ASSA M RI FLESAT 180

Foreward

Genesis

Nineteenth Century North East

Annexation of Assam

Early History

Frontier Police and Military Police

The Tribal Expeditions

World Wars & Inter War Years

World War I

Inter-War Years

World War II

Post World Wars and Independence

Tribal Policy & NEFA

The Earthquake

Naga Uprising 1955

Escape of Dalai Lama

Chinese Aggression

Indo Pak Wars

Chaukan Pass Expedition

Expansion of Assam Rifles

The Organisation Today

Leadership

Counter Insurgency, Border Guarding & Peace Keeping

North East India

Jammu & Kashmir

Border Guarding

Peace Keeping

Haiti Mission

Training

Assam Rifles Training Centre & School

Training Philosophy

Games and Sports

Epilogue

Connect with the North East

Scroll of Honour

The Road Ahead

Vision For The Future

Bibliography

The Team at 180

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CONTENTS

Lt Gen R K Rana, SM, VSMDirector GeneralAssam Rifles

FOREWORD

Assam Rifles at 180, is intended

to be a commemorative book,

to mark the anniversary of

the raising of the country’s

oldest Para Military Force.

An anniversary induces a

resurgence of interest in the

evolution, and a review of the

course followed so far. This

volume intends to survey the

historical experience and the

principles on which Assam

Rifles was established and

draw the lessons which would

help to shape the professional

issues of today and tomorrow.

From ‘Cachar Le vy ’ to

‘Assam Rifles’ - a series of

circumstances have played an

instrumental part in defining

and redefining our structure

and role from time to time.

During this journey the Force

has come to be honoured by

several epithets and symbols

- each backed by a profound

and inspiring episode. During

this time we have also learnt

that we have a critical role in

carrying out projects designed

to extend economic and social

benefits to the people of North

East and the calibration it

entails in terms of training and

resources.

This book is intended to recall

the whispers of the forbearers

and the intentions of the

statesmen who defined our

ethos and function, lest we get

deluded by the cacophony of

media reports and numerous

other voices vying with each

other for public attention.

The production team of this

book constitutes a passionate

band of youngsters, who

have strived to lend an air

of freshness to the text and

illustrations and I am sure, it

will convey the essence of the

commemorative occasion of

our great Force.

5

GENESIS

View of a village in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh

The Seven Sister States, also

called “Paradise Unexplored”,

are the contiguous states of

Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,

Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram,

Nagaland and Tripura in

Northeastern India. Contrary

to the mainland Indian

perception of Northeast India

as a culturally homogeneous

region of mongoloid races,

the region is diverse in almost

every aspect; it is inhabited

by a mosaic of societies

characterised by diversity of

ethnicity, language, culture,

religion, social organisation,

economic pursuits, productive

relations and participation in

political process. J.B. Fuller

(1909), in his introduction to

Major Alan Playfair’s book on

the Garos, wrote that “The

province of Assam in the far

northeastern corner of India is

a museum of nationalities.” It

has been the meeting ground

of different people who

migrated to the region from

NINETEENTH CENTURY NORTH EAST

South West China or South

East Asia via Burma at various

points of history.

The sobriquet, the Land

of Seven Sisters, had been

originally coined to coincide

with the inauguration of

the new states in January,

1972, by Jyoti Prasad Saikia,

a journalist in Tripura in the

course of a radio talk show.

Saikia later compiled a book

on the interdependence and

commonness of the Seven

Sister States, and named it the

Land of Seven Sisters. It has

been primarily because of this

publication that the nickname

has caught on.

This monolithic view about

North East India is strongly

held, by the policy makers

who have to act from an

administrative perspective

and have to focus on their

similarities in political, social

and economic contexts which

runs contrary to the attempts

of local communities to

assert their identities on

account of perceived identity

crises or complaints about

‘neglect’. Moreover, the seven

sisters are of great geo-

political, geostrategic and

geo-economic importance as

the region borders with China,

Bangladesh, Myanamar and

Bhutan.

The genesis and evolution

of the Assam Rifles is deeply

rooted in this racial, cultural

and bio-geographic diversity

and our colonial history.

9

The North East of IndiaCirca. 1823

An artistic representation of the the landing at RangoonC. 1824 - 1826

Assam came under British

rule after the Anglo- Burmese

War in 1826. The British take

over led to relative stability

and increased economic

activities. The tea industry

flourished and became one of

the principal sources of wealth

because of its large scale

export to Britain. Coal and

oil deposits were discovered

and forest produce provided

substantial income. “Assam”,

writes Lt Col RS Chhettri,

“thus became prosperous,

and new settlements came

up in different places offering

attractive targets for trans-

border forays of the tribals.

This in turn posed a serious

threat to the British industries

and plantations in Assam”

which apparently sparked the

imperative of constituting a

force to contain and regulate

tribesmen inspired by the most

primitive ideas and practices

of war in which looting,

murdering, plundering and

despoiling were norms of life.

Writes Bampfylde Fuller “ …the

tribesmen who are still inspired

by the ancient ideas that war

is one of the most exhilarating

of life’s experiences, and its

commemoration, in war-dress

and war dances, the most

enjoyable of amusements.

The most obvious method of

stopping these marauding

raids was retaliatory incursions

into tribal territory. The Bharat

Rakshak Monitor attributes the

raising of Para Military Forces

to the need to consolidate

and extend the annexation

of the northeastern and the

northwestern portions of the

Indian landmass, with the least

expense to the treasury. The

British found it increasingly

difficult to garrison newly

conquered territories; lying

at great distances from the

towns; with the regular troops.

This was mainly owing to the

exorbitant outlays involved.

Paucity of readily available

units was another reason. The

problem was solved by raising

special local units, such as the

Punjab Irregular Frontier Force

in the Punjab. In the northeast,

the Assam Rifles (AR), initially

named the Cachar Levys,

came into being along with

the Jorhat Militia and the Kuki

Levy. Subsequently all these

forces were reorganized and

renamed as the Frontier Force.

“The task assigned to the

Cachar Levy/Police Militia

immediately after its raising

in 1835 was to guard the

Eastern Frontier of Assam

from the Brahmaputra river to

Cachar and to carry out small

scale punitive expeditions in

the hill areas of Assam.” The

pattern of deployment of

the Force consisted of strong

detachments of troops at

Nowgong and Silchar with

small posts all along the

frontier and an administrative

headquarters at at Asloo (16

miles from Halflong) together

with the Levy’s strongest

detachment. Initially the

ANNEX ATION OF ASSAM

13

Cachar Levy had established

twelve stockades or frontier

posts all along the 400 km

frontier which ran through the

great Nambhar forest near the

foothills of the Naga hills to the

plains of the Surma valley, east

of Silchar.

Maintenance of law and order

was the whole time occupation

of the Force against the

incessant incidents of violence

on the part of the tribal warriors,

who raided the adjoining tea

gardens in Assam, murdered

British officials, transgressed

the recognized boundaries or

hunted human heads in the

neighbouring villages.

The inter tribal feuds amongst

the Nagas, their attacks on the

survey parties and the murder

of several British officers on

duty convinced the authorities

of the necessity of a” Forward

Policy” in the Naga hills. In

order to serve British interest,

towards the close of 1878,

it was decided to gradually

extend British authority over

“all independent tribes”.

In the process of extension

of the British administration,

many British officers lost their

lives. In most of these cases

their heads as well as those of

their escorts were taken away

by the killers along with their

weapons and equipment. It

was for the recovery of their

heads and stores that punitive

expeditions were undertaken;

smaller ones by the Military

Police itself and larger ones in

collaboration with the Army.

Every such expedition generally

ended with the annexation

of the area by the British,

followed by establishment

of Military Police posts in the

annexed area. The expeditions

were also carried out to extend

contact with the frontier tribes

and for carrying out a survey of

unexplored areas.

The Assam Military Police

being light footed, highly

mobile, steeped in austerity

had “more teeth than tail”, and

was the primary instrument

used by the British in the North

East India to establish their

political domination over the

region. There were numerous

expeditions launched in the

nineteenth century and the

decisive role played by the

Assam Military Police has been

eloquently mentioned in a

plethora of historical accounts.

A “Cachar Levy” ConstableCirca. 1835

Some of the famous ones

are : Kuki and Lushai Hills

E x p e d i t i o n s ; M a n i p u r

Expeditions; Abor Expeditions;

Apatani Expedition; Mishmi

Expeditions.

15

EARLYHISTORY

Although Army units were always

on hand, and were employed in

most major campaigns, their

numbers were clearly insufficient

to carry out the everyday patrols

and minor expeditions that

formed an in integral part of

Indian frontier management.

These duties were instead left

predominantly in the hands

of the Frontier Police (later the

Military Police) battalions. The

Frontier Police (FP) had their

origins in various irregular corps

known as ‘Levies’ raised during

the Second Quarter of the 19th

Century . The earliest appears to

have been the 600-strong Shan

Levy raised in 1825 from the Shan

tribesmen who had previously

ser ved with the Burmese.

Initially they served under their

own leaders but in 1831 the

corps was placed under the

command of a military subaltern.

Subsequently Gurkhas and

Cacharies were recruited and

the corps apparently became

to be known as the Cachar Levy.

It had meanwhile incorporated

another Shan militia in 1838,

which came to be known as the

Jorhat Levy.

ln about 1852, the Cachar Levy

was split into two. One part

was based at Nowong (Now

Nangam) and the other at

Silchar in North Cachar. Later

when the Assamese Levies were

officially abolished in 1861, these

two units were considerably

strengthened (from roughly

100-160 men to about 500-560

each) to become respectively

the Nowgong Frontier Police

Battalion and the North Cachar

Hills Frontier Police Battalion.

Lakhimpur Police Militia had

meanwhile been established

in about 1843. The Nowgong

unit began to be referred to as

the Naga Hills Frontier Police

Battalion in the mid 1860s.

FRONTIER POLICE AND MILITARY POLICE

19

The Expedition for containing

of the Lushai Hill Tribes

Another militia, the Kuki Levy,

was raised in Silchar in June

1850, comprising 200 Kukis

and Cacharies who were later

amalgamated into the existing

Frontier Police battalions in

1867. The new Military Police

were originally organized as

four battalions, comprising

the Naga Hills Battalion

(Headquarters at Kohima),

the Lakhimpur Battalion

(Headquarters at Dibrugarh),

t h e C a c h a r B a t t a l i o n

(Headquarters at Silchar) and

the Surma Valley and Garo

Hills Battalion (Headquarters

at Tura). In 1882 the strength of

the Naga Hills Battalion was 568

men which later increased to

700. The Lakhimpur Battalion

was also raised to 700 men in

1883 but the Garo Hills and

Cachar Battalions remained

understrength. Two additional

units were raised following the

annexation of the Lushai Hills.

The tr ibes l iv ing along

India’s North-East Frontier

were sufficiently hostile and

their territory sufficiently

impenetrable that the British

were happy to leave them

alone as much as possible.

Consequent ly, accepted

practice prior to the mid 1860’s

was to simply dispatch punitive

expeditions into the hills when

necessary and to establish

outposts to guard particularly

threatened areas. It was only

the growth of the tea industry

and other commercial interests

in Assam that prompted the

adoption of a more acquisitive

policy, leading in time to the

annexation of Naga, Lushai

and Chin territory in particular.

Nevertheless, such were

the logistical difficulties of

imposing British Government

in the region that many areas

remained ‘unadministered’

even at the end of Victoria’s

reign.

As well as being inveterate

raiders, the majority of the

hill-peoples of the area were

also head-hunters, particularly

the Garos, Kukis, Lushais and

Nagas. In some isolated areas

head-hunting persisted into

the mid-20th Century.

The frequency of their slave-

raids and head-hunting forays

resulted in the Chin being

‘universally hated’ by their

neighbours and numerous

abortive expeditions were

launched against the Chin

from Manipur and Burma

prior to British annexation

of these areas. Conquest of

Upper Burma finally gave the

British access to the Chins’

mountainous homeland at

the end of the 1880s and

s u b s ta n t i a l e x p e d i t i o n s

mounted in 1889-90 and 1892-

93 eventually brought them to

heel. They were progressively

disarmed after 1893 and the

Chin Hills became a province

of British Burma in 1895.

The Tribal Expeditions

1st Assam Rifles (Lushai Hills

Battalion)

Between 1865 and 1868 Kukis

and Lushais from the southern

hills carried out a number

of raids in the Cachar area.

Although expeditions were

mounted against them, but

21

View of the Lushai Hills

it was only during the winter

of 1871-72 that the first of a

number of extensive military

operations could be launched

to subjugate the Lushai tribes.

Two strong columns were

ordered into the Lushai Hills

(now Mizoram), one from Silchar

southwards, to punish the tribes

on the northeast corner, near the

border of Manipur; and the other

from Chittagong eastwards,

to punish the tribes based

at Aizawl and Lungleh. The

Cachar column comprised 300

Frontier Police personnel apart

from other regular forces. The

Chittagong column consisted

of three regular battalions and

a detachment from the Frontier

Police.

The joint operation lasted

throughout the winter. Large

number of tribesmen made their

submission and the Lushais gave

no further trouble for some years.

As a result of this operation, a

line of strongly manned posts,

were established along Cachar,

Sylhet and Chittagong borders.

About a hundred personnel of

the Frontier Police were awarded

the Indian General Service Medal

with clasp “ Looshai” for this

operation- the first such award

to be recorded.

23

mention in General Tregear’s

despatches at the end of the

operations.

Both the columns of the

Frontier Police – the Surma

Valley Military Police and the

Chittagong Frontier Police -

joined hands a few miles south

of Aizawl in mid February, and

were amalgamated into one

force, the forbears of 1st Assam

Rifles.

The punitive operations against

In January 1888, a concerted

attack by the Poi clan led to

the beheading of a British

officer Lieutenant Stewart

and his reconnaissance

party. Following this, a strong

column of Regular troops and

200 Frontier Police personnel

entered the Lushai territory

for a punitive action. This

expedition was strengthened

further to nearly 4000 men

and its task was upgraded to

permanent occupancy in the

Lushai area. To support him,

another column comprising

400 men from the Surma Valley

Military Police was also moved

into the hills. The tactical route

lay along the Dalesari River in

the upper reaches. The valley

was so confined and the terrain

so difficult that progress could

only be made by means of

rafts, a large number of which

were constructed by the

Frontier Police. These men

soon became experts in river

craft and performed the task so

well that they received special

The Lushai Expedition :

Officers checking boats after crossing a river

Pacification of the Lushais

the tribes were successfully

carried out though not without

some close quarter jungle

fighting. When the task was

accomplished, a permanent

stockade was established

at Aizawl where 200 men

remained garrisoned. For these

operations men from both the

units were awarded the Indian

General Service Medal (1859-

1895), clasp “ Chin Lushai Hills

1889-90”.

A number of minor rebellions

were put down during 1890-

91, including one in Manipur

in which a strong detachment

from the Surma Valley Battalion

marched into Manipur State

under Colonel Rennick and

remained there for several

months. During one of these

operations, in the Southern

Lushai Hills, Subedar Sangram

Sing and Havaldar Chandra

Singh Thapa of the Chittagong

Frontier Police distinguished

themselves by their gallantry

and were awarded the Indian

Order of Merit, 2nd Class, the

first such known awards to the

Frontier Police.

In 1892, for instance, two

columns of Military Police,

one each from Aizawl and

Lungleh joined hands with

a regular column of regular

troops from Fort White (60th

Rifles of the British Army and

39th Garhwal) to subjugate

rebellious elements over

a wide area in the central,

southern and northern regions

25

of the Lushai Hills (for which the

General Service Medal with Clasp

“ Lushai 1889-92” was awarded

to the troops and the Military

Police.

2nd Assam Rifles (Lakhimpur

Battalion)

The Lakhimpur Battal ion

was raised in 1864 to secure

the borders along Sadiya

and Lakhimpur districts. The

Battalion saw active service

against the Abors and Mishmis

during the ‘seventies. In addition,

it furnished detachments in

support of survey operations

in the Lhota and Ao areas in

Northern Nagaland. In one of

these expeditions one British

officer was killed and another

wounded, and there were over

130 casualties among the men

of the escort and survey parties.

In consequence, a large punitive

force drawn from regular troops

and the Lakhimpur and Naga

Frontier Police Battalions under

Brigadier General Nuthall was

sent to exact reparations.

During the North Lushai Hills

disturbances of 1890-91, 120

Lakhimpur Battalion troops had

operated under Captain Maxwell

View of The British Cantonment

Langtobal, Manipore

and relieved the Surma Valley

Frontier Police . In 1893, Captain

Maxwell was given the command

of a 600 strong force comprising

300 men of his own and 100 from

the Naga Hills Military Police to

punish a number of Abor villages

who had been raiding the plains

for slaves.

A major expedition up the

Dibong Valley to punish Mishmi

tribesmen became a landmark in

illustrating the high expenditure

of employing regular troops

for minor tasks. Colonel

Molesworth’s column which

proceeded on this assignment

consisted mostly of regulars

(besides Lakhimpur personnel).

It stayed out for three months,

costing the government Rs 2

lakhs, whereas the task could

have been accomplished by just

200 Lakhimpuris.

The next occasion when the

Lakhimpur Battal ion was

employed in the f ield in

conjunction with regular forces

was in 1911. A strong force under

General Bowers, consisting

of two Gorkha battalions, the

Lakhimpuris under their new

Commandant, Captain Sir G

Sutherland Dunbar, bolstered

27

The start of the Manipur Expedition from Shillong, Assam Frontier

by a detachment from the Lushai

Hills Military Police, 27 pounder

guns, a Brigade Signal Company

and some 3000 Naga porters,

were sent up the Dibang Valley

both to explore and survey the

territory towards the Tibetan

Border to punish the Minyong

Abors (around Pasighat) for

their treacherous murder of

the Political Officer, Mr Noel

Wiliamson and a Missionary, Dr

Gregorson. The column operated

from a base at Kobo, for the

preparation of which a strong

detachment of the Lakhimpuris

was made available.

The operation lasted from mid

October to mid December.

