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Algeria's Policy toward Israel: Pragmatism and RhetoricAuthor(s): Jacob AbadiSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 616-641Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329818Accessed: 18/03/2009 05:53
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Algeria's
PolicyToward
srael:
Pragmatism
nd
Rhetoric
JacobAbadi
Thisarticle is an
analysis of
Algerian-Israeli elations.The author
argues
that
Algeria
did
not
come to
termswith
Israel
largely
due to the
rigidityof
theFLN's
(Frontde Libe'ration
ational) ideology
and to the
popularityof
the
Islamic
parties
in
that
country.
At the same
time,
however,
he
argues
that
a
pragmatic
tendency
n
Algeria'sforeign olicy
was evident
ince the
1960s and
thatpolitical
and economicreasons
orced
the
Algerianregime
o becomemore
lexible
in
its
attitude
toward the
Arab-Israeli
conflict
and to
moderate ts
attitude
toward
Israel.
FormerIsraeliPrimeMinister
Yitzhak
Shamir nce
boasted hatunder
his
right-wing
Likudgovernment srael
managed
o
break he walls
surrounding
t
by
establishing
diplomatic
ies with most
countries.
A
similar
statement
was
made
by
former
Labor
PrimeMinisterYitzhakRabin n
one of his
speeches
to
the Knesset.1
ndeed,by
the
early
1990s,
Israel
managed
o
establish
diplomatic
ies with
most
countries
n
Asia
andAfrica.And whenthe
Middle
East
peace
process
appeared
o have
gained
momen-
tum toward he
middle of the
decade,
even the
Muslim
countriesof
North Africa
began
warmingup
to Israel.
Morocco,
Tunisia,
and
Mauritania
ecame
receptive
o
the idea of
establishing iplomatic ies with
Israel,
and
even
Libyamoderated
ts anti-
Israeli
stand.
Yet, despite
the
progressmade
in
the peace
processand the
growing
recognition
among
these
countries hat
coming to
termswith Israel
was no
longer
as
risky as
it hithertohad
been,Algeria
remained
one of the
last countries o
consider
sucha possibility. t wasonlywhenIsrael'sPrimeMinisterEhudBarakmetAlgeria's
President
AbdelazizBouteflika
t
Moroccan
KingHasan
R's
funeral, n July
25,
1999,
that comments
about
rapprochement ere
made.
Why Algeria
remainedone of
the last
countries o
consider
the possibility
of
normalizingelations
with
Israel s the
question
whichthis
article
attemptso
answer.
It
argues
hat
Algeria's
reluctance
o
mend
fences with
Israelwas a
consequence
of
several
actors:
Algeria's
colonial
egacy; he
Franco-Israeli
ollaboration uring
1954-
Dr.JacobAbadi is a professorof MiddleEasternHistoryat theUnited StatesAir ForceAcademy
in
Colorado
Springs,
CO. He is
the
authorof
the books
Britain's
Withdrawal
rom
the
MiddleEast
1947-1971:
The
Economicand
Strategic
mperatives,
nd
Israel's
Leadership:
From
Utopiato
Crisis.
In
addition,Dr. Abadi
has written
numerous
articles
dealingwith
Middle Eastern
affairs.
1.
Yitzhak
Shamir,
Summing
Up: An
Autobiography,
Boston:Little
Brown&
Co.,
1994), p.
252;
Knesset
Proceedings,
July 13,
1992.
MIDDLE
EAST JOURNAL
*
VOLUME
56, NO. 4,
AUTUMN
2002
8/10/2019 Abadi Algeria_s Policy Towards Israel - Pragmatism and Rhetoric 20
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ALGERIA'S
OLICY OWARDS
SRAEL
617
1962,
whenAlgeria
fought
for its
independence;
nd
the ascendancy
f militant
s-
lamicparties
n thatcountry.
Algeria's
attitude
oward srael
wasin large
measure
determined
y its colonial
experience.
The leadersof
the FLN (Front
de
Liberation
National),who
assumed
positions
of leadership
fter
he country's
ndependence
n 1962,
were traumatized
y
their ong
struggle
against
French
colonialrule,
and, therefore,
hatred
of colonialism
occupied
a centralpart
n theirworldview.
srael's
association
withFrance
and
Great
Britainduring he
Suez
Affairof 1956
reinforced
he notion
among
he FLN's eaders,
that
imperialism
and Zionism
conspired
o suppress
all liberation
movements.
The
persistence
f
the Cold Warand
the
increasing
Soviet
influence
n
Algeria
reinforced
that trend.
Despiteits declared ommitmento nonalignment, lgeria's oreignpolicyori-
entation
was
clearly
pro-Soviet
during
he
Cold
War
years.The
FLN regarded
Mos-
cow as the champion
of
all revolutionary
movements.
Consequently,
he
notionthat
Zionism
was associated
with
imperialism
ersisted,
and the
hostility oward
he
Jew-
ish State
ntensified.
Algeria'saversion
o Zionism
apered
ff somewhat
fter he
end
of the Cold
Warandthe demise
of
the
Soviet
Unionby
the late 1980s,
butno meaning-
ful
dialogue
betweenthe
two countries
had
yet
takenplace.
The Algerian
regime's
failureto
transform
tself into a true
democracyhad a
negative
mpact
on
potential
bilateral
elations.Moreover,
heoverwhelming ower
of
the IslamicSalvationFront Front slamiquede Salut,or FIS),which since the early
1990s
had
been locked
in
a
furiousbattle
against
the
military-backed
uthoritarian
regime,
discouraged
heAlgerian
eaders
rom
taking
measures
o
improve
relations.
THE
EARLYYEARS
That
Algeria's
policy
toward
sraelwas
far more
radical han
thatof
any
other
country
n
North
Africa
was
largely
due to
its bitter
struggle
against
France
and
the
historicalmemory
of the
FLN's
leaders,
who never
orgot
he
Franco-Israeli
ollabo-
rationduring
hatperiod.
In
the
first decade
of its
existence,
Israelmaintained
lose
friendship
with
France
whilethe atter
was
occupying
Algeria.
Cooperation
ith
France
was a
high priority
on the
agenda
of the
Israeli
ForeignMinistry
n those
days.
This
was
largely
because
Israel
had
virtually
no
country
romwhich
it could
procure
rms
other
than
France.
Realizing
that
the
only
way
to
prolong
such
cooperation
was
to
assist
France
n its
struggle against
the
Algerian
rebels,
the Israeli secret
services
began
supplying
France
with
vital
information
bout he
rebels,
their
supply
sources,
andtheir
raining
amps
n
Arab
countries.
Both
the
Frenchdefense
establishment
nd
the PrimeMinister'sBureaurecognized he importance f such information nden-
couraged
he
Israelis o
expand
heir
ntelligence
activities
n
Algeria.
The French
ven
explored
he
possibility
of
delivering
arms
o Israel
hroughAlgeria.2
The Israeli
intelligence
services
began
working
closely
with the
French,
and
2. Mordechai
Bar-On,
The Gates of Gaza:
Israel's
Road
to
Suez
and
Back, (New
York: St.
Martin's
Press, 1995),
pp.
167-168.
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618
*
MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL
Israelis
came to
Algeria
for
training
as
helicopter
pilots,
in
orderto
fight guerrilla
warriors
who
infiltrated srael rom
Egyptian
bases.
In
return,
srael
supplied
France
with informationaboutEgyptiancooperationwith the FLN.3In an interviewwith
Sylvia
Crosbie,
Paul
Grossin,
a
leading
French
security
igure,
had revealed hat
Is-
raeli
ntelligence
ourceshad
begun
providing
he
French
nformation
bout
Egyptian
PresidentGamal'Abd
al-Nasir's
nvolvement n
Algeriasince the
summerof
1955.4
Israel'sPrimeMinisterDavid
Ben
Gurionbelieved
hat t
was
largely
due to
its conflict
with
Algeria
that
Francewas
willing
to
support
srael.
And as one
observer
com-
mented,
"themore
ntense he
rebellion
n
Algeria
grew,
he closer
did the
rapproche-
ment and the mutual
understanding
etween the
two
democracies,
old and
the
new,
become."5The
Franco-Israeli
ooperation
ntensified
n
January
1960,
when
Gener-
als YitzhakRabinandChaimHerzogvisitedAlgeria oobserveFrenchparatroopersn
action
in
the
Kabylie
mountains.
