Foreward
Genesis
Nineteenth Century North East
Annexation of Assam
Early History
Frontier Police and Military Police
The Tribal Expeditions
World Wars & Inter War Years
World War I
Inter-War Years
World War II
Post World Wars and Independence
Tribal Policy & NEFA
The Earthquake
Naga Uprising 1955
Escape of Dalai Lama
Chinese Aggression
Indo Pak Wars
Chaukan Pass Expedition
Expansion of Assam Rifles
The Organisation Today
Leadership
Counter Insurgency, Border Guarding & Peace Keeping
North East India
Jammu & Kashmir
Border Guarding
Peace Keeping
Haiti Mission
Training
Assam Rifles Training Centre & School
Training Philosophy
Games and Sports
Epilogue
Connect with the North East
Scroll of Honour
The Road Ahead
Vision For The Future
Bibliography
The Team at 180
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Assam Rifles at 180, is intended
to be a commemorative book,
to mark the anniversary of
the raising of the country’s
oldest Para Military Force.
An anniversary induces a
resurgence of interest in the
evolution, and a review of the
course followed so far. This
volume intends to survey the
historical experience and the
principles on which Assam
Rifles was established and
draw the lessons which would
help to shape the professional
issues of today and tomorrow.
From ‘Cachar Le vy ’ to
‘Assam Rifles’ - a series of
circumstances have played an
instrumental part in defining
and redefining our structure
and role from time to time.
During this journey the Force
has come to be honoured by
several epithets and symbols
- each backed by a profound
and inspiring episode. During
this time we have also learnt
that we have a critical role in
carrying out projects designed
to extend economic and social
benefits to the people of North
East and the calibration it
entails in terms of training and
resources.
This book is intended to recall
the whispers of the forbearers
and the intentions of the
statesmen who defined our
ethos and function, lest we get
deluded by the cacophony of
media reports and numerous
other voices vying with each
other for public attention.
The production team of this
book constitutes a passionate
band of youngsters, who
have strived to lend an air
of freshness to the text and
illustrations and I am sure, it
will convey the essence of the
commemorative occasion of
our great Force.
5
The Seven Sister States, also
called “Paradise Unexplored”,
are the contiguous states of
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram,
Nagaland and Tripura in
Northeastern India. Contrary
to the mainland Indian
perception of Northeast India
as a culturally homogeneous
region of mongoloid races,
the region is diverse in almost
every aspect; it is inhabited
by a mosaic of societies
characterised by diversity of
ethnicity, language, culture,
religion, social organisation,
economic pursuits, productive
relations and participation in
political process. J.B. Fuller
(1909), in his introduction to
Major Alan Playfair’s book on
the Garos, wrote that “The
province of Assam in the far
northeastern corner of India is
a museum of nationalities.” It
has been the meeting ground
of different people who
migrated to the region from
NINETEENTH CENTURY NORTH EAST
South West China or South
East Asia via Burma at various
points of history.
The sobriquet, the Land
of Seven Sisters, had been
originally coined to coincide
with the inauguration of
the new states in January,
1972, by Jyoti Prasad Saikia,
a journalist in Tripura in the
course of a radio talk show.
Saikia later compiled a book
on the interdependence and
commonness of the Seven
Sister States, and named it the
Land of Seven Sisters. It has
been primarily because of this
publication that the nickname
has caught on.
This monolithic view about
North East India is strongly
held, by the policy makers
who have to act from an
administrative perspective
and have to focus on their
similarities in political, social
and economic contexts which
runs contrary to the attempts
of local communities to
assert their identities on
account of perceived identity
crises or complaints about
‘neglect’. Moreover, the seven
sisters are of great geo-
political, geostrategic and
geo-economic importance as
the region borders with China,
Bangladesh, Myanamar and
Bhutan.
The genesis and evolution
of the Assam Rifles is deeply
rooted in this racial, cultural
and bio-geographic diversity
and our colonial history.
9
Assam came under British
rule after the Anglo- Burmese
War in 1826. The British take
over led to relative stability
and increased economic
activities. The tea industry
flourished and became one of
the principal sources of wealth
because of its large scale
export to Britain. Coal and
oil deposits were discovered
and forest produce provided
substantial income. “Assam”,
writes Lt Col RS Chhettri,
“thus became prosperous,
and new settlements came
up in different places offering
attractive targets for trans-
border forays of the tribals.
This in turn posed a serious
threat to the British industries
and plantations in Assam”
which apparently sparked the
imperative of constituting a
force to contain and regulate
tribesmen inspired by the most
primitive ideas and practices
of war in which looting,
murdering, plundering and
despoiling were norms of life.
Writes Bampfylde Fuller “ …the
tribesmen who are still inspired
by the ancient ideas that war
is one of the most exhilarating
of life’s experiences, and its
commemoration, in war-dress
and war dances, the most
enjoyable of amusements.
The most obvious method of
stopping these marauding
raids was retaliatory incursions
into tribal territory. The Bharat
Rakshak Monitor attributes the
raising of Para Military Forces
to the need to consolidate
and extend the annexation
of the northeastern and the
northwestern portions of the
Indian landmass, with the least
expense to the treasury. The
British found it increasingly
difficult to garrison newly
conquered territories; lying
at great distances from the
towns; with the regular troops.
This was mainly owing to the
exorbitant outlays involved.
Paucity of readily available
units was another reason. The
problem was solved by raising
special local units, such as the
Punjab Irregular Frontier Force
in the Punjab. In the northeast,
the Assam Rifles (AR), initially
named the Cachar Levys,
came into being along with
the Jorhat Militia and the Kuki
Levy. Subsequently all these
forces were reorganized and
renamed as the Frontier Force.
“The task assigned to the
Cachar Levy/Police Militia
immediately after its raising
in 1835 was to guard the
Eastern Frontier of Assam
from the Brahmaputra river to
Cachar and to carry out small
scale punitive expeditions in
the hill areas of Assam.” The
pattern of deployment of
the Force consisted of strong
detachments of troops at
Nowgong and Silchar with
small posts all along the
frontier and an administrative
headquarters at at Asloo (16
miles from Halflong) together
with the Levy’s strongest
detachment. Initially the
ANNEX ATION OF ASSAM
13
Cachar Levy had established
twelve stockades or frontier
posts all along the 400 km
frontier which ran through the
great Nambhar forest near the
foothills of the Naga hills to the
plains of the Surma valley, east
of Silchar.
Maintenance of law and order
was the whole time occupation
of the Force against the
incessant incidents of violence
on the part of the tribal warriors,
who raided the adjoining tea
gardens in Assam, murdered
British officials, transgressed
the recognized boundaries or
hunted human heads in the
neighbouring villages.
The inter tribal feuds amongst
the Nagas, their attacks on the
survey parties and the murder
of several British officers on
duty convinced the authorities
of the necessity of a” Forward
Policy” in the Naga hills. In
order to serve British interest,
towards the close of 1878,
it was decided to gradually
extend British authority over
“all independent tribes”.
In the process of extension
of the British administration,
many British officers lost their
lives. In most of these cases
their heads as well as those of
their escorts were taken away
by the killers along with their
weapons and equipment. It
was for the recovery of their
heads and stores that punitive
expeditions were undertaken;
smaller ones by the Military
Police itself and larger ones in
collaboration with the Army.
Every such expedition generally
ended with the annexation
of the area by the British,
followed by establishment
of Military Police posts in the
annexed area. The expeditions
were also carried out to extend
contact with the frontier tribes
and for carrying out a survey of
unexplored areas.
The Assam Military Police
being light footed, highly
mobile, steeped in austerity
had “more teeth than tail”, and
was the primary instrument
used by the British in the North
East India to establish their
political domination over the
region. There were numerous
expeditions launched in the
nineteenth century and the
decisive role played by the
Assam Military Police has been
eloquently mentioned in a
plethora of historical accounts.
A “Cachar Levy” ConstableCirca. 1835
Some of the famous ones
are : Kuki and Lushai Hills
E x p e d i t i o n s ; M a n i p u r
Expeditions; Abor Expeditions;
Apatani Expedition; Mishmi
Expeditions.
15
Although Army units were always
on hand, and were employed in
most major campaigns, their
numbers were clearly insufficient
to carry out the everyday patrols
and minor expeditions that
formed an in integral part of
Indian frontier management.
These duties were instead left
predominantly in the hands
of the Frontier Police (later the
Military Police) battalions. The
Frontier Police (FP) had their
origins in various irregular corps
known as ‘Levies’ raised during
the Second Quarter of the 19th
Century . The earliest appears to
have been the 600-strong Shan
Levy raised in 1825 from the Shan
tribesmen who had previously
ser ved with the Burmese.
Initially they served under their
own leaders but in 1831 the
corps was placed under the
command of a military subaltern.
Subsequently Gurkhas and
Cacharies were recruited and
the corps apparently became
to be known as the Cachar Levy.
It had meanwhile incorporated
another Shan militia in 1838,
which came to be known as the
Jorhat Levy.
ln about 1852, the Cachar Levy
was split into two. One part
was based at Nowong (Now
Nangam) and the other at
Silchar in North Cachar. Later
when the Assamese Levies were
officially abolished in 1861, these
two units were considerably
strengthened (from roughly
100-160 men to about 500-560
each) to become respectively
the Nowgong Frontier Police
Battalion and the North Cachar
Hills Frontier Police Battalion.
Lakhimpur Police Militia had
meanwhile been established
in about 1843. The Nowgong
unit began to be referred to as
the Naga Hills Frontier Police
Battalion in the mid 1860s.
FRONTIER POLICE AND MILITARY POLICE
19
Another militia, the Kuki Levy,
was raised in Silchar in June
1850, comprising 200 Kukis
and Cacharies who were later
amalgamated into the existing
Frontier Police battalions in
1867. The new Military Police
were originally organized as
four battalions, comprising
the Naga Hills Battalion
(Headquarters at Kohima),
the Lakhimpur Battalion
(Headquarters at Dibrugarh),
t h e C a c h a r B a t t a l i o n
(Headquarters at Silchar) and
the Surma Valley and Garo
Hills Battalion (Headquarters
at Tura). In 1882 the strength of
the Naga Hills Battalion was 568
men which later increased to
700. The Lakhimpur Battalion
was also raised to 700 men in
1883 but the Garo Hills and
Cachar Battalions remained
understrength. Two additional
units were raised following the
annexation of the Lushai Hills.
The tr ibes l iv ing along
India’s North-East Frontier
were sufficiently hostile and
their territory sufficiently
impenetrable that the British
were happy to leave them
alone as much as possible.
Consequent ly, accepted
practice prior to the mid 1860’s
was to simply dispatch punitive
expeditions into the hills when
necessary and to establish
outposts to guard particularly
threatened areas. It was only
the growth of the tea industry
and other commercial interests
in Assam that prompted the
adoption of a more acquisitive
policy, leading in time to the
annexation of Naga, Lushai
and Chin territory in particular.
Nevertheless, such were
the logistical difficulties of
imposing British Government
in the region that many areas
remained ‘unadministered’
even at the end of Victoria’s
reign.
As well as being inveterate
raiders, the majority of the
hill-peoples of the area were
also head-hunters, particularly
the Garos, Kukis, Lushais and
Nagas. In some isolated areas
head-hunting persisted into
the mid-20th Century.
The frequency of their slave-
raids and head-hunting forays
resulted in the Chin being
‘universally hated’ by their
neighbours and numerous
abortive expeditions were
launched against the Chin
from Manipur and Burma
prior to British annexation
of these areas. Conquest of
Upper Burma finally gave the
British access to the Chins’
mountainous homeland at
the end of the 1880s and
s u b s ta n t i a l e x p e d i t i o n s
mounted in 1889-90 and 1892-
93 eventually brought them to
heel. They were progressively
disarmed after 1893 and the
Chin Hills became a province
of British Burma in 1895.
The Tribal Expeditions
1st Assam Rifles (Lushai Hills
Battalion)
Between 1865 and 1868 Kukis
and Lushais from the southern
hills carried out a number
of raids in the Cachar area.
Although expeditions were
mounted against them, but
21
it was only during the winter
of 1871-72 that the first of a
number of extensive military
operations could be launched
to subjugate the Lushai tribes.
Two strong columns were
ordered into the Lushai Hills
(now Mizoram), one from Silchar
southwards, to punish the tribes
on the northeast corner, near the
border of Manipur; and the other
from Chittagong eastwards,
to punish the tribes based
at Aizawl and Lungleh. The
Cachar column comprised 300
Frontier Police personnel apart
from other regular forces. The
Chittagong column consisted
of three regular battalions and
a detachment from the Frontier
Police.
The joint operation lasted
throughout the winter. Large
number of tribesmen made their
submission and the Lushais gave
no further trouble for some years.
As a result of this operation, a
line of strongly manned posts,
were established along Cachar,
Sylhet and Chittagong borders.
About a hundred personnel of
the Frontier Police were awarded
the Indian General Service Medal
with clasp “ Looshai” for this
operation- the first such award
to be recorded.
23
mention in General Tregear’s
despatches at the end of the
operations.
Both the columns of the
Frontier Police – the Surma
Valley Military Police and the
Chittagong Frontier Police -
joined hands a few miles south
of Aizawl in mid February, and
were amalgamated into one
force, the forbears of 1st Assam
Rifles.
The punitive operations against
In January 1888, a concerted
attack by the Poi clan led to
the beheading of a British
officer Lieutenant Stewart
and his reconnaissance
party. Following this, a strong
column of Regular troops and
200 Frontier Police personnel
entered the Lushai territory
for a punitive action. This
expedition was strengthened
further to nearly 4000 men
and its task was upgraded to
permanent occupancy in the
Lushai area. To support him,
another column comprising
400 men from the Surma Valley
Military Police was also moved
into the hills. The tactical route
lay along the Dalesari River in
the upper reaches. The valley
was so confined and the terrain
so difficult that progress could
only be made by means of
rafts, a large number of which
were constructed by the
Frontier Police. These men
soon became experts in river
craft and performed the task so
well that they received special
The Lushai Expedition :
Officers checking boats after crossing a river
Pacification of the Lushais
the tribes were successfully
carried out though not without
some close quarter jungle
fighting. When the task was
accomplished, a permanent
stockade was established
at Aizawl where 200 men
remained garrisoned. For these
operations men from both the
units were awarded the Indian
General Service Medal (1859-
1895), clasp “ Chin Lushai Hills
1889-90”.
A number of minor rebellions
were put down during 1890-
91, including one in Manipur
in which a strong detachment
from the Surma Valley Battalion
marched into Manipur State
under Colonel Rennick and
remained there for several
months. During one of these
operations, in the Southern
Lushai Hills, Subedar Sangram
Sing and Havaldar Chandra
Singh Thapa of the Chittagong
Frontier Police distinguished
themselves by their gallantry
and were awarded the Indian
Order of Merit, 2nd Class, the
first such known awards to the
Frontier Police.
In 1892, for instance, two
columns of Military Police,
one each from Aizawl and
Lungleh joined hands with
a regular column of regular
troops from Fort White (60th
Rifles of the British Army and
39th Garhwal) to subjugate
rebellious elements over
a wide area in the central,
southern and northern regions
25
of the Lushai Hills (for which the
General Service Medal with Clasp
“ Lushai 1889-92” was awarded
to the troops and the Military
Police.
2nd Assam Rifles (Lakhimpur
Battalion)
The Lakhimpur Battal ion
was raised in 1864 to secure
the borders along Sadiya
and Lakhimpur districts. The
Battalion saw active service
against the Abors and Mishmis
during the ‘seventies. In addition,
it furnished detachments in
support of survey operations
in the Lhota and Ao areas in
Northern Nagaland. In one of
these expeditions one British
officer was killed and another
wounded, and there were over
130 casualties among the men
of the escort and survey parties.
In consequence, a large punitive
force drawn from regular troops
and the Lakhimpur and Naga
Frontier Police Battalions under
Brigadier General Nuthall was
sent to exact reparations.
During the North Lushai Hills
disturbances of 1890-91, 120
Lakhimpur Battalion troops had
operated under Captain Maxwell
View of The British Cantonment
Langtobal, Manipore
and relieved the Surma Valley
Frontier Police . In 1893, Captain
Maxwell was given the command
of a 600 strong force comprising
300 men of his own and 100 from
the Naga Hills Military Police to
punish a number of Abor villages
who had been raiding the plains
for slaves.
A major expedition up the
Dibong Valley to punish Mishmi
tribesmen became a landmark in
illustrating the high expenditure
of employing regular troops
for minor tasks. Colonel
Molesworth’s column which
proceeded on this assignment
consisted mostly of regulars
(besides Lakhimpur personnel).
It stayed out for three months,
costing the government Rs 2
lakhs, whereas the task could
have been accomplished by just
200 Lakhimpuris.
The next occasion when the
Lakhimpur Battal ion was
employed in the f ield in
conjunction with regular forces
was in 1911. A strong force under
General Bowers, consisting
of two Gorkha battalions, the
Lakhimpuris under their new
Commandant, Captain Sir G
Sutherland Dunbar, bolstered
27
by a detachment from the Lushai
Hills Military Police, 27 pounder
guns, a Brigade Signal Company
and some 3000 Naga porters,
were sent up the Dibang Valley
both to explore and survey the
territory towards the Tibetan
Border to punish the Minyong
Abors (around Pasighat) for
their treacherous murder of
the Political Officer, Mr Noel
Wiliamson and a Missionary, Dr
Gregorson. The column operated
from a base at Kobo, for the
preparation of which a strong
detachment of the Lakhimpuris
was made available.
The operation lasted from mid
October to mid December.
The Manipur Outrage : Kangla Palace Gates
29
There were periods of heavy
fighting, particularly when the
columns were ambushed and
when Abor stockades were
attacked. In the end, the Abors
came to terms. The murderers of
Williamson and Gregorson were
taken into custody and severe
punishment was inflicted upon
the tribesmen. But the cost of
the operation raised quite a hue
and cry in the Indian and British
press. It was generally believed
that the whole operation could
have been swiftly completed by
the Lakhimpuris themselves at a
much less cost.