The Manipur Outrage : Kangla Palace Gates

29

There were periods of heavy

fighting, particularly when the

columns were ambushed and

when Abor stockades were

attacked. In the end, the Abors

came to terms. The murderers of

Williamson and Gregorson were

taken into custody and severe

punishment was inflicted upon

the tribesmen. But the cost of

the operation raised quite a hue

and cry in the Indian and British

press. It was generally believed

that the whole operation could

have been swiftly completed by

the Lakhimpuris themselves at a

much less cost.

During 1912-13, survey parties

were pushed up the Dibong and

Dihang Valleys and far into the

Abor and Mishmi Hills, beyond

points never reconnoitered

before. The security of these

parties fell on the shoulders

of Lakhimpuri escorts. The

battalion was also called upon

to provide protection for a survey

and road building party sent up

the Lohit Valley, the intention

being to open up a trade route

with South West China via Rima

in Tibet. This party succeeded

in cutting a bridle path up to

Walong, after which the work was

discontinued.

3rd Assam Rifles (Naga Hills

Battalion)

When it became imminent that

the Military Police battalions

would have to be reorganized

into three “territorial” units

of Frontier Police, it became

obvious that the Nowgong

Battalion, the senior unit would

be fully occupied with the Cachar

Carriers on the way to the

Abor Expedition

With baskets on their backs and well

armed : The Abor Expedition

- Nagaland Border and the Naga

tribes. It was already unofficially

alluded to as the “Naga Hills

Frontier Police”. Finally, in

1872, the Nowgong battalion

moved to Nagaland. At first its

headquarters was established at

Samguthing, but in 1878, it was

shifted to Kohima.

For a year all went well, till in

May 1879, Damant the Deputy

Commissioner found that the

large village of Khonoma was

collecting arms and ammunition,

and before long this section

showed decided hostility. The

fact being the people now

realised the existence of this

garrison (200 rifles) which

effectively stopped their head

hunting and related pursuits,

entailed payment of tribute,

the supply of men as transport

carriers; and all this they

resented. In spite of evidences

of unrest, such as an abortive

attack on the post at Piphirna,

Damant did not believe it was

likely to be serious, and before

starting out for a tour in the north

he visited Khonoma, (twelve

miles off) to find out the temper

of the people. In October, 1879,

with an escort of twenty-five

Regulars and sixty-five Military

Police, he passed through

Jotsoma and reached the foot

hill on which stands Khonoma.

On arrival at the village gate he

found it closed, and his demands

for admittance were answered by

a volley which killed Damant and

the sepoys with him. The Kohima

Garrison had an uncommonly

unpleasant experience, being

surrounded by some six to

seven thousand Naga warriors,

31

Apatanis leaving the valley after a night and morning of ritual preparation for the war

Warriors performing a dance before setting out with the Assam Rifles to attack Nyishis of Licha

who spared no effort to fire the

thatched buildings and attacked

the stockade repeatedly by

rolling heavy timbers forward

along the ground behind which

they sheltered and fired.

General Nation was now directed

to assemble a force of 1,135

men with two mountain guns at

Golaghat, and in early November

these moved forward and

entered the hills, not without

considerable opposition.

Warriors camping in the Kiyi river valley

Before starting his main assault

from the north, General Nation

sent a detachment of two

companies of regulars and 30

men of the Frontier Police. 200

Manipuri troops were positioned

on a flank for a similar purpose.

The fall of Khonoma was

followed by the establishment

of a temporary post which was

eventually taken over by the

Naga Hills Battalion.

After the settlement of these

disturbances the Battalion at

last found the opportunity to

put into effect the reorganization

scheme of converting to a

“territorial” unit- the Naga Hills

Military Police Battalion. Under

its first Commandant, Captain

Plowden ( A Bengal Cavalryman),

it settled down to make a proper

cantonment at Kohima. At the

same time, Pipers were trained,

later to give way to a 25-piece

band.

33

The Mishmi MissionCirca. 1899

Man and Woman, Mishimi TribeCirca. 1925

The next bit of “excitement” for

the Naga Hills Battalion came

in the wake of the Manipur

rebellion of 1891, in which the

ruler of the state was deposed

and the Political Officer and a

number of other British Officers

treacherously murdered by the

Senapati of the Army, Tikendrajit

Singh. At the height of the

rebellion, the regular Indian

Army stationed in Manipur was

dispersed and virtually chased

out by the rebels of the Manipur

State troops. It was at this stage

that the Naga Hills battalion

came into the picture.

In a brisk engagement against

Manipuri forces, the Military

Po l i c e d e ta c h m e n t h a d

succeeded in capturing the

border post at Mao Thana and

pursued the fleeing Manipuris

for nearly 16 kms. Later the

column reached Imphal. The

three companies of the Naga

Hills Battalion remained there

for a few months, employed on

guard and escort duties.

The remainder of the decade

was comparatively peaceful.

However in 1910-11 a long range

column went out to the area of

the Saramethi Range again to

punish the Aishan Kukis for their

raids towards Somra. During the

winter of 1912-13, the battalion

supplied a number of escorts

for surveys of the Mishmi and

Aka areas. They were the first to

make contact with the people on

the Tibet Border. In the Aka area

the party traversed Tenga Valley

and visited Rupa and Jamiri –

names that were later to become

familiar to the Indian Army in

what later became Kameng

Frontier Division.

35

THE END STATE

The task of pacifying and

humanizing these primitive

hill people would have been

impossible had there not been

at the command of the Civil

Government a trained and armed

force which could be employed

in small detachments and

rapidly mobilized with minimum

of transport. The annexed

territories were garrisoned by

localized battalions of Military

Police and the establishment

of Military police outposts. To

punish offending villages it was

often necessary to proceed in

arms against them. And it was

exceedingly difficult to confine

government intervention rigidly

within the limits of the annexed

territory; for villages inside the

boundary line were sometimes

raided from the outside. The

most plausible and graphic

explanation in this regard comes

from Col LW Shakespear :

“…our officers could hardly

ignore atrocities that were

perpetrated just outside their

jurisdiction; they could not

stand unmoved on their frontier

watching villages go up in flames,

when by crossing a boundary

stream they could stop this

cruelty. By promptitude in action

and steady pressure, peace was

gradually established throughout

(the) area … Men who had been

accustomed to decorate their

houses with skulls felt almost

content in using pumpkins for

this purpose; and so instead

of raiding villages of the open

country, they commenced to

trade with them. Schools were

opened.” Trade, the advent of

the missionaries and growth of

education and all round progress

form part of the narrative of the

regional security corollary which

depended critically on the role

played by the earlier personas of

the modern day ‘Assam Rifles”.

Over time this conduced the

attempts towards geographic

and cultural assimilation of

these independent tribes into

the ‘mainstream’. How the

Force came to be identified with

“friendliness” and a wide range

of civic action projects, can be

traced in their intrinsic tribal

disposition - “Detachments of

Military Police in the course of

their rounds have been known

to drop their official dignity and

“let themselves go” in organizing

games for the entertainment

of the people. They are proud

of their battalion sports…

(and) can gain almost as much

excitement in football and

hockey as by harrying a village

and massacring its inhabitants.”

37

WORLD WARS &INTER WARYEARS

Gurkha bombing party practising in a trench with live bombs near Merville, France.

The extent and significance of

the Indian Army in the World

Wars is severely undermined

by the paucity of records. This

is despite the fact that India

was heavily involved in the First

World War as a key contributor

to the allied forces and at that

time an important part of the

British Empire. For a hundred

years, the story of this force

had been nearly forgotten —

the narrative of World War I

has so far been predominantly

white. World War I marked an

important watershed as for the

first time, Indian soldiers were

fighting on European soil. They

fought in all the major theatres

of war on land, air and sea,

alongside British troops. Their

many awards for bravery, as

well as their war graves and

memorials on the battlefields,

are testimony to their sacrifice

in the service of Britain.

It is important to note that in

the context of the World War

WORLD WAR I

I, the identity of the Assam

Rifles or its precursors is

indistinguishable from the

Indian Army, primarily because,

during the World War I, Assam

Military Police troopers were

part of the Indian Forces that

fought for Britain in Europe

and Middle East.

India raised the world’s largest

volunteer armies: 1.5 million in

WWI and 2.5 million in WWII.

Indian troops were on the

Western Front by the winter

of 1914 and fought at the first

Battle of Ypres. By the end of

1915, they had sustained many

casualties along with those

from sickness. The decision

was taken to withdraw the

Indian Corps from front line

duty at the end of 1915.

In total, 800,000 Indian troops

fought in all the theatres

of the war with 1.5 million

volunteering to fight. They

fought in most theatres of war

including Gallipoli and North

and East Africa. In all 47,746

were classed as killed or

missing with 65,000 wounded.

It is estimated that 74,187

Indian soldiers died during the

war.

The significance of Assam Rifles

in World War I, is rooted in the

huge number of casualties

sustained by the Indian Army.

Indeed the casualties were so

heavy that the Indian Army

Reserves could not cope with

the number of reinforcements

required. Gurkha Regiments

were the worst off in this respect

– because of the difficulty

in calling up reservists from

distant villages in the Nepal

Hills. Short of Nepali recruits,

the British Indian Army turned

to the Assam Military Police

for additional reinforcements

for Gurkha battalions. The

response was immediate

and volunteers came forward

41

Gurkha soldiers at a canteenin France.

in overwhelming numbers.

Therefore even though Assam

Rifles did not participate in the

World War I as a battalion per

se, it contributed over three

thousand men from the force

to various Gurkha Regiments

of the Indian Army. Drafts

and reinforcements were sent

to various affiliated Gurkha

Battalions in France, Egypt,

Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, North

Persia and the North West

Frontier of India. Official figures

include 23 Indian officers (now

known as JCOs) and 3174 men.

Of these, 11 Indian officers and

69 other ranks received various

honours and awards which

included 3 Indian Orders of

Merit, 5 Indian Distinguished

Ser vice Medals and 12

Meritorious Service Medals.

The total casualties suffered

by Assam Rifles during World

War I included the death of 5

Indian officers and 237 other

ranks and injuries to 6 Indian

officers and 247 other ranks.

The contribution of these men

was immeasurable: it could

be argued that without the

prompt arrival of these forces,

it really would have been all

over as Britain’s Army was

small and the many thousands

of men volunteering were not

yet trained and in place.

It was in recognition to the

excellent services rendered

by the Force during World

War I that in October 1917,

the government approved the

redesignation of the Force as

“The Assam Rifles.”

First line transport of a Gurkha battalion in France

43

Copies of some of the letters from various Commanding Officers of the Gurkha Regiments to whom Assam Rifles

sent reinforcements during the Great War between January 1915 and the end of 1918, and which show the value

of their services during that period.

Copy of letter, No. 123/108/A, of 9th August, 1921, from the O.C 1st K.G.O. Goorkha Rifles to the I.G.P, Shillong.

44

Copy of letter, No. 1806/D.C./A.T., of 23-8-21, from the O.C. 2/7th Goorkha Rifles to the I.G.P. Shillong.

45

First photograph from above: Troops at a demonstration during the Non - Cooperation Movement

Second Photograph:The boycott of foreign clothes in Colonial India

The process of demobilization after the Great War saw the return of hundreds of Assam Rifles volunteers

from the regular Army to their parent unit; as a result all Assam Rifles battalions found themselves grossly

oversubscribed in NCOs and men. This inspired the raising of a fifth battalion. The new battalion was raised

at Lokhra on 10 June 1920 and furnished the posts at North Lakhimpur, Harmati, Dikulmakh, Hathipaithi,

Udalguri and Darrang. Since all these posts were located in hot and humid plains of North Assam, it was

decided to set up a hill station post in Happy Valley, on the outskirts of Shillong, to permit a turn over of

officers and men from the posts in the plains for rest and recreation.

INTER-WAR YEARS

DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST NATIONALISTS

The fifth battalion’s first call of

duty was to provide aid to civil

authorities in suppressing riots

and disorders connected with

Mahatma Gandhi’s Non

Co-operation Movement of

1921-1922, a task which was

disliked by the troops because

that amounted to acting against

one’s own people.

In Assam, the nationalists

instigated riots at various places

and organized strikes in the

tea gardens and on the Assam

Bengal Railway and Assam

Rifles were frequently called out

in aid of the civil authority. It

also provided signalers to assist

the Railway system to keep its

telegraph lines open.

The Assam Rifles continued

to be deployed against fellow

Indians since the Independence

Resolution of 1929 which later

flared into the Civil Disobedience

Movement. Detachments from

all battalions were dispatched to

Sylhet, Calcutta and Chittagong.

Between 1931 and 1938 the

First Battalion in Silchar was

constantly called upon to send

detachments to Sylhet and

surrounding areas – including

the tea gardens in which mass

strikes had been staged.

Meanwhile the terms of service

for the men of the Assam Rifles

had also been improved, mainly

as a reward for their sterling

services during the Great War. In

1922, the men’s pay was raised

from 9 to 11 rupees per month

and the system of making a

man pay for his kit was replaced

by a kit being issued to them at

government expense.

47

First photograph from above: Moplah prisoners go to trial

Bottom Left Photograph:2nd Dorsets to deploy from Baird Barracks, Bangalore to Malabar

Bottom Right Photograph:Moplah Prisoners

MOPLAH REBELLION

1923 saw about 650 men drawn

from all the battalions and

dispatched to quell the Moplah

rebellion in Rampa State Agency

near Waltair on the request of

Madras Presidency. The troops

went by sea to Narsapatnam

under the command of Major

Goodall (Commandant Second

Battalion) and then inland to

the scene of disturbances. The

troubled area was extensive

and densely forested. Goodall

decided to replicate the strategy

earlier used during the Kuki

operations. He divided the area

into a number of sub areas , each

with a mobile column, fixed posts

and ‘I’ staff. When the men got

to know the ground, they were

able to flush the insurgents out

of their hidings. After a number of

skirmishes, the rebel leader was

killed and his confederates either

killed or captured. Three Indian

officers were awarded the King’s

Police Medal.

49

AFFILIATION TO GURKHA RIFLES

In 1924, as a further recognition of the services rendered by the Assam Rifles in World War I, as a second

line reserve, all the then existing five Assam Rifles battalions were permanently affiliated with the following

groups of Gurkha Rifles:

1 Assam Rifles to 2nd Group (2 & 9 Gurkha Rifles)

2 Assam Rifles to 5th Group (7 & 10 Gurkha Rifles)

3 Assam Rifles to 1st Group (1 & 4 Gurkha Rifles)

4 Assam Rifles to 4th Group (5 & 6 Gurkha Rifles)

5 Assam Rifles to 3rd Group (3 & 8 Gurkha Rifles)

SUBEDAR MAJOR STEPS UP

Another notable development

was the parity accorded to the

Subedar Major of the Assam

Rifles with that of the regular

Army. The Subedar Major of

the Asssam Rifles often had to

discharge greater responsibilities

than his counterpart in the

regular Army, because of the

limited authorization of British

officers in the battalions. He

was the veritable “Indian

Commandant” in the absence

of the officers who were often

out on tours and expeditions.

The British officers realized their

importance and groomed them

accordingly. Their services were

often rewarded with prestigious

titles of “Rai Bhadur”, “Sardar

Bahadur” and “Khan Bahadur”.

Some of the inspiring Subedar

Majors of this era were, Subedar

Major Jamaluddin of 3 AR, who

was awarded Order of British

India, and accorded the title

“Khan Bahadur”in January 1924;

Subedar Major Jangbir Lama

of 2 AR who was accorded the

title “Sardar Bahadur” the same

year; Subedar Major Hetman Rai

of 4 AR received the title of “Rai

Bahadur”.Rai Bahadur and Khan BahadurMedals

RANI GAIDINLIU

An interesting saga of this period

features Rani Gaidinliu who

is missing from Indian history

textbooks.

Gaidinliu was born on January

26, 1915 at Nungkhao, a village

in Manipur. She was sixteen

when she became the leader of

the Heraka movement after its

charismatic leader Jadonang

was executed by the British.

While the Heraka movement

was long aware of the civil

disobedience movement in

British India, it was Gaidinliu

who first used Gandhiji’s name

and identified her peoples’

struggle against oppression

and self-determination with

the larger national movement

gaining ground in India.

Through armed resistance, she

quickly transformed a religious-

indigenous rebellion into a

revolutionary movement for

independence. The Empire

fearing the spirt of defiance,

launched a manhunt for the

16-year-old rebel leader. The

Assam Governor-in-Council

authorised the overwhelming

force of the 3rd and 4th Assam

Rifles and the entire Manipur

Police Force. After a year long

search and capture operations,

Gaidinliu was arrested on

October 17, 1932. She was tried

and convicted on a charge of murder,

waging war against the British crown

and sentenced to life imprisonment

but later released.

Another noteworthy operational

activity of the era includes the task

of providing escorts to Survey of

India party that proceeded to the

unadministered area between the

Naga Hills and the Burma border.

There was no resistance, but the

operation was one of the most

taxing and arduous one.

51

For her contribution

in the independence

struggle, Government

of India awarded her

by releasing postage

stamps in the year 1996.

Mompunga, a Lushai Chief and Mr Murray a political agent, taking the ‘Oath of Friendship’

CONSOLIDATION OF TRIBAL AREAS

The Great War had interrupted

the process of consolidation

of tribal areas. Even though

the government had been able

to extend its writ to most of

the tribal areas of Assam, the

process was far from complete.

However the operations were

resumed and there were several

expeditions launched in this

phase.

In 1925, two platoons from 3 AR,

provided an escort to a survey

party to the border of Sibsagar

District, penetrating into areas

that had not been visited for

many years.

In the Lushai Hills, the Zongling

area drew three separate visits

by the Superintendent of the

Lushai Hills during 1925-26, each

escorted by the men of the first

battalion. Eventually, in 1931-32,

Zongling was incorporated in the

Lushai Hills District. Thereafter

two platoons of the battalion

were employed in supervising

the construction of a road linking

Lungleh with Sherphor, near

Zongling.

53

The action in Pangsha village

SUPPRESSION OF HEADHUNTING AND SLAVE TRADING

Headhunting has been a practice

among the Naga tribes of India

and Myanmar. The practice was

common up to the 20th Century

and may still be practised in

isolated Naga tribes of Burma.

Many of the Naga warriors

still bear the marks (tattoos

and others) of a successful

headhunt. In the North East

India, all the people living south

of the Brahmaputra River -

Garos, Khasis, Nagas, and Kukis-

formerly were headhunters

including the Mizo of the Lushai

Hills who also hunted heads of

their enemies.