The Israeli
Government
ncouraged
he
100,000
Jews who
lived
in
Algeria
at
that
ime,
to
provide
all
possibleassistance o
the
French,
including
nformation n the
activitiesof the
FLN.
According
o Seymour
Hersh,
his
gave
the
Israelis
remendous
everage
n
France,
not
only
for
purchasing
rms
there
but also for
obtaining
French
support
or the
constructionof
a nuclear
reactor n
Israel.6
In
August1957,
membersof
the FLN
appealed
o Israel
for
support n
theUN
General
Assembly's
debate on
Algeria's
future.
However,
Israel
refused and
voted
againstAlgeria'smembershipntheUN. Thismiscalculationy the Israeliswasbound
to have a serious
effect on
bilateral
elations
or
years
to
come.7
Israel's
nvolvement
in
Algerianaffairs
created
unexpected
omplications
otonly
with the
FLN,
butalso
with
the French.On
February3,
1958, an
IsraeliB-17
plane
andedat
Bone,
Algeria.
The
plane
was
forced down
by the
French
authorities
nd
was not
allowed to
return
to Israel until
the arms on
boardwere
confiscated.
Rumors
hadquickly
spread hat
Israel
was
supportinghe
Algerian
rebels,but
BenGurion
hought t
wise
todeny
their
veracity.
n
his
statement o
the
Knesseton
March
4,
1958, he
argued
hatIsrael
had
purchasedhe arms froman Americancompanyandthatthey were destinedfor a
Latin
American
country.He
went on
to argue
that the
French
authoritieshad
been
informed hat he
plane
would
and n
Algiers
andDakar
on its
way,but
Paris ailed
to
notify the
Algerian
authorities.
Deputy
Defense
MinisterShimon
Peres,who
was
closely
involved
n
arms
procurement
rom
France,
xplained
hat
sraelhadno
choice
3.
DavidBen
Gurion,
he
FirstPrime
Minister:
Selected
Documents,
1947-1963),Yemima
Rosenthal
(Ed.),
(Jerusalem: srael
State
Archives,
1966), p. 321. 4.
SylviaCrosbie,A TacitAlliance:Franceand
Israelfrom
Suez
to
the
Six-Day
War,
Princeton,
New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
1974),
p.
58.
5.
Meron
Medzini,
Ha-Yehudiyah
a-ge'ah:
Golda
Me'ir
ve-hazon
Yisra'el
[The
Proud
Jewess:
Golda
Meir and
the
Vision of
Israel],
(Jerusalem:
Edanim,
1990), p.
239.
6.
SeymourM.
Hersh,The
Samson
Option:
srael's
NuclearArsenal
and
American
Foreign
Policy,
(New
York:
Random
House,
1991),
p.
36-37.
7.
Benjamin
Beit-Hallahmi,
The
Israeli
Connection:
Who
Israel
Arms
and
Why,
New
York:Pan-
theon,
1987), pp. 44-45.
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ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 619
but to
fly
over North
Africa,
n
order o avoiddetectionby
hostilecountries.8Unwill-
ing to antagonize he
French,Ben Gurionstated that he would understandf they
would not allow the
planeto continue o LatinAmerica.Ben Gurion'sannouncement
was received with skepticism n Frenchparliamentaryircles, which argued hat he
was deceivedby his subordinates nd thatthe plane did in
fact carryweapons o the
Algerian ebels.9All along,Ben Gurion emained onvinced
hat heAlgerian ebellion
enhanced srael's
friendshipwith France.He believedthat
once the rebellionended
the Frenchwould
keep distance rom Israel.
The
Franco-Israeliapprochementontinued o alienate he Algeriannational-
ists.While heruling
Mapai Labor) arty efrainedrompublicly upportingheFrench
during
he
conflict,
he
right-wing
Herut
freedom) pposition
party
ed
by Menachem
Begin did not hide its convictionthat supportingFrance
was essential for Israel's
survivaland security.One of Herut's
eaders,Ya'acovMeridor,had once admitted
openly
thathis
party
upported
ranceon the
Algeria
ssue
"because he alliancewith
France s more
mportanthan dealism."''0
One of the rare
opportunities
n
which
a verbalencounter ook
place
between
an
Algerian
andIsraeli
representatives
ccurredn
1958,when the
FLN
was
in
the midst
of
its struggleagainst
he
French.
The
AlgerianSecretary
f
the Arab
League,
Ferhat
Abbas,approached
srael's
Foreign
Minister
Golda
Meir,
who
attended
meeting
of
African
representatives,
nd said:
Mrs.
Meir, your
country
s
being
armed
by France,
he
arch-enemy
f all those
who sit around he
table,
a
government
hat
s
fighting
a ruthless
and
brutalwar
againstmy people
and that uses terror
againstmy
black brethren.How do
you
justify your
intimacy
with
a
power
that s the
primary
oe of the self-determina-
tion
of
the
African
people?"
GoldaMeir
responded
by saying,
"I
do not share
your
hatred or FrenchPresi-
dent
de
Gaulle,
but let me tell
you
the
truth-whether or not
you
like to hear t:
if
de
Gaullewere thedevilhimself,I wouldregardt as thedutyof my governmento buy
arms romthe
only
sourceavailable o us.""
Algeria's
disapproval
f Israel's ies with
Francehad a
damaging
effect on
Israel's
ies
with most Africancountries.This be-
came obvious
n the
spring
of
1960,
when
Israelwas not invited
o the annual
meeting
of African
representatives
n
New
York,
due to a
protest
made
by
the
Algerianrepre-
sentative
who
argued
that
Israel maintained ies
with his
country's mperialist
en-
8. See
Peres' account
of this episode
in MattiGolan,Shimon
Peres:
A
Biography, New
York:St.
Martin'sPress,
1982), pp. 78-80.
9. British
Embassy n Tel Aviv
to Foreign
Office,Public
RecordOffice (hereafter
PRO),
London.
FO/371,
16407, ER103183,
February ,
1962.
10. Cited in MichaelBrecher,
TheForeign Policy System
of
Israel:
Setting,
Images,Process,
New
Haven:Yale
UniversityPress,
1972), p.
173.
11. Golda Meir, My
Life, (New
York:Putnam's
Sons, 1975), pp.
326-327.
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620
* MIDDLE AST OURNAL
emy.'2 ForeignMinistry
officials in Jerusalemwere
fully
awareof the
damaging
f-
fect
which ties
with Francehad on
Israel's
relationswith the African tates.
However,
they regarded
he
link with France
as far more
essential
o
Israel'snational
ecurity.'3
What ntensified hetension n thebilateral elationswas the fact thatIsrael's
activities
in
Algeria
did not remainconfined to
cooperation
with France.In
1961-
1962,
there were
reports
that
Israel
supported
he
French OAS
(Organisation
de
l'Armee
Secrete)
movement
n
Algeria,
an
ultra-rightistrganization
f French ettlers
that
ought
o
prolong
French
ule
n
Algeria.
Whatbound srael o that
group
was that
both
had identical nterest
n
prolonging
Frenchrule.
However,
ordialrelationswith
Francewere so
high
on the
Israeli national
agenda
that when the OAS
approached
Israeli ntelligenceagents
with
the request
hat
Israelhelp
in
theirplan to assassinate
GeneralCharlesde Gaulle,notonlydid the Israelisrefuse,but also alerted he French
Government
o that
danger.'4
The
idea
of collaborationwith
the
OAS
appealed
o
some Israeli eftists
who favored
better elationswith
Algeria.According
o Uri
Avneri,
editorof the radical
and
controversial
HaOlam
HaZeh
weekly magazine,Ben Gurion
backed
one faction within the OAS
whose membersadvocated
partitionof Algeria
into Muslimand
European reas,
but there s no
evidenceto support hatclaim.'5
Members
of the
OAS
were known to
have had
great
admiration
or Israel.
Thus,forexample,Jean-Jacquesusini admiredhe "fanaticism f the Jews in Pales-
tine"andtheir
passionate
ttachmento the soil.
He believed hat he Frenchandother
European ettlers(known by the sobriquet, ieds noirs) were too soft compared o
the
Israelis,
andhe advocated he
formation f a
"JewishHaganah, civil armypow-
erful and with
conviction,
which
wouldregainMuslimconfidence rom the F.L.N.,
and
carryalong
the
Europeans..
to seize
power
n
Algeria, n order o assume t one
day
in France."'6
Commenting
n the difficult
choice whichIsraelhadto makeduring
Algeria'swar of independence,nIsraeliForeignMinistryofficial writes:
12. Michael Comay to ForeignMinistry.(Michael Comay was the first deputyof the Director
Generalof the Israeli
Foreign
Ministry),
Israel
State
Archives,
Jerusalem.
