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PUTNAM ON METAPHYSICS, RELIGION, AND ETHICS:CRITICAL NOTICE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDETO LIFE: ROSENZWEIG, BUBER, LEVINAS, WITTGENSTEINphil_337 425..434
MARK ZELCER
For what can be more characteristic of a Jewish thinker than to use the Jewish experience as a
conduit to universality?Rebecca Goldstein1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, perhaps somewhat prophetically, before Hilary Putnam published
anything about Jewish topics, Kenneth Seeskin recommended looking to Put-
nams writing for insight into how Jews (yes, qua Jews) practice Jewish philoso-
phy.2 Putnam tells us though that up until the past few years he saw nothing
particularly Jewish about his philosophy and it is only recently that he has started
to see the philosophical side of his life in relation to the Jewish side (4);3 but he
does not see himself as a Jewish philosopher. In his most recent book, Jewish
Philosophy as a Guide to Life (henceforth JPGL), Putnam now claims to join
his philosophical side with his life as a practicing Jew.4 Ostensibly the book is
a brief discussion of a theme addressed by three modern Jewish philosophers:
Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. What follows is an
1 Rebecca Goldstein, Betraying Spinoza: The Renegade Jew Who Gave us Modernity (New York:
Schocken Books, 2006) 178.2 Kenneth Seeskin, Jewish Philosophy in the 1980s, Modern Judaism 11 (1991): 168.3 References in the text are all to Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig,
Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein (Bloomington, IN, Indiana UP, 2008) [henceforth JPGL]. Note also that
the first chapter on Rosenzweig is essentially the same as his Introduction to Rosenzweigs
Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A view of World, Man, and God(Cambridge, MA: Harvard
UP, 1999). The chapter on Levinas is essentially the same as the entry on Levinas and Judaism in
the Cambridge Companion to Levinas (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002).
4 Putnam repeatedly characterizes himself as a practicing Jew. See his introduction to JPGL,Thoughts Addressed to an Analytical Thomist The Monist 80:4 (1997a): 487, and God and the
Philosophers Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXI (1997b): 175.
2009 The Philosophical Forum, Inc.
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explication of that theme woven together with other aspects of Putnams thinking,
specifically his ethics. We also pick up some questions that Putnam leaves out-
standing and ultimately elaborate on what he must mean in taking Jewish phi-losophy as a guide to life.
II. WITTGENSTEIN
Putnam understands the three Jewish philosophers he discusses as having
one view in common with Wittgensteins5 philosophy of religion (6). Though
Wittgensteins ideas on the philosophy of religion are known to us only via a
few second-handnotes of lectures and conversations6 they have had a dispropor-
tionate influence on the philosophy of religion,7
and Putnam is arguably the mostprominent thinker to explore them.8
To understand Wittgensteins approach consider first a rather traditional philo-
sophical stance toward religious discourse that goes something like the following:
Religious statements often appear to take stands on historical or ontological
matters. We would ordinarily suppose that a historical or ontological fact-of-the-
matter under dispute is true if and only if it corresponds to the way things are, and
false otherwise. If one were nonetheless to believe the false or dubious statements,
she does so non-rationally or irrationally; perhaps she believes on faith. There is
considerable reason to believe that many ethical, historical, and ontological claimsmade by religions are false and can be easily shown to be highly implausible
(consider, say, that the Bible endorses genocide as sometimes justified, claims that
those on the ark with Noah were the only living creatures at one time or that the
5 Putnam treats Wittgenstein as 1/4 of a Jewish philosopher, mostly because Wittgenstein never
wrote about Judaism philosophically and was only partially Jewish by descent.6 We have fewer than 30 printed pages of notes that have been collected as Remarks on Frazers
Golden Bough (Reprinted in Michael Lambek, A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion [New
York: Blackwell, 2008]) and Lectures on Religious Belief (in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures andConversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett [Berkeley, CA: U of
California P] 5372).7 Wittgensteins impact on the philosophy of religion was initially discussed in terms of what was
labeled Wittgensteinian Fideism. More recently it can be seen in discussions in introductory and
advanced works in the philosophy of religion. See, for example, Richard Messers Does Gods
Existence Need Proof? (New York: Oxford UP, 1993); Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce
Reichenbach, and David Basingers Reason and Religious belief: An introduction to the philosophy
of religion (New York: Oxford, 2003); and Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert
L. Arrington and Mark Addis (New York: Routledge, 2001). Some of these works deal with the
Lectures and Conversations, while others explore the concept of religious discourse as a type of
Wittgenstinian language game. Norman Malcolms Wittgenstein: A religious Point of View? (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UP, 1993) is a general discussion of Wittgensteins view of religion.