In April 1936, Mr Mills, Deputy

Commissioner, submitted a

report on the behaviour of

Pangsha, a Kalo Kenyo Village

in Tribal territory outside the

Control Area. They had been

responsible for 200 deaths in the

last 6 months : they had raided

Kejuk within the Control Area and

taken 53 heads : they had raided

Saochu, also within the Control

Area and taken 188 heads ; and

they had been selling captives

as slaves. Though Pangsha was

outside the Control Area, their

conduct had been such that Mr

Mills advised that an expedition

be sent against them.

Chingmak, the Chief of Chingmei, with the breast

tattoo of a head-hunter. Circa. 1936

55

Major Williams and Assam Rifles soldiers preparing for the expedition to Pangsha

Circa. 1936

Major Williams, J P Mills, Mr Smith and several Nagas on a platform

Circa. 1936

The Government of India

approved the launch of

expeditions and the operations

took place between November

13th and December 13th, 1936,

with Mr Mills in political charge

and Major W R B Williams, in

command of the escort of two

platoons of the 3rd Assam

Rifles. A series of expeditions

escorted by the third battalion

were mounted in 1936 to end

both the heinous practices that

of slave trade and headhunting

in that region. Throughout the

rainy season constant attempts

were made to get the villages to

release their slaves, but although

it was reported that Sanglao had

obeyed Government orders,

“Nokhu and Pesu remained

obstinate.” The expedition

left Mokokchung on the 1st

November 1937 and by the end

of the month all the slaves known

to be in the unadministered area

were set free without any casualty

on own side. Mills’ Report of 30th

January 1937 to the Government

of India commented as follows:

“The expeditions completely

achieved its objects in effecting

the release of several slaves

taken as captives and in inflicting

on Pangsha a well merited

punishment not only for its

participation in the slave trade

but for its head-hunting raids on

its neighbours.”

An account of the inter war years

would not be complete without

referring to the aid given by

the Force to civil authorities in

times of natural disasters. In

June 1929, during a period of

torrential rain, Aizawl became

completely isolated because of

landslides in surrounding areas

and widespread damage to the

road links. The Superintendant

of Lushai Hills called on the

Assam Rifles for assistance. Four

platoons of the First Battalion

A slave family freed during the expedition

Circa. 1936

J P Mills with a freed slave child

Circa. 1936

57

From left to right: Mr Smith, Christoph Von Fürer-Haimendorf, J P Mills and Major Williams in Mokokchung, Nagaland

Circa. 1936

cleared 28 miles of road in six

weeks; other parties were sent

to clear 25 miles of river passage

below Sairang. Most of the

men employed in these tasks

contracted miasmal fevers and

subsequently had to spend long

months in hospital.

Manipur was also visited by

heavy floods that year. The lines

of the Fourth Battalion were

under three feet deep water.

Besides undoing the damage

to their own area, the men

constituted large parties to aid

the civil authority in fighting the

floods in other areas of Manipur.

CONCLUSION

The Force performed very

commendably in the World War I.

It provided officers and soldiers

to the various British Indian Army

Gurkha Regiments, a process,

which over the years resulted,

into permanent affiliations of

the battalions of AR to different

groups of the Gurkhas. They

fought shoulder to shoulder

alongside regular army troops

in the Middle East and acquitted

themselves creditably, bagging

numerous decorations in the

bargain. Later on, men were

provided to the army columns

engaged on punitive expeditions

into the erstwhile Assam Hill

Districts and North Eastern

Frontier Agency (NEFA) and also

some in trans-border reprisal

missions into Burma. It was used

for restoration of law and order

in Patna in 1917 and also against

the Moplah rebels in 1924.

The AR along with the Church,

have managed to transform

p r e - h i s t o r i c a n i m a l i s t i c

societies of the North East from

the stone-age to space-age in

three or four generations. Their

humane and tactful handling

of the inhabitants of our far-

flung regions and tribal areas;

be it during the initial era of

pacification, or in the immediate

post-Independence period of

political turmoil, instability,

ethnic tribal aspirations and

resultant disturbed conditions.

The AR troops have managed

to win the hearts and minds of

the populace in a good natured

and large-hearted manner. It

is, therefore, not for nothing,

that the famous and erudite

anthropologist and naturalist,

Verrier Elwin has bestowed on

them a singularly significant

sobriquet: “The Friends Of The

Hill People!” This is what he has

said of them in tribute:

“The custodians of law and

order, the pioneers of every

advance into the interior, the

guardians of our borders and

the friends of the hill people.

Modestly, and without fuss,

they have faced every hardship

and difficulty, and thousands of

villagers in the wildest of areas

think of them with affection and

gratitude.”

59

Images from World War II

A s s a m R i f l e s r e m a i n e d

practically insulated from

World War II until the danger

of Japanese invasion made it

imperative to deploy forces in

the North East Sector as well.

WW II saw the force functioning

as elements of the much fabled,

hush-hush and ghost-like “V”

Force, on reconnaissance and

harassment missions behind

Japanese l ines in Burma.

Many of its sub units fought

alongside regular British and

Indian troops in the fiercely

contested battles of the Burma

Front from Ukhrul to Kohima.

Units rendered yeoman service

in the management, evacuation

and control of refugees of

Burma/NEFA in the face of

the onslaught of the Imperial

Japanese Army in the First

Burma Campaign of WWII.

Until the latter half of 1941, the

Force remained preoccupied

w i t h t h e n o r m a l ch o re s :

patrolling the border; escorting

administrative off icials to

r e m o t e a r e a s ; a s s i s t i n g

them to establish them the

government’s writ among the

recalcitrant tribals; the internal

security duties in Digboi and

Tinsukia to protect the oil

installations against threats of

sabotage amidst another surge

of civil disturbance. Training

became a priority and more

importantly, intensive jungle

warfare was incorporated in

the training of the Assam Rifles

during this relative lull.

The first faint impact of the war

was felt in early 1941, when in

a throwback to the Great War,

demands were received for

the transfer of the volunteers

from the Assam Rifles to the

regular Gorkha battalions.

As on the previous occasion,

the response was immediate

and enthusiastic. By April, the

second battalion had sent 203

volunteers while the third and

the fourth made available 100

men each – to their respective

affiliated units in the Gorkha

Brigade.

This time, however, their service

would be undertaken closer

to home. After the lightning

Japanese advance in 1942, the

Assam Rifles fought a number

of independent actions behind

enemy lines, as the task of rear-

area defence and rear-guard

often fell to them during the

Allies retreat into India. Later,

as a large influx of refugees fled

from the advancing Japanese

into India, the Assam Rifles

were given the task of managing

and organising this mass of

humanity.

WORLD WAR I I

61

Japan entered the 2nd World

War with simultaneous attacks

on Pearl Harbour and Northern

Malaya. On December 23, 1941

came the first Japanese air

attacks on Rangoon. Successive

raids prompted thousands of

residents to leave the city in the

hope of reaching India. Tavoy

fell in mid-January of 1942,

and on January 20, Mandalay

sustained a 3-day intensive

raid which sent thousands

more into flight, as fires raged

for a radius of 20 miles. On

February 15, Singapore fell, as

the Allies continued to fight

delaying operations in Burma.

On February 17, a turning point

arrived as the Sittang Bridge

was blown in order to block an

immediate Japanese advance

at the cost of hundreds of

All ied soldiers left on the

Japanese controlled bank. On

March 1, the military and official

focus continued to be one of

retaining Rangoon, but Gen

Sir Howard Alexander arrived

and immediately ordered

preparations for a complete

Allied withdrawal. By this time,

Tony Mains had been leading

the Field Security Division in

a Rangoon of numerous fires,

stray snipers and much looting.

It was plain that the Japanese

Army would soon appear and

refugees from elsewhere began

to stream through towards

the Indian border by foot or

whatever primitive means of

transport one could manage.

The Fourth Battalion of Assam

Rifles, established a two platoon

reception centre at Tamu to

organize the rush of suffering

humanity and to provide what

succour it could. Another such

centre was established by the

Battalion in the Sita area. The

rest of the unit was engaged

in organizing massive relief

operations at Imphal; the Third

Battalion’s help was co-opted

for the onward movement of

refugee columns to Dimapur

via Kohima. When the burden

of work increased, additional

platoons from the Second

Battalion of Assam Rifles was

sent to assist the Naga and

Manipur Battalions.

The Assam Rifles played an epic

role in assisting the refugees,

both civi l ian and ser vice

personnel. All battalions had

sent detachments for this

purpose to the various entry

points from Central and North

Burma. The personal accounts

of some of the beneficiaries

of this massive humanitarian

campaign speaks eloquently

about the role of the Assam

Rifles. Dr Krishnan Gurumurthy,

whose family was seeking

refuge from Burma writes, “Our

reception in India was in sharp

contrast to our journey through

Burma. Spontaneous relief and

assistance was forthcoming...

to make our life as comfortable

as possible. There was an air of

sympathy and fellow-feeling all-

round. They arranged free food,

accommodation, travel and

medical care... From Imphal, we

were taken to Dimapur (then

in North-East Frontier Agency)

by bus. The travel took the

whole day through the Naga

Mountains and was very tiring.”

Major Ronald James Anderson

writes in his book titled “The

RECEPTION OF BURMA REFUGEES

Retreat from Mandalay”, “By

keep moving and staying alive

our small party made it to Tamu,

where I was put in a truck, and I

remember the name of Imphal

being mentioned, but I am not

sure. I do remember finding

myself in the officers mess of

the Assam Rifles in Kohima. I

had done it, I had reached the

town of Dimapur in the Indian

state of Manipur, the railhead

town for Calcutta... Here I

realised that my little group was

not alone. There were in fact

thousands of people who had

made it out over the Naga Hills.

Military personnel (from Assam

Rifles) in clean, well starched

uniforms were milling around

trying to introduce some sort of

order. Tents littered the scene

and the weather was overcast

and cold... After all I had been

through and all I had seen it

was not the reception I would

ever have expected.”

Troops walking through a Burmese town.Troops inspect Japanese bombs on captured hill

“Scraggy”, Burma, 1944

63

DHAI MURTI

While the civil authorities were

busily engaged in organizing

r e f u g e e r e l i e f , G e n e r a l

Headquarters in Delhi was

frantically trying to establish

a force in North Eastern India

to repel a possible Japanese

invasion. And the first troops

General Wavell turned to, were

the operationally deployed

Assam Rifles battalions under

the IG Police of Assam. Thus

it was then that the Force

came to be projected on to

the strategic scene of India’s

defence at such a crucial

period of imperial history.

“Wavell therefore decided to

organize a force from the hill

people along the 600 miles

of India’s eastern frontier to

undertake guerilla operations

against the Japanese lines of

communications, should they

pass through the area.”

This group became known as

“Victor Force” (or sometimes

V-Force), and the nucleus of

it was formed from platoons

made up of men from the Assam

Rifles. As part of this force,

Assam Rifles platoons were

used as covering forces during

the later stages of the Burma

Campaign. Other elements

fought in the defensive “boxes”

around Kohima, whilst another,

from the 4th Battalion trained

as airborne troops and were

dropped near the Sittang River

behind Japanese lines. The

1st Battalion, as part of Lushai

Brigade was sent ahead of the

rest of the force to provide

resistance in the Chin Hills.

V Force was a reconnaissance

and intel l igence-gathering

organisation established by

the British during the Burma

Campaign in World War II. In

April 1942, when the Japanese

drove the British Army from

Burma and seemed l ikely

to invade India, General Sir

Archibald Wavel l ordered

the creation of a guerrilla

organisation which was to

operate along the frontier

between India and Burma.

This frontier ran for 800 miles

(1200 kilometres), from the

Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal.

V Force was envisaged as a “stay-

behind” force. If the Japanese

had invaded India after the

monsoon season ended late

in 1942, V Force was to harass

their lines of communications

with ambushes and sabotage,

and to provide intelligence

from behind enemy lines. The

first commander of the force

was Brigadier A Felix Williams,

formerly the commander of the

Tochi Scouts, a paramilitary

unit on the North-West Frontier.

When the Army failed to provide

the 6,000 rifles it had promised

to V Force, Williams arranged

for weapons manufactured by

gunsmiths in Peshawar to be

delivered.

The force was organised into six

area commands, corresponding

to the Indian Civil Service

administrative areas, which

in turn corresponded to the

ethnicity of the inhabitants

of the various parts of the

frontier. Each area command

“V FORCE”

had a Commander, Second-

i n - C o m m a n d , A d j u t a n t ,

Quartermaster and Medical

Officer, four platoons (about

100 men) of the paramilitary

Assam Rifles and up to 1,000

locally enlisted guerillas or

auxiliaries.

The area commanders and other

officers were rarely Regular

Army officers; the qualification

for appointment was more

o f t e n e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e

of the local language and

peoples. Some commanders

were police officers, former

civil administrators, or tea

planters. Even one woman, the

anthropologist Ursula Graham

Bower, was appointed an

officer in V Force.

The Japanese did not invade

India in 1942 as had been

feared. V Force was able to

consolidate itself in the wide

area between the Allied and

Japanese main forces. Bases

and outposts were set up,

standing patrols instituted

and intelligence gathered and

collated. By the end of 1943, the

force had been reorganised into

two main zones: Assam Zone,

including Imphal and all the

frontier north of it, and Arakan

Zone to the south. Detachments

in Tripura were disbanded as

they were deep inside India

and unlikely to be threatened.

An American organisation later

took over the northernmost

areas around Ledo.

When the Indian Eastern

Army carried out a small-

scale invasion of Japanese-

occupied Arakan in early 1943,

V Force provided a degree of

warning about the movements

of Japanese reserves to the

threatened area.

Capt May with ‘V Force’

67

The Second World War saw

the Assam Rifles undertaking

miscellaneous roles. It was

tasked to organise a resistance

group on the Indo-Burmese

Border to counter the Japanese

invasion and to disrupt their

lines of communication. The

whole concept was contained

in Plan Number V, and the

Resistance Force, so formed

and organised, came to be

known as V Force. The Assam

Ri f les , which formed the

nucleus of this Force, coveted

i tsel f with g lor y for the

exemplary performance of its

platoons. They fought gallant

independent actions far into

Burmese territory behind the

enemy lines and later fought

doggedly in the defence boxes

established along the line

from Kohima to Ukhrul. As a

part of the V Force, a number

of Assam Rifles platoons acted

as covering forces both during

the defensive and the offensive

phases of the operations in

Burma. One of the platoons

of the 4th Battalion was also

trained as paratroopers and

was dropped near the Sittang

River behind Japanese lines.

By the time the war ended,

officers and men of all the five

battalions had distinguished

themselves by displaying high

professional excellence and

great valour. As a testament

to the performance of Assam

Rifles men during the war,

members of the unit received

forty-eight gallantry awards.

These included: 3 Members of

the British Empire, 5 Military

Crosses, 4 Orders of British

India, 1 Indian Order of Merit,

13 Military Medals, 15 Indian

Distinguished Service Medals

and 7 British Empire Medals.

69

The World Wars af forded

several opportunities to the

Assam Rifles to prove their

worth as a full fledged fighting

force – both in guerrilla role

and as frontline sub units

fighting a modern war. The

long list of gallantry awards

won by them and eventual

defeat of the Japanese on the

Burma front testified to their

combat capabilities. However

their future was still vague and

amorphous and the subject of

debate. Sir Olaf Caroe, who

had served in the Indian Army

during World War I and was

now an administrator in the

ICS, advocated for the Force to

“follow the road taken in earlier

days by the Piffers and become

members of the Regular Army”,

possibly the Assam Regiment.

Others favoured their reversion

to a purely pol ice force

officered by police officers on

the plea that “their standard of

training did not allow of their

being used in any role other

than the purely local one”.

The performance of the Assam

Rifles in the World Wars and

their list of awards however

had proved otherwise. Another

reason which supported their

affiliation with the Army was

that they had had been trained

and had acquitted themselves

admirably in the art of guerrilla

warfare – which benefitted the

forward policy on the northern

frontier and that “… it is almost

inevitable that if trouble again

arose…the Assam Rifles would

be called upon to provide a

useful supplement to any other

forces employed.” The IG Police

of Assam recommended the

linking of the Assam Rifles with

the Assam Regiment as a sort of

“Light Regiment… constituted

for mixed military and civil

duties.”

The debate was deadlocked

for a long time. Meanwhile,

the Assam Government feared

another Kuki uprising- more

vicious then the previous

one - because many of the

Kukis had collaborated with

the Japanese, and come

into contact with the Indian

National Army, and, “above

all, now had access to large

numbers of modern arms…”

This hastened the decision

to recall the first, third and

fourth battalions from Army

Service who became part of

the civil police under the Assam

Inspector General of Police.

In the period following the

I n d e p e n d e n ce , ba t ta l i o n s

reverted to their former para-

pol ice status which also

entailed reduction of rank and

pay. Furthermore, the strength

of the battalions, which had

been increased to 16 platoons ,

was again brought down to 14.

And the Assam Rifles was hit by

shortage of officers in the wake

of the departure of the British

officers. To ease this, a new

scheme of engaging “contract

of f icers” was introduced.

Under this scheme, released

Emergenc y Commissioned

officers and officers promoted

from VCO rank were posted

to the battalions on a three

POST WAR AND INDEPENDENCE

71

Lt Col Sidhiman Rai, MC

year contract basis. With this,

the Force had to go back

to the system of supplying

rations to the men through

ration contractors, a system

which did not work well in

the interior areas where road

communications were poor

and rations had to be sent by

porters. It was truly a period of

setbacks for the Assam Rifles.

These setbacks however did

not hold them from their

dedication to duty. In 1946-47,

two platoons of the second

battalion escorted the Assistant

Political Officer, Mr James, to

the Mc Mahon Line up the

Siang Valley. The aim of the

expedition was to discourage

Tibetan officials from intruding

into British - Indian territory.

The mission was successful in

that many such officials were

induced to go back to Tibet

without resort to force. The

column returned in February

1947.

It was fortunate for the Assam

Rifles that the first Indian

Governor of the state, Sir

Akbar Hydari, an experienced

administrator, took personal

interest in the affairs of the

Force. In the midst of all the

controversy that was raging

between Delhi and Shillong

regarding the future status

of the Assam Rifles, it was Sir

Akbar Hydari’s farsightedness

t h a t h e l p e d g r e a t l y i n

arriving at a balanced and

appropriate compromise and

consequentially, a series of

organizational changes.