During 1912-13, survey parties
were pushed up the Dibong and
Dihang Valleys and far into the
Abor and Mishmi Hills, beyond
points never reconnoitered
before. The security of these
parties fell on the shoulders
of Lakhimpuri escorts. The
battalion was also called upon
to provide protection for a survey
and road building party sent up
the Lohit Valley, the intention
being to open up a trade route
with South West China via Rima
in Tibet. This party succeeded
in cutting a bridle path up to
Walong, after which the work was
discontinued.
3rd Assam Rifles (Naga Hills
Battalion)
When it became imminent that
the Military Police battalions
would have to be reorganized
into three “territorial” units
of Frontier Police, it became
obvious that the Nowgong
Battalion, the senior unit would
be fully occupied with the Cachar
Carriers on the way to the
Abor Expedition
With baskets on their backs and well
armed : The Abor Expedition
- Nagaland Border and the Naga
tribes. It was already unofficially
alluded to as the “Naga Hills
Frontier Police”. Finally, in
1872, the Nowgong battalion
moved to Nagaland. At first its
headquarters was established at
Samguthing, but in 1878, it was
shifted to Kohima.
For a year all went well, till in
May 1879, Damant the Deputy
Commissioner found that the
large village of Khonoma was
collecting arms and ammunition,
and before long this section
showed decided hostility. The
fact being the people now
realised the existence of this
garrison (200 rifles) which
effectively stopped their head
hunting and related pursuits,
entailed payment of tribute,
the supply of men as transport
carriers; and all this they
resented. In spite of evidences
of unrest, such as an abortive
attack on the post at Piphirna,
Damant did not believe it was
likely to be serious, and before
starting out for a tour in the north
he visited Khonoma, (twelve
miles off) to find out the temper
of the people. In October, 1879,
with an escort of twenty-five
Regulars and sixty-five Military
Police, he passed through
Jotsoma and reached the foot
hill on which stands Khonoma.
On arrival at the village gate he
found it closed, and his demands
for admittance were answered by
a volley which killed Damant and
the sepoys with him. The Kohima
Garrison had an uncommonly
unpleasant experience, being
surrounded by some six to
seven thousand Naga warriors,
31
Apatanis leaving the valley after a night and morning of ritual preparation for the war
Warriors performing a dance before setting out with the Assam Rifles to attack Nyishis of Licha
who spared no effort to fire the
thatched buildings and attacked
the stockade repeatedly by
rolling heavy timbers forward
along the ground behind which
they sheltered and fired.
General Nation was now directed
to assemble a force of 1,135
men with two mountain guns at
Golaghat, and in early November
these moved forward and
entered the hills, not without
considerable opposition.
Warriors camping in the Kiyi river valley
Before starting his main assault
from the north, General Nation
sent a detachment of two
companies of regulars and 30
men of the Frontier Police. 200
Manipuri troops were positioned
on a flank for a similar purpose.
The fall of Khonoma was
followed by the establishment
of a temporary post which was
eventually taken over by the
Naga Hills Battalion.
After the settlement of these
disturbances the Battalion at
last found the opportunity to
put into effect the reorganization
scheme of converting to a
“territorial” unit- the Naga Hills
Military Police Battalion. Under
its first Commandant, Captain
Plowden ( A Bengal Cavalryman),
it settled down to make a proper
cantonment at Kohima. At the
same time, Pipers were trained,
later to give way to a 25-piece
band.
33
The next bit of “excitement” for
the Naga Hills Battalion came
in the wake of the Manipur
rebellion of 1891, in which the
ruler of the state was deposed
and the Political Officer and a
number of other British Officers
treacherously murdered by the
Senapati of the Army, Tikendrajit
Singh. At the height of the
rebellion, the regular Indian
Army stationed in Manipur was
dispersed and virtually chased
out by the rebels of the Manipur
State troops. It was at this stage
that the Naga Hills battalion
came into the picture.
In a brisk engagement against
Manipuri forces, the Military
Po l i c e d e ta c h m e n t h a d
succeeded in capturing the
border post at Mao Thana and
pursued the fleeing Manipuris
for nearly 16 kms. Later the
column reached Imphal. The
three companies of the Naga
Hills Battalion remained there
for a few months, employed on
guard and escort duties.
The remainder of the decade
was comparatively peaceful.
However in 1910-11 a long range
column went out to the area of
the Saramethi Range again to
punish the Aishan Kukis for their
raids towards Somra. During the
winter of 1912-13, the battalion
supplied a number of escorts
for surveys of the Mishmi and
Aka areas. They were the first to
make contact with the people on
the Tibet Border. In the Aka area
the party traversed Tenga Valley
and visited Rupa and Jamiri –
names that were later to become
familiar to the Indian Army in
what later became Kameng
Frontier Division.
35
THE END STATE
The task of pacifying and
humanizing these primitive
hill people would have been
impossible had there not been
at the command of the Civil
Government a trained and armed
force which could be employed
in small detachments and
rapidly mobilized with minimum
of transport. The annexed
territories were garrisoned by
localized battalions of Military
Police and the establishment
of Military police outposts. To
punish offending villages it was
often necessary to proceed in
arms against them. And it was
exceedingly difficult to confine
government intervention rigidly
within the limits of the annexed
territory; for villages inside the
boundary line were sometimes
raided from the outside. The
most plausible and graphic
explanation in this regard comes
from Col LW Shakespear :
“…our officers could hardly
ignore atrocities that were
perpetrated just outside their
jurisdiction; they could not
stand unmoved on their frontier
watching villages go up in flames,
when by crossing a boundary
stream they could stop this
cruelty. By promptitude in action
and steady pressure, peace was
gradually established throughout
(the) area … Men who had been
accustomed to decorate their
houses with skulls felt almost
content in using pumpkins for
this purpose; and so instead
of raiding villages of the open
country, they commenced to
trade with them. Schools were
opened.” Trade, the advent of
the missionaries and growth of
education and all round progress
form part of the narrative of the
regional security corollary which
depended critically on the role
played by the earlier personas of
the modern day ‘Assam Rifles”.
Over time this conduced the
attempts towards geographic
and cultural assimilation of
these independent tribes into
the ‘mainstream’. How the
Force came to be identified with
“friendliness” and a wide range
of civic action projects, can be
traced in their intrinsic tribal
disposition - “Detachments of
Military Police in the course of
their rounds have been known
to drop their official dignity and
“let themselves go” in organizing
games for the entertainment
of the people. They are proud
of their battalion sports…
(and) can gain almost as much
excitement in football and
hockey as by harrying a village
and massacring its inhabitants.”
37
The extent and significance of
the Indian Army in the World
Wars is severely undermined
by the paucity of records. This
is despite the fact that India
was heavily involved in the First
World War as a key contributor
to the allied forces and at that
time an important part of the
British Empire. For a hundred
years, the story of this force
had been nearly forgotten —
the narrative of World War I
has so far been predominantly
white. World War I marked an
important watershed as for the
first time, Indian soldiers were
fighting on European soil. They
fought in all the major theatres
of war on land, air and sea,
alongside British troops. Their
many awards for bravery, as
well as their war graves and
memorials on the battlefields,
are testimony to their sacrifice
in the service of Britain.
It is important to note that in
the context of the World War
WORLD WAR I
I, the identity of the Assam
Rifles or its precursors is
indistinguishable from the
Indian Army, primarily because,
during the World War I, Assam
Military Police troopers were
part of the Indian Forces that
fought for Britain in Europe
and Middle East.
India raised the world’s largest
volunteer armies: 1.5 million in
WWI and 2.5 million in WWII.
Indian troops were on the
Western Front by the winter
of 1914 and fought at the first
Battle of Ypres. By the end of
1915, they had sustained many
casualties along with those
from sickness. The decision
was taken to withdraw the
Indian Corps from front line
duty at the end of 1915.
In total, 800,000 Indian troops
fought in all the theatres
of the war with 1.5 million
volunteering to fight. They
fought in most theatres of war
including Gallipoli and North
and East Africa. In all 47,746
were classed as killed or
missing with 65,000 wounded.
It is estimated that 74,187
Indian soldiers died during the
war.
The significance of Assam Rifles
in World War I, is rooted in the
huge number of casualties
sustained by the Indian Army.
Indeed the casualties were so
heavy that the Indian Army
Reserves could not cope with
the number of reinforcements
required. Gurkha Regiments
were the worst off in this respect
– because of the difficulty
in calling up reservists from
distant villages in the Nepal
Hills. Short of Nepali recruits,
the British Indian Army turned
to the Assam Military Police
for additional reinforcements
for Gurkha battalions. The
response was immediate
and volunteers came forward
41
in overwhelming numbers.
Therefore even though Assam
Rifles did not participate in the
World War I as a battalion per
se, it contributed over three
thousand men from the force
to various Gurkha Regiments
of the Indian Army. Drafts
and reinforcements were sent
to various affiliated Gurkha
Battalions in France, Egypt,
Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, North
Persia and the North West
Frontier of India. Official figures
include 23 Indian officers (now
known as JCOs) and 3174 men.
Of these, 11 Indian officers and
69 other ranks received various
honours and awards which
included 3 Indian Orders of
Merit, 5 Indian Distinguished
Ser vice Medals and 12
Meritorious Service Medals.
The total casualties suffered
by Assam Rifles during World
War I included the death of 5
Indian officers and 237 other
ranks and injuries to 6 Indian
officers and 247 other ranks.
The contribution of these men
was immeasurable: it could
be argued that without the
prompt arrival of these forces,
it really would have been all
over as Britain’s Army was
small and the many thousands
of men volunteering were not
yet trained and in place.
It was in recognition to the
excellent services rendered
by the Force during World
War I that in October 1917,
the government approved the
redesignation of the Force as
“The Assam Rifles.”
First line transport of a Gurkha battalion in France
43
Copies of some of the letters from various Commanding Officers of the Gurkha Regiments to whom Assam Rifles
sent reinforcements during the Great War between January 1915 and the end of 1918, and which show the value
of their services during that period.
Copy of letter, No. 123/108/A, of 9th August, 1921, from the O.C 1st K.G.O. Goorkha Rifles to the I.G.P, Shillong.
44
Copy of letter, No. 1806/D.C./A.T., of 23-8-21, from the O.C. 2/7th Goorkha Rifles to the I.G.P. Shillong.
45
First photograph from above: Troops at a demonstration during the Non - Cooperation Movement
Second Photograph:The boycott of foreign clothes in Colonial India
The process of demobilization after the Great War saw the return of hundreds of Assam Rifles volunteers
from the regular Army to their parent unit; as a result all Assam Rifles battalions found themselves grossly
oversubscribed in NCOs and men. This inspired the raising of a fifth battalion. The new battalion was raised
at Lokhra on 10 June 1920 and furnished the posts at North Lakhimpur, Harmati, Dikulmakh, Hathipaithi,
Udalguri and Darrang. Since all these posts were located in hot and humid plains of North Assam, it was
decided to set up a hill station post in Happy Valley, on the outskirts of Shillong, to permit a turn over of
officers and men from the posts in the plains for rest and recreation.
INTER-WAR YEARS
DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST NATIONALISTS
The fifth battalion’s first call of
duty was to provide aid to civil
authorities in suppressing riots
and disorders connected with
Mahatma Gandhi’s Non
Co-operation Movement of
1921-1922, a task which was
disliked by the troops because
that amounted to acting against
one’s own people.
In Assam, the nationalists
instigated riots at various places
and organized strikes in the
tea gardens and on the Assam
Bengal Railway and Assam
Rifles were frequently called out
in aid of the civil authority. It
also provided signalers to assist
the Railway system to keep its
telegraph lines open.
The Assam Rifles continued
to be deployed against fellow
Indians since the Independence
Resolution of 1929 which later
flared into the Civil Disobedience
Movement. Detachments from
all battalions were dispatched to
Sylhet, Calcutta and Chittagong.
Between 1931 and 1938 the
First Battalion in Silchar was
constantly called upon to send
detachments to Sylhet and
surrounding areas – including
the tea gardens in which mass
strikes had been staged.
Meanwhile the terms of service
for the men of the Assam Rifles
had also been improved, mainly
as a reward for their sterling
services during the Great War. In
1922, the men’s pay was raised
from 9 to 11 rupees per month
and the system of making a
man pay for his kit was replaced
by a kit being issued to them at
government expense.
47
First photograph from above: Moplah prisoners go to trial
Bottom Left Photograph:2nd Dorsets to deploy from Baird Barracks, Bangalore to Malabar
Bottom Right Photograph:Moplah Prisoners
MOPLAH REBELLION
1923 saw about 650 men drawn
from all the battalions and
dispatched to quell the Moplah
rebellion in Rampa State Agency
near Waltair on the request of
Madras Presidency. The troops
went by sea to Narsapatnam
under the command of Major
Goodall (Commandant Second
Battalion) and then inland to
the scene of disturbances. The
troubled area was extensive
and densely forested. Goodall
decided to replicate the strategy
earlier used during the Kuki
operations. He divided the area
into a number of sub areas , each
with a mobile column, fixed posts
and ‘I’ staff. When the men got
to know the ground, they were
able to flush the insurgents out
of their hidings. After a number of
skirmishes, the rebel leader was
killed and his confederates either
killed or captured. Three Indian
officers were awarded the King’s
Police Medal.
49
AFFILIATION TO GURKHA RIFLES
In 1924, as a further recognition of the services rendered by the Assam Rifles in World War I, as a second
line reserve, all the then existing five Assam Rifles battalions were permanently affiliated with the following
groups of Gurkha Rifles:
1 Assam Rifles to 2nd Group (2 & 9 Gurkha Rifles)
2 Assam Rifles to 5th Group (7 & 10 Gurkha Rifles)
3 Assam Rifles to 1st Group (1 & 4 Gurkha Rifles)
4 Assam Rifles to 4th Group (5 & 6 Gurkha Rifles)
5 Assam Rifles to 3rd Group (3 & 8 Gurkha Rifles)
SUBEDAR MAJOR STEPS UP
Another notable development
was the parity accorded to the
Subedar Major of the Assam
Rifles with that of the regular
Army. The Subedar Major of
the Asssam Rifles often had to
discharge greater responsibilities
than his counterpart in the
regular Army, because of the
limited authorization of British
officers in the battalions. He
was the veritable “Indian
Commandant” in the absence
of the officers who were often
out on tours and expeditions.
The British officers realized their
importance and groomed them
accordingly. Their services were
often rewarded with prestigious
titles of “Rai Bhadur”, “Sardar
Bahadur” and “Khan Bahadur”.
Some of the inspiring Subedar
Majors of this era were, Subedar
Major Jamaluddin of 3 AR, who
was awarded Order of British
India, and accorded the title
“Khan Bahadur”in January 1924;
Subedar Major Jangbir Lama
of 2 AR who was accorded the
title “Sardar Bahadur” the same
year; Subedar Major Hetman Rai
of 4 AR received the title of “Rai
Bahadur”.Rai Bahadur and Khan BahadurMedals
RANI GAIDINLIU
An interesting saga of this period
features Rani Gaidinliu who
is missing from Indian history
textbooks.
Gaidinliu was born on January
26, 1915 at Nungkhao, a village
in Manipur. She was sixteen
when she became the leader of
the Heraka movement after its
charismatic leader Jadonang
was executed by the British.
While the Heraka movement
was long aware of the civil
disobedience movement in
British India, it was Gaidinliu
who first used Gandhiji’s name
and identified her peoples’
struggle against oppression
and self-determination with
the larger national movement
gaining ground in India.
Through armed resistance, she
quickly transformed a religious-
indigenous rebellion into a
revolutionary movement for
independence. The Empire
fearing the spirt of defiance,
launched a manhunt for the
16-year-old rebel leader. The
Assam Governor-in-Council
authorised the overwhelming
force of the 3rd and 4th Assam
Rifles and the entire Manipur
Police Force. After a year long
search and capture operations,
Gaidinliu was arrested on
October 17, 1932. She was tried
and convicted on a charge of murder,
waging war against the British crown
and sentenced to life imprisonment
but later released.
Another noteworthy operational
activity of the era includes the task
of providing escorts to Survey of
India party that proceeded to the
unadministered area between the
Naga Hills and the Burma border.
There was no resistance, but the
operation was one of the most
taxing and arduous one.
51
For her contribution
in the independence
struggle, Government
of India awarded her
by releasing postage
stamps in the year 1996.
CONSOLIDATION OF TRIBAL AREAS
The Great War had interrupted
the process of consolidation
of tribal areas. Even though
the government had been able
to extend its writ to most of
the tribal areas of Assam, the
process was far from complete.
However the operations were
resumed and there were several
expeditions launched in this
phase.
In 1925, two platoons from 3 AR,
provided an escort to a survey
party to the border of Sibsagar
District, penetrating into areas
that had not been visited for
many years.
In the Lushai Hills, the Zongling
area drew three separate visits
by the Superintendent of the
Lushai Hills during 1925-26, each
escorted by the men of the first
battalion. Eventually, in 1931-32,
Zongling was incorporated in the
Lushai Hills District. Thereafter
two platoons of the battalion
were employed in supervising
the construction of a road linking
Lungleh with Sherphor, near
Zongling.
53
SUPPRESSION OF HEADHUNTING AND SLAVE TRADING
Headhunting has been a practice
among the Naga tribes of India
and Myanmar. The practice was
common up to the 20th Century
and may still be practised in
isolated Naga tribes of Burma.
Many of the Naga warriors
still bear the marks (tattoos
and others) of a successful
headhunt. In the North East
India, all the people living south
of the Brahmaputra River -
Garos, Khasis, Nagas, and Kukis-
formerly were headhunters
including the Mizo of the Lushai
Hills who also hunted heads of
their enemies.
In April 1936, Mr Mills, Deputy
Commissioner, submitted a
report on the behaviour of
Pangsha, a Kalo Kenyo Village
in Tribal territory outside the
Control Area. They had been
responsible for 200 deaths in the
last 6 months : they had raided
Kejuk within the Control Area and
taken 53 heads : they had raided
Saochu, also within the Control
Area and taken 188 heads ; and
they had been selling captives
as slaves. Though Pangsha was
outside the Control Area, their
conduct had been such that Mr
Mills advised that an expedition
be sent against them.
