Buber Putnam

7/30/2019 Buber Putnam

1/10

PUTNAM ON METAPHYSICS, RELIGION, AND ETHICS:CRITICAL NOTICE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDETO LIFE: ROSENZWEIG, BUBER, LEVINAS, WITTGENSTEINphil_337 425..434

MARK ZELCER

For what can be more characteristic of a Jewish thinker than to use the Jewish experience as a

conduit to universality?Rebecca Goldstein1

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, perhaps somewhat prophetically, before Hilary Putnam published

anything about Jewish topics, Kenneth Seeskin recommended looking to Put-

nams writing for insight into how Jews (yes, qua Jews) practice Jewish philoso-

phy.2 Putnam tells us though that up until the past few years he saw nothing

particularly Jewish about his philosophy and it is only recently that he has started

to see the philosophical side of his life in relation to the Jewish side (4);3 but he

does not see himself as a Jewish philosopher. In his most recent book, Jewish

Philosophy as a Guide to Life (henceforth JPGL), Putnam now claims to join

his philosophical side with his life as a practicing Jew.4 Ostensibly the book is

a brief discussion of a theme addressed by three modern Jewish philosophers:

Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. What follows is an

1 Rebecca Goldstein, Betraying Spinoza: The Renegade Jew Who Gave us Modernity (New York:

Schocken Books, 2006) 178.2 Kenneth Seeskin, Jewish Philosophy in the 1980s, Modern Judaism 11 (1991): 168.3 References in the text are all to Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig,

Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein (Bloomington, IN, Indiana UP, 2008) [henceforth JPGL]. Note also that

the first chapter on Rosenzweig is essentially the same as his Introduction to Rosenzweigs

Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A view of World, Man, and God(Cambridge, MA: Harvard

UP, 1999). The chapter on Levinas is essentially the same as the entry on Levinas and Judaism in

the Cambridge Companion to Levinas (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002).

4 Putnam repeatedly characterizes himself as a practicing Jew. See his introduction to JPGL,Thoughts Addressed to an Analytical Thomist The Monist 80:4 (1997a): 487, and God and the

Philosophers Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXI (1997b): 175.

2009 The Philosophical Forum, Inc.

425


2/10

explication of that theme woven together with other aspects of Putnams thinking,

specifically his ethics. We also pick up some questions that Putnam leaves out-

standing and ultimately elaborate on what he must mean in taking Jewish phi-losophy as a guide to life.

II. WITTGENSTEIN

Putnam understands the three Jewish philosophers he discusses as having

one view in common with Wittgensteins5 philosophy of religion (6). Though

Wittgensteins ideas on the philosophy of religion are known to us only via a

few second-handnotes of lectures and conversations6 they have had a dispropor-

tionate influence on the philosophy of religion,7

and Putnam is arguably the mostprominent thinker to explore them.8

To understand Wittgensteins approach consider first a rather traditional philo-

sophical stance toward religious discourse that goes something like the following:

Religious statements often appear to take stands on historical or ontological

matters. We would ordinarily suppose that a historical or ontological fact-of-the-

matter under dispute is true if and only if it corresponds to the way things are, and

false otherwise. If one were nonetheless to believe the false or dubious statements,

she does so non-rationally or irrationally; perhaps she believes on faith. There is

considerable reason to believe that many ethical, historical, and ontological claimsmade by religions are false and can be easily shown to be highly implausible

(consider, say, that the Bible endorses genocide as sometimes justified, claims that

those on the ark with Noah were the only living creatures at one time or that the

5 Putnam treats Wittgenstein as 1/4 of a Jewish philosopher, mostly because Wittgenstein never

wrote about Judaism philosophically and was only partially Jewish by descent.6 We have fewer than 30 printed pages of notes that have been collected as Remarks on Frazers

Golden Bough (Reprinted in Michael Lambek, A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion [New

York: Blackwell, 2008]) and Lectures on Religious Belief (in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures andConversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett [Berkeley, CA: U of

California P] 5372).7 Wittgensteins impact on the philosophy of religion was initially discussed in terms of what was

labeled Wittgensteinian Fideism. More recently it can be seen in discussions in introductory and

advanced works in the philosophy of religion. See, for example, Richard Messers Does Gods

Existence Need Proof? (New York: Oxford UP, 1993); Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce

Reichenbach, and David Basingers Reason and Religious belief: An introduction to the philosophy

of religion (New York: Oxford, 2003); and Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert

L. Arrington and Mark Addis (New York: Routledge, 2001). Some of these works deal with the

Lectures and Conversations, while others explore the concept of religious discourse as a type of

Wittgenstinian language game. Norman Malcolms Wittgenstein: A religious Point of View? (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UP, 1993) is a general discussion of Wittgensteins view of religion.