Hereafter,
SA) 3301/22,
April 16,
1960.
13. Walter
Eytan
to Haim Yahil
(Walter
Eytan
was the
Director General
of the Israeli
Foreign
Ministry
and Haim Yahil was the
Deputy Head of the Israeli
PurchasingMission in
Germany), SA
2350/3,
September12, 1960.
14. The
assassination
attempt
was
planed to take
place
during
de Gaulle's
visit to
Algeria
in
February
1963.
Accordingto the
proposed
plan, Israel was
asked to train
an IsraeliArab
who was to
assassinatede
Gaulle.
According
o the
group's
calculations,
he
publicwould
be led to believe
that he
assassin
was sent
by
the FLN.
The members
of the
group
were
convincedthat he
assassinationwould
trigger mmense hatredagainstthe FLN andits struggleto freeAlgeria, andthereby he atmosphere
would
be favorable
o seizureof
power
byAlgerie
FranVaise.
For
detailsabout he
scheme see
Michael
Bar Zohar,
Spies
in the
PromisedLand:Iser
Harel
and the
Israeli Secret
Service,
(Boston:
Houghton
Mifflin, 1972),
pp.
225-230.
15. MichaelM.
Laskier,"Israeland
Algeria
amidFrench
Colonialismand
the
Arab-Israeli
Conflict,
1954-1978," srael
Studies,Vol.
6, No. 2
(Summer
2001), p. 7.
16.
Cited
n
Alistair
Home, A
Savage
Warof
Peace:Algeria
1954-1962,
(New
York:Viking,
1977),
p. 485.
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ALGERIA'S
POLICY
TOWARDS
ISRAEL
* 621
Israel
ried
o meet
the dilemma
with
anambivalent
olicy,
which
Dr.
Weizmann
used
to call 'warm
rost'. Some
cautious
overtures
o Algerian
politicians,
erro-
neously
believed
by
Israeliexperts
to
be the
comingleadership,
s well as
full
publicsupport or the politicaland militarypoliciesof Francewereself-cancel-
ing efforts....
Immediately
fter ts
accession
to
power,Algeria
oined
the
Arab
League
and became
one
of its most
outspoken
anti-Israeli
members.'7
Algeria's
attitude
toward
its Jewish
population
was another
factor,
which con-
tributed
to its alienation
from
Israel.Anti-Semitism
was common
in
Algeria
during
the
colonial
era. It remained
an
article
of faith
of many
pieds noirs
who were
highly
influenced
by the proliferation
of anti-Jewish
propaganda
material.
Many
were
influ-
enced by
the
Protocols of
the Elders
of
Zion and other
anti-Semitic
books
that
origi-
nated in Europe. Probably the most popular anti-Jewish book during the 1950s was
La France
Juive, by
Edouard
Drumont.
There
were also
plays
and
shows ridiculing
the Jews,
which became
popular
among
the piedsnoirs.
According
to
Gabriel
Conesa,
the
pieds
noirs
had
greatly
admired the
play,
La
Passion de Notre
Seigneur
Jesus
Christ.
He recalled
that during
one of the performances,
the
crowd stamped
their feet
and shouted,
"Down
with the Jews
Down with
the Jews
Down "'8
The Israeli Government
had
repeatedly
expressed
grave
concern
about
the con-
dition
of the Jews
in
Algeria
and sought
to encourage
Jews to emigrate
before
the
French
withdrawal.
In
a
letter classified
"very
secret"
from
July
11,
1960,
an Israeli
Foreign
Ministry official
in Paris
warned
his
government
that the emergence
of an
independent
Algerian
state might
lead to the
abolition
of the Cremieux
Decree
of 1870,
which
granted
the Jews
the status
of
citizens
of the
French
republic.
He warned
that
the Jews
would
become ordinary
Algerian
citizens
and
thus lose their
identity.
He
called
upon
the
government
to embark
on
urgent
measures
designed
to
encourage
their emigration.'9
The covert
action
taken
by
the emissaries
of the Jewish Agency
and
the
Israeli
intelligence
community
to
encourage
Jews to leave
were not well
re-
ceived
by
Algerian
authorities,
who
regarded
such activities
as
interference
in
Algeria's
domestic affairs.
Scattered
over
ninety
cities
and
villages
throughout
Algeria,
the Jews
were
an
essential part
of
the
Algerian
economy
and
many
were well
versed
in French
as
well
as
in Arabic.
Their
emigration
was
regarded
by
the
Algerian
regime
as a
serious
blow
to the
economy.
Concerned
about
their
fate,
the Israeli
Government began
mobilizing
world public
opinion.
For
example,
in
her
trip
to
Sweden
in
May 1961,
Golda
Meir
expressed
Israel's
wish
for a
peaceful
settlement
of the
Algerian
conflict,
saying
that
Israel
was
deeply
concerned
about
the
fate of
the Jews
in that
country.20
Although
17.
Gideon
Rafael,
Destination
Peace:
Three
Decades
of
Israeli
Foreign
Policy:
Personal
Memoir,
(New
York:
Stein
&
Day, 1981),
pp.
79-80.
18.
Gabriel
Conesa,
Bab el Oued,(Paris:
Rene
Julliard,1972),
p.
620.
19.
Vered
o
Meroz,
ISA
941/6,
July
11,
1960.
20. British
Ambassador
n Stockholm
to Home,
PRO
FO/371, 157754,
ER103142/1,
May
16,
1961.
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* MIDDLE AST OURNAL
they
were
recognized
as
equal
to
all
Algeriancitizens,
the Jews had little faith n
the
FLN and most
of them decided
to
leave
en masse
to
France and
Israel.21
Of
the
130,000
Jews
living
in
Algeria
prior
o
independence nly
35,000
were
left.22
The anti-Jewishattitudewas commonamong Algeriangovernment ircles.23
Anti-Jewish
entiments
persisted
n
Algeria
after
independence
nd thus
reinforced
the negative
attitude
owardthe Jewish State. Houari
Boumedienne,
who came
to
power
n
1965,
after
overthrowing
resident
Muhammad hmedBen
Bella,
encour-
aged
such
sentiments.
He exerted
pressure
n Third
World ountries uch as
Cuba
o
severtheirdiplomatic
elations
with
Israel.24Moreover,
n his
determination
o rid his
country
of
foreigninfluence,
Boumedienne elieved
many
officials
of the
previous
regime
from their
positions.
Among these were Egyptians,
Marxists
and
Jews.25
BILATERAL ELATIONS
UNDER
BEN
BELLA
AND
BOUMEDIENNE
Ben
Bella,
who
came
to
power
in
Algeria
after the
French
withdrawal, ave
immediate ecognition
o
the PalestineLiberation
Organization
PLO) andadhered o
the radicalconvictionprevalent
t thattime
in
the ArabworldthatIsraelhadno right
to exist. He explicitly
said thatIsrael
was
an
artificial tateand
thereforemustdisap-
pear.26However,Algeria's
rhetoricaboutIsrael and Zionism
rarelymatched ts ac-
tions.
Algerianpoliticians
had shown
unmistakable
ragmatic
endenciesand never
allowed theirnational nterest o be adverselyaffectedby their officially declared
policy
toward srael.27
his
became
abundantly
lear
shortly
afterAlgeria's ndepen-
dence.
WhenWest
Germany
nnounced
ts
decisionto recognize
he Stateof Israel n
March1965,theArabstatesheld
a
meeting n whichthey agreed
o recall heirambas-
sadors
n
Bonn;
sever
diplomatic
ies with West
Germany,
f it decidedto establish
diplomatic
elations
with
Israel;considereffective meansforan economicboycottof
21. See accountof this episode in YehudaBen Ari, "HisulKehilatAlgeria" ['The Liquidation f
Algerian
Jewry"],
Gesher,
Vol.
IV,
No.
33, (December
1962),pp.
61-65;
David
Sitton,
Contemporary
Sephardi
Communities,
Hebrew],(Jerusalem:
Ahva, 1982),
pp.153-154.
22.
Ma'ariv, (Tel
Aviv),
June
28, 1962.
23. In a
conversationwith the
British
Ambassador n
Algiers, FerhatAbbas said thathe
had
always
told his
Jewishfriendsthat
the
establishmentof a Jewish
state
in
an Arab
countrywas
"intolerable."