Chingmak, the Chief of Chingmei, with the breast
tattoo of a head-hunter. Circa. 1936
55
Major Williams and Assam Rifles soldiers preparing for the expedition to Pangsha
Circa. 1936
Major Williams, J P Mills, Mr Smith and several Nagas on a platform
Circa. 1936
The Government of India
approved the launch of
expeditions and the operations
took place between November
13th and December 13th, 1936,
with Mr Mills in political charge
and Major W R B Williams, in
command of the escort of two
platoons of the 3rd Assam
Rifles. A series of expeditions
escorted by the third battalion
were mounted in 1936 to end
both the heinous practices that
of slave trade and headhunting
in that region. Throughout the
rainy season constant attempts
were made to get the villages to
release their slaves, but although
it was reported that Sanglao had
obeyed Government orders,
“Nokhu and Pesu remained
obstinate.” The expedition
left Mokokchung on the 1st
November 1937 and by the end
of the month all the slaves known
to be in the unadministered area
were set free without any casualty
on own side. Mills’ Report of 30th
January 1937 to the Government
of India commented as follows:
“The expeditions completely
achieved its objects in effecting
the release of several slaves
taken as captives and in inflicting
on Pangsha a well merited
punishment not only for its
participation in the slave trade
but for its head-hunting raids on
its neighbours.”
An account of the inter war years
would not be complete without
referring to the aid given by
the Force to civil authorities in
times of natural disasters. In
June 1929, during a period of
torrential rain, Aizawl became
completely isolated because of
landslides in surrounding areas
and widespread damage to the
road links. The Superintendant
of Lushai Hills called on the
Assam Rifles for assistance. Four
platoons of the First Battalion
A slave family freed during the expedition
Circa. 1936
J P Mills with a freed slave child
Circa. 1936
57
From left to right: Mr Smith, Christoph Von Fürer-Haimendorf, J P Mills and Major Williams in Mokokchung, Nagaland
Circa. 1936
cleared 28 miles of road in six
weeks; other parties were sent
to clear 25 miles of river passage
below Sairang. Most of the
men employed in these tasks
contracted miasmal fevers and
subsequently had to spend long
months in hospital.
Manipur was also visited by
heavy floods that year. The lines
of the Fourth Battalion were
under three feet deep water.
Besides undoing the damage
to their own area, the men
constituted large parties to aid
the civil authority in fighting the
floods in other areas of Manipur.
CONCLUSION
The Force performed very
commendably in the World War I.
It provided officers and soldiers
to the various British Indian Army
Gurkha Regiments, a process,
which over the years resulted,
into permanent affiliations of
the battalions of AR to different
groups of the Gurkhas. They
fought shoulder to shoulder
alongside regular army troops
in the Middle East and acquitted
themselves creditably, bagging
numerous decorations in the
bargain. Later on, men were
provided to the army columns
engaged on punitive expeditions
into the erstwhile Assam Hill
Districts and North Eastern
Frontier Agency (NEFA) and also
some in trans-border reprisal
missions into Burma. It was used
for restoration of law and order
in Patna in 1917 and also against
the Moplah rebels in 1924.
The AR along with the Church,
have managed to transform
p r e - h i s t o r i c a n i m a l i s t i c
societies of the North East from
the stone-age to space-age in
three or four generations. Their
humane and tactful handling
of the inhabitants of our far-
flung regions and tribal areas;
be it during the initial era of
pacification, or in the immediate
post-Independence period of
political turmoil, instability,
ethnic tribal aspirations and
resultant disturbed conditions.
The AR troops have managed
to win the hearts and minds of
the populace in a good natured
and large-hearted manner. It
is, therefore, not for nothing,
that the famous and erudite
anthropologist and naturalist,
Verrier Elwin has bestowed on
them a singularly significant
sobriquet: “The Friends Of The
Hill People!” This is what he has
said of them in tribute:
“The custodians of law and
order, the pioneers of every
advance into the interior, the
guardians of our borders and
the friends of the hill people.
Modestly, and without fuss,
they have faced every hardship
and difficulty, and thousands of
villagers in the wildest of areas
think of them with affection and
gratitude.”
59
A s s a m R i f l e s r e m a i n e d
practically insulated from
World War II until the danger
of Japanese invasion made it
imperative to deploy forces in
the North East Sector as well.
WW II saw the force functioning
as elements of the much fabled,
hush-hush and ghost-like “V”
Force, on reconnaissance and
harassment missions behind
Japanese l ines in Burma.
Many of its sub units fought
alongside regular British and
Indian troops in the fiercely
contested battles of the Burma
Front from Ukhrul to Kohima.
Units rendered yeoman service
in the management, evacuation
and control of refugees of
Burma/NEFA in the face of
the onslaught of the Imperial
Japanese Army in the First
Burma Campaign of WWII.
Until the latter half of 1941, the
Force remained preoccupied
w i t h t h e n o r m a l ch o re s :
patrolling the border; escorting
administrative off icials to
r e m o t e a r e a s ; a s s i s t i n g
them to establish them the
government’s writ among the
recalcitrant tribals; the internal
security duties in Digboi and
Tinsukia to protect the oil
installations against threats of
sabotage amidst another surge
of civil disturbance. Training
became a priority and more
importantly, intensive jungle
warfare was incorporated in
the training of the Assam Rifles
during this relative lull.
The first faint impact of the war
was felt in early 1941, when in
a throwback to the Great War,
demands were received for
the transfer of the volunteers
from the Assam Rifles to the
regular Gorkha battalions.
As on the previous occasion,
the response was immediate
and enthusiastic. By April, the
second battalion had sent 203
volunteers while the third and
the fourth made available 100
men each – to their respective
affiliated units in the Gorkha
Brigade.
This time, however, their service
would be undertaken closer
to home. After the lightning
Japanese advance in 1942, the
Assam Rifles fought a number
of independent actions behind
enemy lines, as the task of rear-
area defence and rear-guard
often fell to them during the
Allies retreat into India. Later,
as a large influx of refugees fled
from the advancing Japanese
into India, the Assam Rifles
were given the task of managing
and organising this mass of
humanity.
WORLD WAR I I
61
Japan entered the 2nd World
War with simultaneous attacks
on Pearl Harbour and Northern
Malaya. On December 23, 1941
came the first Japanese air
attacks on Rangoon. Successive
raids prompted thousands of
residents to leave the city in the
hope of reaching India. Tavoy
fell in mid-January of 1942,
and on January 20, Mandalay
sustained a 3-day intensive
raid which sent thousands
more into flight, as fires raged
for a radius of 20 miles. On
February 15, Singapore fell, as
the Allies continued to fight
delaying operations in Burma.
On February 17, a turning point
arrived as the Sittang Bridge
was blown in order to block an
immediate Japanese advance
at the cost of hundreds of
All ied soldiers left on the
Japanese controlled bank. On
March 1, the military and official
focus continued to be one of
retaining Rangoon, but Gen
Sir Howard Alexander arrived
and immediately ordered
preparations for a complete
Allied withdrawal. By this time,
Tony Mains had been leading
the Field Security Division in
a Rangoon of numerous fires,
stray snipers and much looting.
It was plain that the Japanese
Army would soon appear and
refugees from elsewhere began
to stream through towards
the Indian border by foot or
whatever primitive means of
transport one could manage.
The Fourth Battalion of Assam
Rifles, established a two platoon
reception centre at Tamu to
organize the rush of suffering
humanity and to provide what
succour it could. Another such
centre was established by the
Battalion in the Sita area. The
rest of the unit was engaged
in organizing massive relief
operations at Imphal; the Third
Battalion’s help was co-opted
for the onward movement of
refugee columns to Dimapur
via Kohima. When the burden
of work increased, additional
platoons from the Second
Battalion of Assam Rifles was
sent to assist the Naga and
Manipur Battalions.
The Assam Rifles played an epic
role in assisting the refugees,
both civi l ian and ser vice
personnel. All battalions had
sent detachments for this
purpose to the various entry
points from Central and North
Burma. The personal accounts
of some of the beneficiaries
of this massive humanitarian
campaign speaks eloquently
about the role of the Assam
Rifles. Dr Krishnan Gurumurthy,
whose family was seeking
refuge from Burma writes, “Our
reception in India was in sharp
contrast to our journey through
Burma. Spontaneous relief and
assistance was forthcoming...
to make our life as comfortable
as possible. There was an air of
sympathy and fellow-feeling all-
round. They arranged free food,
accommodation, travel and
medical care... From Imphal, we
were taken to Dimapur (then
in North-East Frontier Agency)
by bus. The travel took the
whole day through the Naga
Mountains and was very tiring.”
Major Ronald James Anderson
writes in his book titled “The
RECEPTION OF BURMA REFUGEES
Retreat from Mandalay”, “By
keep moving and staying alive
our small party made it to Tamu,
where I was put in a truck, and I
remember the name of Imphal
being mentioned, but I am not
sure. I do remember finding
myself in the officers mess of
the Assam Rifles in Kohima. I
had done it, I had reached the
town of Dimapur in the Indian
state of Manipur, the railhead
town for Calcutta... Here I
realised that my little group was
not alone. There were in fact
thousands of people who had
made it out over the Naga Hills.
Military personnel (from Assam
Rifles) in clean, well starched
uniforms were milling around
trying to introduce some sort of
order. Tents littered the scene
and the weather was overcast
and cold... After all I had been
through and all I had seen it
was not the reception I would
ever have expected.”
Troops walking through a Burmese town.Troops inspect Japanese bombs on captured hill
“Scraggy”, Burma, 1944
63
While the civil authorities were
busily engaged in organizing
r e f u g e e r e l i e f , G e n e r a l
Headquarters in Delhi was
frantically trying to establish
a force in North Eastern India
to repel a possible Japanese
invasion. And the first troops
General Wavell turned to, were
the operationally deployed
Assam Rifles battalions under
the IG Police of Assam. Thus
it was then that the Force
came to be projected on to
the strategic scene of India’s
defence at such a crucial
period of imperial history.
“Wavell therefore decided to
organize a force from the hill
people along the 600 miles
of India’s eastern frontier to
undertake guerilla operations
against the Japanese lines of
communications, should they
pass through the area.”
This group became known as
“Victor Force” (or sometimes
V-Force), and the nucleus of
it was formed from platoons
made up of men from the Assam
Rifles. As part of this force,
Assam Rifles platoons were
used as covering forces during
the later stages of the Burma
Campaign. Other elements
fought in the defensive “boxes”
around Kohima, whilst another,
from the 4th Battalion trained
as airborne troops and were
dropped near the Sittang River
behind Japanese lines. The
1st Battalion, as part of Lushai
Brigade was sent ahead of the
rest of the force to provide
resistance in the Chin Hills.
V Force was a reconnaissance
and intel l igence-gathering
organisation established by
the British during the Burma
Campaign in World War II. In
April 1942, when the Japanese
drove the British Army from
Burma and seemed l ikely
to invade India, General Sir
Archibald Wavel l ordered
the creation of a guerrilla
organisation which was to
operate along the frontier
between India and Burma.
This frontier ran for 800 miles
(1200 kilometres), from the
Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal.
V Force was envisaged as a “stay-
behind” force. If the Japanese
had invaded India after the
monsoon season ended late
in 1942, V Force was to harass
their lines of communications
with ambushes and sabotage,
and to provide intelligence
from behind enemy lines. The
first commander of the force
was Brigadier A Felix Williams,
formerly the commander of the
Tochi Scouts, a paramilitary
unit on the North-West Frontier.
When the Army failed to provide
the 6,000 rifles it had promised
to V Force, Williams arranged
for weapons manufactured by
gunsmiths in Peshawar to be
delivered.
The force was organised into six
area commands, corresponding
to the Indian Civil Service
administrative areas, which
in turn corresponded to the
ethnicity of the inhabitants
of the various parts of the
frontier. Each area command
“V FORCE”
had a Commander, Second-
i n - C o m m a n d , A d j u t a n t ,
Quartermaster and Medical
Officer, four platoons (about
100 men) of the paramilitary
Assam Rifles and up to 1,000
locally enlisted guerillas or
auxiliaries.
The area commanders and other
officers were rarely Regular
Army officers; the qualification
for appointment was more
o f t e n e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e
of the local language and
peoples. Some commanders
were police officers, former
civil administrators, or tea
planters. Even one woman, the
anthropologist Ursula Graham
Bower, was appointed an
officer in V Force.
The Japanese did not invade
India in 1942 as had been
feared. V Force was able to
consolidate itself in the wide
area between the Allied and
Japanese main forces. Bases
and outposts were set up,
standing patrols instituted
and intelligence gathered and
collated. By the end of 1943, the
force had been reorganised into
two main zones: Assam Zone,
including Imphal and all the
frontier north of it, and Arakan
Zone to the south. Detachments
in Tripura were disbanded as
they were deep inside India
and unlikely to be threatened.
An American organisation later
took over the northernmost
areas around Ledo.
When the Indian Eastern
Army carried out a small-
scale invasion of Japanese-
occupied Arakan in early 1943,
V Force provided a degree of
warning about the movements
of Japanese reserves to the
threatened area.
Capt May with ‘V Force’
67
The Second World War saw
the Assam Rifles undertaking
miscellaneous roles. It was
tasked to organise a resistance
group on the Indo-Burmese
Border to counter the Japanese
invasion and to disrupt their
lines of communication. The
whole concept was contained
in Plan Number V, and the
Resistance Force, so formed
and organised, came to be
known as V Force. The Assam
Ri f les , which formed the
nucleus of this Force, coveted
i tsel f with g lor y for the
exemplary performance of its
platoons. They fought gallant
independent actions far into
Burmese territory behind the
enemy lines and later fought
doggedly in the defence boxes
established along the line
from Kohima to Ukhrul. As a
part of the V Force, a number
of Assam Rifles platoons acted
as covering forces both during
the defensive and the offensive
phases of the operations in
Burma. One of the platoons
of the 4th Battalion was also
trained as paratroopers and
was dropped near the Sittang
River behind Japanese lines.
By the time the war ended,
officers and men of all the five
battalions had distinguished
themselves by displaying high
professional excellence and
great valour. As a testament
to the performance of Assam
Rifles men during the war,
members of the unit received
forty-eight gallantry awards.
These included: 3 Members of
the British Empire, 5 Military
Crosses, 4 Orders of British
India, 1 Indian Order of Merit,
13 Military Medals, 15 Indian
Distinguished Service Medals
and 7 British Empire Medals.
69
The World Wars af forded
several opportunities to the
Assam Rifles to prove their
worth as a full fledged fighting
force – both in guerrilla role
and as frontline sub units
fighting a modern war. The
long list of gallantry awards
won by them and eventual
defeat of the Japanese on the
Burma front testified to their
combat capabilities. However
their future was still vague and
amorphous and the subject of
debate. Sir Olaf Caroe, who
had served in the Indian Army
during World War I and was
now an administrator in the
ICS, advocated for the Force to
“follow the road taken in earlier
days by the Piffers and become
members of the Regular Army”,
possibly the Assam Regiment.
Others favoured their reversion
to a purely pol ice force
officered by police officers on
the plea that “their standard of
training did not allow of their
being used in any role other
than the purely local one”.
The performance of the Assam
Rifles in the World Wars and
their list of awards however
had proved otherwise. Another
reason which supported their
affiliation with the Army was
that they had had been trained
and had acquitted themselves
admirably in the art of guerrilla
warfare – which benefitted the
forward policy on the northern
frontier and that “… it is almost
inevitable that if trouble again
arose…the Assam Rifles would
be called upon to provide a
useful supplement to any other
forces employed.” The IG Police
of Assam recommended the
linking of the Assam Rifles with
the Assam Regiment as a sort of
“Light Regiment… constituted
for mixed military and civil
duties.”
The debate was deadlocked
for a long time. Meanwhile,
the Assam Government feared
another Kuki uprising- more
vicious then the previous
one - because many of the
Kukis had collaborated with
the Japanese, and come
into contact with the Indian
National Army, and, “above
all, now had access to large
numbers of modern arms…”
This hastened the decision
to recall the first, third and
fourth battalions from Army
Service who became part of
the civil police under the Assam
Inspector General of Police.
In the period following the
I n d e p e n d e n ce , ba t ta l i o n s
reverted to their former para-
pol ice status which also
entailed reduction of rank and
pay. Furthermore, the strength
of the battalions, which had
been increased to 16 platoons ,
was again brought down to 14.
And the Assam Rifles was hit by
shortage of officers in the wake
of the departure of the British
officers. To ease this, a new
scheme of engaging “contract
of f icers” was introduced.
Under this scheme, released
Emergenc y Commissioned
officers and officers promoted
from VCO rank were posted
to the battalions on a three
POST WAR AND INDEPENDENCE
71
year contract basis. With this,
the Force had to go back
to the system of supplying
rations to the men through
ration contractors, a system
which did not work well in
the interior areas where road
communications were poor
and rations had to be sent by
porters. It was truly a period of
setbacks for the Assam Rifles.
These setbacks however did
not hold them from their
dedication to duty. In 1946-47,
two platoons of the second
battalion escorted the Assistant
Political Officer, Mr James, to
the Mc Mahon Line up the
Siang Valley. The aim of the
expedition was to discourage
Tibetan officials from intruding
into British - Indian territory.
The mission was successful in
that many such officials were
induced to go back to Tibet
without resort to force. The
column returned in February
1947.
It was fortunate for the Assam
Rifles that the first Indian
Governor of the state, Sir
Akbar Hydari, an experienced
administrator, took personal
interest in the affairs of the
Force. In the midst of all the
controversy that was raging
between Delhi and Shillong
regarding the future status
of the Assam Rifles, it was Sir
Akbar Hydari’s farsightedness
t h a t h e l p e d g r e a t l y i n
arriving at a balanced and
appropriate compromise and
consequentially, a series of
organizational changes.
