ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 1
Volume 2 - Issue 6, June 2012
Contents:
Global Pulse: Naval war games in the East
Joelle Westlund examines the recent developments in the Yellow Sea, where a series
of trilateral naval exercises of South Korea, Japan and the US have triggered new ten-
sions between these countries and the People’s Republic of China. Will the conflict go
beyond words?
Security in the Sahel: A forgotten conflict and why it matters
Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli examines the long-standing conflict in the Western Sahara,
where the Saharawi population is longing for independence while Morocco is claiming
ownership of the territory. She warns of the severe consequences of a resumption of
the armed conflict for the entire Sahel region.
In the shadow of the Arab Spring: THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT
In the shadows of the Arab uprisings in Tu-
nisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and several other
countries, which received worldwide attention,
another region in the ‘backyard’ of the South-
ern Mediterranean is (re-)developing towards a
major political and humanitarian crisis - the
Sahel region. This region should, however, get
more attention from the international commu-
nity, above all the UN and EU. Mali is cur-
rently making headlines because of the coopera-
tion of Islamist groups and Tuareg rebels in the
north of the country. The long-standing con-
flict of the Western Sahara has the same under-
lying matter: a territorial issue - in this case
between the Polisario Front and the govern-
ment of Morocco.
Both conflicts, however, demonstrate that
we need to look beyond the northern rim of
Africa and actively facilitate solutions to the
territorial disputes and political conflicts which
threaten to gain a religious-extremist dimen-
sion. If Europe does not contribute to a sophis-
ticated conflict-settlement in the Sahel region,
the political and humanitarian crisis situation
will trigger new waves of migration or even
turn the region into a new safe haven for
Islamist terrorists. - Florian Bauernfeind
Signs on the way to the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria (Photo: G. Pellegrini-Bettoli)
IS
SN
2294-1
274
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 2
On 21 and 22 June 2012, South Korea, Japan, and the US
carried out a series of trilateral naval exercises in the southern
islands of Jeju in the Korean Peninsula. The operation was
described as being “of a humanitarian nature” by the Republic
of Korea (ROK) Defense Ministry, as it included search and
rescue practices
along with mari-
time interdiction
drills to improve
response times
and communica-
tion.
The inclusion
of the Japanese
Maritime Self-
Defense Force
troops in this co-
operative naval
maneuver is un-
precedented in
the history of Ja-
pan-South Korea relations. In previous US-ROK military
exercises, Japan has played an observatory role, but has re-
mained distant militarily due to historical legacies. The latest
drill is expected to bolster cooperation between the three
allies and “will perform as a framework in further improving
the military relationship,” stated research fellow Park Chang
Kwoun of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. How-
ever, for neighbouring states like China, the renewed engage-
ment represents an escalation of enmity in the region already
fraught with tension.
China’s response to the drill was explicit and blatant in its
opposition. The
Chinese People’s
Liberation Army
Navy admiral Yin
Zhuo claimed that
the objective of the
exercises was to
keep a watchful eye
on China, particu-
larly as a way to
monitor its military
activity. Zhuo fur-
ther remarked that
Seoul, Washington,
and Tokyo had
“taken the first
steps towards a ‘mini-NATO’ in Northeast Asia with their
joint military exercises.”
While it is true that the trilateral activities signal a shift in
the American military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region,
China’s accusations must be taken in stride. As a founding
member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Naval war games in the East By Joelle Westlund
The transatlantic partnership was forged in war two generations ago and maintained for decades under the looming threat of re-
newed conflict. With the Alliance now at a crossroads, its future depends on the active engagement of its members’ young citizens.
Committed to this endeavor, YATA is proud to partner with Atlantic Voices and help bring the opinions, analysis, and commentary of
young Atlanticists to the forefront of international debate. By presenting security, economic, and diplomatic issues through the eyes
of future policy and decision makers, Global Pulse aims to build a bridge between the challenges of today and the solutions of tomor-
row.
South Korean marines corps takes part in the joint military exercise on Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea (Photo: New York Times)
GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 3
China has spearheaded multiple military drills in the last year
that have contributed greatly to rising tensions in the region.