8 See his Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992), ch. 7 and (2008) ch 1.

MARK ZELCER

426


3/10

universe was fully formed in 6 days). Therefore people with these religious beliefs

have them non-rationallysay, on faith.9

Wittgenstein rejects this approach and refuses to accept that belief in religion isa conceptual confusion. Rather, considering religion as essentially prescientific

thinking to be rejected by post-Enlightenment thinkers is itself an example of a

conceptual confusion, a clear case of being in the grip of a picture (11). Wittgen-

stein sees this conceptual confusion as emerging from conflating a theory with a

way of life. The analysis in the previous paragraph treats religion as a theory when

it actually is and must be treated as a way of living,10 as words only have meaning

in the stream of life. To take one example, the role that Jacob and Esau play in the

lives of believers is wholly different from the role that empirical beliefs play (13).

Conflating those two kinds of roles is itself a conceptual confusion.Wittgenstein charges those who are engaged in the philosophical project of

proving or disproving religious claims of missing the point.11 But it seems that

pointing out that one is missing the point is not particularly helpful in the absence

of a discussion of what the point is. So where Wittgenstein leaves us somewhat

unsatisfied, Putnam begins to fill in some blanks and leads us in the direction of

the point. Putnam explicates Rosenzweigs, Bubers, and Levinass key ideas in

order to show what religious discourse actually is about and how such an expli-

cation can be got from their respective Jewish philosophies.

III. METAPHYSICS

In Renewing Philosophy Putnam expresses what can be viewed as a Jewish

hermeneutical approach to philosophy. He writes: The only way I know of

pointing to a better way in philosophy is to engage in a certain kind of reading, a

reading of the work of some philosophers who, in spite of their mistakes and flaws

[. . .] point the way toward and exemplify the possibility of philosophical reflec-

tion on our lives and language that is neither frivolously sceptical nor absurdly

metaphysical, neither fantastic parascience nor fantastic parapolitics, but serious

9 This way of contrasting the views is suggested by Iakovos Vasiliou in his Wittgenstein, religious

belief, and On Certainty who describes the relevance of On Certainty to Wittgensteins religious

thought (in Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion). Note also that the Wittgensteinian

program is typically seen in contrast with the programs akin to Richard Swinburnes.10 Putnam means way of living in the sense that Pierre Hadot uses it in Philosophy as a Way of Life:

Spriritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Amold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (New

York: Blackwell, 1995).

11 Putnam is careful to argue in a number of places that this does not inoculate religion from criticism,but rather merely from a certain kind of criticism. See, for example, Putnam (1997b): 178; On

negative theology, Faith and Philosophy 14:4 (1997c): 408; and (1992): 16879.

PUTNAM ON METAPHYSICS, RELIGION, AND ETHICS

427


4/10

and fundamentally honest reflection of the most difficult kind.12 Beginning with

metaphysics, Putnam finds an important Wittgensteinian idea running through

Rosenzweigs, Bubers and Levinass work. In JPGL Putnam makes the case thatRosenzweig and Wittgenstein share a world-view, which sees classical philosophy

of religion with its associated metaphysical questions about God, as wholly

mistaken about the way religious people think about religion.13 In claiming that

religious people need to approach God by acknowledging Him, Rosenzweig views

religion rather as a way of life and not something to be reasoned out. Such

acknowledgment is akin to the way that Stanley Cavell reads Wittgensteins claim

that while there may be truth in skepticism our relation to the world ordinarily

requires acknowledgment rather than proof. And like Cavells Wittgenstein,

acknowledging, for Rosenzweig, is not a matter of knowledge but a mode of living(27).

Like Wittgenstein, Rosenzweig wants to disabuse us of the pervasive meta-

physical notion that there are essences, and in general to discourage people from

following the trail of philosophy down misleading paths. These paths are words

that have no internal relation to a genuine religious life. Philosophy must take

Man, World, and God collectively as brute and, in place of a critique (which would

anyway be insignificant to a religious person), we should do philosophy in a way

that leads us toward an experience. For Rosenzweig this means adopting a

narrative philosophy that requires a prose that leads the reader and author toencounter each other.

Narrative philosophy is not aboutthe reader or the author, but it is meant to lead

the reader into an encounter with the authorto describe an event between reader

and author as opposed to proving something about the author or discovering some

essence. Scientific or historical accounts of revelation may be true, but they are

unimportant to the practicing Jew (42) because it is not the truth that is important

but rather it is in the religious significance that the meaning inheres.