T h e m o s t i m m e d i a t e

organizational change in Assam

Rifles after independence was

the separation of Assam Rifles

from the police. Accordingly,

on 17 September 1947, HG

Bartley, CIE, IP was appointed

the first Inspector General of

Assam Rifles, directly under the

Governor of Assam.

Mr Bartley retired from the

service soon after and Lt Col

Sidhiman Rai, MC took over as

the first Army Officer and the

first Indian IGAR, in the rank of

Colonel. Col Rai, originally an OR

in 10 Gurkha Rifles was granted

Emergency Commission in the

Assam Regiment wherein he

was awarded the MC on the

Burma front.

Sir Akbar Hydari

HG Bartley

73

Nehru led a campaign for the development of tribal areas in the economic, social, political and intellectual

fields.He laid down certain guidelines for the upliftment of tribal people which would later be helpful in the

framing of government policies towards the tribal areas. The ethos of Assam Rifles was moulded by Pandit

Nehru’s Tribal Policy.

S o o n a f te r I n d i a ga i n e d

independence, some of the

Christian missionaries and

o t h e r f o r e i g n e r s s ta r t e d

promoting sentiments in favour

of separate and independent

states in North East India. The

virtual absence of any political

or cultural contact of the tribals

in the North-East with the

political life of the rest of India

was also a striking difference.

The struggle for independence

had little impact among the

tribals of the North-East. To

quote Jawaharlal Nehru: “the

essence of our struggle for

freedom was the unleashing

of a liberating force in India.

This force did not even affect

the frontier people in one

of the most important tribal

areas.’ Again: ‘thus, they never

experienced a sensation of

being in a country called India

and they were hardly influenced

by the struggle for freedom or

other movements in India.”

The t r ibal pol ic y of the

Government of India, inspired

by Jawaharlal Nehru was

therefore even more relevant

to the tribal people of the

North-East . ‘All this North-

East border area deserves our

special attention,’ Nehru said

in October 1952. ‘Our contacts

with them will do us good and

will do them good also. They

add to the strength, variety

and cultural richness of India’,

Nehru further emphasised.

A reflection of Nehru’s policies

was in the Sixth Schedule of

the Constitution, which applied

only to the tribal areas of Assam.

The Sixth Schedule offered a fair

degree of self-government to

the tribal people by providing

for autonomous districts and

the creation of district and

regional councils, which would

exercise some of the legislative

and judicial functions within

the overall jurisdiction of the

Assam legislature and the

parliament. The objective of the

Sixth Schedule was to enable

tribals to live according to their

own ways. The Government

of India also expressed its

willingness to further amend

the constitutional provisions

relating to the tribal people if

it was found necessary to do

so with a view to promoting

further autonomy. However,

Nehru clarified that this did

not mean that the government

would countenance secession

from India or independence

by any area or region, or

would tolerate violence in the

promotion of any demands.

The Assam Rifles troops and

t h e go v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s

working in tribal areas of the

North East had a special role to

play in the process. Due to their

continuous deployment in the

North East region, Assam Rifles

was identified more closely

with the local inhabitants

than any other force operating

in the region. Hence in the

years to come, independent

India’s government had to

rely more and more on Assam

Rifles for extending Indian

administration and government

policies into the remotest

corners of the North East .

The ethos of the Assam Rifles

was thus moulded by Pandit

Nehru’s Tribal policy.

TRIBAL POLICY

75

North Eastern Frontier Agency

(NEFA) was an anthropological

a n d s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l t e s t

case for Nehru’s and Verrier

Elwin’s policies. NEFA (present

Arunachal Pradesh) was created

in 1948 out of the border areas

of Assam. NEFA was established

as a Union Territory outside

the jurisdiction of Assam

and placed under a special

administrat ion. From the

beginning, the administration

was manned by a special

cadre of officers who were

asked to implement specially

d e s i g n e d d e v e l o p m e n ta l

policies without disturbing the

social and cultural pattern of

the life of the people. Verrier

Elwin, a British anthropologist

who spent nearly all his life

studying the tribal people

and their condition, wrote in

1967, ‘A measure of isolation

combined with a sympathetic

and imaginative policy of a

progressive administration

has here created a situation

unparalleled in other parts of

India.’

T h e e x e r c i s e m e t w i t h

considerable success with

the steadfast support of

Assam Rifles whose personnel

shouldered the burden of

administrative activity. They

a l o n e w e re t ra i n e d a n d

equipped to endure the early

years of hardship when the

North Eastern Frontier Agency

Administrative Service was still

in its infancy.

It was unfortunate that the

enlightened approach to the

developments of tribals – the

essence of Pandit Nehru’s and

Elwin’s “Philosophy for NEFA”,

could not be executed in the

entire North East. In many parts,

the government faced tribal

unrest and rebellion. Therefore

the ‘soft approach’ proved

insufficient on many occasions

when it became unavoidable to

resort to military confrontation.

NEFANORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY

Dr Verrier Elwin

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visits NEFA

THE EARTHQUAKE

In 1950, there was a major

earthquake in Assam within

the living memory and this

also became a critical year in

the history of the Assam Rifles.

The epicentre of this great

earthquake was located north

of Rima just across the border.

Therefore, though se vere

shocks were felt all over Assam,

they were of the maximum

intensity in the Mishimi and

Abor Hills of the Sadiya Frontier

Tract which were the closest

to the epicentre and also

close to the outposts of 2AR.

It came shortly after dark on

that fateful day, unleashing

its fury and devastation for

full five vicious minutes. The

effects on the mountains were

terrific. Rocks roared down

all around while mountain

sides were stripped off the

forest covering. Practically

every tributary of the Lohit

from the river downwards was

shocked by rock avalanches

forming innumerable lakes

which ultimately broke their

barriers causing devastating

floods in the low lying area of

the plains. Lower down, the

area in and around Sadiya

was severely shaken. The

earth cracked and opened

up at many places, damaging

roads and bridges. The floods

that followed immediately

washed away ferr y ghats

and marooned innumerable

villages. The National Highway

was submerged for miles on

end and with the railway line

damaged at various places,

Sadiya was completely cut off

from the rest of the world. The

Assam Rifles lines at Sadiya also

suffered severely. Most of the

barracks and family quarters

had either collapsed or become

77

View of a broken bridge during

the earthquake of 1950, Assam

unsafe due to severe damages.

Assam Rifles outposts up in

the hills reported damage to

buildings and properties in

varying degrees. At Riga and

Walong, the Assam Rifles posts

had completely collapsed. At

Denning all the buildings had

either collapsed or were badly

damaged and a new stream was

now flowing through the camp,

dividing it into two. There were

however no casualties. After

the initial shock was over, the

Assam Rifles recovered quickly

and the best in every man

came to surface. Wherever

the Assam Rifles men were

located in the affected areas,

they immediately began to

reconstruct buildings, roads

and tracks on their own

initiative. At Sadiya they put

shelters for their homeless

families within 24 hours of the

earthquake. Similarly all posts

started repairs to their buildings

and also work on tracks in a

desperate bid to link up with

the Battalion Headquarters

and with each other. The result

was that within a short time,

though after very heavy toil, the

Assam Rifles were able to open

all the important tracks in the

Mishimi and Abor Hills. Even as

the Assam Rifles themselves

struggled for existence, under

the impact of the devastation

caused by the earthquake,

the y rendered invaluable

help to the civil population.

Great tributes were paid to the

Assam Rifles for their splendid

work and here is the extract

from the statement of the then

Chief Minister of Assam, Shri

Bishnuram Medhi:

“The splendid work of the

Assam Ri f les dur ing th is

emergency deserves mention.

For days after the earthquake,

there was no news about the

three Assam Rifles and Military

parties marooned in the Lohit

Valley tracks at the time of

the disaster, and of those

who were standing guard at

some of the remote outposts

near our borders. It was due

to the heroism of the Officer-

in-charge of our last outpost

at Walong in the Lohit Valley

and his men, that contact was

at last established with these

marooned parties, as also with

Mr. Kingdon-Ward, the famous

botanist-cum-explorer, who

was trekking near the Tibetan

border at the time of the

earthquake”.

View of submerged town in Assam. The photos depict the extent of devastation caused by the

floods following the earthquake.

T h e W o r l d Wa rs h a d a

tremendous impact on the

Nagas. During World War I the

Naga members of the Labour

Corps brought money and

dresses, but World War II was

fought in Nagaland itself. Nagas

were introduced to modern

guerilla fighting which was

natural to them. The dumps of

arms and ammunition left by

the retreating Japanese Army

provided ready material to be

used against the security forces

later.

By the beginning of 1953, the

situation in Nagaland had

turned volatile. Phizo toured

the district and exhorted the

people not to pay taxes. Assam

Rifles men were ambushed and

killed, government buildings

and houses of loyal Nagas were

set on fire, telephone lines were

cut and bridges destroyed. One

of the worst acts of violence,

which took place in November

1954, was the massacre of fifty

seven villagers of Yimpang

by men of Pangsha Village in

Tuensang area in retaliation

of the murder of a dak runner,

who was the son of the village

headman of Pangsha.

On March 30, 1953, Jawaharlal

Nehru visited Kohima and

was greeted with derision.

That was another unhappy

episode. The Naga leaders

maintain that “the Indian

leader did not try to find out

the wishes of the Naga people.

The same year nine police

outposts were opened in the

Naga Hills. Action against the

NNC members was intensified.

Different Acts, including the

Assam Disturbed Areas Act

1955, were imposed to enable

the armed forces personnel to

carry out their difficult task. In

1956, army units were deployed

in important towns like Kohima

and Mokokchung.

A s ra i d s a n d a m b u s h e s ,

pa r t i c u l a r l y i n Tu e n s a n g

Division, continued despite the

induction of more platoons of

Assam Rifles and one battalion

of the UP Special Armed

NAGA UPRISING 1955

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Kohima, 1953

79

81

Constabulary, it was decided

to call in the Army.

By this time, the strength of

underground Nagas increased

and the situation was becoming

tense. As recurring acts of

Naga violence and the counter

violence of the state forces

increased, Assam Rifles was

given the task of bringing back

normalcy and securing the

atmosphere in the Naga areas.

The Force was equipped with

the ‘Assam Disturbed Areas Act’

imposed on Naga areas on 27

August 1955, and later called

the Armed Forces (Special

Powers) Act or AFSPA 1955,

later amended in 1972.

This resulted in a charged

atmosphere with increasing

mil itant activity and NNC

propaganda against India. The

Union Government declared

an official policy of handling

the Naga crisis more forcefully.

Nearly two divisions of the Army

along with several battalions of

the Assam Rifles were deployed

in Naga areas. The Assam Rifles

suffered many casualties but

also won a large number of

honours and awards, including

two Ashok Chakras Class-I.

Sub Maj Kharka Bahadur Limbu, AC

1962

Lt Col Man Bahadur Rai, AC

1962

Dalai Lama being received in India by the Assam Rifles after his escape from Tibet

Sporadic uprisings against

the Chinese for some years

culminated in a large-scale

rebellion in Lhasa in March

1959. The revolt was sought

to be crushed while the Dalai

Lama left Lhasa on 17th March

1959 for an unannounced

destination. The description

of His Hol iness ’s escape

from Lhasa in Dom Moraes’s

timeless book “The Revolt in

Tibet”, and particularly his

onward journey after crossing

over to India refers to Assam

Rifles for conducting him to

safety – “A strong detachment

of Assam riflemen was sent to

the border checkpost to ensure

the safety of His Holiness, who

was urged to lose no time in

leaving for Tawang. The North

East Frontier Agency was sealed

off, only accredited officials

and the local population being

allowed entry. Private traffic

was banned in the foothills

region of Assam State, and

identity cards were rigorously

checked. At Chuthangmu

the Dalai Lama’s bodyguard

surrendered their arms to the

Indian authorities, and the

Assam riflemen became the

Living Buddha’s escort…”

After crossing Kin-Ze-Mane,

His Holiness Dalai Lama was

received at Chuthangmu Post

by 5 Assam Rifles and the

people of Monyul on 31st March

1959. He then stayed for one

night each at Gorsam, Shakti,

Lumla and Thongleng. He was

received by the then abbot of

the Tawang Monastery and

Government officials on 5th

April 1959.

Another account refers to his

journey from Bomdila by a

jeep some seventy miles to

the foot of the hills, where

just across the border “was an

Assam Rifles post known as

“Foothills”, which controlled

the border separating NEFA

from the State of Assam. The

Assam Rifles escorted him to

the present official bungalow of

Deputy Commissioner Tawang

where he stayed for three

nights, “ringed by a unit of the

Assam Rifles”.

As a token of appreciation for

the services rendered by the

Assam Rifles, the Dalai Lama,

ver y graciously presented

his personal weapons to the

Assam Rifles. These weapons

are proudly displayed in the

Training Centre (ARTC&S)

a s m e m e n to e s . H e a l s o

bestowed on them his warm

and affectionate blessings,

which indeed seem to have

prophetically presaged their

exponential growth : “May your

luck increase to the size of a

mountain. May your fame be

such as to cover the whole sky.

May your knowledge become

vast and deep as the sea long

and healthy lives to you and

hope your work for others, will

be a success.”

ESCAPE OF

DALAI LAMA

83

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

“May your luck increase to the size

of a mountain. May your fame be

such as to cover the whole sky. May

your knowledge become vast and

deep as the sea, long and healthy

lives to you and hope your work for

others will be a success.”

His Holiness Dalai Lama’s Blessings for

Assam Rifles

An Indian Army Post immediately after the news of Chinese Aggression in the North East, 1962

However, the episode also

precipitated the beginning of

China’s antipathy for India and

a slew of posturings which still

rankle our bilateral relations.

After the Dalai Lama’s flight to

India and the highly provocative

Chinese statements against the

political asylum given to him in

India, it should have become

apparent that India’s Northern

b o r d e r s n e e d e d u r g e n t

attention. There was a report

prepared many years earlier in

1951, by the late Lt Gen Kalwant

Singh on the defence of our

Northern borders which was

ignored by the establishment

as was the Chinese rejection of

Panchsheel Agreement.

Towards the end of August 1959,

an Assam Rifles post at Longju

in the Subansiri Subdivision of

NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh)

and another one in Ladakh

were overrun by the Chinese

in an obvious show of force

to convey a message to India.

This set in motion the process

of giving some attention at last

to the border defence against

the Chinese threat.

Sometimes in early 1962,

orders came from Army HQ

for “Operation Onkar”, which

directed all Assam Rifles posts

to move forward, right upto the

border. They were to be backed,

of course, by the Army. The

idea was to establish the right

of possession on our territory

and to deter the Chinese from

moving forward and occupying

it, as was claimed by them.

As should have been expected,

the Chinese reacted. The first

serious action took place on

8 September 1962 when they

surrounded an Assam Rifles

post at Dhola on the Namka

Chu River in the North West

corner of Kameng. This set

the inevitable ball in motion.

On 25 August, the Chinese

ambushed an Assam Rifles

border patrol and killed three

of them. On 8 September 1962,

when the Dhola Post manned

by a sub unit of Assam Rifles

was encircled by the Chinese,

the men retaliated valiantly but

had to withdraw when they ran

short of ammunition.

These two incidents while

reaffirming the necessity for

physically occupying the Indo-

Tibetan Border also indicated

beyond doubt the Chinese

determination to evict them

by force to assert that the

territory was disputed. It was

evident therefore that Assam

Rifles would have to have

effective backing of the regular

Indian Army if they were to

hold on to their posts against

Chinese attacks. Consequently,

HQ 4 Infantry Division with two

brigades was moved into NEFA

and all Assam Rifles posts were

placed under the operational

control of this Division.

CHINESE AGGRESSION

87

Images from the Indo - China War in 1962

Following this, the Government

of India launched what later

came to be known as the

“For ward Policy” – which

entailed the establishment of

of Assam Rifles and Army posts

all along the Mcmahon Line.

Meanwhile an extra battalion,

17 Assam Rifles was raised to

relieve elements of the third

brigade of 4 Division located

in Sikkim.

The fateful year 1962 dawned

as the Army continued with its

hectic activity to implement

Operation Onkar, the codename

for the deployment of forward

posts along the Indo- Tibetan

Frontier. “The Assam Rifles

were in the forefront of the

deployment” writes Maj Gen DK

Palit, “strung out on or near the

border in self contained posts,

often on inaccessible heights,

unsupportable tactically, and

unmaintainable operationally,

except by air drops - which

of course depended on the

vagaries of the weather and

on the avai labi l i ty of the

aircraft … The Assam Rifles

had been allotted 34 new posts

to be manned by 24 platoons

squeezed from the Assam Rifles

battalions deployed in NEFA…

The Signals resources having

been stretched beyond limit,

there were frequent wireless

breakdowns and many posts

remained out of contact with

their headquarters…”

S e v e r e r e s o u r c e c r u n c h

and lack of preparedness

notwithstanding, the Assam

Rifles was tasked to delay

the advancing Chinese forces

so that the Indian Army could

establish its defence lines.

During this time and since

then, the Assam Rifles also

maintained their peacekeeping

role in the northern areas of

India in the face of growing tribal

unrest and insurgency. In this

environment the maintenance

of law and order, countering

insurgency and reassuring the

people of the region became

important tasks for the security

forces and initially they fell to

the Assam Rifles before the

Army assumed control, and

then later their experience

and goodwill in the region was

drawn upon in order to assist

the Army in conducting these

tasks.

Pakistan chose this period to

flare up the Tripura border. 6

Assam Rifles was ordered to

open five posts on Tripura’s

border with East Pakistan.

In September 1962, patrols

from Pakistan Rifles violated

the disputed territory, where

previously a status quo had

been accepted by both the

countries. The skirmishes

continued till 18 October, when

a ceasefire was arranged and

both sides withdrew from the

disputed area.

89

Indian troops forming a man-tow for artillery over rough mountain terrain, Indo - China War, 1962

Meanwhile, a force of two to

three hundred Chinese troops

surrounded the Assam Rifles’

position at Nam Ka Chu, in the

Thag La Ridge about seven

days march west of Tawang.