An operation that took place at the end of April 2012 is
particularly noteworthy. In conjunc-
tion with Russia, China carried out a
six-day defensive exercise off the
coastal Shandong province in the sensi-
tive Yellow Sea, just west of the Ko-
rean Peninsula. The mandate of the
drill was comparable to the exercises implemented by South
Korea, Japan and the US, as it included reconnaissance,
search and rescue, and tactical air defense. Under the code
name ‘Maritime Cooperation 2012’, China and Russia com-
bined 16 Chinese warships, 13 warplanes, two submarines
and seven Russian surface ships, one of which set voyage
through the narrow Strait of Japan. The Washington Times
called this highly provocative gesture a projection of power
that “will become a vehicle of Chinese coercion in the future.”
The military drills were particularly significant because
they operated for the first time outside of the framework of
the SCO, which in recent months has focused its mandate on
combating terrorism. Inaugurated in 2001, the SCO was es-
tablished as a non-alliance, intergovernmental institution
comprised of key member states China, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The organiza-
tion’s call for peace and security in Central Asia has been
accompanied by multilateral counter-terrorism practices.
China commanded the latest exercises under the operational
name “Peace Mission 2012” that took place days after the 12th
SCO Annual Summit at the beginning of June.
April’s naval maneuver is yet another expression of Bei-
jing’s and Moscow’s strategic partnership to counter the
United States’ pivot in the region and boost bilateral rela-
tions. Speaking on Russian engagement, the Chinese Presi-
dent Hu Jintao declared: “We will strengthen our strategic
cooperation on international issues, work together for the
revitalization of both our countries, and safeguard the peace,
stability and security of the region.”
While naval drills can play an impor-
tant role in diplomatic affairs, reflect-
ing partnerships and mutual under-
standing, the rhetorical backlash they
frequently trigger is often inflamma-
tory and dramatized. When justifying the Sino-Russian mili-
tary exercises, Zhang Junshe, Deputy Director of the Naval
Military Studies Institute, claimed: “Every military needs
drills to test its armed forces through exercises, neither China
nor its neighbors are exceptions. There is no need to specu-
late about each other’s normal military activities.” If there is
indeed “no need” for speculation then there should similarly
be no need for a double standard regarding these exercises.
The consequence of such rhetoric for political relation-
ships and regional diplomacy is the fostering of tensions and
polarity. Ultimately, both the United States and China will
continue with their military exercises in cooperation with
their respective allies, and an intensified discourse surround-
ing these activities will certainly not defuse relations in the
future.
Joelle Westlund is an Asia-Pacific Policy Analyst at the Atlan-
tic Council of Canada. She is currently working towards a Mas-ter’s Degree in Political Science at the University of Toronto. Joelle holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from the University of Toronto and has studied at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic as well as the Hebrew University in Jerusa-lem.
The rhetorical backlash naval drills frequently trigger is often
inflammatory and dramatized.
Aboard the deck of the USS George Washington during the joint naval exercises in South Korea in June 2012 (Photo: epa)
Chinese officers visit a Russian vessel taking part in the China-Russia joint exercises in the Yellow Sea (Photo: China Daily)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 4
by Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli
T he issue of security in the Sahel has gained mo-
mentum in the agenda of the European Union
resulting in the 2011 ‘EU Strategy for Security
and Development in the Sahel’. This article will focus on the
issue of Western Sahara, recently referred to by Le Monde
Diplomatique as one of Africa’s ‘marginalized conflicts’. The
analysis’ main objective is to elaborate on the present percep-
tion which considers this con-
flict as ‘marginal’ and examine
the different scenarios that
such a simplistic understand-
ing of the issue could lead to,
both for the Sahel and the EU.
To avoid putting evidence
on Procuste’s bed or claiming
Cassandran foresight, this
study will address the context
of present day Sahel and
Northern Africa, the origins
of the conflict in Western
Sahara and the possible sce-
narios resulting from a continued status quo and its repercus-
sions (if any) on the wider region, the potential implications
for the EU, and a caveat on the importance of interpreting
factual evidence (or admit lack of it) in this complex region
with the nuanced attention it deserves and requires. Ulti-
mately, consideration will be given on how to frame the defi-
nition of ‘conflict on the margins’ and the dangers of failing to
identify in it the seeds for ‘full-blown’ conflicts.