For Buber too, both theorizing about God or saying that it is impossible to

theorize about Him commit one to similar metaphysical errors. Any theory ofreligious knowledge that can answer the question how do you know that God

exists? is a based on a mistake because on Bubers conception of the I-Thou14

12 Putnam (1992): 141.13 See also Paul Franks, Everyday Speech and Revelatory Speech in Rosenzweig and Wittgenstein,

Philosophy Today 50:1 (2006): 2439. For Putnams full treatment of Wittgenstein on religious

belief see Putnam (1992): ch. 7. See also Putnam (1997c): 40722, where Putnam uses Wittgen-

steins views on Religious beliefs to resolve some problems in Maimonides thought. A similar idea

to Wittgensteins is also present in his (1997a). Some limitations of Wittgensteins view are

presented in Putnam (1997b).14 Putnam reiterates the point that an important feature of the translation of Ich-Du is that it should

be rendered as IYou, not IThou. The nature of the relation can get obfuscated in the

MARK ZELCER

428


5/10

relation, asking such a question already assumes that you are outside of the

relationship in which you are both participants. One comes to God by entering a

relationship with Him, and this relationship does not involve a kind of knowledge.For Buber, the IThou relationship one has with friends points beyondthe friend-

ship and ideally leads to the Ultimate Thouthe Divine. One can speak to God,

that is, enter an IThou relation in which all the partial IThou relationships

(with people and other natural objects) are bound up and fulfilled without being

obliterated (65).

Similarly when Levinas says (famously) that the saying precedes the said, he

means that the obligation is to make myself present (in Hebrew, to announce

hineni) to the other, and this precedes any formulation of the obligation. A genuine

ethical relation to another presupposes that you realize that the other person is anindependent reality and not in any way your construction or your own experience

(contra Husserl who takes all experience as a personal construct).

To this end, Levinas reinterprets Descartes argument for the existence of God.

Descartes claims that God must have put the idea of infinity in him because he

could not come by that idea himself. Levinas claims that Descartes is not proving

something but rather acknowledging a reality he could not have constructed, a

reality that proves its own existence by the fact that its presence in my mind is a

phenomenological impossibility. The significance of this for Levinas emerges

when he transforms the argument by replacing God in the argument with the other.The argument then becomes I know the other [lautrui] is not part of my

construction of the world because my encounter with the other is an encounter

with a fissure, with a being who breaks my categories. (79)

IV. ETHICS

Putnam reads a related theme running through the ethics of his three philoso-

phers. Levinass key ethical ideathat the fundamental obligation is not derivable

from any metaphysical or epistemological pictureis sometimes referred to as anethical metaphysics.15 This refers to Levinass position that situates ethics as

first philosophy. That means that not only is there no epistemological or meta-

physical grounding for ethics, there is no grounding whatever, as any ground

seems to leave open the possibility of being undermined. For example, if our

system demands we treat others well for some reason, say because they are

contemporary formality implied by the word Thou. The weight of tradition, however, burdens us

with the older formulation.15 See Edith Wyschogrods Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (New York:

Fordham UP, 2000).


429


6/10

rational (like we are), there is a temptation to consider the other who we might not

consider rational to be outside the purview of our ethics (71). Levinas finds this

unacceptable.For Levinas, the proper ethical stance insists on a demanding moral perfection-

ism, and thus his task is to describe the fundamental obligation to the other (not

legislating rules by which we ought to interact with each other). The fundamental

question is how one should act when one must focus entirely on one other person,

provided ones obligations to others do not conflict with this one. Our fundamental

obligation is to make ourselves present or available to the neediness of the other

prior to our sympathizing with him and, in contrast with Buber, prior even to an

acknowledgment of a reciprocal (IThou) relation with the other. The fundamen-

tal obligation also involves recognizing that one is commanded to be available forthe other. This command is prior to any metaphysical (ontological) commitment

even any commitment to a commander. Asking why should I be there for the

other? indicates that one is not yet fully human (a mensch) in Levinass norma-

tive sense (75).

Buber too is a moral perfectionist. A moral perfectionist is one who takes the

ancient questions about how to live as the most important.16 They are perfectionists

because the commitment that they insist we have is impossibly demanding so

that one is forced to strive for ones unattained but attainable self.17 The

IThou relation is one such normative account of human relations demanded ofus, without which no system of moral rules and no institution can have any real

value.