8 See his Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992), ch. 7 and (2008) ch 1.
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universe was fully formed in 6 days). Therefore people with these religious beliefs
have them non-rationallysay, on faith.9
Wittgenstein rejects this approach and refuses to accept that belief in religion isa conceptual confusion. Rather, considering religion as essentially prescientific
thinking to be rejected by post-Enlightenment thinkers is itself an example of a
conceptual confusion, a clear case of being in the grip of a picture (11). Wittgen-
stein sees this conceptual confusion as emerging from conflating a theory with a
way of life. The analysis in the previous paragraph treats religion as a theory when
it actually is and must be treated as a way of living,10 as words only have meaning
in the stream of life. To take one example, the role that Jacob and Esau play in the
lives of believers is wholly different from the role that empirical beliefs play (13).
Conflating those two kinds of roles is itself a conceptual confusion.Wittgenstein charges those who are engaged in the philosophical project of
proving or disproving religious claims of missing the point.11 But it seems that
pointing out that one is missing the point is not particularly helpful in the absence
of a discussion of what the point is. So where Wittgenstein leaves us somewhat
unsatisfied, Putnam begins to fill in some blanks and leads us in the direction of
the point. Putnam explicates Rosenzweigs, Bubers, and Levinass key ideas in
order to show what religious discourse actually is about and how such an expli-
cation can be got from their respective Jewish philosophies.
III. METAPHYSICS
In Renewing Philosophy Putnam expresses what can be viewed as a Jewish
hermeneutical approach to philosophy. He writes: The only way I know of
pointing to a better way in philosophy is to engage in a certain kind of reading, a
reading of the work of some philosophers who, in spite of their mistakes and flaws
[. . .] point the way toward and exemplify the possibility of philosophical reflec-
tion on our lives and language that is neither frivolously sceptical nor absurdly
metaphysical, neither fantastic parascience nor fantastic parapolitics, but serious
9 This way of contrasting the views is suggested by Iakovos Vasiliou in his Wittgenstein, religious
belief, and On Certainty who describes the relevance of On Certainty to Wittgensteins religious
thought (in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion). Note also that the Wittgensteinian
program is typically seen in contrast with the programs akin to Richard Swinburnes.10 Putnam means way of living in the sense that Pierre Hadot uses it in Philosophy as a Way of Life:
Spriritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Amold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (New
York: Blackwell, 1995).
11 Putnam is careful to argue in a number of places that this does not inoculate religion from criticism,but rather merely from a certain kind of criticism. See, for example, Putnam (1997b): 178; On
negative theology, Faith and Philosophy 14:4 (1997c): 408; and (1992): 16879.
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and fundamentally honest reflection of the most difficult kind.12 Beginning with
metaphysics, Putnam finds an important Wittgensteinian idea running through
Rosenzweigs, Bubers and Levinass work. In JPGL Putnam makes the case thatRosenzweig and Wittgenstein share a world-view, which sees classical philosophy
of religion with its associated metaphysical questions about God, as wholly
mistaken about the way religious people think about religion.13 In claiming that
religious people need to approach God by acknowledging Him, Rosenzweig views
religion rather as a way of life and not something to be reasoned out. Such
acknowledgment is akin to the way that Stanley Cavell reads Wittgensteins claim
that while there may be truth in skepticism our relation to the world ordinarily
requires acknowledgment rather than proof. And like Cavells Wittgenstein,
acknowledging, for Rosenzweig, is not a matter of knowledge but a mode of living(27).
Like Wittgenstein, Rosenzweig wants to disabuse us of the pervasive meta-
physical notion that there are essences, and in general to discourage people from
following the trail of philosophy down misleading paths. These paths are words
that have no internal relation to a genuine religious life. Philosophy must take
Man, World, and God collectively as brute and, in place of a critique (which would
anyway be insignificant to a religious person), we should do philosophy in a way
that leads us toward an experience. For Rosenzweig this means adopting a
narrative philosophy that requires a prose that leads the reader and author toencounter each other.
Narrative philosophy is not aboutthe reader or the author, but it is meant to lead
the reader into an encounter with the authorto describe an event between reader
and author as opposed to proving something about the author or discovering some
essence. Scientific or historical accounts of revelation may be true, but they are
unimportant to the practicing Jew (42) because it is not the truth that is important
but rather it is in the religious significance that the meaning inheres.