This study does not claim to provide answers to the com-
plexities of the region but to draw attention to the wave of
discontent among the young Saharawi generation who was
born in refugee camps and where this discontent could lead to
if a solution to the dead-lock of negotiations is not reached.
Northern Africa and the Sahel
This study will refer to the Sahel region as defined by the
European Union in a narrow approach to include Mauritania
in the west through Mali, Niger, northern Burkina Faso, Chad
and southern Algeria (although most studies do not consider
southern Algeria as belonging to the Sahel). However, the
region has to be analyzed, in the past and even more so today,
within the context of its interdependence with Northern Af-
rica: Algeria and Libya in particular, and to a lesser extent
Morocco. What characterizes these three nations, at least
prior to the Arab Spring and the resulting state of uncertainty
after the demise of Qadhafy, is the presence of state authority
which means high invest-
ments devoted to the defense
sector. The core of the Sahel
region, north and northwest
of Mauritania, north of Mali
and Niger, in contrast is char-
acterized by an only nominal
central government authority
and comparably low invest-
ment in defense.
Populating the region are
Arab, Toubou, Peul, oasis
communities of Songhai, Housa
and Kanuri as well as Tuareg.
They have a nomadic lifestyle and are found most prevalently
in northern parts of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, but also in
southern Algeria and Libya. The largest Tamasheq speaking
populations are in Niger and Algeria and levels of integration
vary considerably. In Mali in particular Tuareg communities
were progressively alienated from the national self-definition in
the 20th century and have sought autonomy numerous times in
the past. However this process has not been linear nor has it
equally affected all Tamasheq speaking communities. The Arab
Spring in Northern Africa has had a direct effect both on the
security issues in the Sahel and Europe’s interaction with the
region. Part of the dilemma for Europe has been how to pro-
mote security in cooperation with the sovereign governments
in the region. Strong economic interests tie the EU to North-
ern Africa but also single bilateral agreements play an impor-
tant role in single member states’ interests. The ousting of
Qadhafi has had its most blatant consequences, resulting in
Security in the Sahel - a forgotten conflict and why it matters
February 27 March, the day of the proclamation of the SADR, a tribute that takes place every year (All photos: G. Pellegrini-Bettoli)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 5
Western Sahara
In the backdrop of these geographic boundaries and ethnic
and tribal diversities, the last African colonial issue lies semi-
forgotten: the disputed territory of Western Sahara con-
tended between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario
Front, a Saharawi national liberation movement pursuing the
independence of the region from Morocco. Western Sahara is
a sparsely-populated area located on the Atlantic coast of
north western Africa. Its natural resources are phosphates and
the stretch of sea is rich in fish. The area
was traditionally inhabited by nomadic
Arab tribes, collectively known as Sa-
harawis, notorious for their long history
of resistance to outside domination.
Western Sahara was under Spanish colo-
nial domination since 1884.
Morocco’s Claim
The position of Morocco is that this territory is an integral
part of its kingdom, and it is therefore willing to grant a de-
gree of autonomy to the region but refuses any referendum
on independence as it would undermine the integrity of the
Moroccan state. Morocco’s claim on the territory is based on
the fact that the Western Sahara is part of the Greater
Maghreb which was historically allied with the Moroccan
Sultanate and fought as part of the Moroccan Liberation Army
against Spain. According to the Moroccan monarchy, histori-
cal, economic, religious, and military ties between the Mo-
roccan sultan and the Saharawi tribal councils prove that Mo-
rocco always exercised authority on Western Sahara. The
International Court of Justice acknowledged such ties but
considered them not sufficient to prove Moroccan sover-
eignty over the territory.
Additionally, there are numerous cultural and historic
bonds between the people of southern Morocco and the peo-
ple of the Western Sahara, emphasized by the Moroccans to
strengthen their territorial claims. There are now hundreds of
thousands (numbers vary according to sources) of Moroccans
living in the Western Sahara, many of whom have lived there
for a generation.
Polisario Front’s Claim
The Polisario Front was founded in 1973, born from a Sa-
harawi student movement in Morocco in 1971 with the aim,
further destabilization of the entire Sahel. Libya played a vital
economic and political role for many in the region, one that
now needs to be filled.
