Abadi Algeria_s Policy Towards Israel - Pragmatism and Rhetoric 20

8/10/2019 Abadi Algeria_s Policy Towards Israel - Pragmatism and Rhetoric 20

1/27

Algeria's Policy toward Israel: Pragmatism and RhetoricAuthor(s): Jacob AbadiSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 616-641Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329818Accessed: 18/03/2009 05:53

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2/27

Algeria's

PolicyToward

srael:

Pragmatism

nd

Rhetoric

JacobAbadi

Thisarticle is an

analysis of

Algerian-Israeli elations.The author

argues

that

Algeria

did

not

come to

termswith

Israel

largely

due to the

rigidityof

theFLN's

(Frontde Libe'ration

ational) ideology

and to the

popularityof

the

Islamic

parties

in

that

country.

At the same

time,

however,

he

argues

that

a

pragmatic

tendency

n

Algeria'sforeign olicy

was evident

ince the

1960s and

thatpolitical

and economicreasons

orced

the

Algerianregime

o becomemore

lexible

in

its

attitude

toward the

Arab-Israeli

conflict

and to

moderate ts

attitude

toward

Israel.

FormerIsraeliPrimeMinister

Yitzhak

Shamir nce

boasted hatunder

his

right-wing

Likudgovernment srael

managed

o

break he walls

surrounding

t

by

establishing

diplomatic

ies with most

countries.

A

similar

statement

was

made

by

former

Labor

PrimeMinisterYitzhakRabin n

one of his

speeches

to

the Knesset.1

ndeed,by

the

early

1990s,

Israel

managed

o

establish

diplomatic

ies with

most

countries

n

Asia

andAfrica.And whenthe

Middle

East

peace

process

appeared

o have

gained

momen-

tum toward he

middle of the

decade,

even the

Muslim

countriesof

North Africa

began

warmingup

to Israel.

Morocco,

Tunisia,

and

Mauritania

ecame

receptive

o

the idea of

establishing iplomatic ies with

Israel,

and

even

Libyamoderated

ts anti-

Israeli

stand.

Yet, despite

the

progressmade

in

the peace

processand the

growing

recognition

among

these

countries hat

coming to

termswith Israel

was no

longer

as

risky as

it hithertohad

been,Algeria

remained

one of the

last countries o

consider

sucha possibility. t wasonlywhenIsrael'sPrimeMinisterEhudBarakmetAlgeria's

President

AbdelazizBouteflika

t

Moroccan

KingHasan

R's

funeral, n July

25,

1999,

that comments

about

rapprochement ere

made.

Why Algeria

remainedone of

the last

countries o

consider

the possibility

of

normalizingelations

with

Israel s the

question

whichthis

article

attemptso

answer.

It

argues

hat

Algeria's

reluctance

o

mend

fences with

Israelwas a

consequence

of

several

actors:

Algeria's

colonial

egacy; he

Franco-Israeli

ollaboration uring

1954-

Dr.JacobAbadi is a professorof MiddleEasternHistoryat theUnited StatesAir ForceAcademy

in

Colorado

Springs,

CO. He is

the

authorof

the books

Britain's

Withdrawal

rom

the

MiddleEast

1947-1971:

The

Economicand

Strategic

mperatives,

nd

Israel's

Leadership:

From

Utopiato

Crisis.

In

addition,Dr. Abadi

has written

numerous

articles

dealingwith

Middle Eastern

affairs.

1.

Yitzhak

Shamir,

Summing

Up: An

Autobiography,

Boston:Little

Brown&

Co.,

1994), p.

252;

Knesset

Proceedings,

July 13,

1992.

MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

*

VOLUME

56, NO. 4,

AUTUMN

2002


3/27

ALGERIA'S

OLICY OWARDS

SRAEL

617

1962,

whenAlgeria

fought

for its

independence;

nd

the ascendancy

f militant

s-

lamicparties

n thatcountry.

Algeria's

attitude

oward srael

wasin large

measure

determined

y its colonial

experience.

The leadersof

the FLN (Front

de

Liberation

National),who

assumed

positions

of leadership

fter

he country's

ndependence

n 1962,

were traumatized

y

their ong

struggle

against

French

colonialrule,

and, therefore,

hatred

of colonialism

occupied

a centralpart

n theirworldview.

srael's

association

withFrance

and

Great

Britainduring he

Suez

Affairof 1956

reinforced

he notion

among

he FLN's eaders,

that

imperialism

and Zionism

conspired

o suppress

all liberation

movements.

The

persistence

f

the Cold Warand

the

increasing

Soviet

influence

n

Algeria

reinforced

that trend.

Despiteits declared ommitmento nonalignment, lgeria's oreignpolicyori-

entation

was

clearly

pro-Soviet

during

he

Cold

War

years.The

FLN regarded

Mos-

cow as the champion

of

all revolutionary

movements.

Consequently,

he

notionthat

Zionism

was associated

with

imperialism

ersisted,

and the

hostility oward

he

Jew-

ish State

ntensified.

Algeria'saversion

o Zionism

apered

ff somewhat

fter he

end

of the Cold

Warandthe demise

of

the

Soviet

Unionby

the late 1980s,

butno meaning-

ful

dialogue

betweenthe

two countries

had

yet

takenplace.

The Algerian

regime's

failureto

transform

tself into a true

democracyhad a

negative

mpact

on

potential

bilateral

elations.Moreover,

heoverwhelming ower

of

the IslamicSalvationFront Front slamiquede Salut,or FIS),which since the early

1990s

had

been locked

in

a

furiousbattle

against

the

military-backed

uthoritarian

regime,

discouraged

heAlgerian

eaders

rom

taking

measures

o

improve

relations.

THE

EARLYYEARS

That

Algeria's

policy

toward

sraelwas

far more

radical han

thatof

any

other

country

n

North

Africa

was

largely

due to

its bitter

struggle

against

France

and

the

historicalmemory

of the

FLN's

leaders,

who never

orgot

he

Franco-Israeli

ollabo-

rationduring

hatperiod.

In

the

first decade

of its

existence,

Israelmaintained

lose

friendship

with

France

whilethe atter

was

occupying

Algeria.

Cooperation

ith

France

was a

high priority

on the

agenda

of the

Israeli

ForeignMinistry

n those

days.

This

was

largely

because

Israel

had

virtually

no

country

romwhich

it could

procure

rms

other

than

France.

Realizing

that

the

only

way

to

prolong

such

cooperation

was

to

assist

France

n its

struggle against

the

Algerian

rebels,

the Israeli secret

services

began

supplying

France

with

vital

information

bout he

rebels,

their

supply

sources,

andtheir

raining

amps

n

Arab

countries.

Both

the

Frenchdefense

establishment

nd

the PrimeMinister'sBureaurecognized he importance f such information nden-

couraged

he

Israelis o

expand

heir

ntelligence

activities

n

Algeria.

The French

ven

explored

he

possibility

of

delivering

arms

o Israel

hroughAlgeria.2

The Israeli

intelligence

services

began

working

closely

with the

French,

and

2. Mordechai

Bar-On,

The Gates of Gaza:

Israel's

Road

to

Suez

and

Back, (New

York: St.

Martin's

Press, 1995),

pp.

167-168.


4/27

618

*

MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL

Israelis

came to

Algeria

for

training

as

helicopter

pilots,

in

orderto

fight guerrilla

warriors

who

infiltrated srael rom

Egyptian

bases.

In

return,

srael

supplied

France

with informationaboutEgyptiancooperationwith the FLN.3In an interviewwith

Sylvia

Crosbie,

Paul

Grossin,

a

leading

French

security

igure,

had revealed hat

Is-

raeli

ntelligence

ourceshad

begun

providing

he

French

nformation

bout

Egyptian

PresidentGamal'Abd

al-Nasir's

nvolvement n

Algeriasince the

summerof

1955.4

Israel'sPrimeMinisterDavid

Ben

Gurionbelieved

hat t

was

largely

due to

its conflict

with

Algeria

that

Francewas

willing

to

support

srael.

And as one

observer

com-

mented,

"themore

ntense he

rebellion

n

Algeria

grew,

he closer

did the

rapproche-

ment and the mutual

understanding

etween the

two

democracies,

old and

the

new,

become."5The

Franco-Israeli

ooperation

ntensified

n

January

1960,

when

Gener-

als YitzhakRabinandChaimHerzogvisitedAlgeria oobserveFrenchparatroopersn

action

in

the

Kabylie

mountains.

The Israeli

Government

ncouraged

he

100,000

Jews who

lived

in

Algeria

at

that

ime,

to

provide

all

possibleassistance o

the

French,

including

nformation n the

activitiesof the

FLN.

According

o Seymour

Hersh,

his

gave

the

Israelis

remendous

everage

n

France,

not

only

for

purchasing

rms

there

but also for

obtaining

French

support

or the

constructionof

a nuclear

reactor n

Israel.6

In

August1957,

membersof

the FLN

appealed

o Israel

for

support n

theUN

General

Assembly's

debate on

Algeria's

future.

However,

Israel

refused and

voted

againstAlgeria'smembershipntheUN. Thismiscalculationy the Israeliswasbound

to have a serious

effect on

bilateral

elations

or

years

to

come.7

Israel's

nvolvement

in

Algerianaffairs

created

unexpected

omplications

otonly

with the

FLN,

butalso

with

the French.On

February3,

1958, an

IsraeliB-17

plane

andedat

Bone,

Algeria.

The

plane

was

forced down

by the

French

authorities

nd

was not

allowed to

return

to Israel until

the arms on

boardwere

confiscated.

Rumors

hadquickly

spread hat

Israel

was

supportinghe

Algerian

rebels,but

BenGurion

hought t

wise

todeny

their

veracity.

n

his

statement o

the

Knesseton

March

4,

1958, he

argued

hatIsrael

had

purchasedhe arms froman Americancompanyandthatthey were destinedfor a

Latin

American

country.He

went on

to argue

that the

French

authoritieshad

been

informed hat he

plane

would

and n

Algiers

andDakar

on its

way,but

Paris ailed

to

notify the

Algerian

authorities.

Deputy

Defense

MinisterShimon

Peres,who

was

closely

involved

n

arms

procurement

rom

France,

xplained

hat

sraelhadno

choice

3.

DavidBen

Gurion,

he

FirstPrime

Minister:

Selected

Documents,

1947-1963),Yemima

Rosenthal

(Ed.),

(Jerusalem: srael

State

Archives,

1966), p. 321. 4.

SylviaCrosbie,A TacitAlliance:Franceand

Israelfrom

Suez

to

the

Six-Day

War,

Princeton,

New

Jersey:

Princeton

University

Press,

1974),

p.

58.

5.

Meron

Medzini,

Ha-Yehudiyah

a-ge'ah:

Golda

Me'ir

ve-hazon

Yisra'el

[The

Proud

Jewess:

Golda

Meir and

the

Vision of

Israel],

(Jerusalem:

Edanim,

1990), p.

239.

6.

SeymourM.

Hersh,The

Samson

Option:

srael's

NuclearArsenal

and

American

Foreign

Policy,

(New

York:

Random

House,

1991),

p.

36-37.

7.

Benjamin

Beit-Hallahmi,

The

Israeli

Connection:

Who

Israel

Arms

and

Why,

New

York:Pan-

theon,

1987), pp. 44-45.


5/27

ALGERIA'S OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 619

but to

fly

over North

Africa,

n

order o avoiddetectionby

hostilecountries.8Unwill-

ing to antagonize he

French,Ben Gurionstated that he would understandf they

would not allow the

planeto continue o LatinAmerica.Ben Gurion'sannouncement

was received with skepticism n Frenchparliamentaryircles, which argued hat he

was deceivedby his subordinates nd thatthe plane did in

fact carryweapons o the

Algerian ebels.9All along,Ben Gurion emained onvinced

hat heAlgerian ebellion

enhanced srael's

friendshipwith France.He believedthat

once the rebellionended

the Frenchwould

keep distance rom Israel.

The

Franco-Israeliapprochementontinued o alienate he Algeriannational-

ists.While heruling

Mapai Labor) arty efrainedrompublicly upportingheFrench

during

he

conflict,

he

right-wing

Herut

freedom) pposition

party

ed

by Menachem

Begin did not hide its convictionthat supportingFrance

was essential for Israel's

survivaland security.One of Herut's

eaders,Ya'acovMeridor,had once admitted

openly

thathis

party

upported

ranceon the

Algeria

ssue

"because he alliancewith

France s more

mportanthan dealism."''0

One of the rare

opportunities

n

which

a verbalencounter ook

place

between

an

Algerian

andIsraeli

representatives

ccurredn

1958,when the

FLN

was

in

the midst

of

its struggleagainst

he

French.

The

AlgerianSecretary

f

the Arab

League,

Ferhat

Abbas,approached

srael's

Foreign

Minister

Golda

Meir,

who

attended

meeting

of

African

representatives,

nd said:

Mrs.

Meir, your

country

s

being

armed

by France,

he

arch-enemy

f all those

who sit around he

table,

a

government

hat

s

fighting

a ruthless

and

brutalwar

againstmy people

and that uses terror

againstmy

black brethren.How do

you

justify your

intimacy

with

a

power

that s the

primary

oe of the self-determina-

tion

of

the

African

people?"

GoldaMeir

responded

by saying,

"I

do not share

your

hatred or FrenchPresi-

dent

de

Gaulle,

but let me tell

you

the

truth-whether or not

you

like to hear t:

if

de

Gaullewere thedevilhimself,I wouldregardt as thedutyof my governmento buy

arms romthe

only

sourceavailable o us.""

Algeria's

disapproval

f Israel's ies with

Francehad a

damaging

effect on

Israel's

ies

with most Africancountries.This be-

came obvious

n the

spring

of

1960,

when

Israelwas not invited

o the annual

meeting

of African

representatives

n

New

York,

due to a

protest

made

by

the

Algerianrepre-

sentative

who

argued

that

Israel maintained ies

with his

country's mperialist

en-

8. See

Peres' account

of this episode

in MattiGolan,Shimon

Peres:

A

Biography, New

York:St.

Martin'sPress,

1982), pp. 78-80.

9. British

Embassy n Tel Aviv

to Foreign

Office,Public

RecordOffice (hereafter

PRO),

London.

FO/371,

16407, ER103183,

February ,

1962.

10. Cited in MichaelBrecher,

TheForeign Policy System

of

Israel:

Setting,

Images,Process,

New

Haven:Yale

UniversityPress,

1972), p.

173.

11. Golda Meir, My

Life, (New

York:Putnam's

Sons, 1975), pp.

326-327.


6/27

620

* MIDDLE AST OURNAL

emy.'2 ForeignMinistry

officials in Jerusalemwere

fully

awareof the

damaging

f-

fect

which ties

with Francehad on

Israel's

relationswith the African tates.

However,

they regarded

he

link with France

as far more

essential

o

Israel'snational

ecurity.'3

What ntensified hetension n thebilateral elationswas the fact thatIsrael's

activities

in

Algeria

did not remainconfined to

cooperation

with France.In

1961-

1962,

there were

reports

that

Israel

supported

he

French OAS

(Organisation

de

l'Armee

Secrete)

movement

n

Algeria,

an

ultra-rightistrganization

f French ettlers

that

ought

o

prolong

French

ule

n

Algeria.

Whatbound srael o that

group

was that

both

had identical nterest

n

prolonging

Frenchrule.

However,

ordialrelationswith

Francewere so

high

on the

Israeli national

agenda

that when the OAS

approached

Israeli ntelligenceagents

with

the request

hat

Israelhelp

in

theirplan to assassinate

GeneralCharlesde Gaulle,notonlydid the Israelisrefuse,but also alerted he French

Government

o that

danger.'4

The

idea

of collaborationwith

the

OAS

appealed

o

some Israeli eftists

who favored

better elationswith

Algeria.According

o Uri

Avneri,

editorof the radical

and

controversial

HaOlam

HaZeh

weekly magazine,Ben Gurion

backed

one faction within the OAS

whose membersadvocated

partitionof Algeria

into Muslimand

European reas,

but there s no

evidenceto support hatclaim.'5

Members

of the

OAS

were known to

have had

great

admiration

or Israel.

Thus,forexample,Jean-Jacquesusini admiredhe "fanaticism f the Jews in Pales-

tine"andtheir

passionate

ttachmento the soil.

He believed hat he Frenchandother

European ettlers(known by the sobriquet, ieds noirs) were too soft compared o

the

Israelis,

andhe advocated he

formation f a

"JewishHaganah, civil armypow-

erful and with

conviction,

which

wouldregainMuslimconfidence rom the F.L.N.,

and

carryalong

the

Europeans..

to seize

power

n

Algeria, n order o assume t one

day

in France."'6

Commenting

n the difficult

choice whichIsraelhadto makeduring

Algeria'swar of independence,nIsraeliForeignMinistryofficial writes:

12. Michael Comay to ForeignMinistry.(Michael Comay was the first deputyof the Director

Generalof the Israeli

Foreign

Ministry),

Israel

State

Archives,

Jerusalem.

Hereafter,

SA) 3301/22,

April 16,

1960.

13. Walter

Eytan

to Haim Yahil

(Walter

Eytan

was the

Director General

of the Israeli

Foreign

Ministry

and Haim Yahil was the

Deputy Head of the Israeli

PurchasingMission in

Germany), SA

2350/3,

September12, 1960.

14. The

assassination

attempt

was

planed to take

place

during

de Gaulle's

visit to

Algeria

in

February

1963.

Accordingto the

proposed

plan, Israel was

asked to train

an IsraeliArab

who was to

assassinatede

Gaulle.

According

o the

group's

calculations,

he

publicwould

be led to believe

that he

assassin

was sent

by

the FLN.

The members

of the

group

were

convincedthat he

assassinationwould

trigger mmense hatredagainstthe FLN andits struggleto freeAlgeria, andthereby he atmosphere

would

be favorable

o seizureof

power

byAlgerie

FranVaise.

For

detailsabout he

scheme see

Michael

Bar Zohar,

Spies

in the

PromisedLand:Iser

Harel

and the

Israeli Secret

Service,

(Boston:

Houghton

Mifflin, 1972),

pp.

225-230.

15. MichaelM.

Laskier,"Israeland

Algeria

amidFrench

Colonialismand

the

Arab-Israeli

Conflict,

1954-1978," srael

Studies,Vol.

6, No. 2

(Summer

2001), p. 7.

16.

Cited

n

Alistair

Home, A

Savage

Warof

Peace:Algeria

1954-1962,

(New

York:Viking,

1977),

p. 485.


7/27

ALGERIA'S

POLICY

TOWARDS

ISRAEL

* 621

Israel

ried

o meet

the dilemma

with

anambivalent

olicy,

which

Dr.

Weizmann

used

to call 'warm

rost'. Some

cautious

overtures

o Algerian

politicians,

erro-

neously

believed

by

Israeliexperts

to

be the

comingleadership,

s well as

full

publicsupport or the politicaland militarypoliciesof Francewereself-cancel-

ing efforts....

Immediately

fter ts

accession

to

power,Algeria

oined

the

Arab

League

and became

one

of its most

outspoken

anti-Israeli

members.'7

Algeria's

attitude

toward

its Jewish

population

was another

factor,

which con-

tributed

to its alienation

from

Israel.Anti-Semitism

was common

in

Algeria

during

the

colonial

era. It remained

an

article

of faith

of many

pieds noirs

who were

highly

influenced

by the proliferation

of anti-Jewish

propaganda

material.

Many

were

influ-

enced by

the

Protocols of

the Elders

of

Zion and other

anti-Semitic

books

that

origi-

nated in Europe. Probably the most popular anti-Jewish book during the 1950s was

La France

Juive, by

Edouard

Drumont.

There

were also

plays

and

shows ridiculing

the Jews,

which became

popular

among

the piedsnoirs.

According

to

Gabriel

Conesa,

the

pieds

noirs

had

greatly

admired the

play,

La

Passion de Notre

Seigneur

Jesus

Christ.

He recalled

that during

one of the performances,

the

crowd stamped

their feet

and shouted,

"Down

with the Jews

Down with

the Jews

Down "'8

The Israeli Government

had

repeatedly

expressed

grave

concern

about

the con-

dition

of the Jews

in

Algeria

and sought

to encourage

Jews to emigrate

before

the

French

withdrawal.

In

a

letter classified

"very

secret"

from

July

11,

1960,

an Israeli

Foreign

Ministry official

in Paris

warned

his

government

that the emergence

of an

independent

Algerian

state might

lead to the

abolition

of the Cremieux

Decree

of 1870,

which

granted

the Jews

the status

of

citizens

of the

French

republic.

He warned

that

the Jews

would

become ordinary

Algerian

citizens

and

thus lose their

identity.

He

called

upon

the

government

to embark

on

urgent

measures

designed

to

encourage

their emigration.'9

The covert

action

taken

by

the emissaries

of the Jewish Agency

and

the

Israeli

intelligence

community

to

encourage

Jews to leave

were not well

re-

ceived

by

Algerian

authorities,

who

regarded

such activities

as

interference

in

Algeria's

domestic affairs.

Scattered

over

ninety

cities

and

villages

throughout

Algeria,

the Jews

were

an

essential part

of

the

Algerian

economy

and

many

were well

versed

in French

as

well

as

in Arabic.

Their

emigration

was

regarded

by

the

Algerian

regime

as a

serious

blow

to the

economy.

Concerned

about

their

fate,

the Israeli

Government began

mobilizing

world public

opinion.

For

example,

in

her

trip

to

Sweden

in

May 1961,

Golda

Meir

expressed

Israel's

wish

for a

peaceful

settlement

of the

Algerian

conflict,

saying

that

Israel

was

deeply

concerned

about

the

fate of

the Jews

in that

country.20

Although

17.

Gideon

Rafael,

Destination

Peace:

Three

Decades

of

Israeli

Foreign

Policy:

Personal

Memoir,

(New

York:

Stein

&

Day, 1981),

pp.

79-80.

18.

Gabriel

Conesa,

Bab el Oued,(Paris:

Rene

Julliard,1972),

p.

620.

19.

Vered

o

Meroz,

ISA

941/6,

July

11,

1960.

20. British

Ambassador

n Stockholm

to Home,

PRO

FO/371, 157754,

ER103142/1,

May

16,

1961.


8/27

622

* MIDDLE AST OURNAL

they

were

recognized

as

equal

to

all

Algeriancitizens,

the Jews had little faith n

the

FLN and most

of them decided

to

leave

en masse

to

France and

Israel.21

Of

the

130,000

Jews

living

in

Algeria

prior

o

independence nly

35,000

were

left.22

The anti-Jewishattitudewas commonamong Algeriangovernment ircles.23

Anti-Jewish

entiments

persisted

n

Algeria

after

independence

nd thus

reinforced

the negative

attitude

owardthe Jewish State. Houari

Boumedienne,

who came

to

power

n

1965,

after

overthrowing

resident

Muhammad hmedBen

Bella,

encour-

aged

such

sentiments.

He exerted

pressure

n Third

World ountries uch as

Cuba

o

severtheirdiplomatic

elations

with

Israel.24Moreover,

n his

determination

o rid his

country

of

foreigninfluence,

Boumedienne elieved

many

officials

of the

previous

regime

from their

positions.

Among these were Egyptians,

Marxists

and

Jews.25

BILATERAL ELATIONS

UNDER

BEN

BELLA

AND

BOUMEDIENNE

Ben

Bella,

who

came

to

power

in

Algeria

after the

French

withdrawal, ave

immediate ecognition

o

the PalestineLiberation

Organization

PLO) andadhered o

the radicalconvictionprevalent

t thattime

in

the ArabworldthatIsraelhadno right

to exist. He explicitly

said thatIsrael

was

an

artificial tateand

thereforemustdisap-

pear.26However,Algeria's

rhetoricaboutIsrael and Zionism

rarelymatched ts ac-

tions.

Algerianpoliticians

had shown

unmistakable

ragmatic

endenciesand never

allowed theirnational nterest o be adverselyaffectedby their officially declared

policy

toward srael.27

his

became

abundantly

lear

shortly

afterAlgeria's ndepen-

dence.

WhenWest

Germany

nnounced

ts

decisionto recognize

he Stateof Israel n

March1965,theArabstatesheld

a

meeting n whichthey agreed

o recall heirambas-

sadors

n

Bonn;

sever

diplomatic

ies with West

Germany,

f it decidedto establish

diplomatic

elations

with

Israel;considereffective meansforan economicboycottof

21. See accountof this episode in YehudaBen Ari, "HisulKehilatAlgeria" ['The Liquidation f

Algerian

Jewry"],

Gesher,

Vol.

IV,

No.

33, (December

1962),pp.

61-65;

David

Sitton,

Contemporary

Sephardi

Communities,

Hebrew],(Jerusalem:

Ahva, 1982),

pp.153-154.

22.

Ma'ariv, (Tel

Aviv),

June

28, 1962.

23. In a

conversationwith the

British

Ambassador n

Algiers, FerhatAbbas said thathe

had

always

told his

Jewishfriendsthat

the

establishmentof a Jewish

state

in

an Arab

countrywas

"intolerable."

Evans to Beith,

PROFO/371,

173138,

VP1051/1, January2,

1962.

24. Jerusalem

Post,

December

28, 1978.

25.

Nachman

List,

"Mishtar

Boumedienne

Be-Algeria

"

("Boumedienne's

Regime

in

Algeria:Pre-

liminary

Summaries"),

Molad,

Vol.

23, (1965), p.

155.

26. Al Ahram,(Cairo),May 2, 1965.

27.

Ben-Gurionhad once

remarked

n

his address

o the

Knesset

that,during

his

visit to

Algeria

in

the springof 1963,

Nasir was

displeased

withAlgeria's

attempts o preserve

ts

independenceand its

links with other

Maghrebcountries

and,

therefore,did not

attend hebanquet

given in

his honor.The

only "positive"

result of his visit

was that

he

managed to secure

Ben Bella's

signatureon a

joint

declarationon

the liberation

of Palestine.

Reply by

the Prime

Minister,MrDavid

Ben-Gurion

o the

Knesset

Foreign Affairs Debate.

State

of

Israel,

GovernmentPress Office.

PRO

FO/371, 170519,

ER1022/13, May 13, 1963.


9/27


WestGermany nd reassesstheirrelationswith any countrywhich decidedto recog-

nize Israel. When the participantswere asked to vote on the resolution,Morocco,

Libya, and Tunisiaexpressedreservations bout the first two points while Algeria

approved f all pointsandsevered ts diplomatic ies withBonn.28Nevertheless,Alge-

ria eft

an opening or reconciliationwithWestGermany.RadioAlgiersattackedTuni-

sia, saying hat t regrettedhe fact that"certainArab eadersplace short-term ational

interests bove hoseof theArabnationandsuccumb o the bribery f certain ccidental

countries."29 evertheless, heAlgerianGovernment id not encourageprotestsor

demonstrations gainstBonn.

Although ts radicalposition was more in line with that of Egypt, there were

clear indications hat

Algeria hoped

to

avoid a conflict

with

Tunisiaand West Ger-

many.When he announcedAlgeria's decision to support he resolutionspassed in

Cairo,Foreign

MinisterAbdelaziz

Bouteflika aid thatthe lack of consensus

among

the Arab states on this

matter,"proved

ach

country

could

express

tself

in

termsof

immediate nd

ong-range

nterests."30

owever,

e refrainedrom

attackingTunisia's

divergent

tand on the issue.

The

French

daily

Le Monde commentedon

Algeria's

behavior,saying

that the

planned

demonstrations

y

Palestiniansand Tunisians n

Algiers against

he WestGerman

Embassy

and TunisianPresidentHabib

Bourguiba,

scheduled

o take

place

on March18 of that

year,

had nevermaterialized.

ccording

to the

newspaper,

his

proved

"the

Algeriangovernment's

esireto do

nothing

which

would embitter ts relationswith Tunisiaand even FederalGermany."31 oreover,

when an EastGermanparliamentaryelegation

arrived

n

Algiers

on March

17, 1965,

Bouteflikadid not commithimself to extend

recognition

o the East German

egime,

saying

thathis

government

id

not

examine

hat

question.

Sources

n

Algiers

made t

clear

that

the

visit was

"absolutely

ot

a

prelude

o

recognition"

f its

government.32

On March

20,

Hans

JurgenWischnewski, deputy

of the

West

German

Social

DemocraticParty

and President f the Association

or

Friendship

etweenWestGer-

manyandAlgeria,

visited

Algiers.Following

he visit he told the WestGerman

news-

paper

Neue

Ruhr

Zeitung

hat

"Algeria

will not

recognize

East

Germany

ven if she

seversrelationswith Bonn."33He saidthatwhile it was no longerpossible o prevent

Ben Bella from

recalling

his ambassador

n

Bonn,

no demonstrations

gainst

he

Ger-

man

Embassy

n

Algiers

would ake

place.Moreover,

outeflika

aid hat

Algeria

wanted

to

maintaineconomic and cultural

ies with

West

Germany

and

hoped

to limit the

crisis

in

the

MiddleEast.

This

pragmatic endency

was reinforced

y

the fact thatthe

West German

deputy

recommended

hat

his

government

eliver70 million German

marks

1 DM=US$.25

at the

time)

n

aid

to

Algeria

and

thatBonnrefrain

rom

object-

28. Area Handbook

or

Algeria, Richard

F. Nyrop et al.

(Washington

D.C.: US

Government

PrintingOffice,

1972),

p. 241.

29. TheMaghreb

Digest,

Vol. III,No. 5,

(May 1965), p.

38.

30. The

Maghreb

Digest

Vol

IV,

No 5, p. 39.

31. The

MaghrebDigest

Vol IV,

No 5, p. 39.

32. The

MaghrebDigest

Vol IV,

No 5, p.

40.

33. The

Maghreb

Digest Vol IV,

No 5, p.

40.


10/27

624

*

MIDDLE AST

OURNAL

ing to Algeria'sentry

o the Common

Market.4

Algeria'sapproacho West

Germany

emainedmoderate ven afterthe crisis.

When

Bonn

supplied

sraelarms

n

lieu of

reparations,

hich t

pledged

o

pay

Holo-

caustsurvivors,Directorof the PoliticalAffairsDepartmentn theAlgerianForeign

Ministry

MouloudKassem

complainedmildly.

And when asked

by foreign

ournalists

why Algeria

did not

recognizeIsrael,

he found t

appropriate

o

explain

hathis

coun-

try

would

never do so even

if

all

Arab states

did,

because Ben Gurion had once

proposed

o de Gaulle

hat

Algeria

shouldbe

partitioned.35

t the same

time,

the

Alge-

rianGovernment

ontinued o reaffirm

ts

unqualified

upport

or the Palestinians.But

such enthusiastic

xpressions

of

solidarity

with the Palestinians

temmed

primarily

fromAlgeria's

determination ot to remain

n

the

margins

of

MiddleEastern

politics

and to avoidbeingovershadowed y Egypt.In a statement,which he made afterhis

return

rom he

Organization

f African

Unity'smeeting

of

foreign

ministers

n

Nairobi,

in

the

spring

of

1965,

Bouteflika aid

that he

Algerian

Governmentwas

committed o

the liberation

f Palestineno less than

Egypt

or

Syria.36

Supporting

he Palestinian

truggle

or

nationhood eemed

to

fit

very

well into

the

regime'srevolutionary

hilosophy.Addressing

a mass

rally

on

March

20, 1965,

Ben

Bella said thatthe Arabswould

never

accept

Israelas

afait

accompli,

no

matter

how

many

arms t received rom

he

imperialists.

He

added,

hat he

imperialistswould

never

be successful

n

imposing

he

"eternal

xistence"of Israelon the

Arabs.37 en

Bella even wentto the extentof sayingthathe waswilling to send ahundredhousand

soldiers

o liberate

Palestine.38

oumedienne hared he

same

opinion

oward

he Pal-

estiniansand

promised

not to

deviatefrom his

predecessor's

olicy.39

Notwithstanding

is

hostility oward srael,

Boumedienne eemed t wise to tune

down his

rhetoric

when

doing

so

seemed

n

Algeria's nterest.

Shortly

prior o his rise

to

power

he had a serious

conflict

with Ben

Bella about the

possible removal of

Bouteflika,

his

protege.

There

were

speculations hatBouteflika's

extremelyradical

attitude oward he Palestine

question

might

have caused

this

disagreement.40ware

of

the

overwhelming

nfluence

which

American

Jewry exertedon the US Govern-

ment,Boumedienneought o moderate heanti-Israelitatements f hisForeignMin-

ister.

However,

he intense

pan-Arab

entiments f thatperiodcompelled

him to inten-

sify

his criticism

against

sraeland to

promote he

Palestinian ause.Israel'sassocia-

tion

with SouthAfrica

urned t

into an

easy targetof criticismby the

Algerian egime

34. The

Maghreb

Digest,

Vol.

IV,

No.

5, p.

40.

35.

Bromeley

to

Scrivener,PRO

FO/371,

184100,

VP

1022/3, March

1, 1965.

36.

Ewart-Biggs

o

Foreign

Office,

PRO

FO/371,

184100,

VP1022/5,

March

12,

1965.

37. Haydayto Kay,PROFO/371, 184100,VP1022/6, March22, 1965.

38.

Ben

Bella's

statement

was

similar o

numerous

tatements

made

by

Libya's leader

Mu'ammar

al-

Qadhdafi,

who on

September

1,

1980, proposeda

union with

Syria,

threateningo

enlist as a Fida'i

in

Palestine,

f

his

proposal

were

rejected. n

both

cases

championing

he

Palestinian

ause fit

well

into

their

scheme of

transforming

he

Middle

Eastern

order,

n

which

they

would

become

central

igures.

Both

leaders

were

attempting

o

challenge

Egyptian

hegemony by

championing he

Palestinian

ause.

39. List,

"Boumedienne's

Regime,"p.

155.

40.

Bromeley

to

Scrivener,

PRO

FO/371,

184100,

VP1022/8,

June 7,

1965.


11/27


and

in

a debateover Apartheid n December9, 1966, the Algeriandelegateequated

Israel'spolicy to that of SouthAfrica and blamedboth for encouragingPortuguese

imperialismn Mozambique.4'

Algeria'scriticismof Israel ntensified urthern the wakeof the Six Day Warof

1967.TheAlgerianpresscompared he war o theAlgerian evolution nddescribed t

as a majorstep in the Arab struggleagainst mperialism.42 lgeriasent an infantry

battalion,artillery,and about 100 MiG aircraft o the war front, but they were de-

stroyedduring

he first

stage

of the war.

In

addition,

75 T-34

and T-54/55 medium

tankswerepreparedorshipmento Egypt,butthe warhad already nded.Moreover,

onJune6, Algeriasevered ts diplomatic elationswiththe US anddid not renew hem

until 1974. Boumedienne riticized he subsequent ease-fireagreementwith Israel.

He argued hat he peace negotiationsweredoomed o failure; hat he violentstruggle

againstIsrael

must

be total;

and

that

all

means, ncludingmilitaryaction, shouldbe

utilizedagainstIsrael,regardless

f

casualties.This,

he

said,shouldbe a protracted

warof attrition onductedmainlyby the Palestinians, ut withthe most activesupport

of the sisterArabstates.43

Boumedienne pplieda ThirdWorldrevolutionarydeology to the Arab-Israeli

conflict.Given

Algeria'sexperience

n

a war

of liberation,

his

deology

seemed

appro-

priateat that

ime. ZionismandIsrael

were regarded s agents

of

imperialism ndthe

Palestinianstruggle was compared o the

FLN's

war

of

liberationagainst French

colonialism.In an interviewwithjournalistEdmundGhareeb, ormerFLN leader

Mohammed

Yazid

expressed

his

government's

iew on the

Palestinianssue.

He

said

that

his

country

would

always

be

ready

to

assist

the Palestine iberationmovement

because

"we

feel part

of the Palestinian

eople."

He

added

hat

any peaceplan

hatdid

not recognize he Palestinians' ight

o self-determination

ouldnot

be

acceptable

nd

that

he best andmostrealistic

olutionwas to createa democratic alestinian

tate,

n

whichall inhabitants

would

ive

peacefully.Moreover,

Yazidadmitted hat

his

govern-

ment

had

all

along

been

assisting

he

Palestinians.He told Ghareeb:

Youcan stress the fact thatwe have trainedmanyPalestiniansn the military

field, including

aviation.Some

of them

are

known:Abu

Ali

lyad,

Abu

Jihad,

and

Abu

Sabri,

who were

trained n

Algeria,

and

hundreds f others.And we

have

also trained

Palestinians

n

other

fields,

in the economic and industrial

ields,

to

prepare

or the time when Palestine

will be

independent.

Following

the Six

Day War,

Boumedienne

met

with

Syrianrepresentatives

o

discuss

methods

by

which the Arabs

could increase

the terroristactivities

against

41.

"Statement

by Shlomo Hillel

in SpecialCommittee

on

Apartheid." SA 3992/2,

December9,

1966.

42. Area

Handbook

or Algeria, p. 247.

43. Area

Hanbook.

44.

See" Interview:

MohammedYazidon

Algeriaand the Arab-Israeli

Conflict,"Journal

of

Pales-

tine Studies,Vol.

, No. 2, (Winter

1972),

pp.

3-18.


12/27

626

*

MIDDLE

AST OURNAL

Israel.4s

The FLN'sregime

had

publiclyexpressed

ts

position

on the Palestinian

uestion

in

a six-pointdocument upportinghe resistancemovementagainst mperialism nd

callingfor theliberation f Palestine.Y6

When the UN debated he

proposal

o send

a

fact-finding

mission

to the

occu-

pied territories

n

1968,

Israel

required

hatthe missionalso examine he conditionof

the Jews

in Arab countries.

n

response,

he

Algerianrepresentative

aid that Israel

had

set

conditions,

which it

knew

in

advancewere

unacceptable

or

the fulfillmentof

the humanitarian

ission.

He

argued

hat

by doing

so Israel

ought

o shirk ts

obliga-

tion to account

or

the

conditionsof

the

refugees,

which

resulted

rom ts

expansion-

ist policies.47Yet,

all

along,

Algerian

eaders

did

not lose

sight

of theirnational nter-

ests.TheAlgerian egimecontinuedo strive oward he restoration f its tieswiththe

US,

which were severedafterthe

Six

Day War,by appearing

s an

honestbroker

n

disputes

between

Israel and the

Palestinians,

who

resorted

o

hijacking

aircraft

n

order o

give publicity

o their

cause.

On

July 23, 1968,

an

Israeli

El Al

aircraft n its

way

fromRometo TelAviv was

hijackedby

Palestinian ommandosand

landed

n

Algeria.The Israeli

Government

was determined

o

free the

hostages

and

despitestrongobjection rom

Defense

Min-

isterMoshe Dayan,

PrimeMinisterLevi

Eshkoldecided o deal with thePalestinians

throughAlgerian

mediation.48

he

Algerian

Government

ad

openlysympathized

with

the Palestinian ommandos.49ts officialorgan,Al-Mujahid, rgued hat the seizure

of the aircraftwas

justified

since it

served

Israel's

militarygoals.50

At

the

same

time,

however, he AlgerianGovernmentought o appear s an honestbroker n

the deal to

release the aircraft

n

return

or what

it

describedas a

"humanitarianesture"by

Israel.The

episode

ended

up

with

Israel'sagreement o release ifteen

woundedguer-

rillawarriorsromIsraeliails.5'

Indeed, his operation arnedAlgeria he reputation f

an

arbiter

n MiddleEastern

disputes52

nd

paved

the

way

for

better elationswith

the

US.

Yetall

alongAlgeria

allegedlyprovided

ssistance

o the

Palestinians.

n

unidenti-

fied source

in

Paris told the Israeli

daily

Ma'ariv

correspondent

hat

Algeria was

trainingPalestinianso hijack civilian aircraft.According o this source, an aide to

Bouteflikaacted as a liaison

betweenthe AlgerianGovernment ndthe Palestinians

45.

Hadas to

Michael,ISA,

FO/3983/32, November

20, 1967.

46. Jean-Paul

Chagnollaud,Maghrebet

Palestine,

(Paris:

Sindbad,1977),

pp.176-177.

47.

Middle East

Record,

Vol.

IV,

(1968),

Edited

by

Daniel

Dishon,(Jerusalem:

srael

Universities

Press,

1973), p. 115.

48.

Moshe

Dayan, Storyof My

Life, (Jerusalem:

Edanim,

1976), p. 720.

49. Israel'sChief of Stafflaterrevealed hat he IDFhadplanned o carryouta rescueoperation o

free the

hostages

aboard he hijackedEl Al

plane.

Jerusalem

Post, July6, 1977.

50. Zeev Shiff

and Raphael

Rothstein,Fedayeen:

Guerrillas

Against Israel,

(New

York:

McKay,

1972), p. 132.

51. DanRaviv

andYossi

Melman,Every

Spy is a Prince:

The

CompleteHistoryof

Israel'sIntelli-

gence

Community,

Boston:Houghton

Mifflin,

1990), pp.

176-177.

52. Kameel

Nasr,Arab and

IsraeliTerrorism:The

Causes

andEffectsof

PoliticalViolence,

1936-

1993, (London:

McFarland,1997), p.

52.


13/27

ALGERIA'S

OLICY OWARDSSRAEL 627

who were being trained

here.The person's

name was identifiedas Haj

Ali.3

More-

over,Algeriaprovided helter

o

Palestinians

who committed ctsof terrorism gainst

Israel.

In the autumn f 1968, the Israelimediareported hattheAlgerianswere train-

ing large

units

of

the Palestinian uerrilla rganization

atah

n

specialbases through-

out the country.54

imilar

reportsappeared

ater n the foreignmedia.Boumedienne

agreedto providemilitary raining o

membersof the Fatah

on condition hat they

operate

nsidePalestine.55 he notoriousMuhammad oudiaof

the radicalPalestinian

group Black Septemberwas reported o

have found refuge in Algeria. Boudia was

assassinatedby

Mossad agents, who placed

a bombin his car in Paris on June 28,

1973.56

Boumedienneontinued o show that

he was quiteenthusiastic bout upporting

the

Arab cause. Prior to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli

Warhe

sought to prove to

Egypt

hathe was not seeking o replace

Nasiras the leaderof

the

Arabworldandthat

his sole desire

was to

join

the war effort

against

Israel.According

o

Western ntelli-

gence sources,

he

helped

n

coordinating

Arabwar activities

during

he Yom

Kippur

War.57

lgeria oined

the

war

effortby sendingan

armored

rigade

andsmallerauxil-

iary

forces to

Egypt.

In

addition,

t

deposited

$200

million with the Soviet Union in

order o finance

Egyptian

rms

purchases.58

oumedienne

wentto the extentof

telling

the

Soviets to

chargeAlgeria

for all Soviet

military

aid to the

Arabs.59Nevertheless,

evenBouteflika,who was morehostileto Israel hanhispredecessor,voidedalienat-

ing

the US.Alluding o

US air-lift o Israel

during

heYom

Kippur

War,

he once

argued

that

Egypt

and

Syria

had

proof

that

Portugal

ndSouth

Africa

supported

srael

during

that

war.'

He

avoided

mentioning

he

fact

that

the US used

Portuguese

ases

in

the

Azores

n order o

supply

armsand

equipment

o Israel.

Obviously,

Bouteflika ound

a more

convenient

arget

and blamed

the

Portuguese.

And

what

proved

moredeci-

sively

that he

Algerian

egimegave priority

o national nterests

ver

deological

con-

siderations

was the fact

that t showed

ittle enthusiasm

n

applying

he Arab

boycott's

regulations gainst

Israel.6'

t was

far less

risky

for

the

Algerianregime

o denounce

the cease-fireagreements rranged y US Secretary f StateHenryKissinger,n the

aftermath

f the Yom

KippurWar,by saying

that"as

far as

we

are

concerned,

here s

53.

Ma'ariv,September

22,

1970.

54.

Ma'aniv,October

21,

1968.

55.

New York

imes, December

31, 1968.

56.

Ian Black

andBenny

Morris, srael's

Secret

Wars:A Historyof

Israel's

Intelligence

Services,

(NewYork:GroveWeidenfeld,1991), p. 275.

57. Jerusalem

Post, December

4,

1973.

58.

Lt. GeneralSaad

el Shazly,

Crossing

the Suez, (San

Francisco:

AmericanMideast

Research,

1980),

p.

278.

59. Jerusalem

Post,

November

15, 1973.

60. Jerusalem

Post,

November 20, 1973.

61. Walter

HenryNelson

andTerenceC.F. Prittie,

TheEconomic

War

against

the

Jews, (New

York:

RandomHouse,

1977),

p. 45.


14/27

628

*

MIDDLE

AST OURNAL

no

difference

betweena Jew and an

Israeli."62

Bouteflika,who served

at

that ime as

the

President

f the UN

General

Assembly

found

t less

risky

to lend verbal

support

o the

Palestinians,

ndwhen

PLO

Chairman

YasserArafataddressed he UN on November13, 1974, he introducedhim as the

"commander

n chief of the Palestinian

Revolution."63

srael

complained

hatat the

same

meeting

Bouteflika

enied ts

representative

he

right

o

speak.f4

When

Yugoslavia's

President osipBroz

Tito

paid

a

visit to

Algeria

on October

1977,

Boumedienne

oined

him in stating hat he

only

solution o the conflictwas a totalIsraeliwithdrawalrom

Arab

occupied

and

andthe

restoration f Palestinian

ights.65

The

Algerian

motion

n

the UN

Economic and Social Council to brand

Israel

racist

was

staved off

by the

Africannations."

Thesympathetic ronouncements adeby theAlgerianGovernment ere made

not only for

domestic

consumption esigned

o enhance

he

popularity

f

the regime

in

the eyes

of the

Algerianmasses,

but

also

to

embarrass he

Egyptians.There

was

little wonder

therefore,

hat when

Egyptian

President

Sadat embarked n his 1977

peace

initiative with

Israel,

which

resulted

n

the

1978

Camp David accords, the

Algerianswere

highly

critical

of

him, saying

thathis

visit to Jerusalemwas detrimen-

tal to the unity

of the

Arab world.67

Algeriaagreed o a number

f sanctionsagainst

Egypt and supported

he

ArabLeague'sdecisionto

sever diplomaticrelationswith

Cairo.The

Egyptiandiplomat

Boutros

Boutros-Ghali as

right

o

argue

hat he

Alge-

rian Government's ommitment o the Palestiniancause had its limits. He writes,

"Algeria

wants to

fight

Israelto the last

Egyptian oldier.. The zeal of the Algerian

brothers oward he Palestinian

question

s in

proportion

o

the

distance

hat

separate

Algeria

from Israel....The farther

away..

the

greater he zeal."68

Botrous-Ghali r-

gued

that

Algeria

accused

Egypt

of

"selling ts soul to America

at a time whenAlgeria

was selling its

oil

to

the same

country."69

While

it

would be

inaccurate o say that the

Algerianregime did not have

genuine sympathy

or

the Palestinian

cause,

it

would be

just as hard to refute the

argument

hat

the

Algerianssought to challenge

Egypt's leadership ole in the Arab

worldby usingthePalestinian ard.

62. Jerusalem

Post,

august

27,

1973.

63.

David

B. Tinnin

with

Dag

Christensen,The Hit

Team,

Boston:

Little,

Brown

& Company,

1976),

p. 226.

64.

Jerusalem

Post,

November

15,

1974.

65.

"Joint

ommunique ssued on

the

occasion of the visit

toAlgeria of

President

Tito of Yugosla-

via,

Algiers,"October

21, 1977."

International

Documents

on

Palestine,

1977,

(Beirut:Institute or

PalestineStudies, 1979), doc#168, p. 264.

66.

Jerusalem

Post,

May 13, 1978.

67.

"Communiquessued by the

Council of

Ministersof Algeria

stating

hatthevisit of

President

Sadat

contradicts he interests

and

unity

of

the Arab

people.

Algiers, November

20,

1977."Interna-

tional

Documentson

Palestine, 1977,

doc#302,

pp. 436-437.

68. Boutros

Boutros-Ghali,Egypt's

Road to

Jerusalem:A

Diplomat's

Story of the

Struggle or

Peace

in the

Middle

East,

(London:Random

House,

1997), p. 264.

69.

Boutros-Ghali p.

274.


15/27

ALGERIA'S

OLICY OWARDS

SRAEL 629

RELATIONS

NDER

CHADLI

ENJEDID

By the

end of the 1970s,

there

were clear ndications

hat

Algeria

was becoming

less committedo aradicalanti-Israeli olicy and tsparticipationn theSteadfastness

and

Confrontation ront,

whichopposedSadat's

peace

initiativewith

Israel,was no

longer

taken as seriously.

This changeoccurred

on

February , 1979,

whenChadli

Benjedid

waselected

president

fter hedeath

of Boumedienne.

Until

thenAlgeriawas

officially

committed o

nonalignment. oumedienne's

egimewas sympathetic

o all

anti-colonialmovements

and Zionismwas regarded

s a tool of the imperialist

ow-

ers.

Therefore,

t

seemed

ogicalto

support

he PLO.However,

hissort of nonalign-

ment

was far

from

being genuine.

Moscow bore part

of

the responsibility

for

Boumedienne's ttitude.Anti-Zionismwas oneof themethodsby whichSovietPresi-

dent Leonid

Brezhenev

sought to gain

favorwith

Boumedienne.

Brezhenev

asked

Boumedienne

o

use

his

reputation

s a mediator

n orderto create

a

united

front

against

Israel,

which

he

described

as the "treacherousnemy."70 y

denouncing

he

West,Algeria

found

itself close to the

SovietUnion,

from

which it did not

seem to

benefit

much.

Nor was the communist deology popular

n

Algeria.

Friendship

with

the

Soviet Union

appealed

o

Boumedienne argely

due

to Moscow'sreputation

s a

leader

of

all

anti-colonial

movements.

Under

Benjedid,

Algeria

aspired

o

a more

genuine

form of

nonalignment.

t

became increasinglyactivein meetingsof organizations ttendedby Western oun-

tries.

Moreover,Algeria

began

to act

as an honest

broker

n

complicated

olitical

af-

fairs

n an

attempt

o

win Western

upport.

n

January 981,Algeria's

representatives

negotiated

he

release

of 52 American

hostages

who were held

in Iran for fifteen

months.

In October

1981,Algeria

was one

of fourteen

developing

countries

which

met

in

Cancun,Mexico,

to discuss

economic matters.

Algerian

delegates

attended

similar

meetings,

which

later

took

place

in New Delhi

and

in

Belgrade.

At the

same

time, Algeria's

relations

with

Egypt

had

gradually

mproved, specially

after

Sadat's

1981assassination.Algeriaalsosupportedhe FezPlan,adoptedata meetingof Arab

representatives

n 1982.71

This

meeting

was

significantly

more

moderate han

the

previous

ones.

Although

t called

upon

Israel

to withdraw

rom the

occupied

errito-

ries

and o dismantle

ts settlements

n theoccupied

erritories,

t

implicitly

ecognized

Israel'sright

o exist.

Algeria's

Foreign

Minister

was a

member

f the

Arab

delegation,

which

made

its

way

to

Washington

o discuss

the

plan.

In

addition,

Algeria

acted as

mediator

n the Lebanese

civil war.

Algeria's

more

moderateattitude

mproved

ts

standing

n the US and

the commercial

dealings

nvolving

the

sale of natural

as

in-

creased

considerably.Benjedid's

regime

had

demonstrated

reater

ensitivity

o

US

70.

"Message o

HawariBoumedien,

October

9, 1973).By

Leonid

L.

Brezhnev,

The

Israeli-Arab

Reader:

A Documentary

History

Of the

MiddleEast,

WalterLaqueur

and

BarryRubin,

(Eds.),

(New

York:

Facts on

File,

1985), p.

461.

71. An

Algerian

communique

tated

hat"Algeria emains

ready

and

firmly

nfavor

of

united

action

on the

basis

of the Fez declaration."

erusalem

Post,

May 19,

1983.


16/27

630* MIDDLE AST OURNAL

mediationefforts

in

the Arab-Israeli

onflict,

and its anti-Israeli hetoricdiminished

considerably.

On his visit to

Washington

n

April 1985, Benjedid

said that his

country

wel-

comed anyinitiativewhich couldbringpeaceto the MiddleEast,but stated hatthe

Palestinian ssue

mustbe addressed

n

thiscontext.72

he

negotiations

etweenIsrael

and the

Arabs,

he

said,

should

be direct and based

on

Security

Council Resolution

242,

which calls

for the

exchange

of

land

for

peace.73Benjedid'spledge

to

support

Security

Council

Resolution

242

stood in

sharp

contrast o the

joint communique

issued eight yearsearlierby Algeria and PLO's official spokesman Abd al-Muhsin

Abu Mayzar,who visitedAlgeria

n

February 977.

In

thatcommunique, oth sides

stated hatthey

"affirmed heir

position

of

rejecting he SecurityCouncilResolution

242, whichobliterateshe fixednational ightsof the Palestinians eople ntheirhome-

land,

Palestine

and

emphasized

hatthis resolutiondoes not

represent

ithera work-

able

or a

just

or

an

acceptable

basis for the

solution

of

the

Palestine

problem,

which

s

theveryessence

of theArab-Zionistonflict n the

MiddleEast."74 learly,hischange

in

Algeria'spolicy

was

inextricably

ied to

Benjedid'spolicy

of

rapprochement

ith

the West

and the

"perestroika"

in

Algeria's foreign policy

orientation.

Commenting

on the

prospects

of better

relations

with

Algeria,

former

Deputy

Defense Minister

Shimon

Peres

once

said thatcountriesand

people

live

longerthan

their rulers,

and that there

is

no need to

suppose

that

improvement

n

the bilateral

relationswas an unrealistic xpectation.He argued hat several of the FLN leaders

showed

friendship

nd

respect

or

Israel,

but that

Boumedienne's egime suppressed

such voices.75

New YorkTimes

correspondent

udithMiller once

noted, that unlike the Irani-

ans,

the

Algerians

did not tend to blame

Israel

for

their misfortunes.

She

writes

"I

made

a mental note

of the

unusualreference o

the radicalIslamists'

Little Satan-

Israel.Algerians

ended ess thanother

Islamists o blameIsrael or theirwoes. There

were so manyotherconvenientvillainsathome and n nearbyFrance."76 esides,the

Algerians

were aware

of

the influence

of IsraeliandJewishelementson the formula-

tionof US foreignpolicy.As Yazid oldGhareeb, With ll duerespect o theAmerican

72.

Benjedid'sreluctance o lose the Palestinian

ard,

which

gave his

regime much

prestige

n the

Arab world,

persisted

despite his

liberalizationprogram.There

is little

wonder,therefore,

that

he

continued o

provideshelter

and

assistance o

Palestinian

ommandoswho were

on

sabotagemissions

to Israel.

Jerusalem

Post,

August

29,

1985.

73. "Review

of the Visit of

President

Benjedid of Algeria:

Transcript f a

White

House Press

Briefing,April 17, 1985 (Extract)."AmericanForeignPolicy CurrentDocuments1985, (Department

of

State,

Washington,1986), p.

534.

74. "Joint

communique ssued

on the

occasion of the visit to

Algeria

of

PLO

spokesman

Abd al-

Muhsin

Abu

Mayzar,

Algiers, February21,

1977,"

International

Documents on Palestine,

1977, p.

332.

75.

Shimon

Peres,

David's

Sling, (New

York:

Random

House, 1970), p. 288.

76.

Judith

Miller, God Has

Ninety-NineNames:

Reporting

rom A Militant

Middle East, (New

York:Simon &

Schuster,1996), p. 189.


17/27


people

I

feel that he Israelipresence here s very strong

andplays a determining ole

in US policy."77 Moreover, Algerians were fully aware of

Israel's expertise in science

and technologyand the benefitswhich normalization ithIsraelcould bring o their

country.Why then did they not immediately ollow in thesteps of Morocco,Tunisia,

and othercountries,which decided o normalize heir ies

with Israel?A close look at

the domesticpoliticalscene couldclarify he causeof theAlgerian egime'sobstinacy.

The reasonsfor Algeria's nability o come to terms

with the Jewish State are

inextricablyied to the inertiaof domesticpolitics,which

stifled he growthof democ-

racy, ncreased he popularity f the FIS and eft the military n controlof the govern-

ment.For

nearly hirtyyearsAlgeria

was

controlledby the

FLN in

a

most authoritar-

ian fashion. The fighters for Algeria's freedomestablisheda regime committed o

socialismandrevolution.Resistance o imperialismoomed arge nthe FLN'sforeign

policy

and

the commonrhetoric

quating mperialism

with Zionism

andIsrael

played

a

major ole

in

theparty's deology.The FLN'sregimeremained

argely nflexibleand

thus failed to adjust o the needs of the modem world.Attempting o live up to its

reputation s

the

champion

of

all revolutionary

movements,

and the

Palestinians n

particular,

he

regime

severed

ts

diplomatic

elations

with the

US,

which it

regarded

as

an

imperialistpower

that used Israel

as

a tool

in

an

attempt

o

suppress

he

Arab

masses. But

when

the regime'srevenues romhydrocarbon

uffered

n

1974, it was

forced to

ignore

ts

principles

and embarked n an effortto mendfences

with

Wash-

ington.

The

FLN's

regimeestablished

n

enormous

bureaucratic

pparatus, hichcould

no longer be supported

when oil

prices plummeted

during

he

mid-1980s. The at-

tempts

made

by Benjedid

o liberalize he

economy

resulted

n

sharp

rise

in

prices.

Corruption

ncreasedand

very

few benefited rom

the new

opportunities,

which

re-

sulted

from the liberalization f the

Algerianeconomy.Supported y

the

FLN,

the

government ureaucracy,

nd the

army,

he

regime

effectivelysuppressed

ll

political

parties.

And what made matters

worse was the lack of cultural

unity

manifested

by

the

mix

of

Arab,Berber,

ndFrench lements.

The

regime's

nability

o find a

remedy

to thepressingdomesticproblems esultedn anger hat ed to a decline nitspopular-

ity

and

to

the

spread

of militant

slam.

The dramatic

hanges

which occurred

during

he

mid-1980s,

which

manifested

themselves

n

the revival

of free trade

and

democratization

n the one handand n the

bankruptcy

f

authoritarianism

nd communism

n

the

other,

stood

in

sharp

contrast

to

the

Algerian egime'spoliticalagenda

and

oreignpolicy

orientation. he situation

t

the end

of the

1980s,

as

John Entelis

put it,

was that

"therewas an enormous

gap

between

revolutionary

hetoric

nd

the

oppressive

nature

f

Algeria's

domestic

politi-

cal economic

order.Fundamental

hange

was

required

n

both

nationaland

foreign

policy spheres

o reestablish

congruence

hat most

people

would

find

credible."78

77. MohammedYazid's

Interview,p. 15.

78.

JohnP.Entelis,"Islam,

Democracy,and

the State:

The

Reemergence

of

Authoritarian

olitics

in

Algeria," slamism

and Secularism

n NorthAfrica,

JohnRuedy

(Ed.), (London:

Macmillan,1994),

p.

226.


18/27

632

*

MIDDLE

AST OURNAL

Shortly

after

his rise to

power,Benjedid

hadembarked n substantial eforms

designed

to move

the

country

oward

democracy.

The FLN was

separated

rom the

state,

and the

military

was neutralized.

However,by

October

1988,

domesticcondi-

tionsinAlgeriawereaggravatedo apointwhere healreadyunpopular LNcouldno

longer

maintain

n

control.

At that

point,

t

seemedas

if

Algeriamight

be on its

way

to

democracy.Benjedid's

reforms

provided

he

necessary ngredients

or

a workable

democracy,

and even

a new

constitution

was

introduced

n

February

1989.

These

changes,

as Entelis

noted,

had an

impact

on

the

country's

official

political

deology,

"but

t

also

signaled

a formalbreakwiththe

ideological

oundation f its

foreignpolicy

orientation,

based

as it was on

militantcollective self-reliance

among

Third

World

states

organizedalong

socialist

principles

of redestributive

ustice,

collectivization,

nationalization, lobalcartelization, ndWestern paybacks'orpast practicesof co-

lonial exploitation

and

pauperization."79

evertheless,despite

he

emergence

of new

parties

and

organizations,

he

FIS

was far

better

n

generating upport

or it

aims. Its

political agenda

was attractive ecause

it was tied to

Algerianpopular

and

political

culture.

The

FIS

embraced

Algerian

nationalism,

slamic

dentity,

evolutionary

eri-

tage,

and

ethnic

diversity.Therefore,

t won

the elections

of

June

1990.

However,

on

January 1,

1992

therewas a

coup againstBenjedid.

Martial aw was

declared,

ndon

March

4,

1992

the FIS was dissolved.

Benjedid'sreforms

weakened he

FLN

and ushered

n

a period of

greater

democracyand opennessin foreign policy. However,this processwas interrupted

and thus

slowed down the

openness

to the West and the

normalization f relations

with

Israel.The

riots of

October1988

broughtmartial aw and caused the death

of

many

FIS'

sympathizers

nd

therebygave greaterpopularity o that party.The FIS

managed

o

remain

popular

due to its

grassroots ctivities hroughouthe

country.

n

mosques

and ocal

gatherings

FIS'

representativespoke

n the

nameof Islamic

radi-

tion,

criticized

he

government's

orruption

nd its

associationwith the West.

Despite

the

effortsof the

military-backedovernment nd the

formaldisso-

lution of the FIS

in

March

1992, that partyremained he most powerful

and most

popularoppositiongroup,even afterthe arrestof its leaders,Ali Belhaj andAbbassi

Madani.Boudiaf's assassinationn

June1992was a clear testimony o the

powerof

the Islamic establishment

n

Algeria's highest militarycommandstructure.80

here

was

little wonder

therefore, hat

the

authoritarianegime, which disbanded he FIS,

would be sensitive

to

criticism from its

Islamic rivals and would thereforerefrain

from

open

associationwith

the Westandwith Israel n particular. he

inabilityof the

Algerian leaders to embarkon such a daringcourse of action as

grantingofficial

recognitiono

the

Stateof Israel

was reinforced y the fact thatthelegitimacyof the

regime ackedsolidfoundations.

Whereas he Moroccanmonarchywas always den-

79. John

P.Entelis,"Islam,

Democracy,and

the State:The

Reemergence

of

Authoritarian olitics in

Algeria,"

slamismand

Secularism

n

North

Africa,

John

Ruedy(Ed.), (London:

Macmillan,

1994),p.

228.

80. John P.

Entelis,

"Islam,

Democracy,and the

State:The

Reemergence

of

Authoritarian

olitics

in

Algeria,"

p.

243.


19/27


tified with ProphetMuhammad nd the

King enjoyed a unique religious aura,the

legitimacyof the Algerian eadershipwas basedsolely on the FLN's role in Algeria's

war of liberation gainstFrench olonialrule.The fact that he religiouspartieswere

left out of the politicalgame made t easierfor the FIS to claim thatthe regimewas

anti-Islamic.8"

nwilling

o be

exposed

to such criticism, he Algerianregimekept a

low profile n its ties with the US and avoideda dialoguewith Israel.

The pragmatic endencyof the Algerian

regime had clearly manifested tself

during

he

1991

Gulf

War,

when the

Algerian

mediacondemned he US-led coalition,

which in its view was designed to support srael's aggression n the region. Press

editorialsaccusedwhat

they regarded

s a

double-standard S policy

in

the Middle

East,arguing hat he demand hatIraqwithdraw romKuwaithad to be accompanied

by a similardemand hatIsraelwithdraw romAraboccupied and.

Torn

between he

need to maintainnormal

relationswith the US and to prevent he FIS from gaining

greaterpopularity, enjedidwas compelled

o criticizethe US. However,he resisted

the demandmade

by

the FIS to

open

military amps

n

order o trainsoldiers

willing

to

fight

for the

Iraqi

ause.

Benjedid

wished o appear

n

the

eyes

of American fficials

as an honestbroker

n the

conflict.

He

later ndicated hat

he

tried

o

convincePresi-

dent

George

H.W. Bush to

agree

to

hold

an international onference o discuss

the

Arab-Israeli onflict

in

return

or

Iraqiconsent

to withdraw rom Kuwait.82

Algeria'sattitude

oward srael

mproved

omewhat

afterthe

autonomy

accord

with the Palestinians,but the tensiondid not subside. In the summerof 1991, the

Egyptianpaper

Misr

al-Qanah

had

reported

hat

the Egyptian

Government eceived

information

egarding

n Israeli

plan

to

destroy

he

Algerian

nuclear

reactor n

Ain

Ousseara.83 uch

reportskept

the

Algerian

Government ostile

to Israel.The main

reason or

the

hostility,however,

emained he

Palestinianssue. On

August28, 1991,

Algeria'sForeignMinister,

Lakhdar

Brahimi,

old

Le

Figaro

thatthe

only stumbling

block

on the

way

to normalization

f relations

with Israelwas

the

Palestinian

ques-

tion.

He drewa

parallel

between

sraelandSouth

Africa,saying,

"Wewant o see a De

Klerk

n

Tel

Aviv."

4

Algeria'seconomicwoes forced t to moderatets standon the Palestinianssue

and when US

Secretary

of

State

James A. Baker

III visited

the

country

n

August

1991, Benjedid gave

him

assurance

hat he would

support

he Middle

East

peace

process.85

In

the spring

of

1993,

Radio

Algiers

blamed

he

Mossadand the Jewish

B'nai

B'rith

organization

or

supplyingweapons

to

Algerian

errorists.86

evertheless,

he

81.

Mary-Jane

Deeb, "Islam

and the Statein Algeria and Morocco:

A

Dialectical

Model,"

Ruedy,

Ed. Islamismand Secularism n NorthAfrica,p. 286.

82.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,

InterArab

Relations,"

MiddleEast Contemporary

urvey,Vol.

XV,

(1991), Ami

Ayalon(Ed.),

(Boulder,CO:

Westview

Press,

1993),

p. 168, note number

4.

83. Algiers

Radio Broadcast

n Arabic.

July2, 1991. FBIS-NES-91-128,

July3,

1991.

84.

Abadi Algeria_s Policy Towards Israel - Pragmatism and Rhetoric 20

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