Evans to Beith,
PROFO/371,
173138,
VP1051/1, January2,
1962.
24. Jerusalem
Post,
December
28, 1978.
25.
Nachman
List,
"Mishtar
Boumedienne
Be-Algeria
"
("Boumedienne's
Regime
in
Algeria:Pre-
liminary
Summaries"),
Molad,
Vol.
23, (1965), p.
155.
26. Al Ahram,(Cairo),May 2, 1965.
27.
Ben-Gurionhad once
remarked
n
his address
o the
Knesset
that,during
his
visit to
Algeria
in
the springof 1963,
Nasir was
displeased
withAlgeria's
attempts o preserve
ts
independenceand its
links with other
Maghrebcountries
and,
therefore,did not
attend hebanquet
given in
his honor.The
only "positive"
result of his visit
was that
he
managed to secure
Ben Bella's
signatureon a
joint
declarationon
the liberation
of Palestine.
Reply by
the Prime
Minister,MrDavid
Ben-Gurion
o the
Knesset
Foreign Affairs Debate.
State
of
Israel,
GovernmentPress Office.
PRO
FO/371, 170519,
ER1022/13, May 13, 1963.
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ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 623
WestGermany nd reassesstheirrelationswith any countrywhich decidedto recog-
nize Israel. When the participantswere asked to vote on the resolution,Morocco,
Libya, and Tunisiaexpressedreservations bout the first two points while Algeria
approved f all pointsandsevered ts diplomatic ies withBonn.28Nevertheless,Alge-
ria eft
an opening or reconciliationwithWestGermany.RadioAlgiersattackedTuni-
sia, saying hat t regrettedhe fact that"certainArab eadersplace short-term ational
interests bove hoseof theArabnationandsuccumb o the bribery f certain ccidental
countries."29 evertheless, heAlgerianGovernment id not encourageprotestsor
demonstrations gainstBonn.
Although ts radicalposition was more in line with that of Egypt, there were
clear indications hat
Algeria hoped
to
avoid a conflict
with
Tunisiaand West Ger-
many.When he announcedAlgeria's decision to support he resolutionspassed in
Cairo,Foreign
MinisterAbdelaziz
Bouteflika aid thatthe lack of consensus
among
the Arab states on this
matter,"proved
ach
country
could
express
tself
in
termsof
immediate nd
ong-range
nterests."30
owever,
e refrainedrom
attackingTunisia's
divergent
tand on the issue.
The
French
daily
Le Monde commentedon
Algeria's
behavior,saying
that the
planned
demonstrations
y
Palestiniansand Tunisians n
Algiers against
he WestGerman
Embassy
and TunisianPresidentHabib
Bourguiba,
scheduled
o take
place
on March18 of that
year,
had nevermaterialized.
ccording
to the
newspaper,
his
proved
"the
Algeriangovernment's
esireto do
nothing
which
would embitter ts relationswith Tunisiaand even FederalGermany."31 oreover,
when an EastGermanparliamentaryelegation
arrived
n
Algiers
on March
17, 1965,
Bouteflikadid not commithimself to extend
recognition
o the East German
egime,
saying
thathis
government
id
not
examine
hat
question.
Sources
n
Algiers
made t
clear
that
the
visit was
"absolutely
ot
a
prelude
o
recognition"
f its
government.32
On March
20,
Hans
JurgenWischnewski, deputy
of the
West
German
Social
DemocraticParty
and President f the Association
or
Friendship
etweenWestGer-
manyandAlgeria,
visited
Algiers.Following
he visit he told the WestGerman
news-
paper
Neue
Ruhr
Zeitung
hat
"Algeria
will not
recognize
East
Germany
ven if she
seversrelationswith Bonn."33He saidthatwhile it was no longerpossible o prevent
Ben Bella from
recalling
his ambassador
n
Bonn,
no demonstrations
gainst
he
Ger-
man
Embassy
n
Algiers
would ake
place.Moreover,
outeflika
aid hat
Algeria
wanted
to
maintaineconomic and cultural
ies with
West
Germany
and
hoped
to limit the
crisis
in
the
MiddleEast.
This
pragmatic endency
was reinforced
y
the fact thatthe
West German
deputy
recommended
hat
his
government
eliver70 million German
marks
1 DM=US$.25
at the
time)
n
aid
to
Algeria
and
thatBonnrefrain
rom
object-
28. Area Handbook
or
Algeria, Richard
F. Nyrop et al.
(Washington
D.C.: US
Government
PrintingOffice,
1972),
p. 241.
29. TheMaghreb
Digest,
Vol. III,No. 5,
(May 1965), p.
38.
30. The
Maghreb
Digest
Vol
IV,
No 5, p. 39.
31. The
MaghrebDigest
Vol IV,
No 5, p. 39.
32. The
MaghrebDigest
Vol IV,
No 5, p.
40.
33. The
Maghreb
Digest Vol IV,
No 5, p.
40.
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624
*
MIDDLE AST
OURNAL
ing to Algeria'sentry
o the Common
Market.4
Algeria'sapproacho West
Germany
emainedmoderate ven afterthe crisis.
When
Bonn
supplied
sraelarms
n
lieu of
reparations,
hich t
pledged
o
pay
Holo-
caustsurvivors,Directorof the PoliticalAffairsDepartmentn theAlgerianForeign
Ministry
MouloudKassem
complainedmildly.
And when asked
by foreign
ournalists
why Algeria
did not
recognizeIsrael,
he found t
appropriate
o
explain
hathis
coun-
try
would
never do so even
if
all
Arab states
did,
because Ben Gurion had once
proposed
o de Gaulle
hat
Algeria
shouldbe
partitioned.35
t the same
time,
the
Alge-
rianGovernment
ontinued o reaffirm
ts
unqualified
upport
or the Palestinians.But
such enthusiastic
xpressions
of
solidarity
with the Palestinians
temmed
primarily
fromAlgeria's
determination ot to remain
n
the
margins
of
MiddleEastern
politics
and to avoidbeingovershadowed y Egypt.In a statement,which he made afterhis
return
rom he
Organization
f African
Unity'smeeting
of
foreign
ministers
n
Nairobi,
in
the
spring
of
1965,
Bouteflika aid
that he
Algerian
Governmentwas
committed o
the liberation
f Palestineno less than
Egypt
or
Syria.36
Supporting
he Palestinian
truggle
or
nationhood eemed
to
fit
very
well into
the
regime'srevolutionary
hilosophy.Addressing
a mass
rally
on
March
20, 1965,
Ben
Bella said thatthe Arabswould
never
accept
Israelas
afait
accompli,
no
matter
how
many
arms t received rom
he
imperialists.
He
added,
hat he
imperialistswould
never
be successful
n
imposing
he
"eternal
xistence"of Israelon the
Arabs.37 en
Bella even wentto the extentof sayingthathe waswilling to send ahundredhousand
soldiers
o liberate
Palestine.38
oumedienne hared he
same
opinion
oward
he Pal-
estiniansand
promised
not to
deviatefrom his
predecessor's
olicy.39
Notwithstanding
is
hostility oward srael,
Boumedienne eemed t wise to tune
down his
rhetoric
when
doing
so
seemed
n
Algeria's nterest.
Shortly
prior o his rise
to
power
he had a serious
conflict
with Ben
Bella about the
possible removal of
Bouteflika,
his
protege.
There
were
speculations hatBouteflika's
extremelyradical
attitude oward he Palestine
question
might
have caused
this
disagreement.40ware
of
the
overwhelming
nfluence
which
American
Jewry exertedon the US Govern-
ment,Boumedienneought o moderate heanti-Israelitatements f hisForeignMin-
ister.
However,
he intense
pan-Arab
entiments f thatperiodcompelled
him to inten-
sify
his criticism
against
sraeland to
promote he
Palestinian ause.Israel'sassocia-
tion
with SouthAfrica
urned t
into an
easy targetof criticismby the
Algerian egime
34. The
Maghreb
Digest,
Vol.
IV,
No.
5, p.
40.
35.
Bromeley
to
Scrivener,PRO
FO/371,
184100,
VP
1022/3, March
1, 1965.
36.
Ewart-Biggs
o
Foreign
Office,
PRO
FO/371,
184100,
VP1022/5,
March
12,
1965.
37. Haydayto Kay,PROFO/371, 184100,VP1022/6, March22, 1965.
38.