The situation escalated in no

time and on 20 October, two

Chinese brigades mounted a

massive attack. Simultaneous

attacks were mounted against

the Indian defensive posts

and localities in Ladakh and

Kashmir. In NEFA, the Assam

Rifles faced the brunt of the first

onslaught along all the invasion

routes, the Kameng Sector, the

Central Sector of NEFA and the

Walong Sector.

The contribution made by the

Assam Rifles to the overall war

effort in NEFA and the gallantry

of individual officers in the

war effort in NEFA, once again

proved the military value of

the Force. Some of the most

determined resistance offered

during the border battles were

by the men of Assam Rifles,

as at Khenzemane and in the

Walong Sector. In proportion

to the number of personnel

deployed under the Army,

both the casualty rate and

the awards for the gallantry

were among the highest. And

if it is remembered that the

Assam Rifles fought under less

favourable circumstances, their

performance becomes truly

remarkable.Furious battles

were fought leading to massive

casualties on the Chinese side,

but eventually the war was lost.

The American magazine, TIME,

facing the lack of preparedness

of the Indian Armed Forces,

wrote, “The Indian (Army)

needs almost everything except

courage.”

91

The Assam Rifles were not

directly involved in the Indo-

Pak War of 1965. However,

as the bulk of Army was

withdrawn from Nagaland and

Manipur, the responsibility for

the maintenance of law and

order in these states devolved

mostly on the Assam Rifles.

While maintaining vigil on the

border, 6 Assam Rifles had a

number of skirmishes with the

East Pakistan Rifles and the

mujahids. In 1971, the Force

was tasked to prevent the

infiltration of Mizo hostiles from

East Pakistan. Though Assam

Rifles did not have any direct

involvement during Indo-Pak

Wars of 1965 and 1971, it had

face-off with Chinese Army in

Sikkim, during this period.

There were two confrontations

with the Chinese in 1965. One

of the patrols from 17 Assam

Rifles challenged a Chinese

patrol that had intruded into

Sikkim. The Assam Rifles patrol

took up positions to prevent

the Chinese from advancing.

The Chinese also took up

positions and both the patrols

remained facing each other

from 9 AM that day to 4 AM the

next morning, after which the

Chinese patrol withdrew.

The first clash of arms occurred

on 12 December,1965, when

an Assam Rifles patrol of a

platoon strength under Lt MD

Uniyal came under heavy fire

from about 300 Chinese while

moving along the Chhamdo

hill. The patrol returned the fire.

However, the odds were against

the Assam Rifles patrol because

it soon ran out of ammunition.

Just then Lt I S Sirohi who was

patrolling from 17th Battalion’s

post at Giagong rushed to

the rescue, having heard the

sounds of firing. Sirohi engaged

the enemy from suitable fire

postions to enable Lt Uniyal’s

patrol to withdraw. In the

meantime, Capt GS Bajwa had

also rushed to the battle with

thirty men from Kerang Post.

Lt Uniyal and six others were

killed in this action.

ASSAM RIFLES DURING IND O - PAK WARS

India had its largest haul of Pakistani tanks when the offensive of Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division was blunted at the Battle

of Asal Uttar, which took place on 10 September near Khemkaran. The biggest tank battle of the war came in the form of the

Battle of Chawinda, the largest tank battle in history after World War II. Pakistan’s defeat at the Battle of Asal Uttar hastened

the end of the conflict.

Chaukan Pass has been noted

by Col LW Shakespear as one

of the most inaccessible and

inhospitable areas in the

erstwhile NEFA (now Arunachal

Pradesh). Several expeditions

undertaken since 1885 had to

be abandoned because of the

harsh terrain and weather. In the

wake of the Chinese ingressions,

this area was perceived as

one of tremendous strategic

importance. An attempt was

made in June 1960 by Jemadar

Dam Bahadur Limbu of 7 Assam

Rifles but had to be abandoned

due to bad weather. Major

Sumer Singh made yet another

attempt to reach Chaukan Pass

in February 1961. Modifying the

earlier routes and supported by

airdrops, the column reached a

point just 22 kms North East of

Chaukan Pass. Here he found

a village named Sidi which he

renamed Gandhigram and he

set about clearing a Dakota

landing strip. However the

column could not proceed

further due to the monsoons.

In October 1961, the Inspector

General of Assam Rifles (IGAR),

Major General Ajit Singh Guraya

decided to lead an expedition

to the Chaukan Pass himself.

Accordingly, an expedition

nicknamed Sri j i tga I I was

organized to reconnoiter land

routes to the Chaukan and

Hpungan Passes to establish an

Assam Rifles post at a suitable

place from where foreign

intrusion could be checked.

This massive effort led to the

taming of this unexplored area.

This expedition justified Verrier

Elwin’s portrayal of the Assam

Rifles being “pioneers of every

advance into the interior” and

was filmed by the Government.

In his recommendations, the

IGAR brought out the strategic

importance of this area and

the need for populating it

by encouraging settlements

preferably of ex servicemen

from Assam Rifles. The area

was found to be of tremendous

economic potential with its

fertile soil, abundant growths of

good quality cane, bamboo and

timber, and traces of bitumen,

coal and sulphur. The IGAR’s

socio-strategic vision was to

set up a model village with

a market and some centrally

controlled projects such as

a saw mill, poultry farming,

piggeries and dairy farms.

The region was inhabited by the

Lisu tribe. The Lisu originally

migrated from Myanmar and

were ‘discovered’ in 1961 by

Major General Guraya during

his Chaukan Pass expedition,

leading to the settlement

of 192 families of Nepali ex-

servicemen in the valley in 1965.

Maintained by Air Force sorties

throughout the year, Assam

Rifles share their own rations

with the villagers when the

weather prevents the flights.

An Advance Landing Ground at

Vijaynagar was inaugurated in

November 2011.

CHAUKAN PASS EXPEDITION

Mahatma Gandhi’s bust at Gandhigram

at Sidi

93

EVOLUTION OF THE

CREST

The Force started with only

750 men in 1835 and ti l l

India’s Independence in 1947,

consisted of only five battalions

which formed part of the Civil

Police under the Inspector

General of Police, Assam.

Independence of the country

brought a plethora of changes

and in 1947, a full fledged

Inspector General of Assam

Rifles was appointed to head

the Force.

In 1950, the disposition of the

Force was : 1 Assam Rifles in

Lushai Hills, 2 Assam Rifles and

5 Assam Rifles on the Northern

Border facing Tibet (China), 3

Assam Rifles deployed to take

care of the Naga Areas, both in

the state of Assam and in NEFA

and 4 Assam Rifles in Manipur.

At this time the old Tripura

Rifles was being reorganized

into 6 Assam Rifles.

In October 1950, the occupation

of Tibet by China led to the

exposure of the Northern

Frontier open to a potential

Chinese threat . Therefore

in December 1950, a high

powered committee under

the chairmanship of Maj Gen

Himmat Sinh, the then Deputy

Defence Minister with Maj

General Kulwant Singh, the

Chief of General Staff was set

up to examine the defence of

India’s Northern and North

Eastern borders from Sikkim

through NEFA, and from Assam

to the Burma border. The

Committee considering the

broader aspect of roles of the

Assam Rifles, its place in Assam’s

administration, force level

and internal communication

stipulated that the Assam Rifles

would be the most suitable

paramilitary agency to take on

the commitment in the North

East.

Based on the recommendation

of the Defence Committee, in

addition to 6 Assam Rifles,

which was already in the

process of being raised out of

the erstwhile Tripura Rifles,

7 Assam Rifles was raised in

October 1952 followed by the

raising of 8 Assam Rifles in

September 1955.

In the meantime, the rank of

Inspector General Assam Rifles

was upgraded to Brigadier in

1949 and in 1955 Headquarters

1 Sector, later called Manipur

Range Assam Rifles and now

Headquarter 9 Sector, was

raised under the command of

Deputy Inspector General, Col

AS Bedi.

The growing expectations

as well as discontentment

amongst tribals in the North

East coupled with political and

social changes in independent

India was leading to unrest

in various parts of the North

East i.e. in Nagaland, Manipur,

Tripura and Assam.

In 1955, insurgency started in

Nagaland and by 1956 it was

apparent that insurgency was

likely to continue and probably

would increase in intensity. The

government thus decided to

raise a number of Assam Rifles

battalions on a permanent

basis at the rate of two new

battalions per year from 1956

EXPANSION OF ASSAM RIFLES

95

to 1959. Thus, by 1959 the

Force had a total seventeen

battalions, which after raising

were deployed in various parts

of the North East.

Meanwhile, improvement in

firepower, communications and

administrative arrangements

were also made. The centralized

system of supply of stores, arms,

ammunition and equipment

through Army Ordnance Depots

also commenced. To meet the

growing communication needs,

an Assam Rifles Signals Unit

(ARSU) was raised in Shillong. In

1957 two Pioneer Companies,

out of which only one remains

and now designated as the

Assam Rifles Construction

and Maintenance Company

(ARC & MC), were raised for

the purpose of construction

as well as maintenance of

operational tracks as well as

construction of temporar y

accommodation for troops.

The rank of Inspector General

Assam Rifles was upgraded to

Major General in 1958. In order

to exercise effective command

and control, more controlling

headquarters were needed.

Thus, Headquarters Nagaland

Range (South) (the present

Headquarter 5 Sector) was

raised in April 1959 followed

by Mizoram Range (the present

Headquarter 23 Sector) in

September 1960 and Nagaland

Range (North) (the present

Headquarter 7 Sector) in July

1963.

In 1961, a formation sign for the

Assam Rifles was introduced.

After the Indo China War of

1962, in which again the Force

proved i ts worth, further

expansion took place. In 1965

– 66, 18 Assam Rifles and 19

Assam Rifles were raised. On 1

August 1965, the administration

of NEFA was transferred from

the Ministry of External Affairs

to the Ministry of Home Affairs

and to that of the Assam Rifles.

In 1966, there was a sudden

outbreak of insurgency in

Mizoram and two more Assam

Rifles battalions, 20 Assam

Rifles and 21 Assam Rifles were

raised in 1968. In 1968, all units

of the Force were equipped

with a new family of small

arms i.e. 7.62 mm Rifles, 7.62

mm Light Machine Guns and 9

mm Sten Guns. The old World

War II vintage Radio Sets were

discarded and better Radio

Sets made indigenously were

introduced. By the beginning

of 1971 the Key Location Plans

of all units started getting

finalized. In October 1972, the

Inspector General Assam Rifles

was appointed the Ex-Officio

security advisor to the North

East Council. This appointment

continued to be held by the

later Director Generals of Assam

Rifles till 2013.

When the cadre review of the

Army was carried out in 1979,

the rank of the Inspector

General Assam Rif les was

raised to Lieutenant General

and the designation changed

to Director General. The first

Director General of the Force

was Lt Gen Sushil Kumar, PVSM.

The Assam Rifles expanded

further f rom twenty one

ba t ta l i o n s to t h i r t y o n e

ba t ta l i o n s b et w e e n 1 9 8 5

and 1988 and some more

controlling headquarters were

raised including Headquarter

Inspector General Assam Rifles

(North) on 15 May 1985 under

the command of a Maj General;

Headquarter Tripura Range (the

present Headquarter 21 Sector)

in July 1985; Headquarter B

Range (the present Headquarter

10 Sector) in September 1986

and Headquarters Assam

and Arunachal Range (the

p r e s e n t H e a d q u a r t e r 2 5

Sector) in October 1986. All

Range Headquarters were

commanded by Army Officers

of the rank of Brigadiers on

deputation. Simultaneously,

with the expansion of the Force,

many ancillary establishments

came up. Assam Rifles Training

Centre and School started in

January 1959 in Misamari and

was shifted to Dimapur in 1962.

In the year 2001 – 2002, two

more battalions were raised.

The turn of the century also

saw the induction of 5.56 mm

INSAS and 7.62 mm Assault

Rif les, Automatic Grenade

Launchers, Sniper Rifles, Riot

Control Grenade Launchers,

Global Positioning System

(GPS), Night Vision Devices,

Bullet Proof vehicles, jackets

and patkas and many other

new generation equipment of

that era.

Unl ike the Indian Army’s

Infantry units that are rotated

from field to peace stations, the

Assam Rifles followed a system

of permanent locations for its

units. However, this has been

reviewed from time to time

and the system of periodic

turnover for AR Battalions

mulled over and executed on an

experimental basis. The Force

now follows periodic rotation

of its battalions between four

grades of stations. The Force,

however, continues to be

deployed in the North East in

entirety.

97

View of the DGAR Headquarters, Laitkor, Shillong.

The highest Headquarters of

the Force, “Directorate General

Assam Rifles” is located at a

small hill town called Laitkor in

Shillong. It is the only Central

Para Military Force which has

its headquarters away from

the capital (New Delhi). For

coordination with Ministry of

Home Affairs under which the

Force is functioning, the Force

maintains a Liaison Office in

New Delhi supervised by an

Army Officer of the rank of

Colonel on deputation.

The Assam Rifles today stands

at over sixty six thousand

force strength. It has three

Headquarters Inspectorate

Generals – North, South and East

located at Kohima (Nagaland),

I m p h a l ( M a n i p u r ) a n d

Srikona (Assam) respectively

commanded by officers of the

rank of Major Generals. Under

these are the twelve Sector

Headquarters commanded by

Brigadiers, administering the

troops deployed on ground

as part of the forty six Assam

Rifles battalions spread over

the entire North East . The

battalions are commanded by

Army Colonels on deputation

to Assam Rifles. The bulk of

these battalions continue to be

deployed for counter insurgency

in the hinterland while some

of the battalions stand guard

covering over one thousand six

hundred kilometers of the Indo

- Myanmar Border.

T h e e q u i p p i n g a n d

maintenance of the Force,

w h i c h wa s ea r l i e r b e i n g

managed through the Army

Ordnance Depots is now being

carried out through the four

Maintenance Groups Assam

Rifles. The communications

and Information Technology

cover is also being internally

managed through the Assam

Rifles Signal staff and the

Assam Rifles Signal Unit. All

logistics support is being

handled through a chain of

Headquarters right down to the

posts. Thus the present scheme

makes the Assam Rifles a self

sustaining body funded purely

through the Ministry of Home

Affairs. The selection, training

and induction of troops is being

handled in a limited manner by

the Force while the bulk of its

requirements is met through

the Staff Selection Commission.

THE ORGANISATION

TODAY

99

Nepalese, viz Limbus, Rais

and Moormis. Meanwhile, the

composition of each battalion

was made three fourth of

Gurkhas and approximately

one fourth of Jaruas.

After World War I, recruitment

in the Force was standardised.

The Gurkhas formed the base of

the Force and constituted about

seventy per cent. Garhwalis

and Kumaonis constituted

another twenty per cent and

Jaruas, Lushais, Nagas, Kukis

constituted the remaining ten

per cent. It will, therefore, be

seen that hundred per cent of

the Force was recruited from

the various hill tribes of India,

who fitted well with the local

tribals of the North East and

had Nepali as the Regimental

Language (certain technical

and special ised categor y

of personnel were from the

other parts of the country). In

1982 the recruitment policy

was changed to meet the

reservations as promulgated

by the Government of India.

Apart from this the Force today

follows about twenty percent

of induction being reserved

for the North Eastern states

and the balance from the rest

of the country. The Junior

Manning Norms / Composition

of officers

Initially when the Force was

raised, civilian officers of the

district concerned were in

charge of various Levies and

Militias. Once the designation

was changed to Military Police,

police officers were sent to

command the battal ions.

However, the nature of the

duties of these battalions

was such that police officers

were not found suitable and

hence procedure of sending

Army Officers on deputation to

Military Police Battalions (the

forbearers of Assam Rifles)

from 1884 onwards started. At

present the Force is officered

mostly by the Indian Army

deputationists with about

twenty percent strength of

officers being made up by the

Assam Rifles Cadre officers. The

Force is headed by an officer of

the rank of Lieutenant General

on deputation from the Army

and designated as Director

General Assam Rifles.

The first Inspector General of

the Assam Rifles at the time

of independence till 14 Aug

1948 was Mr HG Bartley, CIE, IP

while the first Director General

was Lieutenant General Sushil

Kumar, PVSM from September

1979 to December 1981.

The present Director General

is the twenty ninth Inspector

/ Director General of the Force

since independence.

Junior Commissioned Officers/

Other Ranks

The first unit of the Force raised

in 1835 as the Cachar Levy,

had its entire strength made

up of draftees from Bengal.

The “Jorhat Militia” raised in

1838 had mostly local Shans.

During 1850, Captain (later

Major) Butler (the second

commandant of the Cachar

Levy) wanted a more suitable

lot for the job, hence he started

the intake of Nepalese, Shans

and Cacharies to replace the

existing soldiers.

From 1850 to 1871, attempts

were made to enlist various

tribes of the North East in the

Force. However, only Jaruas

and Cacharies were found

suitable. In 1891, a Recruiting

Depot was opened at Purnea,

near Darjeeling Hills (later

shi fted to Darjeel ing ) for

the recruitment of Eastern

101

Commissioned Officers and the Other Ranks of the Force thus are purely from the Assam Rifles with very few

deputations from the Army. The rank structure being followed by Assam Rifles is similar to that of the other para

military forces.

COU NTER INSU RGENCY,BORDER GUA RDING A ND PEACE K EEPING

pockets of civil populace and

vested interests. An important

adjunct of Counter Terrorist

operations has been the launch

of meaningful civic action

projects.

Some of the notable operations

in recent past are being covered

briefly in this chapter.

The credibi l i ty of Assam

Rifles in counter insurgency

is based on a comprehensive

strategy which had evolved

in the wilds of the North East

and tested in various national

and international theatres.

The Assam Rifles leadership

adopted a “multi-pronged

approach against a multi-

dimensional threat,” that is,

a comprehensive approach

much before the western

world could discover and

emphasise an indirect military

approach, with ‘the military

taking a more supporting role

in a predominantly ideological,

pol i t ical , and diplomatic

response.’

A s s a m R i f l e s h a s b e e n

i n t h e f o r e f r o n t o f t h e

counterinsurgency operations

in the Northeast - effectively

coordinating polit ical and

m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i e s a n d

e f fe c t i v e l y ba l a n c i n g t h e

mil itar y and non mil itar y

i n s t r u m e n t s o f C o u n t e r

I n s u rge n c y. D u r i n g t h e i r

long service they have found

themselves operating in various

theatres, including Sri Lanka

and Jammu and Kashmir.