For Buber too, both theorizing about God or saying that it is impossible to
theorize about Him commit one to similar metaphysical errors. Any theory ofreligious knowledge that can answer the question how do you know that God
exists? is a based on a mistake because on Bubers conception of the I-Thou14
12 Putnam (1992): 141.13 See also Paul Franks, Everyday Speech and Revelatory Speech in Rosenzweig and Wittgenstein,
Philosophy Today 50:1 (2006): 2439. For Putnams full treatment of Wittgenstein on religious
belief see Putnam (1992): ch. 7. See also Putnam (1997c): 40722, where Putnam uses Wittgen-
steins views on Religious beliefs to resolve some problems in Maimonides thought. A similar idea
to Wittgensteins is also present in his (1997a). Some limitations of Wittgensteins view are
presented in Putnam (1997b).14 Putnam reiterates the point that an important feature of the translation of Ich-Du is that it should
be rendered as IYou, not IThou. The nature of the relation can get obfuscated in the
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relation, asking such a question already assumes that you are outside of the
relationship in which you are both participants. One comes to God by entering a
relationship with Him, and this relationship does not involve a kind of knowledge.For Buber, the IThou relationship one has with friends points beyondthe friend-
ship and ideally leads to the Ultimate Thouthe Divine. One can speak to God,
that is, enter an IThou relation in which all the partial IThou relationships
(with people and other natural objects) are bound up and fulfilled without being
obliterated (65).
Similarly when Levinas says (famously) that the saying precedes the said, he
means that the obligation is to make myself present (in Hebrew, to announce
hineni) to the other, and this precedes any formulation of the obligation. A genuine
ethical relation to another presupposes that you realize that the other person is anindependent reality and not in any way your construction or your own experience
(contra Husserl who takes all experience as a personal construct).
To this end, Levinas reinterprets Descartes argument for the existence of God.
Descartes claims that God must have put the idea of infinity in him because he
could not come by that idea himself. Levinas claims that Descartes is not proving
something but rather acknowledging a reality he could not have constructed, a
reality that proves its own existence by the fact that its presence in my mind is a
phenomenological impossibility. The significance of this for Levinas emerges
when he transforms the argument by replacing God in the argument with the other.The argument then becomes I know the other [lautrui] is not part of my
construction of the world because my encounter with the other is an encounter
with a fissure, with a being who breaks my categories. (79)
IV. ETHICS
Putnam reads a related theme running through the ethics of his three philoso-
phers. Levinass key ethical ideathat the fundamental obligation is not derivable
from any metaphysical or epistemological pictureis sometimes referred to as anethical metaphysics.15 This refers to Levinass position that situates ethics as
first philosophy. That means that not only is there no epistemological or meta-
physical grounding for ethics, there is no grounding whatever, as any ground
seems to leave open the possibility of being undermined. For example, if our
system demands we treat others well for some reason, say because they are
contemporary formality implied by the word Thou. The weight of tradition, however, burdens us
with the older formulation.15 See Edith Wyschogrods Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (New York:
Fordham UP, 2000).
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rational (like we are), there is a temptation to consider the other who we might not
consider rational to be outside the purview of our ethics (71). Levinas finds this
unacceptable.For Levinas, the proper ethical stance insists on a demanding moral perfection-
ism, and thus his task is to describe the fundamental obligation to the other (not
legislating rules by which we ought to interact with each other). The fundamental
question is how one should act when one must focus entirely on one other person,
provided ones obligations to others do not conflict with this one. Our fundamental
obligation is to make ourselves present or available to the neediness of the other
prior to our sympathizing with him and, in contrast with Buber, prior even to an
acknowledgment of a reciprocal (IThou) relation with the other. The fundamen-
tal obligation also involves recognizing that one is commanded to be available forthe other. This command is prior to any metaphysical (ontological) commitment
even any commitment to a commander. Asking why should I be there for the
other? indicates that one is not yet fully human (a mensch) in Levinass norma-
tive sense (75).
Buber too is a moral perfectionist. A moral perfectionist is one who takes the
ancient questions about how to live as the most important.16 They are perfectionists
because the commitment that they insist we have is impossibly demanding so
that one is forced to strive for ones unattained but attainable self.17 The
IThou relation is one such normative account of human relations demanded ofus, without which no system of moral rules and no institution can have any real
value.