Ben
Bella's
statement
was
similar o
numerous
tatements
made
by
Libya's leader
Mu'ammar
al-
Qadhdafi,
who on
September
1,
1980, proposeda
union with
Syria,
threateningo
enlist as a Fida'i
in
Palestine,
f
his
proposal
were
rejected. n
both
cases
championing
he
Palestinian
ause fit
well
into
their
scheme of
transforming
he
Middle
Eastern
order,
n
which
they
would
become
central
igures.
Both
leaders
were
attempting
o
challenge
Egyptian
hegemony by
championing he
Palestinian
ause.
39. List,
"Boumedienne's
Regime,"p.
155.
40.
Bromeley
to
Scrivener,
PRO
FO/371,
184100,
VP1022/8,
June 7,
1965.
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ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 625
and
in
a debateover Apartheid n December9, 1966, the Algeriandelegateequated
Israel'spolicy to that of SouthAfrica and blamedboth for encouragingPortuguese
imperialismn Mozambique.4'
Algeria'scriticismof Israel ntensified urthern the wakeof the Six Day Warof
1967.TheAlgerianpresscompared he war o theAlgerian evolution nddescribed t
as a majorstep in the Arab struggleagainst mperialism.42 lgeriasent an infantry
battalion,artillery,and about 100 MiG aircraft o the war front, but they were de-
stroyedduring
he first
stage
of the war.
In
addition,
75 T-34
and T-54/55 medium
tankswerepreparedorshipmento Egypt,butthe warhad already nded.Moreover,
onJune6, Algeriasevered ts diplomatic elationswiththe US anddid not renew hem
until 1974. Boumedienne riticized he subsequent ease-fireagreementwith Israel.
He argued hat he peace negotiationsweredoomed o failure; hat he violentstruggle
againstIsrael
must
be total;
and
that
all
means, ncludingmilitaryaction, shouldbe
utilizedagainstIsrael,regardless
f
casualties.This,
he
said,shouldbe a protracted
warof attrition onductedmainlyby the Palestinians, ut withthe most activesupport
of the sisterArabstates.43
Boumedienne pplieda ThirdWorldrevolutionarydeology to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.Given
Algeria'sexperience
n
a war
of liberation,
his
deology
seemed
appro-
priateat that
ime. ZionismandIsrael
were regarded s agents
of
imperialism ndthe
Palestinianstruggle was compared o the
FLN's
war
of
liberationagainst French
colonialism.In an interviewwithjournalistEdmundGhareeb, ormerFLN leader
Mohammed
Yazid
expressed
his
government's
iew on the
Palestinianssue.
He
said
that
his
country
would
always
be
ready
to
assist
the Palestine iberationmovement
because
"we
feel part
of the Palestinian
eople."
He
added
hat
any peaceplan
hatdid
not recognize he Palestinians' ight
o self-determination
ouldnot
be
acceptable
nd
that
he best andmostrealistic
olutionwas to createa democratic alestinian
tate,
n
whichall inhabitants
would
ive
peacefully.Moreover,
Yazidadmitted hat
his
govern-
ment
had
all
along
been
assisting
he
Palestinians.He told Ghareeb:
Youcan stress the fact thatwe have trainedmanyPalestiniansn the military
field, including
aviation.Some
of them
are
known:Abu
Ali
lyad,
Abu
Jihad,
and
Abu
Sabri,
who were
trained n
Algeria,
and
hundreds f others.And we
have
also trained
Palestinians
n
other
fields,
in the economic and industrial
ields,
to
prepare
or the time when Palestine
will be
independent.
Following
the Six
Day War,
Boumedienne
met
with
Syrianrepresentatives
o
discuss
methods
by
which the Arabs
could increase
the terroristactivities
against
41.
"Statement
by Shlomo Hillel
in SpecialCommittee
on
Apartheid." SA 3992/2,
December9,
1966.
42. Area
Handbook
or Algeria, p. 247.
43. Area
Hanbook.
44.
See" Interview:
MohammedYazidon
Algeriaand the Arab-Israeli
Conflict,"Journal
of
Pales-
tine Studies,Vol.
, No. 2, (Winter
1972),
pp.
3-18.
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MIDDLE
AST OURNAL
Israel.4s
The FLN'sregime
had
publiclyexpressed
ts
position
on the Palestinian
uestion
in
a six-pointdocument upportinghe resistancemovementagainst mperialism nd
callingfor theliberation f Palestine.Y6
When the UN debated he
proposal
o send
a
fact-finding
mission
to the
occu-
pied territories
n
1968,
Israel
required
hatthe missionalso examine he conditionof
the Jews
in Arab countries.
n
response,
he
Algerianrepresentative
aid that Israel
had
set
conditions,
which it
knew
in
advancewere
unacceptable
or
the fulfillmentof
the humanitarian
ission.
He
argued
hat
by doing
so Israel
ought
o shirk ts
obliga-
tion to account
or
the
conditionsof
the
refugees,
which
resulted
rom ts
expansion-
ist policies.47Yet,
all
along,
Algerian
eaders
did
not lose
sight
of theirnational nter-
ests.TheAlgerian egimecontinuedo strive oward he restoration f its tieswiththe
US,
which were severedafterthe
Six
Day War,by appearing
s an
honestbroker
n
disputes
between
Israel and the
Palestinians,
who
resorted
o
hijacking
aircraft
n
order o
give publicity
o their
cause.
On
July 23, 1968,
an
Israeli
El Al
aircraft n its
way
fromRometo TelAviv was
hijackedby
Palestinian ommandosand
landed
n
Algeria.The Israeli
Government
was determined
o
free the
hostages
and
despitestrongobjection rom
Defense
Min-
isterMoshe Dayan,
PrimeMinisterLevi
Eshkoldecided o deal with thePalestinians
throughAlgerian
mediation.48
he
Algerian
Government
ad
openlysympathized
with
the Palestinian ommandos.49ts officialorgan,Al-Mujahid, rgued hat the seizure
of the aircraftwas
justified
since it
served
Israel's
militarygoals.50
At
the
same
time,
however, he AlgerianGovernmentought o appear s an honestbroker n
the deal to
release the aircraft
n
return
or what
it
describedas a
"humanitarianesture"by
Israel.The
episode
ended
up
with
Israel'sagreement o release ifteen
woundedguer-
rillawarriorsromIsraeliails.5'
Indeed, his operation arnedAlgeria he reputation f
an
arbiter
n MiddleEastern
disputes52
nd
paved
the
way
for
better elationswith
the
US.
Yetall
alongAlgeria
allegedlyprovided
ssistance
o the
Palestinians.
n
unidenti-
fied source
in
Paris told the Israeli
daily
Ma'ariv
correspondent
hat
Algeria was
trainingPalestinianso hijack civilian aircraft.According o this source, an aide to
Bouteflikaacted as a liaison
betweenthe AlgerianGovernment ndthe Palestinians
45.
Hadas to
Michael,ISA,
FO/3983/32, November
20, 1967.
46. Jean-Paul
Chagnollaud,Maghrebet
Palestine,
(Paris:
Sindbad,1977),
pp.176-177.
47.
Middle East
Record,
Vol.
IV,
(1968),
Edited
by
Daniel
Dishon,(Jerusalem:
srael
Universities
Press,
1973), p. 115.
48.
Moshe
Dayan, Storyof My
Life, (Jerusalem:
Edanim,
1976), p. 720.
49. Israel'sChief of Stafflaterrevealed hat he IDFhadplanned o carryouta rescueoperation o
free the
hostages
aboard he hijackedEl Al
plane.
Jerusalem
Post, July6, 1977.
50. Zeev Shiff
and Raphael
Rothstein,Fedayeen:
Guerrillas
Against Israel,
(New
York:
McKay,
1972), p. 132.
51. DanRaviv
andYossi
Melman,Every
Spy is a Prince:
The
CompleteHistoryof
Israel'sIntelli-
gence
Community,
Boston:Houghton
Mifflin,
1990), pp.
176-177.
52. Kameel
Nasr,Arab and
IsraeliTerrorism:The
Causes
andEffectsof
PoliticalViolence,
1936-
1993, (London:
McFarland,1997), p.
52.
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ALGERIA'S
OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 627
who were being trained
here.The person's
name was identifiedas Haj
Ali.3
More-
over,Algeriaprovided helter
o
Palestinians
who committed ctsof terrorism gainst
Israel.
