadtoimpressiveresultssincetheones,who
wishtofraud,eitherdonotattendtrainingordonot
usethem.
Forthesettingupofanalertsystem(email,SMS)
the authorities could use data from ASYCUDA to
informimportersdirectlyonthelevelofprogressof
theircaseateverystage.Theauthoritiescouldputin
placeaweborSMSapplicationallowingtheimporter
tofollowhiscase,basedondatafromASYCUDAand
informtheimportersontheexistenceofthistool.The
ongoingactivitiestoreinforcetheGUCEwillmake
possibletheseoptions.ThePortauthoritiesshould
alsosolicitfromcarrierstomaintaininformationon
transshipmentsontheirwebsites,ormakeitavailable
tocustomsorGUCEsothatimporterscanaccess
informationthroughawebsiteorviathenotification
system.Additionalactiontoincreasetheawareness
onprocedurescouldincludeautomaticinformation
toimportersbyemailorSMStonotifythemwhere
tofindtheproceduresandregularinformationinthe
newspapersabouttheavailabilityofproceduresat
thewebsitesofDGDorGUCE.ThePortauthorities
couldalsoprovideanonlinesimulatorallowingthe
importer to estimate duties and taxes to be paid
beforethearrivalofhisgoods.
Accelerate the modernization of the Port of Douala
The modernization of the Port of Douala requires
continuation of efforts by the authorities and
othersstakeholdersofthePortontheupgradeand
the modernization of the Port of Douala. Douala
InternationalTerminal(DIT)hasrecentlyinvestedon
themodernizationofthecontainerterminalthrough
theacquisitionoffournewgantrycraneswhichare
operationalsinceAugust2014.Thisinvestmenthas
increasedDIT’sproductivity throughaccelerating
containerhandling.TheFALhasalsodecidedduring
hissessionofearlySeptember2014toinviteDITand
PADtocarryoutthenecessaryconstructionworks
withintheboundariesof thePorttobuildaspace
thatcanaccommodate10,000containersinorder
to freeupspace in the terminalcontainer.During
thesamemeeting, itwasalsodecidedtosuspend
theadmissionof logs intheportenclosureandto
reorganizethemovementofthereleaseofcontainers.
TheGovernmenthasalsocarriedoptionstoshipfrom
thePortofKribi.Aspartthislaterdecision,DITand
PAD should explore opportunities to improve the
supplyoftrucksandtruckmaintenanceforgreater
availabilityandSGSshouldputaneffectivesystem
formonitoringandmaintainingthescanner.
Improve data collection on trade facilitation
Overall,tradefacilitationandtransportintheCEMAC
zonesuffersfromlackofstatistics,bothatMember
StatesandtheCommissionofCEMAClevels.The
situationischaracterizedbyseveraldifferentdata
accordingtothesourcesofinformation,whichcan
leadtoerroneousresultsandinduceuserstomake
riskyconclusions.InCameroon,forcalculationsof
dwelltime,theGUCEexploitsdatacontainerswhile
theDGDusesalleligibledata.Inaddition,theDGD
islimitedtogoodsthatarenotmorethan90days
old,whichisnotthecasefortheDITorGUCE.These
differencesindatasamplescanleadtodifferences
inresults.Theupdatingof indicatorsandcreating
statistics being recurring exercises, it would be
desirabletocontinueperiodically,whilerefiningthe
methodology.Similarly,itwouldbeusefultoinvolve
allentitiesproducingstatisticaldataontransportand
transit,andtoestablishamechanismforvalidation
andpublicationofthestatistics
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