Both Libya and Algeria played a mitigating role in the past
in the Sahel, for example mediating in the numerous Tuareg
rebellions. The Tuareg who used to serve under Qadhafi re-
turning to northern Mali after his demise, have allegedly
taken with them armaments which have been used to rekindle
the rebellion. While Polisario Front Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Ould Salek, expresses concern
for land-to-air missiles that used to
belong to Colonel Qadhafi circulating
in the region, other experts instead
fear the smaller weapons, leading to a
general increase in criminality1. The
falling of the regimes in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt undeniably
have had an effect on countries such as Algeria and Morocco
as well, resulting in them paying close attention to their own
country’s internal state of affairs. Should either of these coun-
tries experience an Arab Spring, chaos in the region would
increase even further.
The Sahel has also become an increasingly important tran-
sit area for drug trafficking and kidnapping and is home to Al
Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which is involved in both
activities. Lastly, the current food crisis in the region risks
pushing the already delicate equilibrium to a full blown politi-
cal crisis. A recent study on the effectiveness of the EU Strat-
egy in the Sahel identifies the security threat in the Sahel as
‘endemic’ and an opportunity for the EU to assert itself as an
international development actor.
The Polisario front defines itself not as a government but as a liberation movement.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 6
at the time, of militarily forcing the end of Spanish coloniza-
tion in Western Sahara. Worthy of note is the fact that the
Polisario Front (Pour la liberation de la Seguiet el-Hamra et
du Rio de Oro) defines itself not as a government but as a
liberation movement. In 1975, a special UN mission engaged
in an investigation in Western Sahara and its findings were
that the vast majority of Saharawis sup-
ported independence under the leader-
ship of the Polisario, not integration
with Morocco or Mauritania.
When Spain withdrew from the
territory in 1976, in application of the
Madrid Accords, Morocco took over Saguia El Hamra while
Mauritania took control of Rio De Oro. The Polisario Front,
with Algerian backing, proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democ-
ratic Republic (SADR) on February 27, 1976 and redirected
its guerrilla war against both Morocco and Mauritania. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) had issued its non-binding
advisory opinion on the matter which was interpreted by each
side as confirming its rights to the disputed territories (ICJ
Reports 1975).2 The Polisario continued the guerrilla war
while it simultaneously helped to guard the columns of Sa-
harawi refugees fleeing from Western Sahara into refugee
camps in southern Algeria in Tindouf. According to the Poli-
sario Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi, during this
flight the civil population was bombed by the Moroccan Air
Force with napalm and white phosphorous.3 In 1979, Mauri-
tania, outnumbered and beaten by the
guerrilla warfare waged by the Polisa-
rio, renounced its claims to the territo-
ry.
In 1979, the UN recognized the Poli-
sario Front as the representative of the
people of Western Sahara.4 A cease-fire has been in place
under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUR-
SO since 6 September 1991. According to some sources, by
agreeing to have the issue of sovereignty conducted under the
auspices of the UN, Morocco has effectively recognized befo-
re the international community that it does not hold sove-
reignty over the territory. MINURSO’s mission of holding a
referendum for self-determination the following year never
translated into reality. The Saharawi population is now living
In 1979, the UN recognized the Polisario Front as the representative of
Western Sahara.
February 27 March
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 7
Western Sahara and to increase communication with the
growing civil rights activism in the territory.6
In 2004, an anti-Abdelaziz (Polisario President) and anti-
ceasefire opposition known as the Front Polisario Khat al-
Shahid announced its existence. Furthermore, defections in
the hierarchy including former head of Security Services Ah-
mend Moulay M’Hamed, a Polisario
founding member Ould Suleim, to cite
a few, have shown a level of disconnect
or discontent within the movement.
Different scenarios resulting
from action and inaction
Peripeteia in ancient Greek signifies ‘a sudden or unexpected
reversal of circumstances’. After 21 years of negotiations, a
breakthrough in the deadlock of negotiations in Western Sa-
hara could hardly be considered ‘sudden’. The focus of this
study is to highlight the possibility of an ‘unexpected’ rever-
sal. Failing to consider the present level of dissatisfaction
among the young generation who have only known life in the
refugee camps, coupled with the Arab Spring movement
sweeping the North African continent, might result in a su-
perficial and imprecise understanding of the current situation.