In the autumn f 1968, the Israelimediareported hattheAlgerianswere train-
ing large
units
of
the Palestinian uerrilla rganization
atah
n
specialbases through-
out the country.54
imilar
reportsappeared
ater n the foreignmedia.Boumedienne
agreedto providemilitary raining o
membersof the Fatah
on condition hat they
operate
nsidePalestine.55 he notoriousMuhammad oudiaof
the radicalPalestinian
group Black Septemberwas reported o
have found refuge in Algeria. Boudia was
assassinatedby
Mossad agents, who placed
a bombin his car in Paris on June 28,
1973.56
Boumedienneontinued o show that
he was quiteenthusiastic bout upporting
the
Arab cause. Prior to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
Warhe
sought to prove to
Egypt
hathe was not seeking o replace
Nasiras the leaderof
the
Arabworldandthat
his sole desire
was to
join
the war effort
against
Israel.According
o
Western ntelli-
gence sources,
he
helped
n
coordinating
Arabwar activities
during
he Yom
Kippur
War.57
lgeria oined
the
war
effortby sendingan
armored
rigade
andsmallerauxil-
iary
forces to
Egypt.
In
addition,
t
deposited
$200
million with the Soviet Union in
order o finance
Egyptian
rms
purchases.58
oumedienne
wentto the extentof
telling
the
Soviets to
chargeAlgeria
for all Soviet
military
aid to the
Arabs.59Nevertheless,
evenBouteflika,who was morehostileto Israel hanhispredecessor,voidedalienat-
ing
the US.Alluding o
US air-lift o Israel
during
heYom
Kippur
War,
he once
argued
that
Egypt
and
Syria
had
proof
that
Portugal
ndSouth
Africa
supported
srael
during
that
war.'
He
avoided
mentioning
he
fact
that
the US used
Portuguese
ases
in
the
Azores
n order o
supply
armsand
equipment
o Israel.
Obviously,
Bouteflika ound
a more
convenient
arget
and blamed
the
Portuguese.
And
what
proved
moredeci-
sively
that he
Algerian
egimegave priority
o national nterests
ver
deological
con-
siderations
was the fact
that t showed
ittle enthusiasm
n
applying
he Arab
boycott's
regulations gainst
Israel.6'
t was
far less
risky
for
the
Algerianregime
o denounce
the cease-fireagreements rranged y US Secretary f StateHenryKissinger,n the
aftermath
f the Yom
KippurWar,by saying
that"as
far as
we
are
concerned,
here s
53.
Ma'ariv,September
22,
1970.
54.
Ma'aniv,October
21,
1968.
55.
New York
imes, December
31, 1968.
56.
Ian Black
andBenny
Morris, srael's
Secret
Wars:A Historyof
Israel's
Intelligence
Services,
(NewYork:GroveWeidenfeld,1991), p. 275.
57. Jerusalem
Post, December
4,
1973.
58.
Lt. GeneralSaad
el Shazly,
Crossing
the Suez, (San
Francisco:
AmericanMideast
Research,
1980),
p.
278.
59. Jerusalem
Post,
November
15, 1973.
60. Jerusalem
Post,
November 20, 1973.
61. Walter
HenryNelson
andTerenceC.F. Prittie,
TheEconomic
War
against
the
Jews, (New
York:
RandomHouse,
1977),
p. 45.
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628
*
MIDDLE
AST OURNAL
no
difference
betweena Jew and an
Israeli."62
Bouteflika,who served
at
that ime as
the
President
f the UN
General
Assembly
found
t less
risky
to lend verbal
support
o the
Palestinians,
ndwhen
PLO
Chairman
YasserArafataddressed he UN on November13, 1974, he introducedhim as the
"commander
n chief of the Palestinian
Revolution."63
srael
complained
hatat the
same
meeting
Bouteflika
enied ts
representative
he
right
o
speak.f4
When
Yugoslavia's
President osipBroz
Tito
paid
a
visit to
Algeria
on October
1977,
Boumedienne
oined
him in stating hat he
only
solution o the conflictwas a totalIsraeliwithdrawalrom
Arab
occupied
and
andthe
restoration f Palestinian
ights.65
The
Algerian
motion
n
the UN
Economic and Social Council to brand
Israel
racist
was
staved off
by the
Africannations."
Thesympathetic ronouncements adeby theAlgerianGovernment ere made
not only for
domestic
consumption esigned
o enhance
he
popularity
f
the regime
in
the eyes
of the
Algerianmasses,
but
also
to
embarrass he
Egyptians.There
was
little wonder
therefore,
hat when
Egyptian
President
Sadat embarked n his 1977
peace
initiative with
Israel,
which
resulted
n
the
1978
Camp David accords, the
Algerianswere
highly
critical
of
him, saying
thathis
visit to Jerusalemwas detrimen-
tal to the unity
of the
Arab world.67
Algeriaagreed o a number
f sanctionsagainst
Egypt and supported
he
ArabLeague'sdecisionto
sever diplomaticrelationswith
Cairo.The
Egyptiandiplomat
Boutros
Boutros-Ghali as
right
o
argue
hat he
Alge-
rian Government's ommitment o the Palestiniancause had its limits. He writes,
"Algeria
wants to
fight
Israelto the last
Egyptian oldier.. The zeal of the Algerian
brothers oward he Palestinian
question
s in
proportion
o
the
distance
hat
separate
Algeria
from Israel....The farther
away..
the
greater he zeal."68
Botrous-Ghali r-
gued
that
Algeria
accused
Egypt
of
"selling ts soul to America
at a time whenAlgeria
was selling its
oil
to
the same
country."69
While
it
would be
inaccurate o say that the
Algerianregime did not have
genuine sympathy
or
the Palestinian
cause,
it
would be
just as hard to refute the
argument
hat
the
Algerianssought to challenge
Egypt's leadership ole in the Arab
worldby usingthePalestinian ard.
62. Jerusalem
Post,
august
27,
1973.
63.
David
B. Tinnin
with
Dag
Christensen,The Hit
Team,
Boston:
Little,
Brown
& Company,
1976),
p. 226.
64.
Jerusalem
Post,
November
15,
1974.
65.
"Joint
ommunique ssued on
the
occasion of the visit
toAlgeria of
President
Tito of Yugosla-
via,
Algiers,"October
21, 1977."
International
Documents
on
Palestine,
1977,
(Beirut:Institute or
PalestineStudies, 1979), doc#168, p. 264.
66.
Jerusalem
Post,
May 13, 1978.
67.
"Communiquessued by the
Council of
Ministersof Algeria
stating
hatthevisit of
President
Sadat
contradicts he interests
and
unity
of
the Arab
people.
Algiers, November
20,
1977."Interna-
tional
Documentson
Palestine, 1977,
doc#302,
pp. 436-437.
68. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali,Egypt's
Road to
Jerusalem:A
Diplomat's
Story of the
Struggle or
Peace
in the
Middle
East,
(London:Random
House,
1997), p. 264.
69.
Boutros-Ghali p.
274.
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ALGERIA'S
OLICY OWARDS
SRAEL 629
RELATIONS
NDER
CHADLI
ENJEDID
By the
end of the 1970s,
there
were clear ndications
hat
Algeria
was becoming
less committedo aradicalanti-Israeli olicy and tsparticipationn theSteadfastness
and
Confrontation ront,
whichopposedSadat's
peace
initiativewith
Israel,was no
longer
taken as seriously.
This changeoccurred
on
February , 1979,
whenChadli
Benjedid
waselected
president
fter hedeath
of Boumedienne.
Until
thenAlgeriawas
officially
committed o
nonalignment. oumedienne's
egimewas sympathetic
o all
anti-colonialmovements
and Zionismwas regarded
s a tool of the imperialist
ow-
ers.
Therefore,
t
seemed
ogicalto
support
he PLO.However,
hissort of nonalign-
ment
was far
from
being genuine.
Moscow bore part
of
the responsibility
for
Boumedienne's ttitude.Anti-Zionismwas oneof themethodsby whichSovietPresi-
dent Leonid
Brezhenev
sought to gain
favorwith
Boumedienne.
Brezhenev
asked
Boumedienne
o
use
his
reputation
s a mediator
n orderto create
a
united
front
against
Israel,
which
he
described
as the "treacherousnemy."70 y
denouncing
he
West,Algeria
found
itself close to the
SovietUnion,
from
which it did not
seem to
benefit
much.
Nor was the communist deology popular
n
Algeria.
Friendship
with
the
Soviet Union
appealed
o
Boumedienne argely
due
to Moscow'sreputation
s a
leader
of
all
anti-colonial
movements.