T h e m o s t i m m e d i a t e
organizational change in Assam
Rifles after independence was
the separation of Assam Rifles
from the police. Accordingly,
on 17 September 1947, HG
Bartley, CIE, IP was appointed
the first Inspector General of
Assam Rifles, directly under the
Governor of Assam.
Mr Bartley retired from the
service soon after and Lt Col
Sidhiman Rai, MC took over as
the first Army Officer and the
first Indian IGAR, in the rank of
Colonel. Col Rai, originally an OR
in 10 Gurkha Rifles was granted
Emergency Commission in the
Assam Regiment wherein he
was awarded the MC on the
Burma front.
Sir Akbar Hydari
HG Bartley
73
Nehru led a campaign for the development of tribal areas in the economic, social, political and intellectual
fields.He laid down certain guidelines for the upliftment of tribal people which would later be helpful in the
framing of government policies towards the tribal areas. The ethos of Assam Rifles was moulded by Pandit
Nehru’s Tribal Policy.
S o o n a f te r I n d i a ga i n e d
independence, some of the
Christian missionaries and
o t h e r f o r e i g n e r s s ta r t e d
promoting sentiments in favour
of separate and independent
states in North East India. The
virtual absence of any political
or cultural contact of the tribals
in the North-East with the
political life of the rest of India
was also a striking difference.
The struggle for independence
had little impact among the
tribals of the North-East. To
quote Jawaharlal Nehru: “the
essence of our struggle for
freedom was the unleashing
of a liberating force in India.
This force did not even affect
the frontier people in one
of the most important tribal
areas.’ Again: ‘thus, they never
experienced a sensation of
being in a country called India
and they were hardly influenced
by the struggle for freedom or
other movements in India.”
The t r ibal pol ic y of the
Government of India, inspired
by Jawaharlal Nehru was
therefore even more relevant
to the tribal people of the
North-East . ‘All this North-
East border area deserves our
special attention,’ Nehru said
in October 1952. ‘Our contacts
with them will do us good and
will do them good also. They
add to the strength, variety
and cultural richness of India’,
Nehru further emphasised.
A reflection of Nehru’s policies
was in the Sixth Schedule of
the Constitution, which applied
only to the tribal areas of Assam.
The Sixth Schedule offered a fair
degree of self-government to
the tribal people by providing
for autonomous districts and
the creation of district and
regional councils, which would
exercise some of the legislative
and judicial functions within
the overall jurisdiction of the
Assam legislature and the
parliament. The objective of the
Sixth Schedule was to enable
tribals to live according to their
own ways. The Government
of India also expressed its
willingness to further amend
the constitutional provisions
relating to the tribal people if
it was found necessary to do
so with a view to promoting
further autonomy. However,
Nehru clarified that this did
not mean that the government
would countenance secession
from India or independence
by any area or region, or
would tolerate violence in the
promotion of any demands.
The Assam Rifles troops and
t h e go v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s
working in tribal areas of the
North East had a special role to
play in the process. Due to their
continuous deployment in the
North East region, Assam Rifles
was identified more closely
with the local inhabitants
than any other force operating
in the region. Hence in the
years to come, independent
India’s government had to
rely more and more on Assam
Rifles for extending Indian
administration and government
policies into the remotest
corners of the North East .
The ethos of the Assam Rifles
was thus moulded by Pandit
Nehru’s Tribal policy.
TRIBAL POLICY
75
North Eastern Frontier Agency
(NEFA) was an anthropological
a n d s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l t e s t
case for Nehru’s and Verrier
Elwin’s policies. NEFA (present
Arunachal Pradesh) was created
in 1948 out of the border areas
of Assam. NEFA was established
as a Union Territory outside
the jurisdiction of Assam
and placed under a special
administrat ion. From the
beginning, the administration
was manned by a special
cadre of officers who were
asked to implement specially
d e s i g n e d d e v e l o p m e n ta l
policies without disturbing the
social and cultural pattern of
the life of the people. Verrier
Elwin, a British anthropologist
who spent nearly all his life
studying the tribal people
and their condition, wrote in
1967, ‘A measure of isolation
combined with a sympathetic
and imaginative policy of a
progressive administration
has here created a situation
unparalleled in other parts of
India.’
T h e e x e r c i s e m e t w i t h
considerable success with
the steadfast support of
Assam Rifles whose personnel
shouldered the burden of
administrative activity. They
a l o n e w e re t ra i n e d a n d
equipped to endure the early
years of hardship when the
North Eastern Frontier Agency
Administrative Service was still
in its infancy.
It was unfortunate that the
enlightened approach to the
developments of tribals – the
essence of Pandit Nehru’s and
Elwin’s “Philosophy for NEFA”,
could not be executed in the
entire North East. In many parts,
the government faced tribal
unrest and rebellion. Therefore
the ‘soft approach’ proved
insufficient on many occasions
when it became unavoidable to
resort to military confrontation.
NEFANORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
Dr Verrier Elwin
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visits NEFA
THE EARTHQUAKE
In 1950, there was a major
earthquake in Assam within
the living memory and this
also became a critical year in
the history of the Assam Rifles.
The epicentre of this great
earthquake was located north
of Rima just across the border.
Therefore, though se vere
shocks were felt all over Assam,
they were of the maximum
intensity in the Mishimi and
Abor Hills of the Sadiya Frontier
Tract which were the closest
to the epicentre and also
close to the outposts of 2AR.
It came shortly after dark on
that fateful day, unleashing
its fury and devastation for
full five vicious minutes. The
effects on the mountains were
terrific. Rocks roared down
all around while mountain
sides were stripped off the
forest covering. Practically
every tributary of the Lohit
from the river downwards was
shocked by rock avalanches
forming innumerable lakes
which ultimately broke their
barriers causing devastating
floods in the low lying area of
the plains. Lower down, the
area in and around Sadiya
was severely shaken. The
earth cracked and opened
up at many places, damaging
roads and bridges. The floods
that followed immediately
washed away ferr y ghats
and marooned innumerable
villages. The National Highway
was submerged for miles on
end and with the railway line
damaged at various places,
Sadiya was completely cut off
from the rest of the world. The
Assam Rifles lines at Sadiya also
suffered severely. Most of the
barracks and family quarters
had either collapsed or become
77
View of a broken bridge during
the earthquake of 1950, Assam
unsafe due to severe damages.
Assam Rifles outposts up in
the hills reported damage to
buildings and properties in
varying degrees. At Riga and
Walong, the Assam Rifles posts
had completely collapsed. At
Denning all the buildings had
either collapsed or were badly
damaged and a new stream was
now flowing through the camp,
dividing it into two. There were
however no casualties. After
the initial shock was over, the
Assam Rifles recovered quickly
and the best in every man
came to surface. Wherever
the Assam Rifles men were
located in the affected areas,
they immediately began to
reconstruct buildings, roads
and tracks on their own
initiative. At Sadiya they put
shelters for their homeless
families within 24 hours of the
earthquake. Similarly all posts
started repairs to their buildings
and also work on tracks in a
desperate bid to link up with
the Battalion Headquarters
and with each other. The result
was that within a short time,
though after very heavy toil, the
Assam Rifles were able to open
all the important tracks in the
Mishimi and Abor Hills. Even as
the Assam Rifles themselves
struggled for existence, under
the impact of the devastation
caused by the earthquake,
the y rendered invaluable
help to the civil population.
Great tributes were paid to the
Assam Rifles for their splendid
work and here is the extract
from the statement of the then
Chief Minister of Assam, Shri
Bishnuram Medhi:
“The splendid work of the
Assam Ri f les dur ing th is
emergency deserves mention.
For days after the earthquake,
there was no news about the
three Assam Rifles and Military
parties marooned in the Lohit
Valley tracks at the time of
the disaster, and of those
who were standing guard at
some of the remote outposts
near our borders. It was due
to the heroism of the Officer-
in-charge of our last outpost
at Walong in the Lohit Valley
and his men, that contact was
at last established with these
marooned parties, as also with
Mr. Kingdon-Ward, the famous
botanist-cum-explorer, who
was trekking near the Tibetan
border at the time of the
earthquake”.
View of submerged town in Assam. The photos depict the extent of devastation caused by the
floods following the earthquake.
T h e W o r l d Wa rs h a d a
tremendous impact on the
Nagas. During World War I the
Naga members of the Labour
Corps brought money and
dresses, but World War II was
fought in Nagaland itself. Nagas
were introduced to modern
guerilla fighting which was
natural to them. The dumps of
arms and ammunition left by
the retreating Japanese Army
provided ready material to be
used against the security forces
later.
By the beginning of 1953, the
situation in Nagaland had
turned volatile. Phizo toured
the district and exhorted the
people not to pay taxes. Assam
Rifles men were ambushed and
killed, government buildings
and houses of loyal Nagas were
set on fire, telephone lines were
cut and bridges destroyed. One
of the worst acts of violence,
which took place in November
1954, was the massacre of fifty
seven villagers of Yimpang
by men of Pangsha Village in
Tuensang area in retaliation
of the murder of a dak runner,
who was the son of the village
headman of Pangsha.
On March 30, 1953, Jawaharlal
Nehru visited Kohima and
was greeted with derision.
That was another unhappy
episode. The Naga leaders
maintain that “the Indian
leader did not try to find out
the wishes of the Naga people.
The same year nine police
outposts were opened in the
Naga Hills. Action against the
NNC members was intensified.
Different Acts, including the
Assam Disturbed Areas Act
1955, were imposed to enable
the armed forces personnel to
carry out their difficult task. In
1956, army units were deployed
in important towns like Kohima
and Mokokchung.
A s ra i d s a n d a m b u s h e s ,
pa r t i c u l a r l y i n Tu e n s a n g
Division, continued despite the
induction of more platoons of
Assam Rifles and one battalion
of the UP Special Armed
NAGA UPRISING 1955
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Kohima, 1953
79
81
Constabulary, it was decided
to call in the Army.
By this time, the strength of
underground Nagas increased
and the situation was becoming
tense. As recurring acts of
Naga violence and the counter
violence of the state forces
increased, Assam Rifles was
given the task of bringing back
normalcy and securing the
atmosphere in the Naga areas.
The Force was equipped with
the ‘Assam Disturbed Areas Act’
imposed on Naga areas on 27
August 1955, and later called
the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act or AFSPA 1955,
later amended in 1972.
This resulted in a charged
atmosphere with increasing
mil itant activity and NNC
propaganda against India. The
Union Government declared
an official policy of handling
the Naga crisis more forcefully.
Nearly two divisions of the Army
along with several battalions of
the Assam Rifles were deployed
in Naga areas. The Assam Rifles
suffered many casualties but
also won a large number of
honours and awards, including
two Ashok Chakras Class-I.
Sub Maj Kharka Bahadur Limbu, AC
1962
Lt Col Man Bahadur Rai, AC
1962
Sporadic uprisings against
the Chinese for some years
culminated in a large-scale
rebellion in Lhasa in March
1959. The revolt was sought
to be crushed while the Dalai
Lama left Lhasa on 17th March
1959 for an unannounced
destination. The description
of His Hol iness ’s escape
from Lhasa in Dom Moraes’s
timeless book “The Revolt in
Tibet”, and particularly his
onward journey after crossing
over to India refers to Assam
Rifles for conducting him to
safety – “A strong detachment
of Assam riflemen was sent to
the border checkpost to ensure
the safety of His Holiness, who
was urged to lose no time in
leaving for Tawang. The North
East Frontier Agency was sealed
off, only accredited officials
and the local population being
allowed entry. Private traffic
was banned in the foothills
region of Assam State, and
identity cards were rigorously
checked. At Chuthangmu
the Dalai Lama’s bodyguard
surrendered their arms to the
Indian authorities, and the
Assam riflemen became the
Living Buddha’s escort…”
After crossing Kin-Ze-Mane,
His Holiness Dalai Lama was
received at Chuthangmu Post
by 5 Assam Rifles and the
people of Monyul on 31st March
1959. He then stayed for one
night each at Gorsam, Shakti,
Lumla and Thongleng. He was
received by the then abbot of
the Tawang Monastery and
Government officials on 5th
April 1959.
Another account refers to his
journey from Bomdila by a
jeep some seventy miles to
the foot of the hills, where
just across the border “was an
Assam Rifles post known as
“Foothills”, which controlled
the border separating NEFA
from the State of Assam. The
Assam Rifles escorted him to
the present official bungalow of
Deputy Commissioner Tawang
where he stayed for three
nights, “ringed by a unit of the
Assam Rifles”.
As a token of appreciation for
the services rendered by the
Assam Rifles, the Dalai Lama,
ver y graciously presented
his personal weapons to the
Assam Rifles. These weapons
are proudly displayed in the
Training Centre (ARTC&S)
a s m e m e n to e s . H e a l s o
bestowed on them his warm
and affectionate blessings,
which indeed seem to have
prophetically presaged their
exponential growth : “May your
luck increase to the size of a
mountain. May your fame be
such as to cover the whole sky.
May your knowledge become
vast and deep as the sea long
and healthy lives to you and
hope your work for others, will
be a success.”
ESCAPE OF
DALAI LAMA
83
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
“May your luck increase to the size
of a mountain. May your fame be
such as to cover the whole sky. May
your knowledge become vast and
deep as the sea, long and healthy
lives to you and hope your work for
others will be a success.”
His Holiness Dalai Lama’s Blessings for
Assam Rifles
However, the episode also
precipitated the beginning of
China’s antipathy for India and
a slew of posturings which still
rankle our bilateral relations.
After the Dalai Lama’s flight to
India and the highly provocative
Chinese statements against the
political asylum given to him in
India, it should have become
apparent that India’s Northern
b o r d e r s n e e d e d u r g e n t
attention. There was a report
prepared many years earlier in
1951, by the late Lt Gen Kalwant
Singh on the defence of our
Northern borders which was
ignored by the establishment
as was the Chinese rejection of
Panchsheel Agreement.
Towards the end of August 1959,
an Assam Rifles post at Longju
in the Subansiri Subdivision of
NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh)
and another one in Ladakh
were overrun by the Chinese
in an obvious show of force
to convey a message to India.
This set in motion the process
of giving some attention at last
to the border defence against
the Chinese threat.
Sometimes in early 1962,
orders came from Army HQ
for “Operation Onkar”, which
directed all Assam Rifles posts
to move forward, right upto the
border. They were to be backed,
of course, by the Army. The
idea was to establish the right
of possession on our territory
and to deter the Chinese from
moving forward and occupying
it, as was claimed by them.
As should have been expected,
the Chinese reacted. The first
serious action took place on
8 September 1962 when they
surrounded an Assam Rifles
post at Dhola on the Namka
Chu River in the North West
corner of Kameng. This set
the inevitable ball in motion.
On 25 August, the Chinese
ambushed an Assam Rifles
border patrol and killed three
of them. On 8 September 1962,
when the Dhola Post manned
by a sub unit of Assam Rifles
was encircled by the Chinese,
the men retaliated valiantly but
had to withdraw when they ran
short of ammunition.
These two incidents while
reaffirming the necessity for
physically occupying the Indo-
Tibetan Border also indicated
beyond doubt the Chinese
determination to evict them
by force to assert that the
territory was disputed. It was
evident therefore that Assam
Rifles would have to have
effective backing of the regular
Indian Army if they were to
hold on to their posts against
Chinese attacks. Consequently,
HQ 4 Infantry Division with two
brigades was moved into NEFA
and all Assam Rifles posts were
placed under the operational
control of this Division.
CHINESE AGGRESSION
87
Following this, the Government
of India launched what later
came to be known as the
“For ward Policy” – which
entailed the establishment of
of Assam Rifles and Army posts
all along the Mcmahon Line.
Meanwhile an extra battalion,
17 Assam Rifles was raised to
relieve elements of the third
brigade of 4 Division located
in Sikkim.
The fateful year 1962 dawned
as the Army continued with its
hectic activity to implement
Operation Onkar, the codename
for the deployment of forward
posts along the Indo- Tibetan
Frontier. “The Assam Rifles
were in the forefront of the
deployment” writes Maj Gen DK
Palit, “strung out on or near the
border in self contained posts,
often on inaccessible heights,
unsupportable tactically, and
unmaintainable operationally,
except by air drops - which
of course depended on the
vagaries of the weather and
on the avai labi l i ty of the
aircraft … The Assam Rifles
had been allotted 34 new posts
to be manned by 24 platoons
squeezed from the Assam Rifles
battalions deployed in NEFA…
The Signals resources having
been stretched beyond limit,
there were frequent wireless
breakdowns and many posts
remained out of contact with
their headquarters…”
S e v e r e r e s o u r c e c r u n c h
and lack of preparedness
notwithstanding, the Assam
Rifles was tasked to delay
the advancing Chinese forces
so that the Indian Army could
establish its defence lines.
During this time and since
then, the Assam Rifles also
maintained their peacekeeping
role in the northern areas of
India in the face of growing tribal
unrest and insurgency. In this
environment the maintenance
of law and order, countering
insurgency and reassuring the
people of the region became
important tasks for the security
forces and initially they fell to
the Assam Rifles before the
Army assumed control, and
then later their experience
and goodwill in the region was
drawn upon in order to assist
the Army in conducting these
tasks.
Pakistan chose this period to
flare up the Tripura border. 6
Assam Rifles was ordered to
open five posts on Tripura’s
border with East Pakistan.
In September 1962, patrols
from Pakistan Rifles violated
the disputed territory, where
previously a status quo had
been accepted by both the
countries. The skirmishes
continued till 18 October, when
a ceasefire was arranged and
both sides withdrew from the
disputed area.
89
Meanwhile, a force of two to
three hundred Chinese troops
surrounded the Assam Rifles’
position at Nam Ka Chu, in the
Thag La Ridge about seven
days march west of Tawang.
The situation escalated in no
time and on 20 October, two
Chinese brigades mounted a
massive attack. Simultaneous
attacks were mounted against
the Indian defensive posts
and localities in Ladakh and
Kashmir. In NEFA, the Assam
Rifles faced the brunt of the first
onslaught along all the invasion
routes, the Kameng Sector, the
Central Sector of NEFA and the
Walong Sector.
The contribution made by the
Assam Rifles to the overall war
effort in NEFA and the gallantry
of individual officers in the
war effort in NEFA, once again
proved the military value of
the Force. Some of the most
determined resistance offered
during the border battles were
by the men of Assam Rifles,
as at Khenzemane and in the
Walong Sector. In proportion
to the number of personnel
deployed under the Army,
both the casualty rate and
the awards for the gallantry
were among the highest. And
if it is remembered that the
Assam Rifles fought under less
favourable circumstances, their
performance becomes truly
remarkable.Furious battles
were fought leading to massive
casualties on the Chinese side,
but eventually the war was lost.
The American magazine, TIME,
facing the lack of preparedness
of the Indian Armed Forces,
wrote, “The Indian (Army)
needs almost everything except
courage.”
91
The Assam Rifles were not
directly involved in the Indo-
Pak War of 1965. However,
as the bulk of Army was
withdrawn from Nagaland and
Manipur, the responsibility for
the maintenance of law and
order in these states devolved
mostly on the Assam Rifles.
While maintaining vigil on the
border, 6 Assam Rifles had a
number of skirmishes with the
East Pakistan Rifles and the
mujahids. In 1971, the Force
was tasked to prevent the
infiltration of Mizo hostiles from
East Pakistan. Though Assam
Rifles did not have any direct
involvement during Indo-Pak
Wars of 1965 and 1971, it had
face-off with Chinese Army in
Sikkim, during this period.
There were two confrontations
with the Chinese in 1965. One
of the patrols from 17 Assam
Rifles challenged a Chinese
patrol that had intruded into
Sikkim. The Assam Rifles patrol
took up positions to prevent
the Chinese from advancing.
The Chinese also took up
positions and both the patrols
remained facing each other
from 9 AM that day to 4 AM the
next morning, after which the
Chinese patrol withdrew.
The first clash of arms occurred
on 12 December,1965, when
an Assam Rifles patrol of a
platoon strength under Lt MD
Uniyal came under heavy fire
from about 300 Chinese while
moving along the Chhamdo
hill. The patrol returned the fire.
However, the odds were against
the Assam Rifles patrol because
it soon ran out of ammunition.
Just then Lt I S Sirohi who was
patrolling from 17th Battalion’s
post at Giagong rushed to
the rescue, having heard the
sounds of firing. Sirohi engaged
the enemy from suitable fire
postions to enable Lt Uniyal’s
patrol to withdraw. In the
meantime, Capt GS Bajwa had
also rushed to the battle with
thirty men from Kerang Post.
Lt Uniyal and six others were
killed in this action.
ASSAM RIFLES DURING IND O - PAK WARS
India had its largest haul of Pakistani tanks when the offensive of Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division was blunted at the Battle
of Asal Uttar, which took place on 10 September near Khemkaran. The biggest tank battle of the war came in the form of the
Battle of Chawinda, the largest tank battle in history after World War II. Pakistan’s defeat at the Battle of Asal Uttar hastened
the end of the conflict.
Chaukan Pass has been noted
by Col LW Shakespear as one
of the most inaccessible and
inhospitable areas in the
erstwhile NEFA (now Arunachal
Pradesh). Several expeditions
undertaken since 1885 had to
be abandoned because of the
harsh terrain and weather. In the
wake of the Chinese ingressions,
this area was perceived as
one of tremendous strategic
importance. An attempt was
made in June 1960 by Jemadar
Dam Bahadur Limbu of 7 Assam
Rifles but had to be abandoned
due to bad weather. Major
Sumer Singh made yet another
attempt to reach Chaukan Pass
in February 1961. Modifying the
earlier routes and supported by
airdrops, the column reached a
point just 22 kms North East of
Chaukan Pass. Here he found
a village named Sidi which he
renamed Gandhigram and he
set about clearing a Dakota
landing strip. However the
column could not proceed
further due to the monsoons.
In October 1961, the Inspector
General of Assam Rifles (IGAR),
Major General Ajit Singh Guraya
decided to lead an expedition
to the Chaukan Pass himself.
Accordingly, an expedition
nicknamed Sri j i tga I I was
organized to reconnoiter land
routes to the Chaukan and
Hpungan Passes to establish an
Assam Rifles post at a suitable
place from where foreign
intrusion could be checked.
This massive effort led to the
taming of this unexplored area.
This expedition justified Verrier
Elwin’s portrayal of the Assam
Rifles being “pioneers of every
advance into the interior” and
was filmed by the Government.
In his recommendations, the
IGAR brought out the strategic
importance of this area and
the need for populating it
by encouraging settlements
preferably of ex servicemen
from Assam Rifles. The area
was found to be of tremendous
economic potential with its
fertile soil, abundant growths of
good quality cane, bamboo and
timber, and traces of bitumen,
coal and sulphur. The IGAR’s
socio-strategic vision was to
set up a model village with
a market and some centrally
controlled projects such as
a saw mill, poultry farming,
piggeries and dairy farms.
The region was inhabited by the
Lisu tribe. The Lisu originally
migrated from Myanmar and
were ‘discovered’ in 1961 by
Major General Guraya during
his Chaukan Pass expedition,
leading to the settlement
of 192 families of Nepali ex-
servicemen in the valley in 1965.
Maintained by Air Force sorties
throughout the year, Assam
Rifles share their own rations
with the villagers when the
weather prevents the flights.
An Advance Landing Ground at
Vijaynagar was inaugurated in
November 2011.
CHAUKAN PASS EXPEDITION
Mahatma Gandhi’s bust at Gandhigram
at Sidi
93
The Force started with only
750 men in 1835 and ti l l
India’s Independence in 1947,
consisted of only five battalions
which formed part of the Civil
Police under the Inspector
General of Police, Assam.
Independence of the country
brought a plethora of changes
and in 1947, a full fledged
Inspector General of Assam
Rifles was appointed to head
the Force.
In 1950, the disposition of the
Force was : 1 Assam Rifles in
Lushai Hills, 2 Assam Rifles and
5 Assam Rifles on the Northern
Border facing Tibet (China), 3
Assam Rifles deployed to take
care of the Naga Areas, both in
the state of Assam and in NEFA
and 4 Assam Rifles in Manipur.
At this time the old Tripura
Rifles was being reorganized
into 6 Assam Rifles.
In October 1950, the occupation
of Tibet by China led to the
exposure of the Northern
Frontier open to a potential
Chinese threat . Therefore
in December 1950, a high
powered committee under
the chairmanship of Maj Gen
Himmat Sinh, the then Deputy
Defence Minister with Maj
General Kulwant Singh, the
Chief of General Staff was set
up to examine the defence of
India’s Northern and North
Eastern borders from Sikkim
through NEFA, and from Assam
to the Burma border. The
Committee considering the
broader aspect of roles of the
Assam Rifles, its place in Assam’s
administration, force level
and internal communication
stipulated that the Assam Rifles
would be the most suitable
paramilitary agency to take on
the commitment in the North
East.
Based on the recommendation
of the Defence Committee, in
addition to 6 Assam Rifles,
which was already in the
process of being raised out of
the erstwhile Tripura Rifles,
7 Assam Rifles was raised in
October 1952 followed by the
raising of 8 Assam Rifles in
September 1955.
In the meantime, the rank of
Inspector General Assam Rifles
was upgraded to Brigadier in
1949 and in 1955 Headquarters
1 Sector, later called Manipur
Range Assam Rifles and now
Headquarter 9 Sector, was
raised under the command of
Deputy Inspector General, Col
AS Bedi.
The growing expectations
as well as discontentment
amongst tribals in the North
East coupled with political and
social changes in independent
India was leading to unrest
in various parts of the North
East i.e. in Nagaland, Manipur,
Tripura and Assam.
In 1955, insurgency started in
Nagaland and by 1956 it was
apparent that insurgency was
likely to continue and probably
would increase in intensity. The
government thus decided to
raise a number of Assam Rifles
battalions on a permanent
basis at the rate of two new
battalions per year from 1956
EXPANSION OF ASSAM RIFLES
95
to 1959. Thus, by 1959 the
Force had a total seventeen
battalions, which after raising
were deployed in various parts
of the North East.
Meanwhile, improvement in
firepower, communications and
administrative arrangements
were also made. The centralized
system of supply of stores, arms,
ammunition and equipment
through Army Ordnance Depots
also commenced. To meet the
growing communication needs,
an Assam Rifles Signals Unit
(ARSU) was raised in Shillong. In
1957 two Pioneer Companies,
out of which only one remains
and now designated as the
Assam Rifles Construction
and Maintenance Company
(ARC & MC), were raised for
the purpose of construction
as well as maintenance of
operational tracks as well as
construction of temporar y
accommodation for troops.
The rank of Inspector General
Assam Rifles was upgraded to
Major General in 1958. In order
to exercise effective command
and control, more controlling
headquarters were needed.
Thus, Headquarters Nagaland
Range (South) (the present
Headquarter 5 Sector) was
raised in April 1959 followed
by Mizoram Range (the present
Headquarter 23 Sector) in
September 1960 and Nagaland
Range (North) (the present
Headquarter 7 Sector) in July
1963.
In 1961, a formation sign for the
Assam Rifles was introduced.
After the Indo China War of
1962, in which again the Force
proved i ts worth, further
expansion took place. In 1965
– 66, 18 Assam Rifles and 19
Assam Rifles were raised. On 1
August 1965, the administration
of NEFA was transferred from
the Ministry of External Affairs
to the Ministry of Home Affairs
and to that of the Assam Rifles.
In 1966, there was a sudden
outbreak of insurgency in
Mizoram and two more Assam
Rifles battalions, 20 Assam
Rifles and 21 Assam Rifles were
raised in 1968. In 1968, all units
of the Force were equipped
with a new family of small
arms i.e. 7.62 mm Rifles, 7.62
mm Light Machine Guns and 9
mm Sten Guns. The old World
War II vintage Radio Sets were
discarded and better Radio
Sets made indigenously were
introduced. By the beginning
of 1971 the Key Location Plans
of all units started getting
finalized. In October 1972, the
Inspector General Assam Rifles
was appointed the Ex-Officio
security advisor to the North
East Council. This appointment
continued to be held by the
later Director Generals of Assam
Rifles till 2013.
When the cadre review of the
Army was carried out in 1979,
the rank of the Inspector
General Assam Rif les was
raised to Lieutenant General
and the designation changed
to Director General. The first
Director General of the Force
was Lt Gen Sushil Kumar, PVSM.
The Assam Rifles expanded
further f rom twenty one
ba t ta l i o n s to t h i r t y o n e
ba t ta l i o n s b et w e e n 1 9 8 5
and 1988 and some more
controlling headquarters were
raised including Headquarter
Inspector General Assam Rifles
(North) on 15 May 1985 under
the command of a Maj General;
Headquarter Tripura Range (the
present Headquarter 21 Sector)
in July 1985; Headquarter B
Range (the present Headquarter
10 Sector) in September 1986
and Headquarters Assam
and Arunachal Range (the
p r e s e n t H e a d q u a r t e r 2 5
Sector) in October 1986. All
Range Headquarters were
commanded by Army Officers
of the rank of Brigadiers on
deputation. Simultaneously,
with the expansion of the Force,
many ancillary establishments
came up. Assam Rifles Training
Centre and School started in
January 1959 in Misamari and
was shifted to Dimapur in 1962.
In the year 2001 – 2002, two
more battalions were raised.
The turn of the century also
saw the induction of 5.56 mm
INSAS and 7.62 mm Assault
Rif les, Automatic Grenade
Launchers, Sniper Rifles, Riot
Control Grenade Launchers,
Global Positioning System
(GPS), Night Vision Devices,
Bullet Proof vehicles, jackets
and patkas and many other
new generation equipment of
that era.
Unl ike the Indian Army’s
Infantry units that are rotated
from field to peace stations, the
Assam Rifles followed a system
of permanent locations for its
units. However, this has been
reviewed from time to time
and the system of periodic
turnover for AR Battalions
mulled over and executed on an
experimental basis. The Force
now follows periodic rotation
of its battalions between four
grades of stations. The Force,
however, continues to be
deployed in the North East in
entirety.
97
The highest Headquarters of
the Force, “Directorate General
Assam Rifles” is located at a
small hill town called Laitkor in
Shillong. It is the only Central
Para Military Force which has
its headquarters away from
the capital (New Delhi). For
coordination with Ministry of
Home Affairs under which the
Force is functioning, the Force
maintains a Liaison Office in
New Delhi supervised by an
Army Officer of the rank of
Colonel on deputation.
The Assam Rifles today stands
at over sixty six thousand
force strength. It has three
Headquarters Inspectorate
Generals – North, South and East
located at Kohima (Nagaland),
I m p h a l ( M a n i p u r ) a n d
Srikona (Assam) respectively
commanded by officers of the
rank of Major Generals. Under
these are the twelve Sector
Headquarters commanded by
Brigadiers, administering the
troops deployed on ground
as part of the forty six Assam
Rifles battalions spread over
the entire North East . The
battalions are commanded by
Army Colonels on deputation
to Assam Rifles. The bulk of
these battalions continue to be
deployed for counter insurgency
in the hinterland while some
of the battalions stand guard
covering over one thousand six
hundred kilometers of the Indo
- Myanmar Border.
T h e e q u i p p i n g a n d
maintenance of the Force,
w h i c h wa s ea r l i e r b e i n g
managed through the Army
Ordnance Depots is now being
carried out through the four
Maintenance Groups Assam
Rifles. The communications
and Information Technology
cover is also being internally
managed through the Assam
Rifles Signal staff and the
Assam Rifles Signal Unit. All
logistics support is being
handled through a chain of
Headquarters right down to the
posts. Thus the present scheme
makes the Assam Rifles a self
sustaining body funded purely
through the Ministry of Home
Affairs. The selection, training
and induction of troops is being
handled in a limited manner by
the Force while the bulk of its
requirements is met through
the Staff Selection Commission.
THE ORGANISATION
TODAY
99
Nepalese, viz Limbus, Rais
and Moormis. Meanwhile, the
composition of each battalion
was made three fourth of
Gurkhas and approximately
one fourth of Jaruas.
After World War I, recruitment
in the Force was standardised.
The Gurkhas formed the base of
the Force and constituted about
seventy per cent. Garhwalis
and Kumaonis constituted
another twenty per cent and
Jaruas, Lushais, Nagas, Kukis
constituted the remaining ten
per cent. It will, therefore, be
seen that hundred per cent of
the Force was recruited from
the various hill tribes of India,
who fitted well with the local
tribals of the North East and
had Nepali as the Regimental
Language (certain technical
and special ised categor y
of personnel were from the
other parts of the country). In
1982 the recruitment policy
was changed to meet the
reservations as promulgated
by the Government of India.
Apart from this the Force today
follows about twenty percent
of induction being reserved
for the North Eastern states
and the balance from the rest
of the country. The Junior
Manning Norms / Composition
of officers
Initially when the Force was
raised, civilian officers of the
district concerned were in
charge of various Levies and
Militias. Once the designation
was changed to Military Police,
police officers were sent to
command the battal ions.
However, the nature of the
duties of these battalions
was such that police officers
were not found suitable and
hence procedure of sending
Army Officers on deputation to
Military Police Battalions (the
forbearers of Assam Rifles)
from 1884 onwards started. At
present the Force is officered
mostly by the Indian Army
deputationists with about
twenty percent strength of
officers being made up by the
Assam Rifles Cadre officers. The
Force is headed by an officer of
the rank of Lieutenant General
on deputation from the Army
and designated as Director
General Assam Rifles.
The first Inspector General of
the Assam Rifles at the time
of independence till 14 Aug
1948 was Mr HG Bartley, CIE, IP
while the first Director General
was Lieutenant General Sushil
Kumar, PVSM from September
1979 to December 1981.
The present Director General
is the twenty ninth Inspector
/ Director General of the Force
since independence.
Junior Commissioned Officers/
Other Ranks
The first unit of the Force raised
in 1835 as the Cachar Levy,
had its entire strength made
up of draftees from Bengal.
The “Jorhat Militia” raised in
1838 had mostly local Shans.
During 1850, Captain (later
Major) Butler (the second
commandant of the Cachar
Levy) wanted a more suitable
lot for the job, hence he started
the intake of Nepalese, Shans
and Cacharies to replace the
existing soldiers.
From 1850 to 1871, attempts
were made to enlist various
tribes of the North East in the
Force. However, only Jaruas
and Cacharies were found
suitable. In 1891, a Recruiting
Depot was opened at Purnea,
near Darjeeling Hills (later
shi fted to Darjeel ing ) for
the recruitment of Eastern
101
Commissioned Officers and the Other Ranks of the Force thus are purely from the Assam Rifles with very few
deputations from the Army. The rank structure being followed by Assam Rifles is similar to that of the other para
military forces.
pockets of civil populace and
vested interests. An important
adjunct of Counter Terrorist
operations has been the launch
of meaningful civic action
projects.
Some of the notable operations
in recent past are being covered
briefly in this chapter.
The credibi l i ty of Assam
Rifles in counter insurgency
is based on a comprehensive
strategy which had evolved
in the wilds of the North East
and tested in various national
and international theatres.
The Assam Rifles leadership
adopted a “multi-pronged
approach against a multi-
dimensional threat,” that is,
a comprehensive approach
much before the western
world could discover and
emphasise an indirect military
approach, with ‘the military
taking a more supporting role
in a predominantly ideological,
pol i t ical , and diplomatic
response.’
A s s a m R i f l e s h a s b e e n
i n t h e f o r e f r o n t o f t h e
counterinsurgency operations
in the Northeast - effectively
coordinating polit ical and
m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i e s a n d
e f fe c t i v e l y ba l a n c i n g t h e
mil itar y and non mil itar y
i n s t r u m e n t s o f C o u n t e r
I n s u rge n c y. D u r i n g t h e i r
long service they have found
themselves operating in various
theatres, including Sri Lanka
and Jammu and Kashmir.
In its chequered history, it
has met with unprecedented
success, displaying sagacious
audacity and adaptibility rarely
paralleled in the history of
Counter Insurgency.
The analysis of each operation
reveals care and precision in
terms of effective domination
and hard intelligence despite
a hostile environment, viz,
adverse local media, partisan
105
was adorned with a Shaurya
Chakra in this operation.
In another heavy gunfight in
January 2014, faced by another
column of the same battalion,
Maj Vikas Kumar, Rifleman
Chamanlal and Sub Sitaram
Pradhan sucessfully neutralised
two NSCN (IM) cadres and
apprehended four with several
weapons, ammunition and
cash.
A major operation which is
regarded as a landmark was ‘Op
Hifazat’ launched in Manipur,
d i s p l a y e d c o n s u m m a t e
leadership and ingenuity, and
the efficiency of effective and
vibrant intelligence network.
Led by Maj D Sreeram Kumar
of 32 Assam Rifles, 12 militants
w e re e l i m i n a te d a n d 2 3
terrorists apprehended in this
operation. 12 weapons were
recovered and Maj Sreeram
Kumar was awarded the Ashok
Chakra.
‘Operation Parinda’, was carried
out by troops of 1 Assam Rifles in
the face of hostile natives in May
2013, who had granted shelter
to the militants of NSCN (IM).
Two militants were killed and
two apprehended following a
gun battle in an inhabited area.
Both the militants were killed at
close range which speaks of the
raw courage and the caution
of the young leadership who
risked their lives to get close
to the armed militants. Maj MS
Ghumman of 1 Assam Rifles
NORTH EAST INDIA
23 AK 47 rifles, one LMG and
CBAR of US origin, to name
a few. This was followed up
by ‘ Op Blue Chip” in March
2013, which was led by the
Commandant of 26 Assam
Rifles, Col Prethyush Pillai and
Maj C Vidhyadharan who had
earlier led the ‘Op Ujjwal’. It
led to four apprehensions and
recovery of a whopping 23 AK
47 rifles, in addition to one
CBAR, one LMG and a huge
quantity of ammunition.
Massive recoveries were also
recorded by 16 Assam Rifles in
the foothills of Chingdai Ridge
in January 2014. This was
followed by the recovery of 40
kgs of Ganja in Jalenbung.
It is quite palpable in each
operation that the junior
leadership is not just a trigger
happy band, but is guided
by caution and discretion to
avoid collateral damages and
inconvenience to the common
masses.
Another five militants were
apprehended in March 2014,
in “Operation Kunsa”, in an
operation based on hard
intelligence gathered by the
same battalion.It was led by
the JCOs of the unit.
A slew of operations carried out
by 1 Assam Rifles reveals a well
coordinated effort by all the
sub units. In “Operation Anand”,
one of the injured militants
surrendered on the spot by
raising his hand. Eyewitnesses
say the militant was spared
even while the encounter was
on and administered first aid by
the RMO of the battalion.
The contemporary history of
the Assam Rifles is replete
with se veral instances of
compassion and sympathy
sometimes at great risk to the
officers and men.
In October 2014, 2 Assam
Rifles and Thoubal Police
Commandos were able to
apprehend one hardcore OGW
of PLA who transported the
IED utilised during the blast in
Imphal. Follow up operation
involved interrogat ion of
this OGW which led to the
apprehension of more OGWs
and one IED fabrication expert
forming the IED transportation
and planting network of PLA.
Further interrogation of these
apprehended persons revealed
the cache of the remaining IEDs.
The battalion launched another
search operation and three
crude remotely controlled IEDs
were recovered. This relentless
operation called ‘Op Blasthunt’,
spanned over 96 hours and
led to the busting of the IED
network of the PLA which
potentially saved numerous
lives.
Another successful operation
b a s e d o n p r o f e s s i o n a l
processing of int , was ‘Op
Songdai II’, launched by Capt
Aby Mathew of 26 AR on
the Indo-Myanmar Border
in December 2014 which led
to the arrest of three arms
traffickers from Myanmar.
‘Op Ujjawal’ was another
s p e c ta c u l a r o p e ra t i o n i n
which hard intelligence and
the presence of mind led to
phenomenal recoveries of
weapons and ammunition;
107
the ‘Chief of Army Staff Unit
Citation’ as well as a ‘Silver
Salver’ from the Governor of
J&K. The battalion earned 71
awards including a Sena Medal.
7 Assam Rifles operated in
J&K from April 1990 to May
1992. In their 25 month stay
in J&K, the battalion killed
200 ANEs, apprehended 222
and 74 ANEs surrendered. The
battalion captured 28 RPGs,
29 UMGs or GPMGs, 409 Rifles
AK 47/ 56 and 175 pistols/
revolvers along with 1.08 lakh
rounds of AK 47, 5,144 rounds
of pistol/revolver ammunition,
465 hand grenades, 6 anti-
tank ammunitions, 77 anti-
personnel mines and many
o t h e r t y p e s o f a s s o r te d
ammunition and explosives.
The battalion’s achievements
were outstanding by any
standard. Major General OP
Kaushik, VSM, GOC 28 Infantry
Division extolled the unit for
being “singularly responsible
for eradicating the terrorist
influence from Kupwara Sector”.
The battalion earned 92 awards
including two KCs, one SC, ten
SMs, one VSM. The battalion
In 1990, the situation in many
parts of J&K had considerably
worsened and addit ional
forces were required. As the
situation in the North East was
relatively stable, the Central
Government decided to use
Assam Rifles battalions in J&K.
Eight Assam Rifles battalions
viz. 3, 7, 10, 18, 21, 23, 26 and
28 were deployed in J&K from
April 1990 to January 1998.
This period was a golden era
for the Force as all battalions
o f t h e Fo r ce p e r f o r m e d
creditably. It is a record in itself
that out of eight Assam Rifles
battalions employed in J&K,
two battalions were awarded
the `COAS Unit Citation’ and
one battalion was awarded the
Northern Army Commander’s
‘Unit Appreciation’ for their
s u p e r l a t i v e p e r fo r m a n ce .
Performance of each Assam
Rifles battalion in J&K is being
covered in brief.
26 Assam Rifles was the first
unit of the Force to be deployed
in “Operation Rakshak”. On 18
September 1990, based on an
information of infiltration by a
huge group of Pakistan trained
anti national elements in
general area Talel, the battalion
carried out a counter infiltration
operation, initially with two
companies and later with an
additional company. During
counter infiltration operations,
the troops tracked the militants
in thick forests and engaged
them in gun battles at different
locations. The Intelligence Cell
and Interrogation Team of the
battalion did a commendable
job by extracting useful and
accurate information from the
apprehended ANEs which led
to a series of operations. One
militant was killed and 90
Pakistani trained militants were
apprehended. The recoveries
included 142 sophisticated
w e a p o n s i n c l u d i n g R L s ,
GPMGs, 7.62 mm and AK-56
rifles, pistols, and also a very
large quantity of ammunition.
The unit rescued Shri Puran
Chand, Deputy Superintendent
of Police, J&K Armed Police,
after about 75 days of captivity
from village Dara in a joint
operation with the Army. 26
Assam Rifles was awarded
JAMMU & KASHMIR
109
2 1 A s s a m R i f l e s w a s
responsible for the kil l ing
of 17 (including five foreign)
ANEs in various encounters,
26 apprehensions and six
surrenders. Huge quantity of
arms and ammunition were
also recovered by them in the
Kupwara Sector.
A total of 41 weapons and huge
number of ammunition were
recovered from Guripura village
in Kashmir in an operation
c o d e n a m e d “ O p e r a t i o n
Cloudburst” in 1995 led by Capt
Raghuraj Singh of 10 Assam
Rifles. In addition, 23 militants
belonging to the Jammu and
Kashmir Hizbul Mujahideen
had surrendered before the
unit.
also received the Chief of Army
Staff Unit Citation as well as a
Silver Salver presented by His
Excellency General KVK Rao
(Retd), the Governor of J&K.
23 Assam Rifles operated in J&K
from July 1994 till December
1996. The unit was deployed
in general area Bhaderwah
Tehsil of Doda District under
HQ 4 Sector. The battalion
performed commendably in
many operations in which
many ANEs were killed and
apprehended with arms and
ammunition. The battalion’s
biggest catch was on 11 August
1996, when Ashan Ahmed, self
styled Deputy Provincial Chief
of Hizbul Mujabidin (HuM) for
Jammu Region, the highest
ranked militant was killed . This
success led to the unconditional
surrender of three more ANEs
along with their weapons
and other warlike stores. The
battalion liquidated 19 ANEs
and recovered a huge cache
of warlike stores during their
tenure in J & K.
18 AR assisted in successful
conduct of State Assembly
elections and captured a
large quantity of arms and
ammunition.
3 Assam Rifles met with
outstanding success in the
‘Seek, Encounter and Search’
operation on 10-11 August 1996
at Village Wurapash in Tehsil
Ganderbal. Five hard core ANEs
of which four were Pakistanis,
were killed. One Pakistani was
identified as Mudassar Jat alias
Saif of District Bahawalpur
(Punjab, Pakistan), who was
a Major of the ISI and was
working as their commander
for Srinagar District.
111
Assam Rifles has been deployed
for counter insurgency in North
Eastern states, as well as for
border guarding role along
Indo-Myanmar Border. The
companies are deployed on
all routes of ingress/egress to
check infiltration, smuggling of
arms, ammunition, drugs, fake
currency notes etc. The major
tasks of border management
include border security, border
development and monitoring
of trans border trade. Border
security involves patroling
and effective sur veil lance
through usage of state-of-art
surveillance equipment for
effective check on infiltration.
Border development involves
infrastructural development
including maintenance and
improvement of roads and
other means of communication.
Assam Rifles is also mandated
to facilitate trans border trade
at Pangsau Pass, Moreh and
Zokhawatar.
Presently, out of the 46 Assam
R i f l e s ba t ta l i o n s , 1 5 a re
deployed in border guarding
role and the balance 31 are
operating in Counter Insurgency
tasks in all the North Eastern
states except in Meghalaya.
B ORDER GUARDING
113
tasks assigned to them with
tremendous dedication and
professional zeal. Their conduct
of civic affairs and maintenance
of peace and tranquility in
the most volatile area of Sri
Lanka speaks volumes of their
competence and devotion
to duty. The firm and tactful
handling of numerous difficult
situations earned them kudos
from one and all.”
In 1987 when the peace keeping
operations got prolonged in Sri
Lanka and the IPKF required
reinforcements, they were
joined by three Assam Rifles
battalions between 1988-90
namely, 22 Assam Rifles, 23
Assam Rifles and 26 Assam
Rifles.
The 26 Assam Rifles operated in
Batticaloa and Amparai areas
under 57 Mountain Division.
23 Assam Rifles in Tellipalai as
part of 54 Infantry Division and
22 Assam Rifles in Trincomalee
under 72 Infantry Brigade. The
boys quickly picked up Tamil,
and mastered watermanship
to chase the insurgents across
lagoons and fight them at close
quarters. The performance
of the Force in Sri Lanka
can be gauged from a letter
of appreciation written by
Brigadier (later Major General)
Shivaji Patil , UYSM to the
Commandant 22 Assam Rifles:
“The tasks assigned to the
Force in Sri Lanka as part of
IPKF were varied and unique
in nature requiring a ver y
high standard of discipline,
tactical as well as professional
competence and leadership.
Even though they had never
performed such duties before,
they quickly learned their
new job. They performed all
PEACE KEEPING
115
HNP on 27 - 28 Aug 14, during
which they apprehended the
most wanted criminal of Haiti.
So far, five FPU-2 contigents of
Assam Rifles have successfully
performed their duties at Haiti
and the sixth contigent is
presently deployed with effect
from July 2015.
The Assam Rifles contingent
has been deployed in Haiti
since June 2010, as part of the
Formed Police Unit-2 (FPU-
2) under MINUSTAH (United
Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti) on one year rotation
basis. The role of the Contingent
is to serve with UN as per UN
mandate to ensure a secure
and stable environment for the
government of Haiti in order to
promote the political process
fo r s t re n g t h e n i n g H a i t i ’s
governmental institutions and
rule of law.
The Contingent of Assam Rifles
has won many accolades for its
exceptional performance in the
UN Mission, the latest being a
special operation which was
conducted at Jamaique IDP
Camp along with UNPOL and
HAITI MISSION
care), facilitating employment
programs for youth, and
improving basic infrastructure
(e.g. building roads). The
preceding chapters testify to
the evolution of a professional
culture with a versatile range of
skills commensurate with the
expanding role of soldiers.
Assam Rifles has experienced all
types of insurgency and counter-
insurgency in variegated terrain
amongst various socio-ethnic
populations. Their capability
over the last 180 years, has
been calibrated by local factors
which have groomed them to
operate relatively appropriately
in unfamiliar, ambiguous, and
d a n ge ro u s e n v i ro n m e n t s .
They have exhibited great
flexibility and self-adapting
mechanisms in every realm of
warfare, by deftly alternating
between peacekeeping and
w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .
Over the long course of their
Counter Insurgency campaign,
the Assam Rifles have been
involved in opening schools,
providing training in new
t e c h n o l o g i e s , d e l i v e r i n g
social services (e.g. medical
CONCLUSION
117
123
The Assam Rifles Training
Centre was established in
Missamari in June 1959 and
later, in the wake of the Chinese
aggression, shifted to Dimapur
in 1962. It was renamed Assam
Rifles Training Centre and
School (ARTC & S) in September
1994.
Since its inception, the School
has constantly evolved in
stature and strength, in keeping
with the changing dynamics of
insurgency and terrorism in
the country. The School has
continuously incorporated
all the lessons learnt during
such operations and has
painstakingly kept its training
curriculum contemporary.
The ARTC & S is poised to
cross a landmark milestone
in its history as it gears up to
train the two thousand strong
women soldiers in a phased
manner with the first lot under
training from April 2015.
The Commandant of the
Centre is an officer of the rank
of a Brigadier, assisted by a
Deputy of the rank of Colonel,
both on deputation from the
Indian Army. The Centre has
two training battalions headed
by Colonels with a capacity of
training almost two thousand
recruits at any time. The ARTC &
S is designated by the Ministry
of Home Affairs as the Centre of
Excellence for Jungle Warfare
and the Centre & School boasts
of excellence in all fields with
most modern training facilities,
next generation communication
and Information Technology
i n f ra s t r u c t u r e a n d m o s t
relevant teaching methods
aimed at catapult ing the
rifleman as a soldier of the
future.
TRAINING AT THE ASSAM RIFLES
TRAINING CENTRE
AND SCHO OL
127
The training is directed towards inculcating self discipline as a virtue in every soldier. Will power,
self denial, self control and a value aided code of conduct are the defining pillars of self discipline.
There is an emphasis on consistency of conduct - on and off parade- with or without supervision.
The primary role of the Assam Rifles Training Centre and School is to train recruits in basic and
specialist trades. Additionally, it provides on the job training to junior leaders and trained soldiers
and conducts orientation courses for all newly posted Army Officers on deputation to the Assam
Rifles.
The Centre also trains the Commando, Firing, Equestrian, Boxing, Judo and Karate teams for the
competitions at national level, the contingents for the Republic Day Parade and those selected for
UN Mission and various competitions related to games and sports.
In a noteworthy development, the Assam Rifles has commenced induction of women recruits for
combat roles from April 2015.
TRAINING PHILOSOPHY
PIONEERS IN JUNGLE WARFARE
A film held by the Imperial
War Museum dated March
1944, shows the Assam Rifles
troops (later identified as 2
Assam Rifles) at Sadiya in
Assam, engaged in multiple
activities of jungle warfare.
The synopsis describes various
activities of jungle warfare and
survival training and states,
“During the Second World
War in Burma, the Assam
Rifles formed the nucleus of ‘V
Force’, raised to raid Japanese
communications, carry out
special reconnaissance and
foster resistance groups. Other
units fought at Kohima and
some were even trained as
paratroopers. Since then the
Assam Rifles were the first
Force of the Union in action
during the 1962 Sino-Indian
War and have been engaged
in counter insurgency in some
of India’s North Eastern tribal
areas.” Col LW Shakespear has
recorded , with a great sense
of pride, that “1 Assam Rifles
had introduced jungle training
in its training cycle in 1941 and
indeed produced a pamphlet
on this subject for use in the
entire Force.”
The relevance of the Assam
Rifles Training Centre and
School has grown manifold
with the mushrooming of
small and big insurgent /
terrorist groups in the country
and worldwide. With its vast
expertise in counter insurgency
and counter terrorism training,
it has truly come into its own
as a centre of excellence in
such operations. Soldiers
receive training in identifying
improvised explosive devices
(IED), jungle survival, counter
terrorism, and interrogation
techniques.
The training focuses on physical
fitness, reflex firing techniques
and tactical lessons. The
module for training is practical
or iented with number of
lectures, discussions, case
studies, sand model exercises
and outdoor exercises. Live
situations are painted during
the outdoor exercises to train
the soldiers to take instant
decisions on the spur of the
moment. The troops are taught
to live in difficult and hostile
terrain, eat and sleep like the
guerrillas and strike as silently
as the they do.
The inherent characteristic
of insurgency in North East
India is small scale low profile
act iv i t ies , with the main
insurgent bases located across
the border. Hit and run tactics
executed by small units force
a large deployment of armed
outfits to counter them. The
efficacy of deploying a large
force under such circumstances
is suspect as it is unlikely to
produce desired results. Thus
learning to operate in small
teams, studying the pattern of
the militants, establishing an
intelligence network, knowing
their traditional sanctuaries,
maintaining the element of
surprise, selecting the site for
counter ambush, observing
the discipline of when exactly
to open fire, knowing field craft
and jungle craft well enough
to remain undetected, and
improvising within a given
situation, is the kind of stuff
that a soldier is trained for.
Jungle operations test soldiers
to their l imit which need
special tactics, techniques and
procedures. In this scenario
soldiers are given physical
drills and common-sense tips
on how to survive in the jungle
by studying its characteristics,
dense vegetation with limited
visibility, crisscross of streams
& rivers, heat & humidity, few
roads, numerous tracks and
limited communication.
The normal schedule is about
thirty six weeks, during which
a soldier undergoes strenuous
drills that make him conversant
with guerrilla warfare and low-
intensity conflicts. The training
module is non-conventional
and once a soldier undergoes
training here, he can face
deadly situations anywhere
in the world in all-weather &
terrain, eat and sleep like a
guerrilla and strike as silently as
a guerrilla. The training module
includes lectures, seminars and
mock operations in the rugged
jungles. The trainees are also
exposed to media interaction,
civic actions plus fraternisation,
human rights and collection of
intelligence and their analysis.
Soldiers undergoing a course
here not only go through
rigorous physical training, but
also tough mental training
through lectures and problems
posed by instructors of the
129
school. An important part of the
training is to avoid collateral
damage as much as possible.
With precision shooting, the
soldiers engage in exercises
where live rounds are used to
shoot down mock terrorists
inside homes and stores
without hitting the civilian
population.
R e c r u i t t ra i n i n g m e r g e s
divergent trainees often from
different levels of culture and
society into a useful team.
A recruit is ‘ issued’ basic
provisions - food, shelter,
clothing - and equipment
according to the requirements
of the training and taught
responsible management of
these provisions. The training
constitutes field craft, battle
craft , drill, physical fitness,
weapon training, reflexive and
reactive shooting. Weapon
training incorporates actual
firing experience and virtual
simulation systems including
Small Arms Training Simulator
(DRONA) and Infantry Weapon
E f f e c t S i m u l a t o r S y s t e m
(IWESS). Vehicle simulators and
training mines are also used.
The school boasts of excellent
training areas, training facilities,
with multiple firing ranges.
The ARTC & S also conducts
specialist training for technical
trades, clerks, cipher personnel
and signal operators. The ethos
of the training is imbibed
through teaching of history of
the Force and the constitutional
p r o v i s i o n s u n d e r w h i c h
Assam Rifles operates. The
programmes include training
of the Junior Commissioned
O f f i ce r s a n d o r i e n ta t i o n
capsules for the Army officers
posted on deputation to the
Assam Rifles.
Being earmarked as the nodal
agency for counter insurgency
training , the ARTC&S also trains
members of other para military
and police forces including
those from some of the friendly
foreign countries from time to
time. Apart from this, it has
also trained various batches on
commando operations, basic
recruit training and handling of
specialist weapons and special
operations.
131
The Assam Rifles, like any other
military or para military force,
have a resilient bond with
games and sports primarily as
a means of fostering espirit-
de-corps, preparation for
combat , skil ls, toughness,
the development of physical
qualities of the war fighter
such as the killer instinct ,
improvement of proficiency
and also as a recreational
means. The presence of the
various teams of the Assam
Rifles is felt at all national and
some international events.
The All India Police Duty Meets
have been the stage for many
accolades for the teams of
Assam Rifles.
Football, Judo and Equestrian
teams have proved their mettle
regularly at various levels.
Archery a relatively new sport
for the Assam Rifles has taken
giant strides with the Force
bagging podium finishes in
almost all significant events.
Wushu and Kick Boxing are two
martial arts where the teams
have been giving an excellent
account of themselves.
Games and Sports have also
been used to mobilize the
local youth and wean away the
support for nefarious activities.
One of the most enterprising
part of such init iat ive is
the conduct of the Annual
Director General’s Polo Cup at
Imphal by the Headquarters
Inspectorate General of Assam
Rifles (South). This meets the
local aspirations where this
is a most popular sport and
also plays a significant role in
fostering the bond between the
Assam Rifles and the people of
the North East.
GAMES & SPORTS
139
The Assam Rifles has been
known as a credible institution
for training, education, and
leadership development in a
culturally attuned manner with
the indigenous populations.
Even as the Force continues with
the capability development
to meet the changes and
counter threats capable of
producing widespread chaos,
successful future engagements
w i l l d e p e n d o n re s i l i e n t
soldiers and cohesive teams
of conventional and special
operations forces training and
working interdependently. The
Force continues to develop
and implement innovative and
effective training solutions,
such as the socio-cultural
leader development initiatives,
and expand opportunities
to access and shape training
support services and products
related to the culture, terrain,
weather, infrastructure and
demographics.
EPILO GUE
“The smog gently floats over the valley in a vacuum left by the pause of violence; in the days that follow
it is the Yaoshang festival. A quiet before the storm only to be pierced by gun fire. In the streets people
scatter, shop shutters come rumbling down and all is once more quiet in anticipation of the next rattle of
bullets... In Manipur death itself has become a spectacle.”
- Akshay Mahajan, Photographer on the morbid atmosphere in Manipur in the wake of militancy
“India’s North East has been
the land of thousand mutinies”
says Wasbir Hussain, the
Executive Director of the Centre
for Development and Peace
Studies, and amplifies its span
and scale as “South Asia’s
hottest trouble spots.” He
attributes the complex conflict
dynamics to the trans-border
l inkages of the insurgent
groups, and strategic alliances
among them, which act as
force multipliers in their favour.
Almost all the insurgency
movements, to begin with,
have started off their campaign
espousing popular causes and
have been seen by separate
constituencies as a natural
by-product of the long-held
grievances of the tribe/ people
against the administration. It is
a different matter, altogether,
that such popular support has
eroded as insurgency gradually
bordered on the extremes of
mindless violence.
A s s a m R i f l e s h a s b e e n
i n t h e f o r e f r o n t o f t h e
counterinsurgency operations
in the North East - effectively
coordinating polit ical and
military strategies. Adept in
local culture, dialect and urban
and jungle warfare, they also
played a critical role in carrying
out projects designed to extend
economic and social benefits to
the local population. The Assam
Rifles has often found itself
actively involved in civic action
programmes implemented to
win the “hearts and minds” of
the people. Over the long course
of this campaign in the North
East, they have been involved
in opening schools, providing
training in new technologies,
del iver ing social ser vices
e.g. medical care, facilitating
employment programmes for
youth and improving basic
infrastructure e.g. building
roads and hydel power projects,
providing water supply and
helping develop agriculture,
handicrafts and above all the
heritage of the North East.
CONNECT WITH THE NORTH EAST
143
Almost four decades after
insurgency began in Assam
with the formation of the
first militant outfit in 1979,
militancy continues in the state.
However, the Government’s
counter-insurgency offensives
and peace efforts, including
Operations Bajrang and Rhino
by the security forces, have
paid dividends with most of
the major insurgent groups
now getting into a peace mode
with intermittent opposition
to the truce overtures by the
breakaway factions.
During this period, the Assam
Rifles took active part in dealing
with disturbances created by
the language and foreigners’
issues and the ethnic conflicts.
It also took active part in
counter insurgency operations
u n d e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
command of the Army to
control the activities of the
various insurgent outfits. With
the signing of the Assam Peace
Accord the state remains calm
though with undercurrents
simmering off and on.
Headquarters Inspectorate
General Assam Rifles (East), the
youngest of the three formation
headquarters of the Force holds
the fort for three of the seven
sister states - Assam, Mizoram
and Tripura. Located at Srikona
in Assam, this formation has one
of its Sectors along with its own
Headquarters and units and
sub units in Assam overseeing
peace in both the upper and
lower regions of the state. The
units are performing creditably
in counter insurgency role as
well as meeting the aspirations
of the populace in Assam.
ASSAM
145
NAGALAND
While Nagaland has seen
development as never before,
the events leading to the
current situation has led to
a stratification of the early
egalitarian Naga society. The
emergence of a middle class
and an unholy nexus between
drug dealers, smugglers etc
and the insurgent groups has
vitiated the body politic and
Naga civic life. The insurgents’
guns though remain quiet as
a result of the ceasefire, the
situation needs to be watched
closely with preemptive actions
as and when called for. The
Assam Rifles has been a key
player in ensuring peace in this
state.
Headquarters Inspectorate
General Assam Rifles (North)
and three of the Sectors
Headquarters are stationed in
Nagaland along with their full
complement of Assam Rifles
Battalions and ancillary units.
They are actively involved
in cumulative set of tasks to
bring these tribal areas into
t h e m a i n s t rea m . M a s s i v e
civic action programmes -
ranging from strengthening
of security, rehabilitation of
people affected by militancy,
confidence building measures,
infrastructural developments,
r o a d s , r u n n i n g s c h o o l s ,
education, forestation, power
and water supply healthcare
and livestock - continue to be
undertaken and continue to
yield results.
One of the landmarks has
been ‘Operation Franchise’ in
February 2000, launched by 3
and 8 Assam Rifles Battalions.
For the first time in the history
of the Tangkhuls eighty percent
of the population exercised
their right to vote in defiance
of the writ of various militant
groups. The relative stability
and the trust level between
the Force and the people also
led to the establishment of a
recruitment node in Ukhrul
town where guidance and
counseling is provided to the
Naga youth.
Apart from this, the Assam
Rifles formations in Nagaland
have undertaken a slew of
other civic action programmes.
Such programmes aim to
benefit the locals, integrate
the people of these far flung
areas with the rest of the
country. These programmes
speak highly of the civic action
initiatives of the Assam Rifles.
Apart from the civic action
schemes, the formations and
units of Inspectorate General
Assam Rif les (North) also
contribute immensely towards
developments in the border
areas under the Border Area
D e v e l o p m e n t P ro g ra m m e
(BADP) of the Government of
India wherein construction of
roads, bridges and culverts
h a v e e n s u r e d i m p r o v e d
connectivity of border villages
within and with the mainland.
This also provides employment
opportunities through self
sustaining projects collectively
managed and run by the locals.
Such init iat ives not only
provide means of sustenance
but also help in promoting the
local handicrafts and heritage.
Lieutenant General RK Rana,
SM, VSM, the current Director
G e n e ra l o f A s s a m R i f l e s
inaugurated the “Pineapple
Canning Plant” established
under Military Civic Action
Programme at Medziphema
under Dimapur District in June
2014. The canning plant is a
promising venture set up by
the Force and handed over to
the people as an initiative of
economic empowerment.
Known for its famous picturesque golf links, the Pine City houses the sprawling Assam Rifles Directorate General which
has become one of the most beautiful and self contained townships in the world.
The Assam Rifles has always
had an exceptional connect
with Meghalaya even though
it does not presently have
any operational commitment
i n t h e S ta te . T h e Fo rce
once functioned under the
Governor of undivided Assam
(before creation of the state of
Meghalaya) and thus continues
to share a special bond with the
Governor of Meghalaya. For the
gallantry and distinguished
service the troops of Assam
Rifles continue to be recognized
and felicitated annually by
the Governor of Meghalaya. A
special privilege afforded to
this Force.
The Headquarters of Assam
Rifles has always been part of
Shillong, first when it was part
of Inspector General of Police
and later when it was separated
from the police in September
1947 as Headquarters Inspector
General of Assam Rifles (HQ
IGAR). In early 1948 the HQ,
IGAR moved into a separate
office at La Bassee Lines near
the present Military Engineering
Services office on the way
to Upper Shillong. Later on
the HQ IGAR was shifted to
Laitmukhrah, which was then
popularly known as Cement
House area and was once the
property of India’s first Defence
Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh
and his relatives.
With the passage of time, as
the commitment of Assam
Rifles increased and the Force
expanded, the HQ IGAR also
expanded and became the
Directorate General Assam
Rifles (HQ DGAR). Now the
old Cement House area has
been completely renovated
to house the Assam Rifles
Signal Unit, the Assam Rifles
Records and Pay & Allowances
Offices, and the Number 2
Officers’ Mess of Headquarter
Assam Rifles. Interestingly,
this area was also called the
Valentine’s Hill in local lore
once upon a time. The Assam
Rifles Administration Unit and a
girls’ hostel is located in Happy
Valley, Shillong.
The Headquarters along with its
ancillary support units occupy
the bowl and hillocks in Laitkor
town. Assam Rifles Security
Elements, Signal Components
and Assam Rifles Construction
& Maintenance Company are
the other occupants of various
pockets in Laitkor. The Assam
Rifles Public School along with
its boys’ hostels is also located
in Shillong.
MEGHALAYA
Assam Rifles Public School, Shillong
149
The kingdom of Manipur was
merged with the Indian Union
on 15 October 1949. However,
o n l y a f t e r a p r o t ra c t e d
agitation interspersed with
violence, it was declared a
separate state in 1972. The
emergence of insurgency in
Manipur is formally traced to
the emergence of the first major
militant group in November
1964. Today, Manipur is one
of the worst affected states in
the North East where at least
a dozen insurgent outfits are
active.
With Manipur continuing to
be the most disturbed state
in the North East, the majority
of the troops of Assam Rifles
are stationed here under the
Headquarters Inspectorate
General Assam Rifles (South).
It has five Sector Headquarters
along with over twenty Assam
Rifles Battalions ensuring peace
in the state and guarding the
porous borders with Myanmar.
All these units have undertaken
socio-economic, sports, local
games and adventure activities
a l o n g w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l
initiatives in Manipur without
compromising their decisive
roles as the field strike force
in Counter Insurgency and
Counter Terrorist Operations.
Following the 1999 Kargil
War, when Army units were
withdrawn from the region and
committed to the war effort,
the Assam Rifles organised
massive recruitment rallies,
which have reduced the state`s
unemployment burden.
Assam Rifles have set up as
many as thirteen Vocational
Training Centres in Manipur.
There is an impressive list of
completed projects related
to water supply schemes,
community halls, foot bridges,
youth centers, water mills,
micro- hydro projects along
with rice mills and solar lights.
Twenty computer centers
have been established at
Ukhrul, Kangpokpi, Sugnu,
Chassad, Palel, Mantripukhri,
Keithelmanbi, and other such
towns. Computers have also
been provided to a number of
schools. Paramedic Training
Centres have been set up in
Ukhrul, Maram and Chandel
for empowering young women.
The Assam Rifles has sponsored
and revitalized games and
sports for the local youth
presenting sporting goods
and equipment free of cost.
In March 2005, HQ IGAR(S)
founded the Assam Rif les
Archery Club (ARAC) as the
nodal agency for archery in
North East India. ARAC has
been winning regularly in
all events since then. It also
sponsored the Grand South
Asian Karate Do Championship
in June 2007, held in Imphal.
National Integration Tours
are conducted from Imphal
to Delhi , Amritsar, Jaipur and
Agra in order to integrate the
youth and children of this
region with the rest of the
country. Every year the Assam
Rifles sponsor Director General
Assam Rifles Equestrian Cup
for promoting equestr ian
skills of Manipur riders, a sport
immensely popular amongst
the locals. Towards this local
craze, HQ IGAR (S) arranged
for horses donated by the
Assam Equestrian Federation
to be transported to Imphal
f r o m D i b r u g a r h . A s s a m
Rifles has also established
a Rehabilitation Centre for
training surrendered militants
in Computer Appl icat ion,
Driving, Carpentry and Tailoring
- an initiative which has turned
out be extremely promising and
fruitful.
MANIPUR
151
On 15 October 1949, the Tripura
Durbar decided for a complete
merger with India. Tripura, the
location of one of India’s most
virulent insurgencies, has
since evolved into one of the
most peaceful states in India’s
troubled Northeastern region.
T h e s ta te reg i s te re d n o
terrorism-related fatalit ies
through 2013, and has reported
miniscule numbers in the last
two years. The Government
of India in a recent move
t e r m i n a t e d t h e m i l i ta r y
engagements under Operation
Hifaazat in March 2015 and
consequently the security
forces have formally ceased all
military operations in the state.
The state had been having an
Assam Rifles battalion ever
since it merged with India. The
Tripura State Force Battalion
was merged with Assam Rifles
to raise the 6 Assam Rifles
Battalion. However, since the
state was relatively peaceful
and it was felt that the state
police would be adequate to
control the law and order, this
unit was moved to Mizoram
which was gripped by full-
fledged insurgency.
The void created by the move of
6 Assam Rifles Battalion had to
be filled up in mid 1985, when
the raising of 23 Assam Rifles
Battalion and Headquarter
‘A’ Range later called Tripura
Range Assam Rifles (and the
present Headquarter 21 Sector)
started in the accommodation
vacated by 6 Assam Rifles
Battalion.
In 1986, due to a surge in the
militant activities, the state
government requis i t ioned
for additional central forces,
preferring Assam Rifles over all
others to deal with the rapidly
deteriorating law and order
situation. 23 Assam Rifles
Battalion was placed under
the state government and
deployed in the Ampi area. 26
Assam Rifles Battalion, which
was still in the process of being
raised, was also allotted to the
state government and three of
its almost raised companies
were deployed in Mandal area.
Other companies followed suit
as soon as they were raised. 27
Assam Rifles Battalion which
had been raised at Diphu was
also sent to Tripura by February
1987 and deployed in the
Teliamura area. HQ ‘A’ Range
Assam Rifles was functional by
now and took control of the
Assam Rifles units deployed in
Tripura. Eventually, with Tripura
declared as “disturbed”, Army
was deployed and the Assam
Rifles battalions were placed
under the Army’s operational
command.
The situation was peaceful
for a brief period, but it again
deteriorated in January 1996
when a splinter militant group,
refused to honour the Peace
Accord signed with the State
Government . Headquarter
Tripura Range (the present
Headquarter 21 Sector) with all
its battalions was moved back
to Tripura.
Presently, a Sector
Headquarter along with its full
complement of ancillary units
and sub units is deployed in
this peaceful state under the
operational command of the
Army.
TRIPURA
153
I n d i g e n o u s i n s u r g e n c y
movements have only been a
fraction of the problem that
Arunachal Pradesh has come
to encounter in the past years.
A variety of factors including its
geographical contiguity with
Myanmar and ethnic similarities
among the residents in some
of Arunachal Pradesh’s districts
with the locals in Nagaland is
the reason why insurgent outfits
from Assam and Nagaland have
exploited the state for their
activities.
The British in 1864 raised a
Frontier Police Force (forebearer
of 2 Assam Rifles Battalion) for
service along the borders of
Sadiya and Lakhimpur Districts
in Arunachal Pradesh. The Force
was later named as Lakhimpur
Military Police. The battalion,
along with Naga Hills Military
Police (forbearer of 3 Assam
Rifles Battalion), independently
and in conjunction with regular
army carr ied out var ious
expeditions to put a stop to the
practice of head hunting and
slave trading by Abors in the
area of Patkoi Ranges, Dibong
and Dihang Valleys. They also
provided detachments for
security of survey operations
to explore unknown areas and
for protection of road/track
building parties in the areas.
In 1947, the first Administrative
Centre was established at Kore.
At this time another battalion,
the 5 Assam Rifles, was also
raised. Initially, units of the
Assam Rifles were deployed in
small detachments to cover the
vast areas and in many cases
platoons had been split to man
the posts. Many detachments
were commanded by Junior
Commissioned Officers and
s o m et i m e s e v e n b y N o n
C o m m i s s i o n e d O f f i c e r s .
However, as the Force built
up a rapport with the various
tribals, they were able to carry
out their task effectively even
in small detachments. Later, it
was decided to occupy larger
posts. The number of battalions
was also increased by two, the
9 Assam Rifles and 11 Assam
Rifles Battalions.
The Assam Rifles continues
with its special bond with
this state with a Sector
Headquarters along with its
entire complement of units and
sub units stationed in the three
districts of Tirap, Changlang
and Longding to carry out
Counter Insurgency tasks as
well as border guarding of
Indo-Myanmar Border.
ARUNACHAL PRADESH
155
The Mizo Nat ional Front
(MNF), an insurgent group
that emerged from the Mizo
National Famine Front in 1959
— a formation protesting the
widespread famine caused
by a regular failure of the
bamboo crop due to mautam.
Deprivation soon led to open
rebellion and the extremist
section within MNF advocated
the use of violence to seek
independence from India.
The MNF members forcibly
collected donations from the
locals, recruited volunteers
and trained them with arms
supplied by Pakistan.
On the night of 28 February/1
March 1966, the MNF launched
a series of simultaneous attacks
on the 1 Assam Rifles Garrisons
at Aizawl, Lunglei and Champai.
The law and order situation
went beyond the control of
the local Police and the Deputy
Commissioner of the district
took shelter in the Assam Rifles
headquarters. The insurgents
also attacked the Assam Rifles
post in Chhimluang on the
Aizawl-Silchar Road, but were
repulsed successfully by the
Assam Rifles. On 2 March, the
insurgents ambushed a patrol
of the 1 Assam Rifles.
MIZORAM
157
1 Assam Rifles Battalion at
Aizawl, held steadfast against
an attack by the MNF suicide
squad. The MNF lost thirteen
men in a counter-attack by the
Assam Rifles soldiers.
Due to the dogged
determination of the Assam
Rifles and valiant militar y
actions, the victory parade
proposed to be held by the MNF
on 2 March had to be called off.
Meanwhile, the Government
invoked the Assam Disturbed
Areas Act, 1955 and the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act,
1958 and the situation was
brought under controllable
limits.
The first elections in Mizoram
were held from 24 to 27 April
1979 and Assam Rifles helped
in the conduct of fair and
free elections. The People’s
Conference, a political party
headed by Brig T Sailo who
was once the Commandant of
6 Assam Rifles Battalion won
by a huge majority. In 1986, the
Union of India under Shri Rajiv
Gandhi and the MNF signed the
Mizoram Peace Accord initiating
the process of bringing peace
to the state.
Mizoram Range Assam Rifles
(later Headquarter 23 Sector)
was raised at Silchar on 10 Sep
1960 under Col J D Nadirshaw,
VrC, SC, as the first Deputy
Inspector General of the Range.
In 1966, during the inception of
large scale insurgency in Mizo
Hills, the Range Headquarter
was moved to Aizawl and it
has continued to stay in Aizawl
since then. The State Range was
redesignated as Headquarter
Mizoram Range with Mizoram
becoming a Union Territory in
March 1972 and renamed as
Headquarter 23 Sector in Jan
1997. The sector headquarter
a n d i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
continue to be deployed in the
state since then.
The units of this sector have
been actively involved in
civic action activities such as
conducting free medical camps,
spreading computer literacy,
training the youth of Mizoram
for recruitment into security
forces, organizing educational
trips and excursions for school
children while continuing to
stand guard on the borders of
Mizoram.
Sikkim was integrated as
the eighth North Eastern
Council state in 2002. So far
the situation in the state has
been by and large peaceful.
The lone incident of spill
over of insurgency from the
neighbouring states has been
the arrest of certain anti
national elements in January
2003 from a partly constructed
apartment near the Flourmill
area in Gangtok.
On 28 July 1963, the 17 Assam
R i f l e s B a t ta l i o n e n t e r e d
Sikkim and was deployed in
North Sikkim. The battalion
headquarters of the unit was
initially located at Libong
and later shifted to Pegong in
February 1969. The companies
of the battalion manned the
defences in the lofty mountains
of North Sikkim. In 1998, 17
Assam Rifles Battalion after
serving in Sikkim for thirty five
years was replaced by 30 Assam
Rifles Battalion. Presently,
there is no presence of Assam
Rifles in this hill state.
SIKKIM
159
Left above: Captain Man Bahadur Rai
Right above: Captain Jas Ram Singh
Left below: Subedar Kharka Bahadur Limbu
Right below: Major D Sreeram Kumar
Pre - Independence Awards
1. Indian Order Of Merit2. Indian Distinguish Service Medal (IDSM)3. Mention In Dispatches (MD)4. Kings Police Medal (KPM)5. Order Of British India (OBI)6. CIE7. Cdr Of The Order Of British Empire (CBE)8. MBE9. MC 10. Bar To IDSM 11. BEM 12. BEM (Civ Division) 13. Military Medal
Post - Independence Awards
1. AC 2. PVSM 3. KC 4. AVSM 5. Bar To AVSM 6. VrC 7. SC 8. Bar To SC 9. SM (Gallantry) 10. VSM 11. Bar To SM (Gallantry) 12. Bar To VSM 13. UYSM 14. YSM 15. COAS Commendation Card 16. VCOAS Commendation Card 17. GOC-in-C (EC) Commendation Card 18. GOC-in-C (NC) Commendation Card 19. Mention-in-Despatches (MD) 20. SM (Distinguished) 21. Bar To SM (Distinguished)
13300411060201030501060125
0409352101051380134886200201087961150247301305
THE SCROLL OF HONOUR
161
THE ROAD AHEAD
T h e D i re c to ra te G e n e ra l
of Assam Rifles develops
concepts and capabilities,
e va l u a te s m o d e r n i za t i o n
solut ions and integrates
t h e s e ca pa b i l i t i e s . T h e y
also communicate with the
government, industry and
Army stakeholders to ensure
awareness and understanding
of modernization priorities.
The pr ior i t ies lay down
equal emphasis on the troop
comfort so as to enhance their
efficiency and consequently
the operational preparedness
of the Force. The stations where
the various units and sub
units are located, have been
addressed for their amenities,
essential services, upkeep,
green approach, habitat ,
infrastructure and facilities.
The beautiful locales of most
of these establishments add
to the aim of making them the
best townships in the country
and possibly the world.
The signature location of
Assam Rifles is Laitkor in
Shillong which is noted as
one of the prime locations in
Directorate General Assam Rifles, Laitkor, Shillong
DEVELOPMENT
163
the world and is celebrated
for its aesthetics and upkeep.
It stands out as a minimalist
but elegant island of serenity
developed with indigenous
and limited resources. All this
is aimed at ensuring happy
troops and families residing in
well laid out beautiful stations
so as to make the Force
administratively vibrant and
operationally efficient.
Modernisation of the
equipment profile, weapon
systems, communications has
been an ongoing process along
side developing the concepts
and capabilities to equip the
Force to be a potent Force
Multiplier for implementation
of national policies.
VISION FOR THE FUTURE
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are not new to Assam Rifles. From a simplistic perspective, the
evolution of the Assam Rifles manifests that they have been acting within all the critical spheres of
successful counterinsurgency.
165
The War of Tomorrow
J Paget in his authoritative
book , “Counter-insurgency
Campaigning” has claimed that
an insurgency can comprise
of differing levels of guerrilla
warfare, sabotage, subversion
and terrorism.
The ever bourgeoning list of
counterinsurgency involves
military, paramilitary, political,
e co n o m i c , p s y c h o l o g i ca l ,
and civic actions taken by
a government to defeat an
insurgency.
Rule of Law
Counter-insurgent forces are
bound to operate within the
rule of law. The operation has
to employ this legal mandate
and its conduct must meet
the highest legal standards.
Militar y forces have to be
briefed about the rules of
engagement with regard to
legal and other provisions such
as arrests, searches, warrants,
interrogation techniques and
intelligence gathering by issuing
appropriate instructions. With
the thrust on development in
the North East and integrating
its people with those of the
mainland, the need, especially
for the junior leadership of
Assam Rifles to ensure that the
Force becomes an instrument
for implementation of the rule
of law would be inescapable.
This coupled with the growing
assertion by the populace
would apply t remendous
pressure on the troops and
thus the necessity for socio-
psychological training at all
levels.
Sound Intelligence
Sound intelligence prevents
the armed forces from targeting
the wrong people as insurgent
sympathizers. A single act of
violation of the rule of law
creates hostility in society
which would affect the local
population psyche for long. It
is indeed crucial that armed
personnel to be deployed in
conflict areas are trained in
local cultures, social habits,
the status of women, and so
on. Initially, when the majority
of personnel in the Assam Rifles
were from the North East, they
possessed local knowledge
and language skills valuable to
counter insurgency operations.
With the changed intake profile,
this issue would require serious
addressing by the Force to
continue to be as effective in
its designs as hitherto fore.
Intelligence from within would
also assume significance for
the fact that the majority of the
Force would consist of troops
from outside the North East
but deployed continuously
in the demanding conditions
of the North East for periods
spanning their entire careers
which could be upto almost
forty years usually.
The Training Imperative
T h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t
and militar y realized that
accomplishing the special tasks
that counter insurgency warfare
requires - gathering local
intelligence, using minimal
force, coordinating military and
civilian actions, conducting
psychological operat ions,
The Assam Rifles Headquarters on a misty morning.
Dhai Moorti and War memorial dominate the haze.
Compassion and sacrifice – the two signposts of the past – shall be the guides through
the mist of future as well.
engaging in economic and
social development projects
(e.g. building roads, hospitals
and schools) , interact ing
with the media and Non-
Governmental Organizations
(NG0s) (e.g.. human rights
g ro u p s ) , a n d s u p p o r t i n g
civilian authorities—demand
special training for troops to
be inducted into insurgency
situations.
Media and NGOs
Two participants in the counter
insurgency environment—the
media and NG0s – mostly seem
to be performing an adversarial
role. The media reports on the
administration’s oversights,
inadequacies, prevarications
and failures. Many NGOs focus
on alleged human rights abuses
committed by the security
forces. Military personnel not
accustomed to the freedom the
media enjoys find themselves in
troubled waters with the media.
With such freedom continuing
to reach greater levels, a cold
mutual distrust would need to
be quickly changed to greater
understanding and acceptance
of the situation so as to be able
to deal with it effectively.
Looking Ahead
India has had one of the longest
experiences in countering
insurgencies and a unique one
at that. “India essentially sees
and responds to insurgencies
within its frontiers as challenges
to the project of nation building.
And it is perception that has
determined the Indian way in
counterinsurgency.”
A significant factor in the Indian
counterinsurgency operations
is the political leadership’s
understanding that the rebels
are fellow citizens who have to
be won over. An Order of the
Day issued in 1955 by the then
Chief of Army Staff to the troops
being dispatched to the Naga
Hills brings this out abundantly:
You must remember that all
the people of the area in which
you are operating, are fellow-
Indians and the very fact that
they are different and yet
part of India is a reflection
of India’s greatness. Some of
these people are misguided
and have taken to arms
against their own people, and
are disrupting the peace of this
area. You are to protect the
mass of the people from these
disruptive elements. You are
not there to fight the people
in the area, but to protect
them, you are fighting only
those who threaten the people
and who are a danger to the
lives and properties of the
people. You must, therefore,
do everything possible to win
their confidence and respect
and to help them feel that they
belong to India.
Conclusively, the Assam Rifles
has to align itself to the people-
centred battlefield. “The future
is not one of major battles
and engagements fought by
armies on battlefields devoid
of population; instead, the
course of confl ict wil l be
decided by forces operating
among the people of the world.
Here, the margin of victory will
be measured in far different
terms than the wars of our
past. The allegiance, trust, and
confidence of populations will
be the final arbiters of success.”
The Assam Rifles thus needs
to continue to reaffirm its
allegiance to the people of the
North East and live by its hard
earned sobriquet – “Friends of
the North East People”.
167
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Col L W Shakespear History of The Assam RiflesHistory of Upper Assam, Upper Burmah and North- Eastern Frontier
Maj Gen DK PalitSentinels of the North East The Assam Rifles Vol I Brig P K Gupta Sentinels of the North East The Assam Rifles Vol II
Sir Alexander Mackenzie “History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal”
Sir Henry Cotton “Indian and Home Memories”
Sir James Johnstone“My Experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills”
H Srikanth & C J Thomas Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in Northeast India
Donn Morgan KipgenThe Great Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19: Its Real SignificancesA Role beyond Charter : The Multi-roles of The Assam Rifles
Lt Col A K Sharma (Retired)The Assam Rifles
BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 4(5) March- April 2002“The Assam Rifles: Sentinels of the East”
Ben HayesThe Other Burma? Conflict, Counter-insurgency and Human Rights in Northeast India
Amitav Ghosh Exodus from Burma, 1941: A Personal Account, Parts 1, 2 & 3
Charles R. ListerCultural Awareness and Insurgency in Afghanistan
Vijendra Singh JafaCounterinsurgency Warfare : The Use & Abuse of Military Force
Frank MoraesThe Revolt in Tibet
United States Army Training and Doctrine CommandThe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual : Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations The United States Army Study for the Human Dimension
Lt Col RS ChettriGuardians of The North East
M D Sharma and M C Sharma Para Military Forces of India
Sumit Ganguly and David P FidlerIndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned
Namrata Goswami Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India
Centre For Development and Peace Studies (CDPS)
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) : Institute for Conflict Management
THE TEAM AT 180
Director GeneralLieutenant General RK Rana, SM, VSM
Additional Director GeneralMajor General MK Yadav
Brigadier GSBrigadier PN Verma
Brigadier PersBrigadier V Sreehari, SC
Brigadier AdmBrigadier GS Reddy, SM
IFAMr Eddie Khawlhring
DIG MedDIG (Dr) Vinay Kumar
Col GS (Ops)Colonel JS Dhody
Col GS (Int)Colonel CPSN Misra
Col MSColonel Vijay Chahar
Col AdmColonel Shubhojit Lahiri
Col MedicalColonel Amul Duttasharma
Col EMEColonel Sanjay Bakshi
Col ProvisionCol Shailendra Singh
Chief Signal O�icerColonel Rajiv Krishan
Chief EngineerColonel Ramesh Santhanam
Chief Legal O�icerColonel Leena Gurav
Chief Record O�icerColonel SK Thampi
Liaison O�icerColonel Sanjay Sharma
Head Of O�iceCommandant RC Verma
Commandant QCommandant RC Kothari
Assam Rifles Administrative Support UnitCommandant Prasad Thapa
Assam Rifles Signal UnitLt Col Sandeep Bajaj
Assam Rifles Construction & Maintenance CompanyMajor Shaunak Kamat
ASSAM RIFLES TRAINING CENTRE AND SCHOOL
Commandant Brig K Narayanan
Dy CommandantColonel NK Narayana
No 1 Trg BnColonel Vivek Kochar
No 2 Trg BnColonel MA Siddiqhi
1 MGAR 2 MGAR 3 MGAR 4 MGAR
Commandant Commandant Commandant Commandant Lt Col Ashwin Kumar Lt Col Sanjiv Gajraj Lt Col A Chandel, SM Lt Col Rakesh Trivedi
1 Workshop 2 Workshop 3 Workshop 4 Workshop Lt Col RK Mishra Lt Col Swarup Bera Lt Col Anil Dhaka Lt Col Aman Chowdhary
HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (NORTH)
Inspector GeneralMajor General MS Jaswal, YSM, SM
Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier
Colonel GSColonel Rajesh Gupta
Colonel AdministrationColonel Amit Kumar
HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (SOUTH)
Inspector GeneralMajor General VS Srinivas, VSM**
Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier Sunil Kumar, SM
Colonel GSColonel G Gautam
Colonel AdministrationColonel Achalesh Shanker
HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (EAST)
Inspector GeneralMajor General Gopal R, SM
Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier RK Gupta
Colonel GSColonel Mukesh Bhanwala
Colonel AdministrationColonel Pankaj Pachnanda
HEADQUARTER 5 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier Debashis Das, SMAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel SS Bhogal, VSM
HEADQUARTER 6 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Brijesh Dhiman
HEADQUARTER 7 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Sushil MannAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Dharmesh Yadav
HEADQUARTER 9 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier VT MathewAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Chandan Bajaj
HEADQUARTER 10 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Peeyush Pandey, VSM
HEADQUARTER 21 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Avinash Singh Berar, VSM
HEADQUARTER 22 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier SP Vishwas Rao, SM**
HEADQUARTER 23 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier TC Malhotra
HEADQUARTER 25 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Govind KalawadAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Manish Sinha, VSM
HEADQUARTER 26 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Rajiv ChhibberAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel S Renganathan
HEADQUARTER 27 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier RK Sharma,SC, SMAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Kotnath Venugopal
HEADQUARTER 28 SECTOR
Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Gajendra Joshi, SM
Officer-in-charge
Col Rajiv Krishan
Editor-in-chief
Ranjan Chaudhary
Chief of Production
Shubhojit Chatterjee
Illustrations and Graphics
Sneha Baliga
Monika Gugliya
Editorial Assistance
Capt Aparna Iyer
Archana Chaudhary
Production equipment
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Contact:
Published in New Delhi at Isis Books
on behalf of Assam Rifles
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