Part II of Rosenzweigs Star of Redemption tells the tale of the love affair
between God and man in his preferred style of narrative philosophy. It describes
the Biblical narrative as God falling in love with man even before being sure of the
beloveds qualities. And, in agreement with traditional Jewish teachings, the
vertical direction of the love between God and man must be accompanied by a
horizontal love of ones fellow man (48). Rosenzweig holds (unlike Levinas)
that it is only when I realize that I am loved by someone wholly other, that I canthen learn to love my nearest neighbor. For Rosenzweig it is the awareness of God
that evokes the desire to be worthy of such love (49).
16 Putnam refers to the ancient questions as they are used in Pierre Hadots Philosophy as a Way of Life
(1995).
17 Putnam borrows Stanley Cavells moral perfectionism. See part 12 of Putnams Dewey Lecture formore on Cavells influence on Putnam. (In Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 82:2 [2008]:
10115)
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V. PUTNAMS ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS
Putnams own distinctly Pragmatist conception of ethics strikes a similarchord.18 Consistent with the Wittgensteinian view of religion, Putnam argues that
when we are talking about ethics the ontological enterprise is wholly misguided.
Our ethics should not inflate our ontology to account for our ethical beliefs. That
is, it should not appeal to a Platonic realm or to a Moorean ethical property, to
explain our ethics. Just as importantly, it should not deflate our ontologyeither
by reducing ethical statements to the form A is nothing but B, as in good is
nothing but utility or eliminating them entirely by dismissing any talk of the good
as merely mistaken.
Putnam claims that it is unfortunate that philosophy is divided into differentbranches as arguments from one generally apply to many others. In one passage
Putnam discusses this version of ethics (which he calls pragmatic pluralism),
though he could have just as easily been speaking about religion, mathematics, or
metaphysics: I hold that pragmatic pluralism does not require us to find myste-
rious supersensible objects behind our language games; the truth can be told in
language games we actually play when language is working, and the inflations that
philosophers have added to those language games are examples, as Wittgenstein
saidusing a rather pragmatist turn of phraseof the engine idling.19 In fact,
Putnam eschews such ontologizing across the board. Instead, he takes up theWittgensteininan view that sees any attempt to provide ontological or non-
mathematical justifications for mathematics or non-ethical explanations for the
truth of ethical statements as deeply misguided. Quines essay On what there is,
Putnam argues, has had disastrous consequences for analytic philosophy by
making Ontology (sic) respectable. Exists may just have different senses in
ethics, mathematics, and religion20 and each should be judged by its own criteria.
In Wittgensteinian terms, each domain has its own language game that it plays and
what it is to exist in one, may only bear a family resemblance to what it is to
exist in another.
VI. UNIVERSALITY
At this point the reader may notice that we have not said anything that sounds
particularly like Jewish philosophy. This is because Putnams three thinkers uni-
versalize the positions they advocate so that the approach is applicable to all
Jews and non-Jews alike. However, all three are inspired by Jewish sources and
18 See Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004) ch. 1.19 Ibid: 22.20 Ibid: 23.
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themes and have a separatethough not unrelatedmessage specifically for
Jews. Rosenzweig, for example, urges everyone to experience the redemption. He
believes that there will ultimately be a redemption where the Jewish ideal of lovefor ones neighbor will be universalized. This redemption should be so seriously
anticipated so as to be as if it were being experienced now.
Levinas universalizes a number of Jewish themes as well. On Levinass rein-
terpretation of Judaisms particularity into his own ethics-phenomenology, Jewish
chosenness is a universal moral category, not a particular historical fact (69). All
human beings are Jews. Just as Jews find that their dignity as humans comes from
obeying commandments, so too does Levinas declare that human dignity should
be experienced in obeying the fundamental commandto take on infinite respon-
sibility toward the other.21
Every human being must experience him or herself ascommanded to be available to the neediness of the other person, and one must
know of this command prior to a philosophical account of how such a command
or commander is possible. This knowledge that I myself received a divine
command is not based on metaphysical speculation.22 Nor is it based on an
epiphany where one comes to know the commander. In the end, we have but a
trace of the commander (87).
Putnam argues that Levinass ethics is universal enough that it can critique
Judaism. In an important sense both Levinass and Putnams ethics can serve to
motivate their respective approaches to Judaism, which can in turn shed light onanother problem posed by Putnam.23 As we saw, Putnam reads Wittgenstein as
arguing that it is incorrect to critique ones scientific views on the basis of ones
religious views, as religion and science are not interpenetrable. It may, however,
seem reasonable to critique ones ethical views in light of ones religion, or ones
religion on the basis of ones ethics.24 Is this allowed on the Wittgensteinian view?