There are two fundamental questions we should address:
Could the stalemate break into a renewed armed conflict?
How, if at all, would this impact on the Sahel region and ulti-
mately on European interests?
An interview with Ahmed Lehib Abdi, Secretary General
of UJSARIO, was revealing. According to him the reason
why a peaceful movement will never work in Western Sa-
hara, as was attempted in Gdeim Izik in Western Sahara in
2010, is that, while in Egypt and Tunisia the movement was
in what the Polisario defines as the ‘occupied territories’ of
Western Sahara. The ‘liberated territory’, with its ‘center’ in
Tifariti, east of the Berm wall built by Morocco, is a stretch
of land the Polisario won back with its guerilla warfare. This
area however is poor in natural resources and almost comple-
tely uninhabited. The rest of the Saharawi population lives in
south-western Algeria, in the refugee camps near the city of
Tindouf. The total population census varies according to the
sources, ranging from a total of 200,000 to 400,000.5
The Polisario Front: Internal Structure and Chal-lenges
While the potential consequences of this 21-year stalemate
will be analyzed in detail in the following paragraphs, some
further clarification on how the SADR is organized will yield
a dimension of the level of internal organization, pressures
and conflicts it faces. While some defections and discontent
will be addressed here below, it is difficult to assess their real
impact on the internal stability of the
Polisario. The Saharawi National Coun-
cil (SNC) is the legislative branch of the
government in exile, its parliament. It
has 101 members which are elected at
the General Popular Congresses, held
biannually. The last one (the xiii), held in December 2011,
was attended by delegates from the refugee camps of Tin-
douf, representatives of the Saharawi’s People Liberation
Army and the ‘popular organizations’ UJSARIO (students)
UNMS (women’s organization) and UGTSARIO (labour un-
ion).
Between congresses the supreme decision-making body is
the National Secretariat (NS) which is divided in committees
handling defense, diplomatic affairs, culture, etc. An interest-
ing shift in internal policy, which reflects the need for an in-
creased level of cooperation and communication between the
free zone, the camps and the ‘occupied territories’/Western
Sahara, is the new composition of the NS since 2003. Before
this date, political appointments were solely for diaspora Sa-
harawis, due to fear of infiltration and complications in com-
munications with those in the occupied territories. Twelve of
these 41 members are now from the ‘occupied territories’ in
Western Sahara. This strategy, as explained by Prime Minis-
ter Abdelkader Taleb Omar, is two-fold: to strengthen the
movement’s underground network in Moroccan-controlled
Could the stalemate break into a renewed armed conflict? How, if at all, would this impact on the Sahel region and ultimately on European interests?
A woman at the February 27 March, holding a sign requesting the liberation of political prisoners held in Morocco
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 8
centralized around the capitals, in Western Sahara the capital
is not El-Ayoun but Rabat. According to Mr Abdi, Morocco
is buying time in the negotiations, the only way to bring Mo-
rocco to the negotiating table with
serious intentions will be to inflict eco-
nomic losses on it via a resumption of
the armed struggle.7
This argument begs the question:
with what armaments? As far as open
source intelligence indicates, the outdated arms the Polisario
Front receives from Algeria are hand-me-downs from the
Russian arsenal (old tanks T-55s, T-62s and BM-21s rocket
launchers, and it does not dispose of an air force), outdated
and unreliable. The Saharawi People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA) is considered to have manpower capabilities of 6,000
to 7,000 active soldiers — very few compared to its war
years when some
sources quote figures
of 20,000 active men.
However, those num-
bers rise exponen-
tially when we con-
sider that both male
and female refugees in
the camps undergo
military training at
18. Furthermore, the
role of women, par-
tially due to the cul-
tural Berber heritage,
was crucial in the
past, forming auxil-
iary units protecting
the camps during war years.