Under
Benjedid,
Algeria
aspired
o
a more
genuine
form of
nonalignment.
t
became increasinglyactivein meetingsof organizations ttendedby Western oun-
tries.
Moreover,Algeria
began
to act
as an honest
broker
n
complicated
olitical
af-
fairs
n an
attempt
o
win Western
upport.
n
January 981,Algeria's
representatives
negotiated
he
release
of 52 American
hostages
who were held
in Iran for fifteen
months.
In October
1981,Algeria
was one
of fourteen
developing
countries
which
met
in
Cancun,Mexico,
to discuss
economic matters.
Algerian
delegates
attended
similar
meetings,
which
later
took
place
in New Delhi
and
in
Belgrade.
At the
same
time, Algeria's
relations
with
Egypt
had
gradually
mproved, specially
after
Sadat's
1981assassination.Algeriaalsosupportedhe FezPlan,adoptedata meetingof Arab
representatives
n 1982.71
This
meeting
was
significantly
more
moderate han
the
previous
ones.
Although
t called
upon
Israel
to withdraw
rom the
occupied
errito-
ries
and o dismantle
ts settlements
n theoccupied
erritories,
t
implicitly
ecognized
Israel'sright
o exist.
Algeria's
Foreign
Minister
was a
member
f the
Arab
delegation,
which
made
its
way
to
Washington
o discuss
the
plan.
In
addition,
Algeria
acted as
mediator
n the Lebanese
civil war.
Algeria's
more
moderateattitude
mproved
ts
standing
n the US and
the commercial
dealings
nvolving
the
sale of natural
as
in-
creased
considerably.Benjedid's
regime
had
demonstrated
reater
ensitivity
o
US
70.
"Message o
HawariBoumedien,
October
9, 1973).By
Leonid
L.
Brezhnev,
The
Israeli-Arab
Reader:
A Documentary
History
Of the
MiddleEast,
WalterLaqueur
and
BarryRubin,
(Eds.),
(New
York:
Facts on
File,
1985), p.
461.
71. An
Algerian
communique
tated
hat"Algeria emains
ready
and
firmly
nfavor
of
united
action
on the
basis
of the Fez declaration."
erusalem
Post,
May 19,
1983.
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630* MIDDLE AST OURNAL
mediationefforts
in
the Arab-Israeli
onflict,
and its anti-Israeli hetoricdiminished
considerably.
On his visit to
Washington
n
April 1985, Benjedid
said that his
country
wel-
comed anyinitiativewhich couldbringpeaceto the MiddleEast,but stated hatthe
Palestinian ssue
mustbe addressed
n
thiscontext.72
he
negotiations
etweenIsrael
and the
Arabs,
he
said,
should
be direct and based
on
Security
Council Resolution
242,
which calls
for the
exchange
of
land
for
peace.73Benjedid'spledge
to
support
Security
Council
Resolution
242
stood in
sharp
contrast o the
joint communique
issued eight yearsearlierby Algeria and PLO's official spokesman Abd al-Muhsin
Abu Mayzar,who visitedAlgeria
n
February 977.
In
thatcommunique, oth sides
stated hatthey
"affirmed heir
position
of
rejecting he SecurityCouncilResolution
242, whichobliterateshe fixednational ightsof the Palestinians eople ntheirhome-
land,
Palestine
and
emphasized
hatthis resolutiondoes not
represent
ithera work-
able
or a
just
or
an
acceptable
basis for the
solution
of
the
Palestine
problem,
which
s
theveryessence
of theArab-Zionistonflict n the
MiddleEast."74 learly,hischange
in
Algeria'spolicy
was
inextricably
ied to
Benjedid'spolicy
of
rapprochement
ith
the West
and the
"perestroika"
in
Algeria's foreign policy
orientation.
Commenting
on the
prospects
of better
relations
with
Algeria,
former
Deputy
Defense Minister
Shimon
Peres
once
said thatcountriesand
people
live
longerthan
their rulers,
and that there
is
no need to
suppose
that
improvement
n
the bilateral
relationswas an unrealistic xpectation.He argued hat several of the FLN leaders
showed
friendship
nd
respect
or
Israel,
but that
Boumedienne's egime suppressed
such voices.75
New YorkTimes
correspondent
udithMiller once
noted, that unlike the Irani-
ans,
the
Algerians
did not tend to blame
Israel
for
their misfortunes.
She
writes
"I
made
a mental note
of the
unusualreference o
the radicalIslamists'
Little Satan-
Israel.Algerians
ended ess thanother
Islamists o blameIsrael or theirwoes. There
were so manyotherconvenientvillainsathome and n nearbyFrance."76 esides,the
Algerians
were aware
of
the influence
of IsraeliandJewishelementson the formula-
tionof US foreignpolicy.As Yazid oldGhareeb, With ll duerespect o theAmerican
72.
Benjedid'sreluctance o lose the Palestinian
ard,
which
gave his
regime much
prestige
n the
Arab world,
persisted
despite his
liberalizationprogram.There
is little
wonder,therefore,
that
he
continued o
provideshelter
and
assistance o
Palestinian
ommandoswho were
on
sabotagemissions
to Israel.
Jerusalem
Post,
August
29,
1985.
73. "Review
of the Visit of
President
Benjedid of Algeria:
Transcript f a
White
House Press
Briefing,April 17, 1985 (Extract)."AmericanForeignPolicy CurrentDocuments1985, (Department
of
State,
Washington,1986), p.
534.
74. "Joint
communique ssued
on the
occasion of the visit to
Algeria
of
PLO
spokesman
Abd al-
Muhsin
Abu
Mayzar,
Algiers, February21,
1977,"
International
Documents on Palestine,
1977, p.
332.
75.
Shimon
Peres,
David's
Sling, (New
York:
Random
House, 1970), p. 288.
76.
Judith
Miller, God Has
Ninety-NineNames:
Reporting
rom A Militant
Middle East, (New
York:Simon &
Schuster,1996), p. 189.
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ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 631
people
I
feel that he Israelipresence here s very strong
andplays a determining ole
in US policy."77 Moreover, Algerians were fully aware of
Israel's expertise in science
and technologyand the benefitswhich normalization ithIsraelcould bring o their
country.Why then did they not immediately ollow in thesteps of Morocco,Tunisia,
and othercountries,which decided o normalize heir ies
with Israel?A close look at
the domesticpoliticalscene couldclarify he causeof theAlgerian egime'sobstinacy.
The reasonsfor Algeria's nability o come to terms
with the Jewish State are
inextricablyied to the inertiaof domesticpolitics,which
stifled he growthof democ-
racy, ncreased he popularity f the FIS and eft the military n controlof the govern-
ment.For
nearly hirtyyearsAlgeria
was
controlledby the
FLN in
a
most authoritar-
ian fashion. The fighters for Algeria's freedomestablisheda regime committed o
socialismandrevolution.Resistance o imperialismoomed arge nthe FLN'sforeign
policy
and
the commonrhetoric
quating mperialism
with Zionism
andIsrael
played
a
major ole
in
theparty's deology.The FLN'sregimeremained
argely nflexibleand
thus failed to adjust o the needs of the modem world.Attempting o live up to its
reputation s
the
champion
of
all revolutionary
movements,
and the
Palestinians n
particular,
he
regime
severed
ts
diplomatic
elations
with the
US,
which it
regarded
as
an
imperialistpower
that used Israel
as
a tool
in
an
attempt
o
suppress
he
Arab
masses. But
when
the regime'srevenues romhydrocarbon
uffered
n
1974, it was
forced to
ignore
ts
principles
and embarked n an effortto mendfences
with
Wash-
ington.
The
FLN's
regimeestablished
n
enormous
bureaucratic
pparatus, hichcould
no longer be supported
when oil
prices plummeted
during
he
mid-1980s. The at-
tempts
made
by Benjedid
o liberalize he
economy
resulted
n
sharp
rise
in
prices.
Corruption
ncreasedand
very
few benefited rom
the new
opportunities,
which
re-
sulted
from the liberalization f the
Algerianeconomy.Supported y
the
FLN,
the
government ureaucracy,
nd the
army,
he
regime
effectivelysuppressed
ll
political
parties.
And what made matters
worse was the lack of cultural
unity
manifested
by
the
mix
of
Arab,Berber,
ndFrench lements.