In its chequered history, it

has met with unprecedented

success, displaying sagacious

audacity and adaptibility rarely

paralleled in the history of

Counter Insurgency.

The analysis of each operation

reveals care and precision in

terms of effective domination

and hard intelligence despite

a hostile environment, viz,

adverse local media, partisan

105

was adorned with a Shaurya

Chakra in this operation.

In another heavy gunfight in

January 2014, faced by another

column of the same battalion,

Maj Vikas Kumar, Rifleman

Chamanlal and Sub Sitaram

Pradhan sucessfully neutralised

two NSCN (IM) cadres and

apprehended four with several

weapons, ammunition and

cash.

A major operation which is

regarded as a landmark was ‘Op

Hifazat’ launched in Manipur,

d i s p l a y e d c o n s u m m a t e

leadership and ingenuity, and

the efficiency of effective and

vibrant intelligence network.

Led by Maj D Sreeram Kumar

of 32 Assam Rifles, 12 militants

w e re e l i m i n a te d a n d 2 3

terrorists apprehended in this

operation. 12 weapons were

recovered and Maj Sreeram

Kumar was awarded the Ashok

Chakra.

‘Operation Parinda’, was carried

out by troops of 1 Assam Rifles in

the face of hostile natives in May

2013, who had granted shelter

to the militants of NSCN (IM).

Two militants were killed and

two apprehended following a

gun battle in an inhabited area.

Both the militants were killed at

close range which speaks of the

raw courage and the caution

of the young leadership who

risked their lives to get close

to the armed militants. Maj MS

Ghumman of 1 Assam Rifles

NORTH EAST INDIA

23 AK 47 rifles, one LMG and

CBAR of US origin, to name

a few. This was followed up

by ‘ Op Blue Chip” in March

2013, which was led by the

Commandant of 26 Assam

Rifles, Col Prethyush Pillai and

Maj C Vidhyadharan who had

earlier led the ‘Op Ujjwal’. It

led to four apprehensions and

recovery of a whopping 23 AK

47 rifles, in addition to one

CBAR, one LMG and a huge

quantity of ammunition.

Massive recoveries were also

recorded by 16 Assam Rifles in

the foothills of Chingdai Ridge

in January 2014. This was

followed by the recovery of 40

kgs of Ganja in Jalenbung.

It is quite palpable in each

operation that the junior

leadership is not just a trigger

happy band, but is guided

by caution and discretion to

avoid collateral damages and

inconvenience to the common

masses.

Another five militants were

apprehended in March 2014,

in “Operation Kunsa”, in an

operation based on hard

intelligence gathered by the

same battalion.It was led by

the JCOs of the unit.

A slew of operations carried out

by 1 Assam Rifles reveals a well

coordinated effort by all the

sub units. In “Operation Anand”,

one of the injured militants

surrendered on the spot by

raising his hand. Eyewitnesses

say the militant was spared

even while the encounter was

on and administered first aid by

the RMO of the battalion.

The contemporary history of

the Assam Rifles is replete

with se veral instances of

compassion and sympathy

sometimes at great risk to the

officers and men.

In October 2014, 2 Assam

Rifles and Thoubal Police

Commandos were able to

apprehend one hardcore OGW

of PLA who transported the

IED utilised during the blast in

Imphal. Follow up operation

involved interrogat ion of

this OGW which led to the

apprehension of more OGWs

and one IED fabrication expert

forming the IED transportation

and planting network of PLA.

Further interrogation of these

apprehended persons revealed

the cache of the remaining IEDs.

The battalion launched another

search operation and three

crude remotely controlled IEDs

were recovered. This relentless

operation called ‘Op Blasthunt’,

spanned over 96 hours and

led to the busting of the IED

network of the PLA which

potentially saved numerous

lives.

Another successful operation

b a s e d o n p r o f e s s i o n a l

processing of int , was ‘Op

Songdai II’, launched by Capt

Aby Mathew of 26 AR on

the Indo-Myanmar Border

in December 2014 which led

to the arrest of three arms

traffickers from Myanmar.

‘Op Ujjawal’ was another

s p e c ta c u l a r o p e ra t i o n i n

which hard intelligence and

the presence of mind led to

phenomenal recoveries of

weapons and ammunition;

107

Recoveries and kills in Jammu & Kashmir

the ‘Chief of Army Staff Unit

Citation’ as well as a ‘Silver

Salver’ from the Governor of

J&K. The battalion earned 71

awards including a Sena Medal.

7 Assam Rifles operated in

J&K from April 1990 to May

1992. In their 25 month stay

in J&K, the battalion killed

200 ANEs, apprehended 222

and 74 ANEs surrendered. The

battalion captured 28 RPGs,

29 UMGs or GPMGs, 409 Rifles

AK 47/ 56 and 175 pistols/

revolvers along with 1.08 lakh

rounds of AK 47, 5,144 rounds

of pistol/revolver ammunition,

465 hand grenades, 6 anti-

tank ammunitions, 77 anti-

personnel mines and many

o t h e r t y p e s o f a s s o r te d

ammunition and explosives.

The battalion’s achievements

were outstanding by any

standard. Major General OP

Kaushik, VSM, GOC 28 Infantry

Division extolled the unit for

being “singularly responsible

for eradicating the terrorist

influence from Kupwara Sector”.

The battalion earned 92 awards

including two KCs, one SC, ten

SMs, one VSM. The battalion

In 1990, the situation in many

parts of J&K had considerably

worsened and addit ional

forces were required. As the

situation in the North East was

relatively stable, the Central

Government decided to use

Assam Rifles battalions in J&K.

Eight Assam Rifles battalions

viz. 3, 7, 10, 18, 21, 23, 26 and

28 were deployed in J&K from

April 1990 to January 1998.

This period was a golden era

for the Force as all battalions

o f t h e Fo r ce p e r f o r m e d

creditably. It is a record in itself

that out of eight Assam Rifles

battalions employed in J&K,

two battalions were awarded

the `COAS Unit Citation’ and

one battalion was awarded the

Northern Army Commander’s

‘Unit Appreciation’ for their

s u p e r l a t i v e p e r fo r m a n ce .

Performance of each Assam

Rifles battalion in J&K is being

covered in brief.

26 Assam Rifles was the first

unit of the Force to be deployed

in “Operation Rakshak”. On 18

September 1990, based on an

information of infiltration by a

huge group of Pakistan trained

anti national elements in

general area Talel, the battalion

carried out a counter infiltration

operation, initially with two

companies and later with an

additional company. During

counter infiltration operations,

the troops tracked the militants

in thick forests and engaged

them in gun battles at different

locations. The Intelligence Cell

and Interrogation Team of the

battalion did a commendable

job by extracting useful and

accurate information from the

apprehended ANEs which led

to a series of operations. One

militant was killed and 90

Pakistani trained militants were

apprehended. The recoveries

included 142 sophisticated

w e a p o n s i n c l u d i n g R L s ,

GPMGs, 7.62 mm and AK-56

rifles, pistols, and also a very

large quantity of ammunition.

The unit rescued Shri Puran

Chand, Deputy Superintendent

of Police, J&K Armed Police,

after about 75 days of captivity

from village Dara in a joint

operation with the Army. 26

Assam Rifles was awarded

JAMMU & KASHMIR

109

After elimination of Abu Nandal, a PAK militant of HUA in Jammu & Kashmir

2 1 A s s a m R i f l e s w a s

responsible for the kil l ing

of 17 (including five foreign)

ANEs in various encounters,

26 apprehensions and six

surrenders. Huge quantity of

arms and ammunition were

also recovered by them in the

Kupwara Sector.

A total of 41 weapons and huge

number of ammunition were

recovered from Guripura village

in Kashmir in an operation

c o d e n a m e d “ O p e r a t i o n

Cloudburst” in 1995 led by Capt

Raghuraj Singh of 10 Assam

Rifles. In addition, 23 militants

belonging to the Jammu and

Kashmir Hizbul Mujahideen

had surrendered before the

unit.

also received the Chief of Army

Staff Unit Citation as well as a

Silver Salver presented by His

Excellency General KVK Rao

(Retd), the Governor of J&K.

23 Assam Rifles operated in J&K

from July 1994 till December

1996. The unit was deployed

in general area Bhaderwah

Tehsil of Doda District under

HQ 4 Sector. The battalion

performed commendably in

many operations in which

many ANEs were killed and

apprehended with arms and

ammunition. The battalion’s

biggest catch was on 11 August

1996, when Ashan Ahmed, self

styled Deputy Provincial Chief

of Hizbul Mujabidin (HuM) for

Jammu Region, the highest

ranked militant was killed . This

success led to the unconditional

surrender of three more ANEs

along with their weapons

and other warlike stores. The

battalion liquidated 19 ANEs

and recovered a huge cache

of warlike stores during their

tenure in J & K.

18 AR assisted in successful

conduct of State Assembly

elections and captured a

large quantity of arms and

ammunition.

3 Assam Rifles met with

outstanding success in the

‘Seek, Encounter and Search’

operation on 10-11 August 1996

at Village Wurapash in Tehsil

Ganderbal. Five hard core ANEs

of which four were Pakistanis,

were killed. One Pakistani was

identified as Mudassar Jat alias

Saif of District Bahawalpur

(Punjab, Pakistan), who was

a Major of the ISI and was

working as their commander

for Srinagar District.

111

Assam Rifles has been deployed

for counter insurgency in North

Eastern states, as well as for

border guarding role along

Indo-Myanmar Border. The

companies are deployed on

all routes of ingress/egress to

check infiltration, smuggling of

arms, ammunition, drugs, fake

currency notes etc. The major

tasks of border management

include border security, border

development and monitoring

of trans border trade. Border

security involves patroling

and effective sur veil lance

through usage of state-of-art

surveillance equipment for

effective check on infiltration.

Border development involves

infrastructural development

including maintenance and

improvement of roads and

other means of communication.

Assam Rifles is also mandated

to facilitate trans border trade

at Pangsau Pass, Moreh and

Zokhawatar.

Presently, out of the 46 Assam

R i f l e s ba t ta l i o n s , 1 5 a re

deployed in border guarding

role and the balance 31 are

operating in Counter Insurgency

tasks in all the North Eastern

states except in Meghalaya.

B ORDER GUARDING

113

tasks assigned to them with

tremendous dedication and

professional zeal. Their conduct

of civic affairs and maintenance

of peace and tranquility in

the most volatile area of Sri

Lanka speaks volumes of their

competence and devotion

to duty. The firm and tactful

handling of numerous difficult

situations earned them kudos

from one and all.”

In 1987 when the peace keeping

operations got prolonged in Sri

Lanka and the IPKF required

reinforcements, they were

joined by three Assam Rifles

battalions between 1988-90

namely, 22 Assam Rifles, 23

Assam Rifles and 26 Assam

Rifles.

The 26 Assam Rifles operated in

Batticaloa and Amparai areas

under 57 Mountain Division.

23 Assam Rifles in Tellipalai as

part of 54 Infantry Division and

22 Assam Rifles in Trincomalee

under 72 Infantry Brigade. The

boys quickly picked up Tamil,

and mastered watermanship

to chase the insurgents across

lagoons and fight them at close

quarters. The performance

of the Force in Sri Lanka

can be gauged from a letter

of appreciation written by

Brigadier (later Major General)

Shivaji Patil , UYSM to the

Commandant 22 Assam Rifles:

“The tasks assigned to the

Force in Sri Lanka as part of

IPKF were varied and unique

in nature requiring a ver y

high standard of discipline,

tactical as well as professional

competence and leadership.

Even though they had never

performed such duties before,

they quickly learned their

new job. They performed all

PEACE KEEPING

115

HNP on 27 - 28 Aug 14, during

which they apprehended the

most wanted criminal of Haiti.

So far, five FPU-2 contigents of

Assam Rifles have successfully

performed their duties at Haiti

and the sixth contigent is

presently deployed with effect

from July 2015.

The Assam Rifles contingent

has been deployed in Haiti

since June 2010, as part of the

Formed Police Unit-2 (FPU-

2) under MINUSTAH (United

Nations Stabilization Mission

in Haiti) on one year rotation

basis. The role of the Contingent

is to serve with UN as per UN

mandate to ensure a secure

and stable environment for the

government of Haiti in order to

promote the political process

fo r s t re n g t h e n i n g H a i t i ’s

governmental institutions and

rule of law.

The Contingent of Assam Rifles

has won many accolades for its

exceptional performance in the

UN Mission, the latest being a

special operation which was

conducted at Jamaique IDP

Camp along with UNPOL and

HAITI MISSION

care), facilitating employment

programs for youth, and

improving basic infrastructure

(e.g. building roads). The

preceding chapters testify to

the evolution of a professional

culture with a versatile range of

skills commensurate with the

expanding role of soldiers.

Assam Rifles has experienced all

types of insurgency and counter-

insurgency in variegated terrain

amongst various socio-ethnic

populations. Their capability

over the last 180 years, has

been calibrated by local factors

which have groomed them to

operate relatively appropriately

in unfamiliar, ambiguous, and

d a n ge ro u s e n v i ro n m e n t s .

They have exhibited great

flexibility and self-adapting

mechanisms in every realm of

warfare, by deftly alternating

between peacekeeping and

w a r f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .

Over the long course of their

Counter Insurgency campaign,

the Assam Rifles have been

involved in opening schools,

providing training in new

t e c h n o l o g i e s , d e l i v e r i n g

social services (e.g. medical

CONCLUSION

117

TRAINING

123

The Assam Rifles Training

Centre was established in

Missamari in June 1959 and

later, in the wake of the Chinese

aggression, shifted to Dimapur

in 1962. It was renamed Assam

Rifles Training Centre and

School (ARTC & S) in September

1994.

Since its inception, the School

has constantly evolved in

stature and strength, in keeping

with the changing dynamics of

insurgency and terrorism in

the country. The School has

continuously incorporated

all the lessons learnt during

such operations and has

painstakingly kept its training

curriculum contemporary.

The ARTC & S is poised to

cross a landmark milestone

in its history as it gears up to

train the two thousand strong

women soldiers in a phased

manner with the first lot under

training from April 2015.

The Commandant of the

Centre is an officer of the rank

of a Brigadier, assisted by a

Deputy of the rank of Colonel,

both on deputation from the

Indian Army. The Centre has

two training battalions headed

by Colonels with a capacity of

training almost two thousand

recruits at any time. The ARTC &

S is designated by the Ministry

of Home Affairs as the Centre of

Excellence for Jungle Warfare

and the Centre & School boasts

of excellence in all fields with

most modern training facilities,

next generation communication

and Information Technology

i n f ra s t r u c t u r e a n d m o s t

relevant teaching methods

aimed at catapult ing the

rifleman as a soldier of the

future.

TRAINING AT THE ASSAM RIFLES

TRAINING CENTRE

AND SCHO OL

127

The training is directed towards inculcating self discipline as a virtue in every soldier. Will power,

self denial, self control and a value aided code of conduct are the defining pillars of self discipline.

There is an emphasis on consistency of conduct - on and off parade- with or without supervision.

The primary role of the Assam Rifles Training Centre and School is to train recruits in basic and

specialist trades. Additionally, it provides on the job training to junior leaders and trained soldiers

and conducts orientation courses for all newly posted Army Officers on deputation to the Assam

Rifles.

The Centre also trains the Commando, Firing, Equestrian, Boxing, Judo and Karate teams for the

competitions at national level, the contingents for the Republic Day Parade and those selected for

UN Mission and various competitions related to games and sports.

In a noteworthy development, the Assam Rifles has commenced induction of women recruits for

combat roles from April 2015.

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

PIONEERS IN JUNGLE WARFARE

A film held by the Imperial

War Museum dated March

1944, shows the Assam Rifles

troops (later identified as 2

Assam Rifles) at Sadiya in

Assam, engaged in multiple

activities of jungle warfare.

The synopsis describes various

activities of jungle warfare and

survival training and states,

“During the Second World

War in Burma, the Assam

Rifles formed the nucleus of ‘V

Force’, raised to raid Japanese

communications, carry out

special reconnaissance and

foster resistance groups. Other

units fought at Kohima and

some were even trained as

paratroopers. Since then the

Assam Rifles were the first

Force of the Union in action

during the 1962 Sino-Indian

War and have been engaged

in counter insurgency in some

of India’s North Eastern tribal

areas.” Col LW Shakespear has

recorded , with a great sense

of pride, that “1 Assam Rifles

had introduced jungle training

in its training cycle in 1941 and

indeed produced a pamphlet

on this subject for use in the

entire Force.”

The relevance of the Assam

Rifles Training Centre and

School has grown manifold

with the mushrooming of

small and big insurgent /

terrorist groups in the country

and worldwide. With its vast

expertise in counter insurgency

and counter terrorism training,

it has truly come into its own

as a centre of excellence in

such operations. Soldiers

receive training in identifying

improvised explosive devices

(IED), jungle survival, counter

terrorism, and interrogation

techniques.

The training focuses on physical

fitness, reflex firing techniques

and tactical lessons. The

module for training is practical

or iented with number of

lectures, discussions, case

studies, sand model exercises

and outdoor exercises. Live

situations are painted during

the outdoor exercises to train

the soldiers to take instant

decisions on the spur of the

moment. The troops are taught

to live in difficult and hostile

terrain, eat and sleep like the

guerrillas and strike as silently

as the they do.

The inherent characteristic

of insurgency in North East

India is small scale low profile

act iv i t ies , with the main

insurgent bases located across

the border. Hit and run tactics

executed by small units force

a large deployment of armed

outfits to counter them. The

efficacy of deploying a large

force under such circumstances

is suspect as it is unlikely to

produce desired results. Thus

learning to operate in small

teams, studying the pattern of

the militants, establishing an

intelligence network, knowing

their traditional sanctuaries,

maintaining the element of

surprise, selecting the site for

counter ambush, observing

the discipline of when exactly

to open fire, knowing field craft

and jungle craft well enough

to remain undetected, and

improvising within a given

situation, is the kind of stuff

that a soldier is trained for.