Whether the present generation that has never experi-
enced guerilla warfare would be able to repeat the gestures of
the older generation remains to be tested. What should not
be dismissed is that, cornered into a situation with no future,
the disillusionment over 20 years of negotiations falling on
deaf ears, a generation of highly educated Saharawis might
well be tempted to try the armed struggle.
Not all youth favours resumption of an armed conflict.
Showing an opposite view from the UJSARIO leader, an
Afapredesa (the Saharawi human rights organization) repre-
sentative who was tortured in Moroccan prisons for graffiti-
writing in El-Ayoun in Western Sahara, is clearly against vio-
lence.8 The two men are roughly the same age, both have
received higher education in Libya and
Algeria yet their outlook is radically
different. The one differentiating factor
in their background is that while the
UJSARIO youth was brought up in the
Tindouf camps, the Afapredesa advoca-
te grew up in Western Sahara where most of the resistance
(peaceful and violent) has recently played out.
Status quo and repercussions on the region
Historically Algeria has backed the Polisario Front for the
following reasons: to establish its strong commitment to anti-
colonialism (due to its history with France), and to act as the
main player in the
region, with a view to
enclose Morocco.
France has been
blocking the Security
Council vote for
MINURSO’s mission:
refusing to include
human rights moni-
toring as part of its
mandate. France’s
position is linked both
to its economic inter-
ests and its colonial
past with Algeria. The
UN ‘Baker Plan’ II
endorsed by the UN
Security Council in 2003, envisioned Saharawi self-rule under
a Western Sahara Authority for a period of five years, with a
referendum on independence to follow. However, Morocco
refused to agree to a referendum that included independence
as an option.
Algeria’s efforts at present are focused on dealing with its
own internal tensions, which have existed for years (also
among the different generations of generals). Protests, albeit
fragmented, have taken place even if they have not resulted in
an Algerian Arab Spring (the reasons for this are not the remit
of this study). For these reasons, despite the superior defense
The economic interests explain Europe’s view for the need for an improvement in the security and
stability of the region.
A graffiti wall at Afapredesa, the Saharawi human rights organization, in memory of political prisoners who have disappeared
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 9
drawn to the issue following numerous kidnappings of Euro-
peans, as well as the increased drug-trafficking of cocaine and
hashish. Running parallel to these activities was the rise of Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and, more recently,
the appearance of new splinter groups, such as the Movement
for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Boko
Haram in northern Nigeria.
Drug trafficking
Related to the increased insecurity in the region is the grow-
ing drug-trafficking. The Sahel and its underbelly via Guinea
Bissau have been the gateway for drugs coming in from Latin
America (cocaine). The Sahel has also been the route for
hashish of which Morocco is the world’s number one pro-
ducer. What changed are the routes: a process of diversifica-
tion has taken place in the past decade. And no reliable data
exist on the total amount of hashish traveling through the
region. Heightened security has also led to a different cocaine
route mainly via Guinea Bissau, and via Ghana and Benin.
From there it proceeds to the European markets via the key
market of Mauritania. The drug-trafficking is closely related
to a proliferation of weapons and community conflicts to com-
pete for access to the drug market. Recent studies have at
times tried to implicate the drug-trafficking with the disen-
chanted Saharawi youth but while the link is easy to make on
paper, there exists no significant evidence to substantiate this
claim.
Implications of inaction in Western Sahara
Recent events in May 2012, when Morocco refused to recog-
nize UN special envoy Christopher Ross in his role as media-
tor, would appear to confirm the position expressed by the
Saharawi USJARIO youth: Morocco is doing everything to
buy time in the process. The new round of negotiations
scheduled for May and June has now been delayed indefi-
nitely. While the older generation of the Polisario Front in-
sists on a referendum that includes the option of total inde-
pendence, which Morocco refuses, the Saharawi leadership
advocates peaceful negotiations as the only way to get there.9
In the past there have been threats of resumption of conflict,
however Polisario now seems to be more concentrated on
containing these passions from its youth. Part of this could be
due to the realization that an armed struggle would be detri-
mental to the Saharawis. There might also be political calcula-
capacities of Algeria, and its massive investments in defense
spending, we are unlikely to see military action outside its
borders. While this general approach on Algeria’s part is true
for most of Sahel, given the direct interest and geopolitical
antagonism against Morocco, Algeria has hosted and backed
the Polisario since 1975.