Part II of Rosenzweigs Star of Redemption tells the tale of the love affair

between God and man in his preferred style of narrative philosophy. It describes

the Biblical narrative as God falling in love with man even before being sure of the

beloveds qualities. And, in agreement with traditional Jewish teachings, the

vertical direction of the love between God and man must be accompanied by a

horizontal love of ones fellow man (48). Rosenzweig holds (unlike Levinas)

that it is only when I realize that I am loved by someone wholly other, that I canthen learn to love my nearest neighbor. For Rosenzweig it is the awareness of God

that evokes the desire to be worthy of such love (49).

16 Putnam refers to the ancient questions as they are used in Pierre Hadots Philosophy as a Way of Life

(1995).

17 Putnam borrows Stanley Cavells moral perfectionism. See part 12 of Putnams Dewey Lecture formore on Cavells influence on Putnam. (In Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 82:2 [2008]:

10115)

MARK ZELCER

430


7/10

V. PUTNAMS ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS

Putnams own distinctly Pragmatist conception of ethics strikes a similarchord.18 Consistent with the Wittgensteinian view of religion, Putnam argues that

when we are talking about ethics the ontological enterprise is wholly misguided.

Our ethics should not inflate our ontology to account for our ethical beliefs. That

is, it should not appeal to a Platonic realm or to a Moorean ethical property, to

explain our ethics. Just as importantly, it should not deflate our ontologyeither

by reducing ethical statements to the form A is nothing but B, as in good is

nothing but utility or eliminating them entirely by dismissing any talk of the good

as merely mistaken.

Putnam claims that it is unfortunate that philosophy is divided into differentbranches as arguments from one generally apply to many others. In one passage

Putnam discusses this version of ethics (which he calls pragmatic pluralism),

though he could have just as easily been speaking about religion, mathematics, or

metaphysics: I hold that pragmatic pluralism does not require us to find myste-

rious supersensible objects behind our language games; the truth can be told in

language games we actually play when language is working, and the inflations that

philosophers have added to those language games are examples, as Wittgenstein

saidusing a rather pragmatist turn of phraseof the engine idling.19 In fact,

Putnam eschews such ontologizing across the board. Instead, he takes up theWittgensteininan view that sees any attempt to provide ontological or non-

mathematical justifications for mathematics or non-ethical explanations for the

truth of ethical statements as deeply misguided. Quines essay On what there is,

Putnam argues, has had disastrous consequences for analytic philosophy by

making Ontology (sic) respectable. Exists may just have different senses in

ethics, mathematics, and religion20 and each should be judged by its own criteria.

In Wittgensteinian terms, each domain has its own language game that it plays and

what it is to exist in one, may only bear a family resemblance to what it is to

exist in another.

VI. UNIVERSALITY

At this point the reader may notice that we have not said anything that sounds

particularly like Jewish philosophy. This is because Putnams three thinkers uni-

versalize the positions they advocate so that the approach is applicable to all

Jews and non-Jews alike. However, all three are inspired by Jewish sources and

18 See Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004) ch. 1.19 Ibid: 22.20 Ibid: 23.


431


8/10

themes and have a separatethough not unrelatedmessage specifically for

Jews. Rosenzweig, for example, urges everyone to experience the redemption. He

believes that there will ultimately be a redemption where the Jewish ideal of lovefor ones neighbor will be universalized. This redemption should be so seriously

anticipated so as to be as if it were being experienced now.

Levinas universalizes a number of Jewish themes as well. On Levinass rein-

terpretation of Judaisms particularity into his own ethics-phenomenology, Jewish

chosenness is a universal moral category, not a particular historical fact (69). All

human beings are Jews. Just as Jews find that their dignity as humans comes from

obeying commandments, so too does Levinas declare that human dignity should

be experienced in obeying the fundamental commandto take on infinite respon-

sibility toward the other.21

Every human being must experience him or herself ascommanded to be available to the neediness of the other person, and one must

know of this command prior to a philosophical account of how such a command

or commander is possible. This knowledge that I myself received a divine

command is not based on metaphysical speculation.22 Nor is it based on an

epiphany where one comes to know the commander. In the end, we have but a

trace of the commander (87).

Putnam argues that Levinass ethics is universal enough that it can critique

Judaism. In an important sense both Levinass and Putnams ethics can serve to

motivate their respective approaches to Judaism, which can in turn shed light onanother problem posed by Putnam.23 As we saw, Putnam reads Wittgenstein as

arguing that it is incorrect to critique ones scientific views on the basis of ones

religious views, as religion and science are not interpenetrable. It may, however,

seem reasonable to critique ones ethical views in light of ones religion, or ones

religion on the basis of ones ethics.24 Is this allowed on the Wittgensteinian view?

Religions sometimes advocate for seemingly misguided ethical positions. Are

religion and ethics interpenetrable in a way that religion and science are not, and

how do we reconcile those ethical injunctions within religions that are blatantly

immoral?