Religions sometimes advocate for seemingly misguided ethical positions. Are
religion and ethics interpenetrable in a way that religion and science are not, and
how do we reconcile those ethical injunctions within religions that are blatantly
immoral?
21 See Michael Morgans Levinas and Judaism (in Jeffrey Bloechl and Jeffrey L. Koskys Levinas
Studies: An Annual Review [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 2005]) for a discussion of Putnam on
Levinass Jewish universalism and particularism, especially as it is exemplified in Jewish ritual.22 This is in contrast with thinkers like Maimonides, Reuven Agushewitz, and others who believed that
the path to God is via metaphysical speculation. See Putnams On Negative Theology (1997c) for
a discussion and (Wittgensteinian) critique of Maimonides solutions to the problem of ascribing
attributes (including existence) to God.
23 Putnam (1997b): 181.24 This question should not be interpreted as asking if Wittgenstein accepts Braithwaites position that
religious language is moral exhortation. He does not.
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Putnam seems to have an answer in mind. He specifically selects those Jewish
thinkers who are (perhaps atypically) both universalists and Jewish philoso-
phers. These thinkers were chosen precisely because their universality underpinstheir philosophy of religion. Levinas, for example, taught repeatedly that mono-
theism is a humanism. Putnam can consistently claim that ones ethics and ones
religion are realms that can be, and perhaps ought to be, brought to bear on one
another because we want a universalist ethical message regardless of our particu-
lar religion. This is supported by Putnams (otherwise idiosyncratic) selection
of Jewish philosophers. In some respects the project ofJPGL expresses this well.
In the case of each of Putnams three thinkers, Jewish theoretical insight was
amassed to offer a critique of classical ethics. Classical ethics was in turn made
universal, thereby transcending the original Jewish insights. So we see thatPutnam assumes a significant overlap of the ethical and religious spheres (lan-
guage games) at least as far as we allow our ethics to shape our religion. Putnam
does not provide any reason to think it may work the other way as well, and makes
no provisions for religion to interfere with ones ethics.
VII. CONCLUSION
Putnams program is to construct a way to read religion and ethics without the
ontological concerns we have come to expect from theories of religion andtheories of ethics. Even no ontologyethical or religious deflationism, so to
speakis burdensome, with its need to reformulate traditional ethics or religion
within a framework unfamiliar to religious people. What Putnam does for ethics is
show a pragmatic alternative to classical ethicsone that ameliorates our onto-
logical scruples by making us realize that the insertion of Ontology that Rosen-
zweig has called a philosophical disease can be cured with a renewed appeal to
a kind of common sense. In JPGL we see how elements from the Jewish tradition
can demonstrate how to read religious discourse as distinct from scientific theory.
Putnam shows that the apparent ontological questions need not be about our actualontological commitments; and just like he has argued that there is a way to
objectivity without objects,25 we can also have spirituality without spirits.26 By
taking up Wittgensteins approach to religion, Putnam obviates the need to address
the traditional ontological questions about God. Belief in God is a way of life,
not an ontological commitment. By advancing a Pragmatist position on ethics,
25 See Putnam (2004) Lecture 3. But see also two interesting critical discussions: David Copps The
ontology of Putnams Ethics Without Ontology (Contemporary Pragmatism 3:2 (2006): 3953)
and David Weissmans Review of Ethics Without Ontology, Metaphilosophy 36:3 (2005).26 In doing this, Putnam is extending the program exemplified by John Deweys A Common Faith
(New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1934).
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Putnam also obviates the need to address the traditional metaphysical questions
about the good. Thus one need not worry about how to ground his ethics in order
to account for his use of ethical discourse, in the same way that one need notground his religion to be a believer in it. We have likewise seen how Putnam sees
the realm of ethics in relation to his position on religion.
Putnams efforts express an important Pragmatist antidote to the recent spate of
popular books that attempt to explain away our religious beliefs,27 disprove the
arguments for Gods existence,28 show the irrationality of religion,29 or describe
how evil religion really is;30 as if religion has anything to do with proofs, ratio-
nality, or history.31
Baruch College, CUNY
27 See, for example, Pascal Boyer,Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought
(New York: Basic Books, 2001); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural
Phenomenon (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2006); and Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of
Religion (New York, Oxford UP, 2002).28 See, for example, John Allen Paulos, Irreligion: A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for
God just Dont Add Up (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).29 See, for example, Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2004).
30 See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How religion Poisons Everything (NewYork: Hachette Book Group, 2007).
31 For various reasons, my thanks go to Alan Grose, Chris Steinsvold, and Elly Vintiadis.
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