Jungle operations test soldiers

to their l imit which need

special tactics, techniques and

procedures. In this scenario

soldiers are given physical

drills and common-sense tips

on how to survive in the jungle

by studying its characteristics,

dense vegetation with limited

visibility, crisscross of streams

& rivers, heat & humidity, few

roads, numerous tracks and

limited communication.

The normal schedule is about

thirty six weeks, during which

a soldier undergoes strenuous

drills that make him conversant

with guerrilla warfare and low-

intensity conflicts. The training

module is non-conventional

and once a soldier undergoes

training here, he can face

deadly situations anywhere

in the world in all-weather &

terrain, eat and sleep like a

guerrilla and strike as silently as

a guerrilla. The training module

includes lectures, seminars and

mock operations in the rugged

jungles. The trainees are also

exposed to media interaction,

civic actions plus fraternisation,

human rights and collection of

intelligence and their analysis.

Soldiers undergoing a course

here not only go through

rigorous physical training, but

also tough mental training

through lectures and problems

posed by instructors of the

129

school. An important part of the

training is to avoid collateral

damage as much as possible.

With precision shooting, the

soldiers engage in exercises

where live rounds are used to

shoot down mock terrorists

inside homes and stores

without hitting the civilian

population.

R e c r u i t t ra i n i n g m e r g e s

divergent trainees often from

different levels of culture and

society into a useful team.

A recruit is ‘ issued’ basic

provisions - food, shelter,

clothing - and equipment

according to the requirements

of the training and taught

responsible management of

these provisions. The training

constitutes field craft, battle

craft , drill, physical fitness,

weapon training, reflexive and

reactive shooting. Weapon

training incorporates actual

firing experience and virtual

simulation systems including

Small Arms Training Simulator

(DRONA) and Infantry Weapon

E f f e c t S i m u l a t o r S y s t e m

(IWESS). Vehicle simulators and

training mines are also used.

The school boasts of excellent

training areas, training facilities,

with multiple firing ranges.

The ARTC & S also conducts

specialist training for technical

trades, clerks, cipher personnel

and signal operators. The ethos

of the training is imbibed

through teaching of history of

the Force and the constitutional

p r o v i s i o n s u n d e r w h i c h

Assam Rifles operates. The

programmes include training

of the Junior Commissioned

O f f i ce r s a n d o r i e n ta t i o n

capsules for the Army officers

posted on deputation to the

Assam Rifles.

Being earmarked as the nodal

agency for counter insurgency

training , the ARTC&S also trains

members of other para military

and police forces including

those from some of the friendly

foreign countries from time to

time. Apart from this, it has

also trained various batches on

commando operations, basic

recruit training and handling of

specialist weapons and special

operations.

131

The Assam Rifles, like any other

military or para military force,

have a resilient bond with

games and sports primarily as

a means of fostering espirit-

de-corps, preparation for

combat , skil ls, toughness,

the development of physical

qualities of the war fighter

such as the killer instinct ,

improvement of proficiency

and also as a recreational

means. The presence of the

various teams of the Assam

Rifles is felt at all national and

some international events.

The All India Police Duty Meets

have been the stage for many

accolades for the teams of

Assam Rifles.

Football, Judo and Equestrian

teams have proved their mettle

regularly at various levels.

Archery a relatively new sport

for the Assam Rifles has taken

giant strides with the Force

bagging podium finishes in

almost all significant events.

Wushu and Kick Boxing are two

martial arts where the teams

have been giving an excellent

account of themselves.

Games and Sports have also

been used to mobilize the

local youth and wean away the

support for nefarious activities.

One of the most enterprising

part of such init iat ive is

the conduct of the Annual

Director General’s Polo Cup at

Imphal by the Headquarters

Inspectorate General of Assam

Rifles (South). This meets the

local aspirations where this

is a most popular sport and

also plays a significant role in

fostering the bond between the

Assam Rifles and the people of

the North East.

GAMES & SPORTS

139

The Assam Rifles has been

known as a credible institution

for training, education, and

leadership development in a

culturally attuned manner with

the indigenous populations.

Even as the Force continues with

the capability development

to meet the changes and

counter threats capable of

producing widespread chaos,

successful future engagements

w i l l d e p e n d o n re s i l i e n t

soldiers and cohesive teams

of conventional and special

operations forces training and

working interdependently. The

Force continues to develop

and implement innovative and

effective training solutions,

such as the socio-cultural

leader development initiatives,

and expand opportunities

to access and shape training

support services and products

related to the culture, terrain,

weather, infrastructure and

demographics.

EPILO GUE

“The smog gently floats over the valley in a vacuum left by the pause of violence; in the days that follow

it is the Yaoshang festival. A quiet before the storm only to be pierced by gun fire. In the streets people

scatter, shop shutters come rumbling down and all is once more quiet in anticipation of the next rattle of

bullets... In Manipur death itself has become a spectacle.”

- Akshay Mahajan, Photographer on the morbid atmosphere in Manipur in the wake of militancy

“India’s North East has been

the land of thousand mutinies”

says Wasbir Hussain, the

Executive Director of the Centre

for Development and Peace

Studies, and amplifies its span

and scale as “South Asia’s

hottest trouble spots.” He

attributes the complex conflict

dynamics to the trans-border

l inkages of the insurgent

groups, and strategic alliances

among them, which act as

force multipliers in their favour.

Almost all the insurgency

movements, to begin with,

have started off their campaign

espousing popular causes and

have been seen by separate

constituencies as a natural

by-product of the long-held

grievances of the tribe/ people

against the administration. It is

a different matter, altogether,

that such popular support has

eroded as insurgency gradually

bordered on the extremes of

mindless violence.

A s s a m R i f l e s h a s b e e n

i n t h e f o r e f r o n t o f t h e

counterinsurgency operations

in the North East - effectively

coordinating polit ical and

military strategies. Adept in

local culture, dialect and urban

and jungle warfare, they also

played a critical role in carrying

out projects designed to extend

economic and social benefits to

the local population. The Assam

Rifles has often found itself

actively involved in civic action

programmes implemented to

win the “hearts and minds” of

the people. Over the long course

of this campaign in the North

East, they have been involved

in opening schools, providing

training in new technologies,

del iver ing social ser vices

e.g. medical care, facilitating

employment programmes for

youth and improving basic

infrastructure e.g. building

roads and hydel power projects,

providing water supply and

helping develop agriculture,

handicrafts and above all the

heritage of the North East.

CONNECT WITH THE NORTH EAST

143

Almost four decades after

insurgency began in Assam

with the formation of the

first militant outfit in 1979,

militancy continues in the state.

However, the Government’s

counter-insurgency offensives

and peace efforts, including

Operations Bajrang and Rhino

by the security forces, have

paid dividends with most of

the major insurgent groups

now getting into a peace mode

with intermittent opposition

to the truce overtures by the

breakaway factions.

During this period, the Assam

Rifles took active part in dealing

with disturbances created by

the language and foreigners’

issues and the ethnic conflicts.

It also took active part in

counter insurgency operations

u n d e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

command of the Army to

control the activities of the

various insurgent outfits. With

the signing of the Assam Peace

Accord the state remains calm

though with undercurrents

simmering off and on.

Headquarters Inspectorate

General Assam Rifles (East), the

youngest of the three formation

headquarters of the Force holds

the fort for three of the seven

sister states - Assam, Mizoram

and Tripura. Located at Srikona

in Assam, this formation has one

of its Sectors along with its own

Headquarters and units and

sub units in Assam overseeing

peace in both the upper and

lower regions of the state. The

units are performing creditably

in counter insurgency role as

well as meeting the aspirations

of the populace in Assam.

ASSAM

145

NAGALAND

While Nagaland has seen

development as never before,

the events leading to the

current situation has led to

a stratification of the early

egalitarian Naga society. The

emergence of a middle class

and an unholy nexus between

drug dealers, smugglers etc

and the insurgent groups has

vitiated the body politic and

Naga civic life. The insurgents’

guns though remain quiet as

a result of the ceasefire, the

situation needs to be watched

closely with preemptive actions

as and when called for. The

Assam Rifles has been a key

player in ensuring peace in this

state.

Headquarters Inspectorate

General Assam Rifles (North)

and three of the Sectors

Headquarters are stationed in

Nagaland along with their full

complement of Assam Rifles

Battalions and ancillary units.

They are actively involved

in cumulative set of tasks to

bring these tribal areas into

t h e m a i n s t rea m . M a s s i v e

civic action programmes -

ranging from strengthening

of security, rehabilitation of

people affected by militancy,

confidence building measures,

infrastructural developments,

r o a d s , r u n n i n g s c h o o l s ,

education, forestation, power

and water supply healthcare

and livestock - continue to be

undertaken and continue to

yield results.

One of the landmarks has

been ‘Operation Franchise’ in

February 2000, launched by 3

and 8 Assam Rifles Battalions.

For the first time in the history

of the Tangkhuls eighty percent

of the population exercised

their right to vote in defiance

of the writ of various militant

groups. The relative stability

and the trust level between

the Force and the people also

led to the establishment of a

recruitment node in Ukhrul

town where guidance and

counseling is provided to the

Naga youth.

Apart from this, the Assam

Rifles formations in Nagaland

have undertaken a slew of

other civic action programmes.

Such programmes aim to

benefit the locals, integrate

the people of these far flung

areas with the rest of the

country. These programmes

speak highly of the civic action

initiatives of the Assam Rifles.

Apart from the civic action

schemes, the formations and

units of Inspectorate General

Assam Rif les (North) also

contribute immensely towards

developments in the border

areas under the Border Area

D e v e l o p m e n t P ro g ra m m e

(BADP) of the Government of

India wherein construction of

roads, bridges and culverts

h a v e e n s u r e d i m p r o v e d

connectivity of border villages

within and with the mainland.

This also provides employment

opportunities through self

sustaining projects collectively

managed and run by the locals.

Such init iat ives not only

provide means of sustenance

but also help in promoting the

local handicrafts and heritage.

Lieutenant General RK Rana,

SM, VSM, the current Director

G e n e ra l o f A s s a m R i f l e s

inaugurated the “Pineapple

Canning Plant” established

under Military Civic Action

Programme at Medziphema

under Dimapur District in June

2014. The canning plant is a

promising venture set up by

the Force and handed over to

the people as an initiative of

economic empowerment.

Known for its famous picturesque golf links, the Pine City houses the sprawling Assam Rifles Directorate General which

has become one of the most beautiful and self contained townships in the world.

The Assam Rifles has always

had an exceptional connect

with Meghalaya even though

it does not presently have

any operational commitment

i n t h e S ta te . T h e Fo rce

once functioned under the

Governor of undivided Assam

(before creation of the state of

Meghalaya) and thus continues

to share a special bond with the

Governor of Meghalaya. For the

gallantry and distinguished

service the troops of Assam

Rifles continue to be recognized

and felicitated annually by

the Governor of Meghalaya. A

special privilege afforded to

this Force.

The Headquarters of Assam

Rifles has always been part of

Shillong, first when it was part

of Inspector General of Police

and later when it was separated

from the police in September

1947 as Headquarters Inspector

General of Assam Rifles (HQ

IGAR). In early 1948 the HQ,

IGAR moved into a separate

office at La Bassee Lines near

the present Military Engineering

Services office on the way

to Upper Shillong. Later on

the HQ IGAR was shifted to

Laitmukhrah, which was then

popularly known as Cement

House area and was once the

property of India’s first Defence

Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh

and his relatives.

With the passage of time, as

the commitment of Assam

Rifles increased and the Force

expanded, the HQ IGAR also

expanded and became the

Directorate General Assam

Rifles (HQ DGAR). Now the

old Cement House area has

been completely renovated

to house the Assam Rifles

Signal Unit, the Assam Rifles

Records and Pay & Allowances

Offices, and the Number 2

Officers’ Mess of Headquarter

Assam Rifles. Interestingly,

this area was also called the

Valentine’s Hill in local lore

once upon a time. The Assam

Rifles Administration Unit and a

girls’ hostel is located in Happy

Valley, Shillong.

The Headquarters along with its

ancillary support units occupy

the bowl and hillocks in Laitkor

town. Assam Rifles Security

Elements, Signal Components

and Assam Rifles Construction

& Maintenance Company are

the other occupants of various

pockets in Laitkor. The Assam

Rifles Public School along with

its boys’ hostels is also located

in Shillong.

MEGHALAYA

Assam Rifles Public School, Shillong

149

The kingdom of Manipur was

merged with the Indian Union

on 15 October 1949. However,

o n l y a f t e r a p r o t ra c t e d

agitation interspersed with

violence, it was declared a

separate state in 1972. The

emergence of insurgency in

Manipur is formally traced to

the emergence of the first major

militant group in November

1964. Today, Manipur is one

of the worst affected states in

the North East where at least

a dozen insurgent outfits are

active.

With Manipur continuing to

be the most disturbed state

in the North East, the majority

of the troops of Assam Rifles

are stationed here under the

Headquarters Inspectorate

General Assam Rifles (South).

It has five Sector Headquarters

along with over twenty Assam

Rifles Battalions ensuring peace

in the state and guarding the

porous borders with Myanmar.

All these units have undertaken

socio-economic, sports, local

games and adventure activities

a l o n g w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l

initiatives in Manipur without

compromising their decisive

roles as the field strike force

in Counter Insurgency and

Counter Terrorist Operations.

Following the 1999 Kargil

War, when Army units were

withdrawn from the region and

committed to the war effort,

the Assam Rifles organised

massive recruitment rallies,

which have reduced the state`s

unemployment burden.

Assam Rifles have set up as

many as thirteen Vocational

Training Centres in Manipur.

There is an impressive list of

completed projects related

to water supply schemes,

community halls, foot bridges,

youth centers, water mills,

micro- hydro projects along

with rice mills and solar lights.

Twenty computer centers

have been established at

Ukhrul, Kangpokpi, Sugnu,

Chassad, Palel, Mantripukhri,

Keithelmanbi, and other such

towns. Computers have also

been provided to a number of

schools. Paramedic Training

Centres have been set up in

Ukhrul, Maram and Chandel

for empowering young women.

The Assam Rifles has sponsored

and revitalized games and

sports for the local youth

presenting sporting goods

and equipment free of cost.

In March 2005, HQ IGAR(S)

founded the Assam Rif les

Archery Club (ARAC) as the

nodal agency for archery in

North East India. ARAC has

been winning regularly in

all events since then. It also

sponsored the Grand South

Asian Karate Do Championship

in June 2007, held in Imphal.

National Integration Tours

are conducted from Imphal

to Delhi , Amritsar, Jaipur and

Agra in order to integrate the

youth and children of this

region with the rest of the

country. Every year the Assam

Rifles sponsor Director General

Assam Rifles Equestrian Cup

for promoting equestr ian

skills of Manipur riders, a sport

immensely popular amongst

the locals. Towards this local

craze, HQ IGAR (S) arranged

for horses donated by the

Assam Equestrian Federation

to be transported to Imphal

f r o m D i b r u g a r h . A s s a m

Rifles has also established

a Rehabilitation Centre for

training surrendered militants

in Computer Appl icat ion,

Driving, Carpentry and Tailoring

- an initiative which has turned

out be extremely promising and

fruitful.

MANIPUR

151

On 15 October 1949, the Tripura

Durbar decided for a complete

merger with India. Tripura, the

location of one of India’s most

virulent insurgencies, has

since evolved into one of the

most peaceful states in India’s

troubled Northeastern region.

T h e s ta te reg i s te re d n o

terrorism-related fatalit ies

through 2013, and has reported

miniscule numbers in the last

two years. The Government

of India in a recent move

t e r m i n a t e d t h e m i l i ta r y

engagements under Operation

Hifaazat in March 2015 and

consequently the security

forces have formally ceased all

military operations in the state.

The state had been having an

Assam Rifles battalion ever

since it merged with India. The

Tripura State Force Battalion

was merged with Assam Rifles

to raise the 6 Assam Rifles

Battalion. However, since the

state was relatively peaceful

and it was felt that the state

police would be adequate to

control the law and order, this

unit was moved to Mizoram

which was gripped by full-

fledged insurgency.

The void created by the move of

6 Assam Rifles Battalion had to

be filled up in mid 1985, when

the raising of 23 Assam Rifles

Battalion and Headquarter

‘A’ Range later called Tripura

Range Assam Rifles (and the

present Headquarter 21 Sector)

started in the accommodation

vacated by 6 Assam Rifles

Battalion.

In 1986, due to a surge in the

militant activities, the state

government requis i t ioned

for additional central forces,

preferring Assam Rifles over all

others to deal with the rapidly

deteriorating law and order

situation. 23 Assam Rifles

Battalion was placed under

the state government and

deployed in the Ampi area. 26

Assam Rifles Battalion, which

was still in the process of being

raised, was also allotted to the

state government and three of

its almost raised companies

were deployed in Mandal area.

Other companies followed suit

as soon as they were raised. 27

Assam Rifles Battalion which

had been raised at Diphu was

also sent to Tripura by February

1987 and deployed in the

Teliamura area. HQ ‘A’ Range

Assam Rifles was functional by

now and took control of the

Assam Rifles units deployed in

Tripura. Eventually, with Tripura

declared as “disturbed”, Army

was deployed and the Assam

Rifles battalions were placed

under the Army’s operational

command.

The situation was peaceful

for a brief period, but it again

deteriorated in January 1996

when a splinter militant group,

refused to honour the Peace

Accord signed with the State

Government . Headquarter

Tripura Range (the present

Headquarter 21 Sector) with all

its battalions was moved back

to Tripura.

Presently, a Sector

Headquarter along with its full

complement of ancillary units

and sub units is deployed in

this peaceful state under the

operational command of the

Army.

TRIPURA

153

I n d i g e n o u s i n s u r g e n c y

movements have only been a

fraction of the problem that

Arunachal Pradesh has come

to encounter in the past years.

A variety of factors including its

geographical contiguity with

Myanmar and ethnic similarities

among the residents in some

of Arunachal Pradesh’s districts

with the locals in Nagaland is

the reason why insurgent outfits

from Assam and Nagaland have

exploited the state for their

activities.