European Economic Interests
A recent study requested by the European Parliament's Com-
mittee on Development provides a snapshot of the current
economic interests that tie the EU to the Sahel region. These
economic interests explain Europe’s view for the need for an
improvement in the security and stability of the region. The
ties are both on a bilateral basis for the different member
states and for the EU as a whole, notably the fishing agree-
ments with Morocco linked to the resources of Western Sa-
hara; Mauritania is an important source of iron and vital for
European steel industry; Niger provides 12% of the EU’s
uranium consumption; the Sahel is a critical transit for the
Russian Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline project, which should
bring Nigerian gas into Europe (although this project seems to
be at a standstill since a few years, there are other schemes such
as the Cameroon/Tchad pipeline into Niger). As witnessed
even prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, the security situation
in the Sahel region was shifting from one that local govern-
ments considered nuisance, to one of threat. It was during the
French Presidency of the EU in 2008 that attention was
Little girl in the Tindouf camps going to school
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 10
About the author
Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli
Gaja Pellegrini-Bettoli holds a Master’s Degree in Eco-
nomic History from the London School of Economics. She
authored a reportage in Algeria on the October kidnap-
pings in Tindouf. She has published articles on foreign pol-
icy issues in Corriere della Sera and France24 Observers. Previ-
ously, she worked at the European Commission.
General assembly UN, 21-11-1979 (accessed 16 June, 2012). 5 Polisario Front Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi,
interview with author, 28 February 2012.
6 Polisario Front Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Omar, inter-
view with author, 27 February 2012. 7 Secretary General Saharawi Student Union, UJSARIO, Ahmed
Lehbib Abdi, interview with author, 27 February 2012.
8 Afapredesa representative, interview with author, 28 February
2012. 9 Polisario Front Representative in Italy Omar Mih, interview
with author, 1 March 2012.
10 UJSARIO Ahmed Lehbib Abdi, interview with author, 27
February 2012.
11 Polisario Front Minister Foreign Affairs Mohamed Salem Ould
Salek, interview with author, 27 February 2012.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They
do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
its members, affiliates or staff.
This study is dedicated to Rossella Urru and her
family, an inspiration in courage. In the hope
that she, together with Ainhoa Fernandez and
Enric Gonyalons may return home soon.
tions as most of the protests are now taking place in the in
Western Sahara. In either case, to dismiss the possibility that
events will not take a different route simply because they
have not for 21 years, would seem near-sited, particularly at a
time when the entire region is being swept by dramatic chan-
ges. Particularly among the youth, some view failure to act
now as a missed opportunity.10
Interestingly, when asked if the current situation would
harm the negotiation process by pushing Europe to focus on
maintaining security by endorsing a status quo in the region,
the Polisario Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that this would
be a dangerous miscalculation for the EU which ultimately
will make the situation worse.11
Conclusion
This study has highlighted the fragmented and, at times, con-
tradictory information presently available. In a rapidly chang-
ing geopolitical scenario, with different players and interests,
an a priori characterization of the issue of Western Sahara as a
frozen or marginal conflict might not be correct or at least
not complete. Sufficient evidence does exist that a growing
number of the population both in the Western Sahara and in
the camps in Tindouf, is losing confidence in the UN and the
EU, and that the negotiation process is growing thin. Al-
though this forgotten conflict is not considered of prime con-
cern today, should an armed confrontation in the form of
guerrilla warfare resume, it would exponentially increase the
already existing chaos and insecurity in the Sahel region with
repercussions on European economic interests. While a clear
understanding of the region is difficult because of the conflict-
ing or at times non-existing evidence, sweeping the dirt un-
der the carpet could be counterproductive in the long-run for
all players at stake.
1 Polisario Front Minister Foreign Affairs Mohamed Salem
Ould Salek, interview with author, 27 February 2012. 2 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
p1=3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=5 (ICJ 16 Oct.
1975, summary advisory opinion, accessed 16 June 2012). 3 Polisario Front Minister of Culture Khadija Hamdi Abdalahi,
interview with author, 28 February 2012. 4 Point 7, Res. 34/37 -Question of Western Sahara- 34th
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 6 11
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