21 See Michael Morgans Levinas and Judaism (in Jeffrey Bloechl and Jeffrey L. Koskys Levinas

Studies: An Annual Review [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 2005]) for a discussion of Putnam on

Levinass Jewish universalism and particularism, especially as it is exemplified in Jewish ritual.22 This is in contrast with thinkers like Maimonides, Reuven Agushewitz, and others who believed that

the path to God is via metaphysical speculation. See Putnams On Negative Theology (1997c) for

a discussion and (Wittgensteinian) critique of Maimonides solutions to the problem of ascribing

attributes (including existence) to God.

23 Putnam (1997b): 181.24 This question should not be interpreted as asking if Wittgenstein accepts Braithwaites position that

religious language is moral exhortation. He does not.

MARK ZELCER

432


9/10

Putnam seems to have an answer in mind. He specifically selects those Jewish

thinkers who are (perhaps atypically) both universalists and Jewish philoso-

phers. These thinkers were chosen precisely because their universality underpinstheir philosophy of religion. Levinas, for example, taught repeatedly that mono-

theism is a humanism. Putnam can consistently claim that ones ethics and ones

religion are realms that can be, and perhaps ought to be, brought to bear on one

another because we want a universalist ethical message regardless of our particu-

lar religion. This is supported by Putnams (otherwise idiosyncratic) selection

of Jewish philosophers. In some respects the project ofJPGL expresses this well.

In the case of each of Putnams three thinkers, Jewish theoretical insight was

amassed to offer a critique of classical ethics. Classical ethics was in turn made

universal, thereby transcending the original Jewish insights. So we see thatPutnam assumes a significant overlap of the ethical and religious spheres (lan-

guage games) at least as far as we allow our ethics to shape our religion. Putnam

does not provide any reason to think it may work the other way as well, and makes

no provisions for religion to interfere with ones ethics.

VII. CONCLUSION

Putnams program is to construct a way to read religion and ethics without the

ontological concerns we have come to expect from theories of religion andtheories of ethics. Even no ontologyethical or religious deflationism, so to

speakis burdensome, with its need to reformulate traditional ethics or religion

within a framework unfamiliar to religious people. What Putnam does for ethics is

show a pragmatic alternative to classical ethicsone that ameliorates our onto-

logical scruples by making us realize that the insertion of Ontology that Rosen-

zweig has called a philosophical disease can be cured with a renewed appeal to

a kind of common sense. In JPGL we see how elements from the Jewish tradition

can demonstrate how to read religious discourse as distinct from scientific theory.

Putnam shows that the apparent ontological questions need not be about our actualontological commitments; and just like he has argued that there is a way to

objectivity without objects,25 we can also have spirituality without spirits.26 By

taking up Wittgensteins approach to religion, Putnam obviates the need to address

the traditional ontological questions about God. Belief in God is a way of life,

not an ontological commitment. By advancing a Pragmatist position on ethics,

25 See Putnam (2004) Lecture 3. But see also two interesting critical discussions: David Copps The

ontology of Putnams Ethics Without Ontology (Contemporary Pragmatism 3:2 (2006): 3953)

and David Weissmans Review of Ethics Without Ontology, Metaphilosophy 36:3 (2005).26 In doing this, Putnam is extending the program exemplified by John Deweys A Common Faith

(New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1934).


433


10/10

Putnam also obviates the need to address the traditional metaphysical questions

about the good. Thus one need not worry about how to ground his ethics in order

to account for his use of ethical discourse, in the same way that one need notground his religion to be a believer in it. We have likewise seen how Putnam sees

the realm of ethics in relation to his position on religion.

Putnams efforts express an important Pragmatist antidote to the recent spate of

popular books that attempt to explain away our religious beliefs,27 disprove the

arguments for Gods existence,28 show the irrationality of religion,29 or describe

how evil religion really is;30 as if religion has anything to do with proofs, ratio-

nality, or history.31

Baruch College, CUNY

27 See, for example, Pascal Boyer,Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought

(New York: Basic Books, 2001); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural

Phenomenon (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York:

Houghton Mifflin, 2006); and Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of

Religion (New York, Oxford UP, 2002).28 See, for example, John Allen Paulos, Irreligion: A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for

God just Dont Add Up (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).29 See, for example, Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New

York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2004).

30 See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How religion Poisons Everything (NewYork: Hachette Book Group, 2007).

31 For various reasons, my thanks go to Alan Grose, Chris Steinsvold, and Elly Vintiadis.

MARK ZELCER

434

Buber Putnam

Documents

Transcript of Buber Putnam