The
regime's
nability
o find a
remedy
to thepressingdomesticproblems esultedn anger hat ed to a decline nitspopular-
ity
and
to
the
spread
of militant
slam.
The dramatic
hanges
which occurred
during
he
mid-1980s,
which
manifested
themselves
n
the revival
of free trade
and
democratization
n the one handand n the
bankruptcy
f
authoritarianism
nd communism
n
the
other,
stood
in
sharp
contrast
to
the
Algerian egime'spoliticalagenda
and
oreignpolicy
orientation. he situation
t
the end
of the
1980s,
as
John Entelis
put it,
was that
"therewas an enormous
gap
between
revolutionary
hetoric
nd
the
oppressive
nature
f
Algeria's
domestic
politi-
cal economic
order.Fundamental
hange
was
required
n
both
nationaland
foreign
policy spheres
o reestablish
congruence
hat most
people
would
find
credible."78
77. MohammedYazid's
Interview,p. 15.
78.
JohnP.Entelis,"Islam,
Democracy,and
the State:
The
Reemergence
of
Authoritarian
olitics
in
Algeria," slamism
and Secularism
n NorthAfrica,
JohnRuedy
(Ed.), (London:
Macmillan,1994),
p.
226.
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632
*
MIDDLE
AST OURNAL
Shortly
after
his rise to
power,Benjedid
hadembarked n substantial eforms
designed
to move
the
country
oward
democracy.
The FLN was
separated
rom the
state,
and the
military
was neutralized.
However,by
October
1988,
domesticcondi-
tionsinAlgeriawereaggravatedo apointwhere healreadyunpopular LNcouldno
longer
maintain
n
control.
At that
point,
t
seemedas
if
Algeriamight
be on its
way
to
democracy.Benjedid's
reforms
provided
he
necessary ngredients
or
a workable
democracy,
and even
a new
constitution
was
introduced
n
February
1989.
These
changes,
as Entelis
noted,
had an
impact
on
the
country's
official
political
deology,
"but
t
also
signaled
a formalbreakwiththe
ideological
oundation f its
foreignpolicy
orientation,
based
as it was on
militantcollective self-reliance
among
Third
World
states
organizedalong
socialist
principles
of redestributive
ustice,
collectivization,
nationalization, lobalcartelization, ndWestern paybacks'orpast practicesof co-
lonial exploitation
and
pauperization."79
evertheless,despite
he
emergence
of new
parties
and
organizations,
he
FIS
was far
better
n
generating upport
or it
aims. Its
political agenda
was attractive ecause
it was tied to
Algerianpopular
and
political
culture.
The
FIS
embraced
Algerian
nationalism,
slamic
dentity,
evolutionary
eri-
tage,
and
ethnic
diversity.Therefore,
t won
the elections
of
June
1990.
However,
on
January 1,
1992
therewas a
coup againstBenjedid.
Martial aw was
declared,
ndon
March
4,
1992
the FIS was dissolved.
Benjedid'sreforms
weakened he
FLN
and ushered
n
a period of
greater
democracyand opennessin foreign policy. However,this processwas interrupted
and thus
slowed down the
openness
to the West and the
normalization f relations
with
Israel.The
riots of
October1988
broughtmartial aw and caused the death
of
many
FIS'
sympathizers
nd
therebygave greaterpopularity o that party.The FIS
managed
o
remain
popular
due to its
grassroots ctivities hroughouthe
country.
n
mosques
and ocal
gatherings
FIS'
representativespoke
n the
nameof Islamic
radi-
tion,
criticized
he
government's
orruption
nd its
associationwith the West.
Despite
the
effortsof the
military-backedovernment nd the
formaldisso-
lution of the FIS
in
March
1992, that partyremained he most powerful
and most
popularoppositiongroup,even afterthe arrestof its leaders,Ali Belhaj andAbbassi
Madani.Boudiaf's assassinationn
June1992was a clear testimony o the
powerof
the Islamic establishment
n
Algeria's highest militarycommandstructure.80
here
was
little wonder
therefore, hat
the
authoritarianegime, which disbanded he FIS,
would be sensitive
to
criticism from its
Islamic rivals and would thereforerefrain
from
open
associationwith
the Westandwith Israel n particular. he
inabilityof the
Algerian leaders to embarkon such a daringcourse of action as
grantingofficial
recognitiono
the
Stateof Israel
was reinforced y the fact thatthelegitimacyof the
regime ackedsolidfoundations.
Whereas he Moroccanmonarchywas always den-
79. John
P.Entelis,"Islam,
Democracy,and
the State:The
Reemergence
of
Authoritarian olitics in
Algeria,"
slamismand
Secularism
n
North
Africa,
John
Ruedy(Ed.), (London:
Macmillan,
1994),p.
228.
80. John P.
Entelis,
"Islam,
Democracy,and the
State:The
Reemergence
of
Authoritarian
olitics
in
Algeria,"
p.
243.
8/10/2019 Abadi Algeria_s Policy Towards Israel - Pragmatism and Rhetoric 20
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ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 633
tified with ProphetMuhammad nd the
King enjoyed a unique religious aura,the
legitimacyof the Algerian eadershipwas basedsolely on the FLN's role in Algeria's
war of liberation gainstFrench olonialrule.The fact that he religiouspartieswere
left out of the politicalgame made t easierfor the FIS to claim thatthe regimewas
anti-Islamic.8"
nwilling
o be
exposed
to such criticism, he Algerianregimekept a
low profile n its ties with the US and avoideda dialoguewith Israel.
The pragmatic endencyof the Algerian
regime had clearly manifested tself
during
he
1991
Gulf
War,
when the
Algerian
mediacondemned he US-led coalition,
which in its view was designed to support srael's aggression n the region. Press
editorialsaccusedwhat
they regarded
s a
double-standard S policy
in
the Middle
East,arguing hat he demand hatIraqwithdraw romKuwaithad to be accompanied
by a similardemand hatIsraelwithdraw romAraboccupied and.
Torn
between he
need to maintainnormal
relationswith the US and to prevent he FIS from gaining
greaterpopularity, enjedidwas compelled
o criticizethe US. However,he resisted
the demandmade
by
the FIS to
open
military amps
n
order o trainsoldiers
willing
to
fight
for the
Iraqi
ause.
Benjedid
wished o appear
n
the
eyes
of American fficials
as an honestbroker
n the
conflict.
He
later ndicated hat
he
tried
o
convincePresi-
dent
George
H.W. Bush to
agree
to
hold
an international onference o discuss
the
Arab-Israeli onflict
in
return
or
Iraqiconsent
to withdraw rom Kuwait.82
Algeria'sattitude
oward srael
mproved
omewhat
afterthe
autonomy
accord
with the Palestinians,but the tensiondid not subside. In the summerof 1991, the
Egyptianpaper
Misr
al-Qanah
had
reported
hat
the Egyptian
Government eceived
information
egarding
n Israeli
plan
to
destroy
he
Algerian
nuclear
reactor n
Ain
Ousseara.83 uch
reportskept
the
Algerian
Government ostile
to Israel.The main
reason or
the
hostility,however,
emained he
Palestinianssue. On
August28, 1991,
Algeria'sForeignMinister,
Lakhdar
Brahimi,
old
Le
Figaro
thatthe
only stumbling
block
on the
way
to normalization
f relations
with Israelwas
the
Palestinian
ques-
tion.
He drewa
parallel
between
sraelandSouth
Africa,saying,
"Wewant o see a De
Klerk
n
Tel
Aviv."
4
Algeria'seconomicwoes forced t to moderatets standon the Palestinianssue
and when US
Secretary
of
State
James A. Baker
III visited
the
country
n
August
1991, Benjedid gave
him
assurance
hat he would
support
he Middle
East
peace
process.85
In
the spring
of
1993,
Radio
Algiers
blamed
he
Mossadand the Jewish
B'nai
B'rith
organization
or
supplyingweapons
to
Algerian
errorists.86
evertheless,
he
81.
Mary-Jane
Deeb, "Islam
and the Statein Algeria and Morocco:
A
Dialectical
Model,"
Ruedy,
Ed. Islamismand Secularism n NorthAfrica,p. 286.
82.
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,
InterArab
Relations,"
MiddleEast Contemporary
urvey,Vol.
XV,
(1991), Ami
Ayalon(Ed.),
(Boulder,CO:
Westview
Press,
1993),
p. 168, note number
4.
83. Algiers
Radio Broadcast
n Arabic.
July2, 1991. FBIS-NES-91-128,
July3,
1991.
84.
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