The British in 1864 raised a

Frontier Police Force (forebearer

of 2 Assam Rifles Battalion) for

service along the borders of

Sadiya and Lakhimpur Districts

in Arunachal Pradesh. The Force

was later named as Lakhimpur

Military Police. The battalion,

along with Naga Hills Military

Police (forbearer of 3 Assam

Rifles Battalion), independently

and in conjunction with regular

army carr ied out var ious

expeditions to put a stop to the

practice of head hunting and

slave trading by Abors in the

area of Patkoi Ranges, Dibong

and Dihang Valleys. They also

provided detachments for

security of survey operations

to explore unknown areas and

for protection of road/track

building parties in the areas.

In 1947, the first Administrative

Centre was established at Kore.

At this time another battalion,

the 5 Assam Rifles, was also

raised. Initially, units of the

Assam Rifles were deployed in

small detachments to cover the

vast areas and in many cases

platoons had been split to man

the posts. Many detachments

were commanded by Junior

Commissioned Officers and

s o m et i m e s e v e n b y N o n

C o m m i s s i o n e d O f f i c e r s .

However, as the Force built

up a rapport with the various

tribals, they were able to carry

out their task effectively even

in small detachments. Later, it

was decided to occupy larger

posts. The number of battalions

was also increased by two, the

9 Assam Rifles and 11 Assam

Rifles Battalions.

The Assam Rifles continues

with its special bond with

this state with a Sector

Headquarters along with its

entire complement of units and

sub units stationed in the three

districts of Tirap, Changlang

and Longding to carry out

Counter Insurgency tasks as

well as border guarding of

Indo-Myanmar Border.

ARUNACHAL PRADESH

155

The Mizo Nat ional Front

(MNF), an insurgent group

that emerged from the Mizo

National Famine Front in 1959

— a formation protesting the

widespread famine caused

by a regular failure of the

bamboo crop due to mautam.

Deprivation soon led to open

rebellion and the extremist

section within MNF advocated

the use of violence to seek

independence from India.

The MNF members forcibly

collected donations from the

locals, recruited volunteers

and trained them with arms

supplied by Pakistan.

On the night of 28 February/1

March 1966, the MNF launched

a series of simultaneous attacks

on the 1 Assam Rifles Garrisons

at Aizawl, Lunglei and Champai.

The law and order situation

went beyond the control of

the local Police and the Deputy

Commissioner of the district

took shelter in the Assam Rifles

headquarters. The insurgents

also attacked the Assam Rifles

post in Chhimluang on the

Aizawl-Silchar Road, but were

repulsed successfully by the

Assam Rifles. On 2 March, the

insurgents ambushed a patrol

of the 1 Assam Rifles.

MIZORAM

157

1 Assam Rifles Battalion at

Aizawl, held steadfast against

an attack by the MNF suicide

squad. The MNF lost thirteen

men in a counter-attack by the

Assam Rifles soldiers.

Due to the dogged

determination of the Assam

Rifles and valiant militar y

actions, the victory parade

proposed to be held by the MNF

on 2 March had to be called off.

Meanwhile, the Government

invoked the Assam Disturbed

Areas Act, 1955 and the Armed

Forces (Special Powers) Act,

1958 and the situation was

brought under controllable

limits.

The first elections in Mizoram

were held from 24 to 27 April

1979 and Assam Rifles helped

in the conduct of fair and

free elections. The People’s

Conference, a political party

headed by Brig T Sailo who

was once the Commandant of

6 Assam Rifles Battalion won

by a huge majority. In 1986, the

Union of India under Shri Rajiv

Gandhi and the MNF signed the

Mizoram Peace Accord initiating

the process of bringing peace

to the state.

Mizoram Range Assam Rifles

(later Headquarter 23 Sector)

was raised at Silchar on 10 Sep

1960 under Col J D Nadirshaw,

VrC, SC, as the first Deputy

Inspector General of the Range.

In 1966, during the inception of

large scale insurgency in Mizo

Hills, the Range Headquarter

was moved to Aizawl and it

has continued to stay in Aizawl

since then. The State Range was

redesignated as Headquarter

Mizoram Range with Mizoram

becoming a Union Territory in

March 1972 and renamed as

Headquarter 23 Sector in Jan

1997. The sector headquarter

a n d i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t s

continue to be deployed in the

state since then.

The units of this sector have

been actively involved in

civic action activities such as

conducting free medical camps,

spreading computer literacy,

training the youth of Mizoram

for recruitment into security

forces, organizing educational

trips and excursions for school

children while continuing to

stand guard on the borders of

Mizoram.

Sikkim was integrated as

the eighth North Eastern

Council state in 2002. So far

the situation in the state has

been by and large peaceful.

The lone incident of spill

over of insurgency from the

neighbouring states has been

the arrest of certain anti

national elements in January

2003 from a partly constructed

apartment near the Flourmill

area in Gangtok.

On 28 July 1963, the 17 Assam

R i f l e s B a t ta l i o n e n t e r e d

Sikkim and was deployed in

North Sikkim. The battalion

headquarters of the unit was

initially located at Libong

and later shifted to Pegong in

February 1969. The companies

of the battalion manned the

defences in the lofty mountains

of North Sikkim. In 1998, 17

Assam Rifles Battalion after

serving in Sikkim for thirty five

years was replaced by 30 Assam

Rifles Battalion. Presently,

there is no presence of Assam

Rifles in this hill state.

SIKKIM

159

Left above: Captain Man Bahadur Rai

Right above: Captain Jas Ram Singh

Left below: Subedar Kharka Bahadur Limbu

Right below: Major D Sreeram Kumar

Pre - Independence Awards

1. Indian Order Of Merit2. Indian Distinguish Service Medal (IDSM)3. Mention In Dispatches (MD)4. Kings Police Medal (KPM)5. Order Of British India (OBI)6. CIE7. Cdr Of The Order Of British Empire (CBE)8. MBE9. MC 10. Bar To IDSM 11. BEM 12. BEM (Civ Division) 13. Military Medal

Post - Independence Awards

1. AC 2. PVSM 3. KC 4. AVSM 5. Bar To AVSM 6. VrC 7. SC 8. Bar To SC 9. SM (Gallantry) 10. VSM 11. Bar To SM (Gallantry) 12. Bar To VSM 13. UYSM 14. YSM 15. COAS Commendation Card 16. VCOAS Commendation Card 17. GOC-in-C (EC) Commendation Card 18. GOC-in-C (NC) Commendation Card 19. Mention-in-Despatches (MD) 20. SM (Distinguished) 21. Bar To SM (Distinguished)

13300411060201030501060125

0409352101051380134886200201087961150247301305

THE SCROLL OF HONOUR

161

THE ROAD AHEAD

T h e D i re c to ra te G e n e ra l

of Assam Rifles develops

concepts and capabilities,

e va l u a te s m o d e r n i za t i o n

solut ions and integrates

t h e s e ca pa b i l i t i e s . T h e y

also communicate with the

government, industry and

Army stakeholders to ensure

awareness and understanding

of modernization priorities.

The pr ior i t ies lay down

equal emphasis on the troop

comfort so as to enhance their

efficiency and consequently

the operational preparedness

of the Force. The stations where

the various units and sub

units are located, have been

addressed for their amenities,

essential services, upkeep,

green approach, habitat ,

infrastructure and facilities.

The beautiful locales of most

of these establishments add

to the aim of making them the

best townships in the country

and possibly the world.

The signature location of

Assam Rifles is Laitkor in

Shillong which is noted as

one of the prime locations in

Directorate General Assam Rifles, Laitkor, Shillong

DEVELOPMENT

163

the world and is celebrated

for its aesthetics and upkeep.

It stands out as a minimalist

but elegant island of serenity

developed with indigenous

and limited resources. All this

is aimed at ensuring happy

troops and families residing in

well laid out beautiful stations

so as to make the Force

administratively vibrant and

operationally efficient.

Modernisation of the

equipment profile, weapon

systems, communications has

been an ongoing process along

side developing the concepts

and capabilities to equip the

Force to be a potent Force

Multiplier for implementation

of national policies.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are not new to Assam Rifles. From a simplistic perspective, the

evolution of the Assam Rifles manifests that they have been acting within all the critical spheres of

successful counterinsurgency.

165

The War of Tomorrow

J Paget in his authoritative

book , “Counter-insurgency

Campaigning” has claimed that

an insurgency can comprise

of differing levels of guerrilla

warfare, sabotage, subversion

and terrorism.

The ever bourgeoning list of

counterinsurgency involves

military, paramilitary, political,

e co n o m i c , p s y c h o l o g i ca l ,

and civic actions taken by

a government to defeat an

insurgency.

Rule of Law

Counter-insurgent forces are

bound to operate within the

rule of law. The operation has

to employ this legal mandate

and its conduct must meet

the highest legal standards.

Militar y forces have to be

briefed about the rules of

engagement with regard to

legal and other provisions such

as arrests, searches, warrants,

interrogation techniques and

intelligence gathering by issuing

appropriate instructions. With

the thrust on development in

the North East and integrating

its people with those of the

mainland, the need, especially

for the junior leadership of

Assam Rifles to ensure that the

Force becomes an instrument

for implementation of the rule

of law would be inescapable.

This coupled with the growing

assertion by the populace

would apply t remendous

pressure on the troops and

thus the necessity for socio-

psychological training at all

levels.

Sound Intelligence

Sound intelligence prevents

the armed forces from targeting

the wrong people as insurgent

sympathizers. A single act of

violation of the rule of law

creates hostility in society

which would affect the local

population psyche for long. It

is indeed crucial that armed

personnel to be deployed in

conflict areas are trained in

local cultures, social habits,

the status of women, and so

on. Initially, when the majority

of personnel in the Assam Rifles

were from the North East, they

possessed local knowledge

and language skills valuable to

counter insurgency operations.

With the changed intake profile,

this issue would require serious

addressing by the Force to

continue to be as effective in

its designs as hitherto fore.

Intelligence from within would

also assume significance for

the fact that the majority of the

Force would consist of troops

from outside the North East

but deployed continuously

in the demanding conditions

of the North East for periods

spanning their entire careers

which could be upto almost

forty years usually.

The Training Imperative

T h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t

and militar y realized that

accomplishing the special tasks

that counter insurgency warfare

requires - gathering local

intelligence, using minimal

force, coordinating military and

civilian actions, conducting

psychological operat ions,

The Assam Rifles Headquarters on a misty morning.

Dhai Moorti and War memorial dominate the haze.

Compassion and sacrifice – the two signposts of the past – shall be the guides through

the mist of future as well.

engaging in economic and

social development projects

(e.g. building roads, hospitals

and schools) , interact ing

with the media and Non-

Governmental Organizations

(NG0s) (e.g.. human rights

g ro u p s ) , a n d s u p p o r t i n g

civilian authorities—demand

special training for troops to

be inducted into insurgency

situations.

Media and NGOs

Two participants in the counter

insurgency environment—the

media and NG0s – mostly seem

to be performing an adversarial

role. The media reports on the

administration’s oversights,

inadequacies, prevarications

and failures. Many NGOs focus

on alleged human rights abuses

committed by the security

forces. Military personnel not

accustomed to the freedom the

media enjoys find themselves in

troubled waters with the media.

With such freedom continuing

to reach greater levels, a cold

mutual distrust would need to

be quickly changed to greater

understanding and acceptance

of the situation so as to be able

to deal with it effectively.

Looking Ahead

India has had one of the longest

experiences in countering

insurgencies and a unique one

at that. “India essentially sees

and responds to insurgencies

within its frontiers as challenges

to the project of nation building.

And it is perception that has

determined the Indian way in

counterinsurgency.”

A significant factor in the Indian

counterinsurgency operations

is the political leadership’s

understanding that the rebels

are fellow citizens who have to

be won over. An Order of the

Day issued in 1955 by the then

Chief of Army Staff to the troops

being dispatched to the Naga

Hills brings this out abundantly:

You must remember that all

the people of the area in which

you are operating, are fellow-

Indians and the very fact that

they are different and yet

part of India is a reflection

of India’s greatness. Some of

these people are misguided

and have taken to arms

against their own people, and

are disrupting the peace of this

area. You are to protect the

mass of the people from these

disruptive elements. You are

not there to fight the people

in the area, but to protect

them, you are fighting only

those who threaten the people

and who are a danger to the

lives and properties of the

people. You must, therefore,

do everything possible to win

their confidence and respect

and to help them feel that they

belong to India.

Conclusively, the Assam Rifles

has to align itself to the people-

centred battlefield. “The future

is not one of major battles

and engagements fought by

armies on battlefields devoid

of population; instead, the

course of confl ict wil l be

decided by forces operating

among the people of the world.

Here, the margin of victory will

be measured in far different

terms than the wars of our

past. The allegiance, trust, and

confidence of populations will

be the final arbiters of success.”

The Assam Rifles thus needs

to continue to reaffirm its

allegiance to the people of the

North East and live by its hard

earned sobriquet – “Friends of

the North East People”.

167

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Col L W Shakespear History of The Assam RiflesHistory of Upper Assam, Upper Burmah and North- Eastern Frontier

Maj Gen DK PalitSentinels of the North East The Assam Rifles Vol I Brig P K Gupta Sentinels of the North East The Assam Rifles Vol II

Sir Alexander Mackenzie “History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal”

Sir Henry Cotton “Indian and Home Memories”

Sir James Johnstone“My Experiences in Manipur and the Naga Hills”

H Srikanth & C J Thomas Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in Northeast India

Donn Morgan KipgenThe Great Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19: Its Real SignificancesA Role beyond Charter : The Multi-roles of The Assam Rifles

Lt Col A K Sharma (Retired)The Assam Rifles

BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 4(5) March- April 2002“The Assam Rifles: Sentinels of the East”

Ben HayesThe Other Burma? Conflict, Counter-insurgency and Human Rights in Northeast India

Amitav Ghosh Exodus from Burma, 1941: A Personal Account, Parts 1, 2 & 3

Charles R. ListerCultural Awareness and Insurgency in Afghanistan

Vijendra Singh JafaCounterinsurgency Warfare : The Use & Abuse of Military Force

Frank MoraesThe Revolt in Tibet

United States Army Training and Doctrine CommandThe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual : Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations The United States Army Study for the Human Dimension

Lt Col RS ChettriGuardians of The North East

M D Sharma and M C Sharma Para Military Forces of India

Sumit Ganguly and David P FidlerIndia and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned

Namrata Goswami Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India

Centre For Development and Peace Studies (CDPS)

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) : Institute for Conflict Management

THE TEAM AT 180

Director GeneralLieutenant General RK Rana, SM, VSM

Additional Director GeneralMajor General MK Yadav

Brigadier GSBrigadier PN Verma

Brigadier PersBrigadier V Sreehari, SC

Brigadier AdmBrigadier GS Reddy, SM

IFAMr Eddie Khawlhring

DIG MedDIG (Dr) Vinay Kumar

Col GS (Ops)Colonel JS Dhody

Col GS (Int)Colonel CPSN Misra

Col MSColonel Vijay Chahar

Col AdmColonel Shubhojit Lahiri

Col MedicalColonel Amul Duttasharma

Col EMEColonel Sanjay Bakshi

Col ProvisionCol Shailendra Singh

Chief Signal O�icerColonel Rajiv Krishan

Chief EngineerColonel Ramesh Santhanam

Chief Legal O�icerColonel Leena Gurav

Chief Record O�icerColonel SK Thampi

Liaison O�icerColonel Sanjay Sharma

Head Of O�iceCommandant RC Verma

Commandant QCommandant RC Kothari

Assam Rifles Administrative Support UnitCommandant Prasad Thapa

Assam Rifles Signal UnitLt Col Sandeep Bajaj

Assam Rifles Construction & Maintenance CompanyMajor Shaunak Kamat

ASSAM RIFLES TRAINING CENTRE AND SCHOOL

Commandant Brig K Narayanan

Dy CommandantColonel NK Narayana

No 1 Trg BnColonel Vivek Kochar

No 2 Trg BnColonel MA Siddiqhi

1 MGAR 2 MGAR 3 MGAR 4 MGAR

Commandant Commandant Commandant Commandant Lt Col Ashwin Kumar Lt Col Sanjiv Gajraj Lt Col A Chandel, SM Lt Col Rakesh Trivedi

1 Workshop 2 Workshop 3 Workshop 4 Workshop Lt Col RK Mishra Lt Col Swarup Bera Lt Col Anil Dhaka Lt Col Aman Chowdhary

HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (NORTH)

Inspector GeneralMajor General MS Jaswal, YSM, SM

Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier

Colonel GSColonel Rajesh Gupta

Colonel AdministrationColonel Amit Kumar

HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (SOUTH)

Inspector GeneralMajor General VS Srinivas, VSM**

Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier Sunil Kumar, SM

Colonel GSColonel G Gautam

Colonel AdministrationColonel Achalesh Shanker

HEADQUARTER INSPECTORATE GENERAL (EAST)

Inspector GeneralMajor General Gopal R, SM

Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier RK Gupta

Colonel GSColonel Mukesh Bhanwala

Colonel AdministrationColonel Pankaj Pachnanda

HEADQUARTER 5 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier Debashis Das, SMAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel SS Bhogal, VSM

HEADQUARTER 6 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Brijesh Dhiman

HEADQUARTER 7 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Sushil MannAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Dharmesh Yadav

HEADQUARTER 9 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier VT MathewAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Chandan Bajaj

HEADQUARTER 10 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Peeyush Pandey, VSM

HEADQUARTER 21 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Avinash Singh Berar, VSM

HEADQUARTER 22 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector GeneralBrigadier SP Vishwas Rao, SM**

HEADQUARTER 23 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier TC Malhotra

HEADQUARTER 25 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Govind KalawadAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Manish Sinha, VSM

HEADQUARTER 26 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Rajiv ChhibberAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel S Renganathan

HEADQUARTER 27 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier RK Sharma,SC, SMAdditional Deputy Inspector GeneralColonel Kotnath Venugopal

HEADQUARTER 28 SECTOR

Deputy Inspector General Brigadier Gajendra Joshi, SM

Officer-in-charge

Col Rajiv Krishan

Editor-in-chief

Ranjan Chaudhary

Chief of Production

Shubhojit Chatterjee

Illustrations and Graphics

Sneha Baliga

Monika Gugliya

Editorial Assistance

Capt Aparna Iyer

Archana Chaudhary

Production equipment

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Contact:

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Published in New Delhi at Isis Books

on behalf of